At the end of April 2026, the United States simultaneously plays the role of a warring power, a space pioneer, a key link in the global economy and a source of political upheaval. Outside America this is perceived not as a familiar backdrop but as a concentrate of risks and opportunities. Russian, French and Chinese media and experts are discussing not one or two but several overlapping storylines at once: the war of the US and Israel against Iran and its consequences for global security; Washington’s aggressive trade‑tariff policy and the Supreme Court’s ruling on duties; a shift in the trajectory of US monetary policy and the struggle for control over the Federal Reserve; the US energy pivot and its growing role as an exporter; and the symbolic but very loud launch of a crewed lunar mission under the Artemis program. These topics converge through three very different lenses — Russian, French and Chinese — and their overlay reveals the real global agenda around the United States.
The first and most acute storyline is the ongoing US and Israeli war with Iran. For Russia this is primarily a question of the global balance of power and the sanctions architecture. In the news feed of Parliamentary Newspaper, Tehran’s reaction to possible US strikes on oil infrastructure is presented as another escalation: the Iranian side “promised a harsh response if the US strikes the country’s oil facilities.” Russian commentators place this in a broader context: each new US operation in the region, they argue, confirms the “inability of Washington to live without war” and simultaneously accelerates the formation of alternative formats — from deepening Iran‑Russia cooperation to intensified contacts within BRICS. The tone mixes schadenfreude and anxiety: on the one hand, the “boomerang of sanctions” against Russia, it is claimed, is returning to the US in the form of rising prices and inflationary pressure; on the other — any military clash around Iranian oil threatens a blow to the global market, and thus to the Russian economy, which is tied to raw‑material exports.(pnp.ru)
The Chinese conversation about the same conflict is almost entirely wrapped in the language of markets and macroeconomics. In reviews on platforms like Xueqiu and in morning roundups by Xinhua/Sina, the US and Israeli war with Iran appears alongside inflation and Fed rates as an “external shock.” A commentator using the pseudonym “资本三流分析” in his rundown of “ten hot foreign topics” describes US President Donald Trump’s announced temporary pause in hostilities at Pakistan’s request primarily through the prism of oil prices, the dollar and rate expectations: cessation of strikes lowers the risk premium in oil prices but increases uncertainty about how far the Fed can continue a dovish course.(xueqiu.com) For Chinese investors America here is not an “empire” or the “world’s policeman” but a source of volatility: any tweet or statement from Washington about Iran turns into a move in the S&P 500 and, through it, moves portfolios of retail traders in Shanghai and Shenzhen. In Chinese overviews there is almost no direct moralizing criticism of the US; instead, authors speak of a “rise in uncertainty in US monetary policy” and the need for “additional hedging” against American risks.
The French debate about the Middle East and the US is less emotional but far more politicized. There the war in Iran is viewed through the prism of Europe’s strategic autonomy. Economic bulletins from the Finance Ministry and analyses by major banks note that Washington’s military line further underlines the EU’s energy dependence on US decisions: after the transformation of America into a net hydrocarbon exporter, Washington has become one of the key beneficiaries of any new energy crisis provoked by war. One analytical review states that exporter status does not make the US immune to inflation but gives it leverage over allies, including European ones.(economic-research.bnpparibas.com) French officials speak in a dry technocratic language, but the subtext is clear: “American security” is increasingly seen in Paris as something provided at the expense of Europe’s vulnerability.
The second major theme is the US’s aggressive trade policy and the recent Supreme Court decision that found massive tariffs imposed by the Trump administration against a number of countries unlawful. That decision, which could result in roughly $1.6 trillion of duty refunds to major importers, became a key story in Chinese business media. Sina Finance recounts expectations of companies like Walmart, which in theory should receive part of these funds, but highlights skepticism: experts and the corporations themselves do not believe the money will quickly reach businesses because of administrative barriers and legal risks.(finance.sina.com.cn) In Chinese commentary this episode is read as proof of the unpredictability of American institutions: the White House promoted tariffs for years under slogans of “fair trade,” and then the Supreme Court reverses the policy, creating legal and financial uncertainty for partners.
In France the same topic is approached from a different angle. The research department of a major bank and economists at the Ministry of Economy treat Trump’s tariff war as a realized shock whose effects have largely been absorbed in prices and supply chains. In their models the tariffs are already built into higher inflation and compressed corporate margins; the question is how quickly the US can adjust course without undermining the remaining trust in multilateral rules. One recent review emphasizes that even with part of the tariffs removed, US federal debt will continue to rise and exceed 100% of GDP already in 2026, and uncertainty around the fate of USMCA and future packages with the EU and Japan remains high.(economic-research.bnpparibas.com) For the French elite America is simultaneously a key market and partner on which too much depends, and a player whose unilateral moves turn any long‑term calculation into a lottery.
The Russian discussion of US trade policy runs through the prism of sanctions and “economic warfare.” There is no open sympathy for American importers expecting duty refunds; rather, the Supreme Court’s decision is presented as yet another confirmation of “double standards”: when it concerns its own business, Washington is willing to revise even flagship measures, but when sanctions hit Russian or Iranian interests, they are presented as an unassailable moral norm. Russian analytical outlets link Trump’s tariff maneuvers to his forthcoming fight to keep a majority in the House of Representatives in November 2026 and the expected reallocation of resources toward the industrial “Rust Belt” — the Republicans’ traditional base.(zh.wikipedia.org) Here the US is not an abstract power but an electoral machine using world trade as an instrument of domestic politics.
The third crosscutting thread is US monetary policy and the battle for the future of the Federal Reserve. In the Chinese space this is one of the main topics. In numerous reviews — from detailed analyses on financial platforms to popular video analysts — the falling likelihood of a Fed rate hike in 2026 is discussed against the backdrop of inflationary spikes caused by tariffs and war. Chinese commentators stress that despite sharp swings in expectations after the start of the war with Iran, the baseline scenario of major banks, such as Goldman Sachs, still assumes a low probability of tightening this year.(blockweeks.com) Attention is also focused on the career of Kevin Warsh, nominated by Trump to head the Fed: Chinese roundups relay his congressional promises to preserve independence from presidential pressure and not to yield to public calls to cut rates.(finance.sina.com.cn) But the subtext is clear: Beijing sees the politicization of the Fed as an additional signal that the “dollar anchor” is becoming less reliable, and this is an argument for accelerating de‑dollarization in regional settlements.
French economists, by contrast, view the Fed more as a relatively predictable institution, while noting a “return of political risk” into its workings. In the latest study by a major bank it is emphasized that for Europe the key question is not so much the level of the rate as the extent to which US monetary policy remains focused on its domestic mandate rather than becoming a tool of short‑term political interests of the administration. European analysts also acknowledge that however political shifts change, the dollar and the US debt market remain the unrivaled benchmarks for global investors — and this pushes the EU toward a difficult balance between criticizing Washington and depending on it.(economic-research.bnpparibas.com)
In Russia the Fed theme is presented differently. The emphasis there is on how changes in rates and Federal Reserve rhetoric affect commodity prices, exchange rates and the ability to work around sanctions. In expert columns one can find the formula that “every Fed rate move is a vote for or against American hegemony,” and discussion of the candidate for the new chair is interpreted through a conspiratorial prism of a struggle between “Wall Street” and the “deep state.” In practice Russian economists closely monitor spreads between US Treasury yields and alternative instruments, but in public rhetoric the Fed becomes almost a political symbol comparable in significance to the Pentagon or the State Department.
The fourth, less conflictual but symbolically important storyline is NASA’s launch of a crewed mission to the Moon under the Artemis program on April 1, 2026. In Russia this event provokes an ambivalent reaction. On the one hand, Russian outlets acknowledge: the US for the first time since 1972 sent a crewed spacecraft to the Moon, and this is a serious technological and image success.(ru.wikipedia.org) On the other hand, comments contain reproaches toward Russian leadership for the “lost space” and arguments that the American lunar project pursues not only scientific but also military goals: the militarization of cislunar space, control over resources and a demonstration of political will to allies and rivals.
Chinese reactions to Artemis are even more complex. On the one hand, state media emphasize that US success confirms the trend of “returning space to the center of geopolitical rivalry” and simultaneously serves as a stimulus to accelerate China’s own lunar program. On the other — in more businesslike and expert publications the American leap is linked to economics: the SLS launch and crewed mission are seen as a signal of Washington’s long‑term bets on a high‑technology industrial complex meant to offset blows to traditional sectors from tariff wars and production relocation. In this logic the crewed flight to the Moon is not only a flag in the regolith but a large Keynesian contract for the aerospace industry, feeding supply chains from rare earth metals to software.
In France interest in Artemis is tinged with a European complex of “missed opportunity.” French and pan‑European commentators remind readers that Europe once dreamed of its own crewed program, but now must choose between close cooperation with NASA and attempting to build an autonomous path practically from scratch. Some columns note that the US lunar project complements the economic agenda of a “new industrial policy” aimed at creating jobs in high‑tech sectors within the country — from defense to green energy. In this sense Paris looks at Washington and sees not only the militarization of space but also an example for its own, far less advanced, industrialization.
Finally, there are quieter but extremely important themes running like a common thread through all three discourses. The first is the chronic growth of US public debt and the question of its sustainability. French analysts cautiously warn that by 2026 debt will exceed 100% of GDP, but immediately reassure: as long as the dollar remains the world’s reserve currency and the American market remains the deepest and most liquid, there is no talk of an immediate crisis.(economic-research.bnpparibas.com) Chinese authors are harsher: for them rising debt is another argument for accelerating diversification of reserves and developing their own payment infrastructures. Russian commentators use this figure as a rhetorical club to demonstrate the “impending collapse of the American model” — even though many of them well understand that real erosion of dollar hegemony is still far off.
The second crosscutting theme is the gap between perceptions of the American economy inside the country and outside it. Chinese financial portals emphasize the “resilience of US fundamentals,” still high employment and strong profitability of some corporations, which makes the American market “uncomfortably attractive” even for those politically opposed to Washington.(meigu.news) French economists, while not hiding annoyance about tariffs and unilateral moves, are forced to admit that the US is pulling the global economy out of stagnation. Russian media, on the other hand, focus on the negatives — inflation, social stratification, political polarization — but even in this context cannot ignore the fact that the dollar still dominates and US markets remain the “main arena of the game.”
Putting these pieces together yields a complex but fairly coherent picture of how the world sees today’s United States. In Russia America appears as a contradictory giant enemy: a militarist power waging wars in Iran and Ukraine through support for Kyiv, while at the same time a technological and financial center whose decisions cannot be shrugged off. In France the US is an inconvenient but indispensable partner whose actions constantly force Paris and Brussels to choose between strategic autonomy and economic pragmatism. In China the US is above all a variable in the growth equation: a source of risks, opportunities and price shocks, treated coolly and instrumentally, translating almost every political move from Washington into the language of interest rates, indexes and exchange rates.
The common thread across all three discourses is the realization that the “American century” has not disappeared but has simply become much more conflictual and unpredictable. The US still sends people to the Moon, moves global markets with a single court decision, and shapes the contours of global security with its wars and its pauses for peace. But now each projection of that power is accompanied by questions and doubts: where does the defense of national interests end and the undermining of allies begin; how politicized are institutions that used to be considered neutral; and how long will the rest of the world tolerate the fate of its economies being so tightly tied to a changeable American course. Answers to these questions in Moscow, Paris and Beijing differ, but they coincide in one respect: the era of unconditional trust in the US is gone for good, and today every new step by Washington is viewed through the prism of one’s own sovereignty and vulnerability.
