The outside world now discusses the US primarily not as an abstract “superpower,” but as a source of very concrete risks: from a shock on the oil market to the politicization of the dollar and the fragility of American institutions themselves. Turkish, German and Chinese media focus on different aspects, but the themes noticeably overlap: Washington’s “economic weapon,” the crisis around Iran and the Strait of Hormuz, political pressure on the Fed and the courts, and domestic socio‑economic tensions within the United States.
Perhaps the sharpest international conversation revolves around the US operation against Iran and oil sanctions. Chinese official and semi‑official media directly call the new wave of sanctions and threats against buyers of Iranian oil an “economic bombing raid.” In an analytical column on China News’ site a special term is even introduced — the “Economic Fury” operation — to describe Washington’s course: anyone who continues to buy Iranian oil or service its flows will be hit by the US Treasury and its “secondary sanctions.” The author compares this to an extension of a military blockade to the financial and logistics system: from intercepting tankers to striking banks and shipping companies that support Tehran’s exports, and emphasizes that warning letters have already been sent to the Emirates and Oman, while more than two dozen companies, individuals and vessels connected to Iranian oil have been sanctioned. Beijing’s interpretation is unequivocal: the US is using dollar dominance and control over settlement infrastructure as an “extra‑territorial weapon,” forcing third countries to comply with American foreign policy under threat of financial isolation and undermining trust in the dollar as a global public good. In this logic Washington acts not merely as a participant in the Middle East conflict but as a “掠夺性霸权” — predatory hegemony that does not balk at economic blows to allies in order to pressure adversaries, as explicitly stated in a China.com.cn column criticizing “Economic Fury” as yet another example of US sanctional hypertrophy. The author also recalls a broader picture: from the long embargo on Cuba to a series of banking and energy sanctions against other states, painting America as, by definition, a “sanctions power.”
From the Turkish perspective the Iran story is colored differently: it’s a question of the balance of power in a “global war” and of the vulnerability of the US and its allies themselves. Conservative Turkish media analyze in detail how Washington and Tel Aviv find themselves “pinched” around the Strait of Hormuz, where Iran, relying on asymmetric tools, can make any attempt at coercion very costly. In a piece on A Haber the actions of the great powers around Iran are described as “giants’ chess,” and international security expert Yaldyn Deniz stresses that Washington traditionally seeks “legitimacy” before each military operation — resolutions, coalitions, humanitarian pretexts — but this time, in his view, “the picture is different”: international support is fragmentary, regional allies are cautious, and the US is increasingly accused of pushing the region toward escalation under the cover of talk about “freedom of navigation.” Deniz notes that for Ankara and other regional players the crisis around Hormuz is not only a risk of oil price spikes but also a test of the real ability of the US to control key maritime chokepoints at a time when its global leadership is being contested. Turkish analysis draws attention to nervousness in Washington: behind the scenes of military decisions, American press reports discuss both the president’s psychological state and the lack of a clear long‑term Iran strategy, which in Ankara is interpreted as a symptom of a deeper crisis of governability in the US. (ahaber.com.tr)
The common thread clearly read in both Turkey and China is the fear of US economic and financial power becoming a systemic weapon that undermines the very basis of global interdependence. In the Turkish context this is expressed through the question of oil and energy markets: if Washington threatens sanctions against countries that simply meet their energy needs via Iran, what are states whose economies critically depend on imports supposed to do? In the Chinese discourse the story enlarges into a critique of the entire US sanctions policy, where the Iran case is only the latest iteration. Chinese analysts link the current “economic fury” to accumulated experience with Cuba, Russia, North Korea and other countries hit by American restrictions, and they cite Western experts who point to the limited effectiveness and serious humanitarian consequences of such tactics. Against this backdrop the argument gains strength that the more the US uses the dollar as a cudgel, the more it motivates the world toward dedollarization and the search for alternative payment mechanisms.
The second major crosscutting theme is the internal condition of the American economy and its political “superstructure.” Chinese media use recent US stories to illustrate growing socio‑economic inequality and the politicization of economic policy. In a recent China News piece the picture of a so‑called “K‑shaped” recovery is sketched: wealthy households and Wall Street form the upper branch of the graph, benefiting from rising asset values; the broad middle and lower classes form the lower branch, whose real incomes lag behind inflation. Data from a metropolitan food bank are cited: about a third of families in the Washington area faced food shortages last year. The organization’s director, Lada Mutia, notes that even families with formally high incomes — $90–120,000 a year, previously considered a stable middle class — increasingly seek help. She explains this by persistently high post‑pandemic inflation and wage growth lagging behind the rising cost of living: rent, groceries and services pull household budgets down. The piece also features voices of ordinary Americans: a suburban Washington resident recounts how a household with two working adults still “can’t make ends meet,” has to cut expenses and rely on food aid, while the government reduces federal funding for social programs. The Chinese author draws the conclusion that behind the facade of “sustained GDP growth” there is an exacerbation of social fissures that become a factor in political polarization and distrust of institutions. (hn.chinanews.com.cn)
Chinese observers believe this social tension is worsened by the way politics increasingly aggressively interferes with independent economic institutions, above all the Federal Reserve. An analytical piece on Chinanews.com.cn examines in detail the high‑profile conflict between the White House and the Fed: Chair Jerome Powell, who faces a criminal investigation regarding Fed building renovation expenses and alleged false testimony to Congress, sees these accusations as merely a “pretext” and believes the real reason for the pressure is the Fed’s refusal to tailor monetary policy to the president’s wishes. The author describes this as a new phase in a long struggle between Washington and Wall Street for control of the Fed, where the key question is whether the central bank will preserve its independence in setting interest rates or become an instrument of the current administration. The article discusses candidates for Fed chair at length, naming former presidential economic adviser Kevin Hassett as a favorite — a man whose close political ties to the White House alarm parts of the financial community. Researcher Liu Yin from the Financial Research Institute at the People’s University of China comments that choosing an overtly politically loyal Fed head could undermine confidence in the predictability of US monetary policy, trigger capital flow turbulence and increase global market instability. In this context China sees the American economy not only as a source of global demand but also as a potential source of shock if the conflict between populist politics and independent institutions gets out of control. (chinanews.com.cn)
The third layer of international discussion concerns the erosion of American political‑legal institutions and what many outside the US perceive as a crisis of “American democracy.” Chinese commentators actively use recent episodes — from record federal government shutdowns to attacks on the judiciary — as illustrations of systemic problems. An analysis on the Guancha portal dissects a sharp speech by Chief Justice John Roberts, who publicly criticized officials threatening judicial independence and, according to American and British media, was primarily referring to President‑elect Donald Trump and Vice President J. D. Vance. The Chinese author cites Western analysts pointing to a paradox: initial dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court came mainly from Republicans angry about cases against Trump, but after the court adopted decisions expanding presidential immunity, Democrats sharply lost trust in the institution. As a result, the article emphasizes, the Supreme Court — which in the American political system should embody stability and arbitration — itself became the object of mass distrust and political attacks, creating risks for the long‑term legitimacy of the entire constitutional framework. (guancha.cn)
This theme of the breakdown of the “model democracy” also appears in more ideologically charged Chinese texts, where the crisis of American institutions is linked to the practice of external coercion. On the Chinese MFA’s site and related resources there are detailed accounts of how the US, in the authors’ view, simultaneously proclaims itself a defender of democratic values and systematically violates international law through unilateral sanctions and military interventions. Arguments cited include, among other things, the January 6, 2021, Capitol riot, the long embargo against Cuba and the practice of “extra‑territorial” laws like the Helms‑Burton Act, which allow punishment of foreign companies for not complying with American policy. The article also quotes Professor Daniel Drezner’s piece in Foreign Policy, which calls the US a “republic of sanctions” — a country that elevates sanctions to a universal foreign policy tool, often ignoring their real impact on humanitarian situations. In the Chinese reading all this forms a narrative that the United States is losing moral authority both at home and abroad, and the conflicts now under discussion around Iran, the Fed and the Supreme Court are merely symptoms of a deeper “system fatigue.” (gh.china-embassy.gov.cn)
The German media field’s view of the US is less emotional than the Turkish or Chinese ones, but similar motifs are clearly present. German quality newspapers and public broadcasters continue to register an ambivalent attitude toward America: on the one hand, as an indispensable NATO and economic partner; on the other, as a source of instability through trade frictions, sanction policy and internal political distortions. In the context of the Iran crisis and the “Economic Fury” operation German analysts are most concerned about effects on the energy market and the global economy: new oil price spikes, a hit to Eurozone industry, and increased pressure on companies operating in the Middle East. At the same time Germany, committed to a multilateral approach, traditionally looks critically at unilateral US “secondary sanctions” that de facto impose American foreign policy on European businesses. Against this backdrop the German discussion on Europe’s strategic autonomy intensifies: how long can the EU allow itself to depend on decisions made in Washington if those decisions lead to direct economic losses for European countries?
Bringing together these different perspectives — the Turkish regional‑security, the Chinese system‑critical and the German pragmatic‑economic — one can see a common outline: the world is finding it harder to perceive the US as a predictable “guardian of order.” In many national debates Washington is turning into a complex phenomenon: partner, competitor, source of risks, and often an example of domestic problems comparable in scale to those it has long pointed to in others. The “Economic Fury” operation against Iran, the struggle for control of the Fed, growing social inequality and the politicization of the Supreme Court are not disparate news items but symptoms that American power increasingly relies on tools that provoke irritation and anxiety even in allied capitals.
That is why in Turkey, Germany and China the discussion now is less about whether America will be great again and more about the cost to others of how it seeks to keep its place in the world, and whether the international community has the resources and the will to offset the consequences of this policy — through regional initiatives, alternative payment systems, or simply a more sober, pragmatic distance from Washington.
