Spring 2026 again made the United States a central subject in foreign media, but not in the usual logic of “America as a model” or “America as the enemy.” This time Germany, Israel and France speak of America as a power on which their own security and political future depend, and at the same time as a problem they must live with and adapt to. The increase in American military presence in the Middle East, Washington’s ultimatum to Iran, US support for Israel in the protracted war in Gaza, the hard rhetoric of the new American president toward Europe, and uncertainty around strategic nuclear arms treaties — all of this weaves into one question: can one still build their order of the world assuming that America will ultimately “hold the umbrella”?
The first common thread, visible across all three countries, is anxiety about a new American escalation in the Middle East. In the French media the reinforcement of US military presence in the region since early 2026 is described as “the largest deployment of forces since 2003,” with aircraft, ships and an anti‑missile system amid growing confrontation with Iran and a harsh crackdown on Iranian protests. French analysts see this as a return to a “maximum pressure” logic restored by Washington: sanctions, attempts to zero out Iranian oil exports, and military demonstrations of readiness to strike. (fr.wikipedia.org)
In the Israeli discourse the same American turn is perceived much more personally. Israeli commentators emphasize Washington’s ultimatum tone toward Tehran — “dismantle your nuclear program or face ‘other options,’” as one religious‑conservative news blog put it commenting on the US statement in February. (bshch.blogspot.com) For an Israeli audience accustomed to seeing Iran as an existential threat, such a turn is perceived as a belated but welcome return of America to the role of the region’s “tough sheriff.” Yet even here the question is raised: is this a coordinated strategy that takes allies’ interests into account, or a new wave of unilateral White House decisions that Israel will be forced either to support or to “take the heat” for?
A different tone predominates in the French and German press: more concern than relief. In Paris, fresh debates on national defense strategy and the updated “National Strategy Review” push commentators to compare the French and American approaches to deterrence. France, strengthening its own nuclear shield and emphasizing Europe’s role in collective security, looks at the US as a factor of instability that simultaneously makes European autonomy more urgent and more risky. (fr.wikipedia.org) German analytical bulletins, discussing Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s visits to Washington and the prospects of a “post‑American” security, remind readers that the latest treaties limiting nuclear weapons are expiring, and with them the foundation of predictability Europe has been used to since the Cold War. (steubing.com)
The second major storyline is related to US support for Israel in the war in Gaza, which has transformed from a local conflict into a long‑term crisis that damages Washington’s reputation in the Global South and polarizes public opinion within the United States itself. European authors increasingly cite American polls that show growing disagreement among a significant share of Americans with unconditional support for the current Israeli course: a majority favor a permanent ceasefire and tying military aid to respect for human rights. (fr.wikipedia.org) French outlets use this as an argument: America is no longer monolithic, and White House foreign policy may increasingly diverge from public sentiment, making it less predictable for allies.
Israeli newspapers and portals focus primarily on how this evolution within the US affects the triangle “Israel — US administration — Jewish diaspora.” Journalist Dan Perry, in his essay on political passivity among American Jews, reminds readers that the Jewish community in the US traditionally avoided direct intervention in Israeli politics, preferring to support Israel as an idea rather than any specific government. Today, he writes, that no longer works: “modern Israel is in desperate defense against dark forces seeking to turn it into an authoritarian theocracy with nuclear weapons,” and American Jews can no longer remain bystanders. (zman.co.il) This internal Jewish‑American discourse is often absent from the American mainstream agenda, but in Israel it is closely read as an indicator of how far the split between the US administration, Congress, the diaspora and Israel itself might go.
Against this background, Israeli observers look with interest and concern at data showing that despite loud headlines about a “crisis” between Israel and American Jewry, real polls show a more complex picture. One analysis in Israel Hayom noted several years ago: the majority of American Jews still either preserve or even strengthen their emotional bond with Israel, and only a minority report a weakening of that feeling. The main problem is not a break but a distorted media discourse that amplifies the sense of a gulf. (israelhayom.co.il) In today’s context of war and increased US military presence in the region this theme is even louder: in Israel American support is seen not only as an “Iron Dome” but also as a mirror of internal American conflicts in which the diaspora finds itself between the liberal agenda of the Democrats and hard security rhetoric.
The third important layer of discussion concerns the broader picture of American global leadership and how it is being reinterpreted in Europe. In Berlin, Paris and other European capitals there is a growing sense that the US is returning to a unilateral “America First” logic, even when official rhetoric insists on commitment to alliances. In Germany one parliamentary analytical note explicitly stated: with the expiration of the last major strategic arms limitation treaty between the US and Russia, Washington is showing readiness to compensate for rising risks not by negotiations but by building up its own military capabilities and pressuring partners to increase defense spending. (steubing.com) In the German view this turns Europe from the “main ally” into an “operational theater” where American strategic tasks are decided.
The French debate takes a somewhat different key. Paris, especially after President Emmanuel Macron’s recent speech at the naval base on Île‑Longue, where he outlined the evolution of French nuclear deterrence, is increasingly articulating the idea of a “European shield” that should not be fully dependent on the whims of American policy. Although the speech was aimed primarily at a domestic and European audience, many French analysts also read it as a veiled response to Washington: if the US increasingly steers its strategic policy toward a harsher, transactional groove, Europe must be ready for a scenario in which American guarantees prove conditional and selective. (fr.wikipedia.org)
Interestingly, the French expert community, when commenting on the new wave of American “military presence” from Europe to the Indo‑Pacific, often debates rather than simply echoes classic left‑wing critics of the US such as Noam Chomsky. Chomsky has argued for decades that Washington’s foreign policy is determined by economic interests and a desire to suppress alternative development models, and French commentators use his arguments more as a starting point than as dogma: today, they write, on top of these economic motives there is also an ideological confrontation with authoritarian powers, which makes the US both a defender of the liberal order and its potential hostage. (fr.wikipedia.org)
The fourth, more specialized but telling, strand of debates is the reaction to American domestic science, technology and medical policy, which appears in foreign press in fragments. In the Israeli professional medical community they still discuss an example from JAMA, whose editorial several years ago questioned the quality of evidence supporting the medical use of marijuana, against the backdrop of a wave of legalization in the US. It noted that more than twenty states and the District of Columbia had passed laws, but the real evidence base for most indications is far from FDA standards. (e-med.co.il) For Israeli physicians and researchers this case is less about cannabis per se than an illustration of how American political and social dynamics can outpace scientific consensus and then be exported to other countries as a “ready‑made model.”
Finally, Israeli and German political columns reveal another, less obvious shared motif: the perception of the US as a state that more actively uses “legal language” to redefine international agreements. A decade ago Iran accused Washington of publishing a “unilateral interpretation” of the Geneva nuclear accord and thus effectively rewriting its content in its favor. (news.walla.co.il) Today, as Washington returns to ultimatum rhetoric and increases military pressure, that experience is recalled as a warning: official texts and US practice can diverge significantly, and allies constantly have to “translate” American statements into the language of their own risks.
In all three countries what dominates is neither anti‑Americanism nor blind faith in Washington, but a complex mix of dependence, irritation and pragmatism. For Germany and France America remains an indispensable element of European security, but is increasingly discussed as a source of instability that forces Europe to think about its own strategic agency. For Israel the US is simultaneously the main shield against regional threats and an unpredictable actor whose internal debates, diasporic conflicts and electoral cycles directly affect the fate of the state.
The common conclusion of these debates, rarely articulated within the United States itself but clearly audible from Berlin, Tel Aviv and Paris, is that the world is no longer ready to live by a logic of “unipolar trust.” America remains the strongest power; its decisions shape the architecture of security and the economy, but other societies are less and less inclined to accept its course as given and increasingly seek ways to insure themselves against American zigzags. And that may be the most important change: the international discussion about America has stopped being a debate “about them” and has become a conversation “about us and our dependence on them.”
