In early April 2026 the image of the United States again became the center of global debate. The reason is obvious: the war of the United States and Israel with Iran, which began on February 28 and led to massive strikes on targets in Iran and retaliatory attacks on American bases in the Middle East, has become the largest American military intervention since Iraq. (ru.wikipedia.org) Against this backdrop, Donald Trump in his second term is simultaneously blackmailing allies with a possible withdrawal from NATO, while inside the United States he is criticized for using an external conflict as a political tool. In South Korea, Russia and Turkey the discussion about Washington runs along different lines, but they intersect in one point: the United States are perceived as a country whose decisions still set the agenda for everyone, but which provoke increasing irritation and distrust.
The main theme uniting the three countries is the war of the United States and Israel with Iran and the recent two-week ceasefire achieved on April 8. (tokengram.ru) The second major storyline is Trump’s threat to “rethink” or even break NATO commitments, which is perceived in Moscow, Ankara and Seoul as a symptom of a serious restructuring of the security system. (reddit.com) Finally, a throughline is the theme of the economic consequences of American policy: from an energy shock in Asia and Turkey to sanctions and financial calculations in Russia.
Different national lenses form around these focal points.
The first and most emotional layer is the perception of the US–Israel war with Iran. In Turkey this war is discussed not as a distant conflict but as a crisis “at the door.” Turkish business and general-political media analyze in detail the talks about the American proposal for a 45-day ceasefire, emphasizing Ankara’s active role as one of the key mediators alongside Pakistan and Egypt. In the piece “ABD-İran hattında temas: 45 günlük ateşkes masada” in Dünya it is said that it is Ankara, together with Cairo and Islamabad, that helps “legitimize” the terms of the ceasefire in Tehran’s eyes and soften America’s ultimatum tone. (dunya.com)
Turkish authors stress that Washington’s proposal is not a humanitarian gesture but an attempt to stabilize markets and restore freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz on terms favorable to the United States and its allies. Anadolu Ajansı’s analysis explicitly states that global markets “are simultaneously watching the ceasefire and US economic growth data,” showing how closely Ankara perceives American military and economic power to be intertwined. (aa.com.tr)
In Russia the tone is quite different: the ceasefire is perceived primarily as a Washington maneuver, not as a path to peace. Komsomolskaya Pravda publishes a conversation with Pavel Podlesny of the Institute of the USA and Canada of the Russian Academy of Sciences under the headline: “‘A new US war with Iran will start in a year’: the ceasefire looks like only a breather.” (kp.ru) Podlesny, one of the prominent Russian specialists on American politics, asserts that for Trump this is only a tactical pause: he accepts the ceasefire, but “tomorrow he will reread ten points of Iran’s plan and declare that it no longer satisfies him,” returning to bombardments. This line fits into a broader narrative of the US as a power that uses war to coerce a security architecture advantageous to itself, but is not ready for serious compromise.
Russian commentators are even more skeptical about Iran’s demands, seeing Tehran’s “ten points” — which call for non-aggression guarantees, removal of sanctions, recognition of the right to uranium enrichment, and payment of compensation — as an unrealistically maximalist set of conditions that the US will never accept. On Monocle.ru an analyst notes that if Washington manages not only to reject these demands but to reformat them into a regional security system with the US as an external guarantor, Trump will be able to present the war as a “forceful imposition of peace.” (monocle.ru)
Turkish press, by contrast, often emphasizes the rationality of the Iranian position. For example, the site F5Haber in the piece “İran'dan ABD'nin ateşkes teklifine ret! Tahran kalıcı barış istiyor” stresses that Iran rejected the American proposal precisely because it did not guarantee either the lifting of sanctions or a long-term end to the war, but only a temporary pause. (cnbce.com) Turkish commentators see this not so much as Tehran’s intransigence as a natural distrust of Washington after years of experience with the nuclear deal and prior military episodes. One column emphasizes that the US “hurried to declare” its proposal the last chance, and then effectively violated the spirit of the ceasefire with strikes carried out in parallel with the negotiations.
In South Korea the war with Iran is covered less emotionally but with a strong focus on economic and energy consequences. In the Asian context the Strait of Hormuz is not only an arena of confrontation between the US and Iran but also a potential “energy bottleneck.” Korean business and geopolitical reviews emphasize that the closure of the strait has already hit oil and gas prices, and combined with rising freight rates and insurance premiums this threatens to undermine the recovery of Korean exports after pandemic and post-pandemic shocks. Korean analysts note that Washington justifies the operation as necessary to ensure freedom of navigation, but in practice “its first victims are Asian energy importers,” forced to pay for a risk they do not control. (smart-lab.ru)
Thus, despite a common dislike of the Iranian theocratic regime and its missile strikes on US bases, Russian and Turkish discourse converge on one point: the United States and Israel are perceived as the parties who introduced the greatest destabilization into the region. In Turkey this is accompanied by the traditional criticism of “Western hypocritical morality” toward Israel; in Russia by a harsher rhetoric about the pursuit of a unipolar world. South Korea, while a US ally, is more restrained, but in the subtext readers are nudged to ask: are we ready to once again pay the economic price for someone else’s ventures?
The second theme actively discussed in the three countries is the threat that the US will leave NATO or radically reduce its participation in the alliance. The formal pretext is Donald Trump’s statements, in which he called NATO a “paper tiger” in interviews with American and European media and hinted that the US might “reconsider” its commitments if allies do not meet his demands on spending and support for American policy on Iran. (reddit.com)
In Russia this is perceived as a long-awaited confirmation of a long-standing thesis: NATO, many Russian experts argue, exists primarily because of American military and political will. The Institute of the USA and Canada of the Russian Academy of Sciences publishes commentary on the “likelihood of the US leaving NATO,” where researcher Alexey Demchuk ponders that even if a formal withdrawal does not occur, the mere fact that this possibility is being discussed already undermines trust in the alliance and opens opportunities for Moscow. (iskran.ru) Russian authors see “strategic fatigue” in Washington — an unwillingness to bear the costs of European security when, as they perceive it, the main front has already shifted to the Middle East and competition with China.
The Turkish perspective is more ambivalent. On one hand, some conservative and nationalist media interpret Trump’s threats as confirmation that Turkey should develop its own defense capabilities and regional alliances, not rely on a “capricious partner” in Washington. On the other hand, many Turkish analysts understand that a formal or informal US departure from NATO would weaken Ankara’s position in Europe and the Caucasus and leave it alone facing both Russia and an ambitious Iran. Column pieces in business outlets frame the dilemma frankly: “NATO without the US is not only weaker for Brussels but far less useful for Ankara.” (dunya.com)
In South Korea, discussion of Trump’s NATO threats automatically transfers to the US–ROK alliance. Korean experts draw parallels: if Trump is ready to so lightly question Article 5 commitments in NATO, how reliable are his guarantees in the event of an escalation with the DPRK or in crises around Taiwan? In April Korean analytical platforms publish pieces that use a “US exit from NATO” as a thought experiment: what would a world look like in which Washington regards military alliances not as a system of long-term commitments but as a set of subscription-style deals — pay up or be left alone. (iskran.ru)
Here an important difference emerges. For Russia NATO weakness is a strategic opportunity. For Turkey it is both a risk and an opportunity. For South Korea it is an almost unconditional threat, because its own security is built around the American umbrella. But in all three cases US actions are interpreted not as a rational adaptation of alliances to a new reality, but as outbursts of unpredictability by a single leader substituting collective strategy with personal political calculation.
The third thread is the economic dimension of American policy, especially in the context of the war with Iran. In Turkey the economic angle literally permeates the narrative. In analytical pieces in Dünya and on the CNBC‑e channel the war is described as a conflict “that for 37 days has deeply affected economies” and amplifies inflationary pressure through rising energy prices. (cnbce.com) Turkish economists warn that even if the two-week ceasefire holds, markets will remain hostages to any Trump tweet-threat against Iran or any strike on Hormuz. A country that has not yet exited its own inflationary turbulence perceives American decisions as an external shock to which it will have to adapt but which it cannot change.
In Russia economic discussions run along different lines. On one hand, analysts discuss the dynamics of the American stock market and investor reactions to the ceasefire, as seen in trader Alexander Pshikin’s review analyzing how Trump’s statements about halting bombings for two weeks are perceived by the markets. (tenchat.ru) On the other hand, business press and expert Telegram channels maintain a throughline: can Moscow use America’s entanglement with Iran to ease sanction pressure, redirect oil and gas flows, and strengthen its own position in relations with China and countries of the “Global South”?
South Korean analysts, for their part, discuss not only energy prices but also prospects for technological and trade competition between the US and China amid the Iranian crisis. For Seoul the question is: will Washington keep its focus on technological restrictions on Beijing and support for “friendly” supply chains, given that a significant share of military and diplomatic resources is now absorbed by the Iran front? If the US relaxes economic pressure on the PRC, Korean firms risk being caught between two giants in a tougher competitive environment. (maily.so)
It is also important how all three countries assess internal American politics in connection with the war. Russian-language sites and newspapers, relying on English-language sources and their own analysis, actively discuss how Trump’s domestic opponents call the campaign against Iran “the Epstein war” or “Operation ‘Epstein’s Fury,’” implying that the aim is to distract attention from publications related to financier Jeffrey Epstein’s case. (ru.wikipedia.org) This is presented as an illustration of deep polarization in American society and the cynicism of elites for whom external war is a continuation of internal political games.
Turkish and, to a lesser extent, South Korean commentators also note that Trump clearly uses the Iranian crisis to bolster his own image as a “tough leader” willing to disregard international institutions from the UN Security Council to the IAEA. For Turkey, which itself has a complicated history with Western institutions, this is a double signal: on the one hand, criticism of the UN and the IAEA resonates with part of the Turkish establishment; on the other hand, America’s demonstrative disregard for multilateral formats calls into question the predictability of any agreement in which Washington plays a key role. (tr.euronews.com)
Against this background it is particularly telling how local actors in the three countries understand their own role. Turkey actively emphasizes its mediator mission — Euronews Turkey reports that it was Ankara, together with Cairo and Islamabad, that prepared the draft 45‑day ceasefire and the mechanism for opening the Strait of Hormuz. (tr.euronews.com) This allows the Turkish elite to speak of itself as a “regional power” able to speak with Washington and Tehran alike, and thus partially compensate for the asymmetry in relations with the US.
In Russia, by contrast, the elite positions the country as a counterweight to American hegemony. Peskov’s comments about “Trump’s threats to Iran” and expert assessments from ISKRAN, regularly cited in Russian media, cement the image of the US as a force pursuing a policy of “reformatting” the entire Middle East to suit its interests, with the ceasefire merely the latest instrument of pressure. (gazeta.ru) In this context Russia presents itself in its own narrative as a defender of international law and multilateral formats, despite Western countries perceiving it differently.
South Korea finds itself in a more complicated, less vocal position. For Seoul the US remains a key ally, and public criticism of American policy is fairly restrained. But within expert discourse the idea of “strengthening strategic autonomy” is gaining louder voices — not as a break with Washington but as diversification of risks: building up defense capabilities, expanding dialogue with other Asian democracies, and carefully exploring forms of engagement with China that could mitigate the consequences of any new American campaign, whether in the Middle East or elsewhere. (maily.so)
Bringing together these disparate reactions, several common motives become visible. The first is growing skepticism about whether the US still serves as guarantor of the “international order.” In Turkey and Russia this is articulated plainly: American actions toward Iran and threats regarding NATO are interpreted as steps that erode trust in the very institutions Washington has long promoted. In Trump’s second term US foreign policy increasingly looks through the prism of deals rather than rules.
The second motive is fear of economic shocks caused by American decisions. In Ankara and Seoul discussions about the US are more and more framed not in terms of values or ideology but through the lens of inflation, access to energy and supply chain stability. The war with Iran, directly affecting the Strait of Hormuz, became a vivid example of how Washington’s strategic games immediately hit wallets in Istanbul and Seoul.
The third is awareness of one’s own agency. Turkey uses the Iranian crisis to boost its status as a mediator and regional player, Russia to strengthen its image as an alternative center of power, South Korea to accelerate, albeit cautiously, debate about strategic autonomy. Paradoxically, it is American unpredictability that spurs others to seek ways to live in a world where the US remains a key actor but can no longer claim to be the sole architect of order.
As a result, today’s conversation about the United States in Seoul, Moscow and Ankara is not just a set of reactions to specific Washington decisions. It is a broader contest over what the world will look like after the current Iranian crisis and a possible transformation of NATO. For some it is a chance for a more multipolar order; for others a source of anxiety and the need for a delicate balance. But for all three it is a reminder that America remains a central player whose moves are long perceived not as a given but as a problem that must be contained or played to one’s advantage.
