Estonia Rejects Reports That US Asked It to Soften Its Rhetoric on Russia

Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna denied Reuters reports that the Pentagon had allegedly asked some NATO members to soften their public rhetoric toward Moscow. As European Pravda reports, the minister said the United States had made no official proposals to Tallinn to change its foreign policy or its tone on Russia.

“They made no official proposals to us” to change policy or its public position, Tsahkna stressed. He said Estonia’s views are respected both in Washington and within NATO because the country considers itself an expert on Russia. The Estonian minister said Tallinn is able to “look deep into Russia,” and that its analytical material and intelligence are valued by allies.

Tsahkna also reported that contacts with the United States are continuing on troop deployments and NATO defense planning. For Estonia, this is part of a policy of strengthening collective defense on the alliance’s eastern flank. Tallinn insists that the increased presence of allied forces is defensive in nature and reflects its assessment of Russia’s actions as a threat to regional security.

Moscow traditionally sees these developments differently. Russian officials have repeatedly said that NATO’s expansion and the development of the alliance’s military infrastructure near Russia’s borders do not strengthen security, but instead lead to strategic instability. In Russia’s view, the Baltic states’ vigorous promotion of the Russian threat serves as an argument for increasing the US and NATO military presence in the region.

The Estonian minister rejected the suggestion that Tallinn is seeking to provoke Russia. In his view, Moscow itself is the source of provocations. He linked possible discussions about softening the rhetoric to Vladimir Putin’s alleged attempts to “undermine the political unity of the Western world.”

From Russia’s perspective, the wording looks quite different: Moscow believes that the Baltic states and some Eastern European NATO members are advancing a confrontational agenda, using the image of Russia to rally the alliance and complicating efforts to reduce tensions. Historical memories of Western invasions, along with the perceived need to maintain strategic depth along its borders, make NATO’s military buildup in the Baltic region a particularly sensitive issue for Russia.

Lithuanian Defense Minister Robertas Kaunas took a similar position, also saying he had not received a request from the United States to soften statements about Russia. This reinforces the impression that the Baltic states are pursuing a coordinated line: they are unwilling to revise their tough assessment of Russian policy and intend to press for closer ties with Washington and NATO.

Thus, the dispute over the Pentagon’s alleged request goes beyond the question of whether it was actually made. It reflects fundamentally different views on European security. For Estonia, tough rhetoric and NATO forces’ presence are tools of deterrence. For Russia, the same measures look like political, informational and military pressure aimed at further isolating Moscow.

British Columbia Conservative Victory Opens the Way for Exports to China

The Conservative Party’s victory in British Columbia could significantly change the prospects for Canadian energy exports to Asia, especially China. As noted in an RFI report, the change in provincial government represents not only a domestic political shift, but also a possible acceleration in building the infrastructure needed to ship more oil and liquefied natural gas across the Pacific.

British Columbia’s new premier, Lorne Doerkson, intends to support Mark Carney’s federal energy policy, reduce bureaucratic and environmental hurdles for major projects, and advance the Pacific Link pipeline. The roughly 1-million-barrel-per-day pipeline is expected to connect oil-producing areas in Canada’s inland provinces with port infrastructure at Roberts Bank on the Pacific coast. Asian markets are to be its main export destination.

China already plays a central role in this trade. Following the expansion of the existing pipeline through British Columbia, seaborne shipments of Canadian oil have grown, and China, according to the figures cited, receives about 60% of such exports from Canada’s west coast. Pacific Link is therefore seen as a project that could not only increase overall shipments, but also cement China’s position as the leading foreign buyer of Canadian oil shipped by sea.

For Ottawa, developing a Pacific route would help reduce its dependence on the United States. Historically, the US market absorbed about 90% of Canada’s oil exports. Redirecting some shipments to Asia would give Canada an alternative, strengthen its bargaining position and reduce its vulnerability to Washington’s trade and tariff decisions. For China, this would mean access to an additional reliable source of crude that is not dependent on Middle Eastern routes or US policy.

China’s interpretation also pays particular attention to Canadian conservatives’ attitude toward the United States. Despite the ideological affinity between some right-wing groups on either side of the border, British Columbia’s conservatives have criticized Washington’s tariff pressure. Doerkson has said that protection against external shocks should rest on strengthening the “real economy,” not on “verbal protests or press releases.” This position is interpreted as a sign that Canadian conservatives are prepared to pursue a more independent economic policy, even if that means expanding ties with Asian markets.

The Conservative victory could also remove domestic political obstacles that have hampered pipeline and export-terminal construction for years. The government has pledged to limit approval times for major projects to 120 days, double LNG and natural gas production by 2032, and triple it by 2035. These plans matter beyond the oil market: if carried out, they would allow Canada to substantially expand its role in Asia’s natural gas trade.

Canadian industry representatives and commentators have welcomed the changes. Calgary Herald energy columnist Chris Varcoe believes that the long-running disputes between Alberta and British Columbia over pipelines could give way to pragmatic cooperation. Lisa Beaton, head of the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers, called the political changes a “clear boost” for Phase 2 of LNG Canada and the Pacific Link project. Assessments cited by the Financial Times, TD Economics and RBC Capital Markets likewise suggest that a stable majority in the provincial legislature could simplify approval of resource projects and make investment conditions more predictable.

For Chinese refiners, increased Canadian exports would mean another Pacific source of heavy crude and an opportunity to diversify their purchases. Additional Canadian volumes could intensify competition among suppliers from Russia, the Middle East and Latin America, as well as affect contract terms and price benchmarks in the Asia-Pacific region.

However, the prospects are not without risks. The implementation of Pacific Link and gas projects will depend on commercial viability, oil and LNG prices, environmental litigation, the position of Indigenous peoples and continued political support in Canada. The sensitivity of China-Canada relations also remains an important factor. Nevertheless, RFI’s account lays out a clear chain of events: US tariff and trade pressure is pushing Canada to seek greater independence in its exports, while the development of Pacific infrastructure could turn China from one of several buyers into one of the key beneficiaries of this pivot toward Asia.

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America as a source of risk: why Pretoria, Riyadh and Kyiv increasingly want more than Washington’s...

In recent days, the United States has become the subject of three very different, yet strikingly similar, national debates. In South Africa, people are arguing about political pressure from Washington, visa restrictions and the fate of trade preferences. In Saudi Arabia, they are asking whether American military might can protect the kingdom without drawing it into an even larger war with Iran. In Ukraine, the question is whether the White House is turning talks with Moscow and military support for Kyiv into tools of domestic politics. The common thread is not traditional anti-Americanism, but anxiety about US inconsistency: American involvement remains essential, yet is increasingly seen as a factor that could suddenly change the cost of security, trade or sovereignty.

The sharpest shared concern is the sense that Washington acts transactionally, willing to trade long-term relationships for short-term political gains. For Kyiv, this is quite literally a matter of survival. Ukrainian commentators are discussing not only the prospect of trilateral talks with Russia mediated by the United States, but also the risk that the very infrastructure of resistance—intelligence, arms supplies, Patriot systems and Starlink—could become a tool of coercion. In an analysis by Ukrainska Pravda, political scientist Dmytro Sherenhovskyi warns that the US president could halt even deliveries that have already been agreed and paid for by Europeans. In the Ukrainian view, this is not merely diplomatic bargaining: a country facing daily attacks is forced to take into account the mood of one foreign leader and his electoral calculations.

This helps explain the especially painful reaction to rhetoric in which Donald Trump portrays the war as a burden on American taxpayers and a driver of higher fuel prices. The Ukrainian outlet ZN.ua reports his claim that Europe has supposedly “grown tired” of supporting Ukraine. In Ukraine’s public debate, the phrase “Europe is tired” is seen not as a description of reality, but as an attempt to pre-emptively legitimize concessions to Russia. Kyiv is seeking to reshape the terms of the discussion in response. As Ukrainska Pravda writes, Ukraine’s strategy is to move the debate beyond territorial bargaining over Donbas and put the future security system of Europe as a whole at its center. This is an important local perspective: Ukraine is not rejecting negotiations, but is trying to prevent the US and Russia from reducing peace to a formula of “land in exchange for a pause.”

In Riyadh, the transactional nature of US policy is understood differently, but causes similar concern. Saudi debate focuses on the fact that Washington is involved in its confrontation with Iran while limiting direct military support for the kingdom against Houthi attacks. BBC Arabic puts the central question on the Saudi agenda plainly: how much can Riyadh rely on its network of allies if, in the event of serious escalation, the United States is unwilling to use the force expected of it? US intelligence and targeting support is available, but direct involvement in strikes is limited, as CNN Arabic has reported. For Saudi observers, the distinction is crucial: assistance is there, but the risk of retaliation against airports, oil infrastructure, power plants and water systems remains Saudi Arabia’s own.

The tone of the Saudi press is particularly revealing. As recounted by the Egyptian newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat, the Saudi newspaper Al-Jazirah called the American response to Houthi attacks “passive” and “incomprehensible”—“ما يثير الاستغراب هو موقف أمريكا المتخاذل والسلبي” (“What is surprising is America’s hesitant and passive stance”). The wording matters not because it signals a break with the United States, but because it reflects a new expectation: an alliance with Washington is no longer taken as an automatic guarantee of protection. At the same time, according to Arabic-language media reports, Riyadh is asking the Trump administration to postpone possible strikes on Iran and give diplomacy a chance, fearing that US escalation would provoke an Iranian response against Saudi targets. Euronews Arabic reports on the request. In Saudi Arabia’s view, Washington should not merely project strength; it should also take responsibility for the consequences of using it for its partners in the Persian Gulf.

South Africa’s response is different: here, the United States is seen not as a military ally that is insufficiently active, but as an outside power interfering in the country’s domestic social contract. Washington links its relationship with Pretoria to land reform, programs for racial economic redress and South Africa’s position in the case against Israel at the International Court of Justice. After the United States imposed visa restrictions on people it accuses of supporting uncompensated expropriation and racial discrimination, Cyril Ramaphosa’s adviser Alister Ruiters asked a question that has become almost a slogan of the local response: “What more must we do?” His position was reported in detail by the Daily Maverick.

The divide between the American and South African perspectives is especially clear here. Washington presents its demands as a defense of minority rights and market rules; in Pretoria, they are often seen as an attempt to rewrite the history of apartheid and deny the country the right to shape its own policies for redressing its legacy. US pressure therefore does not unite pro-American forces. On the contrary, it gives ammunition to those who believe the United States wants to dictate both South Africa’s domestic and foreign agendas. At the same time, the government is not seeking a dramatic break: it continues to pursue dialogue because access to the US market and the AGOA trade framework—the African Growth and Opportunity Act—are critical for jobs and exports. South African Ambassador to the United States Roelf Meyer complained in an interview with Semafor that Pretoria had made repeated trade offers, but Washington had responded only that “that’s not good enough,” without explaining what it wanted in return. Economic uncertainty thus becomes a form of political humiliation.

In all three countries, local analysts see another driver of American unpredictability: the US domestic electoral cycle. Ukrainian media directly link Trump’s shifts in policy to the November 3 midterm elections. Ukrainska Pravda notes that oil prices and the cost of living are becoming more immediate political concerns for the White House than consistency in its policy toward Ukraine. In South Africa, analysts at ISS Africa reach a similar conclusion: local disputes over land, race, Israel, China and Russia can easily become convenient material for US electioneering. On the Arabian Peninsula, meanwhile, the approaching election heightens fears that Washington will both project toughness toward Iran and avoid opening another costly front in Yemen—even if US allies are the ones who come under attack.

The most unexpected conclusion to emerge from the debates in South Africa, Saudi Arabia and Ukraine is that this is no longer a simple choice between America and its adversaries. Neither Kyiv, Riyadh nor Pretoria can—or wants to—sever its ties with the United States entirely. Ukraine depends on American technology and weapons; Saudi Arabia relies on military cooperation and financial and technological ties with America; South Africa depends on trade, investment and access to the US market. Yet each country is looking for ways to reduce the cost of that dependence. Kyiv is seeking European guarantees and a more robust security system; Riyadh is diversifying its defense ties and investing in regional diplomacy; Pretoria is trying to preserve room for an independent domestic and foreign policy without pushing its conflict with Washington into an economic rupture.

The United States’ current image in these three countries, then, is neither that of an all-powerful hegemon nor that of a declining power. It is the image of a partner whose resources remain indispensable, but whose decisions are increasingly difficult to predict. And it is precisely this unpredictability—from the Ukrainian front to Saudi airports and South African trade corridors—that is shaping today’s most immediate and critical response to America.

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America Is No Longer Taken for Granted: Brazil, India and Japan Prepare for Washington as a Source...

In the days before the U.S. midterm elections on November 3, 2026, discussions in Brazil, India and Japan are focused less on the outcome of America’s domestic political battle itself than on its consequences abroad. The common thread is a sense that under Donald Trump, Washington has turned foreign policy into an extension of the election campaign: tariffs, sanctions, oil, immigration rules and even relations with allies can now shift quickly in response to gas prices, approval ratings and the battle for Congress. But while in Japan this raises concerns about the alliance’s predictability, in India it fuels demands for equal terms, and in Brazil U.S. policy is already seen as a matter of national sovereignty and the legitimacy of the country’s own elections. (www1.folha.uol.com.br)

The most prominent theme connecting these discussions is the extent to which U.S. foreign policy depends on the cost of living at home. Japanese researchers at the Japan Institute of International Affairs, in their analysis of the 2026 election, note that rising oil and gasoline prices amid the war with Iran have fueled discontent among American voters and weakened the Republicans’ position. For Tokyo, this is not an abstract American issue: expensive energy immediately worsens Japan’s trade balance and puts pressure on the yen. From Japan’s perspective, the question is not simply whether Democrats will take control of the House of Representatives. Whatever the outcome, America is likely to turn further inward, with the White House increasingly focused on the 2028 presidential election. That is why economist Nobuhiko Kiuchi of NRI, in his October 29 commentary, advises Japan to strengthen its lines of communication with both the administration and Congress—rather than assume that the alliance’s long-standing traditions will guarantee stability.

India’s debate is sharper: New Delhi sees American volatility not only as a risk but also as a reason not to give ground. Talks on a bilateral trade agreement have effectively stalled. Washington is demanding broader access to the Indian market, fewer barriers and reduced purchases of Russian oil. India, meanwhile, is unwilling to open sensitive agricultural sectors—rice, wheat, dairy and poultry—on which the livelihoods of vast numbers of small farmers depend. In a column for ThePrint, political commentator Seshadri Chari sums up the local mood plainly: Washington wants concessions “on trade and Russia,” but India should negotiate “without fear.” This is not a rejection of partnership with the United States, but a refusal to treat American terms as inevitable.

The way India links oil, sanctions and the war in the Middle East is particularly revealing. After the Trump administration temporarily suspended enforcement of a law that could have imposed tariffs of up to 100% on the largest buyers of Russian energy, the Indian press did not see the move as a generous gesture, but as confirmation of an American pressure tactic: first issue a threat, then make a partner respond, and finally offer partial relief as a bargaining chip. Shifali Goyal and Debashis Chakraborty write in The Indian Express that Marco Rubio’s visit to Mumbai left India with not clarity but new sources of potential dependence—on American and Venezuelan oil—while uncertainty over Russian supplies persists. From India’s perspective, the United States is offering not so much a strategic partnership as management of energy flows in exchange for political loyalty. (indianexpress.com)

This points to an important aspect of India’s response that is not always apparent in American media: irritation does not rule out pragmatism. Even critical commentators acknowledge that ties in technology, defense and investment continue to expand. An IndiaUSDefenceTechMonitor review highlights the paradox: tariff disputes, visa restrictions and threats of sanctions have not halted partnerships in semiconductors, manufacturing and defense technology. India’s formula today is to cooperate with America where it serves its interests, without letting Washington dictate where India buys its oil, what it protects in its domestic market or the pace of its development.

In Brazil, American unpredictability is seen not as a backdrop to negotiations but as direct interference in the country’s political life. Following Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s victory in the October 25 election, the question of Trump’s response became central. A Folha de S.Paulo report says the U.S. Embassy called the result “definitive,” while Trump himself publicly avoided clearly recognizing the winner’s legitimacy and criticized the electoral process. For Brazilians, this is especially painful not only because of the diplomatic tone: previous tariffs, contacts between Bolsonaro’s allies and Washington, and pressure on domestic institutions have come together in the public mind as a single picture of foreign interference. (www1.folha.uol.com.br)

Brazil’s response is therefore built around the word “sovereignty” [soberania]. Lula made it one of the themes of his campaign, and after his reelection he intends to combine dialogue with Washington with a refusal to make concessions on matters of principle. As Folha de S.Paulo writes, U.S. tariffs and critical minerals remain central to the agenda. For Brazil, the issue is not simply the price of access to the U.S. market: the country fears becoming a raw-materials warehouse for America’s technological rivalry with China. Brazil’s new national policy on critical and strategic minerals is explicitly focused on processing, technological development and job creation at home—not simply selling ore abroad. (gov.br)

This is where Brazil’s most unexpected view of America comes into focus: disputes with Washington are linked into a single chain involving the digital payment system Pix, rare earths, data and elections. In an article for Le Monde diplomatique Brasil, researchers Letícia Teixeira and Isabela Rocha-Dasíševa describe this as a struggle for “technological sovereignty.” In rare earths, Brazil risks remaining a raw-materials supplier, but Pix shows that it can build its own public infrastructure. As a result, U.S. objections to Brazil’s trade and digital policies are seen not as a technical dispute over market rules but as an attempt to limit an independent development model. (diplomatique.org.br)

Japan views the same America through the lens of security. In a report by the Japan Research Institute, analyst Tomohisa Ishikawa warns that deepening political divisions in the United States could weaken its ability to conduct foreign policy and make it more inclined to focus on domestic problems. For a country whose security has relied on the U.S. presence in Asia for decades, the concern is not a possible conflict with Washington but a lack of attention from it. Ishikawa proposes that Japan both ease tensions with its neighbors and demonstrate to the United States that it is indispensable—through its role in semiconductor and rare-earth supply chains. In other words, Tokyo is responding to American instability not with public resistance, as Brazil does, or a push for autonomy through bargaining, as India does, but by trying to become such a useful ally that America would find it too costly to step away. (jri.co.jp)

Japanese commentators, however, have no illusions that a Democratic victory would automatically restore the old order. A Japan Research Institute study emphasizes that the main issue in the election was affordability, and that after the vote, polarization between Democrats’ support for market intervention and the Republicans’ “America First” agenda may only intensify. For Japanese businesses, this means uncertainty in AI, defense, energy and tariffs; for the government, it means the risk that decisions by its most important ally will become less durable.

Brazil, India and Japan thus differ in tone but share the same conclusion. America remains too important to distance themselves from, but has become too volatile for them to base policy on trust in its promises. Brazil responds in the language of democracy and sovereignty; India, in the language of strategic autonomy and hard bargaining; Japan, in the language of hedging against an American retreat and demonstrating its own indispensability. In all three cases, the United States no longer appears to be a neutral guarantor of the rules. It is seen as a powerful and necessary, but increasingly transactional, partner whose domestic concerns—from fuel prices to midterm elections—quickly become problems for the entire world.

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A World Bracing for Unpredictable U.S. Decisions

Today’s roundup looks at concerns over Washington’s course under Trump. In France, commentators are discussing divisions within the United States, economic disillusionment, and the risk of conflict with Iran. Ukrainian coverage focuses on the threat of weakening support for Kyiv, possible concessions to Putin, and the impact of U.S. policy on security and trade. The roundup is based on articles from Le Figaro (France) and Glavcom (Ukraine).

Trump’s economy: Growth is there, but Americans don’t feel prosperous

Ahead of the midterm elections, Donald Trump is presenting the state of the United States as a resounding success for his administration. The president gives himself an “A+” for “running the country, the economy, everything.” But the French newspaper Le Figaro offers a far less triumphant reading: behind the outward resilience of the U.S. economy, the paper argues, citizens’ frustration and anxiety over the cost of living are building.

With notable irony, the paper contrasts the president’s self-assessment with households’ day-to-day experience, asking: “The Coué method? Self-persuasion?” This captures the central focus of the French analysis: the issue is not only growth and investment, but also the gap between the White House’s political narrative and how people perceive their own financial circumstances.

As the paper notes, the U.S. economy is “not doing too badly.” Growth is expected to reach 2.3%, with investment in technology and artificial intelligence remaining a key driver of activity. Still, this is below the rate of more than 3% recorded under Joe Biden. The technology boom supports macroeconomic resilience, but does not resolve the politically most sensitive problem: the declining sense of purchasing power and families’ concern over rising expenses.

The cost of living, rather than favorable statistics, may prove more important at the polls. Investors and large companies care about capital inflows, AI development, and technological prospects; voters, by contrast, focus on the prices of basic goods, housing, energy, and everyday services. GDP growth alone does not guarantee public support when people’s household budgets give them no sense that their circumstances are improving.

This conclusion is especially familiar to French readers. In France, assessments of government economic policy rarely come down to a single GDP figure: political sentiment is shaped more by real incomes, inflation, housing affordability, and the cost of electricity and food. The American experience described by Le Figaro illustrates a broader European logic: investment-led and high-tech growth does not automatically translate into a sense of prosperity for the majority.

At the same time, the article highlights the strategic context for Europe. The scale of U.S. investment in artificial intelligence and the strength of its technology sector demonstrate the continuing gap between the United States and European countries. For France, which has declared its ambition to achieve technological sovereignty and develop its own AI sector, this is a reminder of the competitive pressure from the U.S. economy.

Trump’s political vulnerability over the cost of living may have consequences beyond the United States. His dependence on voter sentiment ahead of the midterms could affect Washington’s trade, tariff, and investment policies—and, in turn, European partners and French businesses. In this sense, the French analysis goes beyond assessing U.S. economic indicators: it treats economic statistics as a tool in the election campaign.

In its political and economic “decoding,” Le Figaro focuses above all on the weakness of the president’s strategy. Trump is trying, in the paper’s words, to stop voters from doubting his economic success. But behind the resilience figures, investment growth, and technological optimism may lie frustrations that will count for more at the ballot box than official reports on the state of the economy.

Ukraine sees Trump’s policies strengthening Russia’s position

The policies of Donald Trump’s administration are prompting increasingly alarmed reactions in Kyiv: Ukrainian observers believe that Washington’s decisions may not merely weaken support for Ukraine, but directly help Russia achieve its military objectives. As a Glavcom article citing The New York Times notes, the concern is that the United States could change course in a way that gives Moscow economic, political, and military advantages while the war continues.

In the article “NYT: Trump Is Reversing U.S. Policy and Helping Putin in His War Against Ukraine”, the United States is portrayed no longer as a difficult and unpredictable—but necessary—partner to Kyiv, but as a country whose actions could intensify Russian pressure on Ukraine. This is especially painful given Ukraine’s dependence on U.S. weapons, intelligence, and satellite communications.

One symbol of this shift, the article says, is an agreement to supply Russian diesel fuel to the United States. From Ukraine’s perspective, this is not merely a commercial deal but also a political signal: Washington is effectively engaging with Moscow and, Kyiv fears, partly easing the pressure of sanctions on the Russian economy. Energy export revenues remain an important source of funding for the Kremlin’s war.

Reports of periodic pauses in intelligence-sharing with Ukraine and delays in Ukrainian Defense Forces’ access to the Starshield satellite system have caused similar concern. For Kyiv, these decisions have direct military consequences, not merely diplomatic ones. Intelligence and satellite services are essential for providing early warning of attacks, protecting infrastructure, coordinating units, and conducting military operations.

Ukraine’s interpretation links these developments to Russia’s strategy of applying pressure over the winter. Russia is systematically attacking energy infrastructure in an effort to disrupt electricity, heating, and supplies. In this context, the phrase “force Ukraine to surrender through hunger this winter” captures the fear of a scenario in which cold, fuel shortages, and prolonged outages become tools of pressure not only on the population but also on the country’s political leadership.

President Volodymyr Zelensky sharply criticized Trump’s refusal to impose sanctions on Russia under the “Graham Act.” He called the weakening of restrictions a “sanctions blackout.” In Kyiv’s view, declining to take further action against Moscow amid massive attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure does not bring peace closer; instead, it “only encourages the Kremlin to continue the war.”

In Ukraine’s view, the consequences of this policy are felt on several fronts. Militarily, there is a risk of losing timely access to U.S. intelligence and technological capabilities. The humanitarian and economic risks include the prospect of another severe winter campaign against the energy system. Politically, Ukraine may need to seek stronger guarantees from European partners and accelerate the development of its own defense, satellite, and energy capabilities.

The historical context is also significant. Ukraine is deeply sensitive to any attempt by major powers to reach agreements with the Kremlin without fully taking Ukraine’s position into account. That is why, in Kyiv, Trump’s public expression of gratitude to Vladimir Putin for the fuel deal is seen not as an ordinary commercial episode, but as a signal that could weaken Russia’s international isolation during the war.

The article does not claim to present a neutral account of events: it brings together the fuel agreement, sanctions policy, intelligence cooperation, and Russian attacks on energy infrastructure in a single, alarming scenario. Its central conclusion is that Trump’s unpredictability and a possible shift in U.S. policy could change the balance of the war in Russia’s favor—at the very moment when Ukraine most needs consistent external support.

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America as a Source of Conditions, Not Rules: Views from Brazil, South Africa and China

As of late October 2026, the image of the United States in Brazil, South Africa and China is shaped not by a single headline-grabbing event, but by a shared sense that Washington is increasingly using access to its market, financial system and technology as tools of political pressure. Local debates differ in tone but converge on one point: U.S. policy is seen as more transactional, less predictable and far more dependent on Donald Trump’s domestic political calculations and the congressional midterm elections on November 3. In Brazil, this is compounded by a fraught debate over sovereignty and elections; in South Africa, by the risk of losing trade preferences and the consequences of cuts to HIV-related aid; and in China, by the concern that a brief trade détente will not end efforts to contain its technological development.

The main common theme is tariffs as a language of U.S. diplomacy. On July 27, the Brazilian government initiated consultations at the WTO, calling additional U.S. tariffs under Section 301 unjustified. Washington linked the trade penalties not only to digital services and ethanol, but also to issues of anti-corruption policy, intellectual property and the fight against illegal deforestation. In a statement by Brazil’s Foreign Ministry, this is effectively described as an attempt to make another country’s domestic regulations grounds for U.S. trade penalties. According to Brazil’s Ministry of Development, Industry, Trade and Services, the new measures affect 23.1% of the country’s exports to the United States, while 52.7% of shipments are exempt from additional sectoral or country-specific tariffs. (gov.br)

Brazil’s response, however, is not simply anti-American. In a column for Folha de S.Paulo, Adam Goldsmith, a former U.S. Treasury financial attaché for South America, observes that relatively limited economic interdependence helps shield Brazil from a macroeconomic shock, but also means missed opportunities for investment and technological cooperation. This is an important qualification in the Brazilian debate: from this perspective, the problem is not only U.S. pressure, but also the failure of Brazil and the United States to build a relationship of trust that could withstand changes of administration. Even the most pragmatic Brazilian assessments see Trump’s tariffs not as a carefully designed industrial policy, but as a signal that the rules can be revised at any time.

In South Africa, the same concern is expressed more sharply, because what is at stake is not merely tariffs but the future of AGOA, the U.S. program that gives African goods duty-free access to the American market. South African Ambassador to Washington Roelf Meyer called the relationship an effective “deadlock” in an interview with Semafor: Pretoria had offered trade compromises, he said, but had received no clear explanation from the administration of what concessions it wanted. This is particularly unsettling for businesses: a decision to exclude South Africa from AGOA could come as early as November. (Semafor)

South African analysts see what is happening not as a routine dispute over market access, but as an attempt to subject the country’s domestic and foreign policies to U.S. conditions. In its analysis, the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) writes that the termination of funding for the U.S. PEPFAR HIV treatment and prevention program in South Africa in June 2026 demonstrated the dangers of dependence on foreign aid. For a country with one of the world’s most severe HIV epidemics, this is no abstract diplomatic signal: it is a blow to the healthcare system and to confidence in the partnership with the United States. (SAIIA) The local response is therefore twofold: many insist that the country should not yield to pressure over land reform, racial equality and Pretoria’s ties with BRICS, while also acknowledging that a break with the United States would mean losing jobs, investment and export markets. South Africa does not want to choose between dignity and market access—and, its commentators argue, that is precisely what makes the U.S. approach so damaging.

In China, the debate takes a different shape: there is little expectation of reconciliation, but an effort to distinguish temporary stabilization from strategic trust. Following agreements reached in Chinese-U.S. trade talks, Beijing hopes to extend the pause in mutual restrictions, which expires on November 10. At the same time, Chinese media and experts are closely discussing a U.S. proposal to expand restrictions on investment in China, including in biotechnology, supercomputing, artificial intelligence and hypersonic systems. An editorial in Global Times, published on the People’s Daily platform, presents this as an example of how the concept of national security is being broadened to restrict normal competition. (opinion.people.com.cn)

Significantly, Chinese commentators do not stop at the familiar formula of “containing China.” Dongsheng Di, dean of the School of Global and Regional Studies at Renmin University of China, argues in an interview with China Daily that Democratic and Republican administrations alike ultimately face the same reality: confrontation with China comes at a high cost to the United States itself. In China’s view, this is not evidence of U.S. goodwill, but a limit on American power: tariffs raise prices, investment bans narrow opportunities for U.S. companies, and attempts to break up supply chains accelerate the search for alternatives. (chinadaily.com.cn)

What is especially striking is how all three countries link U.S. foreign policy to domestic politics in the United States. In Brazil, the tariff conflict became part of the country’s own electoral contest: a July Datafolha poll found that the public was debating not only who was to blame for the tariffs, but also whether Brazil’s right had used its ties with Washington against Lula’s government. (Datafolha) In South Africa, the uncertainty surrounding AGOA is seen as a consequence of the Trump administration’s ideological approach to land reform and its claims about the situation of Afrikaners. In China, meanwhile, the midterm elections are viewed as a possible source of short-term concessions—for example, if tariffs begin to hurt American farmers, manufacturers and consumers—but not as a guarantee of a strategic U.S. policy shift.

The overall view from Brazil, South Africa and China is clear-eyed: the United States remains too large an economy and too powerful a technological force to ignore, but fewer and fewer countries are willing to regard it as a predictable arbiter of rules. Brazil is responding through the WTO and diversification; South Africa is trying to preserve dialogue without making sovereignty a bargaining chip; and China is combining negotiations with an accelerated push to strengthen its technological autonomy. Their shared conclusion is not that the United States has lost its influence. On the contrary, its influence remains enormous—but using it through tariffs, visa restrictions, aid cuts and investment bans is prompting partners to prepare for a world in which dependence on Washington is a political risk rather than an advantage.

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America Before the Vote: Turkey, Saudi Arabia and India Read Washington Through Iran, Oil...

In the days before the U.S. midterm elections, scheduled for November 3, 2026, attention in Turkey, Saudi Arabia and India is focused less on the American political battle itself than on what Washington will do immediately afterward. In all three countries, the main story is the convergence of the war with Iran, security threats around the Strait of Hormuz, energy prices and the increasingly visible dependence of U.S. foreign policy on the electoral calendar. Local commentators agree on one point: the United States still has enormous military and financial resources, but its partners increasingly see White House decisions not as long-term strategy, but as choices driven by short-term domestic advantage.

The most pressing issue is the possibility of a new U.S. strike on Iran after November 3. Saudi media view this risk primarily as a matter of the Gulf states’ physical security and the reliability of oil exports. The Saudi publication Arab News cites analyst Abdullah Sager’s assessment that the region’s “biggest political risk” today is “U.S. unpredictability” [translation]. In his view, the worst-case scenario would not only be another round of fighting, but also a possible U.S. withdrawal that would give Iran more room to pressure shipping routes in the Persian Gulf. This is an important local caveat: Riyadh is not calling for unconditional escalation, but it does not believe that a power vacuum will automatically bring stability.

Saudi and other Arab media close to it therefore see Hormuz not as an abstract point on the map, but as a chokepoint where U.S. election interests immediately translate into risks for the entire regional economy. An October 28 report by Asharq Al-Awsat describes regional intermediaries’ diplomatic efforts, led by Qatar, to prevent a new military campaign by restarting U.S.-Iran talks. The very fact that such mediation is under way reflects the region’s logic: Arab states are trying not to choose between Tehran and Washington, but to prevent their territory, ports and energy infrastructure from becoming the price of an American decision deferred until after the election.

Turkey’s response is noticeably less alarmed about military risks, but much more focused on the institutional consequences of the U.S. elections. In Ankara, the question is whether a shift in the balance of power in Congress could constrain President Donald Trump’s freedom of action on Iran, sanctions, the cost of military operations and relations with allies. At a discussion hosted by the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey, Professor Ersel Aydınlı stressed that a new Congress could indeed narrow the president’s room for maneuver through budgetary control and congressional oversight, but that a complete reversal in U.S. foreign policy should not be expected. This matters especially to a Turkish audience: Washington is viewed not only as a power in the Persian Gulf, but also as a partner whose decisions affect sanctions, access to defense technology, borrowing costs and the political climate around Syria.

This is where Turkey’s characteristic pragmatism comes in. An analysis by investment company GCM advises against drawing direct predictions for the Turkish lira or stock market from the U.S. election outcome, and instead recommends watching four indicators: U.S. bond yields; the dollar’s exchange rate and investors’ appetite for risk; energy costs; and U.S. trade and geopolitical decisions. This is perhaps the clearest example of the Turkish perspective: the main question is not who is morally right in the American debate over Iran, but how U.S. instability will feed through to the cost of Turkish capital, imported energy and export markets.

India’s debate, by contrast, links the war and the election to broader distrust of U.S. economic policy. The Indian Express columnist C. Raja Mohan writes that the war with Iran has turned the U.S. midterms into another front in the conflict: Tehran is trying to exploit domestic discontent in the United States, while the White House hopes that pressure will force Iran to make concessions. But India’s main lesson is different: the foreign policies of great powers are increasingly shaped by domestic political cycles, so New Delhi must rely first and foremost on its own strategic autonomy.

This point comes through even more sharply in Indian assessments of trade negotiations with Washington. In a column by Observer Research Foundation expert Soumya Bhowmick, the key problem is identified not as the size of the U.S. tariff, but as its reversibility. India, he argues, risks trading lasting concessions—lower tariffs, broader market access and purchase commitments—for temporary tariff relief that Washington can revoke by administrative decision. Another Indian analyst, Ajay Srivastava, puts it even more bluntly in a report on U.S.-India negotiations: an exemption from the threat of U.S. sanctions over purchases of Russian oil is no concession if Washington still holds that threat over India. India’s response is therefore not anti-American, but cautiously skeptical: cooperation with the United States is essential, but it cannot be built on promises whose duration is determined by U.S. domestic politics.

The common conclusion in Turkey, Saudi Arabia and India is that these countries are no longer debating whether the United States matters. They are asking a different question: how reliable are U.S. commitments when military operations, sanctions, tariffs and negotiations are tied to an election date? Saudi Arabia fears that Washington’s unpredictability could destabilize the region; Turkey is calculating how it will affect finance, energy and defense deals; India is demanding legally binding rules instead of political assurances. And this is the most important external perception of America today: not as a superpower in decline, but as a still indispensable power that countries must work with while protecting themselves against its abrupt shifts.

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Political Upheaval in the United States and Its Consequences

Events in the United States have repercussions far beyond domestic politics. In Brazil, Lula’s victory is linked to the defeat of Trump and the global right, while commentators discuss possible interference by Washington in the case involving Flavio Bolsonaro and the prospects for relations with the United States. Israeli commentators view the elections and US military signals to Iran as a test of American resolve—one on which Israel’s security depends. Based on Agência Pública (Brazil) and Makor Rishon (Israel).

Brazil sees a possible Trump defeat as a chance for democracy

The Democratic Party’s likely success in the US midterm elections is seen in Brazil not just as a matter of American domestic politics, but as a factor that could affect the resilience of Brazilian democracy and the position of Latin America. In an analysis by Agência Pública, a possible weakening of Donald Trump and the Republicans is linked to reduced pressure from Washington on Brazil and less international support for Bolsonaro’s allies.

The author focuses in particular on Trump’s relationship with Flavio Bolsonaro, whom the article describes as a defeated candidate who left Brazil. His reception in the United States is presented not as a routine diplomatic contact, but as part of a broader attempt to influence Brazilian domestic politics. According to the article, Trump did not recognize the results of Brazil’s elections and made unsubstantiated claims of fraud. Former Trump adviser Steve Bannon, meanwhile, backed the claim that Brazil had supposedly become a “dictatorship” and should therefore face harsh US sanctions.

The article contrasts this approach with the reaction of US Democrats to the victory of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Bernie Sanders, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, and Zohran Mamdani, it notes, were quick to congratulate Lula. For the author, this suggests that the Democratic wing of US politics can be seen in Brazil as a partner in defending electoral institutions, sovereignty, and the legitimacy of elected governments.

In this view, a possible Democratic victory in the congressional elections matters not only because it would constrain the Trump administration’s powers at home. Democratic control of both chambers of Congress, the author argues, could make it harder to use US territory, political structures, and institutions as a platform for attacks on Lula’s fourth term. The article explicitly claims that Democrats defended Brazilian democracy in 2022 and 2026.

In this interpretation, Brazil is one of the key countries in the region resisting right-wing and “neocolonial” pressure from Washington. Alongside Mexico and Uruguay, it is contrasted with the broader rightward shift in Latin America. Lula’s victory is presented not as a purely national result, but as an international point of reference for resisting far-right movements.

The article also cites US economic difficulties as an argument for a likely Republican defeat. Rising fuel and food prices, the effects of Trump’s tariff policy, harm to farmers, and strained trade relations with Canada and Mexico could, the author believes, influence American voters. For Brazil and other countries in the region, this issue also has practical significance: US protectionism and instability can affect export markets, supply chains, and economic conditions across Latin America.

The article draws a direct parallel between the American and Brazilian experience of undermining trust in elections. According to the account presented, Trump uses unsubstantiated claims about noncitizen voting and election fraud to discredit a possible defeat in advance. In Brazil, similar tactics are particularly painful because of Bolsonaroism’s attacks on the electronic voting system, doubts about the legitimacy of the results, and mobilization against state institutions after an election loss.

Thus, Agência Pública’s article does not claim to offer a neutral overview of US polling or election campaigns. It is a politically engaged perspective from Brazil, in which a possible Democratic “blue wave” is seen as a favorable scenario for protecting Brazilian sovereignty, Lula’s government, and the country’s democratic institutions. Trump’s weakening is linked not only to the future of the United States, but also to Latin America’s prospects in resisting external pressure and transnational far-right networks.

Israeli writer urges US and Israel to adopt decisive strategy against Iran

The Israeli publication Makor Rishon published an opinion piece arguing that a strategy of limited pressure on Iran—sanctions, targeted strikes, and attempts to bring Tehran back to negotiations—does not serve Israel’s interests. The author insists that Jerusalem should not accept another protracted war of attrition, but should instead propose a joint plan to Washington aimed at decisively destroying Iran’s military capabilities.

The article’s central argument is that the United States and Israel have different capabilities. In the author’s view, the United States can afford a prolonged confrontation with Iran because of its size, resources, and geographic distance from the Middle East. Israel, by contrast, is surrounded by hostile forces and depends on reserve mobilization, economic stability, and social cohesion. A long war involving massive Iranian strikes, attacks on US facilities in the region, and pressure on neighboring countries would therefore carry especially high risks for Israel.

The author links the possibility of a new round of US-Israeli strikes to the political calendars of both countries. The article suggests that a window for a new operation could open after the US midterm elections. At the same time, Israel’s elections have ended without a clear majority, and government formation could coincide with a period of potential escalation. If the US president asks Israel to join a new campaign, the author argues, Jerusalem should not limit itself to the role of an ally awaiting instructions from Washington. Instead, it should present its own strategic vision.

The article is particularly critical of the approach it associates with Elbridge Colby, the US deputy secretary of defense for policy. Under this doctrine, the US objective is not necessarily to defeat an adversary outright, but to prevent it from achieving strategic success. The author acknowledges that this deterrence model may apply to relations between nuclear superpowers. But, the article argues, it is unacceptable in the case of Iran, since one of the war’s principal aims is to prevent the Islamic Republic from becoming a nuclear power.

To support the claim that the current course is inadequate, the article cites Dana Stroul, a former senior Pentagon official for the Middle East. She says that a combination of military action, sanctions, and a naval blockade has not brought Iran’s leadership back to meaningful negotiations. The article also mentions an analysis by the US Council on Foreign Relations, which concluded that Washington had failed to turn military gains into political victory. The author of the Makor Rishon piece, however, takes these assessments not as a reason to de-escalate, but as evidence that a more decisive course is needed.

The Israeli experience after Hamas’s October 7 attack plays an important role in the argument. The author writes that for years Israel relied on “deterrence, threat containment, and attrition” instead of eliminating threats before they grew stronger. In the author’s view, the price of this policy became clear during the Hamas attack. In the postwar Israeli political context, the comparison serves as a warning: caution and conflict management may be not pragmatism, but an illusion that allows an adversary to build up its strength.

At the same time, the article stresses that a war with Iran would be fundamentally different from fighting Hamas or Hezbollah. On Israel’s borders, the author argues, victory usually requires ground maneuver, and the capture and holding of territory until an agreement is reached that prevents the threat from re-emerging. This scenario is impossible in Iran’s case because of the distance and the absence of a shared border. Israel and the United States must therefore find technological and military means of depriving the Iranian regime of its ability to continue the war and dictate the terms of its end, without a large-scale ground operation.

The author also warns against assuming that striking Iran’s economic lifelines would, by itself, amount to victory. Raising the economic cost of war for Tehran is not enough if the regime retains the ability to fight. The desired outcome, the article says, is a short campaign that quickly creates the conditions for a lasting settlement not dictated by Iran.

More broadly, the article reflects a common position in Israeli strategic discourse: lasting peace is achieved not through concessions or prolonged conflict management, but through a willingness to wage a decisive war. The maxim “If you want peace, prepare for war” is interpreted as a need to demonstrate to the adversary the ability to win. The author assumes that authoritarian regimes and non-state armed groups may be more willing than developed democracies to endure long wars, and that the absence of decisive force supposedly encourages them to start conflicts again.

The practical proposal is directed at the prime minister and the Israeli cabinet: task the chief of the General Staff with developing an alternative strategy for “resolving the Iran problem,” approve it in Israel, present it to the US president, and coordinate it with the US armed forces. Under this model, Israel would not be a junior partner waiting for Washington to decide, but the initiator of a joint military concept drawing on the technological and military capabilities of both countries.

Thus, Makor Rishon’s article is not a neutral report on diplomacy or possible escalation, but a call for a change in strategy. Its author believes that the United States can afford to forgo complete victory and pursue a prolonged pressure campaign, whereas Israel—because of its size, vulnerability, and regional position—cannot.

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America as a Source of Uncertainty: Why Seoul, Pretoria and Kyiv Are Watching the U.S

In the final days of October 2026, the United States has become more than a foreign partner for South Korea, South Africa and Ukraine: it is a variable on which investment, exports, security and even the limits of political sovereignty depend. Each country is focused on different U.S. issues: in Seoul, tariffs, promised multibillion-dollar investments and the risk of being sidelined in Washington’s dialogue with Pyongyang; in Pretoria, visa restrictions, threats of sanctions and the future of AGOA trade benefits; in Kyiv, U.S. pressure on Ukraine’s military strategy, intelligence sharing and negotiations with Russia. But the underlying concern is the same: under Donald Trump, U.S. policy is seen as increasingly transactional and shaped by domestic electoral logic.

The main thread connecting these concerns is the U.S. midterm elections on November 3. Abroad, they are seen less as a routine contest between Democrats and Republicans than as a test of whether the White House will continue using foreign policy to produce quick domestic political “wins.” In South Korea, this has sparked concern that alliance commitments may matter less than high-profile deals. Korean media report that, after the first package of South Korean investment in the United States was approved, Trump’s interest in bilateral issues waned noticeably, while military cooperation and the transfer of wartime operational control stalled. A News1 analysis describes the risk of “bypassing Korea”: Washington may return to diplomacy with North Korea, but not necessarily with Seoul fully involved. (news1.kr)

For South Korea, it is particularly telling that the U.S. elections are discussed primarily through the lens of economics. Seoul does not expect a possible Democratic victory to automatically reverse Trump’s tariff policy: confrontation with China, technology restrictions and pressure on partners to localize production are seen as a nearly bipartisan reality. Still, there is hope that a weakened White House would at least be less prone to sudden ultimatums. The Seoul Newspaper captures this ambivalence: a Democratic Congress could step up investigations and oversight of the administration, but a “complete repeal” of the tariffs remains unlikely. (seoul.co.kr)

The local shorthand for this anxiety is “Trump’s bill”—the cumulative demands made of Korean companies and the government: investment in America, participation in infrastructure projects and additional spending on security. A Sisa Journal article describes the pressure as both economic and military; in particular, it discusses Trump’s announced plan to invest $54 billion in Korean funds in a gas pipeline in Alaska. (sisajournal.com) For Korean observers, this is not just a commercial deal. It raises the question of whether the alliance still follows the logic of mutual security or is turning into a system of periodic payments for American political favor.

In South Africa, the same transactional approach by the United States looks much harsher—as an attempt to tie trade, visas and investment to Washington’s ideological objections to domestic policies. Pretoria has come under pressure over U.S. accusations of discrimination against white South Africans, as well as disagreements over land policy, economic empowerment for Black South Africans, relations with Israel and the country’s foreign policy more broadly. Since visa restrictions were imposed, South African commentators have been debating not whether there is a crisis with the United States, but how much further the White House is prepared to go—with financial restrictions, an investment boycott or a review of trade preferences. (apnews.com)

An important local distinction, however, is that South Africa’s debate is not reducible to anti-Americanism. Much of the business community is urging the government not to respond emotionally, but to separate the symbolic conflict from practical economic interests. In a Sunday Times column, commentator Peter Bruce makes the surprising claim that the fate of AGOA—the U.S. law granting trade benefits to Africa—is “the least of our worries”: ending the benefits would hurt exporters, but would not be a catastrophe on the scale of a political and investment rupture. (sundaytimes.timeslive.co.za) It is a sober, almost dispassionate view: the danger lies not in a single tariff, but in South Africa being turned into a cautionary example for America’s conservative audience.

Priyal Singh, an analyst at the Institute for Security Studies in Johannesburg, explains the escalation in terms of the U.S. domestic political climate in a Semafor commentary: false claims of systematic persecution of white South Africans resonate with Trump’s conservative electorate. (semafor.com) For Pretoria, this is doubly painful. The United States is not merely criticizing specific government decisions; it is imposing an external interpretation of the post-apartheid reality, in which measures to remedy historic inequality are portrayed as reverse discrimination. The local response is therefore about defending not only trade interests, but also the country’s right to define the meaning of its own social transformation.

Ukraine views America from a very different position of existential dependence. For South Korea, tariffs and investment are questions of future growth; for South Africa, the issue is political and economic autonomy. For Kyiv, U.S. decisions are directly tied to its ability to hold the line. That is why reports that Trump disapproves of Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil infrastructure and may restrict intelligence sharing triggered not ordinary diplomatic anxiety, but a sense that the country’s military resilience was under threat. In a Ukrainska Pravda analysis, journalist Yuriy Butusov poses a starkly practical question: what is more dangerous for the front—disruptions to Starlink/Starshield or an end to U.S. intelligence support? (pravda.com.ua)

Ukrainian analysts see a risk in the current U.S. approach: Kyiv could become a prop in a pre-election peace-making spectacle. Vadym Denysenko, head of the analytical center Delovaya Stolitsa, said Trump may seek to push Ukraine into capitulation-like concessions so he can present the outcome as his own achievement before the congressional elections. (interfax.com.ua) This does not necessarily mean that everyone in Ukrainian society shares this assessment, but it captures a widespread fear: Washington may define “peace” not by how secure Ukraine is, but by how quickly a political deal can be struck.

Ukraine’s response, however, is not passive. Mykola Bielieskov, a senior analyst at the Come Back Alive Foundation and a researcher at the National Institute for Strategic Studies, stresses in an interview with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty that Kyiv’s public warnings about the critical importance of U.S. aid are a signal to both American parties and an attempt to mobilize Ukraine’s supporters within the U.S. political system. (radiosvoboda.org) In other words, Kyiv is relying less and less on the predictability of a single president and increasingly on engagement with Congress, experts, the defense industry and European capitals.

The paradox of the current moment is that South Korea, South Africa and Ukraine view America differently, yet reach similar conclusions. Seoul sees an ally that hands it a bill; Pretoria sees a superpower willing to replace a complex social reality with a convenient ideological narrative; Kyiv sees an indispensable partner whose support is becoming conditional and politically volatile. All three countries must now find ways to retain access to American power while reducing their dependence on America’s mood. That—not tariffs, AGOA or even individual negotiations with Moscow—is becoming the most important international response to the United States today.

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America as a Source of Uncertainty: What India, Japan and France Expect from Elections, Tariffs and a...

A week before the US midterm elections, scheduled for November 3, 2026, discussions in India, Japan and France are focusing less on American domestic politics itself than on its impact abroad. In local commentary, Donald Trump’s America appears at once as a market that cannot be abandoned, a military ally whose reliability cannot be fully trusted, and a source of decisions capable of changing trade terms, energy prices and strategic calculations within days. The common thread running through these discussions is not whether Republicans or Democrats will win, but whether the elections will make Washington predictable again.

In France, the coming elections are seen above all as a test of the viability of American institutions. In its announcement of a major conference on the United States, the French Institute of International Relations describes the November vote as a test of Trump’s control over the country’s political landscape—and, in turn, over global geopolitics. The French perspective is particularly sensitive to the way the domestic campaign in the US is increasingly merging with international strategy: inflation and trade shocks are unfolding alongside the war against Iran. (ifri.org)

This concern goes beyond familiar European discontent with Trump. Experts at the French think tank IRIS warn that if the president’s party loses, accusations of election “theft” could follow, corroding US political culture. The key point in IRIS’s analysis is that France is watching not merely for a shift in the balance of power in Congress, but to see whether American democracy can still peacefully restrain executive power. (iris-france.org) Paris sees its own interests at stake, too: a country that aspires to lead Europe does not want to base the continent’s security on an American political system that may become even more personalized and confrontational.

Japan’s tone is different: there is less moral concern about the state of American democracy and more cool calculation about what will happen after the vote. The Japan Institute of International Affairs notes that if Trump loses his congressional majority, the White House could shift its political focus from domestic affairs to foreign and military policy—areas where Congress places fewer limits on the president. The institute’s analysis explicitly warns of a more active policy toward Iran and China during the president’s “lame-duck” period [when he has lost political support in Congress]. (jiia.or.jp) For Tokyo, this is no abstraction: any US deal with Beijing focused only on long-range missiles or a trade compromise could leave Japan alone to face regional threats, especially North Korean missiles.

Indian writers view the same American uncertainty through the cost of access to the US market. In New Delhi, a possible Democratic victory is not seen as automatically reversing Trump’s tariff policy. Economist Neelanjan Banik warns in a column for BasisPointInsight that a divided Congress will not shield India from tariffs, because Washington’s current system of pressure relies not on a single law but on a combination of “national security” tariffs, trade investigations, and targeted restrictions on countries and sectors. (basispointinsight.com) This is a fundamental point in the Indian debate: the problem for India is not the identity of the US president, or even the size of a particular tariff, but the use of access to trade as a tool of political bargaining.

That is why calls are growing louder in India to avoid trading long-term concessions for short-term promises. Ajay Srivastava, a former trade official and founder of the Global Trade Research Initiative, put the position plainly: India should not offer new concessions while its agreement with the US remains unfinished. The Indian Express quoted him. (indianexpress.com) This response is not anti-American; it reflects a lesson from recent months: even if New Delhi lowers its barriers and increases purchases of American goods, legal and political changes in Washington can quickly deprive those concessions of their expected benefits.

The French response to tariffs is similar in its diagnosis, but broader in scope. For Paris, this is not a bilateral deal but a question of the European Union’s political agency. After the transatlantic agreement was signed, Europeans hoped for at least a pause in the conflict. But Trump’s new threats to raise tariffs over European regulation of American technology companies once again exposed how fragile that stability is. As Le Monde noted, European diplomats have learned not to panic over each new statement from the White House, yet this very calm has become “almost alarming”: constant threats have become the norm. (lemonde.fr) India’s demand for guarantees and France’s growing habituation to threats are two forms of the same response to an America where an agreement does not necessarily mean the end of bargaining.

The most serious shared concern is Iran and the Strait of Hormuz. Here, the differences between the countries are especially clear. In France, the conflict has become part of everyday politics: while visiting Gulf countries, President Emmanuel Macron linked the crisis’s future course to two points on the calendar—the US elections and Trump’s readiness to expand the war again afterward. He also sharply dismissed American comments about the situation in France as “unacceptable and stupid.” Le Monde emphasizes that the prolonged blockade of the Strait of Hormuz is pushing up fuel prices in France while also exposing the impotence of Paris and Arab capitals in the face of the US-Iran confrontation. (lemonde.fr)

For Japan, Hormuz is an even more direct national security concern. Japanese commentators point out that a blockade of the strait threatens energy supplies; it is not some distant Middle Eastern drama. In a Kyodo report, the US-Israeli war against Iran is described as a conflict with no visible way out, while a possible closure of Hormuz is identified as a grave strategic threat to Japan. (kyodo.co.jp) Tokyo therefore has no illusions that a Republican defeat would itself bring a de-escalation. On the contrary, a president weakened at home may seek to project strength abroad.

India’s perspective is even more pragmatic and, in some ways, unexpected. New Delhi is used to balancing between Washington, Moscow and the Gulf countries, but war makes that balancing act more costly: energy routes, oil supplies and prices for Indian households are now tied to decisions over which India has little influence. At the same time, the US is linking trade negotiations to India’s relations with Russia. A column in ThePrint argues that Washington is seeking concessions not only on access to the Indian market for agricultural goods, but also on Russia; the author urges New Delhi to negotiate without fear. (theprint.in) For India, American policy looks like a single package of pressure: trade, sanctions, oil and geopolitical alignment are no longer separate issues.

The most important common feature of these countries’ responses is that none expects a simple return to the old status quo. France hopes American checks and balances will be restored, but fears that Trump’s domestic weakness will make his foreign policy more aggressive. Japan is less concerned about a change in which party controls Congress than about Washington striking deals in Asia without adequately considering its allies’ interests. India believes its trade relations with the US should be protected not through personal ties between leaders, but through market diversification and clearly defined commitments.

America remains indispensable to all three countries—as a buyer, an ally, a technology hub and a military power. But one conclusion is increasingly clear in Indian, Japanese and French commentary: the main problem with the US today is not that it acts too aggressively, but that its partners can no longer be sure which rules will apply tomorrow.

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Trump’s Foreign Policy and the Remaking of the World Order

Reports from Ukraine and Saudi Arabia show how Donald Trump’s policies could affect wars, alliances, and regional balances. Amid criticism of reduced or conditional support for Ukraine, Washington’s positions on Iran, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia’s security, Morocco, Israel, Latin America, China, and Russia are also under discussion. Analysts view US decisions and election results as potential catalysts for a major realignment of global influence. This article is based on reports by TSN.ua (Ukraine) and Masrawy (Saudi Arabia).

Trump again demands “payment” for aid to Ukraine

Former US President Donald Trump has once again criticized US support for Ukraine, claiming that Joe Biden’s administration had “given away $350 billion” and received nothing in return. According to TSN, Trump insists that Europe should cover the cost of weapons for Kyiv.

“We should have charged them something for it. It’s Europe. They can pay,” Trump said, once again presenting military aid to Ukraine not as part of a broader strategy to deter Russian aggression, but as a commercial transaction for which the costs should be reimbursed.

However, the figure of $350 billion he cited is not supported as the amount of direct aid provided exclusively to Ukraine. His claim conflates spending related to Ukraine with spending on US European allies and NATO as a whole. Combining different categories of expenditure in this way amplifies the impression of massive “non-repayable” support, although the actual picture is considerably more complex.

For Ukraine, such statements carry significance beyond US domestic politics. US supplies of ammunition, air defense systems, and other weapons remain critical to protecting the front lines and cities from Russian attacks. Kyiv sees US aid not as a gift that offers Washington no strategic benefit, but as an investment in the security of Europe and NATO itself. Ukrainian officials and Western partners have repeatedly stressed that Ukraine’s ability to deter Russia reduces the risk of a direct confrontation between Moscow and NATO.

The prospect of a shift to a model in which Europe pays for most of the US weapons supplied to Ukraine is a particular cause for concern. This includes the PURL program, under which European countries fund purchases of US weapons for Ukraine. The mechanism could keep supplies flowing, but would also make them more dependent on the political will and financial capacity of European governments, as well as on conditions set by Washington.

For a country that has been repelling Russia’s full-scale invasion for more than two years, uncertainty over weapons poses an immediate risk to soldiers on the front line and civilians. Delays in receiving air defense missiles, artillery ammunition, or other equipment could quickly affect Ukraine’s ability to repel attacks and hold its positions.

The report also recalls accounts of a possible review of sanctions against the Russian Direct Investment Fund and of Russian diesel fuel being supplied to the United States. This heightens anxiety in Ukrainian society: tough rhetoric about the “cost” of aid to Kyiv may go hand in hand with a willingness to make economic compromises with Russia.

That is why the debate in the United States over the price of supporting Ukraine is seen in Kyiv as much more than a budget dispute. It concerns the predictability of military aid, the reliability of the Western alliance, and partners’ willingness to continue deterring Russia—a country waging war, striking Ukrainian cities, holding occupied territory, and posing a daily threat to the security of all Europe.

Saudi Arabia questions US guarantees amid the Houthi threat

The threat posed by Yemen’s Houthis is not an abstract aspect of a regional conflict for Saudi Arabia, but a direct national security concern. The risks extend to border areas, airports, cities, energy infrastructure, sea routes, and the kingdom’s ambitious economic plans, including Vision 2030 diversification projects.

In an article by the Egyptian outlet Masrawy, Samir Ghattas, head of the Middle East Forum for Political and Strategic Studies, attributes the Houthis’ confidence to several factors: Iranian support, the group’s accumulated military capabilities, and US political calculations.

In his assessment, Iranian assistance goes beyond arms deliveries. Tehran, the analyst says, has provided the Houthis with weapons, instructors, and training, and has helped establish a local military industry. The production of missiles and drones inside Yemen means the problem cannot be solved simply by intercepting external shipments: the group can sustain and replenish its arsenal within the country.

Ghattas also points to Yemen’s geography. Mountainous terrain, tunnel networks, and fortified underground storage sites help the Houthis conceal weapons and withstand strikes on military infrastructure. For Riyadh, this means that a decline in fighting does not necessarily mean the threat has disappeared. Even after periods of relative calm, the Houthis may retain missiles and drones, build up new capabilities, and use them again against Saudi targets.

The reliability of US security guarantees is central to the analysis. Ghattas links the Houthis’ current capabilities to events in 2018, when the advance of Yemen’s internationally recognized government on the port of Hodeidah was halted after the United States and the United Kingdom helped broker the Stockholm Agreement. In the analyst’s view, the pause that followed allowed the Houthis to strengthen their position and expand their military capabilities.

This interpretation reflects a sensitive issue for Saudi Arabia: why do its extensive defense, political, and economic ties with Washington not always translate into decisive deterrence of attacks on the kingdom? The question is particularly acute given previous strikes on Saudi airports, cities, and energy facilities.

The analyst also draws attention to contacts between the United States and the Houthis, as well as agreements to halt mutual attacks in the Red Sea. In his account, these arrangements are primarily aimed at protecting US shipping, not at eliminating the threat to Washington’s regional allies. The Houthis may therefore have concluded that the United States wants to avoid a direct, wide-ranging confrontation with them, even as risks to Saudi Arabia persist.

Ghattas also mentions a meeting between Houthi representatives and US officials at the US Embassy in Amman. However, this claim is presented as the analyst’s own assessment and is not accompanied by independent confirmation.

The Bab el-Mandeb Strait—a key sea passage between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden—features prominently in Saudi concerns. Disruption to shipping there would affect international trade, but it also has direct implications for Riyadh: security in the Red Sea matters for the kingdom’s ports, logistics chains, maritime transport, and investment projects.

The Houthis, who control a substantial part of northwestern Yemen, can use their proximity to sea routes as leverage not only over Saudi Arabia but also over international actors. At the same time, Ghattas warns that an actual, sustained blockade of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait would almost inevitably trigger a broader international response, extending well beyond the Saudi-Houthi conflict.

Thus, the position presented by Masrawy explains the threat not only in terms of Iranian support and the Houthis’ military adaptability, but also by pointing to inconsistencies in US foreign policy. For Saudi Arabia, this reinforces a key strategic conclusion: the kingdom’s security cannot be treated as a secondary element in arrangements concerning the Red Sea or Yemen, nor should it depend entirely on whether an external partner is willing to act at a critical moment.

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America Before the Election: Berlin Braces for Greater Unpredictability, Moscow Bargains for an...

Just days before the US midterm elections on November 3, 2026, Germany, Russia, and Turkey are discussing America not as a distant domestic drama, but as a source of immediate foreign-policy consequences. Three issues are converging in the local debate: Donald Trump’s weakening at home, his readiness to revisit sanctions and energy taboos to bring prices down, and the possibility of a new escalation in the war with Iran. But each country sees these issues differently: Berlin sees a threat to rules and predictability among allies, Moscow sees an opportunity for a deal of convenience, and Ankara sees a test of how far presidential friendship can overcome American institutions.

In Germany, the dominant feeling surrounding the US election is not hope for a change of course, but concern that a weakened Trump may become even more impulsive. Bavarian broadcaster BR put the question bluntly: “Trump under pressure—will the US become even more unpredictable?” German debate has focused especially on the link between rising prices for gasoline and food in the US, the president’s falling approval ratings, and the absence of the quick resolutions he promised in Iran and Ukraine. The fact that a televised election discussion features Armin Laschet, chair of the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee, Green Party representative Jamila Schäfer, US party activists, and a former ARD correspondent in Washington shows that, for Germany, this is already a matter of its own security—not just American party arithmetic. As BR notes, a possible Republican loss of the House of Representatives would reduce Trump’s influence, while also raising the question of how he will respond to limits on his power. (br.de)

In Russia, the same pre-election crisis in Washington is read differently: as an incentive for the White House to seek a quick, high-profile foreign-policy result. In an analysis published by the Russian International Affairs Council, Americanist Alexandra Voitolovskaya compares the Russia track in Trump’s calculations to “a table in a casino”: the White House could either score a breakthrough that muffles domestic criticism or push the issue out of the public spotlight. Her conclusion is particularly significant: pressure on Moscow and offers of compromise in the coming weeks will not rule each other out; they will go hand in hand. In other words, Russia’s expert community does not see negotiations as evidence of a lasting normalization. They are a bargaining tool ahead of the election, contingent on Trump’s personal political needs. The RIAC article emphasizes that three tracks are operating in parallel: technological restrictions on Russia, the threat of secondary tariffs on buyers of Russian energy, and a direct presidential channel with Moscow. (russiancouncil.ru)

Turkey’s perspective is even more practical. In Ankara, the US election is measured not only by approval ratings, but also by the fate of the F-35, F110 engines for the KAAN fighter, and CAATSA sanctions [“Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act”]. The Turkish outlet T24 highlights a key paradox: despite Trump’s friendly statements, both defense issues remain unresolved because Congress has the decisive say. A possible Democratic takeover of the House of Representatives is seen as a risk of increased congressional oversight and renewed objections to arms sales. This reflects a characteristic Turkish pragmatism: Ankara is willing to leverage Erdoğan and Trump’s personal relationship, but increasingly recognizes that the US system can block presidential promises. (t24.com.tr)

The most striking shared story is Russian diesel for the US market. Trump’s decision, following a conversation with Vladimir Putin, to allow Russian fuel into the American market has become a symbol for Berlin, Moscow, and Ankara of how US domestic politics can override foreign-policy principles. Germany’s response has been the sharpest. The government stresses that Germany will not return to Russian oil and remains committed to sanctions. Green Party leader Franziska Brantner called Trump’s approach particularly unprincipled: first, launch a war against Iran without a clear plan and drive up global energy prices, then strike a deal with Putin to soften the consequences before the election. In her view, both Ukrainians and consumers will pay the price, and Europe’s response should be energy independence and a move away from fossil fuels. This position is set out in a Tagesschau report. (tagesschau.de)

The Russian debate is noticeably less euphoric than one might expect. RBC links the deal to a nearly 70% increase in diesel prices since the start of the US-Israeli operation against Iran, and explicitly describes it as an attempt by Trump to bring prices down before the vote. At the same time, the outlet highlights the president’s vulnerability: on October 19, his approval rating stood at 31%, according to Reuters/Ipsos, and some Republican candidates had begun distancing themselves from him. For Russian audiences, this turns the fuel deal not into a US geopolitical U-turn, but into a tactical concession by Washington, driven by gas pumps and the ballot box. RBC examines the issue in detail. (rbc.ru)

Turkish analysts add an important caveat: the concession to Russia may not deliver the promised benefits to American consumers. Göktuğ Çalışkan, an expert at the Ankara Center for Crisis and Policy Studies, notes in his analysis that the terms of trade for Moscow will improve, while the benefits to US consumers may be limited. If diesel is simply redirected from one market to another, global supply does not increase; only the cargo’s route changes. This is a surprisingly substantive Turkish reading: the deal reveals not only the hypocrisy of sanctions policy, but also its economic ineffectiveness when the country imposing sanctions faces shortages and high prices itself. (ankasam.org)

Finally, the war with Iran brings all three national perspectives together. In Germany, it is seen above all as an assault on international rules and an energy shock for Europe; in Russia, as a result of Trump’s pre-election need to project strength without losing the opportunity to negotiate; and in Turkey, as a direct threat to the region. Bilgehan Alagöz, a researcher at Marmara University, believes that the likelihood of US operations against Iran resuming after the election is high, although a new escalation could come sooner. He notes that 65% of Americans disapprove of the way Trump is conducting the military campaign, and that Congress has repeatedly voted to limit US involvement. In an Anadolu Ajansı analysis, the war is described as a conflict in which the timing and scale of operations are determined not only by military calculations, but also by US domestic politics, energy prices, and the struggle between Congress and the president over their respective powers. (aa.com.tr)

This is where all three responses to America converge. Berlin fears that Washington is turning alliances and sanctions into variables. Moscow hopes to exploit that volatility, but does not consider it a reliable basis for a long-term deal. Ankara draws an even more pragmatic lesson: the US president’s personal goodwill is useful, but it cannot replace decisions by Congress, stable contracts, or an independent defense capability. So outside the US, the upcoming American election is not seen as the end of the Trump era, but as a turning point after which his policy could become either more constrained—or, paradoxically, more dangerous.

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America as an Internal Risk for Allies and Neighbors: What Brazil, South Korea and Japan See...

As of October 27, 2026, Brazil, South Korea and Japan are discussing more than individual White House decisions. A new problem is emerging: U.S. domestic politics is increasingly becoming a source of international uncertainty. In Brazil, the immediate trigger was Donald Trump’s claim that Lula’s reelection on October 25 had “looked rigged”—without offering any evidence. In Tokyo and Seoul, the main focus remains the U.S. midterm elections on November 3: local experts are trying to determine whether a weakening of the Republicans could constrain Trump or, conversely, make American policy even more chaotic. The shared conclusion is strikingly clear-eyed: what matters to other countries is no longer so much which party formally controls Congress, but whether the U.S. system can produce predictable policies on trade, finance, war and commitments to allies.

Brazil’s reaction is the most emotional, because the dispute concerns sovereignty and the legitimacy of elections that have just concluded. Vice President Geraldo Alckmin called Trump’s assessment “equivocada” (“mistaken”) and stressed that the U.S. president should not interfere in Brazilian politics. It is significant that Trump also said he “gets along well” with Lula. In Brazil, this is seen not as a conciliatory gesture but as a double signal: Washington is keeping open the option of questioning the country’s institutions while still intending to do business with its government. As Agência Brasil notes, the U.S. president linked his suspicions to the extension of voting hours, but offered no evidence of fraud. (agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br)

For Brazil, this is part of a broader story in which trade pressure, visa restrictions, sanctions rhetoric and public support for Bolsonaro-aligned forces have come to be seen as elements of a single policy. In its analysis, Folha de S.Paulo describes relations with the United States as the main foreign-policy challenge of Lula’s new term. The agenda centers on U.S. tariffs, critical minerals and the effort to protect sovereignty while maintaining pragmatic dialogue. (www1.folha.uol.com.br) This highlights a characteristic feature of Brazil’s approach: even those who criticize confrontation with Washington are not calling for a break. Adam Goldsmith, a former U.S. Treasury financial attaché for South America, put the paradox this way in a column for Folha: Brazil’s relatively limited interdependence with the United States temporarily shields it from pressure, but also means missed economic opportunities. (www1.folha.uol.com.br) In other words, Brazil’s debate is not reducible to anti-Americanism. It is more about the cost of dependence and how to prevent access to markets, technology or investment from becoming a foreign power’s license to challenge the outcome of a national election.

South Korea views the U.S. midterms less ideologically and far more practically. The discussion there is not about the abstract fate of American democracy, but about tariffs, investment in U.S. energy, visas for Korean specialists, shipbuilding, batteries, semiconductors and the presence of U.S. troops on the peninsula. In a special report, the state-run trade organization KOTRA warns that the push to restrict China’s role in supply chains will continue regardless of the election results, while policies on electric vehicles, batteries, artificial intelligence and shipyard subsidies will depend on the specific balance of power in Congress and the states. (dream.kotra.or.kr) From the Korean perspective, the United States is both a security ally and a market where the rules can change quickly in response to the American electoral cycle.

That is why Seoul is particularly cautious about hopes for a “divided government” in Washington. Korean financial analysts allow that a shift to divided government—when the White House and at least one chamber of Congress are controlled by different parties—could lower U.S. Treasury yields and weaken the dollar, easing pressure on the won. But the same scenario could slow U.S. investment in AI and hurt Korean exporters of chips and equipment. As Gyeongin Broadcasting writes, what will matter most for South Korea is not the election winner itself, but the actual response of bond yields, the dollar and AI investment. (news.ifm.kr) This is a distinctly Korean way of looking at America: political crisis in the United States is translated not into support for Democrats or Republicans, but into the cost of capital, exchange rates and industrial orders.

Japan’s debate overlaps with South Korea’s on economics, but goes further on security. Japanese researchers see the November vote as a potential turning point after which Trump may have more freedom to maneuver in foreign policy if he no longer has to fear an immediate electoral price. A study by the Japan Institute of International Affairs notes that the war with Iran has already driven up oil and gasoline prices, weakening the Republicans’ position; at the same time, the direct domestic political costs of escalation may ease after the election. The authors issue a particular warning: if the United States seeks an agreement that addresses only direct threats to U.S. territory, risks associated with Iran’s missile and nuclear capabilities may remain unresolved for Japan. (jiia.or.jp) For a country critically dependent on maritime routes and energy imports, this is not an abstract Middle Eastern issue, but a question of prices, insurance, shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and the resilience of the entire Asian economy.

This points to a deeper Japanese concern: an unstable America may be dangerous not because it will abandon its leadership role, but because it will apply force and honor commitments selectively. Tomohisa Ishikawa, an economist at the Japan Research Institute, writes in an analysis of the election’s implications that U.S. political and social polarization may intensify after the vote. Japan, he argues, will have to ease tensions with its neighbors while also working to ensure continued active U.S. involvement in Asian security. (jri.co.jp) It is a telling formulation: Tokyo does not take the U.S. presence for granted as an unquestionable good, but sees no full-fledged replacement for it yet.

In all three countries, then, the U.S. midterms are seen as a test not only for Trump, but also for America’s ability to govern its international role. Brazil sees the risk of political interference and wants to show that its democracy needs no U.S. certification. South Korea fears that Washington’s swings will make strategic investments hostage to tariffs, visas and partisan deals. Japan worries that domestic infighting in the United States will leave allies choosing between unpredictable U.S. engagement and a dangerous vacuum. The most unexpected common thread is that none of them expects a Democratic or Republican victory, by itself, to solve the problem. The rest of the world increasingly sees America as a country whose domestic conflicts are exported along with its dollar, tariffs, military decisions and doubts about other countries’ elections.

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Trump: Political Doubts and Controversial Deals

As the midterm elections approach, attention is focused on Donald Trump’s political prospects and on whether his opponents can restore a system of checks and balances. At the same time, the administration’s influence on business and foreign policy is fueling controversy, including Audi’s dealings with Trump and the prospects for investment in the United States. Washington’s statements and pressure in its dealings with Brazil, Greenland and Iran are also seen as displays of strength that inspire more skepticism than confidence. This article is based on reporting by Asahi (Japan) and NDR (Germany).

Can the US elections restore Congress’s oversight of Trump?

The US midterm elections are testing not only the balance of power between Democrats and Republicans, but also the ability of the American political system to restrain presidential power. In an analysis by Asahi Shimbun, the question is viewed primarily through Japan’s interests. As a key US ally, Japan has a direct stake in the predictability of Washington’s policies on security, trade and international affairs.

According to the Japanese newspaper, during Donald Trump’s second term, the Republican-controlled Congress has largely supported the White House while performing its oversight role far less vigorously. The pace and scale of the changes were illustrated on the first day of the new presidential term: Trump rescinded 78 executive orders and memorandums issued by his predecessor, Joe Biden, including measures on climate policy and public health. For US allies, this means that a change of power in Washington can quickly reshape not only domestic rules but also the country’s international commitments.

One of the article’s central interviewees is Democrat Sherrod Brown, a longtime former senator from Ohio who is seeking to return to the upper chamber of Congress. He recalls a fundamental principle of the US Constitution: “Congress and the president are co-equal branches. Congress has to stand up.” In Brown’s view, lawmakers have failed to establish effective limits on executive power over the roughly decade-long rise of Trump. “Members of Congress haven’t had the courage,” he says.

A potential Democratic victory that puts the House of Representatives—and perhaps the Senate—under their control is therefore seen as more than an electoral win for one party. It could strengthen congressional oversight, make it harder for the White House to pursue unilateral policies, and restore the importance of procedures, hearings, budgetary oversight and legislative constraints.

For Tokyo, this has clear practical significance. Japan relies on the United States for regional security, including deterring China and North Korea and maintaining a US military presence in the Asia-Pacific. At the same time, Japan’s economy is vulnerable to changes in US tariff policy, trade demands, currency decisions, energy policy and Washington’s stance on climate agreements. A stronger, more independent Congress could make US policy less dependent on the president’s personal decisions and thus more predictable for allies.

However, a change in the party holding a majority does not in itself guarantee the restoration of a full system of checks and balances. As Asahi Shimbun notes, there are signs of resistance to Trump within the Republican Party. This is summed up by the phrase “人生は一度きり”—“you only live once.” It reflects some politicians’ willingness to risk their careers and publicly break with the president. But such opposition remains limited: loyalty to Trump is still an important political asset within the party.

The Japanese perspective differs from the familiar American focus on approval ratings, districts and party prospects. The main concern is not so much the electoral arithmetic as the state of the institutions. For a country that places a high value on political stability and bureaucratic continuity, the abrupt reversal of a previous administration’s decisions and the weakening of congressional oversight are sources of serious foreign-policy uncertainty.

Thus, Japan sees the US midterm elections as a test of a broader question: will the United States remain a reliable, governable and predictable partner, or will its policies depend to a decisive extent on the will of one president? The ability of Congress to reclaim its role as an equal branch of government will affect not only the resilience of American democracy at home, but also allies’ confidence in the durability of Washington’s commitments.

Audi chief’s appearance with Trump draws criticism in Germany

Audi’s plans to build its first US factory have sparked debate in Germany not only over investment and growth prospects, but also a sharp political dispute. The controversy arose after Audi CEO Gernot Döllner took part in a campaign event for Donald Trump, where he publicly thanked the US president for supporting the project. According to NDR, worker representatives, unions and politicians in Lower Saxony consider the move an unacceptable alignment of business with an election campaign.

Döllner told employees that his appearance alongside Trump was motivated by the company’s interests. Audi is negotiating to build a plant in Perry, Georgia, which would be the brand’s first factory in the United States. The US is the world’s second-largest premium car market, but Audi’s business there “is not profitable today,” according to its chief executive. Local production is expected to change that, reduce reliance on imports and drive growth in North America.

Audi is expected to invest around $4 billion in the US plant. The facility could create about 4,500 jobs and produce up to 200,000 SUVs a year from the early 2030s. The final decision, however, still needs approval from Volkswagen’s supervisory board, where worker representatives have considerable influence.

This is where the business case collided with concerns about reputation, political neutrality and the protection of jobs in Germany. Daniela Cavallo, chair of Volkswagen’s works council, said Döllner had effectively helped Trump’s election campaign. In her view, sharing a stage with him after a speech containing racist, sexist, xenophobic and transphobic remarks was unacceptable. What she heard, Cavallo said, should make people “want the ground to swallow them up with shame.”

She also pointed to Audi’s corporate rules, which prohibit high-profile public appearances with election candidates during the final three months before a vote. With the US midterm elections scheduled for November 3, Cavallo believes the Audi chief violated a code of conduct he had recently signed.

Jörg Schlagbauer, chair of Audi’s general works council, said employees were “extremely irritated and shocked.” He acknowledged, however, that the US market cannot be ignored. In his view, the company should not “court” politicians, but must first secure the future of its German facilities and employment in the country. Only then, he believes, should an expansion of production in the United States be discussed.

Lower Saxony Minister-President Olaf Lies, who represents the state on Volkswagen’s supervisory board, also described Döllner’s appearance as participation in a “political spectacle.” The issue is especially important for Lower Saxony: the region is closely tied to Volkswagen as a shareholder and industrial center, and the company’s fortunes directly affect thousands of jobs, tax revenues and the region’s economic identity.

Lies did not oppose the US project itself. On the contrary, he acknowledged that strengthening Audi’s position in the US market made strategic sense. But he stressed that investment overseas must not lead to jobs and value creation being displaced from Germany.

IG Metall chair Christiane Benner took an even tougher line. She called the Audi chief’s actions “extremely embarrassing,” “politically unacceptable” and unworthy of both the company and its employees. The response highlights a distinctive feature of Germany’s corporate governance system: unions and works councils do not limit themselves to public criticism, but help shape key decisions through their seats on supervisory boards.

Cavallo is demanding that Volkswagen management provide a full assessment of the impact on all group facilities, especially those in Germany, before approving construction in Georgia. She has also raised questions about possible tariff exemptions for Volkswagen and how durable political agreements with the US could be after a change of power in Washington.

Volkswagen CEO Oliver Blume, for his part, has focused on the project’s economics. Local production would allow the company to make cars “in the US for the US,” he says, and successful growth in North America would benefit the entire Volkswagen Group. Blume has not publicly commented on Döllner’s appearance alongside Trump.

This restraint reflects the central tension surrounding the project. Volkswagen and Audi need to expand in one of the world’s most important car markets, particularly amid tariff risks and the weak profitability of their US business. But in Germany, corporate growth is inseparable from questions of job security, political distance and responsibility to employees. The dispute over the Georgia plant has therefore become more than a debate about a $4 billion investment: it is a test of how far a German automaker is prepared to go in seeking support from the US administration.

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America as a Source of Uncertainty: Germany, France and Brazil View Trump Through the Lens of...

In German, French and Brazilian discussions of the United States in late October 2026, no single story dominates. Instead, there is a shared sense that Donald Trump’s American policy has become both more forceful and less predictable. The US war with Iran, trade pressure and the transformation of alliances into subjects of constant bargaining are seen not as separate episodes but as manifestations of a single pattern. Washington demands loyalty, wields economic leverage and increasingly shifts the consequences of its own decisions onto its partners—from Europe to Latin America. Meanwhile, with the US midterm elections approaching on November 3, foreign policy takes on another dimension: observers abroad are watching more closely to see whether the president’s domestic political weakness is driving his increasingly hard-line stance internationally.

Iran remains the most alarming issue. In Germany, it is seen primarily as a story of American strategic miscalculation, for which Europe is also paying the price. ARD commentator Carsten Küntopp put it bluntly in a Tagesschau article: “Trump hat Amerikas Macht verspielt” [“Trump has squandered America’s power”]. His argument goes beyond criticizing the military operation: the closure or threatened closure of the Strait of Hormuz, attacks on Iran’s neighbors and turbulence in energy markets have exposed the limits of American power. This is particularly painful for German observers because Europe depends on the security provided by the United States while also being vulnerable to the consequences of America’s decision to start a war.

Official Berlin is choosing its words far more cautiously, but that caution itself speaks to the scale of its concern. Chancellor Friedrich Merz said there must be “eine belastbare und dauerhafte Vereinbarung mit dem Iran” [“a reliable and lasting agreement with Iran”], adding that negotiations offer the best chance of achieving lasting stability. Germany is prepared to take part in a process aimed at ending the conflict and ensuring the safety of shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. (bundesregierung.de) Behind the diplomatic language lies a practical calculation: Berlin does not want European industry, consumers and military infrastructure once again held hostage by a war whose objectives are set in Washington but whose costs are shared by its allies.

In France, the irritation is more visibly tied to the question of Europe’s political autonomy. The Paris press sees the current American line as making two demands at once: Europeans must increase defense spending and take on more risks, while their independence is simultaneously constrained. A Le Monde investigation describes how the Pentagon effectively tested NATO allies for political loyalty to Trump’s policies in Europe and the Middle East. One of the newspaper’s sources called it a classic American move that, under MAGA [“Make America Great Again”] ideology, had “monté d’un cran” [“gone up a notch”]. (lemonde.fr) The French criticism here is not simply anti-Americanism. It stems from the view that an alliance in which protection depends on publicly endorsing the White House’s position looks less and less like an equal partnership.

Brazil’s response to the war in Iran is different, but no less skeptical. The main question there is not NATO’s future, but the cost of America’s use of force for the Global South: oil, food, shipping and domestic inflation. An editorial in Folha de S.Paulo accuses Trump of leading the world into a “guerra sem fim” [“endless war”] by rejecting Iran’s proposal. The conflict is already undermining both the US economy and the Republicans’ prospects in the elections. (www1.folha.uol.com.br) This is not just the editorial board’s position. A Datafolha poll found that 70% of Brazilians oppose US-Israeli strikes on Iran, while 87% expect the war to affect Brazil’s economy. (datafolha.folha.uol.com.br) In Brazil, a distant war is not seen as abstract geopolitics but as a risk that everyday life will become more expensive.

The second common thread in the debate is tariffs. But Germany, France and Brazil view them from different points on the map. In Berlin, the United States remains a critically important market, so the 6.3% drop in German exports to the US in August was seen not as routine monthly data but as a warning sign for the country’s export-driven economic model. (bundeswirtschaftsministerium.de) French commentators emphasize a different problem: even an agreement with Washington cannot guarantee predictability. After the US threatened to raise tariffs again in response to the European Union’s fine against Google, diplomatic sources told Le Monde that Europe had almost grown accustomed to sudden White House announcements—to a “calme presque inquiétant” [“almost unsettling calm”] about whatever comes out of Washington. The Le Monde article points to an important shift: in France, Trump is increasingly seen as someone with whom it is impossible to make a deal once and consider the matter settled. (lemonde.fr)

For Brazil, tariffs have a much more direct, almost sovereign character. Measures introduced by the United States in July included an additional 25% tariff on a range of Brazilian goods, plus another 12.5% under an investigation into forced labor. According to the Brazilian government, the new measures affected 23.1% of the country’s exports to the US. (agenciagov.ebc.com.br) Brasília is challenging these measures at the World Trade Organization, arguing that Washington has violated international trade rules. (www-server1.wto.org) The main conclusion in local analysis is paradoxical: US pressure may not force Brazil to make concessions, but it could well accelerate the country’s economic rapprochement with China. An analysis by China Brazil Insight cites figures showing that from January to September, Brazil’s trade with the US fell by 6.8%, while trade with China grew by 11.1%. (chinabrazilinsight.com) In Brazil, the American attempt to protect its own market is thus seen as a gift to Chinese influence—especially in the agricultural and commodities sectors.

Finally, all three countries are discussing the US midterm elections as a referendum not only on Trump, but also on America’s ability to restrain its own drive toward confrontation. In France, a Le Monde editorial calls the vote a test for American democracy, linking it to the presidency’s authoritarian drift, weakened political parties and the redrawing of electoral districts. (lemonde.fr) In Germany, Der Spiegel describes the campaign as a vote on a “gebrochenes Versprechen” [“broken promise”]: voters are frustrated by the high cost of living, the war with Iran and the failure of health insurance policy. (spiegel.de) In Brazil, attention to the US campaign is also tied to the war and tariffs: Folha notes that some Republican candidates are trying to distance themselves from the president precisely on these issues. (www1.folha.uol.com.br)

The main, unexpected conclusion from these national responses is that the United States is no longer assessed separately as a military power, trading partner and leader of the Western alliance. In Germany, the American war calls the reliability of security guarantees into question; in France, it turns NATO into an arena of political pressure; in Brazil, trade pressure and the use of force fuel the desire to diversify ties and avoid dependence on a single center of power. Iran, tariffs and elections combine into a single picture: countries still have to take American power into account, but are increasingly reluctant to assume that American leadership is automatically beneficial or sustainable.

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America as a Source of Conditions: Why South Africa, South Korea and Russia Watch What Trump Does, Not...

In recent days, the United States has become the focus of particularly tense debate in three very different countries. But what South Africa, South Korea and Russia have in common is not so much an interest in American domestic politics as a sense that Washington has turned foreign policy into a series of rapidly changing deals: tariffs are tied to investment, sanctions to fuel prices and elections, and military pressure on Iran to the domestic political calendar. As of October 26, the main issues were the U.S. midterm elections on November 3, trade pressure on partners and adversaries, and the Trump administration’s contradictory diplomacy on Russia, Ukraine and Iran. (seoul.co.kr)

The most general response is distrust in the durability of U.S. commitments. In Seoul, that distrust is primarily economic. South Korean observers see the congressional elections as a possible switch that could change the entire course of U.S. policy: if Republicans hold on to the House of Representatives, the White House will be able to continue tariff pressure and demand further concessions from allies; if Democrats win a majority, investigations, hearings and political constraints on the administration will follow. In an analysis by Seoul Shinmun, Professor of International Trade Kim Tae-hwan suggests that a Democratic-controlled House would not scrap the tariff system entirely, but could curb Trump’s habit of increasing pressure on allies. For South Korea, this is no abstract debate: at stake are promised investments in the United States, including shipbuilding and LNG projects, and whether those investments will be used as permanent collateral in exchange for lower tariffs. (seoul.co.kr)

South Korea’s debate is therefore markedly more pragmatic than emotional: people are less concerned with whether they like Trump than with calculating the cost of American unpredictability. Trump has publicly said that South Korea must pay for lower tariffs, citing $150 billion in investment in U.S. shipbuilding. A Yonhap report became an important signal in South Korea: the alliance with the United States remains the foundation of security, but Washington’s approach to trade increasingly resembles negotiations between a creditor and a client rather than relations between allies. (yna.co.kr)

This is where a parallel with South Africa emerges, although its relations with the United States are far more contentious. In Pretoria, concern centers on AGOA, the U.S. law granting trade preferences to sub-Saharan African countries. Congress has formally extended the program through 2028, but the White House reviews each country’s eligibility every year. South African Ambassador to Washington Roelf Meyer described relations with the Trump administration as a “stalemate”: Pretoria is offering compromises but getting no clear answer on which conditions the United States believes remain unmet. In an interview with Semafor, he summed up the local frustration: negotiations are impossible when the American side only says “that’s not enough” without explaining what needs to change. (semafor.com)

For South Africa’s public and expert communities, this is no longer just a trade conflict. Tariffs and the threat of exclusion from AGOA are seen as a means of politically disciplining the country over its land reform, its Black Economic Empowerment policy—a system designed to expand economic opportunities for the Black majority—and its independent foreign policy. Analyst Kingsley Makhubela told eNCA that American pressure was preparation for a “broader attack on the legitimacy of the South African government.” It is a harsh formulation, but it captures an important shift: some South African commentators see U.S. actions not as a series of separate grievances, but as an attempt to change Pretoria’s political course through economic risks. (enca.com)

At the same time, there is no unified South African policy of “resistance to Washington.” Infrastructure Minister Dean Macpherson warns that it is a mistake to think Africa’s largest economy can easily do without the United States; in a Semafor article, he urges the government to act “cautiously and strategically” to avoid losing access to AGOA. This reflects a characteristic tension in Pretoria: political dignity and defending its domestic course demand firmness, while exporters, jobs and investors call for de-escalation. (semafor.com)

The dilemma is particularly clear against the backdrop of new U.S. trade measures. The South African government continues to challenge the 12.5% tariff imposed by the United States under Section 301, a mechanism that allows Washington to penalize countries for practices it considers unfair. Trade Minister Parks Tau has stressed that Pretoria will seek to have the tariff removed or reduced. But Business Day columnists Jing Chien and Lawrence Edwards point to a deeper problem: more than 80% of the roughly 2,700 South African product categories exported to the United States were affected by the measure, while exemptions for raw materials only entrench the country’s dependence on unprocessed resource exports. (sanews.gov.za)

If South Korea and South Africa discuss the United States as a source of trade uncertainty, in Russia the focus is on America’s tendency to turn sanctions and energy into tools of expedient diplomacy. Trump’s decision to delay new restrictions on Russia and allow Russian diesel fuel to be shipped to the United States is interpreted by Russian experts not as the start of normalization, but as a temporary deal linked to energy prices and the midterm elections. In an analysis by Vedomosti, Dmitry Suslov of the Higher School of Economics views the diesel deal both as an attempt to stabilize the U.S. market and as an “advance” to Moscow, intended to encourage greater flexibility on Ukraine. (vedomosti.ru)

Russian commentators, however, stress how fragile this easing of restrictions is. Lawyer Yulia Eliseeva, in another article in Vedomosti, notes that this is not a dismantling of the entire sanctions regime: only specific measures have been suspended, while the rest of the restrictions remain in place and could quickly be tightened again. Maxim Cherkashin, a researcher at the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences, links Trump’s decision to a desire to ease energy price pressure on American voters ahead of November 3. In Russia’s view, this means a window of opportunity exists, but it depends not on trust between Moscow and Washington, but on the U.S. electoral climate. (vedomosti.ru)

The Russian perspective is even sharper when it comes to U.S. policy on Iran. The main complaint is that Washington talks about negotiations, prepares military options and adjusts its public rhetoric to the domestic political calendar all at once. Farhad Ibragimov, a scholar of the Middle East, writes in a column for Kommersant that a new U.S. operation after the midterm elections looks increasingly likely: it is difficult for Iranian negotiators to explain to the public why they should make concessions to a president who links peace to the threat of further destruction of their country. (kommersant.ru)

In this Russian reading, what matters is not just criticism of American power, but also of its inconsistency. On October 9, Trump promised not to attack Iran before the elections, while also claiming that contacts with Tehran were productive and that Iran would not get a nuclear weapon. Kommersant noted that his public position had shifted several times before then. For a Russian audience, such volatility confirms a familiar point: negotiations with the United States should be judged not by statements, but by what levers of pressure the White House keeps in reserve in case it changes its mind. (kommersant.ru)

This is where the reactions of all three countries converge. In South Korea, there are fears that even allied commitments may be recalculated in terms of investment dollars and tariff concessions. In South Africa, trade preferences are seen becoming conditional and politicized. In Russia, sanctions relief is viewed as a reversible bargaining tool, while the rhetoric of negotiations on Iran is seen as cover for keeping military escalation on the table. The stakes differ: for Seoul, exports, investment and the military alliance; for Pretoria, market access and protection of domestic political autonomy; for Moscow, the sanctions regime, the war in Ukraine and energy revenues. But the overall conclusion is much the same: today’s America is seen not as a predictable system of rules, but as a country where foreign policy is increasingly shaped by the deal of the day and the demands of next week’s elections.

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The US and the World: Alarm Over Political Divisions and Foreign Policy

Political polarization in the United States and Donald Trump’s policies are raising concerns far beyond the country’s borders. Reports from Venezuela and Australia examine the influence of Trump-aligned right-wing movements on elections and democracy in Latin America, as well as the consequences of US decisions on military, trade and humanitarian issues and toward Iran. These topics reflect concerns about the risk of escalating conflicts, economic shocks and the future role of the United States in the world. This review draws on material from the US Department of Energy (Australia) and the University of Veracruz (Venezuela).

GeoVision: US experience informs Australia’s geothermal strategy

The US Department of Energy’s GeoVision program sees geothermal energy as a major but still underused domestic resource. The department describes it as a source of reliable, flexible and renewable energy that can provide electricity, as well as heating and cooling, regardless of weather or time of day.

GeoVision’s central argument is that geothermal resources are widespread across the United States, but their practical development remains limited. According to the program, only a “small fraction” of the potential has been tapped because of “technical and non-technical barriers.” Key challenges include the complexity and cost of drilling, geological uncertainty, the need to improve technology, and the need for more favorable market and regulatory conditions.

Although this is an official US government webpage, not an analysis of Australian policy, its conclusions may also matter to Australia. The country is actively expanding solar and wind generation, energy storage, grid infrastructure and exports of critical minerals. Geothermal energy, however, remains on the fringes of the national energy agenda, despite promising geological areas, including in South Australia and the continent’s inland regions.

The American approach highlights the importance of what is known as firm, or dispatchable, renewable capacity. Geothermal plants can operate “always on,” without depending on sunlight, wind or the time of day. This is particularly relevant for Australia as coal-fired power stations close and debate continues over which technologies can ensure grid reliability when solar and wind output is low.

GeoVision recommends assessing the industry’s prospects not only through individual demonstration projects, but also with quantitative models. These models can compare geothermal technologies, market scenarios, resource-development costs, potential constraints and contributions to the power system. Such a comprehensive approach could be useful in Australia, where fuel availability, grid conditions, distances to consumers and the economic viability of new energy projects vary from region to region.

Geothermal energy can be considered not only as a source of electricity. The US program also covers heating and cooling, opening up a wider range of possible applications: industrial heat supply, energy for remote settlements, building cooling and support for local power systems. In a country with a vast landmass and many remote communities, this could become a distinct area of energy policy.

In Australia, barriers to developing the geothermal industry could include the high costs of exploratory and production drilling, the risk that expected geological characteristics will not be confirmed, limited access to capital for early-stage projects, and competition from rapidly falling-cost solar and wind power. Other factors may include the lack of stable incentives, difficulties connecting to the grid and limited experience with commercial applications of the technology.

Thus, GeoVision does not announce a new government decision or a specific energy project, but sets out a long-term US vision. For Australia, its significance is comparative: the American experience suggests geothermal energy can be viewed not as a narrow niche, but as a potential component of energy security, industrial development and decarbonization.

Monroe Doctrine revives anxieties across Latin America

US policy in the Western Hemisphere is once again the subject of heated debate in Latin America. In a publication by Mexico’s University of Veracruz, historian Felipe Arturo Ávila Espinosa links contemporary political shifts in the region to a long tradition of American expansionism, as well as the influence of big business, digital platforms and conservative ideological circles.

Ávila Espinosa, who heads Mexico’s National Institute for Historical Studies of the Revolutions of Mexico, argues that during Donald Trump’s second term, the Monroe Doctrine is taking on “new forms.” In his view, this involves economic, political and military pressure on countries in the region, as well as Washington’s efforts to maintain influence over the strategic resources of Latin America and the Caribbean.

The historian recalls that the Monroe Doctrine’s slogan, “America for the Americans,” was initially proclaimed as a warning to European powers against interfering in the affairs of the continent. Later, however, he argues, it became an ideological justification for territorial expansion and American hegemony. He cites Mexico’s history as one of the clearest examples: the separation of Texas, the Mexican-American War of 1846–1848 and the loss of more than half of the country’s territory.

Although the publication was produced in Mexico and does not focus directly on Venezuela, its interpretation echoes official Venezuelan rhetoric about sovereignty and foreign interference. For Caracas, relations with Washington have for many years been marked by sanctions, diplomatic isolation and international disputes over the legitimacy of the government. In this context, the claim that the logic of the Monroe Doctrine is being revived is seen not only as a historical analysis, but also as an explanation of current pressure on states with oil and mineral resources and an independent foreign policy.

Venezuelan authorities regularly describe US sanctions and support for opposition forces as interference in the country’s internal affairs. The Mexican researcher places such concerns in a broader historical context: under this view, the direct military expansion of the 19th century may in the 21st century be giving way to financial restrictions, diplomatic pressure, political isolation and competition for control of energy and raw-material resources.

At the same time, Ávila Espinosa does not explain the rise of conservative and far-right forces solely in terms of external influence. He urges progressive movements to engage in self-criticism, acknowledge their own mistakes, strengthen state and civil-society institutions, and respond more effectively to citizens’ needs—especially those of young people. This conclusion is also important for Venezuela, where anti-American rhetoric remains a significant political tool but does not eliminate domestic challenges: prolonged economic hardship, emigration, distrust of institutions and deep political polarization.

Thus, the University of Veracruz publication is not a neutral news report, but a critical, anti-hegemonic interpretation of regional politics. It views American influence as a continuation of the historical logic of the Monroe Doctrine and the growth of right-wing forces as the result of both external pressure and progressive governments’ failure to meet social expectations. This framework is especially familiar in Venezuela, where independence, oil, resources and national sovereignty remain central to public and political debate.

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America as a Tool for Bargaining and Pressure: What Russia, South Africa and Turkey Are Saying About the...

In the final days of October 2026, the United States is being discussed in Russia, South Africa and Turkey less as an abstract superpower than as a country that is increasingly turning foreign policy into a series of short-term deals: fuel in exchange for political flexibility, market access in exchange for concessions, and weapons and sanctions as bargaining chips in personal negotiations. Local commentators reach much the same broad conclusion: under Donald Trump, Washington has become less predictable, but no less influential. The difference is that Moscow sees this as an opening, Ankara as a chance to lift long-standing restrictions, and Pretoria as a threat to its political and economic sovereignty.

The most widely discussed topic in Russia’s media landscape is the unexpected “diesel diplomacy” between Moscow and Washington. Following an October conversation between Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump, the United States temporarily eased restrictions on Russian diesel fuel shipments, and the first tankers have already set off across the ocean. The Russian press sees this not as the start of full normalisation, but as proof that the US president is willing to set aside the logic of sanctions when it gets in the way of lowering fuel prices at home. Vedomosti notes that the waiver is in effect until April 2027; on October 25, Kommersant reported that Trump had praised the deal and that Moscow was ready to supply “any volume” of diesel. (vedomosti.ru)

Commercial gain is not the only thing that matters to Russia’s response. Fyodor Lukyanov, chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, wrote in a commentary for the Russian International Affairs Council that the pause in sanctions pressure could signal a new approach: for the first time, a decision on Russia had been made not because of the Ukraine agenda, but in response to US interests of its own. This is a telling formulation of the view in Moscow: the United States is not becoming Russia’s ally, but is beginning to acknowledge that its domestic economy and global energy markets do not always allow it to follow the old playbook of isolation. (russiancouncil.ru)

There is, however, also considerable scepticism in the Russian debate. Energy expert Sergey Vakulenko argues in an analysis for Meduza that Russia’s export capacity is limited by conditions in its domestic fuel market and damage to its oil-refining infrastructure. In other words, the deal is politically significant, but economically it does not resolve structural problems. This reflects a characteristic Russian ambivalence: Trump is seen as a pragmatist who can be negotiated with, but not as someone whose consistency can be relied upon. (meduza.io)

In Turkey, the same American pragmatism is viewed through a different lens: defence. Attention is focused on whether Ankara can turn the personal relationship between Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Trump into a return to the F-35 fighter programme, the lifting of CAATSA sanctions, and access to engines for its homegrown KAAN aircraft. Turkey’s T24 directly links the prospects for these issues to the US midterm elections on November 3: a possible Democratic gain in the House of Representatives could once again make Congress the main check on Trump’s promises. (t24.com.tr)

Turkey’s particular perspective is that it expects neither friendship nor automatic alliance from the United States. Its expectations are far more instrumental: if Washington wants to keep Turkey within the Western defence architecture, it must offer more than rhetoric—it must offer aircraft, technology and more equal terms. In July, US Permanent Representative to NATO Matthew Whitaker said he believed the sale of F-35s to Turkey would go ahead, while noting that Ankara’s Russian S-400s remained a legal obstacle. Anadolu Agency reported this as confirmation that a window for negotiations remained open, not as a final decision. (aa.com.tr)

At the same time, Turkish analysts see US policy toward Iran as a source of immediate regional risk. Associate Professor Necmettin Acar argues in an Anadolu Agency analysis that the durability of Trump’s approach depends not only on military and sanctions capabilities, but also on whether US elites can maintain consensus around confrontation with Iran and unconditional support for Israel. For Turkey, this is no abstract issue of American domestic politics: a new escalation with Iran would threaten trade routes, energy stability and security along its southern borders. (aa.com.tr)

The strongest and most emotional reaction to the United States is currently coming from South Africa. There, Washington is seen not merely as a difficult partner, but as a power trying to tie Pretoria’s access to the US market to changes in domestic policy—land reform, programmes to expand economic opportunities for the Black majority, and its treatment of Afrikaners. On October 21, President Cyril Ramaphosa warned the country to prepare for possible exclusion from AGOA, which gives African goods preferential access to the US market. In an article for IOL, he acknowledged that the consequences would be “devastating”, but urged South Africans not to see a possible blow as the end of the country’s economy. (iol.co.za)

What is striking about the South African debate is how quickly even a pragmatic discussion about jobs becomes an argument over post-apartheid identity. International affairs columnist J. Brooks Spector wrote in Daily Maverick that US visa restrictions on people associated with racial redistribution policies and land issues had given the bilateral conflict “an entirely new texture”: the pressure now concerns not only trade, but also the legitimacy of South Africa’s constitutional order. (dailymaverick.co.za)

Analyst Donovan Williams put it even more sharply in Mail & Guardian: in his view, the United States has effectively launched a “diplomatic war” against South Africa, based on “fabrications and outright lies”. The wording is deliberately polemical, but it reflects a widespread feeling in Pretoria: Washington is using talk of minority rights not as a neutral human-rights position, but as leverage to change South Africa’s foreign policy—including its independent stance on Palestine, Israel and the Global South. (mg.co.za)

This is where the common thread running through the reactions of all three countries becomes clear. Russia, Turkey and South Africa have different attitudes toward the United States, but all are watching the same transformation: US policy increasingly looks less like the management of alliances through stable rules and more like a personalised dealmaking process, in which domestic needs determine the price of foreign-policy concessions. For Moscow, this is a chance to sell fuel and ease the pressure of sanctions. For Ankara, it is an opportunity to secure military and technological arrangements that have been blocked for years. For Pretoria, it is a risk that trade privileges will be turned into punishment for refusing to revise its own history and social model.

The most unexpected local conclusion is being drawn not in Moscow or Ankara, but in South Africa: there, “America First” is increasingly compared with a mirror image of what Washington condemns elsewhere—a state policy of favouring and protecting “its own” producers and politically convenient groups. The point is made bluntly in an IOL column: MAGA is “BEE in reverse”—an American version of economic preference set against South Africa’s Black Economic Empowerment programme. This comparison shows why the dispute has long since ceased to be about visas, tariffs or diplomatic tone: for Pretoria, it has become a dispute over the country’s right to decide for itself how to address the legacy of apartheid. (iol.co.za)

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America as a Source of Risk, Not Support: What Seoul, Riyadh and New Delhi Think of Washington Ahead of...

A week before the US midterm elections scheduled for November 3, 2026, discussions in South Korea, Saudi Arabia and India focus less on Donald Trump’s party’s chances than on a practical question: will the vote change the style of American policymaking—or simply make it even less predictable? In three very different countries, a common conclusion is taking shape: the United States remains an essential partner, but Washington is increasingly seen as a force that shifts the costs of its own wars, energy problems and election calculations onto its allies and partners.

The main issue is the US-Iran war and the fate of the Strait of Hormuz. For Riyadh, this is a matter of the country’s physical security and its ability to export oil; for Seoul, it is the risk of a cost spike across its export-driven industry; for New Delhi, it is a threat to the energy security of a vast economy. Saudi debate, however, differs markedly from the familiar Western picture of Saudi Arabia as merely an American ally. Saudi writers emphasize that the kingdom does not want to choose between passivity and being drawn into a major war. It seeks to support regional security, but does not want to become the territory on which someone else’s escalation plays out to the bitter end.

In an article by Zaid M. Belbagi for Arab News, the United States and the Gulf states are described not as peripheral executors of Washington’s decisions, but as central participants in both military planning and the search for a political settlement. This is an important shift: the Saudi perspective calls on the United States to provide not symbolic protection, but a predictable security architecture in which the interests of Gulf states are not sacrificed to the vagaries of American domestic politics. At the same time, the Saudi press notes that the US president has explicitly postponed a possible new strike on Iran until after the congressional elections. This sounds alarming to the region: the war is being put on hold not because a political solution has been found, but because its cost has become a liability with American voters. (okaz.com.sa)

That is why, in the Saudi view, Hormuz is not merely a narrow maritime passage, but a test of whether the American strategy is viable. Paradoxically, the kingdom is at once being forced to offset a blow to the global market and to find ways to reduce its dependence on the strait itself. According to data compiled in an Asharq report, some exports have been rerouted through Saudi and Emirati pipelines that bypass the danger zone. But this success does not dispel the main concern: any new US operation against Iran could once again make Saudi infrastructure and oil routes targets. (asharq.com)

In South Korea, the same war is discussed in terms of pressure on allies. Seoul is concerned not only about oil prices, but also about the possibility that America will demand its military participation in securing shipping. In its report, “US Pressure to Form a Multinational Coalition in Hormuz and Korea’s Response”, the East Asia Institute warns that after Seoul refused to support the campaign against Iran, Trump may try to link assistance in Hormuz to trade negotiations and defense spending. The authors suggest keeping options for logistical support available to the government—such as a supply ship or maritime patrol aircraft—but postponing a political decision as long as possible. In other words, Korea’s approach is not abstractly anti-war: it is based on the need to protect trade routes without turning South Korea into a direct party to the conflict. (global.eai.or.kr)

This is especially sensitive for a country whose industrial model depends both on imported energy and uninterrupted maritime trade. The Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade has explicitly noted that the closure of Hormuz following US and Israeli strikes on Iran raises costs across the entire production chain—from energy to raw materials for manufacturing. As a result, Seoul sees US policy toward Iran not as a distant Middle Eastern issue, but as a threat to the competitiveness of Korean exports. (eiec.kdi.re.kr)

A second theme they share is trade as a tool of coercion. The sharpest reaction comes from India. Indian commentators see the American threat of tariffs against buyers of Russian oil not as a consistent sanctions policy, but as a bargaining cudgel. In a column by Ajay Srivastava, founder of the Global Trade Research Initiative, the key point is that Washington first threatened India with additional duties of up to 100 percent over Russian crude, then itself arranged purchases of Russian diesel to bring prices down for Americans, and later temporarily eased pressure on its partners. The author puts the conclusion bluntly, without diplomatic euphemisms: relief from a threat Washington itself created is not a trade concession.

In New Delhi, this is linked to a larger question: India’s right to pursue an independent foreign policy. Ram Madhav, national vice-president of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party, writes in an article for The Indian Express that the double standards are especially glaring: the United States threatens India with punitive tariffs over Russian oil, while granting exemptions to European allies and buying Russian fuel for its own market. His call to “stop weaponizing trade, technology and sea lanes” reflects the current mood in India: the partnership with America must be preserved, but American rules can no longer be accepted as neutral and universal. (indianexpress.com)

Interestingly, India’s reaction is not simply a matter of disappointment in Trump as an individual. Many writers see the problem as structural. In an analysis by Ishan Bakshi, pressure over oil, the sanctions bill, restrictions on IT services and the mobility of skilled professionals are treated as parts of a single signal: Washington may believe that India is no longer as indispensable to containing China as it once was. Hence India’s strategy of “de-risking,” rather than breaking ties: not abandoning the United States, Russia or engagement with China, but not allowing any one power center to dictate terms. (indianexpress.com)

South Korea’s version of the same problem is more muted, but essentially similar. The debate there is about what will outlast the American elections: not so much the makeup of Congress as the system of tariffs, investment commitments and demands on an ally that is already in place. A Korean analysis by Next Journal notes that a change in the House majority would not, by itself, eliminate trade barriers, since the tariff mechanisms are embedded in executive and legislative instruments that are difficult to revise quickly. The most telling episode is the gap between Trump’s statement that Korea could invest up to $200 billion in the US energy sector and South Korean Industry Minister Kim Jong-kwan’s remark that the two sides had in fact agreed on only “three proposals.” This cautious correction shows how wary Seoul is of announcement-driven politics, in which a headline-grabbing figure can become leverage for subsequent pressure. (nextjournal.kr)

Saudi Arabia, India and South Korea therefore face different stakes, but share a similar diagnosis. Riyadh fears that the American war with Iran will make its oil system hostage to someone else’s election calendar. Seoul fears that its military alliance will be turned into demands for resources, investment and participation in risky operations. New Delhi believes that the economy and sanctions have become tools for disciplining partners who maintain the right to pursue their own interests. None of the three capitals concludes that it should distance itself from the United States at any cost. On the contrary, their shared demand of Washington is more pragmatic and more exacting: fewer sudden ultimatums, fewer deals tied to an American election week, and more commitments that remain in force after the votes have been counted.

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Trump’s Transactional Diplomacy Alarms Allies

Articles from Saudi Arabia and Ukraine portray Donald Trump’s policy as a mix of threats, bargaining and possible economic deals. Amid the threat of imminent military action against Iran, options for economic engagement with Tehran are also being discussed. With regard to Russia and Ukraine, concerns center on possible sanctions relief and agreements between major powers: critics warn that such decisions could ease pressure on Moscow and undermine Kyiv’s interests. This article is based on reporting by Al Jazeera (Saudi Arabia) and Slovo i Dilo (Ukraine).

Threat to Iran Raises Risks for Oil and the Strait of Hormuz

US statements about a possible new military operation against Iran, along with Donald Trump’s promise to secure a “big and beautiful” deal, are adding to uncertainty over the security of the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz and the global oil market. As Al Jazeera notes, for Saudi Arabia this is more than a dispute between Washington and Tehran: an escalation near its borders could affect hydrocarbon exports, maritime trade, shipping insurance costs, the investment climate and the implementation of long-term development programs.

Trump is effectively issuing Tehran an ultimatum: accept an agreement or face a military strike. The US president says the United States can “finish the job” quickly and identifies preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons as the central condition for a lasting settlement. At the same time, reports say Washington is considering various operational scenarios, ranging from attacks on military and political targets deep inside the country to strikes on civilian and energy infrastructure.

The possibility that the conflict could spread to the energy sector is especially alarming to Gulf states. Strikes on Iranian infrastructure could trigger retaliation in the Persian Gulf, maritime incidents, sabotage, or threats to oil terminals and shipping. In that case, not only Iranian facilities but also export routes across the region would be at risk.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian accused the United States of derailing a temporary agreement, calling the US administration “cowards.” He nevertheless advocated making another attempt to reach a deal. Tehran also rejected reports that it was prepared to link the opening of the Strait of Hormuz to the lifting of the naval blockade. These signals suggest that both sides are formally leaving room for negotiations, but their positions remain hard-line, and the strait remains one of their main instruments of pressure.

The Strait of Hormuz is of strategic importance to Riyadh. It is one of the world’s key oil shipping routes, and even limited instability in the area could send prices soaring, increase insurance costs, disrupt supplies and raise risks for tanker traffic. Trump’s statements about increased shipments through Hormuz may be aimed at reassuring markets, but they do not eliminate the main threat: a military conflict could quickly change the conditions for maritime traffic.

Saudi Arabia’s primary interest is to prevent the war from spreading. Any clash between the United States and Iran raises the likelihood of strikes, sabotage and maritime incidents near the territory of the kingdom and its partners in the Gulf Cooperation Council. Even a brief escalation could disrupt supply chains and have consequences not only for oil revenues but for the wider regional economy.

This prospect is particularly concerning for the Vision 2030 program. Saudi Arabia’s diversification strategy depends on a steady flow of international capital, tourism growth, predictable business conditions and secure infrastructure. A crisis-driven rise in oil prices could bring short-term budget gains, but a protracted regional war runs counter to the goals of economic modernization and undermines investment prospects.

In recent years, Riyadh has sought to reduce tensions with Tehran, including by restoring bilateral contacts. The prospect of US strikes is therefore seen not as a guaranteed way to resolve the nuclear issue, but as a risk of undoing a fragile regional détente. The article does not quote Saudi officials or experts directly, but its focus on the Strait of Hormuz, energy and the risk of the conflict spreading reflects concerns that matter to Gulf states.

Saudi Arabia’s view goes beyond the question of whether Iran will acquire nuclear weapons. The cost of a possible military campaign, and who will bear its consequences, also matters. Diplomacy built around the formula “a deal or a strike” could leave neighboring countries hostage to decisions made outside the region, while the security of the Gulf, stable shipping and the continuity of oil supplies require not escalation but a lasting political settlement.

Trump Says US Could Do Business With Ukraine and Russia After the War

US President Donald Trump said that after the war ends, Washington will “do business with both Ukraine and Russia.” As the Ukrainian outlet Slovo i Dilo reports, he did not specify which sectors he meant or what conditions would be imposed on Moscow and Kyiv.

For Ukraine, the wording is particularly sensitive. Russia continues its full-scale war, so the prospect of its economic ties with the West being restored soon raises concerns that normalization could come before questions of accountability for aggression, reparations and security guarantees for Ukraine are resolved.

The article discusses Trump’s remarks against the backdrop of economic cooperation between the United States and Ukraine that is already underway. The US-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund, it notes, has concluded its first minerals deal and approved four more projects, including initiatives to support the energy sector. For Kyiv, these are not merely commercial agreements but also a tool for postwar recovery, attracting US capital and strengthening energy resilience.

At the same time, the Ukrainian outlet draws attention to reports by The New York Times about possible economic offers to the Kremlin in exchange for a partial ceasefire. Among the options discussed was restoring Russian gas exports to the European Union. Such a scenario is especially alarming in Ukraine, where dependence on Russian gas has previously given Moscow significant political leverage.

The return of Russian fuel to the European market without eliminating the military threat could revive the previous model of relations, in which Western countries’ economic interests weaken their willingness to resist pressure from Russia. From Ukraine’s perspective, this creates a risk that an end to active hostilities will be treated as sufficient grounds for bringing the aggressor back into the global economy.

Trump also considered the possibility of imposing 200% tariffs on Ukraine and Russia as a way to push the parties toward peace. However, he acknowledged that the measure seemed unrealistic because the volume of trade is relatively small. For Kyiv, this approach illustrates the risks of “transactional diplomacy,” in which war, sanctions and peace talks are discussed primarily in terms of tariffs, markets and economic deals.

Ukraine assesses possible agreements by different criteria: preserving sovereignty, liberating occupied territories, holding Russia accountable, securing compensation for damages and establishing reliable mechanisms to prevent another war.

Although Slovo i Dilo’s article does not include separate comments from politicians or experts, its structure conveys the Ukrainian view of Trump’s statement. His remarks about doing business with both countries are presented alongside the prospect of investment in Ukraine’s economy, reports of possible concessions to Moscow and the question of Russian gas.

The central issue for Ukraine, then, is not the prospect of postwar economic activity itself, but the conditions under which it takes place. Economic cooperation with the United States could contribute to the country’s recovery and the long-term deterrence of Russia. But in Kyiv, restoring business ties with Moscow before the consequences of aggression have been addressed, reparations paid and security guarantees established is seen as a risk of renewed destabilization.

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America Before the Midterms: China, Australia and Japan See Washington as a Source...

In the final days of October 2026, discussions of the United States in China, Australia and Japan unexpectedly converged not so much on Donald Trump’s ideology as on a practical question: to what extent is Washington’s foreign policy now governed by the domestic arithmetic of election season? The focus is on the US administration’s decision to temporarily ease restrictions on Russian diesel fuel, its attempt to bring down domestic fuel prices ahead of the November 3 congressional elections, and the possible consequences of a weakened presidency after the vote. For observers in all three countries, these are not isolated episodes but signs that the United States is increasingly acting like a power whose strategic commitments can be revised under pressure from prices, approval ratings and political expediency.

The Russian issue has attracted the most attention. Australia’s response has been the most emotional and morally forceful. Energy Minister Chris Bowen said Canberra “does not need or want Russian fuel,” stressing that Russia must not benefit from its war against Ukraine. In an ABC report, this position comes across not as a formal disagreement with an ally, but as a principled refusal to accept a deal in which economic relief for the United States comes at the cost of strengthening Moscow politically. (abc.net.au)

Australian commentators go beyond the official formulation. ABC columnist John Lyons calls Trump’s deal with Vladimir Putin the Kremlin’s biggest economic and propaganda victory since the start of the war, while his colleague Laura Tingle sees the main reason for Washington’s reversal as the White House’s concern over high fuel prices and the risk of a Republican defeat in the elections. Her conclusion is especially telling: in Australia, US strategy on Ukraine is no longer seen as the consistent course of a great power, but as a series of contradictory steps driven by the struggle for votes. Tingle’s analysis puts it almost bluntly: US foreign policy is sinking under the weight of its own contradictions. (abc.net.au)

In Japan, the assessment is less emotional, but the concern is more directly tied to national security. An Asahi Weekly editorial describes America’s softening stance toward Russia as a selfish approach that benefits the aggressor and undermines international solidarity. (digital.asahi-weekly.asahi.com) For Tokyo, the issue is not limited to Ukraine: if Washington can quickly retreat from its sanctions policy for domestic economic gain, Japan is bound to ask how durable US commitments in East Asia really are—from the Taiwan Strait to Japan’s southwestern islands.

Chinese publications view the same issue differently. From Beijing’s perspective, easing restrictions on Russian diesel is less a moral failure of the West than evidence of structural weakness in US policy. Guangming Daily describes the White House’s calculation as an attempt to hold on to voters, push for a ceasefire and revive negotiations all at once, but argues that all three goals may prove unattainable. (news.gmw.cn) Chinese writers identify the central contradiction: the United States is trying to use Russia to ease energy pressures at home while maintaining its claim to leadership of the anti-Russian coalition. For Chinese audiences, this confirms the familiar argument that American principles are subordinate to political expediency, while also serving as a warning: Washington’s unpredictability can create risks for everyone, including Beijing.

A second common theme is the US midterm elections as a factor in international security. Meng Weizhan, a researcher at Fudan University, argues in an analysis for Peking University that the most likely outcome is a narrow Democratic majority in the House of Representatives, with Republicans holding the Senate. He warns that even a limited thaw with China after meetings between the leaders will remain vulnerable: technological competition has already become a domestic political consensus in the United States, and Congress can raise the cost of any compromises made by the administration. (igcu.pku.edu.cn) In other words, Chinese commentators do not expect the US vote to automatically improve relations. They anticipate an even more divided Washington, where tactical agreements are possible but a lasting strategic shift is unlikely.

Japanese analysts reach a similar conclusion, but frame it in terms of the danger of political paralysis. Tomohisa Ishida, an expert at the Japan Research Institute, warns in an analysis published on October 21 that a Democratic victory could entrench a prolonged confrontation between Congress and the White House. His observation that a domestic crisis in the United States could worsen the situation in Northeast Asia is particularly important for Japan: US policy circles are already discussing the possibility of moving the defensive perimeter farther from the first island chain linking Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines. (jri.co.jp) This is an extremely sensitive issue for Tokyo. Behind it lies not simply a fear of reduced US resources, but concern that the region’s strategic map could be redrawn without sufficient regard for the interests of America’s allies.

The Australian debate adds the question of dependence. In an ABC column, Laura Tingle poses an uncomfortable question for Canberra: what is the real cost of an alliance with the United States if the ally itself is becoming less predictable? (abc.net.au) The AUKUS program, under which Australia is to acquire nuclear-powered submarines, remains the official foundation of its defense strategy. That is precisely why its vulnerabilities are being discussed so intensely. The slow pace of US shipbuilding has long raised doubts about delivery timelines, while political instability in Washington turns a production problem into a question of trust. ABC notes that the key issue remains whether the United States can both meet its own naval plans and transfer submarines in such short supply to Australia. (abc.net.au)

The most important common thread in the reactions from all three countries is that none of them believes Trump’s weakening after the elections will automatically make the United States more measured. China fears that pressure from Congress will cement technological and military-political competition. Japan allows for the possibility that a weakened president might seek high-profile foreign policy initiatives, or prove unable to sustain the previous level of commitments in Asia. Australia sees the risk that a more chaotic Washington will force Canberra to choose between loyalty to its ally and avoiding entanglement in conflicts that are not its own.

Thus, Chinese, Japanese and Australian reactions differ in their assessments of US intentions but converge on the consequences. China sees the events as revealing the limits of US hegemony and creating an opportunity for a more cautious stabilization of relations with Washington. Japan sees a threat to the guarantees on which its postwar security has been built. Australia sees painful dependence on an ally whose domestic politics increasingly shape its foreign commitments. The dominant international image of the United States in late October 2026 is neither that of a confident leader nor that of a power in irreversible decline, but of a country whose decisions have become so dependent on the next electoral cycle that neither partners nor rivals can regard them as lasting.

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America, with Reservations: Why Japan, Saudi Arabia and Ukraine Are Increasingly Debating Not Its...

In recent days, America has become the subject of especially fraught debate in three very different countries. The reason is not so much domestic scandals in Washington as the consequences of US policy abroad: the protracted conflict with Iran and the risk of a new energy shock; uncertainty over what real help Saudi Arabia can expect against the Houthis; and the increasingly apparent subordination of the Ukraine issue to Donald Trump’s political calendar. The common thread in Japanese, Saudi and Ukrainian reactions is that the United States remains an indispensable power, but its partners can no longer treat American promises as an automatic guarantee of security.

For Japan, the US campaign of pressure on Iran has ceased to be a “distant Middle Eastern war.” In the Japanese energy journal Energy Forum, columnist Masanori Koyama describes the situation as a “complex oil crisis”: since September, pro-Iranian forces have stepped up operations across the Persian Gulf, while US military and economic pressure, in his assessment, is not moderating Tehran but pushing it toward an even harder line. For a country dependent on seaborne fuel supplies, this is not an abstract debate about regime change in Iran, but a question of electricity and fuel costs and the resilience of supply chains. (energy-forum.co.jp)

Japanese commentators also point to a deeper problem: Washington seems to have expanded the operation’s goals faster than it has defined the conditions for ending it. In an analysis by the Institute for Middle Eastern and Asian Studies, Akinobu Kinoshita writes that the US-Israeli campaign has shifted from strikes on Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities to pressure on its political system, a blockade and a struggle over the Strait of Hormuz. His central question is almost characteristically pragmatic: not “how to win,” but “how to end it.” If the measure of success keeps changing—from weakening Iran’s missiles to changing its behavior or political system—then the war has no clear political exit. (imeais.tokyo)

The Saudi response is different: here, US uncertainty is seen not as a risk to an import-dependent economy but as a direct threat to cities, airports and oil infrastructure. Following Houthi attacks, including strikes on King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh on October 10–11, the official Saudi agenda has emphasized the kingdom’s right to self-defense and the need to stop weapons from reaching the Houthis. On October 21, the Saudi Press Agency, SPA, reported the interception of four drones headed toward the country, reinforcing the sense that the crisis is not a one-off incident but an ongoing threat. (spa.gov.sa)

A view is gaining ground in the Saudi press: US assistance matters, but security cannot be built solely around waiting for an American decision. In a column for Al Riyadh, Abdel Aziz Aluwaisheg, secretary-general of the Gulf Cooperation Council, calls for a shift from UN resolutions to practical measures to cut off weapons flows to the Houthis. He notes that American, European and multinational naval forces are already operating in the region, and in effect poses a blunt question: if international mechanisms are not working, states must ensure the arms embargo is enforced themselves. (alriyadh.com) This marks an important shift in tone: Riyadh is not rejecting its partnership with Washington, but demanding that it be measured not by statements of solidarity, but by the ability to protect airspace and shipping.

At the same time, the Saudi debate is not simply about accusing America of abandoning an ally. The regional broadcaster Asharq reported Trump calling the strike on the airport “horrible and unacceptable,” but his formula for possible further action—“maybe we’ll do it, we’ll consider it”—only deepened doubts. Against this backdrop, an Arabic-language BBC analysis describes the situation as a test of the old oil-for-security deal: stable energy supplies in exchange for the American security umbrella. Researcher Mitchell Plitnick puts it bluntly: “America let Saudi Arabia down here” [translated from Arabic], while former State Department adviser Aaron David Miller explains the White House’s restraint as a reluctance to open another front, as well as a consequence of the US midterm elections. (bbc.com.im)

It is this factor—US domestic politics—that is especially troubling to Ukraine. In Ukrainian coverage, America is seen not as a single, stable institution but as a political system in which the outcome of the November 3 elections could alter both the negotiating position on the war and the limits of pressure on Russia. In an article for LB.ua, US expert Oleksandr Kraiev warns that even a potential Democratic victory may not bring Kyiv immediate relief: without the agreement of both chambers of Congress, the president will retain broad room to maneuver through executive powers. Professor Oleksiy Haran adds that Trump is increasingly becoming a source of tension within the American system, but Ukrainians should not expect US elections alone to fix American foreign policy. (lb.ua)

The most interesting Ukrainian conclusion is that frustration with Trump has not turned into a call to break with Washington. Taras Semenyuk of the Solid Info think tank calls the US president’s style “show politics”—“every day is like a TV series, with drama” [translated from Ukrainian]—in an interview with Espreso, but insists that diplomatic channels must remain open. His reasoning is clear-eyed: Trump’s harsh rhetoric can give way to substantive agreements, as has happened before, after public clashes between Kyiv and Washington. At the same time, Ukraine needs to rely on more dependable European support without abandoning dialogue with the United States. (espreso.tv)

An unusual common picture is taking shape. Japan sees a risk in an American strategy that could produce an endless war, disrupting global energy supplies and sea routes; Saudi Arabia sees the risk that alliance commitments may prove weaker than Washington’s electoral calculations; and Ukraine fears that its security will become an element in an American political spectacle and bargaining with Moscow. Yet in Tokyo, Riyadh and Kyiv, no one is discussing a complete break with the United States. They are discussing something else: how to get through an era in which America still wields decisive power, but its partners have to build backup layers of security themselves—from adapting their energy systems and cooperating at sea to relying on European defense support and maintaining constant, even uncomfortable, diplomacy with the White House.

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U.S. Pressure and Political Fallout

Reports from Venezuela and Turkey examine the consequences of the Trump administration’s forceful foreign policy. Washington is stepping up pressure on Cuba and taking measures to gather intelligence, threatening Iran with further military action and displaying its naval presence near Cuba. At the same time, signs are emerging that Arab Americans are moving away from supporting Trump. In this way, external pressure is causing alarm abroad and triggering a political backlash within the United States and its diasporas. This article draws on reporting by Daily Ummah (Turkey) and Yahoo Noticias en Español (Venezuela).

Arab Americans Turn Away from Trump Over Gaza and Iran

Arab American voters are increasingly leaning toward the Democratic Party ahead of the U.S. midterm elections. According to Turkish outlet Daily Ummah, the shift is primarily linked to the war in Gaza, Washington’s support for Israel, and rising tensions with Iran.

According to a poll by The Washington Post and George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government, 58% of registered Arab American voters intend to vote for Democrats. Some 34% of respondents are prepared to support Republicans. These figures differ sharply from the 2024 presidential campaign, when Arab American votes were split almost evenly: Kamala Harris received 41% support, while Donald Trump received 39%.

The Turkish publication interprets this shift as disillusionment with Trump’s promise to “bring peace to the region.” During the war in Gaza, dissatisfaction with Joe Biden’s administration may have led some Arab voters to support the Republican candidate. But the continuation of hostilities, support for Israel, and confrontational rhetoric toward Iran, the outlet argues, have dashed the hopes of those who saw Trump as a possible alternative.

The poll reflects particularly strong opposition to his Middle East policy. Eighty percent of Arab American voters disapprove of Trump’s approach to Israel and Gaza. About 70% believe Israel is committing war crimes and genocide against Palestinians in Gaza. Roughly 80% favor reducing U.S. military aid to Israel, and six in ten support ending it altogether.

Dissatisfaction with Washington’s hard line toward Tehran is equally pronounced: 75% of respondents oppose the U.S. military policy toward Iran. Daily Ummah links this stance to fears that a policy of pressure and threats could widen the regional conflict and lead to even greater humanitarian and political instability.

Foreign policy crises, the outlet stresses, also have economic consequences at home. Seven in ten poll respondents are dissatisfied with the Trump administration’s economic policy. Even among those who voted for him in 2024, about 40% express dissatisfaction with the economic situation. Rising fuel and grocery costs, attributed to tariffs and the Iran crisis, are turning international confrontation into a day-to-day financial problem for American families.

Cultural and political factors are also deepening the sense of alienation. About half of those surveyed consider the Republican Party cold or hostile toward the Arab community. Sixty percent say the same of Trump himself. The Turkish outlet links these views to anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim rhetoric among some Republicans, noting that Islamophobia, discrimination against Muslims, and attitudes toward immigrants remain highly sensitive issues for Arab voters.

Democrats, however, are not seen as unquestioned allies of the community. The Biden administration’s policy toward Israel left deep distrust: 45% of respondents doubt the Democratic Party’s sincerity. This is therefore not a complete shift in political identity, but a temporary swing toward Democrats as the less undesirable alternative amid a broader crisis of trust in the U.S. establishment.

The electoral shift could be especially significant in Michigan, home to a large Arab American community. The state is holding a competitive Senate race between Democrat Abdul El-Sayed, who is of Egyptian descent, and Republican Mike Rogers. For Daily Ummah, the race illustrates how the Palestinian issue, the war in Gaza, and U.S. policy toward Iran can affect not only Washington’s international image but also the balance of power in Congress.

The Turkish outlet’s main conclusion is that Trump’s pro-Israel and military-first approach carries a domestic political cost for the United States. By this logic, support for Israel, military pressure on Iran, and neglect of the Palestinian issue have failed to bring peace to the Middle East while also eroding Republican support among Americans whose families, heritage, and community identities are directly connected to the region.

Cuba Accuses the U.S. of a New Pressure Campaign and CIA Recruitment

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s call for Cubans to “discreetly” work with the CIA to bring about “positive change” on the island prompted a sharp response from Havana and drew particular attention in Venezuela’s media. As Yahoo Noticias reports, Caracas sees this not as an isolated episode in the U.S.-Cuba dispute, but as part of Washington’s broader effort to pressure governments it opposes across the Caribbean and Latin America.

According to the report, the U.S. is offering potential informants instructions on secure communications, VPNs, private browsers, and disposable email addresses. In the Cuban and Venezuelan interpretation, this looks less like a diplomatic appeal than a public recruitment campaign and evidence of active intelligence operations against the island.

Cuba’s Deputy Foreign Minister Carlos Fernández de Cossío said sarcastically that the U.S. had “resorted to publicly recruiting for the CIA.” He said U.S. intelligence was probably in “a state of great desperation or poverty” if it had to advertise its offers “like toothpaste.” Cuba’s Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez, for his part, rejected Washington’s threats and warned that Cuba’s shores would not welcome those arriving “with hostile aims and a thirst for domination.”

The regional context adds to the tension surrounding these statements. Venezuelan audiences draw direct parallels between the situation in Cuba and their own experience of sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and threats against Caracas. The report notes that Donald Trump previously used a U.S. criminal indictment as justification for a military operation against Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. Against this backdrop, the charges against Raúl Castro, related to the 1996 shootdown of aircraft, are seen in Havana not merely as a legal matter but also as a possible instrument of political and military pressure.

Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel called the prosecution of Castro legally baseless and said it was an attempt to justify aggression against the country. Cuban authorities link such actions to a policy of “maximum pressure” that, in their view, is aimed at changing the government and undermining national sovereignty.

The energy crisis is another part of this picture. According to the figures cited, Cuba produces only about 40% of the oil it needs domestically, while its power system depends on seven aging thermal power plants. The article says that the U.S. oil blockade and restrictions are worsening fuel shortages and power outages. In Venezuela, where the oil industry and the effects of sanctions remain central political issues, this is seen as a familiar pattern: economic restrictions create shortages and social discontent, after which those consequences are presented as proof of the government’s failure and a reason to call for its removal.

Distrust of U.S. initiatives is also fueled by historical memory of the CIA operation associated with the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion. The failed attempt to overthrow Cuba’s revolutionary government remains a symbol, for Cuba and its allies, of American covert operations and interference in the domestic affairs of countries in the region.

In Venezuela’s reading, the current situation involving Cuba is a warning to all of Latin America. Pressure through sanctions, criminal charges, information campaigns, and intelligence methods is viewed as part of a single strategy of external coercion. Cuba is thus presented not as a distant object of a U.S.-Cuba conflict, but as an ally of Venezuela whose fate is tied to the region’s broader struggle for political independence.

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America Turns Tariffs Into Geopolitics: How India, Ukraine and Brazil Read Washington’s Signal

Over the past two days, July 30–31, 2025, the main story in the United States for India, Ukraine and Brazil has been not merely Donald Trump’s trade policy, but its transformation into a tool of direct political pressure. Washington has simultaneously announced a 25% tariff on Indian goods—with an additional, as yet unspecified penalty for purchases of Russian oil and weapons—and imposed a 50% tariff on Brazil, openly linking it to the country’s domestic politics and the case against former president Jair Bolsonaro. For Ukraine, meanwhile, these measures have become part of another, vital story: Trump shortened Moscow’s deadline to agree to a ceasefire to 10–12 days and once again spoke of sanctions against buyers of Russian energy. (kommersant.ru)

Together, these three countries offer a particularly clear view of America’s new international image: less an ally or trading partner than a power that ties access to its market to political loyalty, energy choices and even the structure of other countries’ democratic institutions. But the reactions differ. In Kyiv, many see America’s hard line as a long-awaited attempt to deprive Russia of oil revenues. In New Delhi, it is seen as a dangerous precedent: the energy security interests of a country of 1.4 billion people are being declared contrary to US priorities. In Brasília, it is viewed as interference in national sovereignty under the cover of trade policy.

India’s debate centers on a question far broader than the dispute over a 25% tariff: can India preserve its strategic autonomy if the United States is effectively demanding that it reconsider its relations with Russia? In an editorial, The Indian Express describes the tariff blow as a risk to exports, supply chains, employment and economic growth, with potential losses estimated at up to $30 billion. But the authors stress that the underlying problem is not simply access for US goods to the Indian market: Washington is angered by India’s purchases of Russian oil and New Delhi’s defense ties with Moscow. (indianexpress.com)

For Indian audiences, the logic of punishing the country for buying Russian oil is especially troubling. Since the full-scale war began, Russia has sold crude at a substantial discount, and the share of Russian oil in India’s imports rose from around 2% in the 2021–22 fiscal year to 36% in 2024–25. From India’s perspective, this is not an ideological choice in favor of the Kremlin, but a pragmatic effort to protect its domestic market from expensive energy. The US demand is therefore seen as an attempt to make India pay for someone else’s geopolitical strategy—with no guarantee that Washington will treat it as an equal partner. (indianexpress.com)

At the same time, India’s establishment is not calling for a dramatic break. The same The Indian Express editorial board views New Delhi’s restrained response as a pragmatic reaction to pressure, while urging it to continue negotiating a trade agreement. This position reflects India’s foreign-policy tradition: not to choose definitively between the United States and Russia, but to preserve room to bargain with both. India is prepared to discuss specific concessions, but not to accept that Washington should determine its energy policy. (indianexpress.com)

Ukraine, by contrast, views pressure on buyers of Russian oil through the lens of war. Ukrainian commentators see Trump’s shortened ultimatum to Moscow as a sign that the White House is finally beginning to recognize the futility of endless attempts to reach an agreement with Vladimir Putin. Political scientist Andreas Umland writes in a column for Ukrainska Pravda that Trump’s rhetorical shift is more likely linked to his realization that his previous approach has failed than to any fundamental change in his views on Russia. Ukraine’s key caveat is crucial: words of resolve matter only if they are followed by weapons, sanctions and predictable policy—not another deal at Kyiv’s expense. (pravda.com.ua)

Ukrainian foreign-policy expert Liudmyla Pokrovshchuk, commenting on the prospect of secondary tariffs against Russia’s trading partners, said on the FREEДОМ channel that once the deadline expires, Trump could impose the promised 100% tariffs while increasing military supplies to Ukraine. For Kyiv, this marks an important shift: Russian oil is viewed not merely as a commodity, but as the financial foundation of Russia’s ability to continue the war. (uatv.ua)

Ukraine’s response, however, is not simply optimistic. There is an understanding that secondary tariffs on India or other major buyers of Russian oil can be an effective lever only if applied consistently. If the threats remain a bargaining chip, Moscow will gain time, while US partners will have an incentive to find ways around the restrictions. That is why the Indian tariff is read in Ukraine in two ways: as a potentially useful blow to Russian revenues, but also as a test of whether Trump can pursue a long-term strategy rather than simply make high-profile political gestures.

Brazil finds itself in an even more unusual situation: here, the tariff is not a means of applying pressure over Russia or a trade imbalance, but a lever for intervening in a domestic political and legal conflict. An order signed by Trump on July 30 added 40 percentage points to the existing 10% rate, bringing the total tariff to 50%. The document explicitly mentions Bolsonaro, who is facing a case in Brazil over an alleged attempt to prevent the transfer of power after the 2022 election. Folha de S.Paulo notes that the measure appears to be motivated primarily by politics rather than economics. (www1.folha.uol.com.br)

For Brazilians, it is particularly telling that the United States did not impose an equally damaging regime on all trade. Nearly 700 product categories were exempted, including certain types of aircraft, energy products and orange juice. The American Chamber of Commerce in Brazil calculated that the exemptions covered 43.4% of the value of Brazilian exports to the United States. This softened the immediate economic blow but did not dispel political outrage: Washington showed that it could punish a country while simultaneously protecting the sectors of the US economy that need Brazilian goods. (noticias.uol.com.br)

Brazilian political analyst Rafael Favetti, commenting for UOL, voiced a suspicion common in the local debate: the exemptions were most likely concessions not to Brasília, but to American businesses. In other words, this is not Trump backing away from an attempt to influence Brazilian politics, but a targeted adjustment of the punitive measure. (noticias.uol.com.br)

This highlights an important difference between Brazilian and Ukrainian perceptions of US pressure. For Ukraine, secondary measures against Russian oil may be justified because they are intended to end the war and restrict the aggressor’s resources. For Brazil, tariffs linked to Bolsonaro’s fate look like a dangerous assertion of the US right to judge the work of Brazilian courts and influence criminal proceedings in another democracy. Thomas Shannon, a former US ambassador to Brazil, called it the first instance of Trump using the threat of tariffs for a political purpose, directly intervening in another country’s institutions, in an interview with Folha. (www1.folha.uol.com.br)

The common thread linking India, Ukraine and Brazil is not anti-Americanism as such. All three countries need the United States, but each is now being forced to weigh the cost of that dependence. India sees that its partnership with Washington may be made conditional on giving up discounted Russian oil. Ukraine hopes that US tariff power will finally be used against the sources financing Russia’s war, but fears inconsistency. Brazil is discovering that access to the US market may be tied to how its own courts handle a case involving a Trump ally.

The most unexpected conclusion from these distinct reactions is that the United States is pushing the countries in different ways toward greater self-reliance. In India, the case for multi-aligned diplomacy and market diversification is gaining ground. In Brazil, there is a growing incentive to seek alternative export markets and make the defense of sovereignty a unifying domestic slogan. In Ukraine, by contrast, the conviction is strengthening that American power remains indispensable—but only if it is applied systematically, rather than through a series of deals. Trump’s tariffs are thus more than an economic measure: in Delhi, they are read as a test of autonomy; in Kyiv, as a potential instrument of war and peace; and in Brasília, as a test of democratic sovereignty.

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America as a Negotiator with Leverage: Why Seoul, Jerusalem and New Delhi Worry Not About the...

In South Korea, Israel and India, the United States is now being discussed not as an abstract superpower, or even primarily as a source of military protection. The main theme they have in common is Washington’s transformation into a partner that increasingly links security, access to its market, energy deals and its allies’ domestic politics into a single package. In Seoul, this is seen through tariffs and compelled investments in U.S. infrastructure; in New Delhi, through a trade deal, Russian oil and concerns about diplomatic independence; in Israel, through Donald Trump’s direct influence on the election atmosphere and on decisions about when and how to act against Iran.

The debate in South Korea is the clearest example: American protectionism is no longer viewed simply as an external trade dispute, but as a test of how well an ally can preserve its agency. On October 6, Trump publicly said that lowering tariffs on South Korea would require “payment,” linking it to a promised $150 billion investment in American shipbuilding. The formula angered Seoul precisely because it recasts relations between two allies in the language of paying for market access. In an editorial, Hankyoreh warns that the $50 billion in South Korean investment in an Alaska LNG project cited by Trump is not an approved commitment, but merely one option under consideration—and that its actual cost could exceed $60 billion. The paper urges the government not to take on the role of investor in a “bottomless pit” and to secure multilayered guarantees of commercial viability. (yna.co.kr)

But South Korea’s dispute is about more than money. A second Hankyoreh editorial captures the tension of the moment: “Allies share values, but their interests sometimes diverge” [translated from Korean]. This is not a call to distance the country from America; on the contrary, it is an argument for strengthening the alliance while preserving “strategic autonomy.” Behind that phrase lies a fear that Washington may demand not only investment, but greater political and intelligence discipline on issues involving China, North Korea and regional security. Even more pragmatic South Korean business commentators see the dual nature of U.S. projects: investments in energy and shipbuilding could open up the American market to South Korean companies, but they began as a forced price for easing tariff pressure. (hani.co.kr)

India views the same American model even more warily. Negotiations on a bilateral trade agreement are formally close to completion, but the Indian press is far from unreservedly optimistic. At stake are not only tariff rates, but also the terms of U.S. access to the Indian market, purchases of American energy and pressure on New Delhi’s ties with Moscow. An analysis by The Indian Express highlights the asymmetry: India intended to buy $500 billion worth of American goods—from energy supplies to aircraft—over five years, while there is no reciprocal commitment to buy Indian products. An expert quoted anonymously by the paper warns that including U.S.-style “economic security” provisions in the deal could significantly constrain India’s sovereignty in foreign policy, trade and the economy. (indianexpress.com)

The oil issue has proved especially painful. U.S. sanctions legislation targeting Russia and Iran allows tariffs of up to 100% on major buyers of Russian energy, including India. New Delhi sees this as an attempt to turn a commercial deal into a tool for geopolitical alignment. In a column for The Indian Express, Ishan Bakshi argues that pressure over oil imports, sanctions legislation, restrictions on India’s IT sector and skilled-worker migration are not a collection of random steps by the Trump administration, but signs of a deeper reassessment of Washington’s attitude toward India. His particularly unwelcome conclusion for the Indian establishment is that the United States may doubt whether India can become the economic and strategic counterweight to China that Washington had hoped for. (indianexpress.com)

At the same time, a more conciliatory view exists in India. Mark Linscott, a former assistant U.S. trade representative, believes an interim agreement is very close and that a meeting between Modi and Trump could break the deadlock. But even he acknowledges that the most sensitive issues—above all, agriculture and dairy products—will probably have to be left out of the first phase. For India, this is fundamental: protecting farmers is not a technical detail, but a political red line. (indianexpress.com)

Israel’s response is different: America remains an indispensable military and diplomatic partner, but that is precisely why the White House’s unpredictability is seen as a threat to the country’s room for maneuver. The focus is on Trump’s sharp change of tone ahead of Israel’s parliamentary elections on October 27. Just days earlier, when asked about Benjamin Netanyahu, he said he “trusts nobody” [translated from English]; then he publicly backed the Israeli prime minister. Israeli outlet Ynet describes this reversal as a source of concern not only for the opposition, but also for those thinking about long-term relations with the United States: American approval is at once an electoral asset and a symbol of excessive dependence. (ynet.co.il)

The most revealing detail in the Israeli debate is the suggestion that Trump’s support may have served as a kind of compensation for his unwillingness to let Israel launch another strike on Iran before the election. One opposition figure quoted by Ynet put the risk in starkly cynical terms: if voters decide that Washington’s political blessing came “at the expense of security,” it could hurt Netanyahu rather than help him. In this view, the United States is no longer merely a guarantor of Israel’s security, but an external actor that simultaneously regulates the pace of military escalation, influences domestic political battles and has its own midterm elections on November 3 to think about. (ynet.co.il)

This is where all three local perspectives converge. South Korea fears that the alliance will be turned into a bill for American jobs and infrastructure. India worries that trade concessions will become a tool for controlling its foreign-policy choices—from oil to its relations with China and Russia. Israel is concerned that even vital decisions on Iran could be shaped not only by regional realities, but also by the U.S. electoral calendar. The stakes differ: for Seoul, exports and autonomy; for New Delhi, the sovereignty to pursue a multi-aligned policy; for Jerusalem, war, diplomatic support and domestic elections. But local observers share one conclusion: the era when an alliance with the United States was, by itself, considered a reliable safety net is ending. Increasingly, it looks like a contract that is constantly being renegotiated—and Washington sets the price as the talks proceed.

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Ukraine Fears U.S. Pressure and Concessions to Russia

In Ukrainian commentary, Donald Trump’s policy is described as a decisive factor in the war: Washington may be unable or unwilling to pressure Moscow, while still forcing Kyiv to make concessions. The authors warn that such a scenario threatens not only Ukraine, but also the security of democracy as a whole, including Taiwan, and that the United States’ retreat from supporting its allies could bring strategic losses. Based on reporting by Espreso.tv and Flashnews.com.ua (Ukraine).

Ukraine Wants Real Guarantees, Not Hopes for U.S. Pressure

Ukrainian analysts are increasingly skeptical that Washington can quickly force Moscow to end the war. They view a possible resumption of talks between Kyiv, the United States and Russia only as a means of achieving concrete results: protecting energy infrastructure, exchanging prisoners and establishing reliable security guarantees.

As Vadym Denysenko, head of the Business Capital analytical center, notes in an Espreso article, Ukraine and its partners overestimated the United States’ ability to exert decisive pressure on Russia. In his view, a window of opportunity may have existed only during the first months of Donald Trump’s presidency, when Vladimir Putin may have feared an unpredictable response from the new U.S. leader.

Denysenko believes that the Kremlin later concluded that Trump was not prepared to take steps that could lead to a direct confrontation between the United States and Russia. “Our overestimation of the U.S. role in putting pressure on the Russian Federation was very misleading,” the analyst said.

From Kyiv’s perspective, the most effective options for putting pressure on Moscow—military intervention or blocking Russian ships—would inevitably create a risk of direct confrontation between nuclear powers. According to Denysenko, this risk defines the limits of U.S. policy. In that case, Washington’s restraint appears not to be a temporary problem or the result of individual political decisions, but a fundamental constraint: the United States may remain Ukraine’s key ally without necessarily being willing to escalate in order to force Russia to make peace.

The analyst is also skeptical about economic leverage. Direct trade and economic ties between the United States and Russia, in his view, are not substantial enough to serve as a decisive tool of pressure. Moreover, the U.S. market depends on some Russian goods, including fertilizers. “There simply are no other levers of influence,” Denysenko says, casting doubt on the ability of sanctions and diplomatic statements alone to change the Kremlin’s strategic calculations.

For Ukraine, this means it must reduce its reliance on expectations of an outside “savior.” The experience since 2014—and especially since the full-scale invasion in 2022—has led Kyiv to judge international promises primarily by their practical effect: can they stop aggression, protect civilians and prevent a new offensive? The priorities are now strengthening Ukraine’s own defense, developing its defense industry, securing long-term European assistance and obtaining security guarantees that do not depend solely on the position of one U.S. president.

The same logic is evident in assessments of a possible resumption of trilateral contacts between Ukraine, the United States and Russia. An article in The Flash News stresses that Kyiv’s willingness to take part in talks does not mean it trusts Moscow’s intentions or believes a political settlement is imminent.

President Volodymyr Zelensky supports Washington’s efforts to speed up contacts and hopes a meeting of delegations can take place no later than early November. But agreeing on a date, location and format for talks does not, by itself, bring peace any closer. What matters to Ukraine is the outcome: a halt to hostilities, preparations for decisions at the level of national leaders, and the creation of a durable security architecture.

Kyiv is ready to discuss a ceasefire, including a possible “energy truce,” as well as humanitarian issues—above all, an exchange of prisoners of war. For Ukrainian society, these are not secondary items on the agenda, but matters of everyday survival. As winter approaches, protecting energy infrastructure—electricity supplies, heating, hospitals and other critical services—takes on particular importance.

At the same time, Ukraine believes an agreement to refrain from striking energy infrastructure will be meaningful only if its terms are clearly defined. The parties need to specify in advance which facilities will be protected, establish a mechanism for recording violations and provide for independent verification of compliance. Otherwise, any “energy truce” risks becoming a source of mutual accusations, while Russia retains the ability to pressure civilians by attacking infrastructure.

Moscow has formally signaled that it is open to returning to a trilateral format. However, Ukrainian analysis notes, it has shown no willingness to abandon demands that are incompatible with Ukraine’s sovereignty. These include territorial claims, attempts to limit the Ukrainian army and pressure on Kyiv’s ties with Western defense structures. For this reason, Kyiv does not see the Kremlin’s readiness to talk as proof of compromise: any commitments that may be made will still have to be tested in practice.

The central question remains the role of the United States. Ukraine is seeking clarity on what commitments Washington is prepared to make, whether military support will continue and how partners would respond if any future agreements were violated. In Ukraine’s view, security guarantees cannot be a secondary add-on to a peace agreement. Peace that leaves the country defenseless against another Russian invasion will not be durable.

Europe’s involvement is equally important. Meetings in Oslo with representatives of Finland, Norway, the European Union, NATO, the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy are seen as confirmation that the war is not simply a bilateral dispute between Kyiv and Moscow or a narrow U.S.-Russian dialogue. For Ukraine, European participation is both a source of military and financial support and a way to ensure that decisions about its future are not made without its full involvement.

Past rounds of diplomacy fuel this cautious skepticism: the 2025 talks in Istanbul and contacts in Abu Dhabi and Geneva in early 2026. Meetings and statements continued, but the war, the shelling and key political disagreements did not disappear. At the same time, prisoner exchanges and the repatriation of the bodies of the dead show that limited but vital practical agreements are possible even without a comprehensive political settlement.

Ukraine’s main criterion for judging negotiations, therefore, is not the mere fact of dialogue, but measurable results: whether prisoners return home, shelling decreases, the country can get through the winter without a large-scale energy collapse, and real protection emerges against a recurrence of war. In this view, diplomacy has value only when it is backed by enforceable commitments, allied support and guarantees capable of protecting the country not just on paper, but in the face of a renewed threat.

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America as a Source of Risk: Seoul, Tokyo and Moscow Debate Not US Power, but Its Cost...

In recent days, the United States has been discussed in South Korea, Japan and Russia mainly in connection with two interrelated stories: the protracted US-Iran war and the threat it poses to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, and Washington’s unexpectedly softer tone toward Moscow amid the war in Ukraine. In both cases, the local response comes down to one question: can America be a military superpower, a reliable ally and a predictable economic partner all at once—or is its foreign policy increasingly dictated by Donald Trump’s short-term domestic political calculations?

For Tokyo and Seoul, the Iran story is not an abstract Middle East drama but an immediate test of energy security. In an October 14 analysis, Japan’s JETRO directly links the deterioration in the situation after US-Israeli strikes on Iran to disruptions in transit through Hormuz and shifts in trade flows. This is especially sensitive for a country whose industry and consumer prices are vulnerable to fuel-price spikes. Japan’s debate, then, is not limited to a moral assessment of US actions: it is pragmatic and anxious. America appears less a defender of the international order than a power whose decisions turn oil, freight and cargo insurance into political weapons.

In South Korea, the logic is similar, but the conclusion is tougher. Experts at the East Asia Institute, in an assessment of geopolitical risks, advise Seoul to prepare for possible US demands that it join a maritime escort coalition, impose sanctions or provide material assistance. But the recommended course is not automatic involvement in the US campaign; it is “selective cooperation” through information-sharing and maritime security. This is an important shift in South Korea’s tone, though it is not always apparent from the outside: the alliance with the United States remains the foundation of security against North Korea, but participation in a distant American war is increasingly seen as something less than an unconditional duty.

The South Korean press ties Washington’s foreign policy even more closely to US elections. Hankyoreh describes Trump as a leader whose negotiating position is weakening ahead of the midterm elections because of the protracted conflict, while Chosun Biz notes that, according to sources, Tehran is deliberately dragging out negotiations in the hope of hurting Trump through high energy prices. In this reading, the war is no longer a dispute over Iran’s nuclear program: it has become a struggle over the price of diesel in the United States, White House approval ratings and control of Hormuz. For America’s Asian allies, this is an unsettling signal: their own economies are becoming dependent on the US election calendar.

Russia’s response to the same war is notably different. Moscow is using the crisis to reinforce the image of the United States as the party that initiated the escalation, while avoiding direct confrontation with Washington and seeking to play the role of mediator. After talks in Tehran, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that the crisis was caused by military action by the United States and Israel; Vedomosti covers his position in detail. However, Russia’s stance does not amount to unconditional support for Iran. The same article emphasizes that Moscow wants Iran to be stable and independent, and able to meet its strategic partnership commitments. In other words, Russia sees the conflict not only as an ideological dispute with America, but also as a risk of losing an important regional partner.

The most unexpected point of convergence among the three countries is their view of American policy as increasingly transactional. This has been especially evident in Japan’s reaction to the US rapprochement with Russia. An editorial in Asahi Weekly puts it bluntly: “America’s policy of appeasement toward Russia is selfish and plays into the aggressor’s hands” [translation]. The editorial was prompted by Trump’s moves, including an agreement to supply Russian diesel fuel. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that such trade “puts money in Putin’s pocket”; his remarks were reported by Japan’s Newsweek Japan. For Japanese audiences, the issue is not only Ukraine. If the United States is willing to ease pressure on Russia to lower domestic fuel prices, how firmly will it honor its commitments in the Indo-Pacific, where Tokyo relies on US deterrence against China and Russia?

That is why Japanese analysis brings the Iran war and Ukraine together as a single problem of trust in an ally. The US operation in the Middle East creates an energy shock, and then, seeking to soften the impact at home, Washington turns to Russia for fuel and puts pressure on Kyiv. To Tokyo, this looks like a dangerous cycle: an ally first creates global instability, then asks its partners to adapt to the consequences. It is no coincidence that the Japan Research Institute (JRI) wrote this summer that the Hormuz crisis had exposed two fundamental vulnerabilities in Japan’s energy security: its dependence on external routes and the need to coordinate its response not only with the United States, but also across its own government and industry. (jri.co.jp)

In Seoul, the Ukraine story is viewed through the same lens, although it feels less immediate than the risk of war on the Korean Peninsula. South Korea’s JoongAng Ilbo notes that Russia sees US concessions as a sign that Western support for Ukraine is breaking down, while Zelensky, the paper suggests, has begun publicly arguing with Trump because he sees this as his last chance to issue a “tsunami warning” [translation] before a complete break. South Korea’s concern is twofold: concessions to Moscow could shift the balance of power in Europe, but even more troubling is the precedent of the White House tying its support for an ally to the personal loyalty of that country’s leader and to the state of the US fuel market.

Russia’s public narrative, by contrast, presents American softness toward Moscow and its confrontation with Iran as evidence that Washington acts opportunistically rather than on principle. On October 21, Trump said he highly valued Russia’s position on Iran, after Vladimir Putin called on the United States to reach an agreement with Tehran, Vedomosti reported. For Russian audiences, this is presented as a diplomatic success: the United States has to reckon with Moscow both on Ukraine and in the Middle East. But a more sober assessment is visible beneath this optimistic framing. Political scientist Andrey Koshkin, in an RBC analysis, described Trump’s actions as more like an impulsive “juggling of old and new methods” [translation] than a consistent strategy. The point matters: even in Russia, where the current US course is sometimes seen as an opening, American unpredictability is regarded not as an asset but as a source of risk.

The overall conclusion in Seoul, Tokyo and Moscow is paradoxical. No one doubts that the United States retains enormous military, financial and diplomatic power. But more and more commentators are judging that power by how manageable it is. Japan fears that a short-term US deal with Russia could undermine the security of its alliances; South Korea wants to preserve its alliance without automatically becoming involved in wars Washington is waging far from East Asia; Russia seeks to benefit from American contradictions, but does not fully trust a country capable of shifting within a few weeks from sanctions pressure to a search for compromise. In local debates, America today looks not like a fading superpower, but like a superpower whose decisions are becoming more costly for friends, more advantageous to tactical rivals and increasingly difficult for everyone to predict.

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America as a Source of Risk and Security: Israel, Saudi Arabia and South Korea Look to...

In Israeli, Saudi and South Korean discussions of the United States, one question now overshadows any single news story: can the administration of Donald Trump wage war on Iran, keep global energy routes open and honor its commitments to allies—all without subordinating everything to the electoral logic of the US midterm elections on November 3, 2026? In each of the three countries, American policy is viewed primarily through the lens of that country’s own vulnerabilities: in Israel, through its freedom to act against Iran and the future of bipartisan support; in Saudi Arabia, through the security of the Strait of Hormuz and oil exports; and in South Korea, through energy inflation, trade pressure and the cost of its military alliance. (israelhayom.co.il)

The main theme linking these discussions is Hormuz, which local commentary no longer treats as merely a narrow sea passage, but as a test of American power. Israeli analyst Jesse Weinberg writes in a column for Israel Hayom that the United States has managed to restore about 80 percent of prewar oil flows through its naval blockade of Iran, ship escorts and alternative pipelines. But he sees this not as a final victory, but as a dangerous trap: maintaining superiority over the long term requires ships, munitions and political attention precisely when Washington must compete with China in the Indo-Pacific. The Israeli view is therefore ambivalent: the American operation is necessary to deter Iran, but its success could deplete the very resources Israel is counting on in a future escalation. (israelhayom.co.il)

Saudi Arabia’s response is markedly less bellicose and more pragmatic. For Riyadh, the question is not “Will the US defeat Iran?” but rather, “Will it create a stable order in which oil, gas and trade are not held hostage to another round of war?” In an article by Zaid M. Belbagi for Arab News, the US-Gulf Cooperation Council summit is described as a signal that Gulf states have become central both to American military planning and to the search for a political settlement. The author draws particular attention to Saudi Arabia’s reopening of the East-West Pipeline: this is not just a technical way around Hormuz, but also a means of reducing the kingdom’s dependence on decisions made in Tehran and on the pace of the US naval operation. (arabnews.com)

Saudi media, however, do not see infrastructure as a substitute for diplomacy. Saudi commentator Hassan al-Mustafa stresses in his commentary that freedom of navigation must be restored to prewar levels, but that a US agreement with Iran cannot be “a private US-Iranian affair.” In this view, Gulf states do not want to become either Washington’s passive rear guard or a party to an endless war; they need a deal that would compel Iran to abandon pressure through proxy forces and maritime threats. This marks an important difference from Israel’s tone: Jerusalem is primarily concerned that a diplomatic pause would give Iran time, while Riyadh fears that the absence of viable diplomacy will make war the norm. (arabnews.com)

South Korean observers view the same Strait of Hormuz through the pocketbook of an industrial economy. In the Korean press, the conflict is seen not as a distant Middle Eastern drama, but as an accelerant of imported inflation and a risk to export-oriented manufacturing. Chosun Biz describes Tehran’s strategy: drag out negotiations without giving Trump a foreign-policy victory before the midterm elections, while keeping oil prices high by threatening shipping. For Seoul, this is an especially troubling scenario: American domestic politics could prolong the energy crisis, even though Asian importers bear most of the cost of instability. (biz.chosun.com)

The US elections have become the second common theme. The Israeli press discusses them with almost existential anxiety. In an Israel Hayom analysis, a possible Democratic victory is described as a risk to Trump’s room for maneuver on Iran and Israel: an unpopular war, rising gasoline prices and the effects of tariff policy are weakening Republicans, while Democratic control of Congress could complicate White House appointments, funding and foreign-policy initiatives. What matters here is not partisan sympathy in itself, but the sense that the longstanding bipartisan support for Israel in the United States is eroding. Another Israeli column cites an April Pew poll, according to which 60 percent of Americans already view Israel unfavorably. (israelhayom.co.il)

The Saudi newspaper Al Riyadh offers a cooler reading of the American electoral cycle. In its analysis of the elections, it warns against the temptation to explain every American foreign-policy move solely in terms of the November vote: wars, markets and crises, the author notes, impose their own timetable on Washington. But the caveat is telling. Saudi readers clearly recognize that American policy is constrained by domestic fuel prices and voter sentiment, and therefore prefer to build security through regional mechanisms, pipelines and negotiations rather than rely on a single promise of American protection. (alriyadh.com)

In South Korea, the US elections are also seen as a source of unpredictable economic pressure. The clearest example is the Alaska LNG project. After Trump publicly announced South Korean investment, Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy Kim Jung-kwan said Washington had gone far beyond what was agreed, and Seoul immediately and forcefully objected to US Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick. According to Korea Economic Daily, the White House spoke of $50 billion for Alaska, although the South Korean side had not yet agreed either to the investment itself or to its size. For South Koreans, this is not just a dispute over gas: it illustrates “transactional” alliance relations, in which security, access to the US market and investment demands can be bundled together. (hankyung.com)

At the same time, Seoul does not conclude from American unpredictability that the alliance is unnecessary. On the contrary, South Korea’s debate distinguishes the alliance from its current political cost. A poll reported by Korea Economic Daily found that 71 percent of Americans surveyed would support deploying US troops in the event of a North Korean invasion, while 58 percent would approve of South Korea developing nuclear-powered submarines. At the same time, 71 percent opposed Seoul acquiring nuclear weapons of its own. For South Korean readers, this is an important signal: American society remains willing to defend its ally, but prefers that it strengthen itself within the US deterrence framework rather than become a fully autonomous nuclear power. (hankyung.com)

The result of these three local debates is paradoxical. The United States is still seen as an indispensable power—the only one capable of protecting shipping through Hormuz, containing Iran and supporting its allies all at once. But trust in America is increasingly based not on declarations, but on calculations of risk. Israel fears that Washington may be politically constrained precisely when the next war breaks out; Saudi Arabia wants American power to serve a durable regional agreement, not endless confrontation; South Korea seeks to preserve the US military shield without making its economy collateral for American electoral politics. The common conclusion among local observers is simple: America remains at the center of the security system, but its allies are increasingly looking for ways to insure themselves against America’s own volatility.

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Canada Changes Course Under U.S. Tariff Pressure

Canadian authorities are increasingly viewing the trade policy of Donald Trump’s administration not as a temporary dispute over tariffs, but as evidence of a deep and possibly irreversible change in relations with the United States. Prime Minister Mark Carney and Ontario Premier Doug Ford say that the previous model of economic interdependence can no longer be considered a reliable foundation for Canadian industry and exports.

As reported by the Los Angeles Times, Carney stresses that U.S. tariffs are harming more than just Canada. In his assessment, they have “increased costs for American families” while placing Canadian workers and Ontario businesses “at a disadvantage and under a cloud of uncertainty.”

The issue is particularly sensitive for Ontario, where the automotive industry, steelmaking and numerous manufacturing supply chains have been closely tied to the U.S. market for decades. The threat of moving auto production from Canada to the United States is seen in the province as a risk to thousands of jobs and to the entire regional economic base.

Carney points out that North America’s automotive industry was built as a unified system that benefited both countries. But, he says, Washington’s position has changed: “Their approach has changed. Ours must change too.” Canada’s leadership believes that maintaining its previous dependence on the United States has become too risky.

Against this backdrop, the federal government and Ontario authorities announced an 8.7 billion Canadian dollar support package. The funds are intended for steel companies, automakers and critical-minerals development projects in the Ring of Fire region of northern Ontario. The measures are designed both to preserve industrial capacity and to strengthen Canada’s position in sectors of strategic importance to the production of batteries, electric vehicles and high-tech goods.

Doug Ford has taken an even tougher position. In his words, “it is absolutely clear that Canada’s relationship with the United States has changed forever.” He believes there will be no return to the previous arrangement, regardless of the outcome of the U.S. midterm elections or who occupies the White House in the future.

This approach reflects growing Canadian national consciousness, intensified by the tariff war and Trump’s statements about the possibility of turning Canada into the “51st state.” In Ottawa, the conflict is increasingly seen not merely as a dispute over tariff rates, but also as a question of economic sovereignty, supply-chain security and the country’s ability to set its own industrial policy.

Carney’s government intends to reduce excessive dependence on the U.S. market and double exports to other countries over the next ten years. The statistics cited by Canadian authorities support this course: Canadian auto exports to the United States have fallen by more than 10%, while vehicle shipments from the United States to Canada have dropped by more than 20%. In Carney’s assessment, this shows that tariffs do not strengthen national industries but destroy mutually beneficial ties. “Tariffs weaken both industries and reduce choice for our families,” the prime minister said.

The political conflict has been accompanied by mutual accusations. The U.S. Embassy claimed that Canadian politicians were allegedly attempting to interfere in domestic American politics. Diplomats specifically pointed to Industry Minister Mélanie Joly, who had suggested possible retaliatory measures against Republican states, as well as Doug Ford, who placed advertisements in the United States criticizing the tariffs and using statements by former President Ronald Reagan.

At the same time, no evidence of unlawful interference by Canada was presented. In Canada, the embassy’s accusations were viewed as another form of pressure from Washington. More than 275,000 people supported a parliamentary petition calling for the resignation of U.S. Ambassador Pete Hoekstra.

Thus, Ottawa and Toronto are preparing not for a quick return to the familiar trade model, but for a long-term restructuring. Support for steel, the automotive industry and critical-minerals extraction is being combined with plans to diversify export destinations. Canadian authorities are making it clear that the United States remains the country’s largest trading partner, but is no longer seen as a predictable foundation on which Canada can rely without reservation.

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America as a Source of Strategic Anxiety: What Israel, Germany and Australia Saw in...

In recent days, the Israeli, German and Australian press has focused not on any single U.S. initiative, but on a more troubling picture: Donald Trump’s foreign policy increasingly appears to be an extension of his domestic election campaign ahead of the November 3, 2026 midterm elections. In Jerusalem, this is being discussed through the prism of Washington’s personal intervention in Israeli politics and the future of relations with Iran; in Berlin, through fears of a “concert of great powers” involving Russia and China, behind Ukraine and Europe’s back; and in Canberra, as a question of how safe it is to base the country’s strategy on an alliance with a state whose policies have become unpredictable.

The common thread running through these reactions is doubt that America still acts as a predictable ally governed by stable rules. None of the three societies concludes that the United States has ceased to be an indispensable power. On the contrary: it is precisely because of America’s strength that every sharp decision by the White House is felt abroad as an immediate domestic problem. But dependence on the alliance is increasingly being accompanied by political wariness.

In Israel, the American issue is currently highly personalized. On the Ynet page updated on October 21, two columns with opposing tones appeared side by side on Trump’s support for Benjamin Netanyahu. In her commentary, Neve Dromi interprets Trump’s statement not only as an endorsement of Israel’s prime minister, but also as a warning about the rise of political Islam—a threat that, in her view, is shared by the United States, Israel and the “liberal world.” In this logic, Washington and Jerusalem remain part of the same civilizational and security coalition: American pressure or support is not external interference, but an element of the struggle for shared security.

Yet a diametrically opposite conclusion is also being voiced in the same Israeli debate. In the column “Netanyahu Under Pressure—and Applying Pressure Himself”, Gilad Sharon describes the American president as a force interfering in Israel’s elections and sarcastically warns that Israel has not yet officially been declared a “banana republic.” This is an important shift. The criticism is aimed not merely at Trump’s style, but at the political price of closeness to the White House itself: Washington’s support may strengthen Netanyahu, while simultaneously undermining the perception of Israel’s democracy as independent.

Israeli anxiety is particularly evident where the American electoral calendar intersects with the war against Iran. In a Calcalist report, Trump links the end of the war to the period immediately after the congressional elections and to falling energy prices. For Israeli readers, this creates an uncomfortable uncertainty: could the pace of pressure on Tehran, the scale of military operations and the diplomatic terms of a deal depend primarily on gas prices and electoral calculations in the United States? This thought is especially sensitive in a country that views Iran as a long-term existential threat, rather than as an episode in an American campaign.

German discussion focuses on a different but logically related concern: Washington may be changing not only the tactics of war, but also the very principle of international representation. The trigger was Trump’s willingness to discuss a three-way meeting with Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping on Ukraine. Deutschlandfunk conveyed the reaction of Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha: a Russia–China–U.S. format, he said, would not bring peace closer, but would instead encourage Moscow to continue the war. For a German audience, this is not simply a Ukrainian protest. It is a return to Europe’s historic fear of great powers deciding the fate of smaller states without their participation.

German media and experts therefore view the midterm elections not as a familiar American domestic political story, but as a test of how far “Trumpism” can extend into foreign policy. In the announcement for a Frankfurt discussion titled “The U.S. Midterm Elections: The Beginning of the End of Trumpism?”, the organizers explicitly place inflation, trade policy, the cost of living, the U.S. war with Iran, and the consequences for Germany and Europe side by side. This combination is telling: the German perspective sees the American domestic economy and international security as parts of a single mechanism. Rising prices in the United States could make the White House more accommodating toward Russia, more cautious on Iran, or tougher on its allies.

Australia formulates the same problem in the most pragmatic terms. There is less hope here that Trump will change, and more discussion of how to live with his unpredictability without destroying the key alliance. The Guardian Australia political editor, Tom McIlroy, warns in a column that if Republicans lose control of Congress, the president could become even more impulsive, making engagement with him riskier for Prime Minister Anthony Albanese. McIlroy links this to the invitation extended to Putin to attend the G20 summit in Florida and to the concerns of Australians watching their closest ally increasingly seek common ground with authoritarian leaders.

At the same time, Canberra cannot choose between alliance and distance as simply as this may appear in the European debate. Australia depends on the United States for deterring China, intelligence and the AUKUS project—the defense partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States. Thus, the local formula is not a rupture, but a cautious “neither buy into it nor lash out”: do not adapt to Trump’s political style, but do not provoke him publicly either. However, this strategy becomes more difficult when the U.S. administration attacks Australian domestic decisions. In an ABC report, Albanese responds to U.S. accusations of “censorship” over Australia’s digital duty-of-care bill and emphasizes that he will “always stand up for Australian interests.” This is not a break with America, but neither is it traditional automatic solidarity.

Particularly telling is Albanese’s assessment, cited by ABC: under Trump, the United States is “playing a different role in the world.” The Australian prime minister links this to protectionism, tariffs and the launch of the war against Iran without prior consultation with allies. This phrase perhaps reflects the broadest conclusion shared by the three countries. The issue is not that America has become weaker. It has become less collective: a powerful state that increasingly acts on the basis of immediate domestic advantage and then expects its allies to adapt.

There is also a difference that explains much of this. Israel is debating how to use American power without becoming hostage to it in its own elections. Germany is considering how to prevent world politics from returning to the division of spheres of influence. Australia is trying to preserve its military alliance while simultaneously building a safeguard against its political instability. But all three reactions converge on one point: American policy is no longer perceived as an external backdrop. It has become a factor in the domestic politics of U.S. allies—from Israel’s election campaign to German debates over Ukraine and Australian social media legislation.

This is precisely what makes the coming weeks in the United States so important beyond America’s borders. For Israelis, Germans and Australians, the question on November 3 is not only about control of Congress. It is a referendum on whether, after the election, the White House will subordinate international decisions even more closely to the logic of personal power, energy prices and the president’s political survival.

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America at War, Bargaining and Counting Votes: How China, Israel and India Read Washington Ahead...

In China, Israel and India, the United States is currently being discussed not as a unified superpower confidently setting the rules, but as a country whose foreign policy is increasingly subordinated to its domestic political calendar. The focus is on the war between the United States and Israel and Iran, the risk of another surge in energy prices, the U.S. midterm elections on November 3, and a temporary stabilization in U.S.-China trade. The common view in all three countries is this: the White House still possesses enormous military and financial power, but its decisions have become harder to predict because they depend on the price of gasoline, Donald Trump’s approval ratings, and the Republicans’ prospects of retaining control of Congress.

The most acute issue is Iran. Chinese commentators interpret the pause in escalation primarily as an electoral calculation. Diao Daming, a professor at Renmin University of China, explained in a comment for China Radio International that the contradictory signals from the White House and the Pentagon stem from the administration’s simultaneous attempts to maintain military pressure on Tehran while preventing it from becoming a political liability ahead of the vote. In other words, the Chinese interpretation is not that Washington has abandoned force, but that force is now being calibrated with voters in mind. This logic is expressed even more bluntly in another Chinese analysis: the conflict’s central question is “who will hold out longer”—Iran under attack, or Trump in the face of the economic and political backlash from American society. (news.cri.cn)

For Israeli writers, such a pause looks less comfortable. In an analysis by Ron Ben-Yishai for Ynet, it is argued that Trump has chosen to temporarily “keep a low profile” on the conflict: not resume large-scale combat operations until the end of November, while continuing economic pressure and the naval blockade of Iran. According to this view, Israel is quietly accepting the American approach because it understands its political logic and shares the assessment that a rapid diplomatic breakthrough is unlikely. But the Israeli debate is filled with anxiety: waiting does not mean the problem has been solved. Another Ynet article emphasizes that airstrikes alone will not bring down the Iranian regime, while the White House fears both American military casualties and another rise in fuel prices. For Israel, this means that its security is increasingly tied not only to American aircraft carriers and weapons deliveries, but also to how willing Trump is to take risks before November 3. (ynet.co.il)

Indian observers view the same conflict through a broader question: is a protracted war becoming a factor that will make America a less reliable partner in every other region? Vivek Mishra, deputy head of the strategic studies program at the Observer Research Foundation, calls the Iranian campaign a potential political burden for Trump in a column for The Indian Express: the war is gradually feeding into American prices and could therefore affect the election more strongly than international events usually do. For India, however, he writes, what matters more is not the outcome of the vote itself, but what follows it. This is an important distinction: in New Delhi, the question is less who will win control of Congress than whether Washington will be freer to escalate after the election—or, conversely, be forced to seek a way out of the conflict.

India’s response is particularly sensitive to the financial side of American policy. Economic columnist T. N. Ninan warns in a comment for ThePrint Hindi that Trump’s trade war may have been only the first stage of a larger struggle for capital. His argument is highly practical: capital outflows, a weakening rupee and expensive energy are already hurting India, while turbulence in American finance could intensify the impact. In Chinese publications, the same theme appears as a question about the resilience of the dollar-based order. Qian Jing, writing for The Paper, interprets the Federal Reserve’s September rate hike not simply as a monetary decision, but as a rare example of institutional limits on presidential power: in his assessment, Trump may influence the war and the personnel hierarchy, but he cannot order an independent central bank to cut interest rates. (hindi.theprint.in)

There is a particularly revealing nuance in this Chinese view. America’s problem is described not only as Trump’s weakness or the cost of war, but as a test of the entire system of checks and balances. Chinese analysts are watching to see whether the Fed can withstand pressure from the White House, because the answer will affect confidence in the dollar, U.S. Treasury bonds and, consequently, the global financial architecture. Israelis primarily measure American reliability by its readiness to stop Iran; Indians by the United States’ ability not to export inflation and financial instability; and the Chinese by whether America’s political polarization is undermining the foundation of Washington’s global influence. Yet all three perspectives converge on one point: domestic instability in the United States has become an international problem.

Against this backdrop, China’s response to the extension of the trade détente with Washington stands out. The pause in reciprocal tariff increases has been extended until January 10, 2027, while the sides agreed to establish a trade and investment council, partially reduce tariffs on one another, open a dialogue on artificial intelligence and expand selected economic contacts. Chinese Ambassador to the United States Xie Feng discussed this in detail in an interview published by the Chinese embassy. Economist Wei Shangjin describes the extension in an article for China-US Focus as an important but limited achievement: there is no major agreement, while export controls, tariffs and technological rivalry remain in place. (us.china-embassy.gov.cn)

The Indian and Israeli perspectives make this deal even more interesting. For India, the U.S.-China respite is both an opportunity and a warning. It is an opportunity because reduced tensions between the world’s two largest economies lower risks for trade and markets. It is a warning because India is counting on the relocation of production and capital from China, and any new U.S.-China agreement could alter that strategic calculus. For Israel, Washington’s trade policy matters indirectly: it shows that even during a war and amid harsh rhetoric, Trump can shift to pragmatic bargaining when demanded by prices, agricultural states or the domestic political climate. This creates mixed feelings: flexibility may open the way to deals in the Middle East, but it also means that U.S. commitments can be revised as quickly as a tariff rate.

The most unexpected common conclusion emerging from local debates is that America is no longer viewed as a country that first develops a strategy and then makes its domestic policy serve it. Instead, China, Israel and India see a state where elections, inflation, gasoline prices and disputes with the Federal Reserve shape foreign policy almost as much as geopolitical objectives do. For Beijing, this opens room for more equal bargaining; for Jerusalem, it creates the risk that the war with Iran will be governed by the American political cycle; for New Delhi, it means preparing for the waves that American policy creates in markets, energy and the security architecture. America remains an indispensable power, but its allies, partners and rivals are studying not only its aircraft carriers and sanctions, but also its electoral calendar.

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Latin America Reacts to Trump’s Regional Agenda

Venezuelan publications view U.S. policy under Donald Trump as an attempt to strengthen Washington’s influence in the Western Hemisphere. Particular attention is focused on the possible deployment of U.S. troops in Colombia and on political changes in South America, which are presented through the lens of Washington’s policy. At the center of the discussion is concern among countries in the region and close attention to the risks of a new phase of U.S. intervention in security matters. The material is based on publications by Noticiaspia.com and AmCham Colombia (Venezuela).

U.S. Strengthens Military Presence in Latin America

Plans by the United States to send troops to Panama, Colombia, and Honduras are prompting the region to raise not only questions about combating drug trafficking, but also concerns about a new phase of U.S. intervention in Latin American affairs. As the Venezuelan publication Noticias PIA writes, the possible deployment should be viewed in the context of the Donald Trump administration’s drive to restore Washington’s political and military influence in the Western Hemisphere.

According to the publication, up to 600 troops from the U.S. 10th Mountain Division could pass through a new training center in Panama. They are expected to take part in jungle training, followed by the Southern Vanguard exercises in Colombia and drills in Honduras. The article also mentions plans to deploy MQ-9 Reaper drones to Colombia and Ecuador, reinforce the command responsible for operations in the Western Hemisphere and based in Miami, and provide $52 million in military aid.

For a Venezuelan audience, the political significance of these steps is more important than the number of troops involved. The author uses the term “Donroe doctrine”—a combination of Trump’s name and the Monroe Doctrine—implying that the United States is seeking to regain a “preeminent position” in Latin America. In this context, the publication notes, the new U.S. National Security Strategy suggests that Washington intends to “reassert and apply the Monroe Doctrine” in order to restore its primacy in the region.

Adam Isacson, director of defense oversight at WOLA’s Washington office, called the possible deployment unusual by regional standards. “I can’t recall other deployments of U.S. troops in the region approaching 600 personnel, except in emergencies such as invasions or natural disasters,” he said. In Noticias PIA’s interpretation, this assessment argues against portraying the operation as a routine military cooperation program.

A separate concern is that the counter-narcotics campaign could become a pretext for expanding the U.S. military presence. Admiral Francis L. Donovan, head of the U.S. Southern Command, has raised the possibility of shifting operations from the sea to land. The Venezuelan publication interprets this as a signal that U.S. forces may move beyond intercepting vessels in the Caribbean and Pacific.

The article also sharply assesses the humanitarian consequences of counter-narcotics operations. The killing of dozens of fishermen accused of drug trafficking is described as “extrajudicial executions.” Ecuador is cited as an example: a court acquitted 32 crew members of a detained vessel because there was no evidence of their involvement in a crime. The authors also refer to the experience of Plan Colombia: according to the Truth Commission, U.S. service members sexually assaulted 53 14-year-old girls between 2003 and 2007, while diplomatic immunity prevented them from being prosecuted in Colombia.

The issue is particularly sensitive for Venezuela because it shares a border with Colombia. In Caracas, the expansion of the U.S. military presence in Colombia, the deployment of forces to Panama and Honduras, and the use of drones in Colombia and Ecuador may be perceived as the creation of a dense military-political infrastructure around countries in the region that are not always aligned with Washington. From this perspective, the discussion of combating drug trafficking is linked to questions of sovereignty, external pressure, and the historical memory of previous U.S. operations in Latin America.

At the same time, not all information related to U.S. policy in the region reflects an immediate Venezuelan reaction. For example, the AmCham Colombia article, whose headline refers to Trump, a political shift in South America, and support for President De la Espriella, is in fact a program for a conference scheduled for April 23 at the Hilton hotel. The text contains no statements by Donald Trump, Venezuelan assessments, or a reaction from Caracas.

The program for the Colombian event demonstrates which issues concern the country’s business and political circles in their relations with the United States: trade, investment, security, migration, the fight against drug trafficking, the risk of U.S. protectionism, and the possibility that Washington could “decertify” Colombia. Other listed topics include Trump’s tariff policy, economic nationalism, nearshoring, market diversification, and the prospects for U.S. investment.

According to the program, the conference is to be attended by Colombian ministers Pedro Sánchez and Ángela Buitrago, former President Juan Manuel Santos, members of Congress, representatives of the U.S. diplomatic service, the embassies of China and Mexico, and trade associations. No Venezuelan officials, experts, or organizations are among the announced participants. Therefore, this document cannot be considered evidence of Venezuela’s position: it only indirectly shows that security, migration, and U.S.-Colombian relations remain important factors for the entire border area, including the Venezuelan direction.

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America as an Unpredictable Ally: What India, Germany and Turkey Say...

In discussions in India, Germany and Turkey, the United States is now perceived not simply as a superpower that sets the rules, but as a source of simultaneous risks and opportunities. The main irritants are Washington’s policy toward the conflict with Iran, the use of sanctions and tariffs as instruments of pressure, and the increasingly conditional nature of allied guarantees. Yet the local reaction is not reducible to anti-American sentiment. In all three countries, a different, more pragmatic impulse is evident: to preserve access to American power, markets and technology while restructuring relations so that dependence on Washington does not become a strategic vulnerability.

The most painful issue remains Iran and the security of maritime routes. The Indian debate views the crisis not through the familiar Western prism of the nuclear program or regime change, but through the price of oil, the fate of sailors and the viability of India’s trade routes. An editorial in The Indian Express described the situation as a trap between “Iranian blackmail and Trump’s bullying.” The balance in this formulation is important: Tehran is accused of turning the Strait of Hormuz into an instrument of pressure, but America’s unilateral policy—including threats to impose transit fees—is also seen not as a solution, but as an accelerant of the crisis. For India, this is not an abstract dispute between great powers: the publication recalls the Indian crew members killed or missing after tanker strikes and the risks to energy supplies. (indianexpress.com)

In Turkey, the same conflict prompts a different reaction. Ankara sees it as a threat directly on its borders, but also as an opportunity to reassert itself as an indispensable mediator between the West, Iran, the Arab states and Russia. Serhan Afacan, president of the Iranian Research Center, writes in an analysis for Anadolu Ajansı that Turkish efforts could open blocked channels between the United States and Iran if talks begin with the nuclear issue and are given a genuine diplomatic chance. His logic is noteworthy: Turkey is not proposing that either side be chosen, but seeks to establish itself as the state without which even adversaries cannot communicate. (mobile.aa.com.tr)

The German reaction to the Iranian issue is more anxious and less focused on mediation. In Berlin, the American war is perceived primarily as a test of the reliability of NATO’s architecture itself. After Chancellor Friedrich Merz criticized the absence of a clear U.S. strategy toward Iran, Washington announced plans to withdraw 5,000 troops from Germany and cast doubt on the deployment of the promised medium-range systems. Carlo Masala, an expert at the Bundeswehr University, warned in a Deutsche Welle report that this would create a significant gap in deterring Russia—one that European weapons could fill only later. Germany’s problem, therefore, is not only its disagreement with the United States over Iran: it is that a public dispute with the White House could immediately result in military punishment. (amp.dw.com)

This gives rise to a common theme for all three countries: Washington is increasingly perceived as a partner that demands political loyalty but does not guarantee equal treatment. In India, particular attention is being paid to U.S. sanctions against buyers of Russian and Iranian energy. The Indian Express called this policy “reckless and blunt,” stressing that India created neither the Ukrainian nor the Middle Eastern conflicts, yet must pay for their consequences through risks to its own energy security. In India’s foreign-policy vocabulary, this is linked to the principle of “strategic autonomy”: New Delhi does not want to belong either to an anti-American camp or to America’s junior-partner camp. (indianexpress.com)

Moreover, Indian commentators are increasingly questioning the very emotional basis of rapprochement with the United States. Samir Saran, president of the Observer Research Foundation, put it plainly in a column for The Indian Express: Washington poorly understands the word “equal,” and India should conduct diplomacy through “open-eyed diplomacy, not open-hearted sentiment.” This is not a call for a break: the author is confident that the partnership will outlast the current administration. But he insists that its maturity depends on the United States’ ability to recognize India as an independent center of power, rather than a useful tool in its confrontation with China. (indianexpress.com)

In Germany, a similar conclusion takes the form of a demand for European independence. At the Munich Security Conference, Merz said that “the cultural war of the MAGA movement is not ours,” contrasting Europe’s commitment to free trade with American protectionism. At the same time, he is not proposing that the transatlantic alliance be dismantled: Germany’s response is to turn it into a partnership of equals through higher defense spending, its own military capabilities and Europe’s ability to defend its own interests even when Washington chooses a different course. This approach, reflected in a Deutsche Welle analysis, highlights an important German duality: America remains necessary, but faith in its automatic reliability has disappeared. (amp.dw.com)

Turkey, by contrast, is seeking to turn American transactionalism to practical advantage. Turkish analytical pieces show particular hope that the new circumstances will allow restrictions imposed after the purchase of Russian S-400 systems to be lifted and the question of F-35s to be revisited. An Anadolu Ajansı report quotes Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as saying: “It is time to remove all obstacles in the defense industry.” For Ankara, this is not merely a dispute over aircraft. It is a test of whether America is prepared to recognize Turkey as a full-fledged NATO ally, even if Turkey maintains its own relations with Russia and pursues an independent regional policy. (aa.com.tr)

The most unexpected common conclusion from the Indian, German and Turkish reactions is that none of these countries is shaping its policy around expectations that the old America will return. India is preparing to diversify its trade and energy supplies; Germany is accelerating European defense autonomy; and Turkey is turning its geographic position and negotiating channels into sources of influence. Their interests and tones differ, but their key perception is the same: the United States remains too powerful to ignore and too unpredictable to rely on unconditionally.

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America as a Source of Risk, Not Support: What Saudi Arabia, Germany and...

In recent days, the United States has been discussed in Saudi Arabia, Germany and Brazil not so much as an abstract superpower, but as a country whose decisions create threats while leaving allies to deal with the consequences. The central concern in all three countries has been the US war with Iran, its impact on energy and security, and Washington’s increasingly visible tendency to turn trade, sanctions and diplomatic pressure into instruments of domestic and regional policy. But while the main question in Riyadh is, “Who will protect the kingdom when American priorities change?”, Berlin is asking whether Trump’s America can remain a predictable Western leader at all. In Brazil, the concern is more concrete: is Washington trying to influence the outcome of the presidential election by using tariffs, visas and rhetoric about defending democracy?

The strongest common theme is disappointment with the American strategy toward Iran. German discussion has been particularly sharp: the war is seen not as a demonstration of US strength, but as an example of how military superiority can fail to produce a political result. In a commentary for public broadcaster ARD, Karsten Küntopp wrote that America had “weakened itself” in the war because Donald Trump ignored warnings and expert advice; for Germany, this is not a distant Middle Eastern drama but a source of direct economic and energy shocks to Europe. The ARD commentary reflects a characteristic German concern: the White House’s impulsiveness could destroy not only the regional order but also the alliance system on which European security has been built for decades. (tagesschau.de)

This conclusion is reinforced by more pragmatic German assessments. In a Deutsche Welle analysis, Iran expert Fatemeh Aman says Trump wants to end the war in a way that would allow him to claim that Iran’s military and nuclear capabilities have been weakened, freedom of navigation has been restored, and Tehran has returned to the negotiating table. However, “it is still difficult to discern a coherent strategy for achieving this outcome” [translated]. For a German audience, this is an important formulation: the problem lies not only in the war itself, but also in the absence of a credible way out. Hence the broader doubt over whether Berlin can still automatically align its own interests with Washington’s course. (amp.dw.com)

In Saudi Arabia, American inconsistency is felt even more acutely because it is measured not in energy prices, but in the security of cities, airports and oil infrastructure. Saudi media and regional analysts are now focused on the resumption of Houthi attacks and on the possibility that US contacts with the group may have narrowed America’s commitments to protecting its own facilities and vessels. Al-Jazirah, summarizing a study by the Mokha Center for Strategic Studies, notes that the US-Houthi agreement of May 6, 2025 concerned ending reciprocal strikes and protecting American shipping, but contained no monitoring mechanism and did not remove the threat to Saudi targets. Particularly revealing is the study’s claim that the Houthis promised not to attack American vessels while excluding Saudi vessels from that commitment. (al-jazirah.com)

This has produced a distinctly Saudi perception: the United States is not leaving the region, but is becoming a partner that separates its own security from that of its formal allies. An Arab News column concludes that previous attempts at negotiation merely gave the Houthis time and space to continue their war against Saudi Arabia and its neighbors. In a recent article for the same publication, former senior US intelligence official Norman Roule called for attacks on the kingdom to stop being viewed solely through the lens of Yemen’s civil war: this is already, he said, “a terrorist threat to the international community” [translated]. (arabnews.com)

Here, an unexpected divergence from the German debate emerges. In Germany, there is concern that Washington has become too deeply entangled in its conflict with Iran; in Saudi Arabia, by contrast, there is growing concern that the United States is waging war against Tehran while refusing to bear the political and military cost of protecting its partners from the conflict’s regional consequences. The Saudi perspective does not necessarily demand another American campaign; it demands clarity: either Washington provides genuine deterrence, or Riyadh must rapidly build an alternative security architecture. This logic explains why the Houthi front and American policy toward Iran are viewed locally as a single problem rather than two separate crises.

In Brazil, the American factor looks different, but the underlying issue is the same distrust of the limits of American power. The focus there is not the Strait of Hormuz, but the sovereignty of the electoral process. After the Trump administration declined to directly promise that it would respect the outcome of Brazil’s elections, Folha de S.Paulo noted that the State Department had said the United States supported Brazilians’ right to a “free and fair electoral process” [translated], but had not provided the guarantee requested by members of Congress that it would respect the vote’s outcome. In Brasília, this is viewed not as an innocent diplomatic formula, but as deliberate ambiguity against the backdrop of tariff pressure, sanctions against Brazilian officials and Washington’s contacts with allies of the Bolsonaro family. (www1.folha.uol.com.br)

Brazilian media are particularly concerned by the combination of ideology and economics. A Folha editorial argues that Trump’s hard-line policies have already damaged the image of the United States in Latin America: the share of people viewing America favorably fell from 73% in 2024 to 63% in 2026; in Brazil itself, only 59% describe relations with the United States as good, while favorable views of China reach 65%. The editorial emphasizes a paradox important to the region: the success of right-wing populist forces does not automatically mean support for America. National security, employment and the cost of living may push voters to the right, but American pressure, tariffs and conspicuous interference provoke rejection across a wide range of political camps. (www1.folha.uol.com.br)

Also notable is the more detached assessment of Adam Goldsmith, a former US Treasury financial attaché for South America. In his column for Folha, he argues that Brazil’s relatively weak economic ties with the United States have so far shielded Brasília from the worst consequences of Washington’s hostile course, while simultaneously depriving both countries of opportunities for a deeper partnership. This is not anti-American rhetoric, but a far more troubling diagnosis for the United States: American pressure may be too ineffective to bring Brazil to heel, yet strong enough to destroy trust and push it to diversify its ties—above all with China. (www1.folha.uol.com.br)

Thus, the Saudi, German and Brazilian reactions form a coherent picture. In Riyadh, the United States appears to be an ally that can negotiate with a threat to Saudi Arabia while leaving the kingdom to face the most dangerous consequences. In Berlin, America looks like a power whose military activity no longer guarantees order and increasingly threatens Europe’s economic resilience. In Brasília, Washington is seen as a force prepared to use trade barriers, diplomatic signals and talk of democracy to influence another country’s domestic politics.

The main unexpected conclusion is that criticism of the United States in these countries can no longer be reduced to traditional anti-Americanism. Saudis are not calling for an end to the American partnership, Germans are not dreaming of breaking the transatlantic link, and Brazilians do not consider relations with Washington unnecessary. But in all three societies, there is growing pressure on the United States to stop being an unpredictable power that first raises the stakes and then expects its allies to pay the risks themselves. America remains a central player—but its centrality is increasingly perceived not as a guarantee of stability, but as the main source of uncertainty.

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The US Is Backing Away from Support for Ukraine

In Russian and Russia-linked publications, Washington’s actions are presented as a rejection of its former role as Ukraine’s protector. The US is allegedly demanding that Kyiv stop striking Russian energy infrastructure and is pushing it toward negotiations in which Moscow and Washington will make the key decisions. In this interpretation, Ukraine is being transformed from a partner into a party expected to accept terms favorable to Russia, while its allies are showing a willingness to retreat from their previous commitments. The material is based on reports by the Russian and Ukrainian outlets KP.ru (Russia) and 24tv.ua (Russia).

Vance’s Remarks Seen as Limiting Support for Kyiv

US Vice President J.D. Vance’s statements about Ukraine and strikes on Russian energy infrastructure have prompted diametrically opposed interpretations in the Russian and Ukrainian information spaces. The general conclusion drawn by Russian commentators is that Washington is increasingly separating its own economic and domestic political interests from Kyiv’s objectives, maintaining its partnership with Ukraine but refusing to assume full-fledged allied obligations.

As Komsomolskaya Pravda reports, Vance explicitly declined to call Ukraine an ally of the United States. He emphasized that there is no formal alliance between the countries, and that Ukraine is not a NATO member or bound to the US by a mutual defense treaty. In this logic, Kyiv is viewed as a partner of Washington, but not as a state guaranteed protection on the same terms as the United States’ North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies.

Vance’s position on Ukrainian strikes against Russian facilities involved in diesel fuel production provoked a particularly strong reaction. “Do I think they should be striking Russian diesel production facilities that are causing energy prices to rise for American people? No,” the US vice president said. Russian media interpret this statement as marking the limits of American support: Washington may continue cooperating with Kyiv, but it is not prepared to tolerate consequences that affect fuel prices and living standards within the United States itself.

A report by Ukraine’s 24 Channel notes that Vance linked the issue primarily to the risk of higher energy costs for American consumers. Donald Trump had previously also spoken about a possible increase in the price of oil and diesel fuel. In the Russian interpretation, such statements can be used to support the claim that sanctions pressure on Moscow and military assistance to Ukraine carry a significant cost for Western societies.

For Russia, attacks on oil refineries and other energy infrastructure are viewed as strikes against critically important civilian and industrial facilities. The oil and gas sector and refining industry are important for the budget, exports, employment, and the stability of many regions. Moscow has also repeatedly stated that Kyiv’s operations of this kind rely on foreign intelligence, technological, and other forms of support. Consequently, American concern about the strikes’ effects on the global fuel market may be perceived in the Russian information space as an indirect acknowledgment of their sensitivity.

Statements by Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent provided an additional argument in support of the view that US commitments to Kyiv are limited. As noted in the Ukrainian report, he declined several times to give a direct answer when asked whether Ukraine is an ally of the United States. For Russian audiences, this fits the notion of a pragmatic model of US foreign policy: support for partners continues only as long as it does not conflict with Washington’s domestic interests, including the fight against inflation and rising fuel prices.

The Komsomolskaya Pravda report also links this trend to the possible improvement of Russian-American contacts. Russian diplomat Rodion Miroshnik said that expanding dialogue between Moscow and Washington could create a more favorable environment for a settlement. From the Russian perspective, this approach means that the path to ending the conflict lies not in further expanding military assistance to Ukraine, but in direct negotiations between major powers and consideration of Russia’s security interests.

At the same time, a change in rhetoric does not necessarily mean that the US is completely abandoning Ukraine. The report mentions Trump’s statements about the possibility of extending the temporary stay of Ukrainian refugees in the United States, as well as Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s comments about Washington’s readiness to consider options for a peaceful settlement. In the Russian reading, this could mean that humanitarian support for Ukrainians will continue, while the push for strategic rapprochement with Kyiv becomes less pronounced.

Both texts emphasize that the dispute over strikes on Russian oil refineries goes beyond military tactics. It concerns the global energy market, the US domestic economy, the nature of American commitments to Ukraine, and the prospects for negotiations. Russian commentators see Vance’s words as signs that the American administration is prioritizing its own energy prices, inflation, and control of the risks of direct escalation over unconditional support for any action by Kyiv.

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America as Leverage: Why Kyiv, Moscow and New Delhi Read the Shift Differently

In recent days, the main American story for Ukraine, Russia and India has not been a single White House initiative, but a new logic in its foreign policy: the United States is increasingly turning security, sanctions, energy markets, trade and migration into tools for immediate bargaining. Events from October 16–19 brought this trend into particularly sharp focus. Kyiv is debating whether Washington is using critical military services to force Ukraine into concessions; Moscow sees an opportunity to separate economic rapprochement with the United States from the war; and New Delhi is asking whether the era of “special relations,” in which strategic partnership shielded India from American pressure, has come to an end. (pravda.com.ua)

The most painful reaction, naturally, is coming from Ukraine. Ukrainian debate is focused on the connection between the American decision to suspend sanctions measures affecting Russian diesel supplies, demands that Ukraine stop striking Russian oil refineries, and disruptions to the Starshield military satellite communications system. In an analysis by Ukrainska Pravda, this connection is described as three instruments of pressure: intelligence, arms deliveries through the PURL mechanism, and satellite communications. For Ukrainian audiences, this is not a dispute over diplomatic style, but a question of whether an ally can change the terms of its support at a critical moment, relying on its domestic economic conditions—above all, fuel prices in the United States. (pravda.com.ua)

The dispute surrounding Starshield is particularly revealing. Ukrainian officials and military sources said that, beginning October 14, restrictions on connection speeds had hampered the use of interceptor drones and frontline logistics. Volodymyr Zelensky called the consequences “painful and unpleasant,” emphasizing that it had become more difficult to repel attacks by jet-powered Shaheds. The American administration denied involvement in the restrictions, while Kyiv publicly insisted that the signal had come from the U.S. government. In the Ukrainian view, the key issue is no longer merely who technically issued the order: the uncertainty itself looks like a strategic vulnerability, because vital infrastructure lies outside national control. (pravda.com.ua)

This gives rise to a less obvious but important Ukrainian conclusion: dependence on America is now seen not only as a source of strength, but also as a risk requiring European insurance. The authors of Ukrainian reports do not claim that European capabilities can quickly replace American satellites, intelligence or Patriot missiles; on the contrary, they emphasize how difficult such a replacement would be. But that is precisely why the discussion is increasingly shifting from “Will U.S. assistance continue?” to “Which critical functions should Ukraine and Europe take out of unilateral American control?” Former President Viktor Yushchenko expressed the emotional version of this reaction, calling Washington’s current course a “stab in the back” and urging the United States not to abandon its historic role as guarantor of European security. (pravda.com.ua)

In Russia, the same shift is viewed almost as a mirror image, though without the euphoria characteristic of official headlines. The suspension of sanctions and the admission of Russian diesel to the American market are presented as proof that economic pragmatism can break through the sanctions wall. Kirill Dmitriev, head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund, called Washington’s decision “an important and truly historic moment,” while Dmitry Peskov had earlier said that Moscow and Washington should already be developing mutually beneficial projects rather than waiting for a political settlement over Ukraine. This position reflects not merely a desire to sell more fuel: Moscow is trying to establish a principle under which economic ties with the United States become an independent track, rather than a reward for ending the war. (rbc.ru)

Russian analysts, however, also note the limits of this optimism. Fyodor Lukyanov, chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, argues in a commentary for the Russian International Affairs Council that the entire situation should not be explained by Trump’s personal unpredictability. His logic is that the sharp reversals may reflect a fairly consistent goal: securing rapid, measurable gains—from lower fuel prices to a political deal—even if this destroys the previous architecture of pressure on Moscow. In the independent Russian-language expert community, the picture is described even more cautiously. Alexander Gabuev, director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin, calls what is happening a “kaleidoscope of statements” containing too little clarity about the actual status of relations between the United States, Russia and Ukraine. (russiancouncil.ru)

India’s reaction shifts the same dispute onto a different plane—trade, Russian oil and the fate of Indian professionals in America. In New Delhi, U.S. pressure is seen not as an isolated conflict over tariffs or visas, but as part of a broader reassessment of India’s value to Washington. In a column for The Indian Express, Ishan Bakshi links pressure over imports of Russian oil, sanctions legislation targeting buyers of Russian energy, and restrictions affecting Indian IT companies and the mobility of skilled workers. The author’s conclusion is blunt: the problem may outlast the current administration, because the United States is changing not only its tactics but also its assessment of India as a counterweight to China. (indianexpress.com)

This is where a theme shared by Moscow and New Delhi emerges: rejection of American selectivity in energy sanctions. Indian commentators ask why purchases of Russian energy have become grounds for pressure on India, while other major buyers manage to secure more lenient terms. In an explanation by The Indian Express, experts point out that the threat of tariffs of up to 100 percent on major buyers of Russian oil and gas makes a future trade deal with the United States less reliable: concessions by New Delhi may not provide predictability if Washington can change the rules at any moment. For Russia, this is an argument for dismantling the sanctions regime; for India, it is an argument for strategic autonomy—that is, refusing to depend on the political will of any single great power. (indianexpress.com)

The migration issue intensifies India’s sense of inequality. Following U.S. restrictions under the PERM program, which is connected to labor certification for obtaining green cards, India’s Foreign Ministry objected to rhetoric directed at foreign professionals. Ministry spokesman Randhir Jaiswal recalled that Indian professionals bring innovation, productivity and jobs to the American economy, and said wording evoking the painful colonial past was unacceptable. In India’s public sphere, this is not only a defense of the IT sector; it is a symbolic dispute over the dignity of a country that wants to be a technological partner of the United States, not a reservoir of cheap labor. (livemint.com)

At the same time, Indian elites are not calling for a complete break with America. Samir Lalwani of the Carnegie Endowment notes that public trust in the United States has deteriorated because of trade, sanctions, Russia and regional crises, but practical cooperation in defense manufacturing, space, artificial intelligence infrastructure and maritime security continues. This is an important qualification: unlike Ukraine, for which American support is directly tied to survival on the battlefield, India can still separate political irritation from technological cooperation. Its response to pressure is therefore likely to be not a rupture, but a colder bargain. (gateway.ceip.org)

The overall conclusion from the Ukrainian, Russian and Indian reactions is that American policy is increasingly perceived less as a set of lasting commitments and more as a system of levers that can be recalibrated for negotiations, prices, elections and the current balance of power. For Kyiv, this is an alarming story about the cost of dependence; for Moscow, an opportunity to turn partial economic détente into the norm; and for New Delhi, a warning that even a “strategic partnership” does not provide immunity from tariff, sanctions and migration pressure. The most unexpected point of convergence among the three perspectives is not sympathy for any one side in the war, but a growing conviction that, in relations with the current Washington, security, energy, technology and market access can no longer be considered separately.

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Washington’s Shift to “Peace Through Diesel”: Why Russia Sees an Opening, Germany Sees...

As of October 19, 2026, the main American issue being discussed simultaneously in Russia, Germany, and Ukraine is not another declaration of peace itself, but the practical price that Washington, in the view of local observers, is prepared to pay for a negotiating process with Moscow. Donald Trump’s decision on October 16 to suspend the implementation of new sanctions under the “Graham Act”—including the 500-percent tariffs on Russian goods and 100-percent tariffs on major buyers of Russian energy provided for by the law—was legally framed as serving the “national interests of the United States.” The White House order explicitly states that the president exercised his authority to waive application of these restrictions. (whitehouse.gov)

In Russia, this is seen above all as confirmation of a long-standing idea: sanctions pressure does not bring a settlement closer but instead obstructs it. The Russian business press emphasizes the pragmatic side of the decision: the sanctions were not permanently repealed, but their implementation was put on hold, meaning that room for a deal remains. The Kommersant report highlights that the measures scheduled to take effect on October 18 have been frozen, including the most painful trade restrictions. (kommersant.ru) For Russian audiences, this is not merely a diplomatic gesture but a signal that the White House considers normalizing economic ties with Moscow as part of a future agreement.

But the Russian discussion also includes a more cautious, analytical line. In a conversation with Fontanka, Americanist political analyst Malek Dudakov describes Trump not as a consistent ally of Russia, but as a leader unwilling to take either Ukraine’s or Europe’s side. His logic essentially comes down to an American priority: domestic resources and the home market first, followed by obligations to partners. (fontanka.ru) This is a significant departure from a triumphalist interpretation: Moscow sees an opportunity for negotiations, but understands that it depends not on Trump’s sympathies toward Russia, but on his changeable understanding of American interests.

It is precisely this volatility that has provoked the sharpest reaction in Ukraine. Ukrainian journalists and experts do not view the pause in sanctions in isolation; they see it as part of a broader scheme of pressure on Kyiv. An analysis by Ukrainska Pravda identifies three possible U.S. levers: intelligence, financing for arms purchases through the PURL mechanism, and the Starlink/Starshield satellite infrastructure. The authors see the combination of these factors as an attempt to limit Ukraine’s ability to continue the war on its own terms. (pravda.com.ua)

The issue of Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries has become particularly painful. For Washington, judging by Trump’s rhetoric, this is a matter of the global and American diesel market; for Kyiv, it is one of the few ways to systematically target Russia’s sources of revenue and military logistics. In a column for Ukrainska Pravda, Viktoriia Voitsytska, Oleksandr Lemenov, and Volodymyr Nastenko set out the Ukrainian counterargument: Russian oil revenues finance the war, so calls to spare refining capacity look like a demand to preserve the enemy’s resource base. (pravda.com.ua) From this perspective, the dispute over diesel is not a technocratic argument about prices, but a conflict between American electoral economics and Ukraine’s right to self-defense.

Ukrainian irritation has also been heightened by the story of the “energy truce” announced by Trump. In Germany, it has become almost a symbol of the gap between an American political statement and military reality. Tagesschau notes that attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure continued soon after the announcement of a halt to strikes on energy facilities. Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s response—“It was clear that Putin doesn’t read Truth Social”—was presented in the German coverage not simply as sarcasm, but as a diagnosis of diplomacy in which a public announcement substitutes for an agreed and verifiable mechanism. (tagesschau.de)

Berlin draws a broader conclusion from this: the problem lies not only in the specific delay to the sanctions, but also in the possibility that the United States may shift from being a guarantor of pressure on Russia to being a mediator interested in a quick deal and an economic exchange. An ARD/Tagesschau analysis interprets the sanctions freeze as another step toward Vladimir Putin and points to suspicions that the prospects of commercial agreements may be influencing U.S. policy toward Russia. (tagesschau.de) For German political culture, where Ukraine’s security is increasingly regarded as part of Europe’s own security, this looks not like a negotiator’s flexibility, but like the risk of replacing strategy with a short-term deal.

Official Germany is nevertheless trying not to turn its concern into an overt break with Washington. Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul stated the European position with utmost clarity: now is the time to “increase pressure on Russia,” not weaken Europe’s own defenses; “Europe’s defense begins with Ukraine.” In a statement by the German Foreign Ministry, he also emphasizes the need for European agency—the ability of Europe to support Ukraine and strengthen its defenses independently of political fluctuations in the United States. (auswaertiges-amt.de)

This is where the main divergence among the three local perspectives emerges. The Russian debate sees American pragmatism as a chance to move relations out of the sanctions spiral and force Kyiv to agree to negotiations. The Ukrainian perspective sees the danger that the war will be reduced to the price of fuel and that pressure will be directed not at the aggressor but at the country defending itself. The German view fears that Europe will be forced to compensate for American inconsistency with its own money, weapons, and political will.

The common theme, however, is the same: America is once again perceived not as an abstract “West,” but as an independent player driven by domestic electoral and economic motives. Russian commentators believe this brings bargaining and national interest back into international politics. Ukrainian authors believe such bargaining creates the risk of a coerced concession. German observers arrive at an even more uncomfortable conclusion: transatlantic solidarity can no longer be the sole foundation of European security. In other words, the current reaction to the United States in Moscow, Kyiv, and Berlin differs in its assessment of Trump, but converges on one point: Washington’s decisions now shape not only the diplomatic atmosphere, but also the very architecture of the war, sanctions, and European defense.

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Trump Between Kyiv and Moscow: Pressure on Ukraine, Restraint Toward Russia

Russian publications note a noticeable shift in American rhetoric: the administration of Donald Trump, the authors argue, is becoming increasingly reluctant to intensify pressure on Moscow while criticizing Kyiv more harshly. The focus is on Washington’s caution over new sanctions against Russia, its public grievances against Volodymyr Zelensky, and its assessment of the Ukrainian leadership as politically vulnerable and prone to strategic miscalculations. In the Russian media sphere, this approach is interpreted as Trump’s willingness to take Moscow’s interests into account or, at the very least, to avoid further escalation. This material is based on publications by InoSMI (Russia) and Voennoye Obozreniye (Russia).

Russian Media on U.S. Pressure on Ukraine and Zelensky’s Role

In the Russian-language information space, discussion of a possible revision of U.S. policy toward the war in Ukraine is increasingly centered on two interconnected issues: the Donald Trump administration’s readiness for direct dialogue with Moscow and Kyiv’s dependence on external support. These themes appear, in particular, in an opinion column by Brian Whitmore published by Independence Avenue Media and in Voennoye Obozreniye’s article “War as a Guarantee of Power: How Much Longer Can Zelensky Remain an Autocratic President?”.

Whitmore’s column was written by an American political analyst and does not reflect Russia’s official position. It offers a sharply critical view of Trump, but the publication itself, in Russian, addresses an issue important to Russian audiences: could Washington reduce its support for Ukraine and move toward more pragmatic relations with Moscow?

The author argues that under Trump, the United States has “effectively switched sides” in the conflict. He links Trump’s phone conversation with Vladimir Putin, calls for Kyiv to stop striking Russian oil refineries, and alleged restrictions on intelligence sharing and access to satellite infrastructure as part of a single political line. In Whitmore’s view, the White House allegedly sees Ukrainian resistance not as a matter of supporting an ally, but as an obstacle to agreements with Russia.

For Moscow, this assessment is especially significant in the spheres of security and the economy. The author acknowledges the damaging effects of attacks on Russian refineries: citing the International Energy Agency, he says that between 25% and 40% of refining capacity may have been taken offline. From the Russian perspective, U.S. pressure on Kyiv to stop such attacks would mean protecting critical infrastructure and reducing the strain on the military economy.

Whitmore also links a possible political shift in Washington to the prospects of easing restrictions on Russian diesel fuel and to discussions of major oil deals, including those involving Lukoil assets. For Russian audiences, the possible expansion of trade with the United States, a relaxation of the sanctions regime, and access to international markets may appear to show that Russia’s economic isolation is not irreversible.

The status of Moscow in international negotiations is another important issue. The article assumes that Vladimir Putin is capable of securing direct talks with Washington and promoting an agenda favorable to him. In Russian political culture, which places great importance on equal dialogue between major powers, this corresponds to the long-standing view that European security issues should be discussed directly by Russia and the United States, rather than only through Kyiv or European capitals.

From the columnist’s perspective, the greatest concern is the possibility of weakened Western unity. Europe, he suggests, would have to compensate on its own for American capabilities in intelligence, satellite communications, and air defense. From the Russian perspective, this would create greater difficulties for Moscow’s opponents: European countries would have to spend more on their own security, seek substitutes for American resources, and debate the scale of further assistance to Ukraine.

The harshest assessments in the column come from Western critics of Trump, rather than from Russian officials. Former CIA employee Michael Sellers asks: “Are the United States still seeking to ensure that Ukraine can successfully defend itself against Russian aggression?” He concludes that defending Ukraine is becoming an “obstacle” for Trump. Journalist Anne Applebaum, in turn, describes the administration’s actions as an attempt to “force Ukraine to surrender and rescue the Russian economy.”

These statements reveal the fears among some Western supporters of Kyiv that Moscow and Washington could move closer together. At the same time, the column itself is not neutral news reporting: Trump is portrayed as a politician who yields to Putin and is focused on deals, while Ukraine is presented as a country the United States is prepared to leave without adequate protection. Whitmore uses emotionally charged phrases, including “a frightening new reality,” “former allies,” and “a desperate attempt to force Ukraine to surrender,” while his sources are predominantly critical of the Trump administration. The material should therefore be viewed as a liberal Western interpretation of a possible change in U.S. policy, rather than as confirmation of any Russian-American agreements.

According to the author, Volodymyr Zelensky intends to continue strikes on Russia’s energy sector and believes that the United States has ended up “on the wrong side of history.” For the Russian side, this underscores the central role of energy infrastructure in the conflict. Kyiv seeks to limit Russia’s revenues and supply capabilities, while Moscow is interested in protecting its rear-area economy and reducing Ukraine’s ability to carry out long-range strikes.

At the same time, Russian media are developing the theme of the Ukrainian leadership’s domestic political vulnerability. The article “War as a Guarantee of Power: How Much Longer Can Zelensky Remain an Autocratic President?” offers a common interpretation in the Russian information space: Volodymyr Zelensky is allegedly interested in continuing hostilities not only for military reasons, but also because martial law allows elections to be postponed, power to be retained, and political competition to be restricted.

The available excerpt contains no detailed factual text. After the headline, it consists mainly of legal disclaimers concerning organizations banned in Russia, as well as lists of media outlets and individuals designated as “foreign agents.” The only substantive sentence reads: “Why doesn’t America make a diesel fuel deal with Ukraine? … We influence whether these ships move. We determine whether the refineries operate.” This point is presented as an illustration of the United States’ ability to use fuel supplies, maritime logistics, and infrastructure decisions as political leverage over Kyiv.

The headline itself establishes an evaluative framework by calling Zelensky an “autocratic president” and the war a guarantee of his power. This presentation corresponds to the Russian narrative that the cancellation of elections under martial law calls into question the democratic legitimacy of the Ukrainian authorities. Russian rhetoric regularly emphasizes that Zelensky’s presidential term formally expired in 2024 and that voting did not take place because martial law remains in effect.

At the same time, the United States is portrayed in this narrative as an external decision-making center. Control over ships, refining, and diesel fuel supplies is interpreted not as ordinary allied support, but as the ability to determine key economic and military parameters of Ukrainian policy. Ukraine is thus presented not as an equal actor, but as a state critically dependent on Western military, political, and infrastructure assistance.

This interpretation serves several purposes for domestic Russian audiences. It reinforces the argument that the obstacle to negotiations is allegedly not only external support for Kyiv, but also the personal interest of the Ukrainian leadership in preserving the conflict. It also helps portray the war as a confrontation between Russia and not so much Ukraine as the Western system of military, financial, and political support.

Despite their different origins and tones, both publications converge on one point: Ukrainian resilience is seen as closely dependent on decisions made by the United States. Whitmore views this as a threat to Kyiv and evidence that Washington may be moving away from its previous commitments. The Russian interpretation, by contrast, emphasizes Ukraine’s vulnerability, its limited autonomy, and the potential benefits to Moscow from reduced American involvement.

At the same time, neither interpretation by itself replaces a factual account of negotiations, deliveries, or legal procedures in Ukraine. Whitmore’s column is a political critique of Trump, while Voennoye Obozreniye’s article states its conclusion about Zelensky’s motives directly in the headline. Nevertheless, taken together, they reflect an important shift in the Russian media discussion of the war: the possibility of U.S. pressure on Kyiv, pragmatic dialogue between Moscow and Washington, and a reassessment of the previous model of Western support for Ukraine.

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America as an Unpredictable Security Broker: How Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Russia Read...

In recent days, the United States has been discussed in all three countries less as an ideological superpower than as an actor increasingly subordinating its foreign policy to immediate domestic and economic calculations. The catalyst was Donald Trump’s agreement with Vladimir Putin on supplying Russian diesel fuel to the global market, followed by the suspension of new restrictive measures against Russia. In Turkey, this shift is seen as evidence of a widening rift between the United States, its European allies and NATO; in Russia, as a practical but still reversible opportunity for partial normalization; and in Saudi and broader Arab discussions, as a sign that Washington is trying to patch up an energy crisis caused by the war in the Middle East without addressing its roots. (turkpress.co)

For Russia’s public debate, the “diesel deal” matters not only because of the volume of supplies. It is perceived as a political precedent: the United States is temporarily easing the sanctions regime against a country with which it continues to clash over Ukraine. In a Vedomosti analysis, Maxim Cherkashin, a researcher at the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences, links Trump’s decision to the need to stabilize energy prices ahead of the U.S. midterm elections on November 3. Lawyer Yulia Eliseeva, in turn, stresses that this is not the elimination of sanctions but an exceptions mechanism that the White House can cancel at any time. The Russian tone is therefore cautiously positive: the market responded with growth, but commentators do not consider this the beginning of a lasting “détente.” (vedomosti.ru)

Russian official and business voices are trying to turn the episode into a broader argument: supposedly, it is Russia—not Europe—that is offering the world a pragmatic solution to the fuel shortage. Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak said the deal primarily benefits consumers, while European criticism runs counter to Europeans’ own interests. He linked the diesel shortage to reduced supplies from the Persian Gulf and Russia’s export restrictions aimed at safeguarding the domestic market. Yet even in the Russian business press, optimism is limited: Kommersant notes that investors are waiting not for declarations but for signed contracts, actual shipments and the absence of a new escalation. According to Novak, the first deliveries may take place only 15–20 days after commercial agreements are concluded. (vedomosti.ru)

In Turkey, the same story is being interpreted much more broadly than as a dispute over diesel. Gürsel Tokmakoğlu, former head of the Turkish Air Force Intelligence Department, sees it, as summarized in his column for Independent Türkçe, as one link in a single chain: the energy agreement with Moscow, pressure on Kyiv, restrictions on Ukraine’s access to U.S. intelligence and the growing distance between Washington, Europe and NATO. The Turkish conclusion is that Trump is changing not merely the set of sanctions but the very principle of alliance policy: the interests of the U.S. domestic market may outweigh previous commitments to partners. For Ankara, long accustomed to cooperating and competing simultaneously with the United States, Russia and Europe, this is not a reason to choose one camp but an incentive to strengthen its own freedom of maneuver. (turkpress.co)

Turkish analysts also link America’s inconsistency to a broader energy strategy. In an Anadolu Ajansı article, Kenan Aslanlı, a lecturer at Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, describes U.S. policy as a shift from ensuring its own energy security to “energy dominance” [that is, using exports and access to resources as an instrument of geopolitical influence]. Against this backdrop, imports of Russian diesel appear not as an ideological turn in Moscow’s favor but as an acknowledgment that the conflict surrounding Iran, shipping problems and damage to regional infrastructure have created a shortage that Washington cannot quickly make up for on its own. (h.aa.com.tr)

The Saudi and Arab reaction is even more skeptical about the United States’ ability to solve the problem through a limited deal with Russia. An economic analysis by Al-Araby Al-Jadeed emphasizes that Russian volumes may prove useful for Moscow but cannot eliminate the main source of price pressure: the shipping crisis in the Strait of Hormuz and the reduction in regional refining capacity. This logic is particularly relevant to Riyadh: for Saudi Arabia, the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran is no longer external geopolitics but a direct threat to infrastructure, export routes and the kingdom’s reputation as a reliable energy hub. (alaraby.co.uk)

This is where the most unusual common feature of the three perspectives emerges. Russia sees Washington as a potential buyer and negotiating partner; Turkey sees it as an increasingly unpredictable ally with which it is necessary to bargain on every issue; Saudi Arabia sees it as a military power capable of protecting its partners but simultaneously increasing the risks they face through its own strategy of pressuring Iran. In an Arab analysis of Trump’s dilemma, this point is expressed particularly clearly: the United States may help protect the kingdom, but its actions could also push Iran’s allies to expand attacks on Saudi infrastructure and shipping in the Red Sea. (italiatelegraph.com)

Thus, in the eyes of Ankara, Riyadh and Moscow, American policy increasingly looks less like a system of permanent commitments and more like a series of situational deals. But their assessments differ on the key point: Russia is trying to use this transformation as an opportunity to return to markets and diplomatic bargaining; Turkey sees it as confirmation of the need for strategic autonomy; and Saudi Arabia sees it as a warning that even close relations with Washington cannot substitute for its own regional security system. The most important result of the current debate is not the several shipments of diesel but the accelerated erosion of the belief that American power automatically means American predictability.

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America as a Source of Conditions: Why Brazil, Turkey and Ukraine Debate More Than Trump...

In recent days, the United States has become more than a foreign-policy issue for Brazil, Turkey and Ukraine—it has become a measure of their own agency. In Brazil, the debate centers on where Washington’s trade pressure ends and interference in elections begins; in Ukraine, on whether the White House is turning the war with Russia into a deal in which Kyiv’s interests are secondary to American fuel prices; and in Turkey, on how to benefit from closer ties with the United States without becoming even more dependent on Washington over Iran, Syria, sanctions and arms. The common emotion is wariness toward an America that increasingly offers partnership in the form of a condition: access to markets, security or negotiations is not granted free of charge, but in exchange for political loyalty and concessions.

Brazil’s debate most explicitly frames this as a struggle for sovereignty. U.S. pressure has become intertwined with the presidential campaign, in which relations with Washington have emerged as an issue in their own right rather than merely a backdrop to domestic disputes. A Folha de S.Paulo article recalls that the Trump administration not only closely monitored the election but also demanded, during earlier tariff negotiations, that the participation of “political dissidents” be ensured. Brazilian public opinion is particularly sensitive to the fact that economic demands—tariffs, access to critical minerals and digital regulation—are being linked to requirements concerning the structure of the country’s democracy. (www1.folha.uol.com.br)

The editorial board of the Brazilian newspaper A TARDE captured the essence of this reaction in an almost aphoristic phrase: Brazil needs “parceiros, não tutores” [“partners, not guardians”]. In its interpretation, U.S. demands—from giving priority to American companies in the rare-earth sector to restricting China’s presence—look less like ordinary bargaining between states and more like an attempt to convert a trade advantage into political subordination. Importantly, this position extends beyond left-wing anti-Americanism: even where Brazilians are arguing about Lula and Bolsonaro, they are increasingly debating whether a candidate can ensure normal relations with the United States without turning them into dependence. (atarde.com.br)

Ukraine’s reaction is far more dramatic, because for Kyiv, U.S. policy is measured not in tariffs but in the ability to defend its cities and continue the war. A new source of irritation has been Washington’s approach, which links pressure on Russia to the American domestic energy market. Ukrainian analysts are discussing reports of agreements between the United States and Russia on supplies of Russian diesel fuel, as well as pressure on Kyiv over strikes against Russian oil refineries. The Ukrainian Institute of Politics described this as Washington’s willingness to derive economic benefit from cooperation with Moscow without making it directly dependent on ending the war. (uiamp.org)

This explains Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s sharp remark, quoted by Ukrainska Pravda: “Боляче, коли Трамп стає на інший бік — не наш” [“It hurts when Trump takes the other side—not ours”]. This is not simply an emotional outburst. From the Ukrainian perspective, the United States risks becoming not an ally helping restore security but an arbiter for whom halting attacks on Russian oil refining is more important than preserving Ukraine’s military leverage against Russia. (pravda.com.ua)

The paradox of Ukraine’s view is that Kyiv is not rejecting talks with the United States and continues to count on Trump’s influence over the Kremlin. But it increasingly doubts that American mediation automatically coincides with Ukrainian interests. On October 17, Zelenskyy explicitly warned of the risk of further easing sanctions against Russia while emphasizing his readiness to negotiate with the American side in Ukraine, Europe or the United States. This is the position of a partner with no choice: Kyiv cannot break with Washington, but it is dangerous to rely on it unconditionally. (mind.ua)

Turkey’s reaction is less confrontational but no less pragmatic. Ankara sees today’s America as both a window of opportunity and a source of new risks. After the July NATO summit in Ankara, Turkish commentators began discussing a possible reset in relations with the United States: lifting restrictions, prospects for the F-35 and Turkey’s greater importance in the Western security architecture. Analyst Erman Tatlıoğlu wrote in AA Analiz that Russia’s war against Ukraine, the Middle East crisis and Europe’s rearmament had restored Turkey’s central strategic importance. (haberintelifi.aa.com.tr)

However, Turkish media do not view this rapprochement as an unconditional success. A DW Türkçe analysis stressed that the personal rapport between Trump and Erdoğan has not yet resolved the key disagreements—CAATSA sanctions, the F-35 issue and the consequences of U.S. policy toward Iran. (amp.dw.com) Unlike Ukraine, Turkey is not asking the United States to provide it with the tools for survival; unlike Brazil, it is not debating direct interference in the electoral process. But its elites fear something else: that Washington may use the promise of defense concessions to tie Ankara more closely to its regional agenda.

The Iranian issue is particularly revealing. In a conversation with Trump, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan urged him: “İran ile diyaloğu sürdürün” [“Continue the dialogue with Iran”]. Behind this diplomatic formula lies a clear Turkish calculation: a new U.S. escalation with Tehran would harm border security, trade routes, energy prices and Turkey’s role as a mediator. (amp.dw.com) For Ukrainians, however, an American war around Iran primarily means competition for air-defense missiles and Washington’s attention; Turkish audiences see the risk of losing their own mediating role; and Brazilians see yet another sign that the United States is increasingly turning economic and military levers into a unified system of political influence.

This is where three very different national perspectives converge. Brazil fears American tutelage over its political choices. Ukraine fears an American deal with Russia behind its back or over its head. Turkey fears that strategic rapprochement with the White House will bring short-term benefits while narrowing its room for independent maneuver. In each of these countries, America remains an indispensable partner. But the image of the United States is changing: it is no longer a guarantor of order but the most powerful negotiator, ready to set a price for security, markets, technology and diplomatic attention.

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Trump, Sanctions and the Erosion of U.S. Influence

Donald Trump’s policies are provoking growing concern and criticism: the decision to grant an exemption from the sanctions regime against Russia is irritating even Republicans, while protracted wars and Washington’s inconsistent steps, analysts say, are weakening American influence and bringing its opponents closer together. Additional pressure on Israel over settler violence in the West Bank, along with broader instability in the region, is raising further questions about the United States’ ability to maintain its strategic position. Based on publications by Al Jazeera (Saudi Arabia).

U.S. Policy Heightens Saudi Arabia’s Concerns

Changes in U.S. foreign policy, protracted armed conflicts and rising domestic economic costs are deepening doubts about Washington’s ability to remain the unquestioned guarantor of security in the Middle East. In an Al Jazeera article, this trend is examined through the lens of the inconsistent course pursued by Donald Trump’s administration, the wars surrounding Ukraine and Iran, sanctions policy toward Russia, as well as U.S. tariffs and rising fuel costs.

Although the publication does not cite direct statements by Saudi officials, politicians or experts, Saudi Arabia occupies an important place in it as an example of an energy power’s vulnerability to modern asymmetric threats. Attacks on the kingdom’s oil infrastructure and Houthi missile and drone strikes demonstrate that even a country with large military expenditures and close ties to the United States cannot regard the protection of vital facilities as fully guaranteed.

Particular attention is paid to the development of inexpensive drones and precision-guided missiles. These technologies significantly reduce the traditional advantage enjoyed by states with the most powerful armies, expensive weapons systems and substantial resources. For Riyadh, this is not a theoretical problem: oil facilities, export infrastructure and supply routes remain potential targets, and any successful strike could have consequences not only for domestic security but also for the global energy market.

The article cites journalist Patrick Cockburn’s assessment that both the United States and Russia are struggling in their attempts to achieve decisive victories over opponents with inferior military capabilities—Ukraine and Iran. This conclusion calls into question the notion that technological and resource superiority automatically ensures a swift end to conflicts. For Saudi Arabia, such a situation means that it must rely not only on external guarantees, but also on its own air defenses, critical-infrastructure protection, regional diplomacy and an expanded circle of international partners.

The connection between the confrontation with Iran, the security of the Persian Gulf and conditions on fuel markets remains particularly sensitive. According to data cited in the Al Jazeera publication, the war caused gasoline prices in the United States to rise by approximately 50%, while diesel prices increased by about 70%. For the Saudi economy, high energy prices may generate additional revenue; at the same time, instability poses risks to oil production and transportation, investment plans and the implementation of the Vision 2030 economic diversification program.

The conflict in Yemen and the security of the Red Sea also remain part of Saudi national security. Houthi actions against targets in the kingdom show that regional crises can quickly extend beyond local fronts and affect export chains, maritime shipping and critical energy infrastructure. Under these conditions, dependence on the U.S. military presence does not eliminate risks but becomes merely one element of a more complex security system.

The article’s overall assessment is that the chaotic and contradictory nature of Washington’s policies is undermining allies’ confidence, while prolonged wars are depleting the United States’ political, financial and military capabilities. For Saudi Arabia, this increases the need for a cautious balance: maintaining strategic relations with the United States while strengthening its own defenses, developing regional channels for dialogue and avoiding direct involvement in a confrontation that could threaten the stability of the Persian Gulf and the kingdom’s long-term economic priorities.

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America as a Source of Uncertainty: India, Ukraine and South Korea Read Trump’s Decisions Through...

As of October 17, 2026, the main American issue provoking reactions in India, Ukraine and South Korea was not Washington’s abstract struggle with Russia, but its sharp turn toward a policy in which the energy costs facing American voters matter more than previous sanctions principles. Donald Trump’s October 16 decision to suspend the application of some sanctions and tariffs under legislation targeting Russia and Iran—following an agreement to supply Russian diesel to the United States—was interpreted very differently in the three countries, but led to a common conclusion: American policy is becoming increasingly transactional, situational and tied to the domestic electoral climate. (chosun.com)

In India, the reaction almost immediately turned into a discussion of double standards. Indian commentators point out that only recently Washington threatened countries—above all India and China—with tariffs of up to 100% for making large purchases of Russian energy. Now, however, the White House is effectively opening the door to Russian diesel because fuel prices in the United States have become a politically sensitive issue ahead of the November 3 midterm elections. The editorial board of The Indian Express expressed Indian frustration in especially clear terms: New Delhi has the right to demand that its energy needs and costs be assessed “by the same standards” as Washington’s needs. (indianexpress.com)

The significance of this reaction goes deeper than yet another dispute over oil. For India’s political and expert community, the events confirm the basic doctrine of strategic autonomy: a country of more than 1.4 billion people cannot allow an external partner to determine where it should buy its energy. Indian analysts do not regard even a temporary lifting of the threat as a victory. The GTRI research group warns that the relaxation provides only short-term relief without eliminating uncertainty, and therefore India should continue making purchases on commercially advantageous terms and should not mistake the American concession for a lasting guarantee. ThePrint Hindi presents this position precisely as a call to protect energy security, rather than as a reason for diplomatic optimism. (hindi.theprint.in)

Indian strategist C. Raja Mohan, in a column for The Indian Express, offers an even more unexpected perspective. He calls Washington’s hypocrisy obvious, but sees it not as an exception, rather as the norm in international politics: “all politics is local.” For New Delhi, this means that a possible rapprochement between the United States and Russia could even reduce pressure surrounding Russian oil, while simultaneously making the global system less predictable. India’s debate, therefore, is not reducible to an anti-American reaction: it is pragmatic and almost coldly realist. The United States is seen as an important partner, but one whose rules apply only as long as they coincide with its current domestic interests. (indianexpress.com)

For Ukraine, the same news looks not like hypocrisy but like a direct strategic threat. Ukrainian media link the lifting of restrictions, the Russian diesel deal and pressure on Kyiv into a single narrative: while trying to reduce fuel costs at home, the United States is demanding that Ukraine stop striking Russian oil refineries—that is, one of the few tools Kyiv has to constrain Russia’s war economy. In an analysis by Ukrainska Pravda, this mechanism is described as the “three elements of US pressure” on Ukraine: intelligence, the PURL weapons-purchasing program and Starlink. This is not simply a diplomatic disagreement, but a reminder of how heavily Ukraine’s military resilience depends on American technological and intelligence channels. (pravda.com.ua)

Kyiv found the logic behind the American demand particularly painful. If strikes on Russian oil refineries raise diesel prices in the United States, Ukraine is effectively being blamed for American consumers’ inconvenience—regardless of the fact that Russia continues its war and strikes Ukrainian energy infrastructure. Volodymyr Zelenskyy responded with a principle of reciprocity: if Moscow wants attacks on its oil facilities to stop, it should stop attacking Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. This position was reported by Yevropeyska Pravda: Kyiv does not reject an energy ceasefire as an idea, but refuses to turn it into a one-sided ban imposed on Ukraine. (eurointegration.com.ua)

The Ukrainian reaction therefore differs markedly from India’s. In India, American inconsistency is an argument in favor of freedom of maneuver. In Ukraine, it is seen as a risk that an ally is prepared to trade away part of Ukraine’s defense strategy for lower prices at the pump ahead of the elections. Even Trump’s decision to suspend sanctions measures against Russia is interpreted by Ukrainian commentators as a signal that the American administration may be more interested in a quick deal and cheap fuel than in consistently weakening Russia’s military potential. (pravda.com.ua)

In South Korea, the American issue is developing along a different trajectory but leads to the same sense of dependence on an American deal. Seoul is watching as trade concessions become increasingly openly linked to investment in American industry, energy and shipbuilding. Trump said that South Korea must pay for lower tariffs, highlighting $150 billion in investment in American shipbuilding; at the same time, major investments in US energy, including an LNG project in Alaska, are being discussed as part of the agreements. Chosun Ilbo reports on how directly the American president links access to a more favorable trade regime with Korean capital investment in the United States. (chosun.com)

South Korea’s distinctive feature is that American pressure is rarely described here as a rupture in the alliance. It is more often perceived as the alliance’s new price. For a country whose export economy is closely tied to the United States and whose security rests on an American military presence, the issue is not whether it can simply say “no,” but whether it can turn compelled concessions into access to American supply chains, defense contracts and energy assets. Accordingly, statements about Korean investment in American infrastructure are read in Seoul both as a commercial opportunity and as a bill presented to an ally. Hankyoreh noted that Trump presented expanded Korean participation in American energy projects as proof that the “deal” with Seoul was becoming increasingly advantageous—first and foremost, of course, for the United States. (hani.co.kr)

Against this backdrop, the US war with Iran and the surge in oil prices are heightening South Korean anxiety. For India, expensive oil is an argument in defense of Russian purchases; for Ukraine, it is the reason Washington is pressuring it over attacks on Russian energy infrastructure; for South Korea, it is a reminder of the structural vulnerability of an import-dependent economy. South Korean debate links the Middle East conflict, American inflation, trade deals and national industrial policy into a single chain. Even the American midterm elections become an external economic factor here: if the White House is seeking quick ways to bring down energy prices and demonstrate an inflow of investment, Korean corporations must take this into account when planning multibillion-dollar projects. (chosun.com)

The common international conclusion drawn from the Indian, Ukrainian and South Korean reactions is a harsh one. America does not cease to be a key power for any of the three countries, but the nature of that power is changing. For India, the United States increasingly looks less like a moral arbiter and more like a negotiator whose interests must be weighed and the cost of pressure demonstrated. For Ukraine, it remains an indispensable partner, but its support is becoming ever more dependent on American domestic politics. For South Korea, the United States remains a military ally and crucial market, but the alliance is now increasingly accompanied by an investment bill and a tariff ultimatum.

The most important local observation is that New Delhi, Kyiv and Seoul no longer expect Washington’s rules to remain unchanged. They are trying to adapt to an America that simultaneously demands sanctions discipline, buys Russian diesel, pressures allies with tariffs and uses energy projects as an instrument of geopolitical loyalty. The only difference lies in their reserves of resilience: India responds with strategic autonomy, Ukraine with an effort to prevent its defense from becoming a bargaining chip, and South Korea with the costly adaptation to the American model of an “alliance as a deal.”

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America in the Mirror of Ankara, Riyadh, and Moscow: War with Iran Tests U.S. Power

The main issue through which the United States is currently being discussed in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Russia is not American domestic politics as such, but Washington’s ability to manage the war with Iran, the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz, and the conflict’s consequences for Eurasian energy as a whole. After attacks on vessels became more frequent again in September–October 2026, while U.S.–Iranian contacts through Qatar failed to produce a political breakthrough, commentators in all three countries have converged on one conclusion: U.S. military superiority does not in itself mean that Washington can impose a durable order. But the meaning of this conclusion differs from country to country. For Turkey, it is primarily a question of regional security and preserving Iran as a manageable neighbor; for Saudi Arabia, it concerns protecting infrastructure and investment, as well as the Kingdom’s status as a pillar of Gulf security; for Russia, it is an argument supporting the claim that the American strategy of pressure is in crisis.

The Turkish debate is particularly notable because it views the war not as merely an episode in the confrontation between Washington and Tehran, but as a process capable of reshaping the land and maritime links around Turkey. In an analysis by Istanbul’s Center for Iranian Studies, Rahim Farzam and Emine Gözde Bayraktaroğlu note that Tehran’s proposal, conveyed through Qatar, to open the Strait of Hormuz within seven days was rejected by Donald Trump, although indirect contacts did not cease. The authors identify Iran’s effort to return to a formula of mutual concessions rather than a capitulation agreement: President Masoud Pezeshkian stated that any deal should be based on a “win-win” strategy. In the Turkish reading, this matters not because Ankara unconditionally accepts Iran’s position, but because the collapse of negotiations threatens it with trade disruptions, an influx of instability across its eastern borders, and the strengthening of separatist groups. This is discussed in a recent İRAM analysis. (iramcenter.org)

Turkish experts also see a key contradiction in the American approach: Washington is trying simultaneously to economically strangle Iran, control maritime routes, and keep the diplomatic door ajar. Serhan Afacan, president of İRAM, writes that after the April ceasefire, the conflict effectively turned from a U.S.–Israeli operation into a direct U.S.–Iranian war, allowing Israel to move into the background while Washington began paying the main price for the pressure campaign. His conclusion is cautious but telling: another major war is not inevitable, but “uncertainty” itself has become a permanent condition of the region. For Ankara, this means relying on mediation and containment rather than choosing sides. A Turkish analysis separately emphasizes that the attempt to replace maritime transport with Iranian overland transit through Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Turkmenistan is already causing congestion at the borders and cannot become a full-fledged alternative to sea routes. (iramcenter.org)

The Saudi perspective is noticeably less ideological and more practical. In Riyadh, America is judged by two criteria: does it guarantee the Kingdom’s physical security, and does it help restore predictability to the energy market? Saudi political analyst Fayez al-Shahri made an important point in a column for Al-Riyadh: American military superiority has not brought about Iran’s “political submission,” but Iran’s ability to disrupt traffic through Hormuz has not become a strategic victory either. In other words, both sides are capable of inflicting damage, but neither has yet been able to turn a tactical asset into an acceptable political settlement. (alriyadh.com)

In the Saudi press, Hormuz is increasingly described not as a disputed strait but as the nerve center of a new security model. In an Arab News article, analyst Zaid M. Belbagi writes that Vision 2030 and economic diversification require investors to feel that the Persian Gulf is a reliable place for long-term investment. Therefore, strengthening defense cooperation with the United States is viewed in Riyadh as a necessity rather than a geopolitical luxury: the issue involves protecting oil facilities, countering Houthi attacks, and maintaining export routes that bypass Hormuz. But this is also where the Saudi caveat becomes apparent: executive promises from the White House are not the same as treaty guarantees approved by U.S. institutions. (arabnews.com)

This duality distinguishes the Saudi view from the Turkish one. Ankara fears that the United States may go too far and destroy the fragile balance along its borders. Riyadh, by contrast, wants a more reliable American shield, but fears that American inconsistency will leave it alone to deal with the consequences of the war. Even in Saudi publications critical of Iran, there is visible irritation that negotiations and displays of force continually replace one another without creating stable rules for the passage of vessels. Asharq Al-Awsat directly links Trump’s sharp shifts in position to the difficulties of mediation and uncertainty surrounding sanctions relief. (aawsat.com)

Russian observers view the same picture through the prism of the strategic failure of pressure. For them, the failure to agree on terms concerning Hormuz is evidence not only of Iran’s intransigence, but also of the United States’ inability to reconcile three incompatible objectives: freedom of navigation, maximally painful sanctions against Tehran, and the preservation of its right to expand the military campaign at any moment. In a Vedomosti article, experts point to the disappearance of trust: Tehran views negotiations as a possible “smokescreen,” since military operations have already resumed amid diplomatic contacts. (vedomosti.ru)

The Russian debate links the Middle Eastern war even more sharply to the American domestic political calendar and the oil market. In a commentary for Kommersant, Iran expert Lana Ravandi-Fadai emphasizes that Iran is prepared to discuss restoring freedom of navigation, but “not as a defeated party.” Energy expert Igor Yushkov offers a more cynical explanation of the American approach: in his assessment, Trump uses the Hormuz factor to influence the oil and gas market—calming it with talk of a deal when prices are too high and increasing anxiety with statements about possible strikes when that is politically advantageous. This does not necessarily mean that Moscow believes the United States consciously seeks endless war; rather, in the Russian analysis, Washington appears to be a power for which controlled instability has become an instrument of competition in the energy market. (kommersant.ru)

The most unexpected point of agreement among the three countries is that none of them describes America as an all-powerful arbiter. Turkey sees the United States as a source of dangerous strategic uncertainty, Saudi Arabia as an indispensable but institutionally not entirely reliable guarantor, and Russia as a powerful player unable to convert military pressure into a political result. Another conclusion is also shared: Hormuz has ceased to be merely a waterway. It has become a measure of whether America in the 21st century can provide global order without destroying the economic and diplomatic environment on which that order depends.

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America as a Variable: Why India, Russia and Saudi Arabia Are Losing Faith in...

By October 16, 2026, the United States had simultaneously become the subject of three very different, yet remarkably similar, discussions in India, Russia and Saudi Arabia. In New Delhi, the focus is less on the size of American tariffs than on the unreliability of any terms reached with Washington; in Moscow, it is the unexpected lifting of restrictions on Russian diesel fuel and how this changes the context of the conflict in Ukraine; in Riyadh, it is the United States’ willingness to help against the Houthis, but without a firm guarantee of direct military involvement. The common conclusion of local commentators is simple: American policy is increasingly perceived not as a system of stable alliance commitments, but as a set of deals that can be revised depending on energy prices, the electoral calendar and the current balance of power.

The clearest symbol of this shift was the diesel agreement between Moscow and Washington. Following a telephone conversation between Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump on October 9, the United States exempted transactions involving Russian diesel from sanctions until April 7, 2027. The deal covered more than 300,000 tonnes of supplies in October, 500,000 tonnes in November, another one million tonnes later, as well as a potential additional three million tonnes. Kommersant also highlights the political symbolism of the moment: the American president announced the deal precisely when his representatives were discussing proposals to end the war with Ukraine and European countries. (kommersant.ru)

In Russian discourse, this is less a reason to speak of a sudden friendship with America than evidence of the extreme instrumentality of the current US administration. Fyodor Lukyanov, chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, writes in a commentary for the Russian International Affairs Council that under Trump, sanctions are becoming a mechanism that Washington switches on and off depending on its “immediate political and economic requirements.” His key point is that Moscow should not mistake this reversal for a new, permanent US policy: it is more an opportunity for maneuver than the beginning of a relationship based on trust. (russiancouncil.ru)

At the same time, Russian authors see energy as the arena in which American inconsistency becomes especially obvious. Until recently, Washington sought to restrict Russian revenues and maintain pressure on Moscow; now, the need to lower fuel prices for American consumers makes Russian diesel politically acceptable. On October 16, Trump himself called Ukrainian strikes on Russian refineries “a disgrace,” linking them to rising global oil prices and fuel shortages. Kommersant directly notes that this demand coincides with the American interest in Russian supplies. (kommersant.ru) To Russian audiences, this looks like recognition of the obvious: when US domestic economics are at stake, geopolitical principles quickly give way to pragmatism.

India’s reaction to the same model is much more concerned. New Delhi does not see American flexibility as an advantage for a partner; on the contrary, it views it as the risk of reaching an agreement that will lose its value tomorrow. In a column for The Indian Express, expert Saumya Bhowmick defines the problem particularly precisely: the main “tariff” in relations between India and the United States is not the rate written on paper, but uncertainty. The US Supreme Court overturned Trump’s reciprocal tariffs, talks on a trade agreement have reached an impasse for the third time, and India’s presumed advantages over its competitors could disappear following the next administrative decision in Washington. (indianexpress.com)

This leads to a characteristic Indian prescription: rather than buying a promise of low tariffs at the price of irreversible concessions on markets, procurement and regulation, India should demand legally stronger guarantees, a tariff ceiling and the right to take retaliatory measures. This is not anti-Americanism, but a lesson India is drawing from American volatility. Ishan Bakshi, senior editor of The Indian Express, goes even further in his analysis: he regards pressure over Russian oil purchases, sanctions legislation, attacks on Indian IT services and the mobility of skilled workers not as a collection of one president’s whims, but as signs of a deeper reassessment of the US attitude toward India. His conclusion sounds almost like a formula for Indian foreign policy: the country needs American technology, capital and markets; Chinese components and goods; and Russian energy and weapons. (indianexpress.com)

Saudi Arabia views American transactionalism through the lens of security. Following the October 10 attack on the passenger terminal at King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh, Brigadier General Turki al-Maliki, spokesman for the coalition in Yemen, called the Houthi strike a terrorist act and a war crime, promising a firm response within the framework of international humanitarian law. A report by Saudi newspaper Okaz noted that the victims included civilians—passengers and airport employees—who were killed or injured. (okaz.com.sa)

However, the local debate is focused not only on retaliation, but also on the question of what America is actually prepared to do. In the Saudi author’s column “When You Are Saudi Arabia’s Neighbor”, attention is drawn to the ambiguity of the American signal: Washington says it will not directly enter the war in Yemen, but will continue sharing intelligence with the coalition. The author believes the Houthis may have mistakenly interpreted this restraint as permission to intensify attacks on Saudi tankers and civilian infrastructure. At the same time, he emphasizes the desire of Riyadh and other Gulf countries not to become direct parties to a broader war involving the United States, Israel and Iran. (okaz.com.sa)

This reveals a particularly important nuance for Saudi Arabia. America’s willingness to negotiate with the Houthis for the sake of maritime security is perceived not as diplomatic subtlety, but as a dangerous signal to an armed group. In another Okaz column, talks between US representatives and the Houthis are described as exposing the group’s slogans: an organization that built its identity around hostility toward America proved willing to discuss security arrangements and guarantees for shipping with it. But for Riyadh, this also leads to another conclusion: the United States may negotiate with Saudi Arabia’s adversary if doing so serves its own maritime and energy interests. (okaz.com.sa)

The Indian, Russian and Saudi reactions converge not in their assessment of America as a friend or an adversary, but in a more sober understanding of its behavior. Russia sees an opportunity to use American pragmatism to ease sanctions pressure, but does not regard it as a guarantee of lasting détente. India wants to protect itself from American unpredictability through contractual safeguards while also diversifying its external ties. Saudi Arabia needs American intelligence, weapons and political influence, but is increasingly proceeding from the assumption that the kingdom’s security cannot be built on the expectation of inevitable US intervention.

Paradoxically, America’s main export these days is not diesel, tariffs or military support, but uncertainty. For Washington, it may be a source of tactical freedom. For three major regional powers, it is becoming an argument for greater self-reliance, risk protection and abandoning the old belief that the United States has immutable rules of the game.

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America as a Transaction: Why Seoul, Brasília and Paris Trust “Allies” Less

As of October 16, 2026, the United States is being discussed in South Korea, Brazil and France less as the familiar center of world politics than as a state that has turned foreign policy into an instrument of domestic campaigning, pressure and immediate gain. Each country has its own trigger: in Seoul, American statements suggesting that South Korean investments in Alaska have already been agreed; in Brasília, the consequences of the tariff war; and in Paris, the increasingly direct question of whether Europe can defend itself without Washington. But local commentators in all three countries are reaching nearly the same conclusion: an agreement with today’s America is no longer the endpoint of negotiations, but merely an intermediate stage in a new round of bargaining.

The most nervous reaction is currently coming from South Korea. Donald Trump is using the Alaska LNG project as evidence of his own economic achievements ahead of the November midterm elections in the United States, claiming that South Korea will invest around $50 billion in Alaska’s infrastructure. Seoul, however, insists that this is not an approved investment commitment, but only the beginning of an assessment of the project, provided it is commercially viable and complies with domestic law. In Korea, this difference in wording has become more important than the figures themselves. The Korean publication MTN directly links Washington’s insistence to competition in Alaska ahead of the midterms [midterm elections], while Industry Minister Kim Jung-kwan reiterates that participation is possible only if economic feasibility is demonstrated. (news.mtn.co.kr)

This reflects a distinctly Korean concern: Washington is not simply proposing a business project, but publicly presenting it as a concession already secured, thereby creating political pressure on its ally. In an editorial in Chosun Ilbo, this is described as a unilateral announcement that should be met neither with haste nor with confusion. Behind this restrained formulation lies a sharper idea: alliance commitments must not be turned into a form of payment for lower tariffs or for the goodwill of the White House. (chosun.com)

Seoul also has a rational argument against an emotional response. The project in Texas and the construction of nuclear facilities could potentially provide South Korean companies with contracts for equipment, engineering and operations. But Alaska LNG is a different case: the enormous pipeline, high costs and uncertain returns make it less an energy deal than a test of Korea’s ability to say “no” even to its closest military partner. The plan published by Seoul confirms the Texas gas project, a framework for eight nuclear power plants, and only a conditional assessment of the Alaskan option. (eiec.kdi.re.kr)

The debate in Brazil is even tougher, because there American economic pressure is perceived not as difficult bargaining between allies, but as interference in the country’s sovereign decisions. The tariffs imposed by the United States under Section 301 of its trade legislation affect digital trade, the payments system, access to the ethanol market, intellectual property, environmental policy and other matters that Brazil considers primarily domestic prerogatives. Brazil’s Foreign Ministry called the measures unjustified and contrary to US obligations under the WTO, and initiated consultations. (gov.br)

It is particularly telling that the local dispute has long gone beyond the question of “what tariff rate will be imposed.” In an analysis by the Observatory of Foreign Policy and Brazil’s International Insertion, the American tariffs are interpreted as an instrument of geopolitical coercion and an attempt to preserve US leadership in the Western Hemisphere amid China’s growing influence. This is an important Brazilian perspective: the conflict is seen not simply as an argument over imports, but as punishment for an overly independent foreign, digital and industrial policy. (opeb.org)

At the same time, Brasília is avoiding romantic anti-Americanism. Government statistics show that the additional US measures affected approximately 23.1% of Brazilian exports to the United States, while shipments to the US market fell by 6.5% year on year from January through September. The local approach is therefore not a symmetrical trade war at any cost, but a combination of legal resistance, negotiations and accelerated market diversification. (gov.br) In this respect, Brazil’s reaction differs noticeably from South Korea’s: Seoul is trying to clarify the terms of its deal with America, while Brazil is trying to reduce the very degree of its dependence on the American market.

The French reaction is less focused on tariffs and much more on security. In Paris, American unpredictability is now interpreted not as the eccentricity of a single president, but as evidence of a structural rupture: the United States continues to demand that Europeans spend more on defense, while at the same time potentially weakening European consolidation, testing allies’ political loyalty and reconsidering its own military presence. Le Monde quotes Fabrice Pothier of Rasmussen Global, who says that the American administration is mixing strategic demands with ideological considerations and tests of partners’ loyalty—“an explosive cocktail” [translation]. (lemonde.fr)

French politicians are drawing from this an idea that until recently sounded almost utopian: Europe should not create an alternative to NATO, but gradually transform the alliance into an organization in which Europeans are capable of directing their own defense. A French parliamentary report proposes that the EU “take ownership” of NATO and turn it into its armed instrument—a deliberately sharp formulation that reflects the shift in Paris’s thinking. (lemonde.fr) Former European Commissioner Thierry Breton puts it even more broadly in an interview with Le Monde: Europe too often acts as a large market, but not as a power; the era when policy could be built on trust in American guarantees is over. (lemonde.fr)

This is where all three national perspectives converge. South Korea fears that security and trade will be reduced to the price of American campaign promises. Brazil sees trade instruments as a way to secure political concessions. France is concluding that even a military alliance no longer exempts it from the need to possess its own resources, technologies and industrial base. What differs is not the diagnosis, but the scale of the response: Seoul is trying to preserve the alliance while defending the boundaries of agreements; Brasília is seeking more markets and greater reliance on international law; and Paris wants to turn European dependence into European agency.

The most unusual local idea comes from Korea: the problem is not that the United States is demanding investments, but that publicly announcing an agreement that has not yet been reached becomes a method of imposing it. The most pragmatic comes from Brazil: retaliatory tariffs may primarily harm domestic consumers, so sovereignty requires not only loud gestures but also precise calculation. The French conclusion is the most long-term: America is no longer viewed as an ally that is fading away, but increasingly as a powerful partner whose interests cannot automatically be treated as one’s own.

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Trump and American Power: From Iran to Latin America

Israeli and Brazilian media view Donald Trump’s policies as an increasingly significant and potentially destabilizing factor. The focus is on Washington’s reliability in its relationship with Netanyahu, the risk of escalation involving Iran, and a possible shift in the U.S. strategy on Ukraine—toward a peace agreement or a new phase of confrontation. Meanwhile, the Brazilian press is discussing the prospect of deploying U.S. troops in Latin America, reflecting the region’s concerns about intervention and sovereignty. This material is based on reports by O Povo (Brazil) and News Israel (Israel).

Brazil Concerned by Expanded U.S. Military Presence

Plans by Donald Trump’s administration to expand the U.S. military presence in Latin America under the pretext of combating drug trafficking have caused concern across the region. As noted by the Brazilian outlet O Povo, this is not merely a new security operation, but could also alter the political and military balance in Central and South America.

According to available information, the United States intends to send about 600 soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division to a jungle training center in Panama. After training, the units are expected to take part in exercises and operations alongside the forces of Colombia and Honduras. At the same time, Washington plans to deploy MQ-9 Reaper drones to Colombia and Ecuador, establish a new command structure in Miami, and expand counter-narcotics operations. In addition to maritime routes, operations are expected to be conducted more actively on land.

For Brazil and other countries in the region, the key question is not so much the size of the U.S. contingent as whether the temporary deployment will become the basis for permanent U.S. military infrastructure. The mission is formally described as temporary, but American officials acknowledge that rotating units could become a lasting element of the region’s security architecture.

This scenario is particularly sensitive because of Latin America’s historical memory. During the 20th and 21st centuries, many governments and societies in the region viewed U.S. intervention in their affairs as a violation of national sovereignty. The issue has additional significance for Brazil, whose foreign-policy tradition is based on non-intervention, the peaceful resolution of conflicts, and strengthening regional autonomy.

Although the publication does not include direct comments from Brazilian politicians or experts, its assessment reflects widespread Latin American distrust of the militarization of counter-narcotics policy. Human-rights organizations fear an increase in civilian casualties, while specialists point out that eliminating individual members of criminal groups rarely destroys the networks themselves: new figures quickly replace leaders who have been killed or arrested.

O Povo pays particular attention to the effectiveness of U.S. operations already under way. Washington says it has carried out 71 strikes against suspected vessels in the Caribbean and the eastern Pacific, resulting, according to U.S. data, in 239 deaths. However, the American side has not provided evidence that all those killed were actually involved in drug trafficking. Experts have also not observed any significant reduction in the availability of cocaine on the U.S. market.

For Brazil, which is simultaneously fighting transnational crime and remains an important transit territory for cocaine, this raises a broader question about the effectiveness of external military force. Drug trafficking is linked not only to supply routes and armed groups, but also to sustained consumer demand, financial schemes, corruption, poverty, and weak state institutions. Military strikes may hit individual links in the chain, but they do not eliminate its structural causes.

An expanded U.S. presence could also affect the domestic politics of neighboring countries and increase pressure on governments pursuing a more independent foreign policy. This, in turn, could complicate regional cooperation, in which Brazil seeks to maintain a prominent diplomatic role.

Thus, the O Povo report views the American campaign against cartels not as a neutral technical operation. The focus is on the risk of normalizing a permanent U.S. military presence, doubts about the effectiveness of a force-based approach, and concern that the fight against drug trafficking could become a new mechanism for expanding American influence in Latin America.

Israel Questions the Effectiveness of MOAB Against Iran

The possible use by the United States of the super-powerful MOAB bomb against Iran would not guarantee the destruction of its nuclear and missile infrastructure, according to authors at the Israeli outlet Inyan Mer­ka­zi. The publication examines Donald Trump’s threats primarily from the perspective of Israel’s security and urges readers not to confuse an impressive explosion with a genuine military result.

MOAB, known as the “mother of all bombs,” weighs about 9.8 metric tons and can cause extensive destruction on the surface. However, the outlet emphasizes that the weapon is not designed to penetrate mountain formations or deep underground complexes. The main problem is that Iran has spent many years building defensive infrastructure designed to withstand possible U.S. and Israeli air superiority.

Tehran’s nuclear facilities, missile arsenals, command centers, production plants, and storage sites are dispersed, camouflaged, and in many cases located deep underground. Therefore, the authors note, “the force of an explosion is not equal to its ability to penetrate.” After a powerful strike, the key question will not be the scale of the destruction on the surface, but what remains operational “under the mountain.”

The American GBU-57 MOP, weighing about 13.6 metric tons, is mentioned as a more suitable weapon for such tasks. It was designed to destroy hardened underground facilities. Even its use, however, would not guarantee success: the outcome would depend on the depth of the structures, geological conditions, the design of the fortifications, the accuracy of the strike, and the quality of intelligence.

From the Israeli perspective, a massive airstrike could destroy entrances to facilities, communications, and external infrastructure, but would not necessarily eliminate equipment, material stockpiles, and production capacity hidden in protected underground rooms. This distinction between a spectacular attack and the irreversible elimination of a threat is central to the publication’s assessment.

The possibility of retaliatory escalation is also a major concern. A U.S. operation against Iran could lead to strikes on American bases, energy facilities, maritime routes, and Washington’s allies in the Middle East, including Israel. The possible destabilization or blockade of the Strait of Hormuz could indirectly affect Israel’s economy and security through a surge in global energy prices, disruptions to maritime and air logistics, financial instability, and an expansion of the regional conflict.

Although the publication does not cite separate statements from Israeli politicians or military officials, it reflects the caution characteristic of Israel’s strategic discourse. It expresses distrust of symbolic “superstrikes” and calls for assessing an operation by its verifiable results: whether Iran retains the ability to produce weapons, develop its nuclear program, threaten its neighbors, and launch retaliatory attacks.

As Inyan Mer­ka­zi emphasizes, “spectacular destruction is not necessarily a strategic victory.” For Israel, what matters is not the loudness of the explosion or the political effect of demonstrating force, but whether Iran’s military and nuclear infrastructure is actually put out of operation.

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America as a Source of Risk: What France, China and South Africa Saw in Washington This Fall

In mid-October 2026, the United States simultaneously became, in the eyes of the outside world, a military power, a trade negotiator and an unpredictable domestic political actor. In France, people are discussing the cost of America’s protracted conflict with Iran—not only in missiles and oil, but also in the weakening of European security. In China, the main issue has been the fragility of even those de-escalation agreements with Washington reached only recently: America’s midterm elections could once again turn China into an object of domestic political struggle. In South Africa, the same logic is already being felt directly: visa restrictions and US demands concerning land reform are perceived as an attempt to turn America’s culture war into an instrument of foreign policy.

The broadest common theme is fatigue with a policy of American pressure that produces no lasting result. The French discussion focuses on the US war with Iran and its secondary consequences. Experts from the French Institute of International Relations, in an analysis for France Culture, describe the conflict as a military demonstration of overwhelming superiority without a political conclusion: the United States has shifted from relying on coercive force to economically and financially strangling Iran, including through threats of secondary sanctions against its partners. But, in their assessment, the cost of this course is weakened trust among the Arab monarchies, the wear and tear on the US military machine, growing risks to the global economy and a new wave of inflation in Europe. (ifri.org)

For the French, the issue is not merely moral criticism of the war, but its practical implication: Washington is becoming less and less capable of simultaneously conducting a campaign in the Middle East, containing Russia in Europe and competing with China in Asia. An analysis in Le Monde explicitly notes that the new US defense strategy reduces the European presence to “burden sharing” [that is, shifting costs and responsibility onto allies], cutting American combat forces in Europe from five brigades to three. The French view therefore is not limited to habitual anti-Americanism: it reflects concern that Europe remains dependent on the United States precisely when the US is becoming increasingly distracted by its own wars and electoral priorities. (lemonde.fr)

China’s reaction to the same set of events is noticeably cooler and more instrumental. Researchers in Beijing see the war with Iran primarily as an example of how American pressure can extend beyond a bilateral conflict—through sanctions against banks, trading partners and supply chains. Wu Xinbo, director of Fudan University’s Center for American Studies, warns in an interview with the university portal that if US secondary sanctions affect Chinese financial institutions, they would have the effect of a “financial nuclear bomb” [that is, an extremely destructive systemic impact]. At the same time, he stresses that such a move would also damage the dollar’s standing, meaning Washington itself must calculate the cost of escalation. (fddi.fudan.edu.cn)

But Chinese commentators do not conclude from America’s difficulties that compromise is inevitable. On the contrary, they see US domestic politics as the main source of instability. In an analysis by Peking University, researcher Meng Weizhan calls the November 3 election a “narrow corridor” [a situation in which the outcome is determined by a small number of competitive districts], rather than a major shift in the political era. His main conclusion is particularly telling: even if the Democrats take the House of Representatives, this will not end the technological rivalry with the PRC; instead, Congress will raise the domestic political cost for the White House of making any concessions to Beijing. (igcu.pku.edu.cn)

This is where the French and Chinese perceptions converge. Paris fears that America can no longer reliably guarantee the security of its allies; Beijing fears that America cannot reliably honor even its own agreements if they become inconvenient during an election campaign. American policy is beginning to be perceived not as a state policy line, but as a variable dependent on the president’s approval ratings, gasoline prices, war and the balance of power in Congress. Le Monde correspondent Piotr Smolar describes Donald Trump’s campaign ahead of the election as an attempt to replace unfavorable reality with aggressive political marketing: against the backdrop of low support for his cost-of-living policies, the president is holding a series of rallies and promising voters new payments. (lemonde.fr)

The South African reaction makes this story the most tangible. For Pretoria, America’s midterm elections are not a distant spectacle, but a reason why the bilateral dispute is taking on an increasingly hard-edged form. Following the visa restrictions announced on September 15 against individuals whom Washington associates with land expropriations, racial discrimination and violence against minorities, the conflict over land reform, the rights of Afrikaners and policies to expand economic opportunities for the Black majority has ceased to be a purely domestic matter. (issafrica.org)

Ronak Gopaldas and Priyal Singh of the Institute for Security Studies in Johannesburg offer an important qualification in their joint article: political relations are rapidly deteriorating, while trade and strategic ties remain resilient. Their phrase “moving goalposts” particularly accurately conveys local frustration: Pretoria is trying to respond to the accusations, but the criteria for normalizing relations change as the dispute becomes useful to American lobbyists and election rhetoric. The authors note that disagreements over Israel, China, Russia, land policy and racial equality can easily be turned into ready-made campaign material in the United States. (issafrica.org)

This may be the most unexpected South African conclusion. Local analysts are not calling for a demonstrative break with the United States, nor do they consider the threat of sanctions inevitable. They propose separating public drama from material interests: America needs South African markets, minerals, infrastructure and financial systems no less than Pretoria needs access to the US market. But in their view, Washington is turning questions of historical justice after apartheid into an ideological test of loyalty.

Thus, three very different countries arrive at a similar feeling. France sees an America squandering its strategic resources in a war with no clear exit. China sees a rival with which it must negotiate, but warns against confusing tactical warmth with stability. South Africa sees a superpower prepared to project its own cultural and electoral conflicts onto another country’s sovereignty. The common image of the United States in these discussions is not that of a declining power, but of a still extraordinarily powerful country whose strength is increasingly used situationally—and therefore becoming equally difficult for partners and adversaries to predict.

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Diesel, intelligence and elections: why Trump’s America has become a source of one...

In recent days, the United States has found itself at the center of three interconnected international disputes: Donald Trump’s agreement with Vladimir Putin to allow Russian diesel onto the global market, threats to restrict aid to Ukraine, and suspicions of political pressure on allies and partners. In Kyiv, this is seen not as another diplomatic flare-up, but as a matter of physical security ahead of another winter of war. In France, the events are being interpreted as proof that Europe can no longer base its defense on the assumption of unwavering American support. In Brazil, meanwhile, U.S. policy is discussed primarily in terms of sovereignty, tariffs, elections, and the risk that Washington is prepared to use economic leverage to interfere in the domestic politics of other countries.

The central thread connecting these developments is the unexpected transformation of Russian energy—from a target of sanctions into an instrument of U.S. domestic policy. Brazilian international affairs commentator Lourival Sant’Anna, in a column for CNN Brasil, notes that permission to sell Russian diesel is unlikely to significantly alter the physical volume of fuel on the market, but radically changes the political meaning of the U.S. position: Moscow gains not only revenue, but also a direct U.S. interest in the stability of Russian supplies. From the Ukrainian perspective, this step is particularly painful because it coincided with American pressure on Kyiv to halt strikes on Russian oil refineries—one of the few ways to systematically hit the financial foundation of Russia’s war.

The French debate formulates the same conclusion more bluntly: the diesel deal looks like the subordination of European security to the short-term goal of lowering fuel prices in the United States ahead of the midterm elections. An analysis by Le Monde directly links this to the U.S. and Israeli war against Iran, which has driven up diesel prices: Washington is trying to offset the consequences of its own Middle East policy, effectively expanding the Kremlin’s room for maneuver. Ukrainians see an almost surreal inversion here: the country under attack is expected to stop striking Russian oil infrastructure, while Russia is simultaneously given the opportunity to earn money from fuel exports. It is no coincidence that Volodymyr Zelensky called what was happening a betrayal: “We are losing a powerful partner” [«Nous sommes en train de perdre un partenaire puissant»], he said in an interview quoted by Le Monde. (lemonde.fr)

The second common theme is the unreliability of dependence on U.S. infrastructure. On October 13, Donald Trump denied that Washington had stopped sharing intelligence with Ukraine, saying: “No, we didn’t do that. We’re helping them.” But in the Ukrainian information space, it was not the formal denial that mattered most, but the very fact that such a threat had been made. Analysts at BII describe the situation as the use of military-technical cooperation as a tool to pressure a partner’s decisions. For Ukrainian society, intelligence is not an abstract diplomatic currency: it means warnings of ballistic launches, satellite information, target data, and military analysis. Reports of delays in alerts amid strikes on energy facilities are therefore perceived as a potential price for political disagreement with the White House. (bii.agency)

The French response to the same crisis is less emotional, but strategically even more far-reaching. Paris sees it as yet another confirmation of the need for European autonomy—above all, its own satellite, intelligence, and defense capabilities. French expert François Heisbourg, quoted by Le Monde, calls for European projects such as IRIS² and Ceres to be accelerated so that Kyiv does not remain dependent on American data. This is an important shift: previously, the French idea of “strategic autonomy” was often viewed in Eastern Europe as rhetoric capable of weakening NATO. Now it is increasingly being presented as a practical response to the risk that an American president could instantly turn access to critical technology into a bargaining chip. (lemonde.fr)

The third theme is the perception of the United States as a power increasingly inclined to export its own political conflicts abroad. In Brazil, this concern is especially visible because of the presidential campaign. Trump said he was following Brazil’s elections “closely” [«de perto»], against the backdrop of earlier tariff measures, visa restrictions, and concerns among Brazilian authorities about foreign interference. A Folha de S.Paulo article emphasizes that Brazilian intelligence classified possible U.S. influence on the 2026 elections as a high-level threat. For local audiences, the issue is not limited to Trump’s sympathies toward one candidate or another: U.S. tariffs, sanctions, and public statements are seen as potential means of altering the balance of power within Latin America’s largest democracy. (www1.folha.uol.com.br)

That is why Brazil’s response to the United States differs noticeably from Ukraine’s and France’s: there is less hope of returning Washington to its previous alliance behavior and more desire to reduce vulnerability to it. An editorial in Folha cites an instructive Latinobarómetro finding: the share of Latin Americans with a favorable view of the United States fell from 73% in 2024 to 63% in 2026; in Brazil, relations with China are viewed more positively than relations with the United States. The editorial draws a fundamental conclusion: a rightward electoral shift in Latin America does not automatically imply sympathy for Washington. For Brazilians, Trump’s toughness—from tariffs to deportations and pressure on neighboring countries—does not look like “conservative solidarity”; it looks like a return to a policy in which the region is treated as America’s backyard. (www1.folha.uol.com.br)

Paris frames this problem in the language of international law. During a session of the National Assembly, lawmaker Anna Pic accused the U.S. president of attempting to dismantle the postwar international order and bring Europe under his control; Minister for Foreign Trade Nicolas Forissier replied that France and the EU must remain committed to the rule of law, support for the International Criminal Court, and sustained aid to Ukraine. His words about the need to remain “committed, consistent, and stable” alongside Ukraine and Zelensky [«volontaire, stable, cohérente»] are important precisely as a contrast with Washington, whose policy in Paris is increasingly described as unpredictable. The official transcript of the French Foreign Ministry shows that France links U.S. pressure on Ukraine, tensions in the fuel market, elections in other countries, and attacks on the International Criminal Court into a single chain. (diplomatie.gouv.fr)

The most unexpected common feature of the reactions in Kyiv, Paris, and Brasília is that they are no longer discussing Trump merely as an eccentric leader, but rather a new model of American power. Ukraine fears that vital military aid will be exchanged for cheaper gasoline for American consumers. France concludes that an alliance with the United States no longer eliminates the need to build independent European capabilities. Brazil sees confirmation of a long-standing Latin American suspicion: trade, security, and elections may become elements of a single pressure package. These assessments differ in tone but converge in substance: the main international problem today is not the weakening of American power, but its increasingly transactional and domestically oriented use.

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Trump Steps Up Pressure: Iran, Venezuela and Ukraine

Russian and Venezuelan sources view U.S. foreign policy under Donald Trump as increasingly tough and unpredictable. The focus is on the risk of escalation against Iran, military pressure on Latin American countries, and attempts to influence the course of the conflict in Ukraine through intelligence sharing, sanctions concessions, and negotiations with Russia over assets. In this picture, individual decisions form part of a broader strategy of geopolitical bargaining and coercion capable of expanding the scale of regional conflicts. This article is based on publications by Prospect (Russia) and El Sol de las Américas (Venezuela).

Interceptor drones become a symbol of technological rivalry

A publication by the Russian outlet Prospect.com.ru presents the development of counter-drone capabilities as another stage in the military-technological rivalry among Russia, the United States and Iran. At the same time, the article itself looks more like a collection of news fragments and headlines than a coherent analytical text: it contains no details about a specific U.S. project, independent argumentation or verifiable comments from Russian military specialists.

The main thesis is stated in the headline itself: the United States is allegedly being forced to “catch up” in developing interceptor drones in response to Russian and Iranian experience. In this interpretation, Russia is portrayed not as a country lagging behind leading Western technologies, but as one of the participants shaping the modern military agenda and forcing Washington to seek new solutions.

The Russian effort to develop interceptor drones occupies a separate place in the collection. The article mentions the Vyverna-Kogot, DF-1 Roscherk, DF-3 Gadyuka and Astra-PVO systems. They are credited with speeds of up to 500–850 kilometers per hour, as well as capabilities against fixed-wing drones, jet-powered drones and mass attacks. In this framework, fast interceptor drones are viewed as a relatively inexpensive and asymmetric response to the spread of strike and reconnaissance UAVs.

Against this backdrop, references to the Lockheed Martin MORFIUS X-Rotor interceptor, equipped with a microwave emitter, as well as European initiatives in exoatmospheric interception, are presented as signs of intensifying international competition. However, the original article provides no technical specifications for the MORFIUS X-Rotor, development timelines or links to statements by Lockheed Martin. Therefore, the claim that the U.S. program is a direct “response to Russia and Iran” remains primarily a political interpretation rather than a substantiated conclusion.

For Russia, the issue of counter-drone defense has practical significance because of the experience of the war in Ukraine. Cheap FPV drones, reconnaissance aircraft and kamikaze UAVs have become a constant threat both to troops on the front line and to facilities deep inside the country. Under these conditions, interceptors capable of rapidly detecting and destroying aerial targets appear to be a highly sought-after element of defense. At the same time, such developments reinforce the image of Russia’s defense sector as a system capable of quickly creating solutions for new forms of warfare.

The Iranian dimension adds a geopolitical aspect to the publication. References to possible U.S. strikes against Iran, the situation around the Strait of Hormuz and statements by Donald Trump create a picture of regional escalation. In this scheme, Russia is presented as a diplomatic partner of Tehran, while the phrase “Russia and Iran’s response” is interpreted as recognition by the United States of a combined challenge: Russian experience in modern warfare and Iranian capabilities in the missile and drone spheres.

The article also cites reports about statements by Dmitry Medvedev concerning “direct diplomatic assistance” to Iran and Russian humanitarian support. However, the publication contains no direct remarks by Russian politicians, military officials or specialized experts specifically about the American interceptor drone reportedly under development. These fragments instead create a general political backdrop in which Moscow appears not only as a developer of military technologies but also as Iran’s partner in its confrontation with U.S. pressure.

Thus, the Prospect.com.ru publication uses the subject of interceptor drones less to provide a neutral description of technology than to construct a narrative of competition. U.S. developments are explained as a need to respond to threats and experience associated with Russia and Iran. This presentation reflects a common view in the Russian information sphere that the West is being forced to adapt to Russia’s accumulated combat experience rather than single-handedly determining the direction of military-technological development.

Venezuela’s left debates the price of survival

The alleged U.S. military intervention on January 3, 2026, and the subsequent actions of the government of Delcy Rodríguez sparked a heated debate in Venezuela extending far beyond current diplomacy. In Rafael Méndez’s article for El Sol de las Américas, these events are viewed as a test not only for Caracas but also for the entire Bolivarian project, the Latin American left and the countries of the Global South.

The author frames the central question in stark terms: are negotiations with Washington, energy agreements, amnesties and a possible easing of sanctions an unavoidable survival tactic—or do they represent capitulation to the United States and a rejection of the principles on which Chavism was built?

Supporters of a pragmatic course may argue that, given the unfavorable balance of power, temporary concessions are necessary to preserve the state. In this logic, preventing the country’s destruction, preserving institutions and leaving room for future recovery are more important than maintaining ideological purity in a moment of crisis. Negotiations, access for foreign capital and compromises involving the energy sector then become not a voluntary choice but an attempt to buy time.

Méndez, however, clearly rejects this interpretation. He sees a “logic of capitulation” in what is happening and doubts that rapprochement with the United States can be explained solely as a tactical maneuver. In his view, allowing in foreign capital and potentially transferring control over strategic sectors could mean not a temporary retreat but a change in the very nature of the political project. Venezuela, he writes, risks becoming subordinate to “the same interests Chavism swore to fight for a quarter of a century.”

As a historical comparison, the commentator invokes the 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Lenin also accepted extremely harsh conditions in order to preserve the revolutionary state, but he publicly explained his decision, argued with his opponents and called the treaty “brutal, predatory and humiliating.” This, Méndez believes, is what is lacking in Venezuela today. “No one explained why the command did not order resistance and why they swore for years to uphold something they had no intention of fulfilling,” the author notes.

For a country whose official political identity has for decades been based on anti-imperialism, the protection of national resources and resistance to U.S. pressure, relations with Washington have significance extending beyond economics or diplomacy. Any agreements affecting oil, sanctions or sovereignty are perceived as a test of fidelity to the original meaning of the Bolivarian movement.

Méndez’s text is neither a neutral report nor does it contain comments from specific Venezuelan officials or independent experts. It is the position of a political commentator and of someone who previously viewed Venezuela as a “beacon” for left-wing politics. His conclusion is unequivocal: “I cannot call something decided in silence a tactic.” Thus, he demands from the authorities not only practical results but also a public explanation to society of why these particular decisions were chosen.

References to Che Guevara, the call to create “two, three, many Vietnams” and the words “those who want a homeland, come with me” lend the article particular emotional force. For part of the Venezuelan and Latin American left, these are not merely historical slogans but memories of generations raised on the ideas of anti-colonial struggle and national dignity. Against this backdrop, a silent agreement with the most powerful adversary is perceived not as ordinary diplomacy but as a possible betrayal of a political and cultural tradition.

In this interpretation, Venezuela becomes a kind of laboratory for all of Latin America and the Global South. Other progressive governments, Méndez believes, are watching Caracas and inevitably asking themselves: what would happen to them if American ships appeared off their shores? The debate over negotiations and concessions in Venezuela therefore becomes part of a broader debate over where the line lies between saving the state and abandoning its sovereign political course.

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America as a Source of Deals, Pressure and Uncertainty

In Germany, China and Brazil, the United States is being discussed in mid-October 2026 not as a unified superpower with a clear strategy, but as a state whose foreign policy increasingly looks like a collection of separate deals tied to domestic American politics. The most prominent topics differ: in Germany, Washington’s sudden softening toward Russia amid the war against Ukraine; in China, whether the practical U.S. stance toward Taiwan changed after the Chinese-American summit; and in Brazil, fears that tariffs, Donald Trump’s public statements and diplomatic signals are becoming a factor in national elections. But local commentators share a similar conclusion: American power remains immense, while its predictability has declined substantially.

This concern is particularly sharp in Germany. German observers are focused on the agreement reached by Washington and Moscow that opens the way for Russian diesel deliveries to the United States, and on how the Trump administration is simultaneously increasing pressure on Kyiv. In a ZDF commentary, journalist Katrin Eigendorf formulates the main German question: whose side is the American president actually on in Russia’s war against Ukraine? This is not a rhetorical question for Berlin: if Western sanctions unity can be weakened by a bilateral commercial agreement between the United States and Russia, Europe’s strategy of supporting Ukraine becomes dependent on decisions made without Europe. (zdfheute.de)

The German reaction is not simply a familiar form of anti-Americanism. Rather, it is a painful recognition of the gap between American promises to its allies and the practice of transactional diplomacy. For Germany, Russia’s war is an existential issue of European security; for the White House, as many German authors see it, the war is increasingly becoming a bargaining chip involving energy prices, the upcoming U.S. midterm elections and Trump’s personal negotiating logic. It is telling that the German debate links America’s foreign-policy inconsistency to the need for Europe to assume more responsibility itself: even the organizers of a discussion at the Academy for International Affairs of North Rhine-Westphalia frame the issue this way—“America under pressure, Europe forced to act?”—in announcing their October meeting. (aia-nrw.org)

The Chinese debate is less emotional, but no less wary. After the meeting between the leaders of China and the United States, Chinese commentators are examining not declarations but bureaucratic and military indicators: whether arms deliveries to Taiwan will continue, whether approvals will be delayed, and whether the language of American statements about “One China” will change. In an analysis by the Chinese portal China-U.S. Review, author K. S. Liu reaches a cautious conclusion: basic U.S. policy has not formally changed, but the pace of arms-contract approvals has become a subject of close scrutiny. His formulation is particularly characteristic of China’s expert debate: a single pause does not yet prove a reversal, but a prolonged delay or cancellation of deliveries would constitute tangible evidence of a policy shift. (zmyx.net)

This caution is precisely what distinguishes the Chinese reaction from the German one. In Berlin, Washington’s unpredictability is seen as a risk of losing an allied pillar. In Beijing, it is viewed as an opportunity, but not as a gift. Chinese authors are in no hurry to declare closer U.S.-Chinese ties a strategic turning point: in their view, Trump may temporarily ease a specific issue in pursuit of a larger deal without abandoning the fundamental rivalry. Taiwan therefore remains, from the Chinese perspective, not merely a regional problem but a test: can the White House separate trade bargaining and personal diplomacy from its military and political commitments to the island?

A second important layer of the Chinese debate concerns the United States’ domestic economic constraints. In a commentary for China Radio International, Wang Ruibin, director of the Institute of World Economy and Development at the China Institute of International Studies, links America’s record debt and budget deficit to the political calendar: in his assessment, the administration is postponing painful fiscal adjustments until after the midterm elections. In other words, in the Chinese reading, U.S. foreign activity is increasingly explained not only by geopolitical design but also by the need to maneuver among the deficit, weakening consumption and electoral risks. The Chinese commentary speaks directly of a “dilemma” between fiscal and monetary policy. (news.cri.cn)

In Brazil, this American “transactionalism” is felt most directly because it has become intertwined with the campaign ahead of the presidential election. The issue here is not an abstract question of an ally’s reliability, but the limits of acceptable foreign influence. Rubens Barbosa, a former Brazilian ambassador to the United States, told CNN Brasil that indirect interference is already taking place: he is concerned not about the prospect of military action, which he rules out, but about the possibility of political pressure and economic sanctions if the election result is challenged. In an interview with CNN Brasil, he describes this as a process that is “already happening” [“this is already happening”]. (cnnbrasil.com.br)

This concern is fueled by a sequence of real events: tariffs, visa restrictions and Trump’s statements that he is following Brazil’s elections “very closely” [“de perto”]. For Brazilian audiences, the American president’s words carry more weight than ordinary diplomatic courtesy because they were preceded by economic measures and open pressure surrounding the political future of Bolsonaro family supporters. Folha de S.Paulo noted that the statement came three days before the first round, amid concerns within the Brazilian government about American interference. (www1.folha.uol.com.br)

However, the Brazilian debate is not uniform. Some see Washington’s hard line as a direct threat to sovereignty and a repetition of the old Latin American pattern in which economic pressure quickly turned into political influence. Others believe that the United States is simply using the levers available to it in a struggle for favorable trade and technological conditions. Most noteworthy is the position of Adam Goldsmith, a former U.S. Treasury financial attaché for South America: in a column for Folha, he writes that the relatively limited importance of bilateral ties both protects Brazil from American pressure and deprives it of opportunities. This is an atypical conclusion: distance from Washington is not only an expression of independence, but also a sign that the two largest countries in the Americas have failed to build relations based on trust and mutual economic benefit. (www1.folha.uol.com.br)

This is where all three national perspectives converge. Germany fears that the United States may make decisions about European security over Europe’s head; China is testing whether Taiwan will become a bargaining chip in a broader U.S.-Chinese agreement; and Brazil fears that trade tariffs and diplomatic signals will turn its domestic election into an extension of America’s partisan struggle. For Berlin, the key phrase is “European autonomy”; for Beijing, “strategic vigilance”; and for Brasília, “sovereignty.” But behind these different words lies the same observation: today’s America is perceived less as a guardian of predetermined rules than as a powerful player prepared to renegotiate the rules in every individual deal.

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America Bargaining with War: How Paris, Seoul and Moscow Read Washington’s New Policy

In discussions in France, South Korea and Russia, the United States is now perceived not simply as a superpower responding to crises, but as a country whose foreign policy is increasingly subordinated to the domestic price of gasoline, upcoming elections and President Donald Trump’s ability to present yet another deal as a personal victory. Two stories have merged into one: the dangerous, unfinished war with Iran around the Strait of Hormuz and Washington’s sudden attempt to reach an agreement with Moscow on Russian diesel, while simultaneously demanding that Kyiv halt strikes on oil refineries. In all three countries, this causes particular concern, but the overall conclusion is similar: America remains an indispensable power, yet its promises are becoming increasingly transactional and therefore less predictable. (hani.co.kr)

The most immediate issue is Hormuz. The French reaction is especially harsh in its assessment of the American strategy: Paris commentators see not a Washington victory over Iran, but the transformation of a vital sea lane into a permanently managed zone of risk. In Le Monde’s analysis, the conflict is described as the “new normal”: the United States and Iran alternate between negotiations and exchanges of fire, with shooting becoming not an alternative to diplomacy but its instrument. This is an important French perspective: the problem is not one failed operation, but the fact that the White House has effectively acknowledged the possibility of bargaining with a state over access to an international strait while simultaneously trying to coerce that state by force. (lemonde.fr)

French criticism is also based on economic logic. In an editorial in Le Monde and in subsequent articles, the war is viewed as a strategic mistake, since its most obvious result may be nothing more than the partial restoration of passage through Hormuz—the very passage that was open before hostilities began. The Paris press emphasizes the contradiction: Washington’s declared “defense of freedom of navigation” has itself helped create a system of dual blockade, in which both the United States and Iran selectively determine who can sail and how safely. (lemonde.fr)

In Seoul, the same war is seen less as a dispute over international law and far more as a direct threat to South Korea’s economy and freedom of maneuver. On October 14, Hankyoreh linked the increase in attacks on vessels in Hormuz to Iran’s attempt to drive up oil prices ahead of the U.S. midterm elections, and Trump’s decision not to intensify the bombing before the vote to his domestic political calculations. For Korean readers, geography is not the only issue: the country depends on energy imports and exports industrial goods, so instability in the strait immediately becomes a threat to production costs, inflation and the trade balance. (hani.co.kr)

But the Korean debate goes further still: it asks how much an ally is entitled to demand from Seoul in exchange for its protection. JoongAng Ilbo compares possible South Korean participation in a mission around Hormuz with the dispatch of troops to Iraq in 2003. The analogy reflects a dual concern: participation may be necessary to preserve the alliance with the United States and the security of maritime routes, but it could turn Korea into a party to America’s war with Iran. Particularly notable is that the discussion is not reduced to anti-Americanism: Seoul fears both refusal and consent. Refusal could damage relations with its main military ally; consent could create the risk of Iranian retaliation and divert resources from the North Korean threat. (joongang.co.kr)

The Russian public view of Hormuz is different. Here, the American pause until the elections is seen above all as proof that Washington is constrained by its own costs. Russian outlets report Trump’s statement that, until the November 3 congressional elections, the United States will not attack Iran while the blockade remains in place and oil shipments continue through the strait. In this interpretation, American power has not disappeared, but its use depends on fuel prices, approval ratings and the electoral calendar. Vedomosti paints a less triumphant picture: exchanges of threats and incidents in Hormuz show that the United States and Iran are unable to agree on de-escalation at sea. (profile.ru)

It is fuel that connects the Iranian crisis with the war in Ukraine. French outrage was provoked by the agreement reached by Trump and Vladimir Putin on supplies of Russian diesel to the American and global markets. In an article in Le Monde, this logic is stated with particular clarity: the White House placed the interests of American truckers and farmers above those of Ukraine. For France, this is not merely a moral objection. It signals that the sanctions regime, which Europe regarded as a means of deterring Russia, may be weakened by the United States in exchange for short-term stabilization of fuel prices. (lemonde.fr)

Paris was particularly pained by the fact that Trump’s announced “energy truce” between Moscow and Kyiv had not been confirmed in advance by either side. Kyiv called it a surprise, while Moscow immediately gave no clear consent. French President Emmanuel Macron supported the idea of a genuine mutual halt to attacks on energy infrastructure, but at the same time pointed out that Russia continues to strike Ukrainian infrastructure. The French position, reflected in a Le Monde article, comes down to an important distinction: a moratorium on strikes may be useful, but it must not become a smokescreen for a deal that eases pressure on the Kremlin while simultaneously limiting Ukraine’s defensive capabilities. (lemonde.fr)

Russian media, by contrast, emphasize the pragmatic side of the American initiative: Trump is trying simultaneously to cool the fuel market, halt Ukrainian attacks on Russian oil refineries and achieve a diplomatic breakthrough before the elections. RBC gives a detailed account of the American formula: supplies of Russian diesel should help lower global prices, while the energy pause should protect Russia’s refining sector. Yet even within this framework, skepticism about the agreement’s durability is evident: neither Moscow nor Kyiv has formally confirmed it, while Trump himself declared that it had already taken effect. (rbc.ru)

This reveals perhaps the most unexpected common theme in the French, Korean and Russian debates. All three countries see U.S. foreign policy becoming a policy of managing energy prices. In France, this is interpreted as a dangerous substitution of short-term expediency for strategy: allied commitments to Ukraine may be adjusted for the sake of cheap diesel. In South Korea, it means that the alliance with Washington may bring new demands—from investment in American projects to contributions to Middle Eastern security—precisely when the U.S. administration is trying to hold down domestic prices. In Russia, by contrast, this policy is seen as an opportunity: sanctions and military pressure may become bargaining chips if Moscow can offer a resource needed by the American market. (yna.co.kr)

For Europe, this leads to an old but now more concrete conclusion: dependence on the United States is no longer only a question of NATO, but also of intelligence, energy and technological autonomy. French strategist François Heisbourg, quoted by the English-language version of Le Monde, calls for European satellite programs to be accelerated so that Ukraine can become less dependent on American intelligence. South Korea’s conclusion is more modest but no less telling: the alliance must be preserved while vulnerability to decisions made in Washington without regard for their consequences in Asia is reduced. Russia’s conclusion is opposite in values but similar in diagnosis: American guarantees and American prohibitions are no longer perceived as immutable rules. They are increasingly regarded as proposals in negotiations—with a price, an expiration date and the possibility of revision after the elections. (lemonde.fr)

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The US, Energy and New Geopolitical Wariness

In today’s review, the United States emerges as both an influential and ambiguous player in world politics: French reports discuss possible interference through information campaigns, while Turkish publications link US-Russian energy agreements to the need for European coordination and address regional security measures involving Saudi Arabia. At the same time, a significant share of the references is archival, commercial or informational in nature and does not reflect a direct response to current events. The review is based on reports by Gazete Oksijen (Turkey) and Le Monde (France).

Bahçeli Calls on Turkey to Support Saudi Arabia

Devlet Bahçeli, leader of Turkey’s Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and an ally of the ruling coalition, said Ankara should be ready to provide Saudi Arabia with “any possible military support.” In his speech, he presented the kingdom’s security not as a crisis external to Turkey, but as a matter of historical responsibility, religious solidarity and the country’s strategic interests.

According to Bahçeli, support for Riyadh could be provided within the framework of the Mecca Agreement he mentioned. The politician demanded an end to attacks by Yemen’s Houthi rebels on Saudi Arabia while also advocating a political settlement to the conflict in Yemen. He condemned strikes against civilians and infrastructure, including attacks on King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh.

Religious and historical symbolism played a particularly important role in his argument. Bahçeli called Saudi Arabia the custodian of Mecca and Medina and stressed that attacks threatening Islamic holy sites could not go unanswered. “We cannot turn a blind eye, remain silent or show tolerance toward attacks,” he said.

The MHP leader recalled the Ottoman Empire’s role in protecting the Hejaz, Fahreddin Pasha’s defense of Medina and the origins of the image of the Turkish soldier—the “Mehmetçik”—on the lands of the Arabian Peninsula. Within this framework, possible military assistance to Saudi Arabia is portrayed not as an ordinary act of alliance, but as a continuation of Turkey’s historical and Islamic mission.

Bahçeli linked the Houthi strikes to the broader crisis in the Middle East. In his assessment, instability is being fueled not only by events in Yemen, but also by Israel’s policies, tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean, cooperation between Greece and Israel, and the actions of forces that, he claims, seek to weaken Turkey from within and abroad.

The politician warned that escalation in the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait posed direct economic risks. In his view, it could affect international trade, energy supplies, the security of maritime routes and overall regional economic stability.

The speech expressed an idea characteristic of Turkish nationalist discourse: regional self-reliance. Bahçeli believes Middle Eastern states should build their own security system, reach agreements among themselves and prevent outside powers from exploiting interfaith and political divisions. He called Israel the main obstacle to regional peace, accusing it of seeking to benefit from divisions within Muslim societies.

The MHP leader also addressed issues in the Eastern Mediterranean. He warned Greece, Cyprus and Israel over the electricity interconnection project and disputed maritime zones. In his view, US support for the initiative does not eliminate the need to take Ankara’s position into account and coordinate the route with Turkey. This part of the speech reflects Bahçeli’s distrust of projects carried out with US or Israeli participation without coordination with the Turkish side.

Bahçeli also linked regional threats to the domestic political situation. He said that progress toward the dissolution of the PKK and the strengthening of national unity were facing resistance from external and internal forces interested in destabilizing the country. He portrayed corruption investigations, opposition activity and media debates as elements of attempts to create an image of Turkey as weakened and ungovernable.

Thus, the call to support Saudi Arabia formed part of a broader political concept. In it, the protection of Islamic holy sites, Ottoman historical memory, the security of trade routes, Turkey’s claims in the Eastern Mediterranean and domestic consolidation are combined into a single thesis: Ankara should act as an independent regional center of power, capable of defending its allies and its own interests.

Le Monde Did Not Reveal Details About Guilfoyle and Zacharia

The French newspaper Le Monde announced an article about Kimberly Guilfoyle and Katie Zacharia as “two women of power” facing challenges during Donald Trump’s presidency. However, the available text at the Le Monde publication link does not contain the reported investigation or analytical article itself.

Instead of editorial material, the page displays a technical notice about cookies, personal-data processing and advertising targeting. Consequently, the information provided does not allow for a reliable determination of which specific actions by Kimberly Guilfoyle and Katie Zacharia Le Monde considers mistakes, which episodes of their political careers are being examined, or what assessments were offered by French experts, politicians or the publication’s authors.

The headline itself establishes a critical tone: it proposes viewing the two influential women not only through their career positions, but also through their “missteps” in Trump’s political world. This framing may be connected to the French press’s traditional focus on the personalization of power in the United States, the role of personal loyalty to the president and the influence of informal circles on decision-making.

For a French audience, such a topic potentially extends beyond the framework of American domestic political news. Paris has consistently advocated Europe’s strategic autonomy and the development of an independent EU defense policy, meaning that personnel conflicts, domestic instability and competition among centers of influence in Washington may be perceived as factors contributing to international unpredictability.

At the same time, in the absence of the full text of the Le Monde article, specific conclusions about Guilfoyle, Zacharia, the Trump administration or the consequences for France and Europe cannot be attributed to the newspaper. The available data support only discussion of the publication’s stated critical framework, not its actual content, reasoning or quotations.

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U.S. Allies Hear the Same Message: Washington Demands More, Offers Less

In discussions in France, Saudi Arabia and South Korea, the United States is now emerging less as a predictable hub of alliances than as a power translating security, trade and even diplomatic mediation into the language of immediate gain. The backdrop is a combination of crises: Washington’s policy toward Iran and Yemen, pressure on allies to increase defense spending, and a new wave of trade demands directed at Seoul. In each of the three countries, the reaction is shaped by its own risks, but the broad conclusion is similar: U.S. guarantees still cannot be ignored — yet they can no longer be trusted without reservations.

The French debate centers on Washington’s almost paradoxical formula: Europe must become militarily stronger, but not too politically independent. An analysis by Le Monde describes how the Trump administration is simultaneously demanding that Europeans increase defense spending more rapidly while using political pressure that could divide the EU and obstruct its strategic autonomy. Fabrice Pothier, an expert at the consulting group Rasmussen Global, calls the combination of strategic demands, ideological preferences and tests of allies’ loyalty “an explosive cocktail.” For a French audience, this is not an abstract dispute over NATO: the issue is whether Europe will be able to respond to the Russian threat if the American military presence is reduced and Washington’s political support becomes conditional. (lemonde.fr)

This is particularly painful against the backdrop of the U.S. campaign against Iran. French commentators see it as an example of how a show of force can leave behind a less stable order than the one it promised to create. An editorial in Le Monde on the U.S.-Iran agreement argues that the ceasefire opened negotiations but did not resolve the central nuclear issue; the earlier strikes merely undermined confidence in the negotiating process. Another French assessment is even harsher: the agreement signed in Versailles postponed key questions concerning verification of Iran’s nuclear program and its missile capabilities, effectively turning a loudly proclaimed victory into an unfinished deal. (lemonde.fr)

The Saudi reaction is far less theoretical: here, the question is extremely concrete — will American assistance arrive in time if Houthi attacks on the kingdom’s territory and shipping intensify? Saudi expert Abdelaziz Sager, founder of the Gulf Research Center, in an interview with Arab News, reduces the expected value of U.S. commitments to three practical elements: weapons, operational expertise and intelligence. But his key qualification is more important than the list itself: according to Sager, Marco Rubio’s statement should be understood as a pledge of defensive support, not as a commitment for American troops to fight on Saudi Arabia’s behalf. (arabnews.com)

It is precisely this difference between support and direct involvement that has become the focal point of the Saudi debate. In official and semi-official media, the United States is still described as a crucial partner condemning attacks on Saudi airports and civilian infrastructure. But local writers also stress that Riyadh cannot base its strategy on waiting for outside rescue. In Okaz, columnist Faris bin Hizam interprets the attacks on airports not simply as a military action, but as an attempt to raise the cost of the conflict for everyday life, business and the international community; by his reasoning, the response should be to prevent the adversary from turning fear of escalation into a political concession. (okaz.com.sa)

The Saudi perspective thus differs from the French one. Paris is concerned about Europe’s political subordination to the American agenda; Riyadh is concerned about the inadequacy of the U.S. response at a moment of direct threat. Yet both capitals draw a similar conclusion: Washington’s guarantees must now be measured not by statements, but by concrete deliveries, intelligence, protection of critical infrastructure and a willingness to bear risk. It is telling that in Saudi analysis, closer ties with Pakistan and Turkey are viewed not as a sharp break with America, but as the creation of a safety net in case U.S. involvement proves limited. (arabnews.com)

In South Korea, American unpredictability is discussed primarily through trade — but it is perceived as part of the same alliance logic. Donald Trump’s statement that Seoul should pay a “price” for lower tariffs, along with his unilateral mention of a $50 billion investment in an LNG production project in Alaska, alarmed the Korean press not only because of the amount involved. In an article by Chosun Ilbo, the emphasis is on the absence of prior coordination with South Korea: an ally is treated not as an equal negotiating partner, but as a source of investment expected to endorse decisions that have already been announced. (chosun.com)

This is particularly sensitive for Seoul because the U.S. market remains critically important to Korean exports, while trade issues inevitably become intertwined with security concerns on the Korean Peninsula. Korean observers therefore read the tariff threats not only as an economic dispute, but also as a signal about the style of American policy: market access, investment, defense cooperation and political loyalty may become parts of a single package. Significantly, Chosun Ilbo discusses in detail a study by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York according to which tariffs have raised prices for American consumers. From the Korean perspective, this adds irony to the situation: Washington is demanding concessions from its partners even as the costs of the trade war are also falling substantially on Americans themselves. (chosun.com)

Another common theme is the subordination of U.S. foreign policy to the domestic political calendar. French writers link the White House’s caution on Iran to the approach of the U.S. midterm elections on November 3, 2026: war is unpopular, while the cost of living matters more to voters than foreign-policy victories. (lemonde.fr) In Saudi Arabia, this is perceived even more directly. Commenting on the Houthi attacks, Trump said they were probably trying to raise oil prices ahead of the U.S. elections and stressed that after the vote he would “still be here”; in the region, this sounds like an admission that the scale of the American response is also tied to domestic political calculations. An Okaz report conveys the remark without diplomatic packaging. (okaz.com.sa)

The most unexpected conclusion from these local reactions is that neither France, Saudi Arabia nor South Korea is discussing abandoning relations with the United States. All three countries still need American military capabilities, markets, technology or intelligence cooperation. But the old alliance formula — under which the mere presence of the United States was considered a guarantee of predictability — is clearly weakening. France is responding by calling for Europe to develop the ability to act independently; Saudi Arabia by diversifying its regional support and demanding measurable assistance; and South Korea by seeking to turn trade agreements into clearer commitments protected from unilateral decisions. American power has not disappeared. What has changed is that allies increasingly view it not as an unconditional public good, but as a resource they must continually bargain over.

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America as a Deal, Not an Alliance: Why Paris, Pretoria and Moscow Read the New Course...

From October 9 to 13, 2026, the main foreign-policy story surrounding the United States was not another declaration of peace, but Donald Trump’s unexpected agreement with Vladimir Putin on supplying Russian diesel fuel to the American and global markets. For France, this is primarily a blow to Europe’s strategy of pressuring the Kremlin and yet another demonstration of the unreliability of American leadership. In Russia, it is seen as a symbol of the return to pragmatic dialogue with Washington and an opportunity to normalize energy trade. In South Africa, the same American style is perceived differently: as Washington’s tendency to bring ideological and domestic political demands directly into bilateral diplomacy. The common thread seen in all three countries is that Trump’s United States is increasingly offering fewer rules and guarantees and increasingly bargaining for an immediate political or economic result. (lemonde.fr)

In the French debate, the diesel deal looks almost like a caricature of this new transactional approach. In Le Monde’s analysis, Trump’s decision is described as a quick “deal” intended to ease the fuel problem in the United States ahead of the November 3 midterm elections, but politically it is viewed as a concession to Moscow amid an ongoing war. What is especially painful for Paris and other European capitals is that the news emerged alongside US-Ukrainian talks in Miami: Kyiv’s allies saw that Ukraine’s military security could be pushed aside in favor of domestic American fuel prices. François Heisbourg, a French expert on European security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, called the logic of turning the peace process into a commercial deal “low” and potentially conflicting with the interests involved. For the French, the key issue is not the volume of diesel itself, but the precedent: sanctions are becoming not a strategic instrument, but a bargaining chip. (lemonde.fr)

This leads to a second, much deeper issue in France: the acceleration of Europe’s autonomy from the United States. Paris is no longer limiting itself to its familiar calls for “strategic autonomy”; it is now discussing Kyiv’s very practical dependence on American intelligence, satellite communications and air-defense systems. In the same article, Heisbourg warns that Europeans need to develop the IRIS² and Ceres satellite programs more quickly, otherwise Ukraine will remain hostage to decisions made in the White House. This is a characteristically French conclusion: the problem is not that America is negotiating with Russia, but that Europe still lacks the means to offset the consequences of a sudden American reversal. (lemonde.fr)

The tone in Russia’s information space is noticeably different, but it is not simply celebratory. Vedomosti emphasizes the political significance of the agreement: a temporary US license allows supplies of Russian diesel until April 7, 2027, while Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak says Russia’s domestic market will be fully supplied with fuel. This account presents the agreement as recognition of the need for “normal energy trade” and as evidence that direct dialogue between Moscow and Washington can circumvent previous sanctions barriers. However, the Russian analytical view is considerably more cautious than the official one. An analysis by Carnegie Politika notes that the announced volumes are themselves too small to have a radical impact on the global market, while a significant share of the fuel would probably have found export channels anyway. In other words, Moscow’s main gain is not so much additional revenue as the political “legalization” of exports that already exist and a demonstration that the sanctions regime can be circumvented through a personal deal between presidents. (vedomosti.ru)

This difference is especially revealing. France sees the deal as creating a risk that Trump is financing Russia’s ability to continue the war; Russian commentators see above all an acknowledgment of the realities of the global energy market. But an independent economic assessment within the Russian-language debate reduces both interpretations to a more prosaic conclusion: the supply volume may be insufficient to significantly lower prices, while its political impact is already enormous. That is why Europe speaks of undermining pressure on the Kremlin, while Russia speaks of a breakthrough in diplomatic isolation. (carnegieendowment.org)

South Africa’s response to the United States is developing on a different terrain—not around Ukraine, but around sovereignty and Washington’s right to publicly pass judgment on the country’s domestic policies. In late September, Pretoria issued a démarche to US Ambassador Leo Brent Bozell III for the third time in nine months. As Business Day writes, the source of irritation was his public comments on the policy of expanding the economic opportunities of the Black population—BEE—farm murders and other domestic issues. For South Africa, a démarche represents an official diplomatic protest, not an automatic step toward expelling the ambassador; the government intends to keep the channel of dialogue open. But the fact that a third warning was issued in such a short period is seen as a sign that American diplomacy is increasingly operating through public pressure. (businessday.co.za)

South Africa’s distinctive perspective is that it is challenging not only specific US criticisms, but also their method. Washington calls BEE an obstacle to business. Yet, as Business Day points out, the United States’ own assessment of the investment climate simultaneously recognizes South Africa’s strong institutions, independent judiciary, free press and developed financial sector. In Pretoria, this is read as a contradiction: the United States wants to benefit from South Africa’s role as Africa’s most industrialized economy, while at the same time attempting to make access to full-fledged relations conditional on revising the country’s social and racial policies. Thus, unlike Paris, which is concerned about America’s retreat from its commitments to allies, South Africa is primarily wary of bilateral relations becoming an ideological test. (businessday.co.za)

An unexpected common picture therefore emerges. France demands greater predictability from America as an ally; Russia has an opportunity to secure pragmatic recognition of its interests, while understanding the limits of the deal’s real economic effect; South Africa is defending its right not to become the target of an American domestic political campaign. Their assessments of the United States are opposite, but their diagnosis converges: under Trump, Washington is perceived as a power willing to rapidly change the language of relations—from sanctions to trade, from partnership to public pressure—whenever doing so promises an immediate benefit at home. For the world, this means that US diplomacy is no less influential, but far less predictable.

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Possible U.S.-Russia Rapprochement Alarms Kyiv

The visit by a Ukrainian negotiating delegation to Florida, contacts between Donald Trump’s administration and Vladimir Putin, and discussions about possible presidential elections in Ukraine combine to form a picture that Ukrainian analysts view with considerable concern. In a report by columnist Yulia Zabelina published by Radio NV, these episodes are seen as signs that the United States may be reconsidering its approach to the war, sanctions, and relations with Moscow.

The author pays particular attention to the reported agreement between Trump and Putin concerning supplies of Russian diesel fuel to the United States. In Kyiv, a possible easing of restrictions in the energy sector could be perceived not simply as a commercial decision, but as a political signal: Moscow is gaining an opportunity to discuss practical economic issues directly with Washington, while Ukraine continues seeking to coordinate its own position with the American side.

The scenario could look entirely different from a Russian perspective. Direct Russian-American contacts would be presented as confirmation that European security, energy, and the stability of global markets cannot be discussed without Moscow. A possible easing of sanctions on diesel fuel would support the argument that Western policy is pragmatic: restrictions introduced as a tool of pressure may be reconsidered when the interests of the U.S. economy and domestic fuel market require it.

Uncertainty surrounding the talks is also heightened by reports that Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner’s visit to Moscow has been postponed. According to the logic set out in the Ukrainian report, the reason may have been the lack of clarity regarding the positions of Ukraine and its European partners. In Russian political rhetoric, this could serve as confirmation of a different argument: Kyiv and European capitals are not the only decision-making centers and are not always able to determine the course of negotiations between Washington and Moscow.

This once again raises the question of the strength of transatlantic unity. The Ukrainian view is based on fears that the United States may act independently, guided by its own political and economic interests rather than by a coordinated line with Europe and Ukraine. The Russian interpretation, by contrast, would emphasize that Washington can revise its previous policies without regard for its allies, and that declared Western solidarity has pragmatic limits.

For Russia, the issue of diesel supplies is important not only as a possible commercial development. It reinforces the perception that Russian energy resources remain in demand even under sanctions pressure. Domestically, such news could be used as evidence that sanctions remain an incomplete and contradictory instrument, and that attempts to isolate Russia do not eliminate the need to maintain economic and diplomatic channels with it.

This perception fits the Russian assessment of relations with the West that has taken shape since 2014. Public confrontation, sanctions, and harsh rhetoric can coexist with closed-door negotiations, trade in raw materials, and the search for exemptions beneficial to all sides. In this logic, declarations of values give way to “realpolitik”—questions of security, fuel prices, market stability, and the interests of national elites.

The Radio NV report is an analytical assessment rather than a neutral listing of facts. It links the Ukrainian delegation’s visit to Florida, the possible diesel deal, the postponement of the American representatives’ trip to Moscow, and the issue of Ukrainian elections into a single picture that is alarming for Kyiv. In the Russian information space, the same sequence of events would likely be presented as evidence that Moscow retains negotiating and economic weight despite Western pressure.

U.S. “Energy Truce” Seen as Benefiting Russia

The “energy truce” between Russia and Ukraine announced by U.S. President Donald Trump could become not a diplomatic breakthrough but a decision that shifts the balance of the economic war in Moscow’s favor. This is the conclusion reached by South Korean news agency Yonhap, drawing on an assessment by The New York Times and examining the initiative through the lens of sanctions, energy, and the reliability of Washington’s alliance policy.

At the center of attention is a possible agreement to supply 300,000 metric tons of Russian diesel fuel to the United States. Experts estimate that such a contract could bring Russia around $4 billion. For Moscow, this would mean substantial financial support amid the war and international restrictions, while for the Trump administration the supplies could offer a way to reduce domestic diesel prices ahead of the midterm elections.

It is precisely this exchange—access to Russian fuel in return for restrictions on strikes against energy infrastructure—that is causing the greatest concern. According to the logic presented in the report, Washington may be willing to weaken the international sanctions front for the sake of a short-term domestic-market objective, while simultaneously limiting Ukraine’s most effective tool against Russia’s military economy.

Ukrainian attacks on oil-refining facilities are viewed as one of the most important means of reducing Russian revenues from energy exports. If Kyiv is forced to abandon such strikes as part of the “energy truce,” Ukraine risks losing its “most powerful tool” of pressure on Moscow. At the same time, the terms of the deal do not appear symmetrical: as the analysis notes, Russia could potentially retain the ability to attack other critical sectors of the Ukrainian economy—ports, steel mills, warehouses, and data centers.

The Black Sea ports of Odesa are particularly important, as Ukrainian grain exports depend on them. Statistics cited in the report demonstrate the scale of the problem: the number of vessels departing from the three Odesa ports fell from 266 in September last year to 12 in September this year. Thus, restricting strikes on Russia’s oil industry does not necessarily mean protecting Ukraine’s export infrastructure, while economic pressure on Kyiv may continue in other forms.

For South Korea, this issue goes far beyond the European war. Seoul supports sanctions against Russia, depends on the stability of global energy markets, and relies on American security guarantees. Consequently, the possible prioritization of U.S. domestic political needs over a long-term containment strategy is perceived as an alarming signal.

Although the Yonhap report does not include separate comments from South Korean politicians, its focus reflects widespread concern in the country: the war in Ukraine has become a test of whether the United States and its partners are prepared to maintain a united front against the forcible alteration of the international order. For the Korean Peninsula, where deterrence and allied coordination have direct significance, the possible erosion of sanctions solidarity is particularly telling.

In this interpretation, the “energy truce” does not look like a neutral formula for ending attacks, but rather like a mechanism that effectively “ties Ukraine’s hands and feet,” gives Russia new financial opportunities, and creates a risk of division among the allies. The South Korean analysis raises a question broader than the specific negotiations involving Trump, Vladimir Putin, and Volodymyr Zelenskyy: can the short-term benefit of cheaper fuel outweigh the strategic cost of weakening sanctions pressure and transatlantic unity?

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America as an Ally on Trial: Why Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Australia Are...

Events in recent days have prompted Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Australia to discuss America once again not as a distant superpower, but as a factor directly shaping their security. The triggers included Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia followed by Donald Trump’s cautious response, Washington’s conspicuous strengthening of ties with Greece during Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s visit to Athens, and continuing concerns in Australia about AUKUS’s practical reliability. At first glance, these are three different stories. But in local commentary, they converge around one question: if Washington demands strategic loyalty from its partners, how quickly and firmly is it prepared to defend them when real danger arises?

The question is particularly acute in the Arabic-speaking debate surrounding Saudi Arabia. After the strike on King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh on October 10, the American president called the attacks “terrible,” while also emphasizing that the Saudis themselves were capable of defending their country. The Saudi newspaper Al Jazirah also reported another part of his position: the White House was merely “considering” taking part in strikes against the Houthis. In the newspaper’s report, the formula appears diplomatic; to many commentators, it became a symptom of uncertainty. (al-jazirah.com)

The key emotion here is not so much surprise as irritated distrust of the format of the American guarantee. In an Arabic analysis by Almejhar, author Talal al-Shahrani formulates the dilemma in stark terms: the Trump administration faces a choice between direct military intervention on Riyadh’s side and indirect support combined with efforts to seek a broader deal involving Iran and the Houthis. F. Gregory Gause, the Saudi Arabia expert cited by the author, warns that strikes alone cannot resolve the crisis: agreements addressing its political causes are needed. (almejhar.net)

This is an important local nuance. In the American debate, the argument usually comes down to whether the United States should become embroiled in another Middle Eastern war. In the Saudi context, the question sounds different: what exactly does a state gain by concluding a defense agreement with America and investing in a strategic partnership if, at the critical moment, Washington promises only to “make a decision quickly”? In an article by Watan, this concern is described as a test of the entire US-Saudi defense relationship: an alliance is judged not by statements and contracts, but by whether it protects infrastructure, the population and maritime routes during an attack. (watanserb.com)

At the same time, Arab commentary reflects a suspicion that Riyadh’s security could once again become a bargaining chip in broader American plans—above all, efforts to link military support with the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. This does not mean that such a deal is demonstrably under discussion. But the fact that this hypothesis has become a noticeable part of the regional conversation reveals the depth of the doubts: the partnership with the United States is increasingly seen less as an automatic shield and more as a deal whose terms may change at the White House’s discretion. (watanserb.com)

In Turkey, the American problem appears less dramatic militarily, but no less painful politically. The main subject there was Marco Rubio’s visit to Athens on October 7 and his emphasis on Greece’s strategic value. Rubio himself publicly said that a conflict between Turkey and Greece over the Aegean Sea or Cyprus would be “unthinkable,” since both countries are NATO allies. (aa.com.tr) However, Turkish analysts heard in his visit not only a call for de-escalation, but also a signal about American priorities in the Eastern Mediterranean.

In a column for Independent Türkçe, political scientist Osman Gazi Kandemir interprets the visit as evidence that the United States is simultaneously strengthening Greece’s military capabilities, supporting its ties with Israel and trying to keep Turkish-Greek rivalry under control. His conclusion is characteristic of the current Turkish debate: stability in the Eastern Mediterranean should not depend on external guarantees; Turkey needs its own diplomatic ties and deterrence capabilities. (collector.com.tr)

Columnist Doğan Akdeniz put it even more sharply in an article for Aydınlık. He saw Rubio’s speech in Athens not simply as support for an ally, but as an attempt to construct a cultural and political line running from ancient Greece and Christian Europe to modern America. For the Turkish author, this raises the question of whether Ankara could eventually find itself on the periphery of the West’s strategic identity—even if personal contact between Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Trump is maintained. (aydinlik.com.tr)

The contrast with the Saudi reaction is clear. Riyadh asks whether the United States will come to its aid when missiles are already falling. Ankara asks whether Washington is creating a new regional architecture in which Turkey is assigned the role of a difficult but necessary neighbor, rather than that of an equal strategic center. But the underlying concern is the same: both countries want to understand whether American alliances are systems of mutual obligations or tools for managing regional balances on a case-by-case basis.

The Australian debate adds another layer—one centered on the Pacific—to this discussion. There is less concern about an immediate attack, but growing doubt about the long-term ability of the United States to fulfill promises it has already made. AUKUS’s fifth anniversary is taking place against the backdrop of problems with the pace of American nuclear-submarine construction. An ABC report notes that former officials from Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom consider the pact broadly viable, but acknowledge that American submarine production is not accelerating as quickly as the plan to transfer capabilities to Canberra requires. (abc.net.au)

Australians are therefore discussing not simply Trump as a difficult politician, but the risk of dependence on an America whose domestic political and industrial capacities may not match its international commitments. Researchers at the University of Sydney’s United States Studies Centre, in an analysis for The New Daily, found that 58% of Australians surveyed consider Trump’s second administration bad for Australia, while attitudes toward the United States as a power in Asia have become noticeably more cautious. (thenewdaily.com.au)

Perhaps the most unexpected conclusion from these three national debates is that this is no longer traditional anti-Americanism. Turkish analysts are not proposing withdrawal from NATO; Saudi commentators do not regard a break with Washington as realistic; Australia is not abandoning AUKUS. On the contrary, all three countries recognize that the United States remains an indispensable military, technological and diplomatic power. What is changing is something else: the allies want to reduce the cost of one-sided dependence.

For Saudi Arabia, this means combining the American defense umbrella with independent regional diplomacy. For Turkey, it means not allowing closer Greek-American ties to dictate its position in the Eastern Mediterranean. For Australia, it means developing its own industrial and defense base so that AUKUS does not remain a project dependent on overburdened American shipyards. America remains at the center of their strategies, but it is no longer the unquestioned center of their trust.

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America Seen from Seoul, Beijing and Ankara: War as Campaign Strategy, Tariffs as Alliance...

In South Korea, China and Turkey, the United States has been discussed in recent days less as a distant superpower than as a source of immediate costs and risks. Three interconnected issues have dominated the discussion: the protracted US-Iran war and the fate of the Strait of Hormuz, the US midterm elections approaching on November 3, 2026, and Washington’s attempt to shift some of its domestic political problems onto its partners through tariffs, investment demands and security deals. Local commentators’ overall conclusion is rather harsh: Trump’s foreign policy is increasingly subordinated to the logic of the American electoral campaign, but the consequences are being paid for far beyond the United States.

The most prominent common theme is Iran. Chinese, Turkish and South Korean publications agree on one point: Donald Trump’s October 8 statement that the United States would not attack Iran before the midterm elections looks less like a diplomatic breakthrough than an acknowledgment of the political cost of war. In a report by The Paper, Trump’s comments about “productive negotiations” with Tehran and his refusal to launch a strike before November 3 are presented as a direct link between a military decision and the voting calendar. The Chinese perspective is particularly skeptical: Diao Daming, a professor at Renmin University of China, explained the contradictory signals from the White House and the Pentagon by saying that the administration was seeking both to pressure Iran and to prevent the war from damaging its position in the elections. (news.cri.cn)

In Turkey, this connection has been formulated even more explicitly. In an analysis for Anadolu Ajansı, political analyst Bekir İlhan writes that US voters will most likely assess not the war’s geopolitics as such, but its everyday consequences—gasoline, food and housing prices. This is an important Turkish perspective: the war is essentially viewed not as a dispute over Iran’s nuclear program, but as a mechanism that turns into American inflation and then into political vulnerability for the White House. The same idea is being voiced in Seoul. South Korea’s Maeil Business Newspaper has highlighted on its front page a shortage of tankers and rising freight rates resulting from the prolonged Middle Eastern conflict: shipping costs are increasing, while industry is preparing for more expensive raw materials and renewed inflationary pressure. (aa.com.tr)

Interpretations of the war’s future, however, differ. Chinese official and semi-official platforms insist that the problem lies not merely in escalation, but in the very American model of coercive pressure. An editorial in Global Times says that the United States should abandon its “hegemonic mindset,” stop the strikes and acknowledge Iran’s legitimate security concerns. Beijing is also presenting itself as a mediator: Foreign Minister Wang Yi has called on Washington and Tehran to restore the negotiating mechanism, while Chinese experts emphasize the need to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and secure energy routes as soon as possible. (globaltimes.cn)

For Turkey, the same war is above all a matter of regional proximity and diplomatic standing. Ankara wants neither an American victory at any cost nor an Iranian collapse that would hit trade, the border and the migration situation. Serhan Afacan, head of the Center for Iranian Studies, argued in an Anadolu Ajansı article that blocked diplomatic channels could be reopened with Turkey’s participation. This differs from China’s position: Beijing is proposing a new regional security architecture, while Turkey is seeking to demonstrate its practical usefulness as a country capable of talking simultaneously with Iran, the United States, Arab capitals and NATO. (mobile.aa.com.tr)

The South Korean reaction is less ideological and far more bottom-line focused. Seoul is not concerned with who is morally right in the conflict, but with how American election tactics will translate into new demands on allies. A Maeil Business report describes how Trump, under pressure ahead of the elections, is raising the stakes: foreign companies, including South Korean firms, face tariffs of up to 300% if they do not build facilities in the United States. Korean commentators are calling this not merely protectionism, but a policy of coercing investment. The issue of Alaska and LNG is particularly sensitive: the local press notes that the White House is trying to present Korean investment as a domestic political success, even though Seoul prefers to speak of commercial viability rather than an unconditional commitment. (mk.co.kr)

This is where the second common theme emerges: America is perceived as a country where allied relations are becoming increasingly inseparable from domestic politics and elections. In Turkey, this can be seen in the F-35 case. In the summer, Trump promised to lift the sanctions restrictions and consider selling aircraft to Ankara, but Turkish analysts emphasize that a personal promise from the president is not enough: Congress, the issue of Russia’s S-400s, Israeli opposition and divisions within the US state apparatus remain obstacles. An analysis by Tercüman states plainly that the decision depends not only on relations between Trump and Erdoğan, but also on Washington’s ability to turn a strategic priority into coordinated state policy. (tercuman.com)

For China, American inconsistency serves as an argument for multipolarity and for reducing dependence on the United States. Chinese authors link the war around Iran to the broader rivalry between Beijing and Washington: as a Turkish analysis by Anadolu Ajansı argues, the United States is testing the limits of China’s interests without entering into a direct confrontation with the PRC. Oil, sea routes and the cost of instability for Chinese supply chains are especially important. The Chinese debate therefore is not limited to sympathy for Iran: it is built around the idea that American military activity destabilizes global trade, while China can offer predictability, mediation and protection of the principle of sovereignty. (aa.com.tr)

The third theme is Trump’s weakening as an international negotiator. In Seoul, the midterm elections are being followed not out of curiosity about American politics, but because a possible Republican defeat could make pressure from the White House even more severe. A Maeil Business analysis allows for a paradoxical scenario: if the Democrats take the House of Representatives, Trump may seek room for maneuver not domestically but in foreign policy, intensifying pressure on allies over defense spending and trade. (mkbn.mk.co.kr)

Turkish authors likewise see the elections not as the end of Trumpism, but as a test of its ability to outlive Trump. İlhan points out that the war with Iran, tariffs and the rising cost of living could weaken the Republicans, while also determining who will inherit the MAGA movement in 2028—above all, J.D. Vance or the more traditional Republicans around Marco Rubio. In this reading, America is not abandoning external pressure; it is merely debating which faction will have the right to wield it. (aa.com.tr)

The most unexpected common conclusion from Seoul, Beijing and Ankara is that all three countries are already expecting less strategic consistency from the United States. South Korea is trying to formalize agreements in documents and protect its companies from tariff blackmail. China is turning America’s military and trade nervousness into evidence of the need for an alternative international order. Turkey is creating room for mediation and bargaining, but does not believe that personal closeness with Trump will automatically solve its institutional problems with Washington. American policy continues to shape the global agenda, but in these three capitals it is increasingly understood as a policy in which global decisions are made with an eye to the price of gasoline in the United States, fluctuations in the president’s approval rating and the map of the midterm elections.

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Trump, Diplomacy and Indirect Interest in U.S. Politics

Today’s review examines critical assessments of Donald Trump’s presidency in South Korea, as well as analysis of his announced energy truce between Russia and Ukraine and Kyiv’s and Moscow’s differing reactions. Venezuelan materials address the U.S. elections and American geopolitics, including the Cuban Missile Crisis. Most of the remaining publications are only indirectly connected with the American agenda or focus on other topics. The review is based on materials from blogamerica.org (Venezuela) and namu.wiki (South Korea).

U.S. Elections and the Prospect of Pressure on Latin America

The U.S. midterm elections could have consequences far beyond American domestic politics, Argentine historian Leandro Morgenfeld argues in an article for the Venezuelan outlet Blog América. In his assessment, a possible weakening of the Republicans in Congress could limit the foreign-policy initiative of Donald Trump’s administration and reduce Washington’s pressure on Latin American countries.

The author views the vote as a de facto referendum on the president’s course. Trump himself made the campaign personal by urging his supporters: “Consider me to be on the ballot.” In this logic, the loss of one or both chambers of Congress by the Republicans would be not only a domestic political defeat for the White House, but also an obstacle to a more aggressive policy toward Cuba, Venezuela, Mexico, Brazil and other countries in the region.

Morgenfeld calls Washington’s current approach an updated Monroe Doctrine—“the Donroe Doctrine.” In his view, it is based on an alliance with ideologically aligned right-wing governments, the militarization of regional security under the banner of combating drug trafficking, and the use of tariffs as a tool of political pressure. In this framework, the U.S. initiatives “Shield of the Americas” and “Anti-Cartel Coalition of the Americas” are presented not as exclusively anti-drug projects, but as instruments for forming a bloc of states oriented toward Washington.

It is significant that Mexico, Colombia and Brazil have not joined these mechanisms. The author sees this as a sign of resistance to U.S. attempts to build a new system of political and military loyalty in the Western Hemisphere. The article emphasizes that the term “narco-terrorism” may serve the same political function that “communism” did during the Cold War and “terrorism” did after the September 11 attacks: creating a sufficiently broad threat to justify sanctions, military operations and intervention.

Venezuela occupies a special place in this analysis. The country is presented as one of the central targets of the U.S. strategy, amid reports of a possible operation to capture Nicolás Maduro, oil agreements with the Venezuelan authorities and attacks on Caracas. From the author’s perspective, these are not isolated episodes, but an attempt by Washington to restore control over the region, including its resources and foreign-policy choices.

Pressure on Cuba is also viewed as part of a broader regional campaign. Morgenfeld cites Democratic Senator Tim Kaine, who described U.S. policy toward Havana as a de facto military blockade. “If another country did to the United States what the United States is doing to Cuba, it would be regarded as an act of war,” the author quotes the senator as saying. The article notes that Cuba’s situation has worsened since the cessation of Venezuelan oil supplies, while efforts to isolate the island fit into the confrontation with independent and left-wing governments in the Caribbean.

Brazil is identified as one of the key arenas in the struggle over the regional balance. In the author’s view, the government of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has become an important center of Latin American political autonomy: it resists tariff pressure, develops ties with China and does not join the U.S. coalition. Against this backdrop, possible Washington support for Flávio Bolsonaro is interpreted as overt interference in the electoral process.

The author compares this situation with Argentina’s 1946 elections, when U.S. Ambassador Spruille Braden actively opposed Juan Domingo Perón. Today, however, Morgenfeld argues, external pressure is increasingly exerted without the previous caution or attempt to conceal political influence.

Argentine President Javier Milei is also singled out for criticism, with the author describing him as Trump’s most dependent ally in the region. U.S. financial assistance, Argentina’s participation in the “Shield of the Americas,” the admission of American troops and the abandonment of an independent foreign-policy line are described as signs of “asymmetrical and extractive” dependence. For other Latin American countries, Morgenfeld argues, this serves as a warning: short-term political or financial support from Washington may result in restrictions on sovereignty and involvement in conflicts that do not serve national interests.

The article identifies three possible election outcomes: the Republicans retaining control of both chambers of Congress, the Democrats taking the House of Representatives, or the Democrats winning both the House and the Senate. Even with an opposition-controlled Congress, the U.S. president would retain broad powers in foreign policy. Legislators, however, could block or reduce funding, conduct investigations, summon officials to hearings and increase the political cost of military action.

The 1982 Boland Amendment is cited as a historical example. It restricted funding for the Nicaraguan Contras during Ronald Reagan’s administration. This precedent, the author argues, shows that Congress can restrain the executive branch’s interventionist plans, even if it cannot completely change its course.

Morgenfeld openly takes an anti-interventionist and Latin Americanist position. He portrays the United States as a power in relative decline, increasingly unable to attract partners through economic opportunities and increasingly resorting to coercion. “The stick is replacing the carrot because there are not enough carrots,” the author writes.

The article’s main conclusion is that the U.S. elections themselves will not determine Latin America’s future. What will matter is the ability of the countries in the region to coordinate their actions, defend their sovereignty and take advantage of the opportunities offered by a multipolar world. But Morgenfeld believes that a defeat for Trump and the Republicans could open “a crack in the wall” of the new Monroe Doctrine and create space for a more independent policy by Latin American states.

In South Korea, Trump’s Remarks About Women Are Linked to Sexism Controversies

A fragment from the Korean reference and encyclopedia page Namuwiki devoted to criticism of and scandals surrounding Donald Trump shows how his earlier remarks about women are perceived in South Korean online discourse. The episode appears not in a neutral biographical profile, but in a section covering the politician’s controversial statements that have drawn public criticism. The Namuwiki page on criticism of and controversies surrounding Trump interprets this rhetoric primarily through the themes of sexism, gender inequality and the public responsibility of a political leader.

As an example, it cites a passage from Trump’s 1997 book Trump: The Art of the Comeback. Discussing prenuptial agreements, he reportedly claimed that women supposedly disliked such agreements because they were looking for money. He described some women as calculating people seeking to take advantage of a “gullible man.”

It is precisely the generalizing and disparaging nature of these formulations that leads to their inclusion in the list of criticisms of Trump. The material does not present the remarks as a private opinion or merely as a historical detail from his career; instead, it treats them as one example of a persistent pattern of behavior and discriminatory rhetoric.

For a South Korean audience, the topic is especially sensitive against the backdrop of active public debates over gender inequality, sexist culture and conflict between men and women. In South Korea, questions of marriage, housing, family finances and financial responsibility are closely linked to the high cost of living, social pressure to start a family and a pronounced generational divide. Therefore, portraying women as potential “gold diggers” may be perceived not only as the crudeness of a particular politician, but also as the reproduction of a widespread gender stereotype.

The published passage contains no comments from South Korean politicians, experts or official institutions. Nor does it discuss possible consequences for the South Korea–U.S. alliance, trade, policy toward North Korea or diplomatic relations. Its purpose is different: to collect reputational and moral-political criticisms of an American politician whose influence on South Korea’s security makes him a permanent subject of public attention.

Thus, this is neither a report about a new event nor an attempt to present all sides’ positions. The Korean perspective emerges indirectly—in the decision to place these remarks by Trump among matters of public controversy and to regard them as an example of sexist, rather than merely personal, rhetoric.

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America as an Unpredictable Partner: Why Australia, India and Russia Are Increasingly Talking Not About...

As of October 11, 2026, discussions about the United States in Australia, India and Russia center on the same shift: Washington remains too important to ignore, but has become too unpredictable to rely on unconditionally. The triggers vary—from protracted US-India trade talks and a new fuel agreement between Moscow and Washington to the war involving Iran, tariffs and the future of AUKUS. Yet reactions in all three countries converge on one point: Donald Trump’s administration is seen as a force that combines security, trade, energy and personal diplomacy into a single negotiation.

In India, this negotiation is measured primarily in tariffs—and New Delhi is increasingly unwilling to accept the American formula under which it must open its market, increase purchases from the United States and simultaneously adjust its energy ties with Russia, without receiving a long-term guarantee of access to the US market in return. Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman called the talks a “plateau”: the room for mutual concessions has nearly run out. In a column for The Indian Express, Soumya Bhowmick expresses India’s concern in decidedly pragmatic terms: if India cuts its own tariffs and increases purchases of American goods, while its exporters receive no sustainably better terms in the United States, the agreement loses its purpose. (indianexpress.com)

The position of trade expert Ajay Srivastava, founder of the Global Trade Research Initiative, is particularly telling. In a comment for StratNews Global, he advises against signing a deal until Washington clarifies what tariff protection it is actually prepared to offer. This is not anti-Americanism: Indian authors acknowledge the critical importance of the US market, technology and strategic partnership. But they are increasingly demanding that political promises be replaced with legally protected rules. For India, this concerns not only exports of textiles, pharmaceuticals and machinery, but also strategic autonomy: US attempts to link trade with purchases of Russian oil are seen as a test of whether New Delhi can remain an independent center of power. (stratnewsglobal.com)

In Australia, similar distrust takes a military rather than a trade-related form. The United States is not merely a major market there, but the foundation of the country’s defense architecture—and that is precisely why the White House’s unpredictability appears especially dangerous. ABC analyst Laura Tingle, in an analysis of AUKUS’s future, writes that the alliance’s original idea—giving Australia its own nuclear-powered submarine capabilities—risks being transformed into a framework in which the American presence in Australia expands faster than Australian independence. In other words, Canberra is gaining not so much an independent deterrent as deeper integration into US military infrastructure. (abc.net.au)

Two lines of reasoning have therefore collided in Australia’s debate. On one hand, former Australian ambassador to the United States Arthur Sinodinos argues in an article for Guardian Australia that, despite all the problems with Trump, the American alliance system remains indispensable to Indo-Pacific security, and AUKUS should not be written off. On the other, concern is growing that an alliance with the United States turns Australia into a participant in conflicts whose objectives are determined in Washington. Former Prime Minister Paul Keating warned that AUKUS could drag the country into a US war with China, while Emma Shortis, a researcher at the Australia Institute, sees current American policy as a direct challenge to the international order from which Australia previously benefited. (theguardian.com)

Even Australia’s tariff dispute with the United States is viewed through this lens by the local press. When Canberra seeks exemptions from US import restrictions, it faces the same question as India: how valuable are alliance ties if they provide no predictability in commerce? In an ABC analysis, Trump’s tariffs are described not only as a trade instrument, but also as a means of securing political concessions. And in an article about Anthony Albanese’s call with Trump, the nervous tone is especially apparent: even for one of the United States’ closest allies, a tariff reprieve looks not like a rule, but like something subject to the president’s personal “consideration.” (abc.net.au)

Russia’s reaction to America is structured differently: the question here is not whether the alliance can be saved, but how far a situational deal with Washington might go. Russian business media viewed the October 9 agreement between Putin and Trump on supplying Russian diesel to the American and global markets as something significantly more important than an ordinary fuel contract. A Kommersant summary attributes it to a global shortage of refining capacity amid problems at Middle Eastern refineries, shipping restrictions, damage to Russian plants and reduced refining in China. In this picture, Russia is not merely the target of sanctions, but also a supplier without whom the global market cannot cope. (kommersant.ru)

Yet optimism in Russia itself is mixed with caution. In its analysis of the authorization to import Russian diesel, Kommersant cites an important point made by industry sources: technically, it is possible to assemble the stated volumes, but the deal depends on domestic demand, the recovery of oil refining and the political climate. For Moscow, this is not proof that relations are returning to normal, but an opportunity to convert America’s need for fuel into a broader dialogue on sanctions. That is why Russian commentary often treats the “energy truce” around Ukraine not as a humanitarian initiative, but as an object of exchange: the security of energy facilities in return for easing pressure. (kommersant.ru)

The paradox is that the US war with Iran has brought the interests of all three countries into even closer alignment. For Australia, it exposed the risk of automatically following US strategy and affected voter sentiment through fuel prices. For India, it heightened the vulnerability of an energy importer already forced to balance American demands against Russian supplies. For Russia, it opened a window of opportunity in the petroleum-products market, while simultaneously demonstrating how quickly US policy can shift from sanctions pressure to pragmatic purchases—and then back again. In this sense, Trump is becoming less an ideologue of “America First” for the outside world than a manager of a crisis market: an ally, competitor and adversary can suddenly find themselves on the same side of a deal if the United States needs to lower fuel prices or demonstrate a diplomatic success. (theguardian.com)

The most unusual common feature of the Australian, Indian and Russian reactions is their refusal to regard relations with the United States as a stable category. Australia is debating how to preserve the American security umbrella without losing the right to make its own decisions. India is demanding that its strategic partnership not turn into tariff dependence or restrictions on its energy choices. Russia is testing whether America’s need for resources can be converted into a partial exit from isolation. In all three cases, America remains the central power, but is no longer perceived as the guarantor of unchanging rules. The main international conclusion of this week lies precisely here: rather than a united anti-American front, a multitude of countries is forming around Washington—countries learning to cooperate with the United States without their former faith in its constancy.

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America as a Source of Risk: Why Brazil, India and China Debate Its...

The most notable reactions to the United States in Brazil, India and China in recent days have centered on one common idea: Washington is increasingly perceived not as a guarantor of a predictable order, but as a power whose decisions can instantly change the rules of trade, migration, technological competition and war. The trigger for particularly heated debate in India was the Donald Trump administration’s decision on October 8 to suspend eight technology companies from the PERM program, a key stage in obtaining employment-based green cards. The companies affected included Microsoft, Adobe, Cognizant, Capgemini, as well as Indian giants TCS, Infosys, Wipro and HCLTech. (channelnewsasia.com)

In India, the move was interpreted not simply as a migration measure, but as a blow to the very social fabric of the US-India partnership. The issue concerns not only companies, but also thousands of skilled professionals for whom working in the United States was part of a long-term life strategy. In an editorial article, Hindustan Times called the decision incompatible with the spirit of partnership—especially given that Vice President JD Vance referred to foreign IT workers as “foreign indentured servants.” India’s foreign ministry responded that such actions could undermine efforts to build substantive bilateral relations. (hindustantimes.com)

Notably, India’s reaction is not limited to outrage. Economists and industry representatives are trying to assess the damage soberly: the immediate impact on IT companies’ revenues will likely be limited, since most services have long been delivered from India rather than from within the United States. But the long-term problem is more serious: the US market accounts for around 54% of India’s software and IT-services exports, and any closure of channels for skilled-worker mobility sends a signal that American protectionism could spread from goods to knowledge and human capital. This is how the Indian research center GTRI described it in a comment for Economic Times Government: this is no longer a narrow visa dispute, but a sign of a broader “protectionist shift” in the United States. (government.economictimes.indiatimes.com)

In Chinese publications, the story has prompted a different but related response. China’s financial press presents it as an example of the Trump administration’s willingness to sacrifice the interests even of its own technology corporations for the sake of a domestic political display of toughness. “Silicon Valley’s lifeline to talent is being cut off,” the Chinese outlet Cailian Press declared. For Chinese commentators, the key issue is not so much India’s labor question as the opportunity emerging from it: if the United States systematically makes access to its market, universities and permanent residency less reliable, international professionals and companies will increasingly seek alternative centers of technology and capital. (cls.cn)

This reveals an unexpected commonality between Indian and Chinese views. New Delhi fears that America is abandoning the promised mutually beneficial technology partnership; Beijing sees the same policy undermining the United States’ appeal as a global destination for talent. The emotional tone differs: India speaks as an offended ally, while China speaks as an observer documenting a strategic mistake by its rival. But both countries draw the same conclusion: dependence on American institutions is becoming more costly.

The second shared theme is the protracted US war with Iran and its connection to American domestic politics. In Indian analysis, the war is increasingly viewed not as a distant Middle Eastern crisis, but as a factor capable of changing Washington’s foreign-policy options in Asia. Harsh Pant, deputy director of the strategic studies program at ORF, notes in the Indian Express the contradiction: Trump seeks “constructive strategic stability” with China while simultaneously increasing the US military presence in the Middle East. For India, what matters is not only the outcome of the November midterm elections, but also what kind of America will remain afterward—more deeply involved in regional wars and less capable of serving as a strategic counterweight to China. (indianexpress.com)

Brazil’s reaction to the same war is far harsher in its moral assessment. In an analysis published by Folha de S.Paulo, columnist Igor Gielow speaks of “willfulness without focus”: the United States simultaneously claims it wants to leave the Middle East and resorts to intervention to impose its will on Iran. (www1.folha.uol.com.br) For Brazilian audiences, this is particularly sensitive because instability in the Strait of Hormuz immediately translates into fluctuations in oil prices, currency risks and uncertainty for a commodity-based economy. Even where higher oil prices temporarily support oil-company shares, the overall effect is seen as dangerous global turbulence. (www1.folha.uol.com.br)

Brazilian editors also emphasize Trump’s political hypocrisy: a man who built his career criticizing “endless wars” has become embroiled in a conflict with no clear end in sight. In a Folha editorial, the war is explicitly described as yet another “endless war” for America. (www1.folha.uol.com.br) For India, the cost is oil, the security of sea routes and reduced American attention to the Indo-Pacific; for China, it is an opportunity to watch the United States expend its strength far from East Asia; for Brazil, it is further evidence that the global economy remains dependent on Washington’s political impulses.

The third theme—the temporary thaw in US-China relations—evokes almost opposite feelings in the three countries. China’s official and expert rhetoric presents it as a shift from unrestrained competition to “constructive strategic stability.” Diao Daming, a professor at Renmin University of China, explains in The Paper that the change reflects not a sudden emergence of trust between the powers, but Washington’s reassessment of its own interests: inflation, the rising cost of living, trade costs and the approaching midterm elections are making confrontation with China too expensive. (thepaper.cn)

In India, this détente is viewed with far greater caution. Former ambassador Ashok Kantha warns in Hindustan Times that the ceremonial nature of Trump and Xi Jinping’s contacts conceals a significant strategic shift: China and the United States may temporarily stabilize their relationship, while India’s room for maneuver narrows. (hindustantimes.com) In other words, New Delhi fears it may be useful to Washington only as long as the United States needs an additional lever of pressure on Beijing.

Brazil views the détente through the lens of soybeans and markets. An Exame analysis emphasizes that US-China talks on tariffs and agricultural purchases directly affect Brazilian producers: the US-China conflict opens an additional export market for Brazil, while reconciliation could return American soybeans to Chinese contracts. (exame.com) This reflects a distinctly Brazilian perspective: the great powers’ geopolitics matters not in itself, but insofar as it changes commodity prices, access to buyers and the country’s bargaining power.

A coherent picture thus emerges. India sees modern America as an increasingly unreliable partner for its professionals and an increasingly uncertain counterweight to China. China sees a power that, constrained by its own economic and political limitations, is forced to soften its external policy while remaining unpredictable. Brazil sees a source of global market shocks, but also a country whose conflicts sometimes create commercial opportunities. In all three societies, the United States remains a central power—though no longer a model of stability, but a variable that must constantly be hedged against.

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Trump’s Escalation Against Iran: Risks for the Region and the US

Chinese and Saudi media warn that Donald Trump’s policy toward Iran is turning into a dangerous escalation with far-reaching consequences. Rising oil prices, the threat of the conflict spreading to Yemen and Saudi Arabia, and doubts about Washington’s willingness to honor its commitments to its Gulf allies are heightening concern across the region. At the same time, criticism of the president’s course is growing inside the United States: opponents believe he is undermining American values and international influence, while experts question whether the United States can achieve a military victory over Iran. This article is based on reports by Asharq (Saudi Arabia) and 163.com (China).

US Reaffirms Support for Saudi Arabia After Airport Strike

The United States has reaffirmed its readiness to support Saudi Arabia’s security following an attack on King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh. According to the Saudi publication Asharq, Riyadh views the incident not merely as another episode in the conflict in Yemen, but as a direct attack on the kingdom’s civilian infrastructure, public safety and international air traffic.

Donald Trump called the attack “terrible and unacceptable.” He said Washington was monitoring developments and maintaining contacts regarding the incident. Asked about possible US steps, Trump said: “We can do that… we’ll consider it.” In the Saudi interpretation, these remarks mean that the US administration is considering additional measures to assist Riyadh in countering the Houthis.

The US State Department, for its part, said that Washington “stands firmly with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the face of the Houthis.” American officials condemned attacks on civilian infrastructure and airports, stressing that they continued close consultations with the US Embassy in Riyadh and Saudi partners.

For Saudi Arabia, this position is significant as confirmation of the strength of its strategic ties with the United States at a time when the strike hit a facility serving passengers and international transport. King Khalid Airport is one of the most important transportation hubs in the country and the region, so its security is seen as part of the broader protection of urban infrastructure, the economy and people’s daily lives.

In its report, Asharq presents the attack as a crime against civilians and international aviation security, rather than merely a military operation against the Saudi state. The presence of victims of different nationalities, according to this assessment, broadens the international significance of the incident: the risks concern not only Saudi citizens, but also foreigners, air traffic and regional stability.

Condemnation by the United States, Gulf states and Arab countries highlights the Houthis’ diplomatic isolation and strengthens calls to hold those responsible accountable. Riyadh views American support as an element of deterrence and as a necessary part of protecting critical infrastructure.

For Saudi society, an attack on the capital’s airport is especially sensitive. The kingdom has previously faced strikes on airports, cities and energy facilities during the Yemen conflict. Consequently, the attack on Riyadh is perceived not as a distant military incident, but as a threat to public safety and an attempt to undermine the country’s role as a regional transportation and economic hub.

Threats to Iran and Rising Gas Prices Alarm the US and China

A possible escalation of American pressure on Iran could create problems primarily for the United States itself through higher fuel prices, increased inflation and consumer discontent. This is the framing suggested by the headline of a report published by the Chinese platform NetEase: “Shot Itself in the Foot? Trump Threatened to Intensify Strikes on Iran—and US Gas Prices Have Already Risen by More Than 5%”.

The body of the article is unavailable in the accessible data: instead, it contains NetEase’s standard notices stating that the publication was posted by a platform user and reflects that user’s personal views. It is therefore impossible to reliably reconstruct the author’s argument or provide the author’s specific data or expert quotations. However, the headline alone indicates the central thesis: threats of further strikes against Iran could produce an effect contrary to Washington’s interests.

This position is linked to the Middle East’s special role in global energy markets. Military tensions surrounding Iran increase risks to oil production, the transportation of crude and shipping in the area of the Strait of Hormuz—one of the world’s most important oil-export routes. Any growing concern about the stability of supplies could push oil prices higher and subsequently affect gasoline prices for American motorists.

The phrase “shot itself in the foot” reflects a common view in Chinese public discourse of US policy: sanctions, threats and military actions not only destabilize other countries but also create economic consequences within America. In this case, the issue is higher fuel costs, additional inflationary pressure and potentially greater public frustration, particularly if rising gasoline prices become noticeable in people’s everyday expenses.

The situation also has direct economic and strategic significance for China. The Chinese economy remains one of the world’s largest oil importers, so higher energy prices increase business costs, complicate efforts to control inflation and may worsen external economic conditions. The security of maritime routes through the Middle East and the Strait of Hormuz is no less important, as the stability of supplies to Asia depends on them.

Beijing has traditionally opposed unilateral sanctions and military intervention, calling for negotiations, respect for sovereignty and the preservation of regional stability. In this context, the NetEase headline is not simply a report about a possible connection between Donald Trump’s statements and rising gasoline prices. It offers a political interpretation: the US escalation policy is viewed as shortsighted because the consequences of applying force could reverberate back through the American economy and affect consumers.

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America as a Source of Risk, Not Support: What Japan, Germany and South Africa Are Discussing...

By October 10, 2026, the image of the United States in Japanese, German and South African discussions is shaped not by a single sensation but by a more troubling overall picture: Washington is simultaneously waging a protracted conflict with Iran, using tariffs as a foreign-policy tool and increasingly subordinating foreign-policy decisions to the domestic political calendar ahead of the November 3 midterm elections. In Tokyo, this is seen primarily as a threat to energy supplies and the predictability of trade rules; in Berlin, as a test of international law, European autonomy and its own security; and in Pretoria, as proof that US economic pressure can become an extension of political conflict with unwelcome partners. (jetro.go.jp)

The main unifying issue is the US-Israeli war against Iran and its economic cost. The Japanese perspective is particularly practical. For Japan, the dispute over Iran is not an abstract geopolitical debate but a question of whether tankers will be able to pass normally through the Strait of Hormuz, on which the country’s energy and logistics chains depend. The Japan External Trade Organization, JETRO, directly links rising regional uncertainty to disruptions in traffic through the strait and risks to energy supplies and goods deliveries. In JETRO materials, the conflict is described as a factor forcing Japanese businesses to prepare not for a brief military episode but for prolonged instability. (jetro.go.jp)

Importantly, Japanese analysts do not view even diplomatic agreements as a final solution. An assessment by the Japan Institute of International Affairs describes the US-Iran memorandum merely as “an entry point into crisis management”: neither the nuclear issue, nor the navigation regime in the Strait of Hormuz, nor the fundamental dispute over the regional order has been resolved. This is a typically Japanese reading of the situation: Tokyo is less inclined to publicly challenge its American ally over the legitimacy of the war than to emphasize that military force has failed to restore the stability required by Asian energy importers. (jiia.or.jp)

In Germany, the reaction is considerably more politicized and legalistic. Berlin officially welcomes the US-Iran talks but stresses that only “serious, timely negotiations” can deliver long-term stabilization. The federal government’s statement specifically highlights freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz—that is, the same economic pressure point that concerns Japan. However, the German public debate adds another question: what responsibility does a country bear when critical US military bases are located on its territory? (bundesregierung.de)

An analysis by Tagesschau of Ramstein cites President Frank-Walter Steinmeier, who said that, in his view, the war violated international law; the report also notes that many lawyers reached a similar conclusion. This is particularly painful for Germany: the country is not merely observing the American operation from afar but must reconcile its alliance commitments with the rule-of-law principle on which its postwar foreign policy was built. (tagesschau.de)

South Africa views the same war even more harshly—through the prism of its anticolonial political tradition, the United Nations and the sovereign equality of states. Welcoming the June US-Iran memorandum, Minister of International Relations Ronald Lamola expressed hope that it would put an end to the “unlawful use of force and violations of the UN Charter.” In a DIRCO statement, he set out South Africa’s position with utmost clarity: international disputes must be resolved through negotiations, not war. (dirco.gov.za)

This does not mean that Pretoria idealizes Iran. Rather, the local reaction is rooted in concern that might makes right is becoming a general international norm. South African commentators see in the war not only a tragedy in the Middle East but also a warning to countries of the Global South: when major powers bypass multilateral procedures, the consequences are felt through fuel and food prices, transport insurance and the vulnerability of sea routes. That is why South Africa’s official tone is not “choose Tehran” but demand an end to the war and a return to international mediation. (deutsche-afrika-stiftung.de)

The second major issue is US tariffs as an instrument of pressure. Here, the scale of the problems differs sharply, but their meaning does not. Japan managed to negotiate a more manageable framework: the agreement capped tariffs on Japanese imports at 15%, while Tokyo in return indicated its intention to invest $550 billion in the United States. But a Nippon.com analysis emphasizes a politically sensitive detail: the final choice of investment projects remains with the American side, and the last word belongs to the US president. Japan therefore sees the deal not only as protection for its exports but also as a new form of dependence: to preserve access to an ally’s market, it must help pay for that ally’s industrial strategy. (nippon.com)

In Germany, this no longer looks like an isolated trade dispute but like a structural shift in US policy. A study by the Munich-based ifo Institute shows that 62% of surveyed German industrial companies report a negative impact from US trade policy; in mechanical engineering and automotive manufacturing, the share exceeds 70%. Nearly 40% of companies have canceled, postponed or revised investment plans because of this uncertainty. The ifo study calls tariffs the “new normal”—a phrase that captures the change in mood well: German businesses no longer expect a swift return to the previous model of an open transatlantic market. (ifo.de)

In South Africa, this “new normal” is being felt even more painfully. The extension of the US African Growth and Opportunity Act, or AGOA, which provides African goods with preferential access to the US market, was formally good news. But local editorials emphasize the paradox: at the same time as extending the regime, Washington introduced a 12.5% tariff on a broad range of South African imports. A Financial Mail editorial aptly describes the contradiction: in theory, the country can benefit from a trade preference, but in practice it must pay additional duties under another US law. (financial-mail-prod-383389740755.newsteam.io)

South African economists therefore speak not of victory but of chronic uncertainty. Loffie Brandt of Absa AgriBusiness warns the agricultural sector in an interview with TimesLIVE that even with AGOA extended, it must prepare for an unstable environment and take into account the difference between general and sector-specific tariffs. For a country with high unemployment, this is not abstract trade statistics: employment chains in the automotive industry, agriculture, citrus production and winemaking are at risk. (timeslive.co.za)

Finally, interest in the US midterm elections is growing in all three countries, but not out of curiosity about American politics as such. They are being read as an indicator of how long US foreign policy will continue to be shaped by campaign logic. In Japan, research centers advise companies to prepare scenarios in case Washington changes course after the elections; Japanese analyses directly link the election campaign to possible shifts in pricing, trade and diplomatic policy. (pwc.com)

The German press sees the Republicans’ weak position ahead of the elections as a source of contradictory policies: Trump is trying to demonstrate both strength—through military and tariff rhetoric—and a capacity for deal-making, including negotiations with Iran. A Tagesschau commentary interprets Trump’s more restrained tone at the UN General Assembly not as a lasting shift but as the result of domestic political pressure and a search for a way out of a foreign-policy dead end. (tagesschau.de)

This is where Japanese caution, German anxiety and South African skepticism converge. America remains too important to ignore: for Japan, as an ally and market; for Germany, as a military partner and systemic economic center; and for South Africa, as a source of investment and export opportunities. But the United States is increasingly perceived not as a guarantor of stable rules but as a country whose domestic political needs can suddenly change the rules of security, energy and trade for everyone else.

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America Bargaining with the World: Why Australia, France and Japan Are Watching Anxiously

For Australia, France and Japan, the main American story in recent days has been not so much Washington’s domestic political scandals in themselves as their very tangible consequences beyond the United States. The focus is the congressional election on November 3, 2026, to which Donald Trump, in the local reading, is trying to respond simultaneously with populist payments, energy maneuvers and the conspicuous personalization of power. But the news on October 9–10 of his agreement with Vladimir Putin on supplying Russian diesel to the United States and the global market made the picture even sharper: allies see in it not simply a fight against expensive fuel, but Washington’s readiness to change its sanctions and alliance policies for a short-term electoral effect. (apnews.com)

In France, the American midterm elections are discussed above all as a test not of the president’s popularity, but of the viability of American democracy. In an editorial in Le Monde, the vote is described as a test against the backdrop of redistricting, the influence of big money and fears that Trump will not accept an unfavorable outcome. In its analysis of possible scenarios, the French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs reaches a similar conclusion: a Republican defeat could trigger new allegations that the election was “stolen,” further corroding America’s political culture regardless of the formal result. (lemonde.fr)

The Australian debate sounds less academic and more personal. Joe Hockey, Australia’s former ambassador to the United States and former treasurer, said on ABC that there is a “very gray area” between ordinary government procedures and corruption in Washington. He is particularly troubled by the blending of power, personal enrichment and partisan struggle—something viewed in Australia as a departure from far stricter standards of public service. In this respect, the Australian view overlaps with the French one: the problem is seen not as a single White House decision, but as the disappearance of institutional restraints. (abc.net.au)

Japanese commentators approach the same election more pragmatically. Their main question is whether a weakened president will be less dangerous for allies or, on the contrary, will rely even more heavily on unilateral deals and pressure. In an analysis by the Japan Research Institute, experts explicitly warn that after the election Washington could increase pressure on other countries not only over investment in the United States, but also across a broader range of international economic issues. Japan’s concern is linked to its experience of tariff conflicts and Tokyo’s dependence on the American strategy of deterring China: for Japan, the unpredictability of the U.S. president is not an abstract democratic problem, but a risk that security, trade and currency policy will become subjects of improvised bargaining. (jri.co.jp)

That is precisely why the diesel story proved so revealing. In late September, France and Germany faced an American demand to release emergency fuel reserves, while Washington threatened to restrict exports of U.S. diesel. The European Commission publicly rejected the very logic of such a move: at a briefing on October 2, a Commission spokesperson stressed that the EU was categorically opposed to an export ban and ready to coordinate action on reserves, but would not accept blackmail as the norm in relations between partners. The French response was therefore twofold: Paris agreed to a coordinated release of reserves within the G7 framework, but secured a public formula stating that there would be no export restrictions between members of the Group of Seven. (audiovisual.ec.europa.eu)

However, Trump’s subsequent deal with Putin changed the meaning of the compromise. Washington effectively eased restrictions on Russian diesel supplies until April 7, 2027, even though American policy had until recently been based on limiting Moscow’s oil and gas revenues. (fnn.jp) From the French perspective, this is particularly painful: even before the deal, Le Monde had assigned responsibility for the energy crisis simultaneously to Moscow and Washington, linking fuel shortages to the war, attacks on infrastructure and America’s willingness to turn diesel exports into leverage ahead of the election. Paris now sees the risk that sanctions are not a common rule of the Western coalition, but an instrument the White House can temporarily suspend for the sake of domestic fuel prices. (lemonde.fr)

In Australia, the reaction is even more direct, since diesel is the lifeblood of the country’s transport, mining and agricultural economies. Energy Minister Chris Bowen said that Australia “does not need or want Russian fuel,” adding that Russia must not be rewarded for its illegal and immoral invasion of Ukraine. (reddit.com) Behind this formulation lies a broader Australian fear: the alliance with the United States remains the foundation of the country’s security and the AUKUS project, but domestic political panic in America can turn allied energy supply chains into hostages within a matter of days. Australian analysts have already warned that a hypothetical ban on U.S. diesel exports could sharply raise domestic prices and threaten the rationing of supplies. (reddit.com)

Japan views the same crisis through the prism of energy vulnerability and relations with China. Japanese discussions link the midterm elections to inflation, wars and the yen’s exchange rate; financial analysts are developing separate scenarios for every possible combination of control over the House of Representatives and the Senate, because American political instability can already move the dollar more sharply than ordinary differences in interest rates. Nomura recalls that the 2025 tariff shock and Trump’s January campaign over Greenland had already led to a noticeable weakening of the dollar. (nomura.co.jp) For Tokyo, the Russian diesel deal is not necessarily a signal of an immediate change in Japanese policy, but it does indicate that the previous American logic—sanctions against Russia, alliance discipline and stable global markets—can be sacrificed for the sake of a single political date.

This is the common conclusion reached by Australia, France and Japan. They assess Trump differently: the French speak of democratic degradation and Europe’s strategic autonomy, the Australians of corruption and the reliability of their closest ally, and the Japanese of risks to trade, the currency and the balance of power in Asia. But all three countries agree on the central point: the United States is no longer simply a source of decisions to which its allies adapt. It has become a source of sharp volatility against which they must hedge—politically, energetically and diplomatically.

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Concern Over Trump’s Diplomacy With Russia

Ukrainian and Venezuelan sources are discussing Donald Trump’s contacts with Vladimir Putin, possible agreements on the supply of diesel fuel and energy resources, as well as diplomatic initiatives concerning Iran. Against this backdrop, caution prevails: Kyiv emphasizes its demands, fearing that the talks may conceal agreements favorable to Moscow, weaken Ukraine’s position, and affect the protection of Ukrainian migrants. Venezuelan commentators are also assessing the consequences of Trump’s initiatives and the possible return of Russian fuel to global markets. The material is based on Facebook publications from Venezuela and RBC-Ukraine from Ukraine.

Venezuelan Reaction to U.S.–Iran Talks: Criticism of Trump

A publication by RTVE Noticias about Vladimir Putin’s statements regarding a possible peace agreement between the United States and Iran prompted a sharply emotional reaction from a Venezuelan user. The comment contains no analysis of Moscow’s diplomatic proposals, the terms of a potential deal, or the positions of Tehran and Washington. Instead, its author focused on Donald Trump personally, calling him a threat to peace and predictable diplomacy.

The U.S. president is described in the comment as a psychologically unstable and dangerous politician. “This northern guy is completely crazy,” the user writes, using the Spanish phrase: “Este sujeto del norte, está totalmente loco.” Trump is also called a “pobre diablo”—a “pathetic devil” or “poor wretch”—and is said to suffer from a “deep emptiness” that, in the author’s view, neither power nor money can fill.

The commenter claims that Trump supposedly seeks recognition, love, and sincere relationships, but that his arrogance and behavior prevent him from achieving them. In this interpretation, U.S. foreign policy is an extension of the American leader’s personal insecurities, while decisions affecting Iran, the Middle East, and international security are linked primarily to his character.

The Venezuelan context gives this reaction particular significance. A substantial part of the country’s audience views the United States through the experience of sanctions, political pressure on Caracas, support for the international isolation of Venezuela’s authorities, and attempts to influence the country’s internal affairs. Consequently, discussions of U.S.–Iran contacts are seen not only as a Middle Eastern diplomatic story, but also as further confirmation of distrust in Washington’s policies.

Although the commenter cites no Venezuelan experts, politicians, or officials, the rhetoric is close to the anti-interventionist view of U.S. foreign policy that is widespread in the country. Trump is presented not as a head of state with whom a stable and rational dialogue is possible, but as a leader whose personal qualities may have consequences for the entire world.

This reaction demonstrates how international events are interpreted in Venezuela through the country’s own experience of relations with the United States. The focus is not on the substance of a possible U.S.–Iran agreement or Russia’s diplomatic role, but on fears that Washington’s policy depends on the president’s volatility and personal motives.

U.S. Democrats Condemn Trump’s License for Russian Diesel

The Donald Trump administration’s decision to allow purchases of Russian diesel fuel has drawn sharp criticism from leading Senate Democrats and prompted concern in Ukraine. According to RBC-Ukraine, Senators Jeanne Shaheen, Democratic Minority Leader Chuck Schumer, and Elizabeth Warren called the move “a complete betrayal of Ukraine, European allies, and America’s national security.”

The controversy centers on General License No. 135, issued by the U.S. Treasury Department after Trump reached an agreement with Vladimir Putin. The document allows Russian diesel fuel to be purchased anywhere in the world for six months. In Kyiv, this is viewed not as a technical energy exemption, but as a decision capable of once again expanding Russia’s financial resources during the ongoing war against Ukraine.

According to the Democrats, the Trump administration is attempting to offset rising fuel prices resulting from the conflict with Iran through “desperate deals” with the Kremlin. The senators believe that, in order to address a domestic economic problem, the White House is prepared to ease pressure on Moscow, putting the interests of Ukraine and U.S. European partners at risk.

Critics are particularly outraged by the contradiction between the license and recently enacted bipartisan U.S. legislation. That legislation was intended to reduce the revenues of Russia’s war machine and limit purchases of Russian energy resources. The authorization to trade in diesel, the senators argue, undermines this policy and effectively creates an exception that the Kremlin can use to replenish its budget.

“Putin responds only to strength,” Shaheen, Schumer, and Warren emphasize. This assessment echoes a view that is widespread in Ukraine: sanctions relief, economic deals, and partial exemptions for Russia do not persuade it to abandon its aggression. On the contrary, they may reinforce the Kremlin’s belief that Western pressure can be outlasted or circumvented.

For Ukraine, the issue has not only economic but also direct military and political significance. Additional revenues from energy exports could be directed by Russia toward financing its army, producing weapons, and continuing the war. Kyiv is no less concerned by the precedent of Washington negotiating and reaching agreements with Moscow without taking Ukrainian interests into account.

Ukraine’s reaction to the controversy surrounding License No. 135 reflects a broader fear: the short-term energy and domestic political gains of Western countries may once again prove more important than Ukraine’s and Europe’s long-term security. At the same time, the senators’ statement shows that influential forces remain within the U.S. political establishment that are prepared to advocate strong sanctions pressure on Russia and oppose any steps that could make it easier for Moscow to trade in energy resources.

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America Bound by Its Own Calendar: How France, South Africa and Israel Read It

By October 9, 2026, the image of the United States in foreign debates is taking shape not around a single news story, but around a broader impression: Washington’s decisions are increasingly being determined by domestic political drama, electoral advantage and displays of force. In France, this is discussed through concern about the state of American democracy and the politicization of punishment; in Israel, through the question of whether the country’s security can depend on the date of the U.S. midterm elections; and in South Africa, through resistance to U.S. pressure on international institutions and on its own foreign-policy choices.

The Israeli response most literally links American policy to clocks and dates. Donald Trump said that the United States would not strike Iran before the November 3 midterm elections, although, in his words, talks with Tehran remain “productive” and the blockade is still in place. In a Walla report, this formula is accompanied by an almost opposite reality: the U.S. Embassy in Jerusalem is warning citizens of the possibility of a rapid escalation, the closure of airspace and disruptions to transportation. For Israel, this means that a public promise not to go to war does not amount to a reduction in the threat. (walla.co.il)

This duality is expressed even more sharply in an Israeli N12 report: according to the report, the Pentagon has already prepared a scenario for a short but intense three-day campaign against Iran’s missile, drone, energy and military facilities. U.S. forces in the region are being increased to an unprecedented level; by the end of October, three aircraft carriers and more than 20,000 sailors and Marines could be stationed there. In the Israeli reading, therefore, the main question is not whether a military option exists, but when Trump will decide that it is politically convenient. N12 sources suggest that the decision could be postponed not only until the U.S. elections, but also until Israel’s vote on October 27. Israel’s security is thus being placed within two electoral cycles at once. (mako.co.il)

The French perspective views the same America differently: not through the threat of a missile strike, but through concern that political power is turning the law, the army and public cruelty into campaign tools. Le Monde describes the decision to execute Nidal Hasan by firing squad as a return to the United States of 90 years ago—particularly because of the intention to broadcast the execution online. The French correspondent emphasizes not only the death penalty itself, but also the carefully designed symbolism: Hasan is to be shot at precisely 1:30 p.m., the minute when the 2009 massacre at Fort Hood began. For the French newspaper, this blurs the line between justice and revenge. Even Republican Tom Tillis called the public broadcast “disgusting,” noting that such practices are associated with repressive dictatorships rather than with America. (lemonde.fr)

This leads to a broader French conclusion: the November 3 midterm elections are seen not as an ordinary course correction, but as a test of whether the United States can preserve institutional constraints on executive power. In a Le Monde editorial, the paper discusses the risk that Trump will not accept defeat, recalls January 6, 2021, and criticizes the manipulation of electoral districts. This is an important European feature of the perception: France is concerned not simply by the unpredictability of U.S. foreign policy, but by the fact that its source is seen in the internal erosion of American democratic norms. (lemonde.fr)

South Africa, by contrast, translates its dispute with the United States into the language of sovereignty, trade and international law. A symbolic coincidence was the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to South African lawyer Navanethem “Navi” Pillay, a former judge of the International Criminal Court and former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. As Daily Maverick emphasizes, the prize was awarded for defending peace and international law at a moment when those institutions are under intense pressure. For Pretoria, this is inevitably read in the context of the American campaign against the ICC: Washington has already imposed sanctions on its staff and is discussing further measures over cases involving Israeli leaders. Pillay’s Nobel is therefore perceived not simply as a source of national pride, but as moral confirmation of the country’s position that the law must not yield to the “politics of force.” (dailymaverick.co.za)

However, South Africa’s response is far from simple anti-Americanism. In an official account of his remarks, Minister of International Relations Ronald Lamola both rejected the American narrative of a “white genocide” as fake and called the United States an important strategic partner. His position is highly pragmatic: Pretoria wants to preserve U.S. investment, access to the American market through the AGOA program and cooperation on critical minerals—but not at the cost of abandoning non-alignment, constitutional autonomy or the right to speak on behalf of Africa in the G20. “We are a founding state of the G20 and have every right to be there,” Lamola said in response to a question about South Africa’s de facto exclusion from the U.S. presidency. (sanews.gov.za)

This is where the common thread in the French, Israeli and South African reactions emerges. In Israel, there is concern that the American strategy toward Iran is subordinate to electoral calculations. In France, observers see the domestic struggle for power changing the language of punishment, the military and democracy. In South Africa, U.S. pressure on international institutions and bilateral relations demands not capitulation, but a difficult balance between principles and economic necessity. These are not three versions of the old question of whether America is powerful. They are three versions of a new question: how reliable is a superpower if its foreign policy, legal position and even use of force are increasingly perceived abroad as extensions of its domestic campaign?

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America as a Source of Uncertainty: Germany, Brazil and Ukraine Prepare Differently...

In Germany, Brazil and Ukraine, discussion of America in recent days has increasingly come to resemble less and less the customary debate about an ally or the world’s largest market. The focus is on the United States as a country whose domestic politics and Donald Trump’s personal style immediately translate into external risks: for European security, Brazil’s election campaign and the very possibility of ending the war in Ukraine. The common emotion here is not anti-Americanism, but a wary acknowledgment: dealing with Washington remains essential, yet relying on the stability of its course has become much more difficult.

For Kyiv, the main American issue is the meeting scheduled for October 9 between a Ukrainian delegation and Trump envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. The issue is a new comprehensive peace initiative which, according to Ukrainian and international sources, is expected to address all aspects of the war. But Ukraine’s response is not centered on hope generated by the mere fact of negotiations; it centers on the question of the price of peace. Volodymyr Zelensky is sending a high-level delegation to the United States while simultaneously stressing the need to increase pressure specifically on Moscow, rather than seek a formula under which Kyiv would legally or politically formalize the consequences of Russia’s occupation. (amp.dw.com)

This caution has a very specific cause. In September, Kushner publicly articulated a logic perceived in Ukraine as an alarming signal: in his version of events, an agreement could already exist if Kyiv agreed to surrender the territories demanded by Vladimir Putin. Ukrainian media are focusing not only on the substance of this statement, but also on the language of American mediation itself: when the aggressor and the defending country are described as two symmetrical sides in a conflict, the question of Russia’s responsibility for the war disappears. In the Ukrainska Pravda report, Kushner’s formula appears not as neutral diplomacy, but as a test of Ukraine’s readiness to accept an imposed deal. (pravda.com.ua)

This is precisely where the Ukrainian perspective diverges most sharply from the American impulse to “close the issue.” For Kyiv, a ceasefire without verifiable security guarantees is not the end of the war, but a pause during which Russia will rebuild its strength. Therefore, in Ukraine’s debate, the United States remains an indispensable partner, but no longer an unquestioned arbiter: Washington must prove that its desire for a speedy agreement is not more important than Ukrainian sovereignty. This is not a rejection of negotiations, but a demand to change their framework—from pressuring the victim to pressuring the aggressor.

In Germany, the same problem manifests itself differently. Here, American policy is discussed through a painful collision between two dependencies: Europe wants greater strategic autonomy, but at the same time cannot quickly replace America’s military capabilities. Ahead of the U.S. midterm elections, German observers are paying particular attention to Trump’s weakening position against the backdrop of the war with Iran, rising prices and dissatisfaction with the cost of living. In the Deutsche Welle discussion on October 8, American domestic instability is directly linked to the Republicans’ prospects. For Berlin, this matters not out of curiosity about another country’s electoral drama, but because every political turn in Washington can alter U.S. commitments to Europe. (amp.dw.com)

German concern goes deeper than the question of Trump’s popularity. Earlier, political scientist Sasha Lohmann of the Berlin-based German Institute for International and Security Affairs characterized the style of the president’s speeches as resembling an almost “stream of consciousness”: in such a model, policy is determined not by a consistent strategy, but by the leader’s immediate political needs. A DW analysis of the Republican convention shows that the war with Iran is becoming an uncomfortable subject even for the administration itself. In Germany, this leads to a broader conclusion: Europe’s security cannot be built on the assumption that American decisions will always be predictable. (amp.dw.com)

Hence Germany’s paradox. Berlin is not proposing a break with the United States—the role of American infrastructure, intelligence and nuclear deterrence is too great. But the idea is becoming increasingly prominent that the transatlantic alliance must evolve from a relationship of dependence into a partnership with a stronger Europe. This position was also expressed in Friedrich Merz’s speech at the Munich Security Conference: he distanced himself from MAGA’s cultural politics, protectionism and tariff logic, but urged that the alliance with the United States not be written off, but “re-founded” on more equal terms. (amp.dw.com)

Brazil views America primarily through the lens of economic sovereignty—but in October, this issue is inseparable from the presidential campaign. Following U.S. tariff decisions, the trade dispute has become part of the domestic political struggle: negotiations with Washington, attitudes toward Trump and the Bolsonaro camp’s ties to the American right-wing movement have become political markers. At the end of September, Brazil and the United States established a working group on a trade agreement, but this did not remove the main source of irritation: the tariffs have already changed the competitive conditions for Brazilian producers. (www1.folha.uol.com.br)

Brazilian commentators stress that the problem lies not only in the size of the tariff, but also in the arbitrariness of the reasoning behind it. CNN Brasil analyst Lourival Sant’Anna noted that the justification for the U.S. measures changed as Washington sought a legally acceptable construction for a policy it had already chosen. In the CNN Brasil analysis, this is read as criticism not simply of the tariffs, but of the negotiating model itself, in which economic pressure is accompanied by political conditions and constantly changing rules. (cnnbrasil.com.br)

For Brazilian business, the consequences are measured not in rhetoric. According to an estimate cited by Folha de S.Paulo, the relative tariff gap between Brazilian goods and their competitors in the U.S. market rose to 7.5 percentage points; the National Confederation of Industry says that a significant share of the country’s exports is affected by the American measures. (www1.folha.uol.com.br) The local response is therefore pragmatic: Brasília does not want a trade war, but is increasingly seeking alternative markets and fears that dependence on access to the United States is becoming an instrument of political influence.

The Brazilian conclusion is particularly telling—and rarely heard in American debates: Trumpism is viewed not as a distant U.S. phenomenon, but as a factor capable of influencing the distribution of power within Brazil itself. In an O Brasilianista column, the affinity between Bolsonarismo and Trumpism is described as an obstacle to normal trade diplomacy: Washington’s foreign policy has become entangled in Brazil’s electoral polarization. (obrasilianista.com.br)

A unified picture thus emerges. Ukraine sees the United States as both a vital military partner and a potential architect of a dangerously hasty peace. Germany sees it as an essential ally whose domestic turbulence is accelerating Europe’s search for autonomy. Brazil sees it as a huge market and, at the same time, a power capable of turning trade negotiations into a lever of ideological and electoral pressure. In all three countries, America remains a central force, but it is no longer synonymous with a predictable order. The main question being asked of Washington abroad today is not “Will the United States influence the world?” but “What rules is it itself prepared to impose on that influence?”

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Trump and a New Wave of Global Uncertainty

U.S. policy under Donald Trump continues to alarm allies and partners, intensifying tensions on several fronts at once. Pressure on Europe, negotiations over Iran and Ukraine, tighter migration controls, tariff threats, and rising military risks are forcing countries to reconsider their previous strategies and seek ways to counter American influence. Russian and Saudi publications are also assessing Washington’s diplomatic options, its domestic vulnerabilities, and the consequences of a coercive policy for the Middle East. This material is based on publications by Fedpress.ru (Russia) and Facebook (Saudi Arabia).

Possible Witkoff-Kushner Visit Highlights Moscow’s Role

A possible trip to Moscow by U.S. presidential representatives Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner could mark a separate stage in international consultations on resolving the conflict surrounding Ukraine. According to FederalPress, citing Axios and unnamed sources, before a potential meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, the U.S. representatives intend to hold talks with a Ukrainian delegation and discuss the initiative with Germany, the United Kingdom, France, the European Union, and NATO.

The focus of the report is not the substance of the possible American proposal, but the prospect of direct contact between Washington and Moscow. The very inclusion of the Russian capital in the proposed consultation itinerary underscores that discussions with Kyiv and European partners are not being viewed as a substitute for dialogue with Russia.

According to the publication, Washington is seeking “diplomatic progress” before the U.S. congressional midterm elections scheduled for November 3, as well as before winter arrives. These deadlines give the possible initiative additional political and practical significance: the U.S. administration may be taking into account both the domestic electoral calendar and seasonal risks related to energy, infrastructure, and the resilience of European economies.

For Moscow, a potential meeting with Witkoff and Kushner could confirm the continued importance of a direct Russian-American channel, even with the broad participation of Ukraine, European countries, the EU, and NATO. Russia’s traditional position is that issues of European security and a settlement concerning Ukraine cannot be resolved without taking Russian interests into account.

At the same time, possible convergence between the negotiating approaches may concern more than the situation on the battlefield. Depending on the format and substance of the dialogue, the agenda could include sanctions, trade and economic ties, energy issues, and the broader configuration of relations between Russia and Western countries.

Mentioning Vladimir Putin in the context of the presumed talks reinforces the image of Moscow as one of the key participants in the process, without whose consent a comprehensive settlement would be difficult to implement. From this perspective, the conflict cannot be ended solely through military means or sanctions pressure—direct political agreements are necessary.

At the same time, the information remains preliminary. The report contains no confirmation of the future visit from the Kremlin, the White House, Witkoff, or Kushner. The discussion therefore concerns possible plans based on information from Axios, rather than a coordinated and officially announced trip.

Qatar and Saudi Arabia in the Race for the Technological Future

A speech by Paddy Cosgrave, founder and CEO of Web Summit Qatar, at the third summit in Doha provided another signal that technological and investment influence is being redistributed around the world. Although the original Al Jazeera publication formally focuses on rising fuel prices and the situation surrounding the Strait of Hormuz, its content points to a broader question: how the Gulf states are seeking to establish themselves in a new, multipolar global economy.

According to Cosgrave, over the past three years, “the world’s center of technological gravity has begun to shift.” He associates this process primarily with the rapid development of Chinese innovation and the growing difficulty Western companies face in competing with China’s pace of technological growth. Web Summit Qatar, which brought together participants from more than 120 countries, has become a platform for Doha to demonstrate its ambition to move beyond its traditional role as an energy exporter and become a prominent center for digital business, investment, and startups.

This shift has strategic importance for the entire region. The Gulf states possess substantial financial resources generated by oil and gas revenues and are increasingly directing them toward artificial intelligence, cloud technologies, venture capital, digital infrastructure, logistics, and high-tech manufacturing. International summits are becoming not only business events but also instruments for competing for entrepreneurs, developers, investors, and skilled professionals.

This process is particularly important for Saudi Arabia. Under the Saudi Vision 2030 program, the kingdom aims to reduce the economy’s dependence on oil by developing the digital sector, AI, fintech, transport corridors, tourism, and new industries. Cosgrave’s comments about China’s technological rise are consistent with Saudi Arabia’s policy of expanding partnerships: Riyadh maintains deep ties with the United States and Europe while simultaneously strengthening economic, investment, and technological cooperation with Beijing.

From the Saudi perspective, the emerging multipolarity does not necessarily require choosing between the West and China. Rather, it creates room for an independent policy: attracting technology, capital, and expertise from several centers of power while strengthening the kingdom’s own negotiating position. This pragmatic approach allows Saudi Arabia to participate in Western investment and technology projects while expanding cooperation with Asian partners.

The success of Web Summit in Doha also highlights growing regional competition. Qatar, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia are competing for the status of the Middle East’s leading technology, financial, and events hub. Doha uses international conferences and startup platforms to attract global business; Abu Dhabi and Dubai are developing financial zones, digital infrastructure, and AI projects; Saudi Arabia is relying on the scale of its domestic market, sovereign wealth funds, and major initiatives under Vision 2030.

However, the region’s technological transformation is taking place against the backdrop of continued dependence on energy security. The Al Jazeera publication’s headline itself, mentioning rising fuel prices and the Strait of Hormuz, serves as a reminder that oil, gas, and the security of maritime routes still determine the resilience of Gulf economies. For Saudi Arabia, risks around the Strait of Hormuz could affect export flows, budget projections, and global oil prices—and, consequently, the funds available to finance digital and industrial modernization.

Thus, technological events in Doha should be viewed not merely as showcases for startups and innovation. They reflect the Gulf states’ struggle for a place in the global economy, where political and business influence is becoming less dependent solely on hydrocarbons. Against the backdrop of China’s technological rise, intensifying competition among global centers of power, and instability along energy routes, Qatar and Saudi Arabia are seeking to turn their accumulated oil and gas resources into a foundation for long-term economic autonomy. The original publication is available on the Al Jazeera page.

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America as an Unreliable Ally and Tough Negotiator: What Australia, Türkiye and Brazil Think...

By October 8, 2026, the debate about America in Australia, Türkiye and Brazil had become less and less about assessing Donald Trump’s personality. In three very different countries, the United States is primarily seen as a power that simultaneously demands loyalty, uses economic pressure and is prepared to revise previous commitments when doing so serves its short-term interests. But local conclusions differ: in Australia, the debate centers on the price of an almost unconditional alliance; in Türkiye, there is a rare diplomatic window for restoring the military partnership, although its fragility is not forgotten; in Brazil, US tariffs are increasingly interpreted as interference not only in trade, but also in the country’s sovereign right to set its own rules.

The most common theme is Washington’s unpredictability. ABC commentator Laura Tingle captured the core of the local debate particularly precisely in her analysis: over the past year and a half, the main question in world politics has no longer been simply whether the United States is a reliable ally, but the “cost” of such an alliance. For Canberra, this is particularly painful because of AUKUS, the agreement with the United States and the United Kingdom on nuclear-powered submarines and technological cooperation, which has become a central element of Australia’s defense strategy. Australian critics are not calling for a break with America—China remains the main strategic challenge—but they are demanding that dependence no longer be presented as independent policy. (abc.net.au)

This concern is heightened by the fact that US military commitments now coexist with trade pressure. After a temporary tariff expired, Washington imposed a 12.5 percent tariff on Australian exports, linking it to complaints about compliance with the ban on goods produced using forced labor. In an ABC report, this is described not only as a commercial nuisance but also as a source of strategic uncertainty: the country Australia relies on most for its defense is simultaneously prepared to punish it economically. (abc.net.au) This is why the Australian reaction contains an almost paradoxical consensus: the alliance is necessary, but conspicuous closeness to Trump is politically toxic at home. According to data cited in Patricia Karvelas’s analysis, approval of Trump’s actions among Australians had fallen to 27 percent, while 66 percent disapproved. (abc.net.au)

In Türkiye, the same transactional approach by the United States is viewed much more pragmatically. Ankara saw in it an opportunity to restore what had been frozen because of its purchase of Russian S-400 systems: the lifting of CAATSA sanctions and, potentially, access to F-35 fighter jets. During the July NATO summit in Ankara, Trump promised to lift the sanctions, saying that the United States should not punish “friends,” and allowed for the restoration of F-35 sales; Erdoğan, in turn, said he had received a promise concerning five aircraft. Anadolu presented this as a significant turning point in relations between the two countries. (aa.com.tr)

Outside the official rhetoric, however, caution rather than euphoria prevails in Türkiye. In a Medyascope discussion, political analysts Gönül Tol and Ömer Taşpınar emphasized that the sanctions and the S-400 issue do not disappear because of personal rapport between presidents: there are US laws, Congress and NATO’s technical concerns. (medyascope.tv) In a broader Medyascope article about a new geopolitical era, the rapprochement between Trump and Erdoğan is explained not by friendship as such, but by changing US calculations: Washington, having grown cooler toward its European allies, needs Türkiye as a regional counterweight in Syria, around Iran and on NATO’s southern flank. (medyascope.tv) This is an important Turkish perspective: America may give Ankara room to maneuver, but only as long as their interests coincide. The promise of F-35s is therefore seen more as a bargaining asset than as restored trust.

In Brazil, US policy is discussed even more harshly, because here the pressure is expressed directly through tariffs. Washington imposed a 25 percent tariff on a significant portion of Brazilian imports and then added a 12.5 percent tariff linked to US allegations that Brazil was not doing enough to counter imports of goods produced using forced labor. In a report by Agência Brasil, Lula’s government called the measures unjustified; the US side linked its complaints, among other things, to Pix—the national instant-payment system—as well as access to the ethanol market and digital regulations. (agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br)

Pix has become a symbol of Brazil’s reaction. To the US Commerce Department, it is part of a disputed digital policy; to many Brazilians, it is convenient national infrastructure whose success irritates US payment and technology corporations. In an analysis by CNN Brasil, the tariffs are described as an instrument of US reindustrialization at the expense of external partners, while the accusations against Brazil are portrayed as politically charged and at times contradictory. (cnnbrasil.com.br) Brazilian criticism therefore goes beyond the usual dispute over rates: it concerns an attempt by Washington to determine which technological, environmental and anti-corruption standards are acceptable in another sovereign democracy.

At the same time, Brasília does not want to turn resistance into a trade war. In a Folha de S.Paulo report, government sources described the August talks as a cautious continuation of dialogue without inflated expectations. (www1.folha.uol.com.br) This approach reflects an important local dilemma: public and political sentiment demands a response to US pressure, but exporters fear that reciprocal measures could pull the country into a spiral of sanctions in which America’s financial and technological leverage would prove stronger. In a column for Correio Braziliense, this logic is described as a mixture of electoral calculations and the interests of Trump’s circle, rather than a neutral defense of free trade. (correiobraziliense.com.br)

Comparing these reactions reveals the main point: America remains indispensable, but no longer seems predictable. Australia fears that dependence on the United States will limit its freedom precisely when an independent decision is needed; Türkiye is trying to use Trump’s personal diplomacy without forgetting that its results may be overturned by Congress or by another shift in US priorities; Brazil is defending its sovereignty but is forced to reckon with the asymmetry of economic power. The most unexpected common conclusion among local commentators is that the problem for US allies and partners is no longer whether to support Washington, but how to support it without becoming a bargaining chip in its next deal.

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America as a Source of Risk and an Indispensable Negotiator: Views from India, Turkey and...

By October 8, 2026, the United States had simultaneously become the main generator of geopolitical uncertainty for India, Turkey and Russia—and the only actor without whom it is still difficult to imagine a way out of the two wars. In local Indian, Turkish and Russian discussions, attention is focused less on American domestic politics than on the practical consequences of Donald Trump’s decisions: the protracted US-Israeli war with Iran is once again driving up oil prices, while Washington’s promises to bring a settlement in Ukraine closer have yet to develop into a political architecture for peace. The tone varies, but the conclusion is strikingly similar: American power can rapidly change the situation, but it is not necessarily capable of predicting the cost of the next step.

The most urgent topic in all three countries remains the war with Iran and the Strait of Hormuz—the narrow maritime corridor through which a significant share of global oil and gas trade passed before the war. In Turkey, the issue is discussed primarily as a matter of domestic economics. When Brent crude again exceeded $105 a barrel on October 8 following reports that the United States was preparing new options for strikes against Iran, the Turkish business press saw this not as a temporary market spike but as evidence that expectations of a swift de-escalation had been mistaken. An analysis by Ekonomim emphasizes that markets had previously assumed the Trump administration would not want an escalation ahead of the US midterm elections in November, but the preparation of new strike scenarios itself undermines that logic. (ekonomim.com)

For Turkish commentators, another point is also important: Washington may view the conflict as a struggle with Tehran, but the costs are distributed far beyond Iran and the United States. In a piece on Hormuz, Habertürk columnist Nasuhi Güngör writes that American insistence on the strait, coupled with an approach that fails to account for the harm inflicted on other countries, is forcing even states sympathetic to Iran to seek new routes, partnerships and political combinations. (haberturk.com) This is characteristic of the Turkish perspective: Ankara does not reduce the problem to a “West versus Iran” dispute, but sees it as a crisis affecting the entire regional transport and energy system on its borders. American military activity is therefore perceived as a factor that simultaneously raises fuel costs, intensifies inflation risks and expands the room for Turkish diplomacy.

In India, the same war is described in far less ideological and far more accounting-oriented terms. New Delhi views American policy in the Persian Gulf through the import bill, the rupee’s exchange rate and the social sensitivity of petrol, diesel and liquefied-gas prices. India Today notes that the government has so far contained the rise in retail prices: since the beginning of the war, they have increased by only about three rupees per liter, even though India’s oil basket was around $109 a barrel at the beginning of September. (indiatoday.in) But this very protection of consumers is gradually becoming a burden on the budget, oil companies and monetary policy. The Indian Express calculated that from April through July, India’s oil import bill rose by more than 56% year on year, to $63.4 billion, even though the physical volume of supplies barely changed. (indianexpress.com)

This produces a distinctly Indian criticism of the United States: the problem lies not only in strikes or sanctions, but in the fact that Washington is narrowing the room for maneuver of countries forced to buy energy, maintain trade with Iran and avoid severing ties with Russia at the same time. In a Business Standard analysis, the Trump administration’s operation to isolate Iran economically is viewed as a risk for India through higher oil prices, shipping and payment disruptions, as well as the possibility of secondary sanctions over ties with both Tehran and Moscow. (business-standard.com) In other words, the Indian debate does not call for choosing sides, but for an even more vigorous diversification of suppliers and payment mechanisms. This is the pragmatic response of a state that does not want its strategic partnership with the United States to become dependence on American sanctions decisions.

In Russia, the Iran issue sounds different: here it has become an argument against believing that Washington’s military pressure automatically produces a political result. Middle East expert Farhad Ibrahimov, writing in a column for Kommersant, articulates Moscow’s main concern: a new operation following the American elections looks increasingly likely, but there are fewer and fewer grounds for believing that further strikes will force Iran to capitulate. He warns that the threat of destroying the country, on the contrary, strengthens those inside Iran who favor tougher deterrence. (kommersant.ru) The Russian interpretation does not necessarily imply solidarity with every action by Tehran; its essence is different—Moscow believes that a policy of force gives an adversary an incentive not to yield but to raise the stakes. Here, the Russian and Turkish reactions overlap: both see the protracted conflict not as a path to a new order, but as a mechanism for spreading instability across energy, transport and neighboring regions.

The second common theme is American mediation over Ukraine. On October 6, Trump said that a settlement was “really getting close,” and on October 7 announced a new conversation with Vladimir Putin. The Russian press views this without its previous euphoria. Kommersant describes the American approach as two-tiered: Washington supports direct contacts between Moscow and Kyiv while maintaining its own almost daily channel with Russia. (kommersant.ru) At the same time, expert Andrei Kortunov, academic director of the Russian International Affairs Council, warned in a comment to Abzac against expecting a breakthrough: according to him, Kyiv’s position is determined not only by the United States but also by Ukraine’s European sponsors. (dashboard.absatz.media) This reaction reveals an important shift: dialogue with America is seen as a necessary channel, but no longer as a magic key capable of resolving the conflict single-handedly.

The Indian debate, by contrast, sees the limitations of American mediation as an opportunity for the “middle powers.” An editorial in The New Indian Express calls on New Delhi to become more actively involved in the negotiating process. Following Narendra Modi’s contacts with Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar’s visit to Kyiv, the authors believe India can move from general calls for peace to more concrete formulas for a ceasefire and humanitarian agreements. (newindianexpress.com) This is not an attempt to replace the United States. Rather, it is a proposal to supplement American negotiations with mediators trusted by both Moscow and Kyiv. Indian analysts thus turn the inconsistency of Washington’s policy into an argument for their own diplomatic independence.

Turkey reasons along similar lines, but with an emphasis on Istanbul as a venue. The idea has taken hold among Turkish experts that Washington’s unpredictability makes Ankara’s mediation even more valuable: Turkey maintains ties with both Russia and Ukraine, controls critically important Black Sea straits and already possesses negotiating infrastructure. Yet there is also a sober understanding of the risk: Turkey’s role is growing not because the great powers are ready to abandon their rivalry, but because none of them can impose its own solution. In this sense, Istanbul and New Delhi are proposing not an alternative world order, but a diplomatic safety net around the American negotiations.

The most unexpected common conclusion from the Indian, Turkish and Russian reactions is this: all three countries simultaneously want the United States to remain involved and fear the form that involvement may take. Washington remains an indispensable participant in negotiations over Ukraine and a major military player in the Middle East. But its decisions are now judged not by declarations about strength, democracy or peace, but by three down-to-earth questions: will oil become cheaper, will a functioning negotiating channel emerge, and will third countries be punished for trying to protect their own economies? That is why current American policy is provoking in India, Turkey and Russia not a unified anti-American mood, but a more complicated feeling: the United States is necessary to resolve crises, yet is increasingly perceived as a country that itself determines the scale of their next phase.

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Japanese Businesses Brace for New “De-Sinicization” Scrutiny

Japanese companies that moved production from China to Vietnam, Thailand, Taiwan and other Asian countries may face a new type of U.S. trade risk. As Daily Shincho notes, simply changing the country of final assembly may no longer be enough to protect exports to the United States from tariffs, investigations and accusations of circumventing restrictions.

The China-plus-one strategy—diversifying production while retaining some operations in China—became one of the key responses of Japanese businesses to the U.S.-China confrontation that has continued since 2018. Corporations sought both to preserve access to the enormous Chinese market and to reduce their dependence on supplies from China for their U.S.-bound operations. However, Washington’s current approach could call into question the very logic behind this redistribution of production capacity.

The Japanese article pays particular attention to a White House report titled The Great Transshipment Scam. U.S. authorities, according to the report’s account, view the restructuring of trade flows not only as a natural relocation of production but also as possible tariff arbitrage. Under such a scheme, goods or components from countries subject to high tariffs gain access to the U.S. market through countries with lower rates. In the American debate, China is the most prominent historical example of this risk.

The main problem for Japanese manufacturers is that their facilities outside China often remain closely tied to the Chinese industrial base. Even after moving final assembly to Vietnam or Thailand, companies may continue to use Chinese components, materials, machine tools, equipment and subcontracting services. If the United States begins examining not only the country from which a finished product is shipped but also the origin of its parts, the amount of value added, the extent of processing and the actual independence of the production process, fully legal operations in a third country could also come under suspicion.

In other words, the concept of “circumvention exports” risks expanding. Previously, it was primarily associated with the simple transshipment of Chinese goods or the alteration of documents when shipping them through another jurisdiction. Now, however, claims could be brought against products that were genuinely assembled or processed in Vietnam, Thailand or Taiwan but, in the assessment of the U.S. side, remain insufficiently separated from the Chinese supply chain.

This is particularly sensitive for Japanese businesses, since Vietnam, Taiwan, Thailand and South Korea have become important bases for Japanese manufacturing and logistics in recent years. At the same time, these economies have significantly increased their presence in the U.S. market. According to the figures cited in the article, China’s share of U.S. imports fell from 21.6% in 2017 to 7.6% in January–August 2026. Meanwhile, the shares of Taiwan, Vietnam, South Korea and Thailand rose noticeably.

For Washington, this trend may look not only like supply diversification but also like grounds for checking how genuine the relocation of production actually was. Vietnam has already become the largest source of the U.S. goods trade deficit, making it a particularly prominent focus of trade scrutiny. Rising shipments of computer equipment, servers and other goods linked to the investment boom in artificial intelligence further increase the importance of Asian production chains. Taiwan and Vietnam are identified as among the main beneficiaries of this demand.

From the Japanese perspective, this creates an ambiguous situation. On the one hand, moving production capacity out of China has helped companies reduce direct geopolitical and tariff risks. On the other, the countries that became alternative manufacturing bases could themselves come under U.S. pressure. It will not be enough for companies to present a certificate of origin stating “Made in Vietnam” or “Made in Thailand.” They will likely have to demonstrate that the local facility has genuine economic independence and that the processing is not merely formal.

In Daily Shincho’s analysis, this issue is viewed not as another episode in the trade confrontation between Beijing and Washington, but as a practical challenge to Japan’s export model. Companies must reassess the origin of their components, the structure of value added, the dependence of overseas plants on Chinese suppliers and the routes used to deliver goods to the United States.

Thus, the previous “de-Sinicization” may prove insufficient if it consists merely of moving final assembly outside China. For Japanese businesses, the key question is no longer the plant’s location in itself, but whether a company can convincingly prove to U.S. regulators that its Asian production network is genuinely independent of China rather than a new way of preserving its previous dependence.

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America as a Source of Risk: What Australia, Brazil and Japan Are Discussing

In the first days of October 2026, the image of the United States in Australia, Brazil and Japan is shaped not by a single news story, but by a sense of Washington’s constant unpredictability. Local debates focus on U.S. tariff policy, the protracted war with Iran and the unexpected shift toward more manageable U.S. relations with China. In three very different countries, these issues are linked by one idea: an alliance or partnership with America no longer guarantees either economic protection or political certainty.

The most practical concern is trade. In Australia, the issue returned to the forefront on October 6, when the ABC 7.30 program discussed the consequences of Trump’s new tariffs for the country. Australians see them as more than a dispute over percentages: for exporters, they are proof that even a close military alliance and AUKUS provide no immunity from American protectionism. In July, the United States imposed a 12.5% tariff on Australian goods; businesses warned that tariff changes were disrupting pre-agreed prices and investment plans. Tom Wilson, founder of Nashie, put it in businesslike terms: changing the price of a product that has already been labeled and is covered by wholesale contracts is far from as simple as policymakers in Washington assume. ABC captured the characteristic reaction: not fury, but exhaustion at having to “weather yet another blow.”

In Brazil, the tone is sharper, but the conclusion is more paradoxical. Adam Goldsmith, a former U.S. Treasury financial attaché for South America, described current relations in a column for Folha de S.Paulo as historically poor: tariffs, sanctions against Brazilian officials, visa restrictions and pressure over organized crime. But his main argument is unexpected: Brazil’s weak interdependence with the United States is temporarily protecting it. In his assessment, after exemptions and court rulings, the actual U.S. tariff burden has fallen, while the overall impact on Brazil’s GDP is small. In other words, Brazil is suffering primarily politically and symbolically, but is not being immediately economically paralyzed. This is not a compliment to bilateral relations, but a diagnosis: their limited depth has become a safeguard against American pressure—and, at the same time, a missed opportunity for trade and investment.

Japan views the same tariffs differently. For Tokyo, the problem lies not only in the rates but also in the model of dependence: the United States can simultaneously demand strategic alignment against China, seek investment in American supply chains and retain the right to revise trade terms. Japan’s Ministry of Economy emphasizes that, under previous agreements, Tokyo committed to large-scale investment in strategic U.S. sectors—from semiconductors and critical minerals to energy and AI. The official METI overview shows how closely trade and security are already intertwined in Japan’s thinking. But Japan’s current debate increasingly comes down to an uncomfortable question: if trade concessions do not rule out new tariffs, what exactly is an ally buying with its investments?

The second common theme is the U.S. war with Iran and its cost for allies that control neither the campaign’s objectives nor when it will end. ABC analyst Alan Kohler directly linked Trump’s war with Iran and the tariffs to external inflationary shocks pushing up interest rates in Australia. In his analysis, U.S. foreign policy is not distant geopolitics but a factor affecting Australian mortgage payments and fuel prices. Even more sharply, commentator Laura Tingle writes that the end of the U.S. presence in Iraq coincided with a war against Iran that has already entered its eighth month—and sees this as a repetition of an old American mistake: the mission is unclear, while no exit is in sight. In her column, the Iraq experience is not the past but a warning about how a war with vague objectives can expand under its own momentum.

Australia’s reaction is especially telling because it comes from a country that for decades regarded its alliance with the United States as the foundation of its security. After speaking with Trump, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese called for a full exemption from the tariffs—or at least for the rate not to be increased—and at the same time reiterated that the war with Iran must end. Yet in the same conversation, the two sides confirmed that AUKUS was moving “full steam ahead.” The ABC report conveys Canberra’s ambivalence: it cannot abandon the United States as a military partner, but it is increasingly forced to publicly distance itself from Washington’s decisions. It is no coincidence that Albanese says Trump’s America now plays “a different role” in the world, and that Australia is therefore drawing closer to other middle powers. ABC

In Brazil, the Iran issue matters mainly as confirmation of a broader conclusion: the Trump administration uses force, sanctions, tariffs and political pressure as instruments of a single foreign policy. As a result, local concern is focused not only on the Middle East but also on Brazil’s own democracy. Before the first round of Brazil’s elections, Trump said he was closely following the vote; in Brazil, this came against the backdrop of the earlier tariff war and sanctions against Brazilian authorities. Folha reported that Brazilian intelligence classified the likelihood of external U.S. interference in the election as highly critical. After the first round, the international press was already describing the success of right-wing forces as a potential “missing trophy” for Trump, which only intensified a concern in Brazil itself: that the United States sees Latin America’s largest country not as an independent partner but as an arena for ideological competition. Folha

The most subtle and perhaps most important debate is taking place in Japan after Trump and Xi Jinping’s September meeting in Washington. What worries Tokyo is not the trade war itself, but the possibility that the United States and China will manage their rivalry through a bilateral deal, leaving allies’ interests secondary. Shinji Yamaguchi, a senior researcher at Japan’s National Institute for Defense Studies, wrote in a commentary published on October 6 that Beijing seeks to establish a formula of “constructive strategic-stability relations” with America, in which respect for China’s “core interests”—above all, on Taiwan—becomes a condition for stability. His warning is distinctly Japanese in its implications: if China concludes that Washington is willing to accept this logic, it could give Beijing excessive confidence and make it tougher toward its neighbors, including Japan.

This explains Tokyo’s nervous reaction to the summit’s language. The Japan Research Institute interprets the meeting as an extension of the trade truce, but stresses the need to prepare for changes in U.S.-China negotiations rather than regard their stabilization as final. The Japan Research Institute advises taking advantage of the benefits of reduced tensions while avoiding policies based on the assumption that the United States will consistently defend Japan’s priorities. After speaking with Trump, the government of Sanae Takaichi sought publicly to refocus attention on the reliability of the Japan-U.S. alliance: the prime minister said that the two countries had “become allies who trust each other more than anyone else,” and confirmed their intention to jointly uphold the regional order. The Prime Minister’s Office Nevertheless, the very need for such emphasis reveals the scale of the concern.

The broader international view of the United States today cannot be reduced to anti-Americanism. Australia is not prepared to abandon AUKUS, Japan is not turning away from its alliance, and Brazil does not regard an economic break with America as beneficial. But in each of these countries, the United States is increasingly seen as a country against which one must hedge. Australians are hedging through ties with middle powers and efforts to limit their involvement in American wars; the Japanese through their own rearmament, economic security and wariness of U.S.-China deals; and Brazilians through relative autonomy and protection of the electoral process. The most unexpected conclusion they share is this: the problem for allies and partners is no longer whether America is strong enough, but whether it is possible to predict how exactly it will use its power tomorrow.

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America as a Source of Risk: Why Turkey, South Korea and India Trust “Special Relations” Less and...

In Turkey, South Korea and India, discussion of the United States in early October 2026 is no longer focused on the familiar question of how close relations with Washington are, but on another: how long can American promises be relied upon? Three very different countries share the same impression: Donald Trump’s administration has turned trade, security, energy and even alliance commitments into a single set of pressure levers. Their responses, however, differ. Seoul is trying to buy predictability through major investments in America; New Delhi is demanding that the terms of any deal be fixed in a way that cannot be overturned by another White House decision; and Ankara is seeking to use Erdoğan’s personal contact with Trump to lift sanctions and return to the F-35 program—while remembering that decisions in the United States are not made by the president alone.

The most vivid common theme is trade, which from the local perspective has ceased to be an economic technicality and become a test of political sovereignty. This is especially clear in India: negotiations on an agreement with the United States have once again reached an impasse, even though the two sides announced a framework agreement back in February. Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman described the situation as a “plateau,” while U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer said that a final deal “is not imminent.” For Indian author Soumya Bhowmick, the most important cost of American tariffs is not the rate itself but the “confusion”: businesses do not know what regime will be in place tomorrow or whether any concession reached will disappear because of a new investigation, sanctions law or court ruling. In his column for The Indian Express, he urges New Delhi to seek not an attractive tariff figure but conditions that are “harder to reverse.” This is a characteristic Indian view: a dispute with the United States is not a reason to sever ties, but neither is it an ordinary negotiation over market access; it is a test of whether India can preserve its strategic autonomy while purchasing American energy, technology and weapons.

The South Korean debate is even more practical and тревожный. Seoul is already linking lower American tariffs to a package of strategic investments in the United States: the first project announced is the construction and operation of a gas-fired power plant in Texas, while eight major nuclear power plants and an Alaskan LNG project are also under discussion. A Yonhap timeline shows that this arrangement grew out of a deal under which South Korea agreed to invest $350 billion in exchange for a reduction in tariffs from 25% to 15%. In the Korean press, however, this is increasingly viewed not as a voluntary industrial strategy but as the price of a temporary reprieve. Commenting on American pressure to build semiconductor plants in the United States, the editorial board of Hankyoreh urges the government to negotiate while “holding the leverage.” The underlying concern is that Washington wants not merely investment, but the transfer to America of the production expertise on which South Korea’s export model rests.

Turkey’s discussion of tariffs is less institutionally structured, but no less emotionally charged. Local economic commentators associate the new American measures with a double blow: customs barriers are hurting textiles and finished clothing, while the conflict involving Iran is driving up energy costs. An Ekonomim article emphasizes that Turkey has been included among the countries that could face an additional duty of 10–12.5%; another column in the same publication calls the decision on textiles a blow to a sector that was already in serious difficulty. Turkey’s response therefore differs from India’s: New Delhi is thinking about the rules governing a major power, while Ankara is also concerned with the direct social impact on vulnerable exporters and domestic inflation.

The second common thread is distrust of American military policy in the Middle East and an unwillingness to pay for it with their own resources. Trump’s statement that the United States could expand strikes against Iran after the midterm elections was not perceived in South Korea as a distant Middle Eastern story. It overlapped with an already sensitive question: should an ally assist America in an operation that has no direct connection to the security of the Korean Peninsula? An Hankyoreh editorial endorsed President Lee Jae-myung’s statement that “we will not send troops,” interpreting it as a refusal not only to dispatch a contingent but also to participate indirectly—through patrol aircraft or demining teams. This marks an important shift: even a country where the alliance with the United States remains the foundation of national defense is drawing a line between alliance commitments and involvement in an American war.

For India and Turkey, the Iranian crisis looks even more immediate. The Indian editorial position is not limited to anti-war rhetoric: after Indian sailors were killed in American strikes in the Persian Gulf, New Delhi was forced to make its red lines explicit to Washington. The Indian Express presents the dilemma rather bluntly: India must preserve its partnership with the United States, but neither open confrontation nor submission will work. For a country with a vast seafarer diaspora, dependence on maritime trade and longstanding ties with Russia and Iran, American military policy poses a simultaneous risk to people, energy supplies and its freedom of maneuver.

In Turkey, geography adds to the problem. Rising oil prices and tensions around the Strait of Hormuz are seen as an immediate threat to the balance of payments and inflation. But Turkish commentary also contains a broader idea: U.S. military activity does not strengthen American leadership; it undermines it, because allies are refusing to follow Washington automatically. The sharpest voices in the Turkish spectrum see this as evidence of the decline of American hegemony; more moderate authors speak not of decline but of the need for Turkey to avoid building its policy around expectations of Trump’s next personal gesture.

Personal diplomacy is the third theme linking all three countries, although it is especially pronounced in Ankara. After the NATO summit in Ankara in July, Trump promised to work on lifting the CAATSA sanctions imposed on Turkey after its purchase of Russian S-400 systems, and sent a positive signal regarding the F-35. Turkish Deputy Foreign Minister Berat Gümrükçü said that the sides had created political and military working groups and that “this time we really feel that we are closer” to a settlement, as reported by Ekonomim. Yet even in Turkey’s business press and publications close to the pragmatic center, this optimism is accompanied by a significant caveat. An Ekonomim columnist warns that a foreign policy based solely on Trump is vulnerable because the United States has Congress, lobbies, the bureaucracy and public opinion. This is perhaps the most precise local conclusion: the president’s personal goodwill may open a door, but it does not override American institutions.

In South Korea, similar dependence on a single administration is expressed differently. Conservative professor Kim Young-soo writes in a Chosun Ilbo column about the need to survive in a “world without America”: in his view, Trump treats alliances as deals and international rules as expendable material. But the author does not reach an anti-American conclusion. On the contrary, he believes that South Korea cannot replace the United States in deterring China and must therefore strengthen its own defense while preserving the alliance. This is the key Korean difference from the Indian and Turkish approaches: fear of China and North Korea limits Seoul’s freedom to maneuver against the United States more strongly than irritation over trade pressure.

Indian authors, by contrast, are increasingly questioning the very formula of “special relations.” Former foreign minister and parliamentarian Shashi Tharoor calls the main source of the crisis the “radical unpredictability” of MAGA’s transactional policy in an article for The Indian Express. In his assessment, India is no longer seen in Washington primarily as a counterweight to China; it is increasingly viewed as a market for American goods, energy, technology and weapons. Kanthi Bajpai puts it even more bluntly in his column: “special relations” have given way to cold transactionalism. This is painful for the Indian elite not because it expected altruism from the United States, but because the previous arrangement appeared mutually beneficial: America helped strengthen India in Asia, while India helped contain China. Now tariffs, pressure over Russian oil and the possibility of a U.S.–China rapprochement are calling into question the very strategic logic of that exchange.

What is particularly notable is that in all three countries, criticism of America does not turn into a call to reject it completely. In India, people speak of diversification and “red lines,” but not a rupture. In South Korea, they demand that the country not participate in an American war against Iran, but do not question the defense alliance itself. In Turkey, they are skeptical of Washington’s promises, but at the same time want CAATSA lifted and access to the F-35. The common denominator is not anti-Americanism but a new diplomatic realism: the United States remains too important to ignore, but too unpredictable to trust without safeguards.

This view from Ankara, Seoul and New Delhi reveals a shift that is easy to underestimate when reading American debates. For allies and partners, the problem with Trump is not only the harshness of his demands. More important is that every agreement—on tariffs, energy, military affairs or technology—is perceived as a temporary pause before the next round of pressure. Thus, the main international response to America is becoming neither a choice between loyalty and rupture nor an attempt to break away, but a search for ways to make relations with Washington less personal, less one-sided and, ultimately, more reversible for America itself.

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America as a Source of Pressure, Not Order: Views from Brazil, Türkiye and Russia

In Brazil, Türkiye and Russia, attention to the United States in the first days of October has focused not on any single statement by Donald Trump, but on a broader and more troubling pattern: Washington is increasingly perceived as a power that simultaneously bargains, threatens and interferes—from the Strait of Hormuz to the election campaigns of allies and partners. The common thread in the debate is that U.S. policy appears increasingly unpredictable, while its foreign-policy moves are ever more clearly subordinated to domestic electoral considerations ahead of the U.S. congressional midterm elections on November 3. (kommersant.ru)

The main common theme has been U.S. policy toward Iran. In Turkish expert circles, it is viewed less as another turn in the familiar U.S.-Iran conflict than as a dangerous game involving regional communications, one that directly affects Türkiye. Serhan Afacan, president of the Center for Iranian Studies in Türkiye, emphasizes in his column for İRAM that tensions could produce new limited clashes, but that a full-scale war is not inevitable. This is an important qualification to the alarmist tone: Ankara sees room for mediation, but believes the central problem is the inconsistent signals from the United States, which oscillate between discussions of specific points of dispute and threats to destroy the Iranian regime. (iramcenter.org)

The Turkish perspective is particularly practical. For Türkiye, Hormuz is not an abstract oil artery, but the starting point of a chain reaction affecting trade, borders and security. Afacan notes that Iran’s attempts to offset maritime restrictions with overland routes are already causing congestion along routes through Pakistan, Afghanistan, Türkiye and Turkmenistan. In other words, Turkish discussions of American pressure on Tehran focus not only on the nuclear program or the balance of power with Israel, but also on the risk of turning the country into a transit valve for a regional crisis—with queues at the borders, rising costs and new threats along its southeastern frontier. (iramcenter.org)

In Russia, the same issue is viewed much more harshly: not as the risk of an uncontrollable war, but as evidence that Washington has failed to formulate a political objective that can be achieved through military force. In a comment for Kommersant, Iran expert Farhad Ibragimov points to a fundamental contradiction in Trump’s rhetoric: if Iran has already been defeated, as the White House claims, why does the United States need additional forces and Tehran’s acceptance of American terms? His conclusion is even more telling: a new operation appears more likely after the U.S. elections, but there is no reason to believe that further destruction will force Iran to accept a deal. (kommersant.ru)

Russian commentators also see an economic calculation in the wavering policy toward Iran. In a Kommersant analysis, American policy is described as managing oil-market expectations: when it is necessary to ease price pressures, officials speak of negotiations; when greater pressure is needed, threats of strikes return. Under this interpretation, instability in the Middle East becomes not merely a problem for the United States, but a resource—a way to push energy buyers toward American suppliers while also constraining China’s energy space. This does not necessarily mean that Moscow believes Washington wants a war; rather, the Russian debate assumes that the U.S. administration has learned to extract political and market dividends from an unresolved conflict. (kommersant.ru)

Brazil’s reaction transfers the same logic—pressure for political ends—to the Western Hemisphere. But here the concern is not Hormuz, but electoral sovereignty. After the first round of the presidential election on October 4, the Brazilian press has extensively discussed Trump’s previous support for Flávio Bolsonaro, his statement that he was following the election “very closely,” and the combination of diplomatic demarches, tariffs and pressure on Brazilian institutions. In a Folha de S.Paulo article, Trump’s failure to comment immediately after the vote is itself interpreted against the backdrop of accumulated fears of foreign interference, rather than as evidence of neutrality. (www1.folha.uol.com.br)

It is especially telling that the Brazilian debate links American influence not only to Trump’s ideological affinity with the Bolsonaro family. Adam Goldsmith, a former U.S. Treasury financial attaché for South America, lists a whole set of interconnected levers in an article for Folha: tariffs, sanctions against Brazilian officials, visa restrictions and the inclusion of major criminal groups on U.S. terrorist lists. His paradoxical conclusion is that Brazil’s relatively weak economic ties with the United States partly protect the country from immediate damage, while simultaneously highlighting the scale of the opportunities missed in bilateral relations. (www1.folha.uol.com.br)

The most unexpected common theme linking Brazil with Türkiye and Russia is not anti-Americanism as such. In all three countries, the United States is still recognized as a power with which it is necessary to negotiate. But perceptions of American reliability are changing. In Brazil, there are fears that Washington wants to restore Latin America to its own sphere of political influence and force Brazil to distance itself from China, including on infrastructure and critical minerals. In Türkiye, the recent U.S.-China trade truce is viewed as a tactical pause rather than the end of strategic rivalry. In an analysis for Anadolu Ajansı, Kürşat Korkmaz, a lecturer at the Gendarmerie and Coast Guard Academy, notes that the agreements merely reduce economic tensions temporarily without resolving the underlying contradictions. (www1.folha.uol.com.br)

A common picture thus emerges. For Brazil, the United States is now a potential arbiter capable of becoming a participant in domestic political struggles. For Türkiye, it is a military superpower whose actions against Iran could affect its borders, trade and regional stability. For Russia, it is an actor that uses conflict, sanctions and threats as interchangeable instruments of influence. Interests and sympathies differ, but the conclusion is increasingly similar: Trump’s America is perceived not as a guarantor of clear, predictable rules, but as a powerful, situational and electorally motivated negotiator, with whom any agreement may prove to be merely a pause before the next round of pressure.

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America as a Source of Instability: Why Turkey, France and Saudi Arabia Are No Longer Debating...

The main American issue now prompting the most substantive reactions in Turkey, France and Saudi Arabia is not Washington’s internal struggle as such, but the consequences of the US war with Iran and the Donald Trump administration’s attempts to turn the Strait of Hormuz into an instrument of pressure on Tehran. In all three countries, one idea is being voiced almost simultaneously: the United States still possesses enormous military and financial power, but can no longer set the rules of the regional order single-handedly—especially where the cost of an American decision is immediately paid by Iran’s neighbors, energy importers and European consumers.

For Turkey, Hormuz is primarily not an abstract question of maritime strategy, but one of regional sovereignty and economic vulnerability. In Turkish analytical circles, the war is increasingly described as a struggle not only over Iran’s nuclear program, but also over who will establish the rules governing passage through the world’s most important energy artery. In an analysis by Anadolu Ajansı, political scientist Oral Toğa frames the question in stark terms: the decisive indicator will be “whose rules” govern the restoration of regular shipping. If passage depends on Tehran’s permission, Iran turns its military losses into a political resource; if an American corridor becomes entrenched, Washington strips Iran of its principal lever.

But Ankara is also debating another side of this logic. American pressure on Iran is not an isolated sanctions campaign: it affects Turkish banks, trade routes, energy transactions and Turkey’s ability to maintain functioning ties with its neighbor. Following Trump’s threats to impose severe consequences on countries that maintain economic relations with Tehran, the Turkish press explicitly noted that Turkey continues to have substantial trade with Iran. In a report by DW Türkçe, the American strategy is perceived as a risk of extraterritorial punishment for third countries—in other words, as Washington’s familiar habit of extending its own jurisdiction far beyond the United States. It was therefore no coincidence that President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, in a conversation with Trump in August, urged him not to end dialogue with Iran and stressed Turkey’s readiness to support peace efforts, as reported by DW Türkçe. Behind this appeal lies not pacifism as an abstraction, but Turkey’s concern that a prolonged US-Iranian confrontation will ultimately destroy predictability along its eastern and southern borders.

The French reaction places greater emphasis on law and strategic rationality. In France, there is growing irritation that the American operation, launched in response to threats to security and shipping, is taking on the characteristics of a war without a clear political end goal. In an analysis by the Institut Montaigne, the American campaign is described as a shift “from self-defense to punitive war”: the authors argue that Washington risks replacing the task of protecting navigation with a broader punishment of Iran—questionable both under international law and in terms of effectiveness. This is an important French nuance: Paris does not deny the threat posed by Iranian missiles, proxy groups and pressure on maritime routes, but it does not automatically accept the American definition of which means are permissible to eliminate it.

France’s perception of Trump himself is also telling. In a Le Monde analysis, his campaign activity ahead of the November 3 midterm elections is read as an attempt to impose his own version of reality on voters—despite Americans’ concerns over the cost of living and the war. For French observers, this explains the nervousness of the American line in the Middle East: foreign policy is becoming subordinate not only to long-term strategy, but also to the president’s need to demonstrate resolve to his electorate. An earlier article in the same newspaper emphasized that only 31% of Americans supported military action against Iran, while Trump’s promises to lower the cost of living and end expensive foreign wars had gone unfulfilled. This assessment is especially important for Europe: US allies see that foreign escalation may become a domestic political liability for Washington—and, consequently, a factor in its unpredictability.

In Saudi Arabia, the tone is different: there are fewer illusions that the problem can be solved with a single diplomatic appeal, but more attention to the practical architecture of security. Saudi authors do not conceal the fact that Iran is using Hormuz as leverage over the entire region. In a column by Jason Greenblatt for Arab News, it is argued that Tehran does not necessarily intend to shut the strait completely, but rather to make passage so dangerous and expensive that insurers, markets and governments begin demanding concessions from the United States. This logic is close to the official Saudi perception of the threat: the security of shipping is not an American service, but a vital condition for the Gulf states and the global economy.

At the same time, a much more critical conclusion regarding Washington is being voiced in Riyadh. In an article by Ramzy Baroud, the American operation is described as the result of the arrogant belief that the United States can impose an outdated model of dominance on the region. Meanwhile, Saudi analyst Abdel Aziz Aluwaisheg, in another Arab News column, describes the war as a dangerous dead end: the United States has intensified the blockade and sanctions pressure, but failed to restore normal shipping through Hormuz, leaving Iran with its most valuable strategic asset. This is not simply an anti-American position. Rather, it is a demand that the United States be not merely a strong ally, but a predictable architect of a viable order.

This is where the Turkish, French and Saudi perspectives intersect. All three countries reject the idea that Hormuz’s future should be determined by a bilateral deal between Washington and Tehran. Turkey fears that such a deal would bypass the interests of regional states and create new sanctions risks. France sees it as a threat to international law and yet another example of American military power replacing political settlement. Saudi Arabia insists that the security of maritime routes must depend neither on Iranian blackmail nor on Washington’s unilateral right to appoint itself the guarantor of the region.

Particularly noteworthy is the Saudi idea expressed by journalist Osama Al-Sharif in his column: Hormuz is not Iran’s property, to be closed in response to US pressure, but neither is it a space where Washington has the right to impose the terms of passage unilaterally. The strait should be removed from the US-Iranian bargaining process and placed within an international legal framework involving genuine regional participation. This is perhaps the most important local idea that is easy to miss when following only debates in the United States: the countries of the region do not want to choose between American control and Iranian coercion, but to reduce their dependence on both.

The US midterm elections add further urgency to this dispute. The Saudi newspaper Al Riyadh, in an analysis of the American campaign, warns against the temptation to explain every delay or initiative by Washington solely through the elections: wars, markets and security crises have an inertia of their own. But the very need for such a warning shows how widespread the perception has become that the White House is now acting with November 3 in mind. Outside the United States, this is viewed with concern: for the American voter, the war may be one campaign issue among others, but for Turkey, France and Saudi Arabia it remains a question of energy prices, border security, maritime trade and the stability of the entire regional order.

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America as a Source of Risk: Why Australia, Germany and Saudi Arabia Are Arguing Not About US Strength,...

In the first days of October, the main American story outside the United States was not yet another domestic Washington quarrel, but the export of the consequences of America’s war with Iran. The Donald Trump administration’s pressure on its G7 partners to release strategic diesel and oil reserves, concerns over maritime routes, and renewed debate about how capable allies are of relying on Washington brought together countries that otherwise have little in common. Australia, Germany and Saudi Arabia, however, are reading this story through entirely different fears: Canberra sees the risk of political humiliation in an overly close alliance, Berlin sees a threat to the economy and European autonomy, while Riyadh sees the vulnerability of its own security and oil infrastructure.

The immediate trigger for the latest wave of debate was the G7 countries’ decision to release 100 million barrels of diesel and oil from emergency reserves following pressure from the United States. Saudi Arabia’s Arab News quoted a characteristic assessment by Energy Aspects analysts: this was more likely a political gesture intended to persuade Trump not to impose a ban on diesel exports than a firm, technically developed commitment. This wording captures the broader international perception of America: partners are no longer discussing a joint strategy as equal participants, but are instead trying to prevent yet another unilateral decision by the White House.

For Germany, this is particularly painful. Berlin sees the fuel dispute not simply as another energy shock, but as a vivid example of how American domestic politics shifts the costs onto Europe. The German-language edition of Deutsche Welle notes that Trump first threatened to halt diesel exports if allies did not release their reserves, and then said he had not seriously intended such a measure. But for European governments, the threat itself was enough: it showed how quickly energy interdependence can become an instrument of coercion. A DW report from October 3 captures this almost Kafkaesque situation: Europe is forced to respond to a threat whose author then declares it was not serious.

The German reaction therefore goes beyond the question of diesel. The conviction is growing in the country that Trump’s America remains a necessary ally while also becoming a source of systemic unpredictability. Back in February, Chancellor Friedrich Merz publicly drew an ideological line between Berlin and Washington, saying at the Munich Security Conference: “The MAGA culture war is not ours,” while also stressing his commitment to free trade rather than protectionism. As a Deutsche Welle analysis emphasized, this was not a rejection of the transatlantic alliance, but an attempt to turn it into an “equal partnership.” The current fuel dispute, however, makes this formula increasingly unconvincing: equality is difficult to reconcile with a situation in which one side can threaten export restrictions at any moment for the sake of its midterm elections.

Australian irritation has a different, more political character. The debate there is less about whether the American alliance should be preserved than about the price Prime Minister Anthony Albanese is paying for his public closeness to Trump. In a Guardian Australia column, political editor Tom McIlroy drew attention to the controversy surrounding a joint selfie of Albanese and the US president: to critics, it was not an innocuous diplomatic photograph, but a visual symbol of ingratiation toward an American leader who is deeply unpopular in Australia. What matters here is not the photograph itself, but the gap between government calculations and public sentiment: the government considers relations with the United States the foundation of its foreign policy and a safeguard for projects such as AUKUS, while a significant part of society sees Trump as a source of military and economic instability.

The war with Iran has deepened this divide in Australia. Albanese had previously tried not to respond to American provocations in order to avoid jeopardizing the alliance and defense cooperation. But when Trump suggested mass strikes on Iran’s civilian infrastructure, the Australian prime minister called it an “extraordinary statement.” An Australian analysis by the Guardian saw these words as a rare moment when the tactic of “not agreeing enthusiastically, but not snapping back either” stopped working. In German debates, this sounds like an argument for European independence; in Australia, it is a warning that even the most disciplined ally eventually reaches the limits of political silence.

The Saudi perspective is both more pragmatic and more alarming. Riyadh cannot afford to view the American-Iranian confrontation as distant geopolitics: it directly affects oil exports, tanker security, insurance costs and the vulnerability of Saudi infrastructure. The latest data published by Arab News on October 5 show that markets are already factoring in a partial recovery in Middle Eastern supplies and increased Saudi exports, although these shipments are traveling along more expensive and less efficient routes. For the United States, this is a way to soften a pre-election price spike; for Saudi Arabia, it is a reminder that its oil has become an element in someone else’s domestic political struggle.

That is why Saudi Arabia’s reaction cannot be reduced either to support for Washington or to criticism of Washington. The kingdom’s official language consistently emphasizes freedom of navigation, regional stability and the protection of sovereignty. In a joint statement by the United States and the Gulf Cooperation Council published in June by the Saudi Press Agency, the parties described reopening the Strait of Hormuz and ensuring unhindered transit as critically important to regional and global security. But Riyadh’s current steps also reveal a second line of thinking: a desire not to depend entirely on an American guarantee. The SPA statement published on October 5 concerning an emergency meeting between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey refers to the practical strengthening of joint defense mechanisms. This is not an announcement of a break with the United States, but an important indirect signal: the kingdom is seeking to build its security on several pillars rather than on Washington alone.

The most unexpected common feature of these three reactions is the disappearance of the old, simple formula: “America protects, allies support.” Germany wants the United States to remain in NATO, but not to be able to turn tariffs, energy and troops into instruments of punishment. Australia needs the American military umbrella in the Indo-Pacific, but is increasingly aware of the domestic political cost of displaying closeness to Trump. Saudi Arabia is interested in American deterrence against Iran, but is also forced to hedge against the consequences of an American escalation that makes its own territory and export routes potential targets for retaliation.

Today’s international debate about America, therefore, is not a conversation about its decline. It is, rather, a conversation about a new form of American power: it remains capable of forcing the G7 to open its reserves and influencing oil routes, but it increasingly prompts even close partners to create contingency plans. In Berlin, these are called European responsibility; in Canberra, cautious diplomacy without illusions; in Riyadh, regional resilience. The meaning is the same: an alliance with the United States is no longer perceived as ready-made insurance. It is now seen as a risk that must be managed.

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America as an Unpredictable Partner: Moscow Awaits a Deal, Tokyo Fears a “G2,” Jerusalem Counts the...

In Russian, Japanese, and Israeli discussions about the United States during the first days of October 2026, one common mood stands out: America is no longer viewed as a power whose actions are determined solely by alliance commitments or immutable principles. The focus is on the Donald Trump administration’s ability to negotiate with China, pressure Iran, promise talks with Moscow, and reconcile all of this with its own domestic political calendar ahead of the November 3 congressional elections. Yet the conclusions drawn in the three countries are almost diametrically opposed. Russia sees this volatility as an opening for a pragmatic deal; Japan sees the risk of being sacrificed in a major U.S.-China détente; and Israel fears that Washington will settle for a compromise before the threat from Iran has been eliminated.

The most widely discussed topic in Japan was Xi Jinping’s September visit to Washington and his meeting with Trump on September 24. For Japanese commentators, the concern is not so much the fact of contact between the two superpowers as its symbolism and lack of clarity. An analysis by the Itochu Research Institute emphasizes that the Chinese leader received a state reception, while no breakthrough was achieved on key issues ranging from Taiwan and artificial intelligence to trade. Tokyo reads this in two ways: the absence of an agreement does not mean that Japan’s interests are securely protected by the United States; rather, it may mean that they can be included in the next deal.

Japan is particularly troubled by the fact that the final language of the meeting left Taiwan on the periphery, while the historical formula describing the United States and China as allies during World War II was used without regard to its political effect in Japan. The Japanese Strategic and Defense Research Center drew attention specifically to this asymmetry: Taiwan was not mentioned in the document, while a reference to the U.S.-China wartime alliance was included. For Tokyo, this is not a matter of philological nitpicking. In Japanese strategic thinking, Taiwan is not an abstract issue but a potential flashpoint through which a U.S.-China conflict could directly affect the Japanese islands, maritime communications, and American bases in the country.

This gives rise to a characteristic Japanese anxiety: the strength of the American alliance is no longer considered a sufficient guarantee against decisions being made “over an ally’s head.” JB Press puts it bluntly: military strength alone is not enough to prevent Japan from being left on the sidelines when artificial intelligence, semiconductors, critical minerals, and trade concessions become bargaining chips. This is an important local argument that is rarely heard in American debates. Japanese authors are not calling for a break with Washington; on the contrary, they are effectively demanding that the military alliance be supplemented by technological, industrial, and diplomatic autonomy. In their view, American unpredictability is not a reason for anti-Americanism but an argument for ceasing to be merely a “reliable ally” and becoming an indispensable participant in negotiations.

In Russia, the same American transactionalism is viewed with less anxiety and more expectation. The main issue there is linking possible economic recovery to a settlement of the war in Ukraine. On October 1, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said that the United States was ready to discuss joint projects only after a political settlement; Moscow, he said, was proposing to work “in its own interest right now.” This is how his words were conveyed by Kommersant. This is not simply a diplomatic disagreement over the sequence of steps. The Russian interpretation is based on the idea that business and economic interests should become instruments for reducing confrontation, whereas Washington continues to use them as a reward for political concessions.

However, Russia’s reaction is far from being limited to optimism about a possible “grand bargain” with Trump. In an RBC report, Peskov describes bilateral relations as “not in the best shape,” while Russian official assessments increasingly combine hopes for working-level contacts with distrust of American inconsistency. Moscow’s discussion is based on the assumption that the United States can send signals favoring negotiations while continuing to support Kyiv, speak about the economy while intensifying pressure, and promise political contact while postponing it because of the Ukraine issue.

In this sense, Russian commentators see American domestic politics not as a secondary backdrop but as an independent source of instability. In a Vedomosti analysis, Vladimir Vasiliev, chief research fellow at the Institute for the U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, links the administration’s actions concerning the security of the November elections to the risk of a severe domestic political crisis. His formulation—“the American political system is on the threshold of its most serious test”—reflects a widespread Russian view: Trump’s foreign policy will increasingly be subordinated not to a stable strategy but to his personal struggle for control over Congress and the Republican coalition. For Moscow, this means that dialogue is useful, but any promises from Washington should be considered reversible.

The Israeli view of American policy is the sharpest because here the cost of American inconsistency is measured not in trade terms or diplomatic status but in the threat of a new war with Iran. In Israeli analysis, the main issue remains Washington’s shift from extensive military pressure to a long-term strategy of economically isolating Tehran. In a September analysis by the Institute for National Security Studies, INSS authors Yoel Guzansky, Eldad Shavit, and Ari Heistein describe the new American phase as an attempt to shift the center of gravity “from military force to economic isolation.” In their assessment, the problem is that six months into the confrontation, shipping through the Strait of Hormuz has not returned to normal, and the nuclear issue remains unresolved.

For Jerusalem, this does not look like an unequivocal success. Israeli experts fear that Trump wants to turn a limited military result into a politically convenient image of victory without taking on the costs of a prolonged campaign. An INSS assessment dated September 10 highlights the American dilemma: the closer the elections approach and the higher the energy and domestic political costs become, the harder it is for Washington to impose terms for ending the crisis on Iran. It also warns that a new surge in Iranian nuclear activity or an escalation in the Strait of Hormuz could not bring a deal closer but instead derail Trump’s effort to achieve a controlled de-escalation.

This produces a rare combination of dependence and distrust in Israel. The Israeli public still views the United States as an indispensable ally, but is increasingly uncertain that the American president is prepared to place Israeli interests above his own desire to bring the conflict to a swift close. According to an INSS poll conducted in June, 66% of respondents considered U.S.-Iranian agreements bad for Israel, while only 12% believed that Trump was “very committed” to protecting Israeli interests. At the same time, 58% of those surveyed acknowledged that, in the event of disagreement with Washington, Israel could act independently only to a limited extent or not at all. This is perhaps the most important Israeli conclusion: distrust of the American approach does not translate into confidence in Israel’s own freedom of action.

The Russian, Japanese, and Israeli reactions converge in viewing the United States as a country that prefers to negotiate from a position of strength but increasingly uses force to secure a better deal rather than to resolve a problem once and for all. The difference is that Moscow hopes to use this logic to thaw relations, Tokyo is trying not to become a bargaining chip in a U.S.-China trade-off, and Jerusalem fears that a deal with Iran could come too early and be too lenient.

The most unexpected common feature of these three debates is that they are not about whether America is powerful. No one seriously doubts its military, financial, or technological strength. The dispute concerns something else: whether the U.S. administration can turn that power into a predictable order. In Moscow, the answer is: there is no predictability, but one can patiently wait for an opportunity. In Tokyo: there is no predictability, so Japan must urgently increase its own weight. In Jerusalem: there is no predictability, and therefore even the closest alliance does not eliminate the need to prepare for the moment when Washington decides that the war has already become too costly.

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Allies Reassess the Reliability of U.S. Military Leadership

Israeli and German publications are examining how Washington’s actions and commitments are increasing strategic uncertainty for its partners. According to these assessments, the United States is seeking to prevent the war in Yemen from expanding, redeploying military resources amid the Iranian threat, exposing British bases to the risk of regional attacks, and forcing Japan to reassess the political and military cost of its alliance with America. Particular attention is being paid to the shift toward drone warfare and the need for allies to adapt to new conditions. This material is based on publications by Kikar (Israel) and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Germany).

U.S. Returns B-1Bs from Britain Amid Iran-Related Threat

The United States evacuated all B-1B Lancer strategic bombers from the British air base at Fairford and returned them to American territory after receiving intelligence about a possible threat. According to the Israeli publication Kikar HaShabbat, the suspected operation may have been linked to Iran and involved the use of drones against the base, which was used by American long-range aviation.

According to the report, the redeployment was carried out urgently. Some crews took off before preparations for the tanker aircraft needed to support the long-range flights had been fully completed. The U.S. Department of Defense confirmed that all B-1Bs stationed at Fairford had returned to the United States, but declined to disclose details about the move. The Pentagon explained that “operational security considerations” prevented it from reporting force movements in real time.

British Prime Minister Andy Burnham said there were “strong indications” of Iranian involvement in the threat. Tehran, for its part, denied any connection with the events. The report focuses in particular on the possible role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which is regarded in the West and in Israel as a key element of Iran’s network of external operations, missile programs, drone aviation, and support for allied armed groups.

For Israeli readers, the incident in Britain is seen not merely as an episode affecting the security of an American base. It forms part of the broader conflict surrounding Iran and its ability to pressure the United States and its allies far beyond the Middle East. The use of drones, sabotage tactics, clandestine networks, and threats against military infrastructure is consistent with what Israel regards as Iran’s strategy of asymmetric deterrence.

The B-1B Lancer holds a special place in American military aviation. The aircraft can carry the largest conventional payload of any U.S. Air Force bomber and is one of the main components of America’s long-range strike capabilities. Its withdrawal from the British base therefore attracted heightened attention: Fairford has traditionally been viewed as an important staging point for U.S. operations in Europe, the Middle East, and neighboring regions.

At the same time, the evacuation does not mean a reduction in America’s strike capability. The Pentagon emphasizes that the bombers remain fully ready to carry out missions directly from U.S. territory. For Israel, this is an important signal: a change in the force-deployment pattern may indicate the vulnerability of overseas bases to attack, but it does not eliminate Washington’s ability to launch a retaliatory strike.

As Kikar HaShabbat notes, the story took on a dramatic tone in the British media, with talk of “panic” and an “urgent evacuation.” In the Israeli interpretation, however, the incident’s main significance lies elsewhere: it demonstrates how seriously the United States and Britain take intelligence about possible Iranian actions, and how far Tehran’s confrontation with Western states may extend.

The Moses Family Story: A German Perspective on the Tragedy of the Gaza War

The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung’s international liveblog on the war in the Middle East presents the conflict primarily through the human tragedy of hostages and their families. One report focuses on the fate of 83-year-old Gadi Moses, a German-Israeli citizen abducted by Hamas militants on October 7, 2023, from Kibbutz Nir Oz. The full liveblog is available on the FAZ website.

The story of the Moses family shifts the war from the language of military reports, casualty figures, and diplomatic statements to the realm of personal loss, deception, and a long recovery. Gadi Moses’s niece, Machikava, said that his abductors gave him false information about the fate of his wife and daughter. He later learned of his wife’s death by radio. “He was completely broken,” the relative said, describing his reaction.

The story’s particular significance for German readers stems from the fact that Gadi Moses and his former wife, Margalit, were German-Israelis. Their fate is a reminder that the Hamas attack and the ensuing war in Gaza affected not only residents of Israel and the Palestinian territories, but also families connected to Germany. In Germany, Israel’s security is traditionally viewed as part of the country’s state responsibility—Staatsräson—while society is also acutely responsive to the scale of Palestinian deaths and humanitarian suffering.

The Moses family’s story also contains a painful moral paradox. Before the attack, he taught Palestinians agricultural techniques, and he and Margalit supported the idea of peaceful coexistence with the people of Gaza. According to Machikava, the terrorists on October 7 “particularly harmed those who had helped the Palestinians the most.” This episode offers a different perspective on the familiar opposition between solidarity with Israel and compassion for the Palestinian population: support for Israel’s security and a desire for dialogue with Palestinians do not necessarily contradict each other.

The family has also expressed dissatisfaction with the actions of the Israeli authorities. Relatives believe that the country’s leadership has still not begun an official investigation into the circumstances surrounding the failure of October 7 or accepted responsibility toward those affected. In the report, this criticism does not call into question the severity of the Hamas attack; rather, it is presented as a demand for justice, acknowledgment of the state’s mistakes, and the conditions victims need in order to recover.

FAZ places the family’s story within the broader context of the war. Approximately 1,200 people were killed in Israel in the October 7 attack, and more than 250 were abducted. In Gaza, around 74,000 Palestinians have been killed, according to the Hamas-controlled Ministry of Health. The ministry does not distinguish between civilians and members of armed formations in its statistics, however, a limitation the publication notes as important when assessing the figures.

Thus, the German perspective on the war in this report is shaped not only by military strategy or diplomacy. It combines the memory of the Hamas attack, the suffering of Israeli hostages, concern over the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza, and demands for political accountability. The story of Gadi Moses shows how war destroys families and relationships, but does not necessarily extinguish faith in the possibility of peaceful coexistence.

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America as an Unpredictable Partner: Why Moscow, Tel Aviv and Paris Read the New Policy...

By October 4, 2026, the main subject of international disputes over the United States was no longer any single White House initiative, but the style of American policy itself: Washington is conducting a dialogue with Moscow, trying to stabilize relations with Beijing after Xi Jinping’s September 23–25 visit, and remaining deeply involved in the conflict with Iran. In Russia, Israel and France, this prompts different emotions, but the overall conclusion is remarkably similar: American power has not disappeared, yet its use is increasingly determined by short-term bargaining, domestic politics and Donald Trump’s personal logic—not by the former system of alliances and predictable commitments.

The most prominent theme in the French debate is the impression that China has learned to benefit from American nervousness. In Le Monde’s analysis of Xi’s visit to Washington, the meeting is described almost as a reversal of the customary hierarchy: it is not China making concessions to the United States, but the White House seeking to “stabilize” relations with a rival that has successfully withstood tariff escalation and is using its control over rare earths, the soybean market and ties with Iran. French authors are particularly sensitive to the contrast between Beijing’s firmness and the Europeans’ caution: in their view, China has shown that with Trump it is more advantageous to resist pressure first and then offer him a politically flattering picture. (lemonde.fr)

This gives rise to a broader French fear: Trump’s America may itself be accelerating China’s rise. Paris commentators see Chinese diplomacy not as an alternative bloc with firm obligations, but as a network of flexible ties with countries of the Global South—trade, infrastructure, arms, technological standards and a promise not to interfere in internal affairs. In a Le Monde column on China’s strategy, this model is contrasted with American military operations and alliances that require political solidarity. From the French perspective, it is particularly important that Beijing does not have to “replace” Washington throughout the world: it is enough for China to appear a calmer, more consistent and less costly partner. (lemonde.fr)

In Israel, the reaction to the same American unpredictability is far more anxious, because it is measured not in prestige but in security. After the war with Iran, Trump’s former image as an unconditionally pro-Israel president has noticeably faded. According to a June survey by the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), 57% of Israelis believe that Trump supports Israel only as long as it serves his own interests, while just 12% describe him as a leader deeply committed to protecting Israeli interests. This is a striking shift: skepticism is widespread among both coalition voters and opposition supporters. (inss.org.il)

Israeli analysts explain this shift not as anti-Americanism, but as the painful experience of dependence. An INSS analysis of the war with Iran and American policy emphasizes that competing interpretations of Israel’s role have emerged within the U.S. administration itself: some see it as an effective ally and a “force multiplier,” while others see Israel as a country that dragged America into an undesirable conflict. For Tel Aviv, the danger lies not only in criticism, but also in the fact that such interpretations can change rapidly depending on U.S. gasoline prices, the approaching midterm elections and the mood of the Republican electorate. (inss.org.il)

This is precisely where the French and Israeli assessments converge. In France, many believe that Trump changes strategic priorities too easily—from confronting China to conflicts with Iran or Canada. In Israel, there is concern that the same flexibility could one day turn the country’s security from a principle of American policy into a bargaining chip. Both countries observe that the White House is increasingly focused on short-term domestic effects. The French analysis directly links the softer tone toward Beijing to the desire to reduce energy and inflation risks ahead of congressional elections. (lemonde.fr)

The Russian debate is structured differently. In Moscow, today’s America is perceived less as a declining power than as a state with which it is once again possible to speak directly—but only in a pragmatic and conditional language. It is telling that, in the Russian agenda at the beginning of October, an invitation to Vladimir Putin to attend the G20 summit in Miami, meetings between Russian and American representatives, and constant reminders that economic normalization will not happen automatically all exist side by side. In a Vedomosti report published on October 2, Kirill Dmitriev’s and Maksim Reshetnikov’s visits to the United States are described as part of a series of contacts against the backdrop of the American fuel crisis and Trump’s efforts to contain it; at the same time, the Russian side publicly denies that substantive negotiations on lifting sanctions or economic cooperation are already underway. (vedomosti.ru)

The Kremlin’s formula is even clearer: as Dmitry Peskov reported, the United States is linking the resumption of projects with Russia to a settlement in Ukraine. In a Vedomosti report dated October 4, this appears not as a return to prewar normality, but as a negotiating package in which diplomacy, sanctions, energy and the war in Ukraine are traded together. (vedomosti.ru) The Russian view is therefore less romantic than it may appear from the outside: contact with Trump is valuable, but it is not regarded as a guarantee of strategic détente. Moscow sees the United States as a partner willing to make deals, but not one that has abandoned its levers of pressure.

This is the most important difference among the three countries. France sees the weakening of American strategic consistency as an opportunity for China and as an argument for European strategic autonomy. Israel sees it as a risk that the most important security guarantee could become situational. Russia sees a window of opportunity for bilateral bargaining—one that could close just as quickly if Washington decides that the price of an agreement is too high. Yet all three reactions share one idea: today, the allies, rivals and adversaries of the United States must take into account not only America’s power, but also the volatility of its political will. This volatility—more than tariffs, sanctions or individual summits—is becoming Washington’s main export product.

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America as an Unreliable Ally: Why France, Israel and Germany Debate the Cost...

In the first days of October 2026, the United States is being discussed in France, Israel and Germany not as a distant superpower, but as a direct source of strategic uncertainty. At the center of attention are Donald Trump’s attempts to find a way out of the war with Iran, his increasingly selective attitude toward allies, pressure on Europe over Greenland and tariffs, and the noticeable intrusion of American politics into partners’ domestic campaigns. The common thread of these debates is simple: Washington remains indispensable, but is no longer seen as a predictable guarantor of order.

The most painful issue for all three countries is the Middle East, although the nature of their concerns differs. In Germany, the main focus is the risk of Europe being drawn into a war that Washington began with maximalist rhetoric but is now trying to end without a clear political result. In a Tagesschau commentary, ARD correspondent Martin Ganslmaier argued that Trump’s more restrained September speech at the UN reflected not diplomatic maturity, but pressure from American voters angered by the war with Iran, rising energy prices and the White House’s foreign-policy chaos. His description of the president as seeking a way out of a “dead end” precisely captures the German perception: the danger lies not only in escalation, but also in the possibility that the United States has no convincing plan for ending the conflict. (tagesschau.de)

In France, the criticism is more normative. Paris is irritated that American policy combines the use of force with disregard for international institutions, while leaving allies to deal with the consequences. French sensitivity is especially evident on the Palestinian issue. In a joint statement with the United Kingdom and Canada on September 8, the Élysée Palace called the expansion of Israeli settlements and settler violence a direct threat to a two-state solution, and announced plans to restrict imports from settlements and impose targeted sanctions. This is not merely a dispute with Israel; it is also a demonstration of an independent policy line against the backdrop of American diplomacy, which, in the French view, sometimes shields Israel and at other times abruptly distances itself from it, depending on Trump’s latest deal. (elysee.fr)

The Israeli reaction is the most paradoxical. Israeli commentators have no doubt that American military and political support remains critically important; what they question is whether a national strategy can be built on the personal closeness between Benjamin Netanyahu and Trump. In a column for Ynet, this calculation is described almost as a roulette loss: Netanyahu, the author argues, placed everything on Trump for too long and discovered that the US president might prefer a compromise with Iran to Israel’s expectation of Tehran’s complete defeat. The most important Israeli conclusion is this: the problem is not the disappearance of the US-Israeli alliance, but its transformation from a stable institution into a variable dependent on one person’s mood and priorities. (ynet.co.il)

This concern is intensified by the situation in the Red Sea. In the Israeli press, American restraint toward the Houthis is being read not as an isolated episode in the war in Yemen, but as a test of the reliability of the entire regional deterrence system. Ynet writes of the risk that the Houthis, by controlling the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, could turn it into leverage against both Israel and global trade. Israel is therefore debating more than missiles or shipping routes: it is trying to determine whether America is truly prepared to defend the established regional order—or whether it prefers to negotiate with those it promised to deter only yesterday. (ynet.co.il)

The second common thread is disappointment with the American alliance as a system of rules. This issue is especially close to the French and Germans because of the January crisis over Greenland, when Trump linked territorial claims with tariff pressure on Europeans. Even after the September agreement between the United States, Denmark and Greenland, the concern has not disappeared: the American side spoke of permanent control over the island’s security, while Copenhagen and Nuuk emphasized the preservation of sovereignty and Greenlanders’ right to self-determination. For Berlin, this became not an exotic North Atlantic story, but a lesson that NATO no longer guarantees an automatic convergence of interests on both sides of the Atlantic. (amp.dw.com)

German debates are therefore increasingly framed not around the traditional question of “how to preserve transatlantic unity,” but around a much tougher one: how to reduce Germany’s vulnerability to American economic and political coercion. In a January analysis for Die Zeit, tariffs against Germany were directly linked to the Greenland dispute; the automotive, engineering and chemical industries were identified as particularly vulnerable. A later assessment by Tagesschau was more measured: some German companies adapted by localizing production in the United States. But that is precisely the unpleasant political result for Berlin: even if an export catastrophe did not occur, American tariffs still force German businesses to move decisions, investments and supply chains wherever Washington directs. (zeit.de)

The French reaction is more emotional and political. Paris sees today’s America not simply as a partner with different interests, but as a power prepared to punish even close allies for publicly disagreeing with it. The story of the French ambassador in Washington became symbolic. As Le Monde reported, the United States delayed the appointment of a new French envoy after a critical French message about Washington’s vote on the mandate of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. Paris had to issue what was effectively a conciliatory statement. To the French elite, this is humiliating not because diplomats are incapable of smoothing over conflicts, but because Washington used a routine personnel matter to discipline an ally. (lemonde.fr)

This is where the French and German emphases diverge. In Germany, pragmatic concern prevails: America cannot be replaced quickly, so Europe needs stronger defenses, a unified trade policy and the ability to avoid panicking in response to every American impulse. In France, the language of political dignity and “strategic autonomy” is heard much more often. Former French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin, in an assessment cited by Le Monde, framed this as a need for clarity: Europe risks losing its very political essence if it accepts the new American “grammar” of force and coercion. (lemonde.fr)

The third theme is the transformation of American domestic politics into a factor in the domestic politics of its allies. In France, Trump has become not only a foreign-policy problem, but also a mirror for the upcoming 2027 presidential campaign. In a February column for Le Monde, journalist Solenn de Royer noted that his policies—tariff blackmail, claims on Greenland and tough immigration measures—are forcing French parties to take positions not in an abstract debate about “Trumpism,” but on the rule of law, migration and attitudes toward state power. The American example functions in France both as a temptation for some on the right and as a warning to centrists and the left. (lemonde.fr)

In Israel, American influence is even more direct: it is woven into the election campaign ahead of the Knesset elections on October 27, 2026. Trump recently refused to publicly support Netanyahu, saying that he did not know whom he would find it easier to work with, and separately rejected claims that the Israeli prime minister had received advance warning of the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023. In the Israeli reading, this is not neutrality, but a signal: the White House does not want to tie itself unconditionally to a candidate whose political future has become uncertain. (mako.co.il)

The most unexpected local observation comes from Israel itself. A poll by the Israel Democracy Institute shows that only 41% of Jewish respondents believe Israel’s security is an important consideration for Trump, compared with 64% in March. This does not mean that sympathy toward the United States has disappeared; it means that the belief that even a friendly president will necessarily act primarily in Israel’s interests is eroding. (idi.org.il)

A new international picture is taking shape. France responds to America in the language of sovereignty and law, Germany in the language of reducing dependence and institutional safeguards, and Israel in the language of existential necessity mixed with bitter distrust of personal diplomacy. But all three countries agree on the essential point: Trump’s United States remains too powerful to ignore and too unpredictable to rely on unconditionally.

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The United States and Middle East Crises

Turkish media view Washington’s policy as a key, though not always reliable, factor in Middle Eastern conflicts. According to these reports, Israel may need to revise its strategy if American support weakens, while the Houthis are seen as an Iranian tool in negotiations with the United States. At the same time, there are concerns that Washington’s close alliance with Tel Aviv could create political costs for other countries. The German press reports a practical response to U.S. pressure: G7 countries have reportedly agreed to release oil reserves. This overview is based on materials from Yeni Şafak (Turkey) and Süddeutsche Zeitung (Germany).

U.S. Policy on Israel Could Hurt Republicans

Support for Israel and Washington’s involvement in the conflict with Iran could become a serious domestic political risk for the Republican Party ahead of the November 3 elections. This is the conclusion reached by columnist Abdullah Muradoğlu in a column for the Turkish newspaper Yeni Şafak, which examines U.S. Middle East policy through the lens of its cost to American voters.

The author argues that Donald Trump’s administration has gone far beyond diplomatic, financial, and political support for Israel. In his assessment, the United States has effectively assumed the military, economic, and political consequences of a conflict described in the article as “Israel’s war.” Muradoğlu believes this situation is provoking irritation not only among independent voters but also among part of the traditional Republican electorate.

As a historical parallel, the article cites the 2006 midterm elections. At the time, Republicans suffered losses amid the Iraq War and a sharp rise in fuel prices. The author quotes Republican Senator Steve Daines, known for his support of Israel: “Back then, six out of 10 Americans opposed the Iraq War. Gas prices doubled. Sound familiar? In the end, we lost six seats.”

For a Turkish audience, the parallel with Iraq carries particular significance. In Turkey, the U.S. invasion of that country is often viewed as one of the key sources of regional destabilization: it was accompanied by the destruction of a neighboring state, waves of refugees, heightened security threats, and long-term consequences for the entire Middle East. Against this backdrop, the current escalation around Iran is seen not as a distant crisis but as a factor directly affecting Turkey’s border security, energy markets, and the state of the regional economy.

Muradoğlu also points to the gap between Trump’s campaign rhetoric and his current foreign-policy course. Trump came to power as a “peace president,” criticized neoconservatives, opposed costly overseas interventions, and said he intended to focus U.S. policy on the Western Hemisphere. However, according to the author, by starting a war with Iran, he chose the exact opposite path.

This assessment fits with widespread criticism of American interventionism in Turkey. From this perspective, Washington’s decisions in the Middle East are explained less by the defense of the international order or U.S. national interests than by Israel’s influence and that of pro-Israel political circles in the U.S. capital. The author insists that dependence on this course is forcing the United States to bear the costs of conflicts from which Israel benefits above all.

According to the column, dissatisfaction with the war is supported by an AP/NORC poll. The figures cited indicate that 71% of Americans disapprove of the way Trump is conducting the war against Iran together with Israel, while 69% believe the war was not worth the costs incurred. At the same time, more than half of respondents, according to the article, report that the overall economic situation, as well as the condition of the national and local economies, has worsened since Trump took office.

The combination of military conflict, fuel costs, and voters’ everyday well-being is becoming crucial to the Republicans’ political prospects. Rising energy prices and a sense of economic instability could make foreign policy part of the domestic electoral agenda—just as happened in 2006.

The author sees a separate contradiction in the actions of pro-Israel Republicans. Even while warning of possible electoral losses, politicians such as Daines continue to support legislative and political initiatives aimed at protecting Israel. In Muradoğlu’s view, Democrats may exploit this inconsistency during the campaign, portraying Republicans as a force willing to place foreign commitments above the economic and political interests of their own voters.

The Yeni Şafak column does not claim to offer a neutral news analysis of the U.S. elections. It is a political interpretation reflecting a critical Turkish view of the U.S.-Israeli alliance. It presents a possible Republican defeat as the price of ignoring public dissatisfaction with the war, rising costs, and Washington’s involvement in yet another Middle Eastern conflict.

G7 to Release 100 Million Barrels of Fuel Amid Iran War

G7 countries have agreed to release 100 million barrels of oil and diesel fuel from strategic reserves in an attempt to contain the effects of the war with Iran on the global energy market. According to Süddeutsche Zeitung, the decision was made amid “unprecedented volatility in oil markets” and a sharp rise in fuel prices.

Supplies are to begin immediately and continue for four months. Particularly large volumes of diesel are planned to be released onto the market during the program’s first 20 days. Coordination will be carried out through the International Energy Agency, which should prevent fragmented national measures and preserve the principle of collective energy security.

The current release of reserves follows a record intervention in March, when countries had already sent 400 million barrels onto the market in response to the consequences of the war with Iran. The new step shows that previous measures were insufficient to bring about a sustained reduction in tensions: the risks of supply disruptions and price spikes remain high.

The decision is especially significant for Germany. Europe’s largest industrial economy is particularly vulnerable to shortages and rising diesel prices, as road freight, logistics, agriculture, and parts of industrial production depend on the fuel. For Berlin, this is not only an expression of allied solidarity but also an attempt to protect the domestic economy from a new energy shock after the painful experience of dependence on Russian gas and the price instability of recent years.

The political context of the decision is also linked to pressure from the United States. President Donald Trump welcomed the agreement, saying that Europe had agreed to immediately release substantial volumes from its “well-stocked” diesel reserves. For Washington, lower fuel prices also have domestic significance: they could affect voter sentiment ahead of the congressional elections scheduled for November 3.

For European countries, including Germany, the situation highlights the contradiction between their own needs and those of their ally. Lower fuel prices serve the interests of European industry and consumers, but the use of strategic reserves amid U.S. political pressure raises questions about the limits of American influence over European energy policy.

Reserves can ease short-term shortages and curb price increases, but they cannot eliminate the root cause of the crisis—the military conflict and the uncertainty surrounding oil supplies. The G7 decision is therefore both an emergency crisis-management measure and a signal of how limited Western countries’ ability is to offset the consequences of a prolonged war using strategic reserves alone.

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America at War and Bargaining: How Australia, Germany, and Israel Read the October Strategy

As of October 3, 2026, the main American story in Australia, Germany, and Israel is no longer a single statement by Donald Trump or yet another diplomatic gesture from Washington. In the local press, the United States appears to be a power simultaneously trying to wind down the old war in Iraq, keep its new war with Iran under control, and prevent foreign-policy chaos from completely undermining the president’s standing ahead of the November 3 midterm elections. All three countries are debating the same question: does Washington have a strategy—or is it replacing one with a cycle of threats, strikes, and negotiations?

The most prominent common theme is Iran. The Australian reaction is particularly painful because, for Canberra, the conflict ceased long ago to be a distant Middle Eastern drama. In an analysis for ABC, Laura Tingle compares the American withdrawal from Iraq with the current war against Iran and sees an almost mocking historical symmetry. Trump calls the Iraq campaign an “expensive excursion into hell,” yet he himself is waging a conflict that, in her assessment, has already entered its eighth month without a clear end goal. Australia’s concern is not only moral. High fuel prices, growing inflationary pressure, and the risk of further turmoil in energy markets turn America’s military policy into an issue for Australia’s domestic economy. In a September analysis, ABC columnist Alan Kohler directly links Trump’s war with Iran and US tariff policy to short-term inflationary shocks, calling a diplomatic exit the only realistic alternative to further escalation.

Behind this lies a deeper Australian concern: the alliance with the United States, once seen as insurance, is becoming a mechanism for entrapment. Lachlan Strahan, Australia’s former high commissioner to the United Kingdom, expressed the mood in particularly stark terms in The Guardian Australia: traditional allies are “uncomfortable” because Trump launched the war without a clearly defined destination and did not brief his partners on his plans. For Australia, this is not an abstraction. AUKUS, the US military presence, intelligence infrastructure, and deepening operational interoperability make the question not “should Australia support the United States?” but “can Canberra say ‘no’ to the United States at all?” This is what makes the Australian perspective unique: it criticizes not only the war, but also the dependence that makes disagreement with Washington politically and militarily almost impractical.

In Germany, the tone is different, but the diagnosis is similar. German commentators are far less concerned with Berlin’s direct involvement and much more with the collapse of predictability in American policy. The war with Iran is seen as a test for the international order on which Germany depends more than many other countries: for a middle power, rules, institutions, and law are not rhetorical embellishments but compensation for its own limited strength. That is why German discussion is particularly irritated by the difficulty of separating Trump’s military and negotiating tracks. When the president rejects an Iranian proposal, leaves open the possibility of new bombings after the elections, and at the same time speaks of a possible deal, it looks less like flexible diplomacy than the absence of a consistent political objective.

Germany is also closely watching how the war with Iran is returning to American domestic politics. Tagesschau writes about Republican candidates who are beginning to distance themselves from Trump a month before the election. In the German reading, the midterms are becoming not merely a vote on prices and US social policy, but a referendum on the president’s model of power. In a Deutschlandfunk commentary, journalist Anne Reidt calls the very idea of turning the campaign into a plebiscite on Trump risky: the president is not formally running, but he is asking voters to cast their ballots as though his name were on them. For Berlin, this is an important signal: a weakened Trump after the election may be less able to impose his will on allies, but also more inclined toward sharp, demonstrative moves in foreign policy.

The Israeli debate differs because no one here doubts the centrality of American power—the dispute is over whose interests Trump is serving with it and what final configuration he is seeking. Israeli analysts do not automatically regard American threats against Iran as a guarantee of Israeli security. In a Ynet commentary, Eldad Shavit, a former senior member of Israel’s defense establishment, describes the White House’s approach as a combination of military pressure, economic coercion, and negotiations: Trump wants to force Tehran into a deal while avoiding an open-ended war. But Shavit emphasizes the fundamental difference in interests: ending a war does not mean eliminating a threat. For Israel, what matters is not only a ceasefire and freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, but verifiable restrictions on Iran’s nuclear, missile, and proxy infrastructure.

This explains the most characteristic skepticism in the Israeli press: Washington may regard as a victory an outcome that Israel would see as merely a pause. In another Ynet analysis, Shavit notes that the American president needs a “big,” marketable success, whereas Israel requires a much deeper change in the strategic reality. The divergence matters: the more Trump focuses on the domestic political effect ahead of the election, the greater the risk of an agreement that can be presented to American voters as peace but that Jerusalem would regard as incomplete and potentially dangerous.

The second Israeli story is equally revealing: Trump’s unusual restraint toward Benjamin Netanyahu ahead of Israel’s October 27 election. In a Ynet report on Trump’s interview with Time, the president declined to publicly endorse Netanyahu, saying that he does not interfere in Israeli politics. In a country where the American president has traditionally been capable of becoming almost a domestic political factor, this is perceived as more than a neutral formality. It is a reminder that the alliance with the United States under Trump is personalized but not guaranteed: close relations between leaders do not change the fact that the White House acts primarily according to its own electoral and negotiating timetable.

The withdrawal of American troops from Iraq adds another paradox to the picture. The Australian press sees it as a warning: the United States can declare the end of a “quagmire” without resolving the consequences of its own presence. Germany reads it as a symptom of American weariness with long-term commitments. Israel, meanwhile, views it through the prism of Iran’s allies in Iraq and the possibility of a security vacuum. Trump himself is trying to present the troop withdrawal as proof of strength and as a correction of the mistakes of previous administrations, but placing this decision alongside the deployment of additional forces to the Middle East undermines the image of consistent isolationism. America is not leaving the region; it is changing the form of its presence—from a long-term mission to more abrupt, less predictable, and more politically theatrical interventions.

This produces a common Australian-German-Israeli conclusion, although each country reaches it for its own reasons. In Canberra, there is fear of losing sovereign choice within an alliance that has become too close. In Berlin, there is concern that American improvisation is weakening the order on which Europe’s security rests. In Israel, there is concern that America’s search for a quick political result will not align with the need for the long-term containment of Iran. The United States remains an indispensable player for all three countries, but it no longer appears to be a predictable leader. This duality—the necessity of America and growing distrust of the way it applies its power—is today the main international response to Washington.

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America as a Source of Conditions: Why South Africa, India and Germany Are Increasingly Talking Not...

By October 3, 2026, discussion of the United States in South Africa, India and Germany has been united not by a single event, but by a single sentiment: Washington is increasingly seen as a partner that offers negotiations and applies pressure at the same time, changing the rules depending on the deal at hand. In India, this is particularly evident against the backdrop of a US law allowing tariffs of up to 100% on major buyers of Russian energy; in South Africa, because of visa restrictions, tariffs and a political dispute over land reform; and in Germany, following Donald Trump’s conspicuous intervention in the issue of the AfD’s success and growing concern that the fate of the European economy once again depends on US-China bargaining. It is not anti-Americanism as such, but distrust of America’s unpredictability that has become the common thread running through these reactions. (mg.co.za)

The main theme shared by all three countries is the transformation of trade and access to the US market into instruments of foreign-policy coercion. In India’s debate, the new sanctions law is read not simply as punishment for Russia, but as an attempt to force New Delhi to choose between energy security and exports to the United States. The Indian Express analysis highlights a paradox: the US-China truce has been extended, but India remains under threat of tariffs because of its purchases of Russian oil. This is particularly painful for New Delhi amid a tight global energy market: quickly replacing large volumes of inexpensive crude would mean higher domestic costs and greater economic vulnerability. India’s view is therefore noticeably more pragmatic than the rhetoric of a “values-based partnership”: an alliance with the United States is needed to balance China, but it must not mean giving up the right to choose energy suppliers independently. (indianexpress.com)

South Africa’s reaction is sharper still, because its dispute with the United States concerns not only tariffs but also the country’s painful domestic history. Pretoria sees US pressure as an attempt to link trade and visa measures to abandoning policies of economic redress after apartheid, land reform and South Africa’s position in the genocide case concerning Gaza at the International Court of Justice. In an interview with Mail & Guardian, International Relations Minister Ronald Lamola described what is happening as effectively a “diplomatic war” built on “fabrications and outright lies.” This is not merely a diplomatic outburst: in the South African interpretation, the US program to accept white Afrikaners as refugees turns the country’s old racial trauma into an instrument of external pressure. (mg.co.za)

This gives rise to a distinctly South African argument that is almost absent from American debates: the issue is not whether ANC reforms are useful, but whether a foreign power can determine how the country should remedy the consequences of colonialism and apartheid. The Thabo Mbeki Foundation warns that abandoning redress policies—that is, measures aimed at overcoming historically created racial and economic inequality—could deepen rather than ease social divisions. Thus, in the South African perception, American criticism of land reform becomes not a defense of property rights but interference in an unfinished national compromise. (mg.co.za)

In Germany, the American factor is discussed differently, but the logic is the same: concern is driven by the mixing of foreign policy, commerce and ideological pressure. After the AfD’s victory in elections in Saxony-Anhalt, Trump publicly congratulated the party and accompanied his message with the slogan “MGGA”—“Make Germany Great Again.” Chancellor Friedrich Merz replied that interference in German affairs was unacceptable. As ZDF notes, for Berlin this was not simply an eccentric message from the US president, but an unpleasant signal: the White House is prepared to publicly encourage forces that challenge Germany’s postwar political consensus. (zdfheute.de)

But German anxiety is not limited to domestic politics. The Trump–Xi Jinping summit in Washington became a symbol in Germany of a world in which key decisions are made by two superpowers while Europeans pay the price for the consequences. In a Handelsblatt commentary, the meeting is interpreted as posing a risk of a new escalation in trade confrontation, while economists and industrialists fear not so much an immediate rupture as chronic uncertainty: German exports and production chains are deeply connected to both the US and Chinese markets. The state agency Germany Trade & Invest had previously stated explicitly that US-China relations mean no relief for logistics and supply chains for German businesses, even when the leaders display conciliatory symbolism. (gtai.de)

India’s assessment of the same summit is particularly revealing. New Delhi saw plenty of ceremony—the meeting with Xi at the foot of the aircraft stairs, the state banquet and talk of “friendship”—but few guarantees for countries located near the arena of rivalry. Extending the US-China trade truce until January 2027 gives the two giants time to maneuver, but does not eliminate the risks surrounding Taiwan, technology, rare-earth metals and sanctions policy. Indian authors draw attention to the asymmetry: China negotiates with Washington as a rival of comparable scale, while India is simultaneously needed by the United States as a strategic counterweight to the PRC and subjected to American tariff pressure. (indianexpress.com)

This is where the three local perspectives converge. South Africa wants external partnerships not to turn into control over its domestic order; India wants strategic cooperation not to require surrendering its energy sovereignty; and Germany wants the transatlantic alliance not to become a channel for pressure on its democratic politics and industrial model. Their responses differ: Pretoria speaks the language of anticolonial autonomy, New Delhi that of multi-aligned pragmatism, and Berlin that of European self-reliance. But the conclusion is the same: America remains too important to distance oneself from, and too unpredictable to rely on without a safety net.

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America as a Source of Uncertainty: What Russia, Ukraine and France Think About the New...

At the turn of September and October 2026, the United States is being discussed outside its own borders not so much as the familiar guarantor of the Western order, but as a power simultaneously waging war on Iran, bargaining over Ukraine’s future, and redefining the limits of what is acceptable within NATO. In Russian, Ukrainian and French commentary, the subjects differ in their immediate importance, but they share one perception: Washington’s decisions have become less predictable, and the cost of that unpredictability now falls on allies, opponents and global markets.

The broadest common theme is the American campaign against Iran and the blockade around the Strait of Hormuz. In France, it is described above all as a strategic impasse for the United States. In a Le Monde analysis, Trump’s policy is reduced to a formula of “neither war nor peace”: Washington has achieved neither regime change nor a clear agreement, but is shifting the conflict into the economic sphere—sanctions, pressure on trade and threats to energy markets. The French perspective is characteristic here: what matters is not only Iran, but also the erosion of rules. The Paris press sees American power unsupported by a diplomatic objective not as a solution to the problem, but as a mechanism for perpetuating it.

This is particularly evident in assessments of American public rhetoric. An editorial analysis by Le Monde of Trump’s first 100 days of statements records a constant shifting of goals—from destroying Iran’s nuclear program to hints of regime change and then back to negotiations. Columnist Gilles Paris speaks of “an element of improvisation” masking strategic dead ends. French concern, therefore, is not reducible to pacifism: it is the concern of an ally for whom American leadership is becoming synonymous with political risk. It is no coincidence that France is simultaneously joining the United States, Britain and Germany in pressuring Iran through the IAEA, while French commentators doubt that Washington’s military and sanctions policy can produce a lasting result.

In the Russian-speaking expert community, the same war generates an almost opposite, but no less skeptical, calculation. In Nikita Smagin’s commentary for Carnegie Politika, the US strike on Iran is interpreted as a demonstration of “might makes right,” which at the same time destroys the Kremlin’s hopes for a fundamentally different, more negotiable Trump world. In practical terms, however, Moscow benefits from prolonged uncertainty: high oil prices support the budget, Western attention is diverted from Ukraine, and an isolated Tehran becomes even more dependent on Russia. In a later assessment, Smagin explicitly calls the smoldering US-Iranian conflict the optimal scenario for the Kremlin: a full peace would lower oil prices and weaken Russian influence in Iran, while a major war would carry too many risks. This duality is one of the important Russian perspectives rarely visible in the American debate: Moscow benefits neither from an Iranian victory nor from a US defeat, but from a manageable crisis between them.

For Ukraine, the Iran issue matters in a different way. Kyiv does not view it as a separate Middle Eastern drama: it is another test of whether the United States can avoid dispersing its resources and political attention at a time when the war in Ukraine remains unresolved. That is why Ukrainian reactions to American foreign policy in recent weeks have focused not on Trump’s grand statements, but on concrete guarantees—air defense, weapons production and diplomatic pressure on Russia. Following talks between Zelensky and Trump in New York, Kyiv officially emphasized work on launching production of Patriot interceptor missiles in Ukraine, as stated in a statement from the Office of the President of Ukraine. The choice of emphasis is telling: the Ukrainian side measures the quality of its relationship with Washington not by declarations about peace, but by whether protection for its cities will be available before winter.

Ukrainian commentators assess the current “warming” of relations with cautious optimism. European Pravda writes that the meeting gave Kyiv a diplomatic advantage: Trump did not announce new restrictions on strikes against Russian infrastructure, and the tone of the American administration became less hostile. However, this has not turned into trust. Behind the outward improvement in relations lies an uncomfortable fact for Ukraine: the White House continues to view the war as a problem to be settled between leaders, while Kyiv demands a peace that rules out a repeat of Russia’s attack. The Ukrainian perspective is the most down-to-earth of the three: not “what world order is Trump building?” but “will his desire for a quick deal create a pause followed by another war?”

French commentators, by contrast, link the Ukrainian issue to a broader critique of Trump’s personal diplomacy. In Alain Frachon’s column, the paradox is formulated as follows: the US president treats traditional allies more harshly than authoritarian leaders whom he calls friends. For a French audience, this is not merely a psychological portrait of Trump. It explains why Europeans have to rely on their own strategic agency: Washington’s personal closeness with Moscow means neither peace in Ukraine nor greater security for Europe.

A third line, especially visible in Russia and France, concerns Greenland and the Arctic. The agreement signed by the United States, Denmark and Greenland on September 22 removed the immediate threat of an open conflict within NATO, but did not resolve the question of what price an ally may pay to pursue strategic control. In France, this is viewed as a troubling precedent. Le Monde notes that the agreement was concluded through a more traditional diplomatic process, but French authors warn that Greenland’s ability to choose industrial and financial partners now depends to a considerable extent on Washington’s consent. In other words, abandoning direct annexation does not mean abandoning asymmetric control.

Russia’s official reaction has been demonstrably more restrained. Dmitry Peskov said that interaction between Russia and the United States in the Arctic was not on the agenda, as reported by Vedomosti. Russian analytical texts, however, interpret the agreement as an expansion of American military and intelligence capabilities near Russia’s northern borders. Here Moscow faces an uncomfortable reality: publicly, it can portray the dispute over Greenland as evidence of a split in the West, but the practical result is a denser American presence in the Arctic and the closure of the island to military infrastructure belonging to countries outside NATO.

An unusual international picture is thus taking shape. France sees the United States as an ally undermining confidence in its own alliances; Ukraine sees it as an indispensable partner whose promises must be turned into Patriot missiles and genuine commitments; Russian observers see both tactical benefits and a long-term threat in America’s crises. The common conclusion is not that America is “withdrawing” from the world. On the contrary, it is too actively present in it—but increasingly through pressure, personal deals and abrupt shifts. That is why Paris speaks of the need for European autonomy, Kyiv demands verifiable guarantees, and Moscow prefers American conflicts to continue long enough to yield benefits, but not so long that they slip out of control.

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America’s Ultimatum to Europe and Israel’s Anxiety: How Germany, Russia and Israel Read the New...

Over the past two days, the image of the United States in German, Israeli and Russian discussions has taken shape around the same cluster of issues: the war and uncertainty surrounding Iran, the shipping crisis in the Strait of Hormuz, expensive diesel and Washington’s willingness to shift the costs of its policies onto its allies. In Germany, this is seen primarily as a test of economic resilience and the reliability of transatlantic commitments. In Israel, it is viewed as a dangerous moment in which Donald Trump’s desire for a “deal” may conflict with Israel’s demand for irreversible restrictions on Iran. In Russia, it is seen as evidence that American foreign policy is increasingly subordinated to domestic fuel prices and bargaining across a broad range of issues, from the Middle East to Ukraine.

The most resonant story is the US demand that Germany and France release emergency diesel reserves. According to German media reports, the Trump administration has made it clear that if Europe does not send more reserves to the market, Washington may restrict American diesel exports. A Deutschlandfunk report explicitly links this to the White House’s desire to sharply reduce fuel prices in the United States ahead of the November midterm elections. In German public discourse, this is already being described not as allied coordination, but as pressure: t-online used the word Erpressung—“blackmail”—in its headline.

The German reaction is especially painful because Berlin itself is experiencing fuel stress. According to Tagesschau, on October 1, a liter of diesel in Germany cost an average of €2.39, compared with €1.75 before the start of the war with Iran. For Germany, diesel is not merely a motor fuel: it is critical to logistics, industry and some heating systems. The government’s decision to subsidize gasoline and diesel again through a “tank discount” is therefore seen as a forced defensive measure rather than an energy strategy. Monika Schnitzer, an economist and member of the Council of Economic Experts advising the government, called the measure “an expression of political desperation” in an ARD analysis. (tagesschau.de)

Behind the dispute over reserves lies a deeper German anxiety: the United States, on which Europe depends as a supplier of fuel and military power, is now using that dependence as a negotiating tool. A geo-economic analysis by Süddeutsche Zeitung notes that Berlin, Paris, London and the European Commission are already coordinating their response, while Brussels is trying to persuade the United States to act jointly rather than through threats. This is an important shift: the German debate is not limited to whether the reserves should be released. It is about whether Europe has the right to preserve strategic reserves for an even worse crisis—or is obliged to spend them for the sake of the American president’s pre-election stability. (sueddeutsche.de)

In Israel, the same crisis looks entirely different. The main concern there is not diesel, but the political cost of a possible US-Iran agreement. Israeli analyst Eldad Shavit, a former military intelligence officer and senior researcher at INSS, stated the dilemma clearly in a column for ynet: Trump needs an agreement that would allow the war to end, while Israel needs an agreement that would prevent Iran from restoring its nuclear program, missile infrastructure and military capabilities. His conclusion—that ending the fighting by itself does not eliminate the threat—reflects significant distrust of diplomacy unless it is accompanied by verifiable restrictions and an enforcement mechanism.

This anxiety is intensifying amid new signs that the United States is preparing for a military scenario. Israeli media reported on October 1 that the aircraft carrier Theodore Roosevelt and an additional Marine unit were being sent to the region, while Trump was considering resuming large-scale operations against Iran as early as next month. At the same time, the US president himself called Iran’s conditions for reopening the Strait of Hormuz “not good enough” and, when asked about possible escalation after the elections, replied: “possibly.” (ynet.co.il)

However, there is also a paradox in Israel’s view of Washington. The United States remains Israel’s indispensable military backer, but its desire to avoid becoming bogged down in another major war creates the risk of a deal that Jerusalem would consider premature. Shavit stresses that, for the White House, military threats, economic pressure and negotiations are elements of a single strategy; for the Israeli establishment, this could mean that American pressure will be used not to eliminate the threat completely, but to reach a politically advantageous compromise. (ynet.co.il)

The Russian reaction focuses on another aspect of the same picture: energy is turning international conflict into a bargaining arena in which the United States is acting not as a selfless coalition leader, but as a country protecting its own market. In an analysis by Vedomosti, Alexey Belogoryev, director of research at the Institute for Energy and Finance, notes that the United States accounts for a significant share of global diesel exports, while restrictions on supplies would hit the already undersupplied European market first. The Russian view is therefore less sympathetic toward the Europeans: Moscow sees the diesel dispute as confirmation of its long-standing argument that American guarantees are unreliable and that the West’s sanctions and energy architecture can turn against the Europeans themselves. (vedomosti.ru)

At the same time, the Kremlin is trying to separate relations with the United States from a settlement in Ukraine. On October 1, Dmitry Peskov said that Moscow would prefer not to wait for the conflict in Ukraine to end before resuming economic cooperation with America: according to him, major joint projects would benefit “both Russia and America.” In an Interfax report, this position is presented as a practical response to Washington’s linking of business and politics. The Russian official line is notable here: it does not imply any imminent trust in Washington, but offers the United States the logic of a deal—cooperation wherever it produces benefits, even while fundamental disagreements over Ukraine remain. (interfax.ru)

It is precisely at this intersection that the difference between the three countries becomes especially clear. Germany is asking whether its alliance with the United States is becoming an economic vulnerability. Israel fears that, in order to exit the war, America may agree to an insufficiently strict compromise with Iran. Russia, by contrast, reads the same events as proof that Washington is prepared to bargain when domestic pressure becomes strong enough. But the overall conclusion is the same: US policy is currently perceived not as a unified, long-term strategy, but as a constant balancing act between war, fuel prices, elections and negotiations.

The most unexpected local conclusion comes from Germany. There, the diesel crisis is increasingly being viewed not as a temporary energy disruption, but as an argument for Europe’s ability to independently protect critical infrastructure, reserves and industry. The Israeli debate adds a warning: independence from the United States is impossible in the short term, but unconditional trust in the American political cycle is also dangerous. The Russian debate, meanwhile, sees an opening for pragmatic contacts with Washington—not because the conflict is disappearing, but because American foreign policy is becoming ever more tightly tied to the domestic political cost of every barrel and every gallon.

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America as a Source of Risk, Not Support: What India, Brazil and Japan Say About Washington

By early October 2026, discussion of the US in India, Brazil and Japan is united not by admiration for American power, but by concern over its unpredictable use. In local columns, expert debates and official statements, the US is increasingly described as a power that turns trade, sanctions and military alliances into instruments of situational pressure. The reasons for concern differ, however: for India, it is the risk of being punished for buying Russian oil and Washington’s attempt to dictate its energy choices; for Brazil, the fear that Donald Trump’s administration is interfering in its electoral contest; and for Japan, the concern that the White House may bargain with China over Taiwan without regard for its ally’s interests.

The sharpest common theme is the transformation of the economy into an extension of geopolitics. In India, the new US law imposing sanctions on Russia and Iran is viewed not as an abstract act of solidarity with Ukraine, but as a potential threat to national energy security. The law, signed by Trump on September 18, allows tariffs of up to 100% to be imposed on major buyers of Russian oil and gas. Indian commentators point out that, given the country’s heavy dependence on hydrocarbon imports, such a measure effectively demands that New Delhi abandon an independent assessment of its own interests. In an analysis by The Indian Express, political thinker Pratap Bhanu Mehta calls this logic “selective international morality”: Washington holds India and China responsible for the war in Ukraine while showing no comparable willingness to stop its own war with Iran. This is not simply anti-American rhetoric. In India’s view, the issue is the contradiction between America’s appeal to “values” and a practice in which allies are asked to pay for US strategic decisions.

India, however, is in no hurry to turn its irritation into a rupture. Narendra Modi’s telephone conversation with Trump on September 30, amid threats of new sanctions, focused on trade, defense, energy and critical technologies. As Business Standard notes, New Delhi is trying to preserve a multilayered partnership even as it becomes politically toxic. This is a key Indian characteristic: the US remains an indispensable market, technology partner and counterweight to China, but it is no longer seen as a country whose demands automatically merit compliance. Energy autonomy is becoming part of a broader principle of strategic autonomy.

In Brazil, US pressure is discussed even more directly—as an attempt to turn foreign policy into a factor in the domestic electoral struggle. In the pages of Folha de S.Paulo, Adam Goldsmith, a former US Treasury financial attaché for South America, lists a whole chain of steps taken by Washington: 50% tariffs on Brazilian exports, Section 301 measures, Magnitsky sanctions against Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes, visa restrictions and the cancellation of the visa of Brazilian Ambassador Maria Luiza Viotti. His paradoxical conclusion is that Brazil’s weak economic ties with the US protect it from serious damage: after exemptions and court rulings, the effective tariff blow, in his assessment, has fallen to 17% and has barely changed the macroeconomic picture. But the political damage from the campaign is far greater than the economic harm.

Brazil’s reaction is especially noteworthy because Trump is viewed not only as Lula’s foreign opponent, but also as a possible gift to his campaign. A Folha editorial caustically remarks that, through his attacks on the Brazilian population and companies, the Republican is becoming a “luxury campaigner” for Lula’s reelection. The familiar Latin American rally-round-the-flag effect is at work here: the more openly a foreign power tries to lecture Brazil, the easier it is for the government to portray the election as a matter of sovereignty. Reports that, during tariff negotiations, the US administration demanded that “political dissidents” be allowed to participate in the election only reinforced this perspective; a Folha investigation made American interference a subject not only of diplomatic, but also constitutional debate.

For the Japanese, the main problem is not that America is too distant, but that it may change the rules too quickly for its closest ally. Ahead of the US-China meeting on September 24, one question dominated the Japanese press and government sources: would Taiwan become a bargaining chip in a deal between Trump and Xi Jinping? In a Newsweek Japan report, government and party sources spoke openly of fears that, in exchange for Chinese purchases of American goods or other commercial concessions, the US president might soften his position on Taiwan. For Japan, this is not an abstract dispute over diplomatic wording: a possible conflict over Taiwan would affect its maritime communications, the country’s southwestern islands, military logistics and semiconductor supplies.

After the summit, the anxiety did not disappear; it merely changed form. According to nippon.com, the Japanese government viewed Trump’s unusual use of the word “ally” in reference to China with apprehension and urgently began analyzing the outcome of the talks. After a telephone conversation with Trump on September 26, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi publicly emphasized that Japan and the US are “the allies who trust each other most” and that they had confirmed their shared responsibility for peace and stability in the region, according to the Prime Minister’s Office transcript. Yet behind this emphatic language of trust lies a need for guarantees: Tokyo wants not merely to hear assurances of alliance loyalty, but to ensure that it will not be confronted with a fait accompli resulting from a US-China deal.

Japanese analysts see this as a structural problem of Trumpist diplomacy: alliance commitments exist, but constantly compete with the president’s desire to quickly secure a deal he can present to American voters. In an analysis by the Japan Research Institute, the meeting in Washington is described as “managing the confrontation”—an extension of the trade truce while preparing for long-term competition. For Tokyo, this is a cautiously encouraging but insufficient formula: a trade truce does not answer what will happen if Beijing once again makes Taiwan a central condition of its relations with the US.

India and Japan also converge in their assessment of the US war with Iran, although they express it in different terms. In New Delhi, the primary concern is the danger to oil prices and energy access; in Tokyo, it is the risk to maritime routes through the Strait of Hormuz, which is vital to Japanese imports. Japanese criticism, however, often goes deeper than economic calculations. An essay on nippon.com about the first six months of the war in Iran emphasizes that the Takaichi government is forced to refrain from openly criticizing the US because of the alliance’s central role, but that the erosion of the rule of law through American actions ultimately harms Japan’s own interests as well. This is a rare idea for an allied country: dependence on American protection does not change the fact that Washington’s unpredictability weakens the international environment on which Japanese security rests.

The Brazilian press expresses the same concern much more sharply. In a recent Folha editorial, Trump’s refusal to accept a new Iranian settlement plan is presented as a decision condemning the world to a protracted war that has already pushed oil prices above $100 a barrel. For Brazilian observers, the war in the Persian Gulf is yet another confirmation that today’s Washington prefers pressure and displays of force to a policy of negotiation. In the Indian interpretation, this confirms the double standard of sanctions policy; in the Japanese one, it demonstrates the vulnerability of an alliance when an ally can drag the region into the consequences of its own escalation; in the Brazilian view, it recalls the familiar Latin American story of a great power acting without sufficient constraints.

The most unexpected aspect of these three reactions is not their shared irritation with America, but the absence of any desire to build an anti-American bloc. India is still trying to reach agreements with the US and expand technological cooperation. Japan is emphasizing its alliance loyalty even more strongly, while demanding more predictable behavior. Even Brazil, where the tone is harshest, is discussing not an inevitable rupture but the cost of a missed opportunity to build mature and mutually beneficial relations. Yet America’s image has changed: instead of a guarantor of order, it is increasingly becoming a source of risk. In Delhi, Brasília and Tokyo alike, the question now being discussed is not how to move closer to Washington, but how to preserve room for maneuver when White House decisions can simultaneously affect oil, tariffs, elections and security in Asia.

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America as Negotiator, Investor and Source of Uncertainty: Russia, Ukraine and South Korea...

In the final days of September 2026, the United States became more than just a foreign-policy factor for Russia, Ukraine and South Korea—it became a source of one shared concern: how durable are Washington’s commitments if American policy is increasingly subordinated to short-term deals, fuel prices, investment and the domestic political calendar? Local discussions revolve around different issues—the attempt by Donald Trump to launch a limited “energy truce” in the Russian-Ukrainian war, his willingness to scale back exercises with Seoul in exchange for contact with Kim Jong Un, and demands that South Korea accelerate multibillion-dollar investments in the U.S. economy. Yet in all three countries, America is perceived above all as a power that translates security into the language of benefits, production capacity and electoral expediency.

The most acute issue is U.S. mediation over Ukraine. In the Russian interpretation, it looks like Washington’s return to shuttle diplomacy, but not like a rejection of Russia’s basic demands. Russian commentators and official sources emphasize that after the September visits by Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner to Moscow and Kyiv, the negotiating process once again became trilateral in form. Moscow, however, still links a settlement to territorial conditions, Ukraine’s neutral status and the absence of NATO forces on its territory. A RBC analysis stated this directly: America’s return to mediation does not cancel Russia’s previous negotiating position. (rbc.ru)

Particular attention in Russia focused on Trump’s public demand that Kyiv stop striking Russian oil-refining facilities, linking the issue to rising diesel prices. The Kremlin welcomed this framing: the Russian press described it as a rare instance in which the American president had effectively acknowledged the vulnerability of Russia’s fuel infrastructure while also making its protection part of his own domestic political interests. Reports of an alleged mutual agreement not to strike energy facilities were viewed in Russia less as a humanitarian initiative than as an attempt by Washington to stabilize the fuel market ahead of the U.S. midterm elections. (rbc.ru) In this logic, American mediation is useful to Moscow only as long as it limits Ukrainian strikes and does not demand political concessions from Russia.

In Ukraine, the same American activity is interpreted almost as a mirror image—as diplomacy in which Kyiv risks becoming the object of a deal. Ukrainska Pravda called the September 22 meeting between Zelenskyy and Trump “empty,” linking the White House’s interest in an energy truce primarily to American fuel prices rather than to Ukraine’s security needs. (pravda.com.ua) Kushner’s statement that an agreement would already exist if Ukraine agreed to surrender the territories demanded by Moscow was particularly painful in Kyiv. For Ukrainian audiences, this was not merely an unfortunate formulation by a negotiator, but evidence that in Washington peace may still be understood as an exchange of Ukrainian territory for a U.S. foreign-policy success. (pravda.com.ua)

The Ukrainian debate, however, is not limited to disappointment. It also reflects an attempt to adapt to Trump’s transactional style: Ukraine is being urged to become not a petitioner, but an American military-industrial partner. American political strategist Yuri Vanetik, in a column for Ukrainska Pravda, advises Kyiv to “read the law, not the handshakes”—to focus not on the warm tone of meetings, but on concrete decisions, including promised licenses to produce Patriot missiles and congressional pressure on the administration. (pravda.com.ua) This marks an important change in the Ukrainian view of the United States: Washington’s value is now measured not by promises of “support,” but by access to technology, contracts and joint production. Under this model, Ukraine may be useful to America as a holder of unique combat experience and drone technologies, but that usefulness does not yet amount to guaranteed protection. (pravda.com.ua)

South Korea’s response centers on the same problem of predictability, but in a more direct form: can an ally demand money, reduce joint exercises and seek a separate deal with North Korea at the same time? Trump’s decision in August to sharply scale back the Ulchi Freedom Shield exercises, explained by his “very good relationship” with Kim Jong Un, was perceived in Seoul as an unmistakable signal of his desire to resume direct U.S.-North Korean dialogue. Hankyoreh stressed that the instruction was issued immediately before the drills began, placing a political gesture above the alliance’s established military procedures. (hani.co.kr)

South Korean expert Andrei Lankov, in a column for Maeil Business Newspaper, warns that a possible Trump-Kim meeting could be driven by the U.S. president’s personal ambitions and his pre-election need for a striking foreign-policy result. His main fear is that Washington could offer Pyongyang too much—for example, easing pressure or further reducing exercises—without receiving genuine nuclear disarmament in return. (mk.co.kr) This perspective is especially revealing: for Seoul, the very fact of American dialogue with North Korea is not the problem. The problem is a negotiating style in which the interests of the main ally may become secondary to a spectacular bilateral deal.

At the same time, the South Korean press is increasingly linking military dependence on the United States to economic dependence. In September, it became known that Washington was seeking tougher terms for Seoul’s investments in the U.S. economy: Hankyoreh reported that the United States had revised one of the mechanisms protecting the return of funds under a $200 billion investment agreement. (hani.co.kr) As a result, Presidents Lee Jae Myung and Trump’s talks in New York on a nuclear submarine fleet, nuclear-fuel reprocessing, shipbuilding and the transfer of operational control were perceived in Korea not as a collection of unrelated topics, but as a single bargain: investment and industrial cooperation in exchange for greater strategic autonomy and more reliable guarantees. (mk.co.kr)

Unexpectedly, it is the South Korean debate that formulates most precisely the broader conclusion relevant to both Moscow and Kyiv. Professor Won Dong-wook, in an article for Pressian, proposes that Korea stop asking who will win the U.S.-China rivalry and instead determine what choices remain available to Korea itself in the new order of great powers. (pressian.com) The same applies to Russia’s war against Ukraine. Russia seeks to use America’s appetite for a quick deal to entrench its conditions; Ukraine is trying to turn its defense industry into an argument that cannot be ignored; and South Korea is looking for a way not to pay for the alliance through endless investments and unilateral concessions.

The principal international image of the United States today is not that of a declining superpower, but of a superpower that is increasingly open about putting a price on its involvement. For Russia, this creates an opportunity for negotiations in which American economic interests may limit pressure on Moscow. For Ukraine, it creates the risk of a peace measured by a map of territorial concessions, but also an opportunity to establish a foothold in the American defense industry. For South Korea, it is a reminder that even a longstanding military alliance does not eliminate the need to constantly prove its commercial and strategic value to Washington.

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Fairford Base Incident Heightens Tensions Over Iran

The foiled incident near the British RAF Fairford air base, which is also used by the U.S. Air Force, has become a new source of tension in Iran’s relations with Britain and the United States. As Ynet writes, the story is important for Israel not only as a British criminal investigation, but also as a possible signal that Tehran’s confrontation with the West is expanding beyond the Middle East.

British Prime Minister Andy Burnham said there were “strong indicators” of a possible Iranian role in what happened. However, he stressed that the investigation is ongoing and that no public evidence of a direct link between the detainees and Tehran has yet been presented. This caveat remains crucial: the allegations against Iran have not been established by a court or confirmed by published investigative materials.

According to the publication, three vans were stopped near the air base. No explosive devices were found inside—only gasoline. Five British citizens were subsequently released on bail, although the investigation is continuing. The possibilities being considered include intelligence activity, security testing as part of a possible “dry run,” or a political action without any immediate intention of attacking the facility.

Nevertheless, the choice of location gives the case international significance. Fairford is linked not only to British infrastructure but also to the U.S. military presence. Therefore, any possible preparations for action near the base could be perceived by Washington as a challenge directed at both Britain and the United States.

President Donald Trump said the United States was examining the matter “very seriously” and would respond soon. Ynet views his statements about Iran—“they have no money,” “the economy is dead,” and “they have no army”—as a sign that the administration may be ready to use the alleged incident to exert further pressure on Tehran.

The story is unfolding against the backdrop of already unsuccessful contacts between the United States and Iran. According to Axios, Secretary of State Marco Rubio demanded that the Iranian delegation leave New York after unsuccessful talks on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. In this context, the investigation in Britain could become an additional argument for supporters of a hard line against Iran.

Tehran rejects the allegations. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi sarcastically advised British authorities not to jump to conclusions, saying they were “barking up the wrong tree.” His reaction reflects the Iranian position: in Tehran’s view, London and Washington are trying to link Iran to an episode for which direct evidence has yet to be presented.

For Israel, the situation has a direct strategic dimension. Israeli authorities have traditionally viewed Iran as the main source of regional threats because of its nuclear program, missile arsenal, and support for allied armed groups. Therefore, a possible operation against a facility linked to U.S. forces—even if it was not carried out and remains under investigation—fits Israel’s perception of a broader pattern: Tehran is capable of acting through indirect, covert, and difficult-to-prove means far beyond the Middle East.

Thus, the episode near Fairford remains legally unclear but has already acquired political weight. It lies at the intersection of a British investigation, the U.S.-Iran diplomatic crisis, and Israeli concerns about further escalation. The main question now is whether the United States and Britain will consider the available information sufficient to publicly accuse Iran—and whether the incident will trigger a new round of pressure on Tehran.

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America as a Source of Risk, Not Support: What South Korea, India and...

In the final days of September 2026, the United States simultaneously became more than just a foreign-policy partner for South Korea, India and Brazil: it became a factor capable of changing oil prices, access to technology, export markets and even the domestic political climate with a single decision. Yet the local reaction in these three countries cannot be reduced to familiar anti-Americanism. The central concern is different: under Donald Trump, Washington is increasingly seen as a power that translates matters of security, trade, migration and diplomacy into the language of unilateral pressure—and forces its partners to seek ways of preserving room for maneuver.

The sharpest common issue is the transformation of US tariffs and sanctions into tools of coercion. In India, this is being discussed almost as a test of national sovereignty. In an editorial published on September 17, the Indian newspaper Hindustan called possible 100 percent tariffs on countries purchasing Russian energy unfair and warned that Washington could use the tariff threat to force New Delhi not only to abandon Russian oil but also to accept an unfavorable trade deal. (livehindustan.com) For Indian commentators, this is not an abstract dispute about Russia. Russian oil is viewed primarily as a tool for containing domestic fuel prices—and therefore inflation and social discontent.

In an editorial by Deshdoot, this point is made even more forcefully: American pressure is simultaneously affecting energy security, consumer prices and the talent pool of the technology sector. (deshdoot.com) India was particularly alarmed by the extension of restrictions on H-1B visas: a $100,000 fee for some new applicants effectively makes hiring Indian specialists in the United States far more expensive. For a country where employment in the US technology industry remains an important part of the career path of the educated urban middle class, this is seen as a blow not only to IT companies but also to the idea of mutually beneficial globalization. Notably, Indian frustration has not turned into calls to break relations with America. On the contrary, after Narendra Modi and Trump spoke by phone on September 30, New Delhi reaffirmed its commitment to the strategic partnership while discussing trade, defense, energy and critical technologies. (indianexpress.com) India’s formula at present is as follows: cooperation with the United States is necessary, but the partnership must not become a system of unilateral concessions.

Indian analyst Pramit Pal Chaudhuri, head of the South Asia practice at the Eurasia Group, put it particularly precisely in an interview with StratNews Global: in his view, Trump has “no vision of India”—the US president sees it primarily through tariffs, market access and the trade balance, rather than as a central element of an Asian strategy against China. (stratnewsglobal.com) This is an important local observation. In India’s debate, the previous confidence that India’s geopolitical value would automatically shield it from American protectionism is fading.

In Brazil, the same logic of pressure is perceived not only as an economic issue but also as a political one. In recent months, relations with the United States have been burdened by 50 percent tariffs on Brazilian exports, additional measures under Section 301, visa restrictions and sanctions affecting representatives of Brazilian institutions. Adam Goldsmith, a former US Treasury financial attaché for South America, acknowledges the aggressive nature of the current American course in a column for Folha de S.Paulo, but draws an unexpected conclusion: the relatively limited role of the United States in Brazil’s foreign trade is currently partially protecting the country from the shock. (www1.folha.uol.com.br)

This is not optimism but a sober assessment: weak interdependence reduces vulnerability to Washington, but at the same time means missed opportunities for investment, technology and growth. Brazil’s response therefore has two layers. The center-left and nationally oriented camp speaks of the return of the “Monroe Doctrine” and an attempt by the United States to treat Latin America as a zone of political control. More pragmatic commentators acknowledge that conflict with the world’s largest economy is not, in itself, a victory: Brazil would benefit not from isolation from the United States, but from restoring ties on a more equal footing.

A particular source of concern in Brazil is the risk of American influence on elections. Here, the issue of tariffs is almost inseparable from the question of national autonomy. On September 18, the editorial board of Folha compared Trump’s rhetoric to the behavior of a “banana republic caudillo,” pointing to his promise to pay Americans $5,000 if Republicans win the midterm elections. (www1.folha.uol.com.br) For Brazilian audiences, this criticism is not merely a comment on American domestic politics: it also reflects concern that the White House’s unpredictable, personalist style could easily spill over into foreign policy—through sanctions, visas, public signals of support for individual political forces and pressure on institutions.

South Korea views America differently: not through a dispute over trade sovereignty, but through the fear of becoming hostage to deals between superpowers. In Seoul, the main event of recent weeks was the Trump–Xi Jinping meeting in Washington on September 24. Korean markets saw it not as a distant diplomatic ceremony, but as an event capable of directly changing the position of Korean manufacturers of memory chips, HBM chips, automobiles, batteries and energy equipment. As Hana Securities analyst Kim Doo-on noted, according to a report by the Maeil Business Newspaper, US–China talks could probably extend the trade truce and improve supplies of rare-earth metals, but US export controls on advanced semiconductors to China are likely to remain a separate security barrier. (stock.mk.co.kr)

This is what makes South Korea’s anxiety distinctive. Easing the US–China confrontation benefits Korean supply chains and the market, but opening the US market too widely to Chinese cars and batteries could reduce Seoul’s competitive advantage. South Korea wants neither a new technological Cold War nor a Washington–Beijing deal in which the interests of third countries are sacrificed for short-term stability. American policy is perceived here not as an unchanging security guarantee, but as a variable that must be monitored almost in real time, like a stock-market terminal.

This anxiety is even more pronounced on the Korean Peninsula. On September 1, South Korea’s National Intelligence Service told parliament that a US–North Korea summit could take place “at any time,” although no confirmed direct contacts have yet taken place. At the same time, Seoul noted signs that Washington was prepared to discuss relations with Pyongyang without making denuclearization the top priority, while reducing the scale of joint exercises. (mk.co.kr) To American audiences, this may look like Trump’s diplomatic flexibility; to Koreans, it looks like the risk that momentous decisions about the nuclear threat and the security of the peninsula will once again be made according to the logic of a personal deal between leaders.

Finally, the US war with Iran and the struggle to secure shipping in the Strait of Hormuz connect all three countries, although each is responding in its own way. For India, this is a question of oil and the cost of living; for South Korea, it is a question of maritime logistics and alliance commitments; for Brazil, it is further evidence that American power is increasingly being used without sufficient grounding in multilateral rules. After Trump criticized South Korea for providing insufficient assistance on the Iran issue, Seoul said it continued to discuss with the United States and the international community measures to ensure freedom of navigation and normalize maritime transport. (mk.co.kr) This cautious wording is characteristic: the ally does not want a public break with Washington, but neither does it seek to become automatically drawn into someone else’s war.

The overall conclusion emerging from the Korean, Indian and Brazilian reactions is strikingly similar. No one considers the United States an insignificant power, and no one is ready to easily give up access to the American market, technology or security. But America’s image as a predictable architect of order is clearly weakening. India is demanding strategic autonomy, Brazil respect for sovereignty and noninterference, and South Korea guarantees that deals with China or North Korea will not be made over the ally’s head. Washington remains a necessary partner—but is increasingly seen as a partner that cannot be trusted unconditionally.

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America as Ally, Arbitrator and Source of Risk: What Saudi Arabia, Japan and Brazil Discuss About the...

By the end of September 2026, the United States had simultaneously assumed three very different but closely connected roles: security guarantor in the Middle East, negotiator with China on issues vital to Japan, and a state prepared to turn trade and financial pressure into a tool of political influence over Brazil. In Riyadh, Tokyo and Brasília, people are discussing more than Donald Trump’s latest statements. The deeper question is this: how reliable is American support if Washington increasingly acts according to the logic of immediate gain and bilateral deals?

The sharpest test of this issue is taking place in Saudi Arabia. Intensifying Houthi attacks and threats to shipping near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait have turned American promises into a matter of practical survival rather than diplomatic rhetoric. Saudi researcher Abdelaziz Sager, founder of the Gulf Research Center, articulated the local expectation in highly concrete terms: for Riyadh, the value of Washington’s promises is measured in arms deliveries, operational expertise and intelligence. In an analysis by Arab News, he stressed that these three components must turn the alliance into genuine deterrence. This is a characteristic Saudi response: less talk of “eternal friendship,” and more demands regarding the speed, scale and practical applicability of American assistance.

The kingdom’s official line, meanwhile, remains emphatically positive. The Saudi Embassy in Washington called the F-35 agreement evidence of the “depth of the strategic partnership” and linked defense cooperation to regional stability, according to the newspaper Okaz. But there is visible tension between the official optimism and the analytical tone. The Saudi debate starts from the premise that the alliance with the United States remains indispensable, but must not be the only safety net. That is why regional formats and ties with Turkey and Pakistan are being strengthened in parallel, while Saudi Arabia itself seeks to act not as a dependent client but as an organizer of the regional balance. In an Arab News column, this new logic is stated directly: America wants to see partners in the region, not dependents. For Riyadh, this is not a rejection of the United States, but an attempt to reduce the cost of American unpredictability.

In Japan, American unpredictability is perceived differently—not through Houthi missiles, but through fears that momentous decisions on China and Taiwan could be made without fully taking Japanese interests into account. After Trump and Xi Jinping met in Washington on September 24, Japanese observers watched warily to see whether Taiwan might become a bargaining chip in a more advantageous US-China deal on trade, technology or resources. The Japanese government publicly indicated that Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi had conveyed Tokyo’s position to the American side, without disclosing details. On September 26, Takaichi received a direct explanation from Trump of the outcome of his talks with Xi and confirmed the need for coordination on defense and economic security, nippon.com reported.

Yet the very need to seek clarification is more important than the diplomatic formulas. It shows that Tokyo no longer considers the automatic nature of American guarantees sufficient protection. Particular irritation was caused by an episode in which Trump described the United States and China as allies during World War II: Japanese officials urgently began analyzing the political meaning of the phrase, concerned that the White House might want to demonstrate to Beijing its readiness for broader détente. Japanese reports noted unease over the possibility of concessions to China on Taiwan amid Trump’s declining approval ratings and his desire to achieve a quick foreign-policy result before the US elections. The Japanese perspective is especially revealing in this respect: the alliance with the United States remains the foundation of security, but the ally now has to be constantly informed, pressed and restrained from making compromises that are too convenient for it.

Tokyo’s reaction is not limited to Asia. Value-based criticism of American policy is also growing in the Japanese press. An editorial in Asahi Weekly, following Takaichi’s address to the UN, asked whether Japan could genuinely defend international law if Trump is simultaneously increasing pressure on the International Criminal Court and calling on countries to leave it. For Japan, this is not an abstract dispute over international institutions. Tokyo sees law and rules as protection for middle powers against the dictates of larger ones: if the United States itself begins treating rules as bargaining chips, Japanese diplomacy must choose between loyalty to the alliance and loyalty to its own publicly declared model of international order.

The economic dimension of American influence is particularly visible in Japanese debates over the yen’s exchange rate. According to local assessments, Washington is increasingly linking the currency issue to Japan’s fiscal and monetary policies. Takahide Kiuchi, an economist at the Nomura Research Institute, warned in an analysis dated September 28 that after currency coordination, the United States could intensify its influence over Japan’s economic policy; in his view, the market is already pricing in the possibility of larger-scale joint action to support the yen. Here, Japanese concerns echo those of Saudi Arabia: Washington’s support is useful, but it comes with Washington’s right to interfere in a partner’s priorities. In Saudi Arabia, the issue is the structure of defense; in Japan, it is the cost of money, government spending and the national currency’s exchange rate.

In Brazil, this same American approach operates not as the uncomfortable supervision of an ally, but as overt foreign pressure. In the final days of September, Brazilian debate focused on the combination of tariffs, visa restrictions, sanctions policy and American assessments of the country’s domestic politics. In a column for Folha de S.Paulo, former US Treasury financial attaché for South America Adam Goldsmith called the Trump administration’s foreign policy toward Brazil “clumsy and aggressive.” He listed 50 percent tariffs, Section 301 surcharges, sanctions under the “Magnitsky Act,” visa restrictions and the revocation of the visa of Brazil’s ambassador in Washington, Maria Luiza Viotti.

But Goldsmith’s conclusion is the most interesting: the weakness of bilateral ties protects Brazil in the short term. He estimates the actual damage from the current 17 percent tariff at roughly 0.1 percentage point of GDP and remarks with biting irony that the main result of many of the measures has been that some Brazilian officials can no longer go to Disneyland. This does not mean Brazilians consider the pressure harmless. Rather, a dual view has taken shape in Brazil: America can be an irritating and dangerous political factor, but it is not yet so deeply embedded in Brazil’s economy and security that it can unilaterally dictate the country’s direction of development.

This is where the key difference between the three countries becomes apparent. Saudi Arabia wants more reliable American engagement because the cost of its absence is measured in the security of its territory and maritime communications. Japan wants greater predictability and transparency because it fears being presented with faits accomplis in US negotiations with China. Brazil, by contrast, is seeking room for distance because it sees American activity as interference in sovereign political processes. But the underlying motive is the same: in all three societies, the United States is no longer viewed as a neutral provider of protection, markets or rules. America is perceived as a power that offers resources—arms, intelligence, market access, currency coordination and diplomatic backing—while simultaneously demanding a political price.

The unexpected conclusion from these national reactions is that American power has not disappeared at all; on the contrary, it is too tangible. That is precisely why Riyadh is building additional defense frameworks, Tokyo is demanding explanations after US talks with China, and Brasília is trying to prove to itself that it can withstand American displeasure. In September 2026, the dispute is not about whether the world needs Washington. It is about whether it is possible to plan for the future when Washington is simultaneously an ally, a negotiator and a source of pressure.

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America as an Unreliable Guarantor: Why Israel, Ukraine and Saudi Arabia Are Increasingly...

By September 29, 2026, the main issue in American politics discussed in Israel, Ukraine and Saudi Arabia was no longer simply U.S. power, but the practical reliability of its commitments. Each of the three countries is focused on different developments: Washington’s negotiations with Iran, the U.S. attempt to mediate Russia’s war against Ukraine, and the Saudi-American nuclear agreement. Yet they all come down to one question: is America prepared to defend its partners when the cost of doing so becomes high, or is it primarily seeking a diplomatic deal that can be quickly sold?

This concern is especially clear in reactions to the U.S.-Iranian crisis. The Israeli perspective is that negotiations with Tehran can be useful only as a means of applying pressure, but become dangerous if they turn into an end in themselves. In a commentary for N12, Sima Shine, former head of the Iran Program at Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies, describes the renewed indirect contacts between the United States and Iran as evidence not of rapprochement, but of the “depth of mistrust” between the sides. Her conclusion is characteristic of the current Israeli debate: the stronger Washington’s sanctions pressure and threats, the more likely Tehran is to seek not compromise, but a sharp military escalation to improve its negotiating position. (mako.co.il)

For Israeli observers, this is not an academic dilemma. The issue is the risk of attacks on regional energy and water infrastructure, the possible expansion of the conflict through Iran’s allies, and Tehran’s nuclear trajectory. Shine explicitly points out that Iranian threats affect infrastructure across the region, while diplomatic deadlock is pushing the regime toward a choice between an agreement on American terms and an attempt to change the situation by force. In other words, Israel views the United States not as a neutral mediator, but as the only external power whose decisions immediately alter Israel’s own risk calculations. (mako.co.il)

The Saudi response to the same crisis is structured differently. Riyadh is far less interested in the logic of a “decisive strike” and more concerned with not becoming the arena in which the United States and Iran wage war by proxy. Saudi columnist Sobhi Shabbana, writing in Al Jazirah, formulates this position almost as a doctrine: a state’s strength is measured not by the number of weapons it possesses, but by its ability to prevent war from spreading. He stresses that, for the kingdom, the security of the Persian Gulf, freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and energy stability are not foreign-policy abstractions, but elements of national security. (al-jazirah.com)

This represents an important divergence from the Israeli approach. Israel’s public debate demands that Washington not ease pressure until the threat has been eliminated; Saudi Arabia’s demands that Washington not turn pressure into an endless conflict for which the Gulf states will pay. Yet both positions stem from the same distrust of the durability of American strategy. Regional analyst Michael Young, in an Arabic-language Carnegie column, explains why this skepticism is so strong in Saudi Arabia: after the attacks on Aramco facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais in September 2019, Riyadh concluded that, at a critical moment, it would have to rely primarily on itself. (carnegieendowment.org)

This brings us to the second major issue—the U.S.-Saudi cooperation on peaceful nuclear energy. Saudi media present it not as a concession to Washington, but as evidence of the kingdom’s new negotiating independence. In an Al Watan article, the advancement of nuclear cooperation with the United States without an immediate link to normalization with Israel is described as a diplomatic success: according to the paper, Riyadh managed to separate its strategic and technological partnership from political demands while preserving its condition that there be a genuine path toward a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders. (alwatan.com.sa)

This is particularly sensitive for Israel. In the Israeli press, discussion of the agreement is not limited to the issue of civilian energy; it is assessed in terms of the risk of future uranium enrichment and a possible shift in the regional military balance. Even when Israeli commentators acknowledge the value of a close U.S.-Saudi alliance, they see it as a potential price Washington may pay for influence in Riyadh. In other words, for Saudi Arabia the American deal symbolizes sovereignty and the diversification of partnerships; for Israel, it is a test of whether America is prepared to relax previous restrictions in exchange for a short-term geopolitical gain. (alwatan.com.sa)

Ukraine views the same American problem through a completely different, but even more painful, lens: is an agreement possible that will stop the war without making a new war inevitable? Following Donald Trump’s and Volodymyr Zelensky’s September contacts, the Ukrainian debate has become notably skeptical of declarations about a swift peace. Ukrainska Pravda called the meeting in New York “empty” and described irritation within the Ukrainian president’s circle over the lack of concrete American security proposals. One source told the publication in particularly stark terms that, in his view, the Americans were offering neither a strategy for victory nor even a “decent defeat,” but concessions to Russia in exchange for promises of subsequent financial support. (pravda.com.ua)

At the same time, Kyiv is not rejecting U.S. mediation. The Ukrainian position is considerably more nuanced: diplomacy is acceptable if it reduces immediate threats to the population and does not impose one-sided restrictions on the victim of aggression. Responding to American calls for de-escalation, Zelensky said that Ukraine was ready to discuss halting attacks, but only on the condition that Russia stop attacking Ukrainian energy facilities, critical infrastructure and food exports. “Solutions are possible,” he stressed, but de-escalation must be mutual. Ukrainska Pravda reports this. (pravda.com.ua)

Here, an unexpected common thread emerges linking Kyiv with Riyadh. Ukraine and Saudi Arabia are not demanding the same policy from the United States, but both countries refuse to become objects of a deal between larger powers. Saudi Arabia does not want to pay for the U.S.-Iranian confrontation with its security; Ukraine does not want to pay for America’s need to demonstrate diplomatic success with territory and vulnerable energy infrastructure. In both cases, the local response increasingly resembles not the traditional expectation of American leadership, but an attempt to negotiate clear, verifiable conditions.

Israel occupies a special place in this trio. There is still stronger faith there in the necessity of American power, but fears are also growing that Washington may use that power inconsistently—sharply raising the stakes against Iran and then seeking a compromise that leaves regional allies to deal with the consequences. Ukrainians fear peace without guarantees; the Saudis fear war without limits; Israelis fear negotiations that give their adversary time to recover. Different formulations express the same reality: American policy is perceived not as a stable architecture, but as a series of transactions, each capable of quickly changing the regional balance.

That is why the international response to the United States today cannot be reduced to anti-Americanism or the familiar debate over Trump. In Israel, Ukraine and Saudi Arabia, Washington is still considered an indispensable player. But its indispensability no longer means unconditional trust. The louder the United States speaks about negotiations, deterrence and major deals, the more insistently its partners demand an answer to one practical question: who will ensure their security, and by what means, on the day American diplomacy declares success and moves on to the next crisis?

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America as a Source of Risk: Why South Africa, Brazil and Ukraine Trust It Less...

At the end of September 2026, the United States is being discussed in South Africa, Brazil and Ukraine not as a single “superpower ally” or “superpower adversary,” but as a force capable of imposing tariffs, demanding political loyalty, entering negotiations and then immediately revising their terms. In South Africa, the immediate irritant has been U.S. visa restrictions linked to land-reform policies and Black Economic Empowerment programs; in Brazil, it is the tariff war, pressure over critical minerals and, especially, the disturbing Venezuelan precedent; in Ukraine, it is the sudden “thaw” between Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelenskyy, viewed more as a window of opportunity than as a security guarantee. The common thread in local discussions is simple: Washington is increasingly acting transactionally, and its partners must learn to benefit from American attention without mistaking it for a lasting commitment.

The sharpest issue is the transformation of other countries’ domestic policies into an instrument of American coercion. In South Africa, this is felt particularly acutely because the dispute touches on the unfinished legacy of apartheid. After the United States introduced visa measures against individuals whom Washington associates with “racial discrimination,” uncompensated land expropriation and incitement to violence, International Relations Minister Ronald Lamola said that overcoming the country’s historic racial divide was a constitutional obligation. In the local press, the conflict is being interpreted not as a dispute over the technical details of legislation, but as an attempt by an outside power to determine which social-justice tools are permissible in South African democracy. President Cyril Ramaphosa put the response especially precisely: Pretoria is ready to continue the dialogue, but will do so “with dignity” and “sovereignty,” without bowing its head. (iol.co.za)

South African commentators see an irony here: an administration building its own policy around “America First,” tariffs and protectionist redistribution in favor of U.S. producers is accusing Pretoria of pursuing an unacceptable policy of preferential treatment. In an IOL column, Shabodien Rumanay directly compares MAGA to “BEE in reverse”: in both cases, the state deliberately adjusts economic outcomes, yet Washington considers such intervention legitimate for America and suspect when practiced by a country trying to correct structural inequality after apartheid. This does not mean that local authors idealize BEE: they acknowledge its bureaucratization, corruption risks and the limited effectiveness of some mechanisms. But they draw a fundamental distinction between internal criticism of the reform and a foreign state’s right to dictate its abolition. (iol.co.za)

At the same time, a more cool-headed, economic perspective is evident in South Africa. Donald MacKay, founder of XA Global Trade Advisors, argues in an IOL analysis that political noise should not be confused with trade realities: the United States is unlikely to stop purchasing South African gold and platinum, which together account for more than half of the country’s exports to the U.S. His point is important: Washington can use visas, diplomatic pressure and symbolic punishments, but the dependence of American industry on strategic raw materials places limits on escalation. For Pretoria, this is an argument for restraint—not to take the bait, not to turn the dispute into an emotional duel, but also not to change its domestic course to avert every new threat. (iol.co.za)

In Brazil, the same American unpredictability is perceived through the language of economics and regional sovereignty. Brazilian commentators spend less time debating who is right in America’s culture wars and more time considering how tariffs and the ideologization of trade are turning Latin America’s largest economy into an object of pressure. A Folha de S.Paulo report conveys concerns within Lula’s circle that, if the current tariffs become entrenched, they could outlast even a change of administration in Washington—as has already happened with barriers on steel and aluminum. Brazil therefore continues negotiations with the United States, but its previous confidence that a trade conflict could be resolved through ordinary political bargaining has noticeably weakened. (www1.folha.uol.com.br)

Venezuela has an even stronger influence on Brazil’s reaction. For local audiences, U.S. control over part of Venezuela’s oil resources following military intervention looks not like a fight against authoritarianism, but like a return to an old model of resource politics in the Western Hemisphere. Folha describes this policy as combining three elements: oil, the fight against drug trafficking and political influence over the region. In a commentary by Martin Wolf republished by the newspaper, the new Venezuelan agreement is called an almost textbook manifestation of 19th-century colonialism: Venezuelans could have hoped for liberation from dictatorship, but instead risk acquiring a new external master over their oil wealth. (www1.folha.uol.com.br)

In Brazil, this regional concern merges with broader doubts about the durability of the American financial and political model. An editorial in Folha de S.Paulo on Trump’s proposal to pay Americans $5,000 from tariff revenue portrays the U.S. president as a “banana-republic caudillo”—not as an insult directed at the periphery, but as an indication that the very center of the world system is now displaying signs of fiscal populism and personalist rule. From the Brazilian perspective, this has practical significance: if the White House is willing to subordinate tariffs to the electoral cycle and foreign policy to quick domestic political victories, then any deal with it requires safeguards, market diversification and an end to one-sided dependence. (www1.folha.uol.com.br)

The Ukrainian debate is structured differently: for Kyiv, Washington’s inconsistency is not an abstract risk to trade, but a factor in war and survival. Nevertheless, the reaction to the September meeting between Zelenskyy and Trump in New York was cautiously positive. In an analysis by European Pravda, Serhii Sydorenko draws attention to an important shift: after the talks, Trump did not publicly object to Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil-refining facilities. This matters to Ukrainian audiences not because it means complete freedom of action, but because a previous public signal has disappeared—that Kyiv should limit its own defense efforts for the sake of American fuel prices. (eurointegration.com.ua)

But there is no euphoria in Kyiv. Ukrainska Pravda describes the meeting as “empty” and warns that talk of ending the war quickly could conceal preparations for a limited energy truce during the winter. Temporarily reducing strikes on energy infrastructure is logical from a humanitarian perspective, but Ukrainian analysts fear it would allow Moscow to regroup without resolving the central issue: ending the aggression and restoring Ukraine’s security. Even the positive change in Trump’s tone is interpreted as a consequence of circumstances—pressure from the war, U.S. domestic political calculations, fuel prices and the White House’s need to demonstrate a diplomatic result—rather than as a definitive change in American strategy. (pravda.com.ua)

This is where the most unexpected similarity among the three countries emerges. South Africa does not want Washington to determine the limits of its post-apartheid reforms; Brazil does not want to find itself in a Latin America where access to resources becomes the price of American favor; Ukraine does not want its defense to become a bargaining chip in American electoral or pricing politics. Yet none of the three countries is choosing to break with the United States. Pretoria is safeguarding exports and channels of dialogue, Brasília is continuing tariff negotiations, and Kyiv is using every improvement in contact with the White House to strengthen its position. This is not anti-Americanism, but a new diplomatic realism: America remains too important to ignore and too changeable to make its words the foundation of an entire national strategy.

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America Bargains with the World: How Israel, Turkey and South Korea Read Trump’s New Diplomacy

In recent days, the United States has simultaneously found itself at the center of three crises: Washington rejected Iran’s plan to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, Donald Trump held a high-profile but largely substantive-free meeting with Xi Jinping, and Seoul once again began discussing the price of American security guarantees—from investment in U.S. industry to the prospect of nuclear-powered submarines. In Israel, Turkey and South Korea, these events are not viewed as isolated news stories. The local debate boils down to one question: does America remain an ally with predictable commitments—or is it becoming a superpower that offers protection, markets and negotiations only as elements of an ever-changing deal?

The most acute issue is Iran and Hormuz. On September 26, Trump publicly rejected the “seven-day plan” conveyed by Tehran: Iran proposed reopening the strait and returning to negotiations if the United States eased its naval blockade and sanctions on oil exports and unfroze Iranian assets. In Israel’s N12, the decision is read primarily through the lens of a possible military resolution: according to reports from Washington, the U.S. president is considering resuming strikes after the November midterm elections. Israel’s concern is not that Trump is too uncompromising toward Iran, but that his intransigence may prove to be a negotiating posture followed by an incomplete agreement.

This logic is expressed particularly clearly in an analysis by Sima Shine, a former senior member of Israel’s intelligence community, for the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). She warns that Israel is now more dependent than ever on the United States in its confrontation with Iran, while having less influence over the shaping of American policy. For Israel’s expert community, this is a painful reversal of roles: Jerusalem was accustomed not only to receiving American support, but also to being a partner capable of setting red lines. The main fear now is that Washington could declare victory over an agreement that gives Tehran a respite, resources and the opportunity to rebuild its nuclear and missile infrastructure. Israel is therefore calling not for general promises, but for a verifiable timetable to reduce enriched-uranium stockpiles, restrictions on future enrichment and automatic consequences for violating the deal. (inss.org.il)

The Turkish view of the same situation is almost a mirror image. In Ankara, the American blockade and rejection of Iran’s proposal are seen not as necessary toughness for the sake of regional security, but as an attempt to turn diplomacy into an instrument of unilateral control. A June study by ANKASAM described the U.S.-Iran talks as a mechanism not for normalization, but for the controlled limitation of Iranian power—a kind of geopolitical engineering. The current dispute over Hormuz reinforces this interpretation: Turkish commentators see the United States as demanding freedom of navigation while retaining the right to determine which sanctions, routes and political concessions are acceptable.

The Turkish debate, however, is not reducible to anti-Americanism. A column on the Trump-Xi summit in Yeni Birlik emphasizes that even the absence of major agreements can be politically significant: the ceremony, personal contact and preservation of a détente atmosphere can themselves reduce the risk of uncontrolled escalation. This is a characteristically pragmatic Turkish tone. Ankara does not expect America to offer a consistent system of rules, but believes that in a world of personalized diplomacy, its own role as a mediator and regional player may grow. For Turkey, the United States is simultaneously a source of pressure, a necessary security partner and a party with which it must know how to bargain without illusions.

In South Korea, the American rejection of Iran’s proposal is viewed far less ideologically and much more materially. The Korean newspaper Hankyung assesses Trump’s decision through the prism of oil, maritime transport and the risk of another surge in energy prices. For an export economy deeply embedded in global production chains, Hormuz is not only a distant war but also a question of industrial costs, inflation and supply stability. South Korea’s reaction reveals an important feature: Seoul cannot afford the luxury of choosing between the “American camp” and neutrality. It depends on the American military umbrella, but it is equally dependent on stable access to Middle Eastern energy and the Chinese market.

That is why the meeting between Trump and Xi Jinping in Washington became a second shared point of tension for all three countries. Israeli analysts saw it as an attempt to manage the rivalry rather than eliminate it. Reserve Brigadier General Assaf Orion, who heads the INSS program on Israel’s China policy, told Globes that the summit should stabilize relations between the two powers and help them manage their competition, but not resolve it. This is an important distinction for Israel: a détente between Washington and Beijing does not mean that the United States will stop demanding that its partners exercise caution in their technological ties with China.

Turkish observers likewise saw the summit not as a resolution, but as a pause. In their assessment, Trump and Xi gained politically from demonstrating contact, extending the trade truce and keeping channels open on artificial intelligence, rare-earth metals and investment. But the sides did not remove the fundamental conflict over control of technology, supply chains and the rules governing market access. (setadc.org)

For South Korea, the most troubling aspect was not the list of agreements, but the absence of one issue. Korean commentators noted that North Korea was mentioned in the current American readout of the meeting, but the formula referring to the joint goal of denuclearizing North Korea—which had appeared after the May contacts—had disappeared. This is highlighted in an analysis by Stockhub: Pyongyang turned out to be not the center, but the periphery of the U.S.-China dialogue. For Seoul, this is a dangerous signal. When Washington and Beijing focus on trade, rare-earth metals and AI, Korean security risks becoming a secondary issue. (stockhub.kr)

Against this backdrop, the South Korean story about Lee Jae-myung’s meeting with Trump in New York is particularly revealing. The Korean press describes the talks as a package in which strategic investment, American shipbuilding, increased defense spending, the transfer of operational control and the prospect of nuclear-powered submarines are all linked. According to a JoongAng Ilbo report, Lee proposed accelerating the issue of nuclear-powered submarines in exchange for strengthening South Korea’s defense contribution, while Trump showed particular interest in cooperation to revive American shipbuilding. This is not simply a bilateral deal: it shows how an alliance with America is increasingly acquiring a commercial and industrial price tag. (joongang.co.kr)

This is where the Israeli, Turkish and Korean reactions converge. Israel fears that America will trade long-term deterrence against Iran for short-term diplomatic success. Turkey is trying to use American inconsistency to expand the space for an independent regional policy. South Korea is seeking to pay for guarantees in a way that will simultaneously provide greater autonomy in defense and industry. All three countries see the same America, but read it differently: Israel sees an increasingly uncontrollable patron, Turkey sees a power that must be balanced, and South Korea sees an ally whose protection is increasingly presented as a bill to be paid.

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America as a Source of Risk: How Israel, Russia and Germany View Trump’s Policies

By late September 2026, the United States is being discussed in Israel, Russia and Germany less as the familiar center of Western power than as an unpredictable player whose decisions simultaneously shape the course of wars, energy prices, access to weapons and the stability of alliances. The main focus of the debate is the protracted US-Israeli war with Iran and its consequences—from the Strait of Hormuz to Europe’s stockpiles of Patriot missiles. The second issue is Washington’s return to mediation efforts over Ukraine. The third is the gradual transformation of American leadership from an institutional commitment into the more personal and transactional policy of Donald Trump. All three countries are concerned, but for different reasons: Israel fears that American support may prove politically conditional; Germany fears that the United States is weakening European security while demanding an ever-higher price for it; and Russia believes that Washington is still capable of changing the balance of power but does not itself understand how to end the crises it has begun.

The war with Iran has become the point at which these views converge most clearly. In Germany, it is increasingly described not as a demonstration of American power but as its squandering. In a commentary for Tagesschau, ARD Washington correspondent Carsten Küntopp argues that Trump has “lost” the conflict in strategic terms: Iran has not been forced to surrender, the Strait of Hormuz has become a source of prolonged instability, and US allies in the Middle East are being forced to seek additional security guarantees. It is particularly telling that German criticism assesses the war not only in humanitarian or legal terms but also through its direct cost to Europe: a shortage of American air-defense systems means fewer capabilities for Ukraine and greater risks for NATO’s eastern flank. (tagesschau.de)

Russian expert debate views the same crisis differently, but reaches a similar conclusion about Washington’s inconsistency. Middle East expert Farhad Ibragimov described the situation in a column for Kommersant as “neither peace nor war”: the White House alternately promises an imminent resolution, rules out rushing into negotiations, and speaks of restoring normal shipping even as attacks and risks in the region continue. For Russian audiences, this is not simply a criticism of Trump; it is an argument in the broader debate over the fact that American pressure does not necessarily produce a political result. Another Kommersant writer, Oleg Akulinichev, emphasizes in his analysis that the initial expectation of Iran’s swift defeat has given way to a protracted conflict, with Washington’s and Israel’s objectives beginning to diverge: the United States is increasingly concerned with inflation, oil and the November midterm elections, while for Israel the Iranian military threat cannot be postponed until a convenient electoral timetable. (kommersant.ru)

It is this divergence that is being discussed most acutely in Israel. Israeli commentators no longer assume an automatic alignment of interests between Jerusalem and Washington. Former Israeli Air Defense commander Zvika Haimovich wrote in Israel Hayom that Iran is operating in the narrow space between a real regional threat and Trump’s reluctance to resume a major war. In this logic, Tehran does not need to defeat the United States or Israel militarily: it is enough to raise the cost of the conflict, put pressure on American domestic politics and secure negotiations on more favorable terms. An Israeli source familiar with the assessments of the situation put the concern even more directly in Ynet: Iran may escalate in the hope of “wearing Trump down” before the midterm elections. (israelhayom.co.il)

This has produced Israel’s most unusual theme: America is perceived not merely as an ally but as a domestic political factor in Israel over which Israelis themselves have no control. Economic commentator Adrian Pilot called Trump “the most influential person no one in Israel elected” in Calcalist. His point goes beyond the usual discussion of military assistance: a single statement about tariffs, interest rates, sanctions or war can move the shekel, the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, Finance Ministry calculations and the government’s strategic expectations. Israel’s anxiety is therefore twofold. On the one hand, the country depends on American military, intelligence and diplomatic infrastructure. On the other, the personalized nature of Trump’s decision-making makes that dependence less predictable. (calcalist.co.il)

The feeling was reinforced by remarks from Vice President JD Vance that were widely discussed in the Israeli press. As Ynet reported, Vance emphasized that Israel remains an important partner in military technology and intelligence, but said that American policy “cannot be subordinate” to Israel. In the American context, this is an attempt to defend the principle of Washington’s independence; in Israel, it is a painful reminder that an alliance no longer guarantees automatic support for every Israeli strategy. At the same time, Israeli writers are noting the deterioration in American public attitudes toward Israel. For Jerusalem, this is no longer an abstract reputational problem but a potential constraint on the next American administration’s freedom of action. (ynet.co.il)

Germany sees the same American volatility through the prism of Europe’s dependence on the United States. Berlin has not abandoned its desire to maintain close defense ties with Washington: Defense Minister Boris Pistorius and his American counterpart Pete Hegseth agreed to develop military-technical cooperation, while Germany continues to purchase American F-35s and hopes to acquire Tomahawks. That is precisely why the German debate is becoming increasingly tense. Tagesschau notes the paradox: Berlin is seeking closer military integration with the United States at the very moment when the war with Iran has revealed shortages of American ammunition and air-defense missiles. In other words, Germany is deepening its dependence on a supplier that has itself become embroiled in war and may direct its limited resources anywhere—to the Middle East, Asia or domestic needs. (tagesschau.de)

This fear became especially pronounced after Trump demanded reimbursement for previous US spending on Ukraine. The German reaction was not only outrage over the amount but also an awareness of a new principle: even already established allied commitments can be retroactively turned into a bill. Tagesschau links this rhetoric to Trump’s broader attempt to present European security as a service for which Europe must pay separately and immediately. For Germany, where talk of “strategic autonomy” had for years remained more of a political slogan, this is becoming a practical problem—from ammunition stockpiles to the ability to support Ukraine without guaranteed American participation. (tagesschau.de)

The Ukrainian issue shows how differently the three countries interpret American mediation. In Germany, the resumption of Steve Witkoff’s and Jared Kushner’s trips to Moscow and Kyiv was greeted with caution: the participation of German, French and British advisers in some consultations indicates that Europe does not want Washington and Moscow to reach an agreement over the heads of Kyiv and the Europeans. A German Tagesschau analysis emphasizes that American diplomacy returned to the Ukraine issue only after a pause, when the White House’s attention had been absorbed by Iran. For Berlin, this is a symptom: Europe’s war depends on how closely it aligns with the American president’s current political priorities. (tagesschau.de)

In Russia, by contrast, the very fact of renewed American contact is seen as confirmation that a settlement is impossible without direct dialogue with Moscow. Russian publications pay little attention to the European demand for full participation in the negotiations and much more to the conditions Moscow regards as the basis for a deal: the situation at the front, Ukraine’s neutral status, sanctions and the territorial issue. But Russian optimism is restrained: American sanctions initiatives and negotiating signals are proceeding in parallel, creating the impression that Washington is trying both to pressure and to negotiate at the same time. In the Russian reading, this is not necessarily a contradiction but rather a familiar American bargaining style. In Germany, however, it looks like dangerous uncertainty: it is impossible to build Europe’s long-term defense if it is unclear when Trump’s negotiating logic will prevail over the logic of deterrence. (rbc.ru)

The most important point of convergence among Israel, Russia and Germany is that none of these countries still perceives American policy as a stable system of rules. Israel fears that American war-weariness and domestic electoral incentives will lead Washington to favor a short-term deal over the long-term containment of Iran. Germany fears that wars begun by the United States will deplete NATO’s shared resources and force Europe to pay more for less predictability. Russia sees an opportunity to exploit American inconsistency but simultaneously doubts Trump’s ability to turn grand statements into a sustainable architecture of peace. This is the United States’ new international reputation: not a disappearing superpower, but a superpower whose influence remains enormous precisely because no one knows where it will be directed tomorrow.

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Washington’s Spectacle for Two Superpowers: How Germany, Russia and China Read the Trump–Xi...

The main American story to draw a noticeable reaction in Germany, Russia and China in recent days was not any individual tariff or diplomatic spat, but the very format of Donald Trump and Xi Jinping’s September meeting in Washington. After several years in which U.S.–China relations were described almost exclusively in the language of containment, sanctions and the risk of conflict, the White House gave the Chinese leader a reception of rare state-pageantry proportions: a personal meeting with Trump at an air base, military honors, a banquet and deliberately friendly rhetoric. Yet it was precisely the gap between the lavish staging and the modesty of the practical results that became the main subject of foreign commentary.

In Germany, the meeting is seen above all as a troubling example of Trump’s personalized diplomacy. Tagesschau described the summit with the formula “fanfares, an honor guard, a banquet—but almost no decisions”: Washington and Beijing presented no major agreement on artificial intelligence, Taiwan or technology restrictions. The German debate therefore does not boil down to the question of whether the United States and China have “made up.” Far more important is whether U.S. foreign policy is turning into a series of personal deals between leaders, with allies and partners learning the rules only after the two largest powers have agreed on a temporary pause.

This concern is particularly visible in a commentary by RND correspondent Christian Fahrenbach, who called Xi’s visit “much pomp, no objectives.” For German observers, the problem is not Washington’s contact with Beijing itself—Berlin has an interest in predictable trade and in reducing the risk of a major war—but the fact that demonstrative respect for Xi is not accompanied by a clear strategy. Germany finds itself in an uncomfortable position: its export economy depends on the Chinese market, its security depends on the United States, while technological competition between the two forces European companies to choose sides. That is why German coverage reads the summit not as a signal of a new world, but as an indication of how fragile the old Western order may be.

Also telling is the more severe conclusion by MERICS analyst Abhishek Insisa, cited by Deutsche Welle: behind the ceremony, Beijing made no significant concessions to Trump, while the current course of bilateral relations is, for the time being, working more in China’s favor. This assessment reflects a specifically German concern: the United States still possesses enormous military and financial power, but China has learned to derive political dividends from the mere recognition of its equal status. If the American president demonstrates that he needs a personal agreement with Beijing, China receives confirmation of its central place in world politics—even without signing a major treaty.

The Russian reaction to the same story is noticeably less emotional and more geopolitical. Russian commentators saw Xi’s reception not as American weakness in the direct sense, but as recognition that Washington can no longer speak to China from a position of unconditional superiority. The newspaper Vedomosti put “the Thucydides Trap” in its headline—the popular theory that a rising power and the ruling power are almost inevitably headed for confrontation. Yet the point of the article is precisely that the leaders are trying to postpone this logic: the trade truce is being extended, while the risk of direct escalation over technological and military issues is temporarily being contained.

Dmitry Kochegurov, a researcher at the Institute for the Study of Contemporary International Relations and Regional Problems (ISKRA), articulated the Russian view particularly clearly in an interview with Vedomosti: Trump sees Xi as an equal and treats him with respect not because he officially recognizes China as equal to the United States, but because he sees him as a leader “with whom one can do business.” In the Russian interpretation, this matters more than specific declarations. An international system in which Washington could impose conditions simultaneously on Moscow, Beijing and its European allies looks increasingly unrealistic; in its place, a system of bargaining among centers of power is emerging.

At the same time, Russian authors are not inclined to mistake the warm images from Washington for a strategic U.S.–China alliance. Kommersant, summarizing the international reaction, noted that Xi gained the most important thing—confirmation of his status as an equal interlocutor—while Trump was left with few tangible breakthroughs to show. But Moscow understands well that the disputes over chips, rare-earth metals, artificial intelligence, Taiwan and China’s ties with Iran have not disappeared. Russia benefits from the very manageability of U.S.–China rivalry: it reduces the risk of a world war and preserves room for maneuver. However, an excessively deep rapprochement between Washington and Beijing would theoretically reduce Russia’s value as an independent pole. The Russian reaction therefore combines satisfaction at the dismantling of American exceptionalism with caution about a possible new “grand bargain” between the superpowers.

In China, the tone is fundamentally different. There, the Washington meeting is presented neither as a U.S. concession nor as a victory over the United States, but as proof that the course toward “constructive strategic stability” is correct. On the eve of the visit, an official commentary by “Zhongsheng” in the People’s Daily called on the United States and China to “meet each other halfway” and described leader-level diplomacy as a “compass” for bilateral relations. This is characteristic of Chinese political discourse: Beijing seeks not so much to record a one-off deal as to establish the principle that two great powers must maintain communication at the highest level and not allow individual conflicts to destroy the overall framework of their relationship.

After the summit, Chinese official media emphasized predictability. In a People’s Daily report, Stephen Orlins, president of the National Committee on U.S.–China Relations, called predictability a “global public good,” while business representatives stressed that companies need stable, institutionalized contacts more than high-profile political gestures. This is one of the most important Chinese interpretations of American policy: the United States is portrayed not as an unchanging adversary, but as a country with which rules of coexistence can and should be built if Washington abandons unilateral pressure.

But China’s public line is not based on naïve détente. A Global Times editorial on the resumption of U.S.–China security contacts welcomed dialogue while warning that Washington sometimes understands “crisis management” as the right to test China’s red lines and then demand restraint from Beijing. In other words, in Chinese discourse, compromise is acceptable only as interaction between equals. That is precisely why Xi’s state visit to Washington matters disproportionately to the absence of signed breakthrough agreements: it visually reinforces the image of China as a power with which America is forced to negotiate.

Thus, an unusual convergence emerges among three very different perspectives. Germany sees the summit as a risk that Trump is resolving global issues through personal diplomacy, leaving Europe in the role of an observer. Russia views it as a symptom of the transition from American unipolarity to tough but necessary bargaining among the great powers. China uses the same meeting to advance the idea of equal and manageable rivalry. All three reactions converge on one point: the era when Washington could pressure Beijing, reassure its allies and set the rules of global trade single-handedly is coming to an end.

The most unexpected development here is not the absence of a new Cold War, but the emergence of its peculiar diplomatic opposite: rivals retain sanctions, tariffs and military mistrust, yet increasingly need ceremonies of mutual recognition. For Trump, personal closeness with Xi must turn into a political result. For Xi, the reception itself has already become the result. For Germany, it is a warning that Europe may find itself caught between two giants negotiating with each other. For Russia, it is evidence of a new multipolarity. And for China, it confirms that its status is no longer under discussion; only the terms on which Washington will recognize that status remain to be negotiated.

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America as a Source of Risk: Views of Trump’s Policies in South Africa, Israel and Germany

By September 27, 2026, discussion of America in South Africa, Israel and Germany had unexpectedly shifted away from the familiar question of U.S. power toward the price of that power for allies, trading partners and countries seeking to preserve their independence. The main issues are the U.S. and Israeli war with Iran, Washington’s threats to impose new tariffs on Europe, and increasingly intense pressure on Pretoria over its domestic and foreign policies. These issues are perceived differently in each of the three countries, but local commentators share a clear conclusion: under Donald Trump, American policy has become less predictable and therefore requires not loyalty, but safeguards against Washington.

The most acute issue is Iran. In Israel, American involvement is still viewed primarily through the lens of security: the ability of the United States to deter Tehran, prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons and maintain pressure in the Strait of Hormuz. The Israeli press is discussing in detail Trump’s rejection of Tehran’s proposed seven-day pause. According to Israel Hayom, the U.S. administration prefers to continue economically strangling Iran and has not ruled out a new broad campaign of strikes after the U.S. midterm elections in November. For a significant part of the Israeli discourse, this appears to confirm that Washington is unwilling to trade its strategic objective—the weakening of Iran’s military machine—for short-term de-escalation. (israelhayom.co.il)

But this is precisely where a more alarming view is gaining ground in Israel: American resolve is not the same as a sustainable strategy. Israeli analysts have long warned that Trump remains both Israel’s primary external resource and a politician whose decisions depend on his personal image, domestic political pressure and his desire to declare a conflict over on terms favorable to himself. An analysis published by Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies emphasized that Jerusalem must operate in a zone of uncertainty: inflict maximum damage on Iran’s capabilities while not losing access to American support. This formula is particularly important now, when the question is no longer whether the United States will support Israel, but how long and at what cost it is prepared to support its chosen course. (inss.org.il)

In Germany, the same war provokes an almost opposite reaction. Here, the American operation is perceived not as a distant display of force, but as a direct source of energy and industrial risk. On September 23, German government spokesman Stefan Kornelius explicitly linked the need for diplomacy to how “enormously significant” the conflict is for Germany in energy terms, and said that the war must end “as soon as possible.” Berlin is simultaneously calling for Iran to return to negotiations and for the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz to end—but the local debate is increasingly noting a contradiction: Germany is calling for diplomacy while remaining politically aligned with the U.S.-Israeli course. (auswaertiges-amt.de)

German media are developing this criticism even more sharply. A Deutsche Welle analysis describes the possible American model as “mowing the lawn”: the United States regularly destroys Iran’s recovering radars, missiles and maritime infrastructure without promising a final victory. The problem is that such a tactic could turn the conflict into an endless cycle of strikes and subsequent reconstruction. Experts warn that if Tehran concludes that constant American attacks are inevitable, the pursuit of nuclear weapons could become an even more attractive means of deterrence. For Germany, this is not an abstract military dilemma, but a scenario of constant pressure on oil markets, transportation and the European economy. (amp.dw.com)

South Africa views America through a different, but no less painful, experience: Washington’s attempt to turn differences over values into an instrument of direct political coercion. In Pretoria, the discussion is not about the Strait of Hormuz, but about U.S. visa restrictions against individuals whom the Trump administration considers responsible for racial discrimination, uncompensated land reform and policies toward minorities. The South African government rejects this interpretation, saying that measures to correct the legacy of apartheid are a constitutional duty of the state. International Relations Minister Ronald Lamola urged the country to prepare for the “worst-case scenario” because, in his words, the United States is demanding a de facto surrender of sovereignty on issues including black economic empowerment, land policy and foreign-policy direction. (mg.co.za)

The South African story produces perhaps the most unusual local conclusion: the dispute with America is increasingly interpreted not as an ordinary diplomatic conflict, but as a dispute over who has the right to define the meaning of democracy and equality after apartheid. Former U.S. ambassador Leo Brent Bozell III was even drawn into a controversy surrounding possible mediation by former President Thabo Mbeki. The South African side considered the very idea of imposing an external negotiator on the country humiliating; Clayson Monyela, head of public diplomacy, sarcastically suggested imagining the reverse situation—if Pretoria tried to “appoint” Barack Obama as a negotiator for the current American president. (mg.co.za)

Trump’s trade policy creates another common thread between Berlin and Pretoria. Germany sees it as a threat to Europe’s economic autonomy, while South Africa sees it as proof that access to the world’s largest market can be made conditional on political obedience. Germany was particularly irritated by Trump’s reaction to closer ties between the EU and Canada: he called possible Canadian associate membership in the European Union a “hostile act” and threatened high tariffs or restrictions on trade with Europe. For German audiences, this became more than another flare-up in the tariff conflict; it became an argument for a more independent Europe capable of building ties with Canada and other partners without American permission. (tagesschau.de)

Finally, another reaction to the United States is especially noticeable in Germany: interest in domestic American resistance to Trump. In an editorial comment, Der Spiegel journalist Britta Kollenbroich suggests that Germany should view American civil society not as a victim of an authoritarian shift, but as an example of the ability to defend institutions and rights. This is an important shift: America remains both a source of external instability and an internal example of democratic resistance to it. (spiegel.de)

Ultimately, Israel wants America not to waver in confronting Iran, but fears its political inconsistency; Germany wants the war stopped and its dependence on American economic dictates reduced; South Africa sees Washington’s pressure as an attempt to revise its post-apartheid social contract. The international reaction is not reducible to anti-Americanism. Rather, it reflects a more sober view of the United States: an alliance with Washington remains valuable, but fewer and fewer countries see it as a guarantee of predictability.

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The United States at the Center of Diplomacy and Global Security

This new overview examines key decisions and signals from Washington that are influencing the development of international crises. Iran is being urged to move toward negotiations with the United States, Donald Trump allows for the possibility of a nonmilitary agreement with Cuba, while American support for Ukraine and European security remains a crucial factor in discussions of possible peace terms. The focus is on U.S. diplomatic influence, the reliability of its guarantees, and the consequences of foreign-policy decisions for ongoing conflicts. The materials are based on publications by nv.ua and glavred.net (Ukraine).

Ukraine Seeks Peace Without Giving Up Sovereignty and Defense

Two approaches are increasingly coming into conflict in Ukraine’s debate over a possible end to the war. The first proceeds from the need to stop the destruction, economic exhaustion, and risks of another winter under Russian attacks as soon as possible—even if this requires painful compromises. The second insists that diplomacy is possible only if Ukraine retains its right to self-defense, internationally recognized borders, and effective security guarantees. Both positions share the understanding that statements from allies alone are insufficient: the country needs air-defense missiles, protection for its energy sector, functioning export routes, weapons production, and real pressure on Moscow.

In an interview with NV recorded in Kyiv during the YES conference, British historian Niall Ferguson offers an argument in favor of rapid negotiations that is uncomfortable for a significant part of Ukrainian society. His position is based on an assessment of the military and economic balance: Russia is also paying a high price for the war, including because of Ukrainian attacks on its economic and strategic facilities. However, the resources of the two sides are not comparable, and a prolonged conflict is particularly dangerous for Ukraine’s economy.

Ferguson draws attention to the threat to Black Sea trade. “For Ukraine, this is a matter of survival because of the halt in Ukrainian exports,” he says. In his view, the budget deficit, debt burden, and continuation of the war for another year could push the Ukrainian economy into “a very alarming state of weakness.” From this, he concludes that a negotiated agreement must be sought as soon as possible, even if it involves territorial compromises, primarily concerning Donbas.

The historian urges Kyiv to consider “soberly and impartially” whether it is worth “sacrificing several square miles of territory” to end the war and begin reconstruction. In the Ukrainian context, however, this formula provokes fundamental rejection. The issue is not lines on a map, but civilians under occupation, destroyed cities, deportations, violence, and Russia’s attempts to deprive the country of its statehood. The question of territory is therefore closely linked not only to military expediency, but also to sovereignty, people’s rights, and the state’s responsibility toward them.

Ferguson’s interlocutor directly questions the assumption that Washington will be able to force Russia into an acceptable agreement. By her reasoning, it may be easier for the U.S. administration to pressure the victim of aggression—Ukraine—than the Kremlin. Moreover, the problem is not limited to Vladimir Putin: even his possible departure would not automatically mean the disappearance of Russian imperialism.

Ferguson sharply assesses Europe’s capabilities. In his words, European states have not created enough military strength to alter the Kremlin’s calculations, while Germany’s rearmament is proceeding too slowly. Political cycles in Germany, France, and Italy, he believes, make continued support for Kyiv less predictable. “Europe has failed to achieve peace because it does not have sufficient strength,” the historian says.

At the same time, he considers the United States an indispensable diplomatic center and envisions negotiations involving Ukraine, Russia, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. For Kyiv, this prospect is ambivalent: American influence is necessary for security and pressure on Moscow, but Washington’s mediation also raises concerns that unequal terms could be imposed on Ukraine.

As a possible model, Ferguson cites Korea. There is no formal peace treaty between North and South Korea, but South Korea has been able to build a strong economy under the protection of a stable deterrence system. In his view, Ukraine should turn its wartime achievements into a long-term advantage by developing defense technologies, engineering expertise, and domestic production. “Ukraine has surpassed the United States militarily,” he claims, describing Ukrainian achievements as “military-technological miracles.” In this logic, the country’s future depends less on the “territories around Luhansk” than on its ability to become a technological military power.

Yet this is precisely where the central conflict in Ukraine’s debate becomes apparent. Technological modernization and economic recovery are essential, but they do not cancel the demand to restore the occupied territories and protect the people who remain under Russian control. For Ukraine, reliance on technology cannot replace sovereignty.

The practical dimension of this dilemma was demonstrated by Volodymyr Zelensky’s trip to the UN General Assembly. As a Glavred analytical article notes, Kyiv assesses the outcome of the visit not by the number of meetings and public promises, but by whether additional interceptor missiles, air-defense systems, production licenses, mechanisms to protect the energy sector, and tools to pressure Russia appear in practice.

The central issue is preparation for another winter and the risk of new Russian attacks on energy infrastructure. The United States proposed the idea of an “energy truce,” and Ukraine declared its readiness to support it only on the condition of full reciprocity. Zelensky put the position this way: “We are ready for any format of an energy truce.” But Ukraine is prepared to refrain from striking Russian energy facilities only if Russia stops attacking the Ukrainian power system.

For Kyiv, this is not an abstract humanitarian initiative, but a question of heating, electricity, the operation of businesses, hospitals, and transport, and the survival of civilians. At the same time, no agreement has been signed: there is an American proposal that Ukraine accepts provided Moscow undertakes reciprocal obligations. This approach reflects distrust of unilateral restrictions after years of Russian violations of agreements and systematic attacks on civilian infrastructure.

The issue of Patriot systems is particularly important. Zelensky emphasizes that against ballistic threats, “the only things currently working are interceptors for Patriot systems, which are needed practically every day.” A possible U.S. license to produce Patriot missiles in Ukraine is viewed as an opportunity to reduce dependence on external supplies and strengthen the national defense-industrial complex. However, the timing, scale, and parameters of the possible program remain unknown, so the political signal does not yet mean that real production capacity will emerge.

Ukraine’s security is directly linked to exports through the Black Sea. Restoring the grain corridor is important not only for global food security, but also for the operation of Ukrainian ports, foreign-currency revenues, and economic resilience. Zelensky has stressed that Ukrainian food is needed by countries “on every continent,” but full-scale trade is impossible without protecting shipping and port infrastructure and ending Russian strikes.

Serhii Sydorenko, editor of European Pravda, assesses Zelensky’s talks with Donald Trump through the changing nature of relations between Kyiv and Washington. Before the trip, there were concerns that the United States might demand that Ukraine stop striking Russian energy facilities, partly because of possible effects on the American fuel market. But according to Sydorenko, the meeting included “no tough demands” and “no accusations.”

This enabled Kyiv to avoid an “image trap”: Ukraine does not appear to be rejecting diplomacy, while at the same time it refuses to accept unilateral self-restraint as long as Russia continues the war. Sydorenko believes that no major formal agreements were reached: sanctions pressure, details of the Patriot license, and other issues remained unresolved. Nevertheless, in his assessment, relations with the United States have moved onto “a more or less stable positive track.”

Expert Taras Zahorodnyi, for his part, believes Ukraine’s negotiating position is stronger than it may appear from diplomatic rhetoric. Ukraine’s ability to strike military and economic targets on Russian territory gives Kyiv an additional resource. In his view, if Trump wants to demonstrate progress toward a settlement, Washington must not only talk about negotiations, but also provide Ukraine with weapons and use real levers of pressure against Moscow.

Zahorodnyi separately emphasizes the risk to sovereignty. Any agreement restricting strikes must clearly define the legal status of Crimea and other temporarily occupied territories. His question—“What is the legal status of Crimea and the other temporarily occupied territories?”—concerns a fundamental problem: if a ban on strikes extends to lands that Moscow declares Russian, it could be interpreted as de facto recognition of the annexation. Ukraine’s renunciation of strikes on Crimea or Donbas, the expert warns, could create the impression that these are “not our territories”—a scenario Kyiv considers unacceptable.

Ukraine’s strategy is therefore not built around the United States alone. Agreements with Australia, Finland, France, the United Kingdom, Türkiye, and NATO are viewed as elements of a resilience system. Australia promises to continue military and financial assistance, training Ukrainian service members, and cooperation in weapons production. Finland is joining the Drone Deal initiative. Talks with France cover SAMP/T systems, missiles, and the localization of production, while the United Kingdom links its support to energy protection and more affordable air-defense technology solutions.

This diversification is important for Ukraine because it reduces critical dependence on a single partner while also developing its own defense industry. But Ukrainian analysts stress that statements and agreements must be backed by concrete deliveries, production lines, sanctions, and mechanisms for monitoring the fulfillment of obligations.

Ukraine’s debate over peace, therefore, cannot be reduced to a choice between war and negotiations. Kyiv is ready to use diplomacy—including a reciprocal energy truce and international negotiation formats—but insists that any agreements be based on reciprocity, international law, forcing Russia to fulfill its obligations, and preserving Ukraine’s right to defend itself.

The country is simultaneously preparing for winter attacks, seeking Patriot interceptors, protecting maritime exports, localizing weapons production, and maintaining the international coalition. Under these conditions, calls to sacrifice territory for a quick agreement remain extremely painful: for Ukraine, peace without guarantees, without a clear status for Crimea and Donbas, and without the ability to repel a new attack risks becoming not the end of the war, but a pause before its continuation.

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America as Negotiator, Patron and Source of Risk: What Ukraine, Saudi Arabia and Turkey...

The final days of September 2026 showed that the United States had once again become the main subject of foreign-policy discussions in Kyiv, Riyadh and Ankara at the same time—but by no means as an unconditional guarantor of order. In local Ukrainian, Saudi and Turkish debates, Donald Trump’s America appears to be a power that retains enormous military and economic strength but applies it situationally: threatening Iran and immediately talking about a deal; promising to support its allies while urging them to assume a larger share of the costs and risks; conducting peace talks on Ukraine without yet turning them into a mechanism for exerting real pressure on Moscow.

The main common theme is the search for an acceptable way out of the war between the United States, Israel and Iran. At a September 22 meeting in New York, Trump brought together the leaders of the Gulf states, Turkey and several Arab countries, saying that US-Iranian contacts were “gaining momentum.” But for regional capitals, the White House’s rhetoric matters less than tangible issues: the security of oil infrastructure, shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb, and the risk of strikes on their territory. Saudi Arab News writes about this directly: for the Gulf states, the priorities are ending the conflict, restoring energy security and protecting sea routes. Saudi commentator Abdulrahman al-Qahtani formulated the local “red line” especially clearly: no country can be allowed to hold Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb “hostage.” (arabnews.com)

This substantially changes the meaning of the Saudi-American partnership. Riyadh does not view American pressure on Iran as an end in itself or a demonstration of strength: the desired outcome is not another strike, but an agreement that would deprive Tehran of the ability to threaten trade and energy exports. This is why the Saudi press shows an ambivalent attitude toward Trump. On the one hand, the newspaper Okaz reports in detail on his optimism after three hours of contacts between American representatives and Iranian intermediaries: according to the US president, the conversation was “very good and very productive.” On the other hand, the sequence of events itself—when Washington was still talking about new strikes in early September but was already promoting negotiations by September 23—only underscores, for Saudi Arabia, the unpredictability of the American course. (okaz.com.sa)

Turkey’s reaction to the same developments is noticeably less defensive and more geopolitical. In Ankara, American policy is interpreted not only through the lens of Iran but also as an attempt to shift responsibility for managing the regional order onto local powers. In an analysis by the Anadolu Agency, lecturer Yusuf Bahadır Keskin notes that Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar sought to persuade Trump to postpone new strikes not because they sympathize with Iran, but because they themselves would pay for an escalation—with attacks on bases, ports and oil facilities, as well as rising transport and insurance costs. In this interpretation, the United States is not so much leaving the region as offering its allies a reality in which American power is available but will not necessarily be used first or in full. (aa.com.tr)

For Turkey, this creates room for ambition. The presence of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at the New York meeting with Trump and the Gulf states is presented in Turkey’s official media sphere as recognition that Ankara is an essential participant in a Middle Eastern settlement. TRT Haber placed at the center of its coverage US Ambassador Thomas Barrack’s statement that there was “harmony” between Erdoğan and Trump and that relations between the two countries had “never been this good.” This is more than a compliment: in the Turkish reading, the personal channel between the two presidents is an asset that can be converted into influence over the Syrian front, the Iranian crisis and the expansion of trade with the United States. (trthaber.com)

But the Turkish debate is not limited to celebrating closer ties. It also contains a cautious understanding that American praise is simultaneously an invitation to take on greater responsibility. In an Anadolu article, analyst Orhan Karaoğlu offers a broader framework: Washington’s campaign against Iran is not an isolated Middle Eastern crisis but part of a cautious rivalry between the United States and China. For Ankara, this means its role will grow, but also that regional instability may result from a global game whose objectives are determined far from Turkey. (aa.com.tr)

Ukraine’s response to America during these days revolves around a different form of the same problem—the gap between diplomatic access to Trump and practical results. After Volodymyr Zelensky’s meeting with the US president on September 22, the Ukrainian publication European Pravda saw the key positive not in signed agreements, of which there were none, but in a change of atmosphere: Washington did not demand unilateral concessions from Kyiv to Russia and did not object to Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory. For a country that until recently feared renewed American pressure, this is already considered a diplomatic achievement. (eurointegration.com.ua)

However, a much sharper tone can be heard in an analysis by Ukrainska Pravda. The authors call the meeting essentially fruitless: it produced neither a strong sanctions lever against the Kremlin, nor clear defense decisions, nor a workable format for the peace process. Ukraine’s wariness toward the idea of an “energy truce” is especially telling. Kyiv is prepared to discuss halting attacks on energy infrastructure only on the condition that the truce is complete and unconditional—in other words, Russia must not be able to continue attacking Ukraine’s power system while declaring it connected to defense. (pravda.com.ua)

This leads to a conclusion shared by all three countries—one rarely expressed so directly in American political discourse. Ukraine, Saudi Arabia and Turkey are not expecting the United States to make a simple choice between intervention and withdrawal. They are trying to adapt to an America that simultaneously pressures, bargains, mediates and demands greater self-reliance from its partners. Kyiv wants to ensure that the American negotiating process does not become synonymous with concessions to Moscow; Riyadh wants Washington’s struggle with Tehran not to turn the Gulf into a theater of retaliatory strikes; and Ankara wants America’s new need for regional mediators to establish Turkey as a co-author, rather than an object, of the Middle Eastern order.

This is the most important shift in local perceptions of the United States: none of these players is abandoning its ties with Washington. But all three are increasingly unwilling to build their security on the assumption that American will is constant and American promises are automatically equivalent to American action.

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America as Mediator, Sanctions Enforcer and Source of Uncertainty

By September 26, the main topic of conversations about the United States in Ukraine, India and Russia was not any single initiative by Donald Trump, but a new style of American policy: Washington is simultaneously offering itself as a mediator in the war, using tariffs to pressure partners and emphasizing its right to act by its own rules. In Kyiv, this is viewed primarily through the question of surviving the winter and securing air-defense supplies; in New Delhi, through the threat of punishment for buying Russian oil; and in Moscow, through the possibility of resuming dialogue with the White House without compromising its own terms for a settlement.

The Ukrainian reaction to the September 22 meeting between Zelenskyy and Trump in New York was noticeably more cautious than the usual diplomatic optimism. Serhiy Sydorenko, editor of European Pravda, saw it not as a breakthrough but as a return of relations with the United States to a “more or less stable positive track”: for Kyiv, the mere absence of public pressure and demands for an immediate halt to strikes on Russian oil-refining facilities was already important. (eurointegration.com.ua) This is telling: the American tone has become a political resource in its own right, since Trump had previously linked Ukrainian strikes on Russia’s energy sector to rising fuel prices in the United States.

However, the Ukrainian press does not regard the change in tone as a guarantee of a strategic shift. In an analysis by Ukrainska Pravda, the current American policy is described as an attempt to secure an energy truce—a mutual halt to strikes on energy infrastructure—but without a clear answer to the key question for Ukraine: what, specifically, will force Russia to comply with the agreement? The authors stress that Washington has stopped responding with an unequivocal “no” to requests to sell Patriot missiles and license their production, but just as unequivocal a “yes” has not been heard either. (pravda.com.ua)

Patriot has become a symbol of how Ukrainians now view the United States: not only as a weapons supplier, but also as a potential partner in building the country’s own defense industry. Trump publicly confirmed that licensing the production of interceptor missiles in Ukraine was being discussed with Zelenskyy. Ukrainska Pravda notes that the White House had previously cited U.S. needs and urged caution over transferring the technology. (pravda.com.ua) Thus, hope in Kyiv is tempered by an understanding of technological realities: as Valeriy Zarubin, head of BlueBird Tec, explains in his column, years of work, complex supply chains and access to critical electronics lie between receiving a license and producing the first missile in series. (pravda.com.ua) For Ukraine, American support is becoming less valuable as one-off assistance and increasingly valuable as access to the ability to produce weapons independently.

The Russian view of American mediation is different. Moscow welcomes the very fact that contacts with the Trump administration have intensified, but it does not see Washington as an arbitrator capable of imposing a compromise. Rather, it sees it as a channel through which Kyiv and Europe should accept Russia’s interpretation of a political settlement. In Sergey Strokan’s analysis for Kommersant, the disagreement is formulated in particularly stark terms: “Kyiv expects a truce from the talks, not peace.” In Russian public debate, “peace” implies not merely a pause in hostilities but a resolution of questions concerning territory, Ukraine’s status and sanctions; from this perspective, an energy truce may be useful, but remains a secondary episode. (kommersant.ru)

In this sense, Russia’s reaction to Trump combines hope with distrust. After the telephone conversation between Putin and Trump, Kommersant FM political commentator Dmitry Drize wrote that the chances for negotiations remained, but urged against rushing to conclusions: a strong view in Russia’s public discourse holds that a substantive conversation will be possible only after another winter campaign and a change in the military situation. (kommersant.ru) Following Trump’s speech at the United Nations, Drize separately noted that Ukraine had been “relegated to the background” for the American president compared with Iran and other crises. (kommersant.ru) For Moscow, this is an important signal: the United States may retain a negotiating role, but its attention is limited, meaning that American pressure will not necessarily be constant or consistent.

India views the same American policy primarily through the lens of economic security and sovereignty. The U.S. decision to give the president the authority to impose tariffs of up to 100% on major buyers of Russian oil and gas became in New Delhi an almost textbook example of how the war in Ukraine is spilling over into third countries’ relations with America. In an editorial in The Indian Express, this approach is called a “reckless and blunt instrument”: the newspaper argues that India created neither the war in Ukraine nor the crisis in the Middle East, but risks paying for them through increased external pressure. (indianexpress.com)

Sanjaya Baru, a former adviser to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, formulates India’s response particularly clearly in a column for The Indian Express: New Delhi will not “sever ties,” but will reduce its dependence-related risks with respect to America, China and Russia simultaneously. (indianexpress.com) This is not an anti-American position. India remains interested in trade, technology, investment and defense cooperation with the United States. But the threat of secondary tariffs turns Washington from a desirable strategic partner into an unpredictable source of geoeconomic risk. In New Delhi, the American demand to abandon Russian oil is perceived not as a request from an ally, but as an attempt to restrict India’s right to choose the most advantageous energy-supply terms.

This concern extends beyond the oil issue. Indian expert Harsh V. Pant, in an editorial for Dainik Jagran, saw Trump’s September 22 address to the UN General Assembly as an effort to reassert American dominance: the “America First” slogan is combined with a willingness to pressure both rivals and friends. (org432akamprepod.jagran.com) For Ukrainians, this means that security depends on the White House’s current calculations; for Russians, that negotiations with the United States may be accompanied by the threat of new sanctions; and for Indians, that even a partnership with Washington does not protect them from punishment for pursuing an independent foreign policy.

The most unexpected common conclusion from the Ukrainian, Russian and Indian reactions is that none of them sees the United States as a neutral guarantor of order. Kyiv relies on American power but fears American impulsiveness. Moscow values direct contact with Trump but is convinced that his mediation will depend on U.S. domestic priorities. New Delhi wants to maintain its strategic rapprochement with America but is responding to tariff pressure with the principle of “strategic autonomy.” America remains the central power for all three countries—but that is precisely why its policy is increasingly perceived not as a source of stability, but as a variable to which they must urgently adapt.

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America as a Source of Uncertainty: Turkey, Brazil and Japan Read Trump’s Signals...

By the end of September 2026, the United States had become in Turkey, Brazil and Japan not merely a subject of foreign-policy reporting, but a factor forcing them to recalculate their own risks. Three parallel storylines are driving this: the war and sanctions pressure surrounding Iran, Washington’s conspicuously tough line in the Western Hemisphere, and Donald Trump’s meeting with Xi Jinping, from which Tokyo expects an answer to the key question: will Taiwan become a bargaining chip in a deal between the two superpowers? In all three countries, the United States is no longer seen as a predictable guarantor of order, but as a power whose decisions increasingly depend on short-term bargaining, the president’s personal diplomacy, and a willingness to use economic or military coercion.

In Turkey, the most painful issue remains American policy toward Iran. For Ankara, this is not an abstract rivalry between Washington and Tehran: it is linked to energy supplies, border security, Syria, Iraq and the threat of a new wave of regional destabilization. In Murat Yetkin’s analysis, the disappointment that an expected one-on-one meeting between Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Trump on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly never took place is especially telling. The symbolic lack of contact mattered precisely at a moment when Turkey had begun implementing sanctions restrictions against Iran. Yetkin ironically interprets the duality of the American attitude: Trump calls Erdoğan a “tough man,” while simultaneously emphasizing his personal fondness for him—in other words, sanctions and personal diplomacy are proceeding hand in hand. (yetkinreport.com)

The Turkish debate, however, is not limited to anti-American rhetoric. Expert Bilgehan Alagöz, in an analysis for Anadolu Ajansı, describes the current phase as “controlled escalation”: in his assessment, neither the United States nor Iran is seeking an unlimited war, but the very logic of retaliatory strikes could easily undermine that calculation. For Turkish observers, the idea that Washington combines military actions with diplomatic signals—and thus keeps its partners in a state of constant uncertainty—is particularly important. (aa.com.tr) The paradox of the local reaction is that Turkey wants neither a rupture with the United States nor to become a conduit for American pressure on neighboring Iran. Hence the increasingly prominent language of “strategic autonomy”: not a rejection of NATO, but an attempt to prevent an American crisis from becoming a Turkish crisis.

In Brazil, the American issue is even more direct—as a dispute over sovereignty and the permissible limits of interference. Trump’s speech at the UN, in which he discussed the possible use of force in pursuit of US interests in Latin America and justified American actions against Venezuela, was understood not only through the lens of Venezuela or Cuba. (tvbrasil.ebc.com.br) Brazilian commentators saw in it Washington’s claim to return to a “backyard” policy. In a Correio Braziliense analysis, the clash between the two speeches at the UN is described as an exchange of deliberately calibrated messages: Lula stated that “Brazil does not fit into anyone’s backyard,” while Trump emphasized the United States’ readiness to defend its interests in the Western Hemisphere by force. (correiobraziliense.com.br)

This sensitivity has been heightened by Brasilia’s specific grievances over American pressure. According to Folha de S.Paulo, during negotiations over 50 percent US tariffs, the Trump administration demanded that unnamed “political dissidents” be allowed to participate in Brazil’s 2026 presidential election. In Brazil, this was read as interference in the electoral process and as a continuation of American political support for Bolsonaro’s circle. (www1.folha.uol.com.br) Even Trump’s statement about combating the Brazilian criminal groups PCC and Comando Vermelho provoked irritation in the official response: the Justice Ministry pointed to tens of thousands of operations and a national program to combat organized crime, rejecting the American portrayal of Brazil as incapable of controlling its own security. (agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br) The local conclusion here is unusually harsh: trade tariffs, sanctions, talk of criminality and support for “dissidents” are perceived not as separate policy directions, but as a single set of instruments of pressure.

In Japan, the focus of the debate is different: Tokyo fears not a conflict with Washington, but that its interests may become secondary in a US-China deal. Following Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s meeting with Trump on September 22, the Japanese government emphasized the success of coordination on economic security and the Indo-Pacific. Foreign Minister Motegi called it especially important that the conversation took place immediately before the US-China summit and made it possible to reaffirm the strength of the alliance. The JETRO report records precisely this official line: Japan is seeking to incorporate issues involving technology, supply chains and regional security into its bilateral alliance with the United States. (jetro.go.jp)

At the same time, however, concern is growing in the Japanese media that Trump could trade strategic positions for immediate economic concessions from Beijing. On TV Asahi, the Japanese concern was stated directly: the US president could halt arms sales to Taiwan in exchange for economic compensation from China. (news.tv-asahi.co.jp) Former Justice Minister Keisuke Suzuki, by contrast, considers the Takaichi–Trump meeting a successful attempt to navigate a “very narrow path”: keeping the United States engaged in Asia while not giving China an unnecessary pretext for escalation. (fnn.jp) This is Japan’s dilemma: the alliance with America remains indispensable, but the alliance’s reliability is now measured not by treaty formulas, but by how personally interested Trump is at any given moment in taking Tokyo’s interests into account.

The common thread in the Turkish, Brazilian and Japanese reactions is not so much rejection of America as distrust of its new way of acting. Ankara fears being drawn into an Iranian war and sanctions regime; Brasilia resists turning domestic politics into an object of American control; Tokyo worries that security around Taiwan could become a bargaining chip in US-China negotiations. The United States remains too powerful to ignore, but increasingly unpredictable to simply follow. That is why one practical idea is gaining strength in three very different countries: ties with Washington must be maintained, while room for independent maneuver must be expanded—in regional diplomacy, trade, defense and relations with China.

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America as an Ally on Condition: France, Israel and Germany Debate the Cost of Trump’s War...

By September 25, the main American story provoking not merely interest but an anxious local debate in Paris, Berlin and Israel was no longer another declaration from Washington, but the consequences of the protracted US-Israeli war with Iran. The issue is no longer limited to Tehran’s nuclear program. Three interconnected questions have moved to the forefront: can Donald Trump actually bring the war he started to an end; how reliable are US military guarantees and supplies; and is America prepared to turn its own domestic political deadlines—above all, the November 3 congressional elections—into a timetable for international security?

The immediate catalyst was Trump’s September 22 speech at the UN. He said he expected to reach a deal with Iran immediately after the midterm elections, while at the same time leaving open the threat of a new and destructive escalation. In a Tagesschau analysis, this sounds almost like a formula for the current American approach: negotiations are under way, but their political meaning is being deferred until a convenient moment at home. This logic is particularly irritating for France. Paris sees the war as a direct source of energy and trade instability: the de facto blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has already hit maritime shipping and fuel prices. At a meeting with Trump in New York, Emmanuel Macron explicitly reminded him that he had considered the strikes on Iran a mistake from the outset. As Le Monde reports, the French president is simultaneously demanding results on Hormuz and promoting a UN Security Council resolution on freedom of navigation.

This is an important French distinction: Paris does not reduce the problem to the question of whether “the US will defeat Iran.” French debate views the war as an example of how military force without a clear political objective can produce the opposite result. A Le Monde analysis emphasizes that, rather than weakening the Islamic Republic as expected, the war has strengthened its hard-line core and expanded the scope for domestic repression. In a September article, the newspaper records an even more troubling conclusion for the West: Tehran is using American economic pressure and the approaching US elections as an incentive to intensify the pressure, believing that time is on its side. This assessment differs radically from the White House rhetoric of controlled success. The French view is not pacifist in any simplistic sense: Paris is prepared to defend energy infrastructure and shipping, but pointedly does not want to become a party to a new regional war. It is relying on international rules as a way to restrain the logic of mutual coercion between the US and Iran.

In Germany, the tone is different, but the diagnosis is similar: the key phrase here is strategic unpredictability. Berlin depends on the United States for the deterrence of Russia while being forced to watch that same America spend ammunition and political attention in the Middle East. Political scientist Sasha Lomann of the Berlin-based SWP foundation called Trump’s Iran policy “devoid of strategy”—a sharp characterization cited in a Tagesschau interview. German commentators link this not only to Trump’s contradictory statements but also to material consequences. When Defense Minister Boris Pistorius traveled to Washington to discuss expanding defense cooperation, it emerged that an independent US oversight body had identified a serious shortage of weapons and ammunition—including Patriot and Tomahawk missiles—caused by the war with Iran. Tagesschau reports on this in detail.

For Germany, this is almost a perfect illustration of a painful contradiction. Berlin wants to purchase American Tomahawks and has already committed to the F-35, but at the same time it is receiving proof that the US arsenal is not limitless and that Washington’s priorities can change quickly. In other words, the German reaction is not a rejection of the alliance, but an accelerated demand that Europe produce more of its own weapons. In the German view, the war with Iran is ceasing to be a “distant conflict”: it affects the availability of air-defense systems for Europe, support for Ukraine, energy prices and trust in US commitments. Hence the broader drive toward strategic autonomy—not as a break with America, but as insurance against its impulsiveness.

In Israel, the debate is the most paradoxical. The United States remains an indispensable ally, and the recent news of a major American delivery—“60,000 bombs on their way to Israel”, as Globes put it—is seen as confirmation of the depth of the military partnership. Yet it is also in Israel that the risk is being discussed most intensely that Trump could agree to a deal allowing him to declare victory without eliminating the long-term threat to Israel. Part of the Israeli expert community sees possible agreements with Tehran as a dangerous respite: Iran could gain time and resources to rebuild without abandoning its key military capabilities.

At the same time, it is telling that a significant part of the Israeli debate tries to explain American restraint not as “betrayal.” Eyal Tzir Cohen, former head of the Mossad’s International Relations Division, offers a more sober reading in a column for N12: Israel is thinking about how to push the Iranian threat as far into the future as possible, while the United States is asking whether it will then have to manage the consequences of the collapse of the Iranian regime for the next 20 years. This gap bears the imprint of Iraq and Afghanistan, competition with China and America’s fear of another endless war. “The problem has not been solved,” but Washington, according to this logic, is seeking not to defeat Iran definitively, but to prevent Iran from consuming America’s strategy.

This is where the French, German and Israeli reactions converge. France fears that the military campaign is destroying diplomacy and the global order; Germany fears that it is draining resources and making alliance commitments unreliable; Israel fears that America’s desire to leave the war will leave it alone with a revived threat. Yet all three societies are increasingly less inclined to see the United States as a power capable of simply imposing an outcome. America remains the center of power, a source of weapons, sanctions and diplomatic decisions. But its partners are seeing another America ever more clearly: a country whose foreign policy is tied to gasoline prices, Patriot stockpiles, voter sentiment and the president’s personal desire to quickly label any outcome a victory.

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America Loses Its Monopoly on Order: How France, Saudi Arabia and Israel Read Trump’s New...

The main American issue currently drawing the most lively reaction in France, Saudi Arabia and Israel is no longer the mere fact of the US confrontation with Iran, but whether Washington’s policy is capable of turning military pressure into a lasting order. On the sidelines of the UN General Assembly on September 22–23, Donald Trump spoke of “significant momentum” toward an agreement with Tehran following contacts between US representatives and Iranian intermediaries. But in Paris, Riyadh and Jerusalem, this formula is perceived in entirely different ways: for some, it is a belated attempt to escape a dangerous war; for others, a risk of concessions to Iran; and for still others, another test of the real value of American guarantees. The Israeli publication Globes reported Trump’s comments about “movement” toward a deal alongside his threat to Iran, neatly capturing the tension of the current situation: diplomacy is taking place not instead of pressure, but within it. (globes.co.il)

The French reaction is the most skeptical of the American strategy itself. The Paris press views the conflict through its consequences for the international order, the oil market and European security. Le Monde columnist Gilles Paris writes that the Houthi offensive has delivered another blow to the “fragile house of cards” of US Middle East policy: in his assessment, Trump has not only failed to ensure stability since the war with Iran began, but has also left Saudi Arabia alone to face the threat from Yemeni forces. Particularly telling is the claim, according to this interpretation, that the Americans held contacts with the Houthis in Oman, signaling that they did not want to become involved in the Saudi conflict. In his column for Le Monde, Paris explicitly calls this a wedge that the Houthis have managed to drive between the US and its main Arab ally. (lemonde.fr)

Behind France’s irritation lies more than an anti-adventurist reflex. France sees the protracted crisis around the Strait of Hormuz as proof that the American superpower can launch a campaign without calculating the political cost of continuing it. At the beginning of September, Le Monde expressed the idea bluntly: the United States had proved incapable of quickly changing Iran’s behavior, protecting the Gulf states from retaliatory strikes, or restoring normal shipping through Hormuz. From this perspective, Washington’s statements about a future deal sound not like a diplomatic breakthrough, but like a search for a way out of a strategic deadlock. A French editorial assessment even argues that the US voice in the region has lost its former centrality. (lemonde.fr)

The Saudi perspective is notably less ideological and far more practical. For Riyadh, the question of whether Trump is a strong or unpredictable leader is secondary to three measurable issues: whether Saudi cities and energy facilities are protected, whether the maritime export route remains open, and whether America is ready to honor its promises when an attack occurs. In the Saudi English-language press, the US war with Iran is described as a conflict in which Tehran retains its strongest lever—the ability to disrupt traffic through Hormuz and operate through allied armed groups. Dr. Abdel Aziz Aluwaisheg, assistant secretary-general for negotiations and strategic planning at the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, wrote in Arab News that Iran had exposed cracks in the opposing camp: France, Germany and Japan are not participating in the war, while the US has still been unable to achieve the full reopening of the strait. (arabnews.com)

This explains the Saudi ambivalence. Riyadh has no interest in an Iranian victory and does not consider Washington’s endless oscillation between blockade, strikes and negotiations acceptable. But it also does not want Washington to once again build a regional architecture without taking the interests of the Arab states themselves into account. Commentator Osama Al-Sharif, in Arab News, criticizes the American postwar scheme, based on containing Iran and expanding Arab-Israeli normalization: in his view, a repetition of prewar formulas will not bring stability, because those formulas already failed to prevent the current regional catastrophe. (arabnews.com) The Saudi reaction, therefore, does not amount to rejecting the US: it is a demand to replace general assurances with concrete protection and to recognize that Gulf security cannot be designed unilaterally in Washington.

The Israeli debate, by contrast, focuses on whether America’s drive for a deal could turn into a strategic respite for Tehran. In Israeli analysis, Trump appears neither as a peacemaker nor as an unreliable ally in the abstract, but as a politician constrained by US elections, energy prices and a desire to avoid another major war. In a Ynet commentary, Itamar Eichner characterizes the American strikes and pressure as a way to force Iran to accelerate negotiations, rather than as preparations for a full-scale war; the author emphasizes that rising oil prices and the approaching US midterm elections are pushing Trump toward limited, controlled escalation. (ynet.co.il)

But it is precisely this manageability that worries many in Israel. Globes analyst Dean Shmuel Elmas previously expressed the suspicion in exceptionally stark terms: Trump began the campaign by promising unprecedented pressure, but the risk of a global energy crisis then changed his priorities; Israel, according to this logic, is a useful partner as long as it helps pressure Iran, but not necessarily a participant in decisions about a compromise. In his analysis for Globes, a possible deal is portrayed as an agreement that could give Iran economic breathing room without easing Israeli concerns about its long-term military potential. (globes.co.il)

The paradox of the current international reaction to America is that France, Saudi Arabia and Israel assess the desired outcome differently, yet agree on one thing: the old formula of American leadership is no longer enough. France demands multilateralism and predictability; Saudi Arabia, material guarantees and infrastructure protection; Israel, an agreement that will not look like merely postponing the next Iranian crisis. For all three, Hormuz has become not merely a geographical chokepoint, but a symbol of a broader question: can America still serve as a guarantor of security if its partners are forced to hedge simultaneously through Europe, Turkey, Pakistan, China or their own military strength?

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America: A Power Others Negotiate With but Trust Less

The main picture emerging from Chinese, Turkish, and Brazilian discussions on September 22–24, 2026, is not simply a reaction to Washington’s latest statements. The United States is simultaneously seen as an indispensable negotiator, a source of military and economic risk, and a power increasingly willing to assert its right to set the rules in “its” regions. In China, attention is focused on Xi Jinping’s visit to the United States and the attempt to turn rivalry into manageable stability. In Turkey, the debate centers on whether Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s personal ties with Donald Trump can finally resolve long-standing defense and Syrian disputes. In Brazil, meanwhile, U.S. policy has become part of an almost existential argument over sovereignty and whether Latin America is returning to the status of Washington’s “backyard.”

The most prominent common theme is the clash between two visions of the international order. At the UN General Assembly on September 22, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva put it bluntly: “Brazil does not fit in anyone’s backyard.” In Agência Brasil’s official report, the phrase is presented as a defense of the country’s independence; Brazilian commentators saw it as a response to Trump, who at almost the same time was speaking about the United States’ readiness to use force to defend its interests in the Western Hemisphere. Analyst Fernanda Magnotta, writing in CNN Brasil, notes that for Brazil, sovereignty is not an abstract slogan but protection against an imbalance of power. From this perspective, the issue is not merely a bilateral quarrel with the United States, but also the right of a middle power to trade, choose its partners, and hold elections without external political pressure.

This issue has become especially sensitive because Brazil’s public debate links the American line to a revival of the Monroe Doctrine—the idea of a special U.S. role in the Americas. Folha de S.Paulo writes that fears of outside interference are already becoming a factor in the campaign ahead of the 2026 elections. The domestic reaction, however, is far from uniform: some see Lula’s tough position as necessary consolidation around the flag, while others believe the president is using the UN as an electoral platform. This divide was on display in the televised debate reported by CNN Brasil: former Justice Minister José Eduardo Cardozo defended the emphasis on sovereignty, while former Senator Ana Amélia Lemos viewed Lula’s formulation as a convenient campaign slogan. Yet the dispute itself is revealing: even Lula’s critics are forced to discuss relations with the United States in the language of national autonomy, rather than unconditional alliance.

China’s reaction to America is currently less emotional, but no less principled. Beijing’s official line surrounding Xi’s visit to the United States is built around the formula of “constructive strategic stability.” An article in the People’s Daily, published on the day the visit began, speaks of the need to pursue “the right path of coexistence between major powers” and highlights expanding contacts ranging from trade to artificial intelligence and biomedicine. This is not rhetoric expressing trust in Washington; rather, it is an attempt to establish a principle: competition must not turn into the destruction of communication channels. For Chinese audiences, stability primarily means buying time—for the economy, technological development, and the strengthening of China’s diplomatic network outside the American orbit.

Behind the official restraint, however, lies deep caution. A researcher at Fudan University’s Center for American Studies, in a commentary on the leaders’ meeting, calls Taiwan a “stress test” for the current rapprochement: a warm ceremony and trade agreements can coexist with a fundamental dispute over U.S. arms supplies to Taipei. Chinese analysts also view tariffs, export restrictions, and technology policy not as separate issues but as one system of American pressure. Beijing is therefore interested not in a romantic “reset,” but in a limited deal: reducing the risk of a trade or military breakdown without conceding issues of sovereignty and technological standing.

In Brazil, the Chinese-American summit is viewed from a different angle: as an indication of how inconsistent Trump’s foreign policy can be. CNN Brasil draws attention to the contrast between Xi’s lavish reception and the modest expectations for substantive agreements. For Brazilian observers, this offers an important lesson: Washington can simultaneously pressure countries in the region over trade, digital regulation, or domestic politics while conspicuously seeking compromise with its main systemic rival, China. Brazil’s conclusion is therefore that national strategy cannot be built on the assumption that U.S. policy will be consistent; ties must be diversified, and neither the United States nor China should become the sole center of gravity.

The Turkish debate is even more pragmatic. Ankara does not dispute U.S. global leadership in the same terms as Brazil, nor does it compete with Washington globally as China does. But it is increasingly separating personal diplomacy from structural interests. On September 23, President Erdoğan told a meeting with American business leaders that strategic cooperation with the United States was developing “in all areas,” presenting Turkey as a reliable manufacturing and logistics hub for supply chains undergoing restructuring; Anadolu Ajansı reported his remarks. Turkish commentators, however, are not taking this optimism at face value. A DW Türkçe analysis stresses that even with Trump’s political sympathy for Erdoğan, the CAATSA sanctions, Turkey’s return to the F-35 program, F-16 deliveries, and the consequences of the war surrounding Iran remain unresolved.

Iran is precisely what turns U.S.-Turkish relations from a bilateral bargaining process into a matter of Turkey’s national security. Turkish audiences view American pressure on Tehran not through an abstract debate about democracy or the nuclear program, but through the risk of new chaos along the border: migration, rising energy prices, the strengthening of armed non-state groups, and a new redrawing of Syria and Iraq. In a DW Türkçe report on Ankara’s role in the ceasefire, Turkey’s position is described as “active neutrality”—not a rejection of ties with the United States, but an attempt to act as a mediator and avoid becoming a party to someone else’s war. Turkey’s fear is not so much that Washington will necessarily attack Turkey itself, but that American actions will create a vacuum and a new balance of power whose consequences Iran’s neighbors will have to bear.

This is where an unexpected similarity emerges between Ankara, Brasília, and Beijing. All three capitals want to talk to the United States, benefit from trade, and avoid direct confrontation. But all three also see danger in America’s tendency to change the rules depending on the region and the balance of power. Brazil responds in the language of anti-colonial sovereignty, China with the formula of managed strategic stability, and Turkey through bargaining over security, arms, and its mediating role. The difference matters: China seeks to consolidate a balance between two superpowers, Brazil defends its right not to become an object of American hemispheric policy, and Turkey seeks to turn its geographic indispensability into a diplomatic asset.

Taken together, these reactions offer a more complex image of the United States than either the familiar notion of a simple “decline in influence” or that of unconditional American dominance. Washington remains the center around which other countries make their calculations: Xi travels for talks, Erdoğan seeks a deal, and Lula responds from the UN podium. But the United States is increasingly less often seen as a neutral guarantor of the rules. In Chinese texts, it is a competitor whose risks must be contained; in Turkey, an ally whose promises require verification; and in Brazil, a great power whose return to the language of spheres of influence must be politically restrained. This combination of dependence, pragmatism, and distrust best explains how America is perceived internationally today.

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America as a Source of Risk: Why India, Brazil and Japan Increasingly Talk Not About Alliance with the...

As of September 23, 2026, the image of the United States in Indian, Brazilian and Japanese discussions is shaped not by a single news story, but by a combination of three concerns: the protracted US war with Iran, Washington’s increasingly forceful use of trade and sanctions leverage, and doubts about how predictable American commitments to its partners really are. Each of the three countries discusses these issues in its own terms and through the lens of its own vulnerabilities—energy prices in India and Japan, sovereignty and elections in Brazil, and security around China and Taiwan in Japan. But a common conclusion is evident: America remains an indispensable power, yet it is no longer seen as an automatically stabilizing force.

The sharpest common issue is the US-Iran confrontation and the fate of the Strait of Hormuz. For India, this is not primarily an abstract conflict in the Middle East, but a threat to the energy security and economy of a country dependent on imported oil. The editorial board of The Indian Express put the problem in stark terms: until there is a durable agreement on how to manage the strait, the world will keep returning to military strikes and economic escalation. The newspaper notes that Washington is trying to combine military pressure with secondary sanctions, but is running up against reality: China buys most of Iran’s oil, making it impossible to punish all of Tehran’s trading partners without triggering another major conflict. In an editorial, the conflict is described as a trap in which military deterrence and the oil market are inseparable. (indianexpress.com)

Indian authors go beyond the usual criticism of the war. Political scientist Sankalp Gurjar, in a column for The Indian Express, calls US policy a “shadow” that has shaped India’s choice among suppliers from Iran, Venezuela and Russia for two decades. His conclusion is not anti-American but pragmatic: for an import-dependent country, diversifying suppliers is the only viable solution. (indianexpress.com) Former prime ministerial adviser Sanjaya Baru, in another column, offers an even more precise formula: India should not “break relations” with America, but reduce the risks of dependence on both the US and China. (indianexpress.com) In the Indian interpretation, Washington increasingly appears not as a partner expanding New Delhi’s room for maneuver, but as a player whose sanctions are narrowing it.

In Japan, the same conflict is viewed through a much more immediate everyday and industrial concern: oil, inflation and the vulnerability of maritime communications. Nobuhide Kiuchi, an economist at the NRI research institute, warns in an analysis published September 2 that even additional US oil supplies cannot fully replace volumes from the Middle East, and that dependence on decisions made in Washington is itself becoming a constraint. (nri.com) Japan’s state-backed organization JOGMEC notes that in August and September, US-Iran exchanges of fire, attacks on Saudi energy infrastructure and tensions around Yemen pushed oil prices to their highest level since May. (journal.jogmec.go.jp) For Tokyo, therefore, the issue is not only who is right in the conflict. More important is whether the American strategy can ensure stable shipping without turning Asia into a hostage of Middle Eastern escalation.

In Brazil, the tone is less connected to a physical energy shortage, but no less critical of the American approach. Brazilian analysis by CNN Brasil describes the naval blockade and the combination of sanctions with strikes as actions that do not bring negotiations closer, but instead push Tehran toward further military escalation. (cnnbrasil.com.br) A characteristic intuition of Brazil’s foreign-policy culture is evident here: a superpower’s pressure is judged not by its declared objective, but by whether it expands the war and undermines international rules.

The second common concern is the feeling that US domestic politics is beginning to export financial instability. This is discussed particularly openly in Brazil. In a piece about Donald Trump’s proposal to pay Americans $5,000 if Republicans win the midterm elections, the editorial board of Folha de S.Paulo calls such a policy fiscally irresponsible and argues that it undermines confidence not only in the White House, but also in the dollar. (www1.folha.uol.com.br) The comparison itself is especially revealing: the Brazilian newspaper likens the world’s leading power to the populist “caudillo of a banana republic.” This is not merely an emotional insult, but a sign of a profound shift in Latin American perceptions: US fiscal discipline is no longer taken for granted.

India’s reaction is less caustic, but similar in substance. American sanctions laws, tariffs and pressure over purchases of Russian or Iranian oil are seen there as an attempt by Washington to shift the cost of its geopolitics onto developing economies. India’s important distinction is that it is not seeking a symbolic break with the US. New Delhi is trying to build a system of safeguards—more energy sources, more settlement and trade options, and greater freedom of maneuver. Brazil, too, is discussing alternatives to the dollar-based system: a Folha article directly links doubts about US debt, sanctions and the rule of law to countries’ search for alternative payment and reserve mechanisms. (c-level.folha.uol.com.br)

Japan, by contrast, speaks more cautiously, but its concern may be the most strategic. Japanese commentators see a risk in America simultaneously spending resources in Iran, facing rising financial costs and beginning to treat Asia according to the logic of a short-term deal. In an analysis by nippon.com, the war with Iran is linked to a decline in US stocks of interceptor missiles and, consequently, to a possible weakening of deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. The authors call this the spread of “distrust in the United States,” and clearly state Japan’s main fear: the prolonged deployment of American forces to the Middle East could weaken defenses near Taiwan. (nippon.com)

That is why the scheduled September 24 meeting between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping is causing unease in Japan. In a television analysis by TV Asahi, experts suggest that Trump’s priority may be securing US access to China’s rare-earth metals, while Japan fears a deal in which economic gains would be purchased through concessions on Taiwan, including the issue of US arms deliveries to the island. (news.tv-asahi.co.jp) This is perhaps the most specifically Japanese view of today’s America: the ally remains essential, but cannot simply be trusted—it is necessary to agree on red lines in advance, because Washington may trade away part of the regional security architecture in exchange for an advantageous domestic political outcome.

Brazil’s distinctive concern is even more closely tied to domestic politics. There, the United States is discussed not only as a source of sanctions or trade tariffs, but also as a possible participant in the electoral struggle. CNN Brasil reports that Lula’s government sees a risk of US interference in the 2026 campaign that could benefit Flávio Bolsonaro. (cnnbrasil.com.br) And in a Folha essay, this danger is placed in a broader Latin American context: the new American policy is interpreted as the White House’s willingness to influence electoral outcomes in the Western Hemisphere. (www1.folha.uol.com.br) The paradox for Brazil’s right is that an overly conspicuous closeness to Trump could give Lula a powerful political resource—the opportunity to speak in the name of national sovereignty.

A single, though far from uniform, picture thus emerges. India responds to American pressure with strategic diversification. Brazil uses the language of sovereignty, democratic protection and financial distrust. Japan responds with the anxiety of an ally that fears not so much an American withdrawal as a sudden American deal made behind its back. These three reactions are not simple anti-Americanism. Rather, they reflect a new diplomatic caution: cooperation with America remains necessary, but policymakers increasingly have to act as though the main risk comes not from the absence of the United States, but from its unpredictable presence.

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America Between Threats and Bargaining: How Israel, Germany and China Read Trump’s UN Turn

The main theme uniting Israeli, German and Chinese reactions to the United States on September 22–23, 2026, was not simply Donald Trump’s speech at the UN General Assembly, but the formula for American policy that he demonstrated: Iran is being offered either a deal or the “destruction” of the Islamic Republic. Behind this stark alternative, observers in all three countries see the same contradiction: Washington wants to appear absolutely strong while simultaneously seeking a way out of a war that has lasted nearly seven months, is putting pressure on global energy markets and increasingly tying US foreign policy to the American electoral calendar. (thepaper.cn)

In Israel, this duality is perceived primarily through the lens of immediate security. Israeli media identify two parallel developments: the White House is conducting lengthy contacts with an Iranian delegation in New York through intermediaries, while Trump is simultaneously warning of possible new strikes on the underground nuclear facility at Mount Kuh-e-Mosh and speaking of “significant momentum” toward an agreement. A report by Israel Hayom describes this as an almost three-hour diplomatic contact followed by a threat to use force. For Israeli audiences, this is not diplomatic flexibility but a source of anxiety: negotiations could reduce the risk of immediate escalation, but they could also produce an agreement that leaves Iran room to rebuild its military capabilities. (israelhayom.co.il)

This concern is clearly visible in an analysis by N12, in which former Israeli military intelligence chief Amos Yadlin warns of an “agreement trap”: in his assessment, a bad deal would turn the tactical military successes of the United States and Israel into a strategic advantage for Tehran. Significantly, the issue is not limited to Iran’s nuclear program. Israeli debate demands that any American agreement also address ballistic missiles, regional proxy groups and Iran’s ability to threaten shipping. More right-wing commentators, such as Mati Tuchfeld in Walla, by contrast, see an achievement in the fact that American demands have nearly converged with Israel’s. Yet even this optimistic view rests on one condition: the United States must not make concessions when the pressure of war and oil prices pushes Trump toward a quick political result. (mako.co.il)

In Germany, the American dilemma is interpreted differently—not as a question of whether a deal is sufficiently tough, but as the risk of a war without a clear political conclusion. Germany’s Deutsche Welle quotes Iran expert Faten Aman, who says Trump is seeking to end the war in a way that would allow him to declare that Iran’s nuclear and military capabilities had been weakened, freedom of navigation restored and Tehran returned to the negotiating table. But the article emphasizes that Washington, Tehran and the Gulf states have different ideas about how the conflict should end. For German readers, this is particularly troubling because of maritime logistics and energy: tensions are spreading beyond the Strait of Hormuz to routes through the Red Sea, meaning the American operation is no longer a distant Middle Eastern crisis. (amp.dw.com)

German commentary on Trump’s UN speech also notes a striking change in tone. In Tagesschau, Martin Ganslmeier writes of a Trump who is “more statesmanlike and less confrontational,” but explains this restraint not as a change in convictions, but as the result of domestic pressure and a search for a way out. His key conclusion is that even a military superpower cannot resolve the crises in Gaza and the Strait of Hormuz on its own. In the German view, this is the main lesson of recent months: unilateral American pressure creates problems faster than it builds a lasting coalition to solve them. Trump’s return to the language of the UN is therefore interpreted not as a renewed faith in multilateralism, but as a forced acknowledgment of the limits of American power. (tagesschau.de)

China’s reaction links the Iran issue to a broader dispute over the kind of world order America is proposing. The Paper describes Trump’s speech as distinctly domestic and almost campaign-like: threats against Iran, attacks on the International Criminal Court and discussion of overseas conflicts are presented as a package of achievements ahead of the midterm elections. The Chinese presentation particularly highlights the contradiction between threatening to destroy another state and the principles of the UN Charter, which prohibit the threat or use of force. Chinese commentators see this less as a problem with Trump personally than as a symptom of American policy, in which international rules are considered useful only when they do not constrain Washington. (thepaper.cn)

Yet against the backdrop of this criticism, a second, more pragmatic theme is also apparent in China: Xi Jinping’s visit to the United States on September 23–25. Official and state-affiliated media are forcefully promoting the formula of “constructive strategic stability.” In a Global Times editorial, relations between the two countries are presented not as a matter of bilateral courtesy, but of global predictability: the United States and China must interact on the basis of equality, respect and mutual benefit. However, another editorial in the newspaper accompanies this aspiration with a firm caveat: dialogue does not mean accepting rules established by the United States, and American military pressure cannot force Beijing to retreat on issues China considers its core interests. (globaltimes.cn)

This is where the three countries’ unexpectedly shared mood lies. Israel wants America not to trade security for a hasty deal; Germany wants America not to turn threats into an endless war with global economic consequences; China wants America to stop confusing strategic stability with the right to dictate terms. All three reactions, in different ways, question America’s ability to combine strength, diplomacy and domestic politics. Israel fears a lack of American resolve, Germany fears an excess of it, and China fears its unilateralism. But their overall conclusion sounds similar: after Trump’s UN speech, Washington appears not as the unquestioned arbiter of the world order, but as a power simultaneously trying to end the conflict, save face and prove to its voters that it still has complete control over events.

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America as a Source of Risk and Bargaining: How Russia, Turkey and Ukraine Read Trump’s New...

In recent days, the United States has been discussed in Russia, Turkey and Ukraine not so much as a single geopolitical player as a country whose foreign policy increasingly depends on domestic electoral arithmetic, tariffs and the White House’s ability to turn sanctions into a negotiating tool. The immediate trigger was Donald Trump’s signing on September 19 of a law imposing new restrictions on Russia and Iran. It opens the way for sanctions against Russian entities and secondary tariffs on major buyers of Russian energy. But local reactions show that the same decision is perceived very differently in the three countries—as a threat, an opportunity and the subject of complex bargaining.

In the Russian debate, the central question is not “How harsh is the law?” but “Will Trump decide to use it?” In The Bell’s analysis, the new law is described as a mechanism requiring the president to take measures within 30 days while making them more difficult to repeal. At the same time, however, it presents a pragmatic counterargument: the White House may try to suspend the most painful steps until the November 3 midterm elections, fearing a rise in fuel prices. The Russian perspective, therefore, is not limited to the familiar denial of sanctions’ impact. It rests on the assumption that Trump will primarily measure any escalation in foreign policy by its cost to American voters.

This represents an important change in tone. Even in the relatively restrained review by Kommersant, the law is referred to as U.S. “hell sanctions”—an event of the week that cannot be dismissed as routine Washington anti-Russian policy. Russian commentators, however, see it less as America’s return to a consistent strategy of containment than as another example of U.S. unpredictability: Trump’s previous willingness to make deals and seek contacts with Moscow is now combined with pressure, while the outcome will depend on what is more advantageous to the U.S. president at any given moment.

Ukraine’s reaction is outwardly far more optimistic, but it too is far from unreservedly enthusiastic. In a detailed analysis by European Pravda, the law’s adoption is portrayed as a rare moment when Congress created a real lever of pressure on Russia for Kyiv: the sanctions could affect not only Moscow but also countries helping it maintain energy-export revenues. It is particularly important for Ukraine that this is not merely another statement of support, but a legal framework limiting the White House’s own room for maneuver.

At the same time, Ukrainian authors warn that the law does not amount to America’s strategic return to its former role. In a column for Ukrainska Pravda, some Democrats’ vote for the sanctions is explained not by a sudden consensus on Ukraine, but by institutional, electoral and intra-party considerations. The author draws a conclusion unpleasant for Kyiv: the long-term security of Europe and Ukraine’s very survival are no longer viewed by a significant part of the American political elite as unconditional priorities. In other words, Ukraine’s hopes are tied not to trust in Trump but to an attempt to exploit disagreements between Congress and the White House, making aid and pressure on Russia more difficult to reverse.

The perspective of Ukrainian financial expert Oleksii Kushch is particularly revealing. In his column for Glavkom, the sanctions law is interpreted primarily through the lens of the U.S. domestic economy. In his view, Trump is “packaging” tariff policy in a sanctions framework to secure bipartisan support and use external pressure to address his own budgetary and industrial objectives. For a Ukrainian audience, this is a sobering explanation: Washington may act against Russia, but the motive will not necessarily be solidarity with Ukraine—it will more likely involve American deficits, trade policy and competition with China.

In Turkey, the sanctions law is provoking an entirely different set of concerns. The main issue here is not the fate of the Russian economy as such, but the risk that secondary U.S. tariffs could hit Turkish trade and energy security. Dünya Gazetesi writes directly about the possibility of additional duties of up to 100% on buyers of Russian oil and gas, emphasizing that the 30-day period now under way is critical for Ankara, as Washington decides how to use the powers it has obtained. In Turkey, the U.S. decision is perceived as a potential threat not to an abstract “third world,” but to Turkish exports, the banking system and energy prices.

This explains Turkey’s distinctive ambivalence. Ankara wants to preserve relations with Washington and make progress on CAATSA and the F-35 program, but it also cannot easily abandon its energy and trade ties with Russia. In a review by Ekonomim, a possible meeting between Erdoğan and Trump in New York is described as negotiations on several interconnected issues at once: sanctions, the S-400s, the F-35, the war involving Iran and economic risks. U.S. Ambassador Tom Barrack, for his part, said that the dispute over the Russian S-400s “will be resolved,” but added the telling phrase that “the ball is in many courts,” acknowledging that the problem involves both U.S. legislation and questions concerning the systems’ operation or future. Anadolu Ajansı reported these remarks.

The Iranian issue reinforces Turkey’s sense that the United States creates crises while simultaneously using them as negotiating leverage. During Trump’s meeting with the leaders of the Persian Gulf states and Erdoğan, the U.S. president reportedly expressed the view that the crisis with Iran would end after the November 3 U.S. midterm elections, according to Anadolu Ajansı. To a Turkish observer, this amounts almost to an open admission that the regional war is tied to the calendar of American domestic politics. Ankara is especially vulnerable to this: any disruption to shipping and any increase in oil prices quickly turn into inflation and pressure on Turkey’s balance of payments.

The common denominator in the Russian, Ukrainian and Turkish reactions is not faith in America’s unchanging power, but doubt about its predictability. In Moscow, people believe that a sanctions strike could become a bargaining chip. In Kyiv, there is hope that Congress will be able to tie the White House’s hands, but no certainty that this will last. In Ankara, there is concern about becoming collateral damage from American pressure on Russia and Iran, while simultaneously trying to convert the Erdoğan–Trump personal channel into concessions on defense and trade.

The most unexpected conclusion from this three-way picture is that America is now perceived not as an arbiter setting the rules, but as a variable. In Russia, Ukraine and Turkey, its sanctions, military decisions and diplomatic promises are all read through the same question: what will Trump need before November 3—a reduction in prices, a high-profile deal, a show of strength or an opportunity to postpone the conflict?

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America as a Source of Risk and Dependence: What South Korea, Brazil and Ukraine Are Saying...

In South Korea, Brazil and Ukraine, the United States has been discussed in recent days not as a distant superpower, but as an immediate factor in domestic politics, economic resilience and military security. The focus is on America’s war with Iran, Washington’s trade pressure and the Donald Trump administration’s attempts to accelerate negotiations on Ukraine. The common thread running through these discussions is that U.S. allies and partners are increasingly trying to understand not only America’s goals, but also how dependent those goals are on Washington’s domestic political calendar—above all, the midterm elections to Congress in November 2026.

This is especially evident in Ukraine. Kyiv’s discussion of the recent trip by U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner to Moscow and Kyiv is far from euphoric. In an analysis by Ukrainska Pravda, an Americanist directly warns that the visit may have only a limited effect, because only Trump himself is capable of becoming truly involved in the settlement, while his attention has already been consumed by the elections. Ukraine’s response is pragmatic: Washington is still viewed as an indispensable participant in any potential agreement, but its mediation is judged by results—fewer Russian strikes and deliveries of air-defense equipment—not by the number of diplomatic missions. It is no coincidence that Ukrainian authors link talk of “progress by winter” to the chronic shortage of Patriot interceptor missiles.

The U.S. war with Iran is intensifying these concerns. A February review by the Razumkov Centre articulates Ukraine’s key fear: American military and diplomatic resources are shifting toward a theater that Trump considers a higher priority, threatening to reduce assistance to Ukraine, above all in air defense. There is also a bitter paradox here. A weakening of Iran could potentially complicate Russia’s position, since Moscow has long used Iranian technology and connections. But Ukrainian analysts do not consider this an automatic benefit: Russia could turn the Middle Eastern crisis into a new bargaining chip with the United States and Europe, offering mediation, oil or gas in exchange for political concessions. For Kyiv, American power is important, but the unpredictable use of that power may prove no less dangerous than its absence.

In South Korea, American policy is also viewed through the lens of dependence—but a different kind: energy, military and technological dependence. The ongoing conflict with Iran is causing concern over the Strait of Hormuz, energy prices and the possibility that Seoul will be pressured to expand its role in ensuring freedom of navigation. Korean commentator Moon Hee-jeong, speaking on Kyunghyang, links the protracted U.S.-Iranian confrontation specifically to the possibility of pressure on South Korea to send forces to the Hormuz region. For a country that remains a U.S. ally amid the North Korean threat, this is not an abstract dispute over the international order, but a question of where an ally’s obligations end and unacceptable risks begin.

At the same time, Seoul is seeking not to oppose Washington, but to expand its room for maneuver. Ahead of President Lee Jae-myung’s trip to the UN General Assembly, National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac spoke about contacts with American leaders and cooperation in energy, semiconductors and technology, while also emphasizing a policy of “practical diplomacy oriented toward national interests.” This is the logic of South Korea’s response: the alliance with the United States remains the foundation of security, but U.S. economic policy is now perceived as an independent threat. Industry Minister Kim Jung-kwan said Seoul was seeking to ensure that American tariffs on Korean chips did not put the country at a disadvantage compared with its competitors; Washington is discussing tariffs not only on semiconductors, but also on finished electronics. This is turning South Korean investment in the United States from a symbol of the alliance into an object of constant bargaining. (admin.korea.kr)

Brazil views the same American trend even more harshly: not as an awkward negotiation between allies, but as the return of spheres-of-influence politics. The main topic of Brazil’s debate is concern over U.S. interference in the 2026 presidential election. According to Agência Brasil, a report by Brazil’s intelligence agency Abin, sent to the president, the electoral court and the Justice Ministry, raised the risk of American influence on the campaign to the level of a critical threat. In Brazil’s perception, this is not an isolated diplomatic episode: tariffs, pressure over social-media regulation, sanctions, disputes over criminal groups and contacts between U.S. authorities and Bolsonaro-aligned circles combine into a single picture of external pressure.

Particularly controversial was a report by Folha de S.Paulo about a draft U.S. demand to allow “political dissidents” to participate in the election. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva called the document a “dead file” for his government and responded in the most sovereignist terms possible: Brazil’s critical minerals belong to Brazil, just as its elections do. This statement matters as more than campaign rhetoric. In Brazil, two issues that are often handled separately in American policy are converging: control over strategic resources and control over the country’s political direction. As a result, American pressure is perceived not as an ordinary trade conflict, but as a dispute over Brazil’s right to choose its economic partners and political model independently. (www1.folha.uol.com.br)

This is where the differences among the three countries are most revealing. Ukraine fears that the United States will withdraw from its war too far or too soon; South Korea fears that Washington will drag it into someone else’s conflict while also exploiting its trade dependence; Brazil fears that the American administration will try to influence the very mechanism by which power changes hands. Yet all three responses converge on one point: the old formula under which closeness to the United States automatically meant predictability no longer works.

The most unexpected common feature is not anti-Americanism. Neither Seoul nor Kyiv, nor even Brasília, sees a realistic alternative to engagement with the United States. South Korea continues to discuss chips, investment and security with America; Ukraine regards Washington as a key player in any peace; and despite the conflict, Lula has maintained a channel of personal communication with Trump. But the relationships are becoming increasingly less ideological. Their new formula is this: cooperation is necessary, but every American promise is now assessed through its concrete cost—Patriot missiles, tariffs on chips, election security, control over resources and the right not to become a participant in a war they did not choose themselves.

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America as a Source of Risk: Why Paris, Tokyo and Seoul Are Increasingly Discussing Not U.S

By September 21, 2026, discussions of America in France, Japan and South Korea have come to share not one sensational story, but a common perception: under Donald Trump, Washington’s policy has become simultaneously more belligerent, more personalized and less predictable for its allies. At the forefront are the protracted U.S. war with Iran, the sudden reduction of U.S.–South Korean military exercises, and the transformation of trade and investment issues into instruments of political pressure. In local debates, the United States is no longer seen simply as a guarantor of order. Increasingly, it is viewed as a partner whose decisions can instantly alter the military balance, oil prices and the conditions for access to the American market. (lemonde.fr)

The most painful issue they share is the war with Iran, because it is forcing allies to question America’s ability to manage the Middle East while simultaneously deterring threats in Asia. In the French press, the concern is framed primarily as a question of Washington’s strategic capacity. In a Le Monde article, the Trump administration’s unpredictability is presented not as an episode of diplomatic eccentricity, but as a factor forcing Asian allies to reconsider their entire security architecture. The French perspective is characteristic: it focuses less on whether the United States will win a particular campaign and more on whether America’s very way of waging war is undermining trust in alliances and international rules.

Japan’s reaction is even more concrete. In an analysis by Nippon.com, the war with Iran is described as a source of American distrust that Washington is “spreading itself.” For Tokyo, the main risk lies not only in oil and shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. If U.S. aircraft carriers and other forces remain tied down in the Middle East for an extended period, deterrence in the Indo-Pacific will weaken—above all in a potential crisis around Taiwan. This is an important Japanese qualification to the American agenda: in Washington, Iran is often treated as a separate theater, while in Tokyo it is seen as an event that directly changes the calculations of Beijing, Pyongyang and Moscow.

In South Korea, the Iranian issue is also heard as an economic and political threat. Korean commentators note that Trump has publicly promised to end the war after the November midterm elections, linking the end of the conflict to falling oil prices. The Hankyoreh interpreted this as an attempt to reassure voters alarmed by the prolonged war and high energy prices. But for Seoul, the very linkage is troubling: the security of a crucial oil route and the fate of the conflict appear to depend on the U.S. domestic political calendar. And when Trump said on September 18 that a “serious decision” was approaching—whether to resume major strikes against Iran—Korean newspapers read it as a signal that the scale of escalation is still determined by the president’s personal choice rather than by a stable allied strategy. (mk.co.kr)

The second issue is the price of the American alliance. This became particularly acute after Trump’s August 17 order to sharply reduce joint U.S.–South Korean exercises, citing his “excellent relationship” with Kim Jong Un. The conservative South Korean newspaper Dong-A Ilbo expressed the fear in stark terms: a unilateral reduction in exercises casts the shadow of a “Korea without Korea”—that is, the risk of a direct Washington–Pyongyang deal made over Seoul’s head. In this view, the problem is not simply the number of days of exercises; it is that the ally does not know whether its defense might become a bargaining chip in the U.S. president’s personal diplomacy.

There is, however, another, more pragmatic view in Korea. Lee Sang-shin, director of the Unification Policy Department at the Korea Institute for National Unification, argues in an institute analysis that reducing the exercises could potentially be compatible with Seoul’s policy of “responsible peaceful coexistence” with the North. In his assessment, the theory that Korea was being punished for refusing to participate in the Iranian operation should not be overemphasized. More important is to use the opening to resume U.S.–North Korean dialogue—while ensuring that Seoul is not excluded from it. This is the distinctly Korean duality: concern over American unreliability coexists with the hope that the same unpredictability could open a path toward easing tensions on the peninsula.

Japanese analysts view this as a redistribution of responsibilities throughout the American alliance system. In an East Asia Institute report, the simultaneous expansion of the Japan–U.S.–Australia Oriental Shield 26 exercises and reduction of the U.S.–Korean program are described as an asymmetric restructuring: the burden is increasing along the Japan–Australia–India axis while weakening along the U.S.–Korea axis. This leads to an unusually sober Japanese conclusion: Tokyo should not automatically interpret the reduction in exercises as an American withdrawal, but it must prepare for Washington to demand ever more insistently that allies bear the costs and risks of regional deterrence themselves. (global.eai.or.kr)

The French view overlaps with the Japanese one, but leads to a different political instinct. For Paris, the instability of American commitments is another argument in favor of European strategic autonomy. French observers see Trump’s conduct as more than an Asian problem: it demonstrates how dangerous it is to build security on the assumption that the U.S. president will consistently follow established alliance practices. Paris is therefore more focused on Europe’s ability to act independently, while Tokyo is concerned with strengthening the network of alliances around Japan, and Seoul with avoiding becoming an object of negotiations between great powers.

The third common thread is the merging of economics and security. Trump is pressuring the Federal Reserve, threatening to halt trade with countries that run trade surpluses with the United States, and making no secret of his willingness to use tariffs as a personal lever. As Le Monde notes, this approach is not reducing uncertainty but expanding it: tariffs fuel inflation, while political pressure on the Fed calls into question the predictability of U.S. economic policy. For France, this is above all a warning about the vulnerability of European exporters to bilateral threats from Washington.

For South Korea, economic pressure is already inseparable from alliance issues. The Korean newspaper Hankyoreh cites Andrew Yeo, a Korean affairs specialist at the Brookings Institution, as saying that accumulated disagreements over investment in the United States could damage relations between the two countries, with security and economics in the Trump administration potentially ending up “on the same table.” This is especially revealing: Seoul’s investments, participation in U.S. projects, shipbuilding, technology and possible support in the Strait of Hormuz are all becoming elements of a single bargain. Even tariffs on specific Korean goods, including solar-energy and drone components, are perceived not as ordinary commercial measures but as part of this new negotiating environment. (hani.co.kr)

This is where the French, Japanese and Korean reactions converge. They do not share an identical assessment of Trump: in France, concern is stronger over international law and European autonomy; in Japan, over a military vacuum in Asia; and in Korea, over the risk of being bypassed in negotiations with the North. But all three countries reach the same conclusion: America remains an indispensable power, yet the old formula of trust in it no longer works automatically. An alliance with Washington now requires not only loyalty but also constant hedging—with national military capabilities, diversified economic ties and readiness for the next American turn to be announced on social media before allied capitals even hear about it.

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America as a Source of Risk, Not Support: What Germany, France and Turkey Say Today

Discussions of the United States in Germany, France and Turkey as of September 21, 2026, are dominated not by individual statements from Donald Trump, but by a sense that American policy is simultaneously changing the rules of security, trade and domestic European politics. The focus is on the protracted US war with Iran and instability around the Strait of Hormuz, American tariff pressure on European exports, and Trump’s openly ideological sympathy for Europe’s right-wing populists. However, the overall conclusion differs in the three countries: Paris and Berlin are increasingly speaking of the need to protect European agency from American unpredictability; Ankara, by contrast, is trying to turn its personal channel with Trump into practical concessions, while remaining skeptical of Washington’s declarations.

The most difficult issue is Iran. The German reaction is particularly sharp: in a commentary by ARD correspondent Carsten Küntopp, titled “Trump Has Squandered American Power”, the war is presented not as a demonstration of strength, but as the self-weakening of the United States, whose consequences are already affecting Europe as well. From this perspective, Washington is losing on two fronts at once: it is diverting resources needed to deter other threats and forcing its allies to live with energy, logistical and military risks they did not choose. This marks an important shift in the German debate: the question is no longer whether the United States is being decisive enough, but whether it has become the main generator of strategic instability for its own partners. (tagesschau.de)

In France, the same war is viewed through the lens of America’s economic vulnerability and the danger of an internal political breakdown. Le Monde links the Federal Reserve’s rate hike on September 16—made despite Trump’s demands—to the inflationary effects of both the military campaign against Iran and the trade war. To French observers, this amounts to an almost mirror-image refutation of Trump’s promise: a president who came to power pledging to reduce the cost of living and avoid expensive foreign wars has become entangled in a conflict that is raising fuel prices, putting pressure on debt and turning the US economy into a source of external shock. (lemonde.fr)

The Turkish debate is less moralizing and considerably more practical. For Ankara, the war in Iran is not a distant crisis, but a security factor on its own borders, a threat to trade with Iran and a potential bargaining chip with the United States. Political scientist Necmettin Acar, in an Anadolu Ajansı analysis, emphasizes that Trump’s hard line grew out of a long-standing anti-Iran consensus among the American elite, but that this consensus is no longer as firmly rooted in American society. From Turkey, this is read as a sign that Washington’s current policy may be loud, but not necessarily sustainable. Ankara is therefore interested not in choosing a side in the US-Iran confrontation, but in avoiding the secondary economic and political consequences of the conflict. (aa.com.tr)

It is here that the most distinctive Turkish reaction to America becomes apparent: the closeness between Erdoğan and Trump is viewed as a useful but highly unreliable asset. In an article published today by DW Türkçe, the leaders’ expected meeting on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly is linked not to rhetoric about friendship, but to concrete unresolved dossiers—CAATSA sanctions, the F-35 program and the war in Iran; at the time of publication, neither the format nor the exact timing of the talks had been confirmed. In his column, journalist Murat Yetkin ironically questions US Ambassador Tom Barrack’s claim that relations between the two countries are supposedly at their best in history. Turkey’s conclusion is straightforward: warm personal relations may open a door, but they do not eliminate American sanctions mechanisms, disagreements over Syria or Washington’s dependence on its own Middle East strategy. (amp.dw.com)

The second major line of dispute concerns tariffs. In France, this is no longer an abstract debate about free trade, but an assessment of damage by sector. In a September study, the French Treasury states that after the alignment of US tariffs for different partners, the EU has found itself in a less favorable position than Canada, Mexico and the United Kingdom; competitive pressure is increasing most sharply on European machinery, chemicals, agriculture, steel, electronics and automobiles. French Customs separately notes that the additional Section 301 regime for imports from the EU has been in effect since July 24, while a number of metal-containing goods face much higher rates. (tresor.economie.gouv.fr)

In German and French perceptions, the tariffs have become proof that Trump’s economic nationalism cannot be separated from his geopolitics. The United States demands European solidarity on security issues, while simultaneously restructuring the market so that European manufacturers either move production to America or lose their competitiveness. As a result, what is growing is not so much old-style anti-Americanism as a demand for European protection against the United States: an independent industrial policy, less vulnerable supply chains and the ability to act without automatically relying on Washington. For France, this continues the familiar language of “strategic autonomy”; for Germany, which built its prosperity over many years on exports and the transatlantic market, it represents a far more painful rethinking.

Finally, the most politically explosive issue is the transfer of the Trumpist model to Europe. Following the AfD’s success in Saxony-Anhalt, Trump publicly welcomed the result, ending his message with the formula “MGGA”—an obvious imitation of MAGA. In a Deutschlandfunk analysis, historian Volker Depkat advises against reducing the AfD to a German version of Trumpism, but acknowledges a deep ideological and stylistic affinity: anti-elite mobilization, a hard-line migration agenda, distrust of institutional constraints and a politics of permanent conflict. For many Germans, American support for the AfD looks not like ordinary sympathy for an ideologically similar party, but like interference by an ally in Germany’s extremely sensitive history. (deutschlandfunk.de)

In France, the reaction to the same episode is more mixed. In a tribune for Le Monde, historian Frédéric Bozo warns that the breakthrough of the far right in Germany could strengthen existing French Euroskepticism, because Germany is ceasing to appear an unquestioned model of a stable European democracy. But France’s far-right political landscape reacted unevenly: Reconquête welcomed the AfD’s success, while Rassemblement National preferred cautious silence, aware of the toxicity of too close an association with the German party, particularly over the issue of “remigration.” (lemonde.fr)

An unexpected common picture thus emerges. Germany sees today’s America as a risk to its democracy and security; France sees it as a risk to European economic and political sovereignty; Turkey sees it as a risk that can be partially converted into deals, but cannot be taken on trust. Trump remains the most influential external actor for all three countries, but the image of the United States as a predictable guarantor of order is giving way to that of a power with which they must negotiate, hedge against and account for its impact on their own domestic politics.

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America as a Tool of Pressure: Why Russia, India and South Africa Are Debating More Than Trump

By September 20, 2026, discussion of the United States in Russia, India and South Africa had converged around one shared concern: Washington is increasingly openly combining trade barriers, visa restrictions and military force into a single set of foreign-policy tools. Several events in recent days provided the immediate impetus. On September 18, Donald Trump signed a law expanding sanctions against Russia and giving the White House the authority to impose tariffs of up to 100% on major buyers of Russian oil and gas. At the same time, the U.S. administration announced visa restrictions on South Africans it considers involved in discrimination against the white minority and the expropriation of land without compensation. Meanwhile, the ongoing U.S. campaign against Iran is keeping global oil prices at levels where every new sanctions decision becomes a matter not only of diplomacy, but also of the cost of gasoline, food and industrial production. (rbc.ru)

The sanctions law signed by Trump became the central issue in discussions in Moscow and New Delhi. In the Russian interpretation, this is not merely another round of restrictions against Russia itself, but an attempt to punish its entire foreign-trade infrastructure—banks, ships, suppliers and, above all, buyers of its energy resources. As RBC reported, the document allows for secondary tariffs of up to 100% on the largest importers of Russian oil and gas; India and China are among the obvious potential targets. Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov described such steps as “unfriendly actions” that would complicate the search for a peaceful settlement in Ukraine. This is an important detail: Russia’s response is based less on a promise of an immediate countermeasure than on the argument that the United States is declaring itself a mediator while simultaneously expanding its economic war. (rbc.ru)

In India, the issue is viewed in even more practical terms—as a threat to national energy security. An editorial in Jansatta describes the situation as pressure that forces New Delhi to choose between cheap oil, the stability of the domestic market and access for Indian goods to the U.S. market. The Indian press emphasizes that this is not yet an automatically imposed 100% tariff, but rather the transfer to Trump of the power to threaten or impose one. It is precisely this uncertainty that causes the greatest irritation: trade rules are becoming a matter of presidential discretion. (jansatta.com)

The tone of Dainik Jagran is particularly telling: the newspaper writes that an arbitrary increase in tariffs against India would be an expression of American “ego.” But the Indian view is not reducible to emotional anti-Americanism. Local economists are discussing a calculated dilemma: Russian oil provides a price cushion, but losing the U.S. market would hurt exports of mobile phones, engineering products, textiles and leather. In an editorial, Amrit Vichar suggests that the law should be seen primarily as a negotiating weapon—not necessarily as an immediate economic attack, but as an opportunity to demand concessions first and then offer a lower rate. (jagran.com)

This is where the Russian and Indian narratives unexpectedly coincide. In Moscow, secondary sanctions are viewed as an attempt to cut Russia off from its export markets. In India, they are seen as an attempt to force a third country to pay for the U.S. strategy toward Russia. In both cases, the United States appears not as a partner offering alternatives, but as a state attempting to change another country’s economic behavior by threatening to restrict access to its market. Indian expert Ajay Srivastava, founder of the Global Trade Research Initiative, stated this logic directly: the United States could first threaten a 100% rate and then offer a lower tariff as the subject of a deal. (hindi.business-standard.com)

In South Africa, however, the same American method appears differently—not through oil, but through history, race and sovereignty. Washington’s decision to restrict visas for South African officials whom the United States considers responsible for racial discrimination, a policy of expropriating land without compensation or incitement to violence triggered an especially painful reaction in Pretoria. The South African government rejected the U.S. allegations as distortions spread by fringe groups. (aljazeera.com)

South Africa’s public debate is therefore not centered on whether people in the country sympathize with the United States, but on the question: who has the right to define the meaning of post-apartheid land redistribution? In an IOL column, new measures by Secretary of State Marco Rubio are described as an attempt to impose a “racial veto” on post-apartheid restitution policies. The author sees the U.S. intervention not as the protection of minorities, but as an effort to portray any demands for historical justice as racism against whites. This sharply conflicts with the position of Afrikaner groups lobbying for their agenda in the United States, but it shows why the conflict with Washington is perceived within South Africa as a dispute over national dignity, rather than as a technical visa issue. (iol.co.za)

There is also a more pragmatic South African interpretation of events. International-affairs correspondent Peter Fabricius, writing for Eyewitness News, notes that the immediate reason for the new pressure remains unclear and suggests it may be connected to Pretoria’s relations with Tehran. This turns the dispute over the status of Afrikaners into a possible lever in a broader geopolitical deal: Washington may be using South Africa’s internal disagreements to influence its foreign-policy autonomy and its ties through BRICS. (ewn.co.za)

It is precisely the U.S. war with Iran that links the reactions of all three countries into a single story. For India, it means higher oil prices and risks to maritime routes through the Strait of Hormuz; for Russia, a more complicated global oil market amid sanctions pressure; and for South Africa, confirmation of concerns that international law is applied selectively. Back in March, the South African government officially condemned the U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran as violations of the prohibition on the use of force enshrined in the UN Charter. (gov.za)

Russian commentators emphasize the inconsistency of the American approach. In Kommersant, Orientalist Farhad Ibrahimov noted that Trump initially spoke of a swift end to the Iranian conflict and then suggested that negotiations were not an urgent priority; meanwhile, the Strait of Hormuz remains a source of risk for global trade. For India, this creates an almost paradoxical problem: the United States demands that it reduce purchases of Russian oil, while its own military policy in the Middle East makes alternative supplies more expensive and less predictable. (kommersant.ru)

The main conclusion from the reactions of Russia, India and South Africa is that Trump’s U.S. policy is perceived not as a series of isolated episodes—sanctions against Moscow, tariffs against New Delhi, visa restrictions against Pretoria or an operation against Iran. It is seen as a single model: the United States uses dependence on its market, the dollar, visas and security to demand political loyalty. Only the vulnerabilities of the countries differ. Russia is defending the resilience of its exports, India the right to choose an energy supplier for 1.4 billion people, and South Africa the right to decide for itself how to address the legacy of apartheid. But the common response is becoming increasingly clear: not a break with America, but the search for such diversification of trade, energy and diplomatic ties that threats from Washington will no longer be tantamount to orders.

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America as a Source of Risk: Why India, South Africa and South Korea Are Increasingly Talking About...

Events in recent days—above all, the law signed by Donald Trump on September 18 allowing tariffs of up to 100% on major buyers of Russian energy, a new wave of pressure on Pretoria, and continuing uncertainty surrounding US tariffs on semiconductors—have prompted a similar feeling in India, South Africa and South Korea: Washington is increasingly turning access to its market, investment and visas into a tool of coercion. Local reactions, however, differ markedly. In India, this is seen as an attempt to force the country to choose between energy security and its strategic partnership with the United States; in South Africa, as interference in painful domestic disputes over racial inequality and land reform; and in South Korea, as a demand to pay for security and trade access with ever-new investment commitments.

The Indian debate now revolves less around the immediate imposition of a 100% tariff than around the White House’s very right to apply it at its political discretion. The law is aimed at Russia’s revenues from oil and gas exports, but its potential victims are primarily India and China. In an editorial titled “American Arbitrariness” in Dainik Jagran, this approach is described as American arbitrariness: New Delhi, the publication stresses, cannot silently accept punishment for buying oil essential to its economy. The logic of local commentators is simple: for India, Russian oil is not an ideological gesture in Moscow’s favor, but insurance against price spikes for a country of 1.4 billion people.

It is particularly telling that India also views the American threat as potentially damaging to the United States itself. In an editorial comment by Jansatta, the paper warns that if India sharply reduces its purchases of cheap crude, the global oil market will become even tighter, driving prices higher far beyond South Asia. Ajay Srivastava, founder of the Global Trade Research Initiative, told Navbharat Times that India should not alter its long-term energy strategy in exchange for uncertain tariff concessions: in his assessment, Russian oil has already reduced India’s import bill. This does not mean Indian commentators underestimate the threat. On the contrary, many consider it serious precisely because it affects exports—from textiles and pharmaceuticals to engineering products. But the prevailing response is not fear, but a demand for reciprocity: friendship with the United States should not mean abandoning the independent definition of national interests. The law does give the president broad discretion to decide whom to punish and by how much, turning it into an instrument not only of sanctions policy but also of negotiations. (ogj.com)

In South Africa, US pressure has taken on an even more politically charged character. Washington links new visa restrictions against South African officials to allegations of discrimination against white citizens and to the country’s land-expropriation law; Pretoria rejects these accusations. International analyst Kingsley Makhubela, speaking to eNCA, saw the campaign as preparation for a “broader attack on the legitimacy” of the South African government. This is an important local perspective: for many, the dispute is not limited to visas. It concerns whether a foreign power will be granted the right to assess and effectively reshape policies on affirmative action, land reform and economic transformation—measures inseparable in South Africa from the legacy of apartheid. (enca.com)

At the same time, South African commentators are not calling for a romantic break with America. Their concern is pragmatic: political grievances may be followed by trade consequences—new tariffs, investment restrictions or pressure through AGOA, the US program granting African goods preferential access to the American market. In a conversation with Moneyweb, there was concern that AGOA could become Washington’s “stick” in its dispute with Pretoria. The editorial board of Financial Mail welcomed the program’s extension through the end of 2028, but stressed its ambiguity: preferential treatment has been preserved, yet tariffs have already undermined its practical value, while South Africa’s membership remains politically conditional. Economists Jing Chien and Lawrence Edwards wrote in Business Day that the average tariff burden on South Africa’s non-commodity exports remains far higher than it was at the beginning of 2025. As a result, the most characteristic South African response is not a call for retaliatory sanctions, but an accelerated search for alternative markets through the African Continental Free Trade Area, BRICS and Asian destinations. (businessday.co.za)

South Korea views the same American policy through an entirely different lens—technological and alliance-based. Washington is not accusing Seoul of ideological disloyalty, but US tariff threats involving chips, drones and industrial products are perceived as a test of the military-political alliance’s real value. Industry Minister Kim Jung-kwan said negotiations over semiconductor tariffs should proceed according to the principle that Korea must not be placed in a worse position than its competitors. But the very need to seek such a commitment reveals Seoul’s anxiety: for a country where semiconductors are the foundation of exports and a source of strategic influence, “no worse than others” no longer looks like a guarantee, but merely the minimum result of bargaining. (yna.co.kr)

The Korean press describes this bargaining almost as an exchange of market access for capital investment. A Newsis analysis links a possible announcement of South Korea’s first major investment project in the United States to an attempt to untangle the issue of semiconductor tariffs and Washington’s other trade demands. For India, American pressure means “do not buy this oil”; for South Africa, “change your domestic political framework”; and for South Korea, “invest in American manufacturing to preserve predictable market access.” The mechanism differs, but the underlying principle is the same: the United States is offering its partners not so much stable rules as individual deals in which economic concessions become the price of political security.

This unpredictability is the main common theme in the local reactions. Indian commentators fear that sanctions against Russia will become a pretext for pressuring New Delhi’s autonomous foreign policy. South African commentators fear that trade and visas are turning into levers for influencing the internal structure of a post-apartheid state. South Korean commentators fear that even a longstanding alliance with the United States does not protect critical industries from having their terms revised. In all three countries, the desire to cooperate with America has not disappeared; what is disappearing is the confidence that cooperation is based on rules that will apply tomorrow as they do today.

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Sovereignty and Dialogue with the United States

Washington’s international partners seek to build relations based on respect for sovereignty, mutual trust, and consideration of national interests. Denmark and Greenland emphasize the need for autonomy in any arrangements with the United States, Vietnam focuses on strengthening trust, while Turkey is preparing for a diplomatic agenda involving the UN and contacts in America. The materials reflect a cautious and pragmatic approach to U.S. influence—without abandoning dialogue, but with a clear defense of their own interests. This overview is based on material from Yeni Akit (Turkey).

Erdoğan Heads to New York for Dialogue with Trump

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is traveling to New York to attend the 81st session of the UN General Assembly. In the Turkish press, the trip is viewed not simply as another speech on the international stage, but as an important stage in Ankara’s diplomatic activity and a possible opportunity for direct contact with U.S. President Donald Trump.

As Yeni Akit notes, a possible meeting between the two leaders is at the center of the visit’s agenda. For Ankara, a direct channel of communication with Washington is particularly important against the backdrop of numerous regional and international challenges: the conflict in the Middle East, the situation in Syria, security issues in the Black Sea, and Turkey’s complicated relations with its Western partners.

A Haber correspondent İrfan Sapmaz emphasizes the political symbolism of Erdoğan and Trump appearing at the same venue. “One of the most notable diplomatic contacts on the first day will undoubtedly be the interaction between Turkey and the United States,” he said. According to the preliminary schedule, Trump is expected to be the second speaker and Erdoğan the fourth during the same morning session of the General Assembly.

In the Turkish interpretation, this order of speeches and the possible communication between the leaders are intended to demonstrate that Ankara is at the center of global diplomacy. The trip is presented as part of a broader policy of an independent foreign policy, under which Turkey seeks to discuss key issues directly with the world’s major powers, without limiting itself to mediation formats or the framework of traditional alliances.

The Turkish president’s place of residence is also considered significant. During the visit, Erdoğan will stay at the Turkish House—Türkevi—located opposite the UN headquarters. In Turkey’s political discourse, the building has become a symbol of the country’s prominent and independent presence in the United States. Mentioning it underscores Ankara’s intention to rely on its own institutions and promote national interests directly in global decision-making centers.

The Yeni Akit article uses a tone characteristic of pro-government Turkish media: the visit is described as a diplomatic offensive and Erdoğan’s “landing” in New York. Behind this rhetoric lies the idea of equal dialogue with the United States—without dependence on Western capitals and with an emphasis on Turkey’s independent role in regional and international security.

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America as a Source of Risk, Not Support: Views of Washington in Germany, China and India...

In Germany, China and India, discussion of America in recent days has unexpectedly converged not around the usual rivalry between great powers, but around a more specific question: is Donald Trump’s administration capable of bringing crises it has itself exacerbated to an end without shifting the cost onto allies and trading partners? Three themes dominate the local debate: the possibility of a new escalation in the US war with Iran, Washington’s use of tariffs and secondary sanctions as a foreign-policy weapon, and America’s increasingly evident unreliability—even for those that formally remain its partners.

The broadest concern is Iran. China’s reaction is the most forceful in its wording and, at the same time, the most institutional. Beijing is not merely calling for de-escalation; it is constructing a legal argument that the current crisis resulted from the United States’ withdrawal from the nuclear deal, its “maximum pressure” policy and strikes on Iranian facilities under IAEA safeguards. Fu Cong, China’s permanent representative to the UN, said that military methods and sanctions pressure “do not help solve the problem,” and that the only way forward is equal-footing negotiations. In a statement by China’s Foreign Ministry dated September 17, this argument developed into a direct accusation that the United States had created the roots of the current crisis. China’s position thus turns the war in Iran into evidence of a broader thesis advanced by Beijing: Washington is replacing international law with unilateral coercion.

Yet even in China’s official analysis, the focus is not solely ideological criticism but also a calculated interest in US weaknesses. In a CCTV report circulated on September 18, the central question was framed not as “Will America launch another strike?” but as “How does the United States intend to end the war at all?” It listed factors constraining the White House: dwindling ammunition supplies, rising military spending, threats to the Gulf states’ oil infrastructure, pressure from fuel prices ahead of the midterm elections, and the absence of a clear political objective. This Chinese assessment is particularly revealing: Beijing portrays American power not as an unlimited resource, but as a force that becomes strategically vulnerable when a military campaign has no clear exit.

The tone in Germany is different: there is less satisfaction at America’s difficulties and more concern that the cost of US inconsistency will inevitably reach Europe—through oil, logistics, security and domestic political divisions. German commentators have long feared that the Iranian campaign could become an “endless war,” in which destroyed facilities are rebuilt and the United States launches new strikes. In a Deutsche Welle analysis, this logic is described as a self-perpetuating spiral: the American strategy of preventing Iran from rebuilding its capabilities could turn a permanent military presence in the region from an exception into the norm. For Berlin, this is not an abstract moral dilemma. Germany depends on safe shipping and predictable energy prices, but does not want to be drawn into an operation that Washington could sharply expand or wind down according to its own political calculations.

India views the same crisis through the lens of everyday economic security. For New Delhi, a war in West Asia poses risks to oil supplies, vessel insurance, maritime routes, Indian seafarers and the millions of Indian citizens working in the region. India’s response is particularly interesting, however, because it does not separate the war from US sanctions policy. On September 18, India’s Foreign Ministry said that attacks threatening shipping in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait were unacceptable, while also emphasizing that New Delhi would protect its trade and economic interests amid a US law giving the president the power to impose tariffs of up to 100% on major buyers of Russian oil. As Business Standard reports, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal explicitly linked potential sanctions not only to damage to bilateral trade, but also to the global energy market.

This gives rise to a theme shared by China and India, and perceived in Germany through the experience of Trump’s trade threats: the United States is increasingly using access to its own market and dollar infrastructure not as instruments of economic policy, but as tools for disciplining other countries. For Beijing, this confirms the long-familiar picture of “sanctions hegemonism.” For India, it is a painful test of the concept of strategic autonomy. New Delhi does not want to abandon its partnership with Washington, but it is not prepared to let America determine whom a country of 1.4 billion people may buy energy from. India’s formula is therefore highly practical: diversify supplies, continue negotiations with the United States, but do not compromise on energy security. The threat of US tariffs is being added to an already existing physical shortage of crude: according to Business Standard, Indian refiners are now concerned less about the price of oil than about the availability of shipments from Russia and the Middle East.

Germany’s deepest concern, however, concerns not Iran or tariffs, but the political nature of its relationship with America. Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s statement that the era of “unconditional transatlantic friendship” had probably come to an end for a long time was more than an emotional remark. It came after another cooling in relations, including Trump’s endorsement of the electoral success of the Alternative for Germany in Saxony-Anhalt. A Deutschlandfunk report noted that Berlin had criticized this interference and that a planned conversation between the leaders had been postponed. In the German view, the problem is no longer limited to Trump’s abrasive style: America remains an essential security guarantor while simultaneously behaving like a power prepared to pressure Europe with tariffs, interfere in its political symbolism and make its alliance commitments dependent on personal loyalty.

This is where the reactions of the three countries diverge. China sees the weakening of the Western coalition as an opportunity for a more multipolar order. India sees a warning: vital supply chains cannot be built on the assumption that American rules will remain unchanged. Germany, meanwhile, is experiencing the loss of its old confidence most painfully because, for it, the United States was not merely a market or a situational partner, but the foundation of the postwar security architecture. The paradox of the current debate is that none of the three considers a break with America realistic. Yet all three—for different reasons—regard America as increasingly unpredictable. If China’s formula sounds like a call to limit American pressure, and India’s like a demand for the right to make its own economic choices, Germany’s boils down to a more troubling conclusion: dependence on Washington persists precisely when trust in Washington is running out fastest.

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An America Distracted: How Japan, France, and Germany Read the Current Crisis of U.S

By September 19, 2026, the discussion of America in Japan, France, and Germany is no longer focused primarily on yet another provocative statement by Donald Trump. Instead, it revolves around a more troubling question: can Washington simultaneously wage war, maintain its technological lead over China, preserve its allies’ trust, and avoid destroying its own institutions? Local commentary from Tokyo, Paris, and Berlin presents a remarkably consistent picture. The United States still possesses enormous military, financial, and innovative power, but its ability to turn that power into lasting influence is increasingly being called into question.

The most acute issue is the protracted American campaign against Iran. In Germany, it is discussed primarily as a risk of strategic exhaustion. In an analysis by Deutsche Welle, Andreas Noll describes the new logic of the war as a potentially endless cycle: Iran restores its radars, air defenses, and infrastructure; the United States launches another strike; and then faces retaliatory missile and drone attacks. This is not a scenario of decisive victory, but a strategy of continuously “mowing the grass”—an expensive effort to prevent the adversary from recovering without any clear political exit.

For German audiences, the issue is not limited to the Middle East. The war is seen as a test of whether American involvement is consuming resources that previously served European and Asian security. This perspective is particularly sensitive in a country where military dependence on the United States remains substantial, while fatigue with American unpredictability is also growing. In a broader DW analysis of the end of the era of multilateralism, this concern is framed even more broadly: Trump’s policies are viewed not simply as a reaction to the collapse of the old order, but as one of the forces accelerating its destruction. For Berlin, this creates an unpleasant dilemma: Europe needs to prepare for greater autonomy, but it must do so precisely at a time when its trade, technological, and military ties with America remain critical.

In France, the war with Iran is viewed through the lens of U.S.-China rivalry. Parisian commentators are less concerned with debating the tactics of the strikes than with asking who benefits from the fact that the United States has become bogged down in the conflict. In his column, Le Monde columnist Alain Frachon reaches an almost provocative conclusion: in the current confrontation, Trump is, at least for now, unintentionally serving China’s interests. His argument is not that Beijing is directly “defeating” the United States, but that the war with Iran exposes the limits of American military effectiveness and forces Washington to reduce its focus on the Pacific.

This is particularly important ahead of Xi Jinping’s visit to Washington, scheduled for September 24. The French perspective differs noticeably from the American language of “strategic competition.” Frachon sees the problem in the fact that Trump is more inclined to think in terms of personal relationships with “strong leaders” and spheres of influence than in terms of alliances, norms, and the protection of small states. In this view, allies become not partners but countries expected to make concessions—commercial, financial, or political. For France, traditionally protective of the idea of European “strategic autonomy,” this is not an abstract moral complaint. It is a warning: if America simultaneously pressures its allies with tariffs and seeks deals with its rivals, Europeans cannot regard American guarantees as an unchanging given.

Japan views the same problem less ideologically, but perhaps even more concretely. In Tokyo, the central issue is not only the upcoming Trump-Xi meeting, but also the competition over artificial intelligence, chips, computing capacity, and technological standards. A Japan Research Institute study published on September 18 emphasizes that China has nearly eliminated the gap with the United States in the quality of advanced AI models: according to data from the Stanford AI Index cited in the report, the best American model’s lead was only 2.7% in March 2026. At the same time, the United States retains stronger positions in investment and data centers.

The Japanese analysis is notable for refusing to treat American export controls on China as a magic solution. Another recent report by the same institute says that controls on supplies of advanced chips, memory, semiconductor-manufacturing equipment, and cloud computing can slow China’s progress and make it more expensive, but cannot stop it permanently. China has a vast market, skilled personnel, state investment, its own manufacturing base, and the ability to compensate for hardware shortages through more efficient algorithms and software methods.

This leads to a distinctly Japanese recommendation: rather than simply following the American line automatically, Japan should identify its own technological “bottlenecks”—areas in which Japanese companies are strong in equipment, materials, measurement technology, and precision processing. For Tokyo, the issue is not reducible to loyalty to Washington or distance from Beijing. It is about avoiding a situation in which Japan becomes a passive platform where the two superpowers determine the rules governing access to the technologies of the future.

The paradox of the current moment is that both the American and Chinese sides acknowledge the risks of AI, yet neither is prepared to slow the race. Japanese experts note that Washington and Beijing agreed to begin an intergovernmental dialogue on AI after the leaders’ meeting in May, but by mid-September even the format of the future discussions was still being negotiated. In other words, security is recognized as a shared problem, but each side fears that security rules would merely cement its rival’s advantage. In the European view, this looks like yet another indication of the crisis of multilateralism; in the Japanese view, it is a practical risk that the world will split into incompatible technological ecosystems.

Finally, Japan, France, and Germany are showing growing interest in the domestic side of American instability. In Japanese coverage, Trump’s September 18 decision to bar CNN, MS NOW, and Politico from operating in the White House under the pretext of combating “fake news” was directly linked to the threat to press freedom and the First Amendment, as reported by TBS Cross Dig. In France, the move fits an already established image of a president who responds to political failures by attacking the intermediaries between government and society. In Germany, it reinforces a broader fear: if a country claiming the role of defender of the liberal order weakens its own independent institutions, its foreign commitments become less credible.

This is the most unexpected common conclusion among the three countries. They do not believe that America has suddenly become “weak,” or that China has already replaced it as the leading global power. On the contrary, the United States remains an indispensable center of power. But in Tokyo, Paris, and Berlin, the distinction between power and reliability is becoming increasingly clear. The war with Iran, negotiations with China, the AI race, and pressure on the press are seen as parts of a single problem: the United States can still force the world to respond to it, but it is becoming less and less able to convince the world that it can safely be relied upon.

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Trump: Pressure on Security, Trade and Politics

The international reaction to Donald Trump’s policies consists of disparate but interconnected developments. In reports related to Venezuela, attention is focused on U.S. security agreements, military activity in Colombia, threats to exercise veto power, and alleged interference in Brazil’s elections—signs of growing regional concern about American influence. The South Korean agenda adds reports of Trump’s tariff threats against Canada and the EU, tensions surrounding Iran, and discontent within the Republican Party. Ultimately, Washington’s policy appears both as an instrument of external pressure and a source of domestic instability. This material is based on reports by the BBC (South Korea) and the American Chamber of Commerce in Colombia (Venezuela).

Lee Jae-myung Seeks to Restore Trust Amid Crisis

The press conference held by Republic of Korea President Lee Jae-myung was not only a platform for statements on foreign policy and reforms, but also an attempt to restore public trust amid falling approval ratings, personnel scandals, and disputes over proposed changes. As BBC Korea notes, the speech focused on concerns that are particularly sensitive in South Korean society: the security of maritime trade routes, the risk of being excluded from negotiations on North Korea, fears about the concentration of power, and dissatisfaction with socioeconomic policy.

In foreign policy, Lee Jae-myung ruled out sending combat units to the Strait of Hormuz. “There will be no troop deployment connected with participation in or intervention in the war,” he said. At the same time, Seoul does not intend to distance itself completely from protecting shipping. The president allowed for the strengthening of the existing Cheonghae Unit in the region if this is needed to protect Korean commercial vessels, oil routes, and civilians.

This formula reflects South Korea’s complex dilemma. The country is highly dependent on energy imports and export trade, so disruptions along routes through the Red Sea, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Middle East immediately affect fuel prices, industrial supplies, and the domestic economy. Lee recalled that at the start of the conflict, Korean vessels avoided entering the Red Sea, creating problems with oil supplies. In his view, halting transport when the threat level is relatively low could cause excessive damage to the economy. Seoul is therefore attempting to protect its trade interests without turning the mission to ensure freedom of navigation into direct participation in the war.

Another key issue was the possible resumption of contacts between the United States and North Korea. South Korea has traditionally feared a “Korea exclusion” scenario in which Washington and Pyongyang discuss the nuclear issue without Seoul’s full participation. Lee urged citizens “not to worry,” while acknowledging that South Korea could initially find itself somewhat sidelined in the negotiating process.

The president believes that restarting dialogue between the United States and North Korea will be easier than establishing direct inter-Korean contacts. If U.S.–North Korean talks produce results, this could also create conditions for dialogue between Seoul and Pyongyang. Lee said he was continuing preparatory work for a possible meeting between Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un. For South Korea, this is not a matter of diplomatic image: any decisions concerning North Korea’s nuclear and military threats directly affect the security of millions of people in the country.

In domestic policy, the president separately sought to dispel suspicions that constitutional reform could be used to extend his own time in office. “I have absolutely no intention of running for re-election,” Lee said, calling the 1987 Constitution “clothing that no longer fits the Republic of Korea.”

This wording is especially sensitive in the Korean context. The 1987 Constitution was adopted during the country’s democratic transition after authoritarian rule and is viewed as a crucial safeguard against excessive concentrations of power. As a result, any initiative to change the presidential system inevitably triggers concern: society fears that political reform could weaken democratic checks and balances.

Lee also reaffirmed his commitment to “irreversible prosecutorial reform.” The issue remains one of the country’s most polarizing. Supporters of the changes believe it is necessary to limit the prosecution’s enormous powers, including its influence over political investigations. Critics, however, warn that reducing investigative powers could weaken the fight against crime and increase the politicization of law enforcement agencies.

The president acknowledged the risk of gaps emerging after the prosecution service loses the right to conduct additional investigations. He promised to establish oversight mechanisms for the police so that the reform would not result in another powerful institution operating without accountability. Lee is thus attempting to show that the changes do not simply amount to transferring powers from one agency to another.

The most notable part of the speech was his public acknowledgment of his own mistakes. Against the backdrop of falling support, Lee Jae-myung said that he himself bore primary responsibility: “I lacked tact; I lacked communication.” He acknowledged that he may not have sufficiently taken into account the objections of people harmed by certain government decisions, and concluded that he had failed to show citizens enough respect.

In South Korean politics, where presidential approval ratings depend heavily on perceptions of fairness, the quality of personnel appointments, and the response to public dissatisfaction, such words carry particular weight. They represent an attempt to regain the moral initiative and demonstrate a willingness to adjust his governing style without abandoning his reform agenda.

The president also addressed divisions within his own progressive camp. He said that supporters of democratic reform “are all supporters of Moon Jae-in, Roh Moo-hyun, Kim Dae-jung, and comrades of Lee Jae-myung.” The phrase is intended to link the current administration to the legacy of liberal-democratic presidents and ease tensions among various factions, which have intensified over personnel policy and the pace of reforms.

Among his domestic priorities, Lee also named stabilizing housing prices and developing Sejong as the administrative capital. Expensive real estate remains a chronic source of dissatisfaction, particularly among young people and residents of the capital region. The plan to divide functions between Seoul as the “economic capital” and Sejong as the administrative center continues the longstanding strategy of reducing the excessive concentration of population, capital, and government institutions in the capital.

As a result, Lee Jae-myung’s speech offered a portrait of contemporary South Korea’s political anxieties. External security is inseparable from the vulnerability of trade routes and the risk of being excluded from negotiations over the peninsula’s future. Domestic reforms, meanwhile, are assessed through trust in the authorities, fears of increased presidential control, and everyday problems—from housing to fairness in the law-enforcement system. As the BBC Korea analysis indicates, the president is trying simultaneously to convince society of his restraint abroad and prove at home that the government is capable of listening to citizens.

Colombia and the United States Discuss an Agenda of Regional Importance

The American Chamber of Commerce in Colombia announced an event devoted to updating the bilateral agenda between Bogotá and Washington. Although the program contains no statements by Venezuelan authorities, sources from Venezuela, or assessments by local experts, it is of interest to a Venezuelan audience as an indication of strengthening strategic ties between Colombia and the United States in the areas of security, combating drug trafficking, migration, trade, and investment.

The central theme of the discussions will be a reconsideration of Colombian-American relations against the backdrop of trade protectionism, the restructuring of global supply chains, and geopolitical competition. The program lists Colombia’s Defense Minister Pedro Sánchez, Justice Minister Ángela Buitrago, former President Juan Manuel Santos, U.S. Chargé d’Affaires John McNamara, Colombia’s ambassador to the United States Daniel García-Peña, as well as representatives of business and parliamentary circles.

Security will be one of the key areas. The program specifically includes a discussion of the United States’ “strategy to prevent Colombia from being decertified,” as well as cooperation in combating drug trafficking. This agenda is particularly sensitive for Venezuela: the countries share a lengthy border, armed groups operate in border areas, and cross-border crime regularly becomes the subject of mutual accusations. Deeper security cooperation between Bogotá and Washington could cause concern in Caracas, especially given Venezuela’s longstanding political confrontation with the United States.

The migration issue, identified by the organizers as “migration and bilateral cooperation,” is no less important. Colombia remains one of the main host countries for Venezuelan citizens, so decisions that may arise from U.S.–Colombian coordination have direct implications for millions of Venezuelan migrants. They could involve humanitarian assistance, resettlement mechanisms, the regulation of foreigners’ legal status, border controls, and joint aid programs.

The conference’s economic agenda addresses Colombia’s dependence on the U.S. market, tariff policy, nearshoring, reindustrialization, competition from China, and the attraction of investment. The very wording of the question about trade with the United States is telling: “dependence or strategy?” For Bogotá, this is a debate over how to diversify its foreign economic ties while maintaining a partnership with its main market and investor. For Venezuelan observers, the discussion may serve as a reminder of the consequences of foreign-policy isolation and limited access to financial and trade markets.

The topics of coffee, logistics, outsourcing, flower exports, industrial development, and investment show that Colombia seeks to turn its relationship with the United States into more than a mechanism for ensuring security. It also aims to use it as a tool for regional development, job creation, and integration into new production chains. Against the backdrop of Venezuela’s sanctions restrictions and weaker integration into foreign trade, Colombia’s strategy appears to be an attempt to use its geographic proximity to the United States to expand exports and industrial cooperation.

At the same time, the AmCham Colombia program is neither a report on agreements reached nor a reflection of Caracas’s official position. It is an announcement of a business and political conference outlining the issues, participants, and priorities of the Colombian-American elite. The Venezuelan dimension emerges only indirectly—through the shared border, migration flows, regional security, and competition for investment.

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America Returns to the Talks—but Moscow, Kyiv and Berlin Read the Signal Differently

In mid-September, the main American story for Russia, Ukraine and Germany was neither another summit nor a new sanctions package, but Washington’s attempt to reclaim its role as mediator in Russia’s war against Ukraine. Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner’s visits to Moscow on September 5 and Kyiv on September 6 revived talk of a trilateral U.S.–Russia–Ukraine format, but almost nowhere did they create illusions of imminent peace. In Moscow, the visits are seen primarily as recognition that the conflict cannot be ended without taking Russian conditions into account; in Kyiv, as a necessary but potentially dangerous return by the United States to bargaining over territory; and in Germany, as a test of European security, transatlantic loyalty and domestic political stability all at once. (kommersant.ru)

The most significant divergence concerns what exactly should be considered “progress.” Following Putin’s meeting with the American envoys, Russia’s official line was notably positive: presidential aide Yuri Ushakov described the conversation as “substantive and constructive,” saying that Moscow had presented the Americans with its assessment of the military situation and the need to eliminate the “root causes” of the conflict. As Meduza reported it, this does not sound like a readiness for compromise, but rather like the Kremlin’s confidence that diplomacy should formalize what Moscow considers its advantage on the battlefield. Even the more cautious Kommersant analysis notes that the United States may bring negotiators to the same table, but cannot resolve the central disagreements on its own—over territory, an international military presence in Ukraine and security guarantees. (meduza.io)

Ukraine’s reaction to the same American activity is considerably more ambivalent. The very fact that Witkoff and Kushner made their first full-fledged visit to Kyiv is viewed there as an important signal: the United States is once again speaking not only with the Kremlin but directly with the Ukrainian side, with representatives of Germany, France and the United Kingdom also taking part in the consultations. Yet optimism ends where the details begin. In a Ukrainian-language DW report, Ukrainian political analyst Petro Buryachenko described the American mission in notably sober terms: to revive the process, obtain publicly positive assessments from both sides and create a convincing picture of diplomatic movement for Washington. In this interpretation, the talks are needed by the Trump administration not only as an instrument of peace, but also as a political asset ahead of the U.S. midterm elections. (amp.dw.com)

Ukraine reacted particularly sharply to Kushner’s statement that an agreement could be reached if Kyiv agreed to give up the territories within the boundaries demanded by Putin. Ukrainska Pravda conveyed the statement without diplomatic softening: the American mediator had effectively identified a territorial concession as the last obstacle to a deal. For Ukrainian audiences, this is not an offer of compromise but the risk that the American formula for “peace” will boil down to a demand that the consequences of the war be formalized politically. Local commentators therefore do not reject U.S. involvement—in fact, they consider Washington indispensable for arms supplies, air defense and future guarantees—but they are not prepared to view the resumption of talks as an achievement in itself. As DW noted, the American team itself acknowledges that Moscow and Kyiv have no common vision of the desired outcome, while the territorial issue remains the most difficult one. (pravda.com.ua)

This also gives rise to an unexpectedly shared concern in Kyiv and Berlin: Europe cannot simply be a spectator to an American–Russian conversation. Ukrainian analysts stress that the participation of Germany, France and the United Kingdom in contacts with the Americans is not merely a matter of protocol. Germany remains a key European supplier of military aid, while Paris and London are associated with discussions of postwar security guarantees. A Ukrainian DW analysis describes this as the Europeans’ effort to prevent a future settlement framework from becoming a deal agreed over their heads. (amp.dw.com)

In Germany, the American issue has also taken on a domestic dimension. Donald Trump congratulated the “populist party” on the success of the Alternative for Germany in Saxony-Anhalt and ended his message with the slogan “MGGA”—Make Germany Great Again. For Berlin, this was not an innocuous online gesture by an ally, but an intervention in the country’s political nerve center. As Tagesschau reports, Chancellor Friedrich Merz postponed a scheduled phone call with Trump, while the government’s coordinator for transatlantic relations, Metin Hakverdi, responded unequivocally: Germans decide for themselves how to vote and how to shape migration policy. German anxiety is particularly apparent here: Washington is simultaneously demanding greater independence and defense spending from Europe, while the U.S. president publicly sympathizes with a force skeptical of support for Ukraine and of the established architecture of Euro-Atlantic policy. (tagesschau.de)

This anxiety is not limited to irritation among the elites. A September Infratest dimap poll for ARD shows German society divided: more than half of respondents consider Russia a threat to Germany’s security, but two-thirds of AfD supporters rate the threat as low; the country is also split over military support for Ukraine. Thus, American diplomacy is viewed in Germany through the prism of trust: will Washington consistently defend European security, or will it use talks with Moscow and support for right-wing populists as leverage against European governments? (infratest-dimap.de)

This is the main difference among local views of the United States. Moscow sees the White House’s renewed activity as an opportunity to shift the conversation from Russia’s isolation toward negotiating the terms of a deal. Kyiv sees a vital partner capable of helping it get through the winter and hold the front line, but one that may try to accelerate peace at the cost of Ukrainian concessions. Berlin sees an ally without whom European defense remains unimaginable for now, but whose unpredictability is forcing Europe to become self-reliant more quickly. The conclusion shared, surprisingly, by Russia, Ukraine and Germany is strikingly similar: America has once again become the central player, but its return has not reduced uncertainty—it has merely shifted the main dispute to the question of who will determine the postwar peace, and on what terms.

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America as a Conditional Partner: Why Brazil, India and Australia Are Increasingly Asking...

As of September 18, 2026, the United States is prompting not so much the familiar debate over whether people in Brazil, India and Australia like or dislike America, but a more practical and troubling question: how should they deal with an ally, market and military superpower that is increasingly tying cooperation to political concessions? Three storylines converge in the local debate: US tariffs and trade bargaining, Washington’s intervention in sensitive domestic-policy issues in partner countries, and the price of the security offered by the United States. But while in Brazil this has already become a debate about the independence of elections, in India it is about preserving strategic autonomy, and in Australia about whether a defensive alliance is turning into one-sided dependence.

The sharpest Brazilian issue in recent days is not the trade restrictions themselves, but the publication of information that, during negotiations over the first 50% tariff, Donald Trump’s administration demanded that Brazil guarantee the participation of “political dissidents” in the 2026 presidential election. A Folha de S.Paulo report quotes a draft provision under which Brazil was supposed to pledge not to detain or restrict political opponents. In the Brazilian context, this is inevitably read as pressure over the fate of the Bolsonaro camp and as an attempt to recast US foreign policy in the language of another country’s domestic electoral struggle. It is no coincidence that political scientist Peter Birle, in an interview published by Folha, describes tariffs, sanctions and visa measures as forms of pressure more likely to provoke resistance than the result Washington wants. (www1.folha.uol.com.br)

For Brazil, it is particularly painful that US demands are now also linked to security. On September 17, Washington included the country in a report on drug trafficking, claiming that its efforts to combat the PCC and Comando Vermelho—the largest Brazilian criminal groups—were inadequate. Brazilian commentators saw this as more than a dispute over criminal policy: as analyst Clarissa Oliveira noted in a CNN Brasil analysis, such language effectively places Brazil in the same category as countries where drug cartels supplant the state. This heightens fears that security is becoming another lever of political influence. (cnnbrasil.com.br) At the same time, part of Brazil’s business and foreign-policy community is urging the government not to respond to pressure through pure confrontation: José Pimenta, Fiesp’s director of international trade, argues in his column that the US return to Latin America—through agreements on minerals, energy and security with Brazil’s neighbors—is also a signal that Brasília should not drop out of the region’s economic game. (cnnbrasil.com.br)

India’s reaction to America is less emotional, but no less wary. New Delhi continues to negotiate a bilateral trade agreement, but its tone is fundamentally different: the US is needed as a market, a source of technology and a counterweight to China, but not as an arbiter of Indian energy or foreign policy. In February, the White House announced a reduction of India’s “reciprocal” tariff to 18% after India committed to cutting purchases of Russian oil and expanding access for US goods to the Indian market. (whitehouse.gov) However, in September, Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal indicated that a final agreement would be made public only if India received a tariff rate more favorable than those offered to its competitors; his position was stated plainly: national interests cannot be compromised, as Aaj Tak reported. (aajtak.in)

Indian analysts draw a broader conclusion from this: the “special relationship” with the US has given way to a cold, transactional exchange of benefits. Professor Kanti Bajpai writes in The Indian Express that Washington now sees India not as a power to be strengthened for the sake of balancing China, but primarily as a market for US goods, investment and weapons. (indianexpress.com) Even where interests coincide—in the Indo-Pacific, technology and containing China—the Indian debate increasingly proceeds from the principle of “multi-alignment”: maintaining ties with the US without severing relations with Russia, the Gulf states and other centers of power. A study by the Indian foundation VIF describes this not as a relic of nonalignment, but as an active foreign-policy instrument: selective rapprochement while preserving room for maneuver. (vifindia.org)

Australia’s debate reveals a third dimension of the same problem. Here, the US is not an external economic partner but the foundation of the defense architecture through AUKUS. That is precisely why concerns about dependence are stronger. ABC chief international affairs editor Laura Tingle notes in her analysis that most countries are reassessing their ties with the US because of Trump’s unpredictability and wars affecting American allies, while Canberra is avoiding a fundamental debate. She is particularly concerned by the new interpretation of AUKUS: Australia is not gaining independent capabilities; rather, the US Navy is gaining more days of presence in the Indian Ocean through Australian infrastructure. (abc.net.au)

In this debate, former Prime Minister Paul Keating has advanced an unusually sharp argument: he compares Trump’s view of the division of spheres of influence among great powers to the logic of mafia “territories.” But his more important warning is that Australia risks becoming embedded in the US strategy of containing China without having a decisive say in how and when that strategy could lead to a crisis. At the same time, the government is facing more immediate US pressure over plans to require digital platforms to protect children from harmful content and allow users to disable recommendation algorithms. When the White House called possible fines on US technology companies a form of “extortion,” Communications Minister Anika Wells responded in The Guardian Australia: “We are a sovereign country” and have the right to protect parents and children. (theguardian.com)

It is precisely in this convergence—from Brazilian elections to Indian tariffs and Australian submarines and digital platforms—that the main international reaction to today’s America can be seen. Brazil fears that trade and security are becoming tools for influencing its democratic process. India accepts deals but refuses to turn them into dependence on American conditions regarding Russia, markets and geopolitics. Australia, the closest military partner of the three to the US, is beginning to argue not about whether it needs the alliance, but about whether it remains an alliance of equals. In these countries, the US is still viewed as an indispensable power, but no longer as an automatically reliable leader. The new formula among local elites sounds almost identical everywhere: cooperation with Washington is necessary—but submission to its political priorities is not.

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America as a Source of Strategic Uncertainty: Views in Turkey, China and France on the War

As of September 17, 2026, the United States is prompting not so much the familiar debate over “Western leadership” in Turkey, China and France as a more troubling discussion about the unpredictability of American power. Several interconnected issues are at the center of attention: the protracted US war with Iran and the fate of the Strait of Hormuz, Xi Jinping’s scheduled visit to Washington on September 24, and the domestic economic constraints increasingly hampering Donald Trump’s administration. The overall conclusion in these countries differs in tone but is essentially the same: Washington is still capable of imposing crises on the entire world, but is becoming less and less able to control their cost, duration and political consequences.

The most acute issue is Iran. For Turkey’s public debate, this is not a distant conflict but a test of the entire regional architecture on which energy routes, the security of the Black Sea and the Caucasus, Turkey’s trade with the Middle East and its role as a mediator all depend. In an analysis published on September 16 by Anadolu Ajansı, international relations specialist Orhan Karaoğlu suggests viewing the war not as a bilateral confrontation between the United States and Iran, but as a “quiet strategic struggle” between Washington and Beijing. His central point is particularly characteristic of the Turkish perspective: the issue is not who is formally stronger, but whether the constant use of force is destroying the system on which that power rests.

This represents an important shift in perspective. In Turkish commentary, the American campaign against Iran is being read not as a demonstration of resolve, but as a costly strategic trap. The United States is becoming embroiled in a struggle for freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, while simultaneously being forced to spend the ammunition, attention and political capital it needs for its competition with China. Karaoğlu directly links the Iranian theater to the Chinese front: Tehran is not an end in itself, but an element of a larger contest. For Ankara, this means that a crisis on its southern periphery could be prolonged not by regional logic, but by global US-China competition.

China’s official language is noticeably more cautious, but its meaning is no less critical of the American course. At a meeting with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi on September 16, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said that the ongoing US-Iran war “does not serve the common interests” of either side or the international community, and called for the negotiating mechanism to be restored as soon as possible. In a statement by China’s Foreign Ministry published by The Paper, Beijing simultaneously demanded that the Strait of Hormuz be opened, international shipping routes be secured and energy supply chains stabilized. This is a typical Chinese formula: not solidarity with Iran as a belligerent, but a presentation of itself as a power interested in order, trade and predictability.

Yet behind this diplomatic restraint lies a quite specific assessment of the United States. Chinese state analysts increasingly portray Washington as a power caught between military ambitions and domestic constraints. In an Xinhua analysis, the American strategy is described as an attempt to achieve an “honorable exit” from a war that has produced neither a lasting agreement nor a solution to the Strait of Hormuz issue. For Chinese audiences, this is not merely a story about an adversary’s failure: it is evidence that even technological superiority cannot substitute for political compromise. Beijing particularly emphasizes the divergence between America’s objectives: Washington wants both to avoid becoming bogged down in war and to avoid appearing to have yielded to Iran ahead of the midterm elections. In the Chinese interpretation, it is precisely this domestic political logic that makes American diplomacy nervous and inconsistent.

The French reaction to the same war is far less focused on the military balance and much more on the question of trust in the United States as an ally. In a column for Le Monde, columnist Alain Frachon advances a blunt argument: Trump’s current policy is effectively helping China because it is undermining the confidence of America’s traditional allies—in Asia, Europe and beyond. The French concern extends well beyond Iran. Paris sees the American war diverting US resources from the Pacific, while Washington’s trade pressure and dismissive tone are alienating Europe and Canada. In other words, America’s power remains immense, but its alliance network is becoming less reliable.

This point is especially important on the eve of Xi Jinping’s arrival in Washington on September 24. In Turkey, the anticipated meeting is viewed pragmatically: it may show whether the two superpowers can at least contain mutual risks without resolving their fundamental differences over Taiwan, technology, tariffs and Iran. The Turkish ANKASAM center draws attention to an increasingly unusual form of competition: major corporations and technology executives are becoming part of leader-level diplomacy. This is a characteristic feature of the Turkish interpretation: economic elites are no longer merely supporting foreign policy, but are becoming an independent instrument of it. The summit is not expected to produce a historic reconciliation, but agreements on investment, trade and export controls—in other words, a pause rather than a resolution.

China views the meeting in even more instrumental terms. Beijing is not abandoning tough competition, but is seeking to turn US vulnerability in the Middle East into a diplomatic resource. By calling for rationality and the swift resumption of negotiations with Iran, Wang Yi is effectively offering China the role of an indispensable mediator where Washington lacks sufficient trust. At the same time, China’s approach is not limited to anti-American rhetoric: an open Strait of Hormuz and stable energy supplies are vital to the PRC itself. Beijing is therefore interested not in endlessly humiliating the United States, but in a de-escalation that would allow it to present itself as a more stable and less impulsive center of power.

In the French interpretation, the Trump-Xi summit looks almost like a mirror image of Europe’s problem. Frachon writes of a world in which the American president treats major authoritarian powers as equals, while treating allies as dependent partners who can be subjected to tariffs and pressured into concessions. Hence the French fear is not of US-China dialogue itself, but of the logic that may underlie it: if great powers reach agreements on spheres of influence, the interests of smaller states and Europe’s agency become bargaining chips. The sharpest French conclusion is that US unreliability does not automatically make China attractive, but it considerably eases Beijing’s task of presenting itself as an acceptable alternative.

The third common thread is the American domestic economy. Abroad, it is increasingly seen not as an internal US matter, but as a factor in international security. The Federal Reserve’s decision on September 16 to raise its rate to 3.75–4 percent, despite Trump’s demand that it be cut to 1 percent or lower, became a symbolic episode. As Le Monde notes, rising energy prices, expensive borrowing and concern over US debt are turning the White House’s foreign-policy decisions into a domestic problem for voters. The war in Iran is driving up fuel costs, tariff conflicts are fueling inflation, and the approaching elections are pushing the administration toward loud promises of quick results.

For China, this is evidence that the United States is constrained not only by resistance from its rivals, but also by its own markets, budget and electoral cycle. For Turkey, it is a warning that American policy can export economic instability through oil, the dollar and trade barriers. For France, it is another argument in favor of greater European autonomy: an ally whose strategy depends on fluctuations in gasoline prices and an election campaign cannot be the continent’s sole security anchor.

What is particularly striking is that in all three countries, the debate about America is no longer reduced to the familiar formula of “US decline.” No one seriously believes that Washington has ceased to be the leading military, financial and technological power. Turkish analysts speak of the redistribution of American resources, Chinese analysts of the limits of coercive pressure, and French analysts of the erosion of allied trust. These are different diagnoses of the same illness: American power remains colossal, but its political conversion into results is becoming increasingly ineffective.

That is why the upcoming Trump-Xi meeting matters far beyond bilateral relations. For Ankara, it will indicate whether the rivalry between the great powers can be prevented from triggering a new wave of pressure on regional states. For Beijing, it will be an opportunity to consolidate its image as a power that speaks the language of trade and mediation while the United States spends resources on war. For Paris, it will be yet another reminder that Europe needs to strengthen its ability to act independently. America remains the world’s main generator of events; however, in Turkey, China and France, the discussion is increasingly shifting from whether it can act to whether it understands the consequences of its own actions.

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Hormuz as a Test of American Power: Why Israel, France and Russia Are Debating Not US Victory,...

The main topic in recent days in Israeli, French and Russian discussions of the United States has been the war with Iran—but not in the familiar framework of “Washington versus Tehran.” Following Donald Trump’s statements on September 14 about a possible willingness to return to negotiations, it has become clear that local commentators primarily view the American strategy as a crisis of governance: the United States is trying simultaneously to maintain military pressure, secure shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, protect its allies and avoid paying for this with a political defeat on the eve of the US elections on November 3. Kommersant noted that Trump reserved the decision on whether to enter negotiations, while Tehran, through intermediaries, put forward conditions for the full reopening of the strait. (kommersant.ru)

All three countries share a common conclusion: US superiority in weapons has not translated into the ability to impose a political outcome. But the meaning of this conclusion differs. In the French interpretation, it is above all a warning to Europe about the cost of American improvisation. Experts at the French Institute of International Relations write that six months after the war began, none of Washington’s widely proclaimed goals has been achieved: Iran’s regime has survived, the nuclear issue has not disappeared, Iran’s regional allies continue to operate, and Hormuz remains a dangerous artery of global trade. The authors call this an expression of “new American impotence”: enormous military power is being displayed, but it is not creating a stable order. The IFRI analysis emphasizes a particularly French detail: Paris views the conflict not only through the prism of Israel’s security or the containment of Iran, but also through the vulnerability of the European economy—gas, oil, shipping insurance and inflation. (ifri.org)

That is why the French reaction is noticeably less triumphalist than the American rhetoric about control of the strait. Economist Patrick Artus, in a column for Le Point, explicitly includes a protracted US-Iran conflict accompanied by a prolonged disruption of shipping through Hormuz among the three main risks of accelerating inflation, alongside semiconductor shortages and climate shocks. (lepoint.fr) To a French observer, the American policy of “maximum pressure” looks less like resolve than an attempt to replace an unattainable military resolution with financial strangulation. Reporter Armin Arefi, in an analysis for Le Point, assesses this strategy as unlikely to be effective in the short term: sanctions may weaken Iran, but they guarantee neither capitulation nor the restoration of trust in negotiations. (lepoint.fr)

In Israel, the same American hesitation provokes an almost opposite emotion—not fear of inflation, but anxiety that a US deal with Iran could be concluded behind the back of a key regional ally. Israeli researchers are increasingly discussing not merely the fate of Iran’s nuclear program, but the limits of dependence on Washington. Dr. Shai Har-Zvi of Reichman University warns in his September review that disagreements between Israel and the United States are widening simultaneously at the governmental level and in American public opinion. He links this to differences over Gaza’s reconstruction, regional agreements, Washington’s relations with Turkey and US arms sales to Middle Eastern states. (runi.ac.il)

The Israeli perspective is therefore far more hostile to a possible US-Iran compromise. Local analysis raises a question that is secondary in France: what exactly is the United States prepared to regard as a sufficient victory? If the White House agrees to a partial restoration of shipping and a temporary easing of tensions, while leaving Iran with the capacity to rebuild militarily and nuclearly, Israel will view this not as de-escalation, but as postponing the threat. An INSS analysis notes that declining support for Israel in the United States now extends beyond Democrats to young Republicans as well; consequently, Jerusalem cannot indefinitely assume that American backing will be unconditional and enduring. (inss.org.il) The paradox of Israel’s reaction is that it simultaneously demands greater firmness from the United States toward Iran and increasingly doubts that American domestic politics will allow such firmness to be sustained.

The Russian debate emphasizes something else: Hormuz is interpreted as the place where the United States has encountered the limits of power based on sanctions, airstrikes and control of maritime communications. In an RBC article about Iran’s seven conditions for reopening the strait, the juxtaposition of two incompatible claims is particularly telling: Tehran says that it determines the conditions for passage, while Trump declares that the strait is controlled by the United States. (rbc.ru) For Russian authors, this gap between declared and actual power is the story itself, rather than mere diplomatic background. Military expert Yuri Knutov, in a comment to Argumenty i Fakty, argues that Washington needs not so much Iran’s conditions as regime change and control over oil flows; from this, he concludes that the White House faces an impasse between making concessions and triggering a dangerous escalation. (aif.ru)

This Russian narrative is, of course, politically motivated: it emphasizes the weakening of American hegemony and serves the broader argument that a multipolar order is taking shape. But it cannot be reduced to propaganda alone. Russian experts are identifying a real problem that French researchers also acknowledge: Washington can inflict enormous damage on its adversary, but that does not mean it can quickly reopen a trade route, create an acceptable postwar architecture and retain the loyalty of all its partners. PIR Center consultant Leonid Tsukanov, speaking on RBC, predicted as early as this summer that the conflict would be protracted and that reconciliation was not foreseeable, while Alexander Shpunt, director of the Institute for Political Analysis Tools, pointed out that Tehran is turning control over shipping risks into leverage, primarily against insurers and trading companies. (amp.rbc.ru)

The most unexpected aspect of comparing these three reactions is that no one sees Hormuz as merely a geographical point. For France, it is an indicator of the extent to which American military policy shifts costs onto European consumers. For Israel, it is a test of whether Washington will trade an ally’s long-term security for short-term de-escalation. For Russia, it is proof that control over global trade cannot be secured by declarations of superiority alone. In all three cases, Trump finds himself trapped by a double logic: he needs to demonstrate strength to voters, but every new strike raises the price of gasoline, expands the risk of a regional war and makes a diplomatic exit look like a retreat.

That is why current foreign discussions of the United States least resemble a debate over whether America is “winning.” In Israel, France and Russia, they are discussing a more fundamental question: can Washington still be a guarantor of order if its decisions increasingly look like a sequence of abrupt shifts between force, sanctions and negotiations? For now, the answer differs in its political sympathies across the three countries, but is similar in substance: American power remains enormous, yet its ability to turn military pressure into a predictable peace has been seriously called into question.

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America as an Ally—with Caveats: What Germany, South Korea and Israel Say About Trump’s War and Its...

In mid-September 2026, the United States is discussing the midterm elections, but outside America the main source of concern is a different question: how far Donald Trump is prepared to go in the war with Iran—and what allies will have to give up in return for his protection. In Germany, South Korea and Israel, the issue is framed differently, but the underlying concern is the same: Washington remains an indispensable center of power, yet its policy is increasingly seen as personalized, transactional and subordinate to the domestic electoral calendar.

The clearest common theme is the United States’ protracted campaign against Iran. The German debate views it as a risk that another “forever war” could emerge—one that America itself had previously promised to leave behind. An analysis by Deutsche Welle describes a cycle of repeated strikes as Tehran rebuilds its radar systems, air defenses and naval capabilities in the area of the Strait of Hormuz. German observers are particularly skeptical of this model: it may destroy individual targets, but it does not eliminate the adversary’s knowledge or industrial base. The authors effectively see a trap: the United States can choose the scale of the next strike, but cannot control Iran’s response in advance.

In Berlin, this is seen as more than a Middle Eastern problem. Hormuz is an artery of the global energy system, meaning that the war can quickly turn into European inflation, pressure on industry and a new test of transatlantic solidarity. German anxiety is especially evident in comparisons between the current American strategy and Israel’s practice of “mowing the lawn”—regularly weakening an adversary without promising a final victory. For Germany, the metaphor itself sounds like an admission that there is no political endgame: military activity is replacing diplomacy, while temporary control of the crisis is being presented as a strategy.

South Korea views the same war much more pragmatically—through the lens of oil prices, maritime trade and fears that American resources are being diverted from the Korean Peninsula. In an editorial published on September 11, ChosunBiz warned that oil had already risen above $100 a barrel, while rising yields on U.S. bonds and external instability were being transmitted to the South Korean economy through currency and debt markets. From this perspective, Iran is not a distant war but a threat to an export model dependent both on energy imports and uninterrupted maritime logistics.

In Seoul, however, American policy is also causing irritation because Washington is perceived as trying to turn military solidarity into a bargaining chip. A report by Chung Jae-sung, president of the East Asia Institute, and researcher Park Ji-eun for EAI Global states directly that after Trump publicly recalled South Korea’s refusal to support the Iranian campaign, he may demand compensation in negotiations over trade or the allocation of defense costs. The authors suggest that Seoul should prepare limited forms of rear-area assistance—for example, logistics vessels or naval aviation—but postpone a public decision for as long as possible. This is a distinctly Korean formula: do not quarrel with America, but do not allow the country to be drawn into a conflict that could worsen relations with China and leave the peninsula less protected.

This is where the war with Iran merges with the second major theme—the unexpected softening of Trump’s stance toward Kim Jong Un and the scaling back of U.S.-South Korean exercises. For German commentators, this is another example of the president’s personal diplomacy being placed above the alliance architecture. A DW report notes that Trump justified the reduction in exercises by citing their cost and his “very good” relationship with the North Korean leader. Pyongyang, however, did not reciprocate the concession: its missile programs continue, while Kim now has stronger ties with Moscow and Beijing.

In South Korea, the fear of this approach is described as the danger of “bypassing Seoul.” Yonsei University professor Yang Seung-ham put it bluntly in an analysis for NewsPim: Trump is handling the North Korean issue not as a relationship with an ally, but through his own personal connection with Kim Jong Un; South Korea, he said, must acknowledge that it is already being “bypassed.” Another Korean expert, Kim Yong-yoon, offers the opposite response in a column for Aju Business Daily: rather than wait for the United States and North Korea to reach an agreement over Seoul’s head, South Korea should seek to become the “architect” of a new order on the peninsula. This is an important difference from the European reaction. Germany is primarily looking for ways to limit the consequences of American unpredictability; Seoul is trying to turn that unpredictability into an argument for greater agency of its own.

In Israel, attitudes toward the United States are even more complicated. American military power remains critically important there for deterring Iran, and some analysts view the current pressure on Tehran as a strategic achievement. Eyal Tzir Cohen, former head of the Mossad’s Tevel unit, writes in a commentary for N12 that the United States has at least temporarily weakened one of Tehran’s main levers—the ability to turn the Strait of Hormuz into a threat to the global economy. His conclusion is not triumphalist: the improvement remains “far from ideal,” but in regional strategy, even a partial weakening of Iran is highly significant.

At the same time, however, Israel’s expert community increasingly doubts that American commitments are unconditional. A June poll by the Institute for National Security Studies found that only 12% of Israelis believe Trump is strongly committed to protecting Israel’s interests; 57% think he supports the country only where it serves his own interests. The figures are cited in an INSS publication. Notably, this distrust is not limited to the opposition: among both coalition supporters and its opponents, the prevailing view is that Washington’s support is conditional rather than automatic.

Dr. Shai Har-Zvi of Reichman University calls the widening cracks between Israel and the United States a “red flag” in a September review. He points not only to Iran but also to the Trump administration’s desire to independently promote Gaza’s reconstruction, contacts between Israel and Syria, and deals with Saudi Arabia and Turkey. For the Israeli strategist, the problem is not that America has ceased to be an ally; it is that America, as an ally, is increasingly acting as an independent regional broker whose priorities may not coincide with Israel’s.

This leads to a common conclusion across the three countries. Germany fears that America is creating an endless conflict without a convincing political exit. South Korea worries that the United States is simultaneously demanding assistance in the Persian Gulf and weakening security guarantees where that security is vital—against North Korea. Israel sees American power as a key resource, but increasingly regards Trump’s support as a contract with changing terms. In all three cases, this is no longer about traditional anti-Americanism. On the contrary, local debates begin from the assumption that the United States is too important to allow the luxury of a complete break. That is precisely why calls for independent plans are growing louder—in case decisions in Washington are made primarily for the sake of war, a deal or elections in America itself.

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