In early March 2026, global discussion of the United States once again concentrated on power, war and Washington’s unilateral decisions. In German, South African and Russian debates there is almost no talk of American domestic politics detached from foreign policy: all three information environments view the U.S. through the prism of the crisis in relations with Iran, the military operation in Venezuela, the transformation of NATO and the upcoming G20 summit in Miami. These events intertwine with the return to power of Donald Trump, which in Berlin is seen as a risk to European security, in Pretoria as a test of the Global South’s sovereignty, and in Moscow as confirmation of the image of the U.S. as an aggressive power that violates international law.
One of the key pressure points became the war between the U.S. and Israel on one side and Iran on the other, which suddenly flared on February 28, 2026 and has already been dubbed in the international press a new Middle East conflict of the AI era. For the first time in a large-scale conflict, deepfakes and generative AI were massively used for disinformation: fake clips about "uprisings in Tehran" and the "elimination of leadership" triggered brief panic on energy markets and added a digital dimension to the military one. (ru.wikipedia.org) Against the backdrop of strikes by the U.S. and Israel and Iran’s retaliatory missile attacks, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk publicly condemned the actions of all parties and called for an immediate return to negotiations. (ru.wikipedia.org) European institutions reacted more cautiously: European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa called the conflict "deeply worrying" and stressed the need for "restraint" and a "credible transfer of power" in Iran, thereby effectively assuming the role of mediator between Washington and Tehran. (ru.wikipedia.org)
From the German point of view, this crisis overlays preexisting anxiety about the U.S. course under Trump. A recent strategic report prepared within the framework of the European security discussion emphasizes that changes in U.S. foreign policy and alliance policy under the Trump administration "make the scale and reliability of American guarantees less predictable," and that Russia’s main strategic goal is declared to be the splitting of NATO. (belfercenter.org) German analysts, in this logic, see the strikes on Iran and the operation in Venezuela not simply as isolated episodes but as elements of a common pattern: Washington is demonstrating its readiness to use force outside a UN Security Council mandate, while Europe finds itself caught between loyalty to an ally and the risk of escalation on which it is itself energetically and politically dependent.
The U.S. military operation in Venezuela, which began in the first days of 2026, reinforced this perception. An emergency UN Security Council meeting on January 5, 2026 in New York was convened precisely because of Washington’s actions; the debate there became a concentrate of divergences: the U.S. appealed to "protecting democracy," while Russia and a number of Global South countries spoke of violations of sovereignty and bypassing UN procedures. (ru.wikipedia.org) In the Russian press this episode was almost automatically likened to previous U.S. interventions in Latin America, drawing a line from Panama and Grenada to Caracas. For the Russian audience this is a convenient example of "old imperialism" which, commentators argue, exposes the hypocrisy of American rhetoric about international law.
The South African discourse, by contrast, frames the Venezuelan and Iranian crises within a broader debate about the fairness of global governance. In an analytical note published by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation regarding South Africa’s G20 presidency, it is emphasized that even when the U.S. is "physically absent" from meetings, as happened at one summit, it still "sets the agenda" — whether that be sanctions policy, reform of international institutions or debates about human rights. (kas.de) The fact that the U.S. remains host of the next G20 summit in 2026 in Miami is used in South African columns as a vivid symbol of asymmetry: a Global South country bets on multilateralism, while Washington, in the words of one South African political scientist, "prefers coalitions of the willing to UN procedures."
A particular irritant in Pretoria is the selection of invitees to the G20. The report emphasizes that against the backdrop of accusations in Europe and the U.S. about "genocide of white farmers" in South Africa — which local elites consider exaggerated and politically motivated — the exclusion of certain Global South states from the Miami summit is perceived as an attempt by Washington to build a "club of like-minded" nations around the American agenda. (kas.de) In South African commentary this is linked to the war in Iran: the U.S. supposedly wants even global economic platforms to a priori support its sanctions line and the isolation of its opponents.
The Russian reaction to the Iran crisis illustrates how a foreign policy conflict overlays an already entrenched image of the U.S. in society. In official comments Moscow called the strike on Iran "unprovoked aggression" and used rhetoric that has become standard in recent years: emphasis on violation of sovereignty, ignoring the UN Security Council and the danger of setting a precedent for other states. (ru.wikipedia.org) At the same time, the Russian public sphere contains a more complex picture of the U.S. Popular discussions in online communities not directly tied to propaganda portray America as a country of extremes and opportunities at once: users note the high share of people with tertiary education, a developed labor market that allows servicing large student loans, while also complaining about a "schizophrenic" job market where entry-level positions often demand inflated qualifications — a PhD plus ten years’ experience. (reddit.com) This polarity — admiration for economic power and criticism of foreign policy — makes the Russian reaction to U.S. moves particularly contradictory: while condemning strikes on Iran and the operation in Venezuela, many nonetheless acknowledge that without American technological and financial weight it will be difficult to shape a new world order.
Germany in the current debate acts as a laboratory of European fears. Deutsche Bank’s annual macroeconomic outlook for 2026 notes that the U.S. and Germany are forecast to see a "consistent cyclical recovery," yet in the section on risks to Europe a significant place is given to foreign policy uncertainties tied specifically to American security policy: shifts in U.S. positions toward NATO, outbreaks of conflict in the Middle East and Latin America, and rising military spending. (wealth.db.com) At the level of editorial nuance, this manifests in German media increasingly comparing Washington’s actions not with abstract norms of international law but with European interests. For the German reader it matters not only whether the U.S. has the right to strike Iran or intervene in Venezuela, but how this will affect energy prices, migration flows and the domestic political balance in Germany itself.
The South African perspective adds the notion of "democracy with double standards." In pieces on South Africa’s G20 presidency it is repeatedly emphasized that the U.S., by distancing itself from some platforms, simultaneously demands that partners follow its sanctions regimes and geopolitical priorities. (kas.de) Venezuela and Iran appear here as symbols that Washington quickly moves from diplomacy to force when it believes international formats are stalling. In South African political discourse this is interpreted as a challenge not only to particular regimes but to the very principle of sovereign equality: if a great power can, relying on economic might and military potential, impose sanctions and conduct operations without regard for the opinion of the rest of the world, then "multilateralism" becomes a façade.
Finally, Russian analysis uses the Iranian and Venezuelan cases to support the thesis of a "militarized U.S. economy." In recent expert comments on markets and rates, American air formations and U.S. Navy actions in crisis regions are mentioned alongside inflation and the key rate as factors affecting investor expectations. (cdn.iz.ru) This way of talking about the U.S. — as a coupling of the Pentagon, the dollar and technology — differs from the European, more institutional and legal approach, and from the South African, more moral-political one. For the Russian audience the U.S. is simultaneously the main military opponent, a systemic economic competitor and, paradoxically, an important benchmark for comparing standards of living and opportunities.
The common denominator of these differing perspectives is growing distrust in the U.S. ability to act as a "responsible hegemon." Germany increasingly asks how long American security commitments are and whether "coalitions of the willing" are substituting collective NATO and EU mechanisms. South Africa sees U.S. strikes on Iran and intervention in Venezuela as a threat to the idea of an equal Global South and doubts whether the Miami G20 summit will be a venue for genuine dialogue rather than consolidation of a Western agenda. Russia uses every new crisis as an argument that international law in its current form is an instrument of the strong, not a universal norm.
Yet nowhere — neither in Berlin, nor in Pretoria, nor in Moscow — are the U.S. perceived as a disappearing factor. On the contrary, the greater the anxiety provoked by American policy, the clearer the realization: no major war, no systemic reform — from Iran and Venezuela to the future of the G20 — can be resolved while ignoring Washington. It is precisely this combination of irritation and dependence that today shapes the tone of the world’s conversation about the U.S. — a conversation in which Germany argues about reliability, South Africa about fairness, and Russia about legitimacy, but all three ultimately describe the same problem: what to do with a power without which one cannot, but with which one increasingly cannot continue as before.
