World about US

Across different corners of the globe, the United States is now being discussed almost simultaneously in three languages — German, English and Chinese — but the set of issues largely overlaps. The focus is the sharp reformatting of Washington’s foreign policy after Donald Trump’s return to the White House in 2025, the electoral showdown approaching in 2026 with the midterm Congressional elections, a new wave of trade protectionism, and the ongoing conflicts in which the US is in one way or another involved — from the Middle East to Asia. What in American debate often looks like a string of domestic political cyclones is perceived abroad as a single storm affecting the security, economy and political stability of other countries.

Bringing together the voices of Berlin, Canberra and Beijing reveals several key storylines. First, allies in Europe and Asia debate how reliable the American “nuclear umbrella” and the security guarantee system are in the era of “Trump 2.0,” and whether they are ready for a world in which the US alternately intervenes forcefully and pulls back. Second, economists from Frankfurt to Shanghai analyze the consequences of a new tariff escalation that the Trump administration has already begun — especially for export-oriented economies like Germany and for China, traditionally a target of protectionism. Third, observers discuss the state of American democracy: a growing share of “independent” voters, fatigue with constant elections and political polarization provoke not only curiosity abroad but also alarm, because the predictability of the American domestic scene determines the dollar’s course, borrowing costs and investment decisions worldwide. Finally, in China a distinct strand of discussion is devoted to how the “second Cold War” — a phrase already established in both Western and Chinese texts — is reshaping the strategic balance between Beijing and Washington. (toutiao.com)

One of the most noticeable cross-cutting themes is the new configuration of American foreign policy and how allies perceive it. German and Australian authors discuss in parallel how radically Washington’s style has changed: from familiar multilateral formats to unilateral steps, targeted operations and demonstrative pressure on partners. Chinese analysts, for their part, treat the same actions as part of a broader strategy of containing Beijing, seeing many initiatives not as accidental but as a logical continuation of a course that began long before Trump but has taken on a sharper form under him.

In the Chinese journal 当代美国评论 (Contemporary American Studies) one review piece describes the current administration’s foreign policy as a combination of “low-risk, high-return” interventions — pinpoint strikes, sanctions and demonstrative pressure tactics that allow the White House to show resolve without large-scale ground wars. The authors warn that such a strategy creates a constant background of uncertainty for the global economy and pushes other powers — including China — to accelerate building their own financial and technological security systems to reduce dependence on the dollar and American markets. The review directly ties foreign-policy surges to the US electoral cycle: the closer the elections, the greater the temptation to use the international stage as a tool to mobilize the electorate. (toutiao.com)

In Europe, this sense of unpredictability turns into a question about the future of the transatlantic alliance. The German press discusses at length how, after the CDU’s victory and the formation of a new government led by Friedrich Merz, Berlin must simultaneously strengthen its own defense and seek a new balance with the US. In one English-language remark, Merz effectively signaled Washington that Germany is “back in the game” and intends to increase military spending in the face of the threat from Russia and Trump’s new tariff policy, which already affects German manufacturers. Merz’s biography, as German and Russian press remind readers, is closely linked to transatlantic structures, but his current statements increasingly express the theme: Europe must learn to provide for its own security without automatically counting on Washington, including by viewing France’s and the United Kingdom’s nuclear capabilities as a “European shield.” (ru.wikipedia.org)

The Australian debate runs on the same thread but through the prism of the Indo‑Pacific region. Canberra has traditionally relied on the alliance with the US, and amid growing rivalry between Washington and Beijing Australia is simultaneously deepening its participation in AUKUS and carefully calculating the risks of being drawn into a possible conflict over Taiwan or into the Persian Gulf. Australian analysts, drawing on their history of “harmonizing” the alliance with the US and relations with Asia — as described in the 2000s book The Howard Paradox — assess whether that trick can be repeated in a much more severe strategic environment. The prevailing thought: there is no substitute for America as the “strategic guardian” in the region, but its policy has become so variable that Australia has had to invest heavily in its own defense capabilities and regional mini‑alliances so as not to be left alone against China in case Washington changes course. (en.wikipedia.org)

Chinese commentators, by contrast, see these moves — from AUKUS to NATO strengthening and heightened US activity in the Arctic and North Atlantic — as elements of an emerging “second Cold War.” Chinese media frequently cite the Western term “axis of aggression,” which one American author used to describe China, Russia, Iran and North Korea as a bloc opposing the US and its allies. Chinese writers reject that formula as an ideological construct but openly acknowledge that Washington is steadily building a network of “small clubs” — in technology, defense and finance — to limit Beijing’s maneuvering space. At the same time, PRC diplomats in statements and embassy materials in Washington continue to criticize American “exceptionalism” and recall internal US crises, from the Capitol riot to racism and social inequality, as evidence that the “city on a hill” has lost the moral right to lecture others. (zh.wikipedia.org)

Another large block of discussion concerns American domestic politics and its “exportable” effects. In China, American elections are treated almost like a macroeconomic indicator. Articles on economic and analytical portals dissect the balance of power ahead of the 2026 elections: Republicans hold both chambers of Congress, but their margin in the House is minimal and in the Senate only a few seats. Individual reviews examine key Senate races, from Alaska to Texas and Ohio, through the lens of “kitchen‑table issues” — cost of living, health insurance, mortgage insurance premiums. That same commentary points out: the sharper the social problems in the US, the higher the risk that the administration will seek to “vent steam” through tough foreign‑policy moves — from trade wars to demonstrative strikes against “defiant” regimes. (finance.sina.com.cn)

Another important detail in the Chinese debate is the rise in the number of “independent” voters in the US. Relying on Gallup data and analytical material from American media, Chinese authors describe “independents” as the largest political bloc, making up more than 40% of the electorate. For them this is an indicator of the erosion of party identity in the US and growing disillusionment with traditional elites. Texts draw parallels between this phenomenon and the global wave of populism, emphasizing that such “floating” groups can swing the pendulum toward even more radical figures than Trump, or conversely force both parties to moderate. For China this is a key question: whether independents will become the backbone of some “third way” or remain a battleground between Republicans and Democrats affects the predictability of American policy toward Beijing. (china.com.cn)

In Germany, observers view American domestic politics primarily through the prism of its impact on Europe. Political scientists and journalists in Berlin note that the breakup of the “traffic light” coalition at the end of 2024 coincided with Trump’s presidential victory in the US, and many see a symbolic link: a new era of instability has begun on both sides of the Atlantic. In pre‑election debates in Germany the American theme was constantly present: dependence of Europe on US LNG after the break with Russia was discussed, fears of new tariffs on European exports, and the question of how much longer Germany can keep spending to support Ukraine when the main ally — the US — sometimes increases assistance and sometimes signals possible cuts in commitments. This “flashing” of Washington is often described in German commentary as a factor pushing Berlin toward a more independent line, but at the same time as a challenge the country is not yet fully prepared to meet. (my.ua)

Australian commentators, in turn, regard American polarization and another “super‑long” electoral cycle as a chronic source of instability in the region. Articles in Australian international‑relations journals and think tanks point out that every two‑year change in the composition of Congress can shift US foreign policy on issues key to Canberra — from climate to trade and defense. This forces Australia to build strategy not only around the White House but also around Congress, and to strengthen horizontal ties with Japan, India and Southeast Asian countries. A recurring but less prominent point in commentary is irritation that internal American debates — from “culture wars” to immigration — are sometimes exported as pressure on partners over LGBT rights, migration policy or attitudes toward China, which in an Asian context is perceived far less unambiguously than within the US itself. (en.wikipedia.org)

A special layer is Chinese “American studies,” where the US is simultaneously an object of scholarly analysis and a political opponent. Chinese universities and research centers continue to churn out texts on the “structural rivalry” between Beijing and Washington. One recent analytical review emphasizes that with Trump’s return “essentially nothing has changed” in the US line of containing China: both Democrats and Republicans regard Beijing as the main strategic competitor, with differences mainly in style and tactics. According to this logic, Democrats prefer multilateral formats, sanctions and pressure through international organizations; Trump bets on bilateral “deals” and overt pressure, including high tariffs that target not only China but also European allies. This approach is called “arbitrary” and “undermining the global economic system” in Beijing, but it is used there as an argument for accelerating China’s technological autonomy — from semiconductors to seed stocks — a topic explored in detail in articles about American agricultural and technology policy. (toutiao.com)

Against this background Chinese officials and pro‑government authors construct a narrative of moral superiority. Materials from the PRC Embassy in Washington and large state‑affiliated media regularly emphasize that the US, which likes to speak about human rights, itself suffers from systemic racism, police violence, “democratic deficit” and political corruption. Reminding readers of the Capitol riot and the intensification of America’s cultural wars, the Chinese side argues that the myth of “American exceptionalism” has collapsed and the concept of the “city on a hill” no longer works even in the eyes of many Americans themselves. In these texts the US appears less as a model and more as a “negative example,” whose mistakes should push other countries to seek alternative development models, based, Chinese authors claim, on “collective security” and a “community of shared future for mankind.” (us.china-embassy.gov.cn)

Interestingly, at the level of “small” topics the international agenda also picks up American storylines. Germany, which will host some matches of the 2026 World Cup, discusses not only the sporting aspects but also the political background of the largest tournament taking place in the US, Canada and Mexico with ironic distrust. The German newspaper Die Zeit recently asked sardonically about the future World Cup, “who would be happy if Greenland became part of the US,” alluding to Trump’s long‑standing and resurfacing fantasies about purchasing the island and tying them to an image of America in which sport, geopolitics and business are inevitably intertwined. For a European audience this is another reminder that American foreign policy can intrude even into what was traditionally considered “outside politics” — from the Olympics to World Cups. (zeit.de)

Taken together, Germany’s, Australia’s and China’s reactions to today’s US form a complex mosaic. The common note is growing distrust of the predictability of American policy and the realization that a “unified West led by Washington” is no longer an unquestioned given. But paths diverge from there. Germany, despite doubts, still sees the US as the main military shield and economic partner and therefore seeks ways not to fall out with Washington while cautiously building its own autonomy. Australia tries to balance the fear of America withdrawing from the region with concern about being pulled into an overly risky confrontation with China to which Washington might drag it. China perceives the US as a strategic rival whose internal weaknesses and external surges must be simultaneously exploited and neutralized by building a parallel architecture of institutions and norms.

For a reader used to viewing the world through American media, the intonations in these foreign debates are particularly valuable. Where Americans argue about tactics — tariffs, sanctions, operations abroad — people in Berlin, Canberra and Beijing talk about the survival of entire economic models, the future of regional security and whether it is still possible to build long‑term strategy relying on an unpredictable Washington. This shift — from seeing the US as an “anchor” to viewing America as one of the largest sources of global uncertainty — is the main conclusion of the current international discussion about the role of the United States.

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