In March 2026, discussion of America in the foreign press almost automatically boils down to two narratives: the war around Iran and the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz on one hand, and the Trump administration’s global tariff war on the other. Casting shadows over them are long‑standing disputes about human rights and double standards, which in India flared up anew after Washington’s recent recommendation to sanction Indian intelligence. The general backdrop is growing distrust in the U.S. ability to act “responsibly” and predictably, even as none of the three countries — India, Australia and France — are ready to write off Washington as a key military and economic actor.
The first knot of tension is the war in Iran and the associated crisis in the Strait of Hormuz. It was the U.S., together with Israel, that struck Iranian targets and began escorting tankers, after which Tehran announced the closure of the strait to American, Israeli and “Western allied” vessels. Traffic through Hormuz collapsed from more than 140 ships a day to a handful, instantly affecting oil prices and marine insurance.(fr.wikipedia.org)
In the French debate this crisis is described through the prism of systemic risks to the global economy and Europe’s excessive dependence on American military initiative. French publications analyze in detail how a blockade of Hormuz and U.S. strikes on the Iranian navy create a “perfect storm” in the energy market: a quarter of the world’s seaborne oil supplies are at risk, insurers have suspended coverage for war risks, and the Energy Agency was forced to announce an unprecedented release of hundreds of millions of barrels from member states’ strategic reserves.(fatshimetrie.org) Reports from Brussels and Geneva emphasize that Washington effectively presented allies with a fait accompli: first military escalation, then the expectation that Europeans will make up for the consequences in the energy market and the strait.
President Emmanuel Macron, announcing the joining of French ships to the escort mission through Hormuz as part of the European operation Aspides, repeatedly stresses its “primarily defensive and supportive” character.(fr.wikipedia.org) This wording frames the dispute with Washington: Paris does not want to appear as a junior partner in an American war, but it also cannot ignore the threat to freedom of navigation. French commentators draw parallels with the 2003 Iraq war: the U.S. is again acting with a “fait accompli strategy,” involving allies at the stage of managing consequences.
The Indian conversation about American involvement in the war around Iran is even more tense — and personalized. For Delhi, the Hormuz crisis and the U.S. operation against the Iranian navy are not abstract geopolitics but direct interference in its own “backyard.” The sinking of the Iranian frigate IRIS Dena became a symbol: the Americans sank the ship after it had participated in naval exercises hospitably organized by India in the Indian Ocean and had departed from American forces in peaceful circumstances.(en.wikipedia.org)
In the Indian press this is described as a diplomatic humiliation. Prominent strategic analyst Brahma Chellaney called the sinking of Dena “a strategic disgrace” for India: in his view, Washington turned India’s maritime “backyard” into a combat zone, calling into question Delhi’s role as a responsible security guarantor in the Indian Ocean. Former navy chief Admiral Arun Prakash was even sharper: he said the U.S. showed “some form of betrayal,” participating “hand in hand” with Iranian sailors in the Indian exercise and then sinking their ship immediately after it left the Indian port, although they could have postponed the operation “to spare India this humiliation.”(en.wikipedia.org) For many Indian commentators this is not just an episode of the Iranian conflict but a symptom that Washington views India as a venue for its disputes rather than as an equal strategist.
In Australia the same Iranian crisis is discussed differently: through the lens of alliance obligations and the risk of being dragged into someone else’s war. Canberra has acknowledged that Australian military personnel were present on board the American submarine that sank IRIS Dena — this raises questions among local analysts about the transparency of decision‑making and how deeply the country is already involved in a war that has not been formally declared.(en.wikipedia.org) For an Australian audience this is another reminder: betting on strategic closeness with the U.S. and the AUKUS project means participating in operations initiated in Washington, sometimes without a full public mandate.
The second major theme is U.S. tariff policy and the effective dismantling of a century‑old free trade architecture. For Australia and India this is both an economic blow and a political test of sovereignty, while France sees American protectionism as a symptom of a deep shift in the global order.
In Australia the discussion centers not only on the “baseline” 10 percent tariff on all goods imported into the U.S. introduced in 2025, but also its recent rise to 15 percent.(australianonlinenews.com.au) Canberra officially stresses that compared with China, Vietnam or even Japan, Australian exports still occupy a privileged position — tariff rates for those countries are much higher. But economists and columnists remind readers: in the structure of the Australian economy the U.S. is one of the key markets for meat, metals and high‑tech goods, and any tariff increase will inevitably hit farmers and industry. One Australian analyst told local media: if Australia was once a kind of “special partner” of the U.S. in free trade, it is now merely one of the countries on the general list of payers of the American global “import tax.”
Australian foreign policy thought does not reduce everything to numbers. Centrist and left‑liberal commentators see Trump’s tariff policy as part of a broader trend — Washington’s abandonment of the role as architect of an open global economy. Economists warn that tariff escalation on China and dozens of other countries undermines Asian production and logistics chains, and Australia, deeply integrated into regional trade, is “not insulated” from the negative consequences even if its own rate seems moderate.(theguardian.com) Against this backdrop voices demanding greater economic independence from the U.S. and market diversification grow louder in the national discourse, even while military alliance is maintained.
In France the American tariff war is woven into a broader debate about “the end of American hegemony.” It’s not only about a specific 10 or 15 percent rate, but about symbolism: a country that for decades promoted liberalization and the WTO is now causing a global trade shock. European business press widely cites Mark Carney’s speech in Davos, in which he — without naming the U.S. directly but quite transparently — criticized trade wars and even territorial ambitions as threats to global stability.(en.wikipedia.org) For French and European economists this confirms that the “exceptional American status” in the world order is being exhausted, and the EU must build greater autonomy in both trade and finance.
In India U.S. protectionism has overlapped with an existing crisis in bilateral relations in 2025–2026, when the U.S. imposed harsh tariffs on Indian exports tied to Russia’s oil purchases and Delhi’s position on the conflict with Moscow.(en.wikipedia.org) Indian commentators talk about the “worst crisis in two decades” in relations and ask to what extent Washington truly sees India as a partner rather than as a lever of pressure on China and Russia. In Indian English‑language media and popular forums there is an emotional surge: accusations that India is being turned into an “American vassal state without the benefits of vassalage” to statements that the U.S. “uses countries while they are useful and then discards them.”(reddit.com) Even proponents of strategic closeness with Washington more often stipulate: India must not let the U.S. “make India a second China” — a rival that will later be systematically squeezed.(reddit.com)
The third line of dispute with America is human rights and intervention in internal affairs. For France this is a familiar theme, often coupled with criticism of Europe’s own double standards. But in India it took on a sharply confrontational character after the March report by the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom recommending targeted sanctions against India’s external intelligence agency R&AW for alleged violations and persecution of religious minorities.(en.wikipedia.org)
The Indian government reacted extremely strongly: a Foreign Ministry spokesperson called the report “biased” and “politically motivated,” stressing that such assessments do not reflect India’s true diversity and democratic character. On the pages of the conservative press in New Delhi the Commission’s report was compared to “Hollywood fiction” and “propaganda surpassing Goebbels.”(en.wikipedia.org) At the same time Indian security services carried out a series of operations that resulted in the arrest in several cities of U.S. and Ukrainian citizens accused of espionage and financing terrorism in northeastern regions. In the Indian discourse this is presented as a “counter‑blow” against Western structures that, in Delhi’s view, interfere in internal affairs under the cover of human rights rhetoric.
Against this background skepticism grows in India’s expert community: how seriously does Washington take India as an equal democratic partner if it is ready to openly question its institutions while simultaneously using its markets and geopolitical weight? Some commentators recall that the U.S. not long ago called the Indo‑Pacific partnership the “cornerstone” of its strategy, while others bitterly note that “the real test of friendship comes with sanctions, not just joint summits and laudatory speeches.”(reddit.com)
Finally, in all three countries discussion is growing — sometimes directly, sometimes between the lines — about trust in American leadership. In Australia this is reflected in polls showing a majority of the population considers Trump’s re‑election “bad news for the world,” and the share of those who believe the U.S. can “act responsibly on the world stage” has sharply fallen compared to a decade ago.(en.wikipedia.org) Australian experts emphasize a paradox: 80% of respondents still see the alliance with the U.S. as the foundation of national security, but only a minority trust specific American policies — especially on trade and climate.
In France skepticism has a different character. The country has long been accustomed to the idea of America as an “empire prone to unilateral action,” but the current combination of trade wars, territorial ambitions and military escalations around Iran is seen as a new phase.(lepoint.fr) French commentators speak of the “erosion of the moral authority” of the U.S.: a country whose own sanctions and strikes on Iran have destabilized the Middle Eastern economy for decades now calls on others to save the oil market and protect shipping. Some see hypocrisy in this, others simply the consequence of Washington no longer being able to unilaterally finance global stability and delegating risks to allies.
The Indian conversation about trust is even more contradictory. On the one hand, Indian leaders like to emphasize a historic chance: a close alliance between the world’s two largest democracies is supposedly capable of ensuring a “peaceful and prosperous 21st century,” as the U.S. vice‑president said while speaking in Jaipur.(reddit.com) On the other hand, every new American sanction initiative, every episode like the sinking of IRIS Dena off India’s coast, fuels fears that “partnership” for Washington primarily means unilateral steps and an expectation that Delhi will adapt.
A unifying motif in all three countries is fatigue with American unpredictability and, at the same time, an unwillingness to break with the U.S. France seeks to turn discontent into a push for European strategic autonomy, while still sending ships into Hormuz, effectively insuring the consequences of Washington’s decisions. Australia criticizes Trump’s tariffs and doubts his leadership qualities, but continues to deepen military cooperation, participating even in risky operations such as the attack on the Iranian frigate. India loudly objects to sanction threats and religious reports from American commissions, but remains engaged in joint summits and high‑technology trade talks, from GPUs to civil nuclear energy.(reddit.com)
That is the main, not always obvious feature from Washington’s perspective of the current moment: the world criticizes America more harshly than at any time in recent decades, but so far does not see a real alternative to its role in security, technology and finance. Indian, Australian and French voices converge on one thing: if the U.S. does not learn to align power with predictability and respect for partners’ interests, the question will no longer be how great American influence is, but how many countries will actively begin to build a world “after America” — and do so without looking back.
