At the end of March 2026, the image of the United States abroad is being shaped again not by its economy or culture, but by war. The central theme of nearly all discussions in South Africa, France and Saudi Arabia is the large-scale American military campaign against Iran and the related escalation in the Middle East, which many regional analysts are already calling the start of a "long low-intensity world war." Against this background, old fears about American expansionism, unilateral interventions in Latin America and the growing rift between Washington and the Global South are revived.
At the same time, tone and emphasis differ sharply. In French expert circles there is discussion of the return of "Trumpist" unilateral expansionism and its consequences for Europe.(courrierdesameriques.com) In the Saudi and broader Arab information space the focus is on how a US and Israeli war against Iran undermines regional security and is forcing the Gulf monarchies to reassess their relations with Washington.(reddit.com) South African authors, continuing a long tradition of criticizing the "global sheriff," see in the events confirmation that American foreign policy remains at odds with international law norms and the interests of the Global South.(mg.co.za)
All this is unfolding against the backdrop of open military actions: from January to March 2026 the US and Israel have been conducting a series of operations against Iran — from massive airstrikes on nuclear and military infrastructure to strikes on Kurdish areas inside Iran and increases in US forces in the region.(fr.wikipedia.org) In these three countries four major lines of interpretation have emerged: "war and international law," "security and the hypocrisy of alliances," "American expansionism from Latin America to the Middle East," and "the fracturing of US hegemony and the start of a more chaotic world."
First, the US war with Iran is almost everywhere considered through the prism of legitimacy. French and South African commentary emphasizes that, unlike classic self-defence scenarios, Washington is acting preventively and without a clear UN Security Council mandate, drawing parallels with Iraq in 2003 and heightening distrust of American references to international law. French lawyers and political scientists analyzing the legal aspects of US and Israeli strikes on Iran point out bluntly that the 2026 operations are hard to fit within Article 51 of the UN Charter on self-defence, because the parties were not subject to an immediate armed attack, and the concept of preventive strikes has not yet been recognized by international law.(fr.wikipedia.org)
This theme resonates strikingly with the South African tradition. Earlier Mail & Guardian pieces discussed how the US is "departing from its own promises" to countries of the South, including on climate and development, and how its use of force from Iraq to Afghanistan discredits appeals to "the rules."(mg.co.za) South African commentators now project this critique onto Iran, stressing that in the 2026 war Washington again demonstrates that "rules matter when they suit the US, and are easily ignored when regime change in 'problematic' states is at stake." In South African discourse the war in Iran is linked both to the Palestinian experience and to long-standing distrust of NATO: the American strike on Tehran is seen as another example of the West using force against countries outside its bloc, invoking abstract "security" while ignoring its obligations when people in Gaza or Africa suffer.
The Saudi and broader Gulf voice is different but equally critical. In popular Saudi discussions about the current strikes on Iran and the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz a characteristic formulation appears: "The US is not the world's policeman but a great power stuck in a war of attrition, without broad international cover, like in Iraq." This is how the present American campaign against Iran is described in one discussion among Middle Eastern users analyzing reports from the Financial Times and other media that Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait and Qatar are reassessing multibillion-dollar investments in the US and considering invoking force majeure to suspend contracts due to increasing military risks.(reddit.com)
For Saudi discourse, the key question becomes: who is protecting whom? According to sources cited in Middle Eastern commentary, the Gulf states are watching with concern as Washington redeploys missile defense systems — THAAD and Patriot — from the Gulf toward Israel, leaving infrastructure and bases in the Gulf more vulnerable to Iranian retaliatory strikes.(reddit.com) In Saudi eyes this looks like a reversed logic of alliance: instead of the US guaranteeing the security of the Gulf monarchies, local armies are expected to cover American interests and facilities.
From this grows sharp scepticism: if Washington cannot or will not protect its traditional partners, why follow its agenda blindly? In one popular Saudi discussion about the nature of modern wars, the experiences of Ukraine and the current US war against Iran are described as examples of an "era of cheap wars," in which drones and relatively inexpensive ballistic missiles exhaust complex and costly air defense systems. The author concludes: "From observing wars in which the US participates, one can say that America will not go to war whose outcome it does not know in advance."(reddit.com) This statement simultaneously acknowledges US military power and questions the rationality of the current escalation with Iran, where the outcome is far from predetermined.
In France the second major line of discussion is the return of "American expansionism" in its almost classical form, but now under a new balance of forces. French research centers and foreign policy journals analyze not only the Middle East but also US actions in Latin America. A January study from the Centre for International Studies at Sciences Po examines in detail Operation Absolute Resolve, launched in January 2026: US troops land on Venezuelan territory with the aim of arresting its president and dismantling the ruling regime, which the authors directly compare with the "dark pages" of previous Washington policy in the region.(sciencespo.fr)
For a French audience such operations fit the narrative of "Trumpist" expansionism, contours of which first emerged during Donald Trump's initial presidential term and have now been reinvigorated. In a francophone review of the current US administration's foreign policy strategy it is emphasized that Washington increasingly speaks the language of "primacy of nations" and distrust of "transnational organizations." It is in this key that the hard line of the White House toward the European Union is explained, with the EU described in the analytic text as "an organized supranational challenge to sovereignty."(courrierdesameriques.com)
A French diplomat and US expert notes in his column that "current American policy harms not so much Russia or China as the very idea of Western unity." The logic of Washington, in his view, is this: first restore US "coercive authority" through successful operations in Iran and Latin America, then talk to allies from a position of strength. However, in France there is a growing understanding that in such a scenario Europe becomes not a partner but a theater — an object of pressure. One analytic article specifically notes that at the Munich Security Conference in February 2026 Vice President J.D. Vance presented a program in which Europeans were urged to "take responsibility for their own security," which in France was read as a veiled invitation to prepare for a reduction of American guarantees under NATO.(courrierdesameriques.com)
Against this backdrop, US reactivation in military and quasi-military spheres of the Western Hemisphere is particularly sharply perceived: from the "Bouclier des Amériques" project — a multilateral Washington initiative to fight drug cartels and related networks, where the US explicitly promises partners military support for strikes against cartels' infrastructure, to pressure on Colombia across migration, economic and diplomatic tracks.(fr.wikipedia.org) In French discourse this is seen as a revival of a Monroe-esque approach: the US seeks to cement a veto and the right to use force across the Western Hemisphere while simultaneously demanding Europe's unconditional loyalty on eastern and southern fronts.
The third common theme across the three countries is the feeling that the world system is entering a phase of "war diffusion." In the Arab intellectual sphere, widely read in Saudi Arabia, a recent conversation with American economist Jeffrey Sachs has become an important reference; in an interview in early March 2026 he claimed the world has entered the "first days of World War III." He simultaneously describes the burning theaters — from Iran to Ukraine and from the Western Hemisphere to the Arabian Sea — and stresses that by his index of commitment to multilateralism the US remains among the least committed to the UN of all 193 member states.(reddit.com)
For Saudi and other Middle Eastern authors this assessment is useful because it comes not from a "traditional" anti-American critic but from a well-known Western economist. In Arab texts it is used as an argument: if even a Western professor speaks of the start of a world war and of the US systematically undermining the UN, it confirms long-standing regional grievances against Washington. The idea is repeated that the United States "has shifted from the role of guarantor of order to a factor of chaos."
In South Africa, with its experience of fighting apartheid and long-standing criticism of unilateral interventions, the US war with Iran fits into a broader picture: the Global South, local commentators argue, continues to pay for the games of great powers, but unlike during the Cold War it now has more tools for resistance — from BRICS to alternative financial and diplomatic platforms. A number of South African voices link US operations in Iran and Venezuela to Washington's efforts to limit the influence of China and Russia, but stress that such steps accelerate Africa's and Latin America's distancing from the Western camp.(mg.co.za)
In France a similar diagnosis is expressed in more academic language. In a recent issue of Politique étrangère, French authors argue that the current 47th US president proposes an economic and foreign policy program in which national interests are understood extremely narrowly, and the principles of multilateralism and "liberal internationalism" almost dissolve.(ifri.org) For French analysts it is unclear how Europe should react: on the one hand it still depends on the US for defense; on the other hand its elites are increasingly skeptical about the stability and predictability of American strategy.
The perception of the US war with Iran in Saudi Arabia has a particular dimension as a threat to regional balance. Arab discussions closely track the consequences of the IRGC's blockade of the Strait of Hormuz — a spike in oil prices, the risk of $100 per barrel "within hours," and growing concern among Gulf countries that their exports and critical infrastructure are becoming targets of retaliatory strikes.(reddit.com) Against this background local commentators voice what until recently was mainly said by Iranian or Turkish analysts: that a war started to demonstrate US strength could ultimately weaken American influence in the region if the Gulf monarchies feel instrumentalized and unprotected.
A notable nuance in the Saudi discussion is a sober view of the military balance. Popular discussions acknowledge that the technological superiority of the US and Israel is "frighteningly large," but conclude that precisely this superiority makes a full-scale direct war with Iran too risky for Washington: cheap rockets and drones can inflict "unacceptable damage" on American bases and allied infrastructure, and intercepting each such projectile costs millions of dollars.(reddit.com) This links to lessons from the war in Ukraine, which the region studies closely: an example of a war of attrition in which the resource-superior side is forced to spend disproportionately to defend against relatively cheap strikes.
If these three national perspectives are assembled into a single picture, the result is a rather bleak but important snapshot of how the US is seen today outside the West itself. For South African authors the war with Iran and the intervention in Venezuela confirm that Washington has not abandoned the reflex of unilateral interventions and is ready to bypass the UN when it deems necessary. For French experts the current US course is a combination of old expansionism and new strategic selfishness that undermines both multilateralism and Western unity. For Saudi and broader Middle Eastern observers American policy looks like a set of risky moves in which regional allies become expendable and targets of retaliatory fire, and the global role of the US evolves from guarantor of order to source of instability.
The common denominator of these different voices is a deep mistrust of the US's ability to act within predictable rules and with regard for partners' interests. It is precisely this mistrust that is now forming a new international image of America — not through official statements from capitals, but through columns by South African journalists, policy notes from French institutes and emotional discussions on Saudi online platforms. Reading them together makes it clear: for a significant part of the world Washington has long ceased to be the "indispensable nation" and is increasingly perceived as one of the great powers engaged in a protracted and ever less controllable struggle for influence.
