In early March 2026, discussions about the United States in Ankara, Kyiv and Beijing revolve around a single cluster of topics: the US and Israel’s war against Iran and its security consequences, Washington’s role in attempts to end the war in Ukraine, and the broader question of whether America remains a reliable and predictable leader or is turning into an impulsive power whose decisions others must guard against. Each of the three capitals talks about Washington differently, but a common thread runs through all three debates: the US is increasingly seen less as a “global arbiter” and more as a player that forcefully pushes its interests, sometimes at the expense of its allies.
The biggest new factor is the war with Iran. In Turkey it instantly became a domestic security issue: US and Israeli strikes on Iran, Iranian retaliatory missiles and their interception over Turkish territory have prompted Turkish commentators to speak of the US as a force dragging the region into conflict without regard for neighbors’ risks. Against reports of Iranian missile interceptions over Kahramanmaraş and Gaziantep, official Ankara condemned the US strikes on Iran while simultaneously demonstrating readiness to defend its skies against any missiles, regardless of origin. Turkish press reviews emphasize that Turkey found itself literally “under fire from someone else’s war,” a war initiated primarily by Washington and Tel Aviv, not Ankara. Turkish diplomacy is trying to maintain balance: Ankara is a NATO member on one hand, and on the other it openly states that it does not accept the logic of US and Israeli “preventive strikes” that endanger regional stability. Against this backdrop, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan earlier warned that Iran’s nuclear program and general escalation could trigger an arms race in the Middle East, and pro-government outlets like Yeni Şafak use this thesis to justify the need for an independent Turkish defense architecture and distancing from Washington’s riskiest moves. (en.wikipedia.org)
Ukraine, by contrast, views the war in Iran through the prism of concern: might it become a reason for the US to divert attention and resources away from supporting Kyiv. Ukrainian analytical pieces from late winter and early spring say the world is entering a phase of deep instability, where the war in Ukraine intertwines with political crises inside the US and a new conflict hotspot in the Middle East. One 2026 forecast emphasizes the risk of a prolonged war in Ukraine coinciding with an escalation between Washington and Beijing over Taiwan and now a protracted Iranian crisis, which could lead to the “dispersion” of American power and to Ukraine ceasing to be Washington’s top priority. (tsn.ua)
In China, the war with Iran has prompted broader conclusions about the style of American foreign policy. Chinese commentators, including prominent political scientists, see US actions as an example of Washington using allies as footholds and not hesitating to break diplomatic norms. In an article published on a Chinese news portal, political scientist Zheng Yongnian of the Chinese University in Hong Kong (Shenzhen) notes that it is widely believed in China that the US “is using Israel as a springboard” for a war with Iran. Official Chinese media in editorials write that striking Iran at a moment when diplomatic contacts are still ongoing creates “an alarming precedent: diplomacy becomes an instrument subordinated to the will of the dominant power, rather than a platform for equal negotiations between sovereign states.” Former Chinese military officer turned independent commentator Sun Zhongping formulates a conclusion often quoted in the Chinese segment: “For China the strategic takeaway is very simple: you cannot assume your opponent will play by the rules.” (wenxuecity.com)
The second major block of debates in all three countries is Washington’s role in the war in Ukraine and in attempts to impose peace. For Ukraine this is, evidently, a matter of survival. In late 2025 and early 2026 Ukrainian media were dominated by debates over the so‑called “Trump plan” to end the war. According to Ukrainian press citing Western and Ukrainian insiders, Donald Trump’s administration offered Kyiv a 28‑point plan that many Ukrainian analysts and parts of the American establishment considered clearly tilted toward Moscow: it involved de facto recognition of Russian gains, time‑limited security guarantees, and pressure on Kyiv to make territorial concessions. One Ukrainian analytical piece stresses that this plan forces Ukraine into a “hard choice” and creates a dangerous precedent for the US: a country claiming to defend the international order would be legitimizing the forcible seizure of territory in Europe. (bastion.tv)
A characteristic detail in the Ukrainian debate is attention to Washington’s pressure tactics. Political scientist Volodymyr Fesenko, in an interview with a Latvian outlet discussing the American peace initiative, acknowledges that “the pressure was last week, when a US representative comes and says ‘within the next few days you must agree to the United States’ peace plan’,” recalling that US officials have previously arrived in Kyiv with ultimata, including financial conditions for compensation for aid already provided. For part of the Ukrainian expert community, the US in this context acts not only as the main military ally but also as an actor pushing toward a compromise dangerously close to a “frozen conflict” and loss of some sovereignty in exchange for short‑term stabilization. (ukr.lsm.lv)
At the same time, a pragmatic view remains in Ukraine: without the US the war is unlikely to end on terms acceptable to Kyiv. Former US presidential special representative for Ukraine Keith Kellogg, in a discussion at Davos frequently cited by Ukrainian media, said that if Ukraine “survives this winter” and enters spring, “the advantage will be on its side,” and the war could end by autumn 2026. Ukrainian commentators interpret these statements as a signal that Washington still sees a scenario in which intensified support and pressure on Russia could lead to a deal more favorable to Ukraine — while also reminding that there are other voices within the US administration pushing for a quicker “resolution” at the expense of concessions from Kyiv. (rbc.ua)
If Ukraine debates the US through the lens of its own future and possible borders, China uses the Ukrainian issue as part of a broader picture of American behavior. Chinese analytical pieces on China’s role in Russia’s war against Ukraine emphasize that Washington, on one hand, is trying to deter China from supporting Moscow, and on the other is simultaneously unleashing a new war in the Middle East, sending mixed signals about its priorities. At a recent MFA press briefing, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning responded to a question about why Beijing comments differently on Iran and Ukraine. In Chinese discourse this is explained by Beijing’s view that the US plays a far more destabilizing role in the Middle East, whereas in Ukraine, Chinese officials claim, responsibility is shared among Russia, NATO and the US, which “ignored Russia’s legitimate security concerns.” This narrative allows Beijing to simultaneously criticize Washington as a source of chaos and present itself as a proponent of “political settlement” and a “multipolar order.” (zh.wikipedia.org)
Turkish press approaches the US role in the Ukrainian war more cautiously than Ukrainian or Chinese media. For Ankara, Kyiv is an important partner and recipient of arms deliveries, but Moscow remains a key energy and political player in the region. Turkish commentary on the war increasingly argues that the US, under slogans of supporting democracy, is actually fighting for a redistribution of influence in the Black Sea region, and that an excessively hardline anti‑Russian stance by Washington could harm Turkey’s own interests, including stability in Syria, the Caucasus and the Black Sea. Turkish authors link the Ukrainian conflict and the war in Iran into a single picture: in their view, the US acts like a “military‑diplomatic arsonist‑firefighter,” stretching its commitments across multiple conflicts and then turning nearest allies into frontlines, exposing them to risk.
Against this backdrop, another common theme arises in all three countries: doubts about the durability of American leadership and discussions that Europe and regional powers must take on more responsibility. The Ukrainian outlet “Європейська правда,” analyzing the February Munich Security Conference, noted that the “key visionary leader” there appeared to be French President Emmanuel Macron, who laid out reforms Europe needs to withstand pressure not only from Russia and China but also the US. His idea was that Europe should play a more direct role in any peace settlements and not rely on the US president — in that piece referring to Donald Trump — to automatically share Europe’s security vision. Ukrainian commentators saw in this not only criticism of Washington but also a potential resource: the more active Europe is, the more options Kyiv has in negotiations with the US and Russia. (eurointegration.com.ua)
In China the idea of a “weary hegemon” is used to contrast the American model of leadership with China’s own: while, as one popular portal writes, “America is busy with wars,” China is busy with “meetings and the economy.” In an article on the Sina platform authors juxtapose US defense spending — including an anecdotally presented episode that in September 2025 the US defense secretary allegedly approved multimillion‑dollar purchases of premium seafood for the military department — with China’s “rational” investment policy, which prioritizes domestic modernization, scientific and technological development and infrastructure. This contrasting image is presented as an illustration of the degradation of American state governance and the growing divide between a “warring America” and a “building China.” (sina.cn)
In Turkey the debate about a “new order” is intertwined with traditional wariness toward any external patrons. Politicians and commentators close to the ruling party, amid the Iranian crisis and events on the Ukrainian front, are intensifying rhetoric about the need for Turkey’s “strategic autonomy”: in their view, the country cannot fully rely on either the US and NATO or on Russia and China. The interception of Iranian missiles over Turkish cities is used as an argument: while the US and Israel pursue their objectives, it is Turkey that bears the risk of falling debris and possible retaliatory strikes. This feeds a popular idea in Turkish society that Ankara should remain in NATO but simultaneously expand its own capabilities as much as possible — from missile defense to diplomatic maneuvering between blocs. (en.wikipedia.org)
Overall, looking at these three countries together produces a paradoxical image of the US. For Ukraine, Washington remains a vital guarantor but also a hard negotiator ready to press for a deal convenient primarily to the White House. For Turkey, the US is an ally it cannot abandon but also a source of risks that drags the region into dangerous wars while ignoring Turkish concerns. For China, America is the main rival and at the same time an example of how a former hegemon, unable to abandon coercive methods, slowly undermines its own authority, opening space for “alternative centers of power.”
What unites all three debates is one thing: nowhere is the US still perceived as an unquestioned arbiter. In Ankara, Kyiv and Beijing Washington is spoken of in terms of interests, deals and risks, not values and common projects. At the same time each capital calculates in its own way how to use or restrain American power: Ukraine — so as not to lose the chance for a just peace; Turkey — so as not to become the battlefield of others’ wars; China — to accelerate the shift to a world where the US is only one center of power among others, not the only one. It is in this diversity and, simultaneously, in a shared fatigue with American wars and initiatives that a new stage in global perceptions of the US can be seen.
