World about US

18-03-2026

Isolation of the US and Israel amid the Iran conflict

Recent reports in German and Russian media paint a picture of growing dissatisfaction with US policy, which together with Israel finds itself in an increasingly difficult and unpopular confrontation with Iran. The pieces highlight Donald Trump’s irritation with wavering NATO partners, allies’ reassessment of their positions in the Persian Gulf, and the worsening of domestic political crises in Washington — up to the resignation of a prominent intelligence community representative on Iran. European leaders, these reports say, are increasingly criticizing and condemning the administration’s actions, and in some cases allies face a choice between supporting the US and protecting their own interests, creating an impression of stagnation or a loss of American leadership in the conflict. The material is based on BR (Germany) coverage.

Germany and the Iran war: distance, concern and lessons of the past

Bayerischer Rundfunk’s reporting on a war between the US, Israel and Iran is presented in the format of a news ticker on br.de, but in essence provides a coherent, characteristically German view of the escalation. Through dry updates, quotes and links a clear line emerges: Germany seeks to keep the maximum distance from direct participation, viewing events primarily through the lens of European security, global stability and its own historical lessons.

From the very beginning the ticker stresses: Berlin does not want to and will not go to war. By recounting Donald Trump’s statements it conveys Germany’s position, which, according to the former US president, supposedly declared that it “has nothing to do with the Iran war and therefore does not want to participate.” In the same logic another Trump remark is quoted: the elimination of part of Iran’s leadership was “something great” (“etwas Großartiges getan”), yet the German side takes no step toward its own military involvement.

This duality is typically German: rhetorically and politically Germany stands with the US and Israel, unequivocally condemning the Iranian regime and its weapons programs. But in practical terms Berlin is extremely cautious about the use of military force, especially outside a UN mandate and without broad European backing. That is why the ticker repeatedly conveys the theme of maintaining distance: Germany is an ally, but not a participant in the war.

The choice of topics and emphases illustrates a classic set of German concerns. The ticker quotes UN warnings in detail: if the war continues until June, the number of people at risk of hunger could rise by another 45 million. Attention is also focused on the possible closure or destabilization of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz — a key artery for global supplies of oil and gas, on which the German economy is indirectly dependent. Bayerischer Rundfunk presents the Hormuz threat not as a narrowly national energy issue for Germany, but as a factor of global instability affecting world prices, trade and the overall state of international security.

Running through the whole narrative is fear of further destabilization of the Near and Middle East: a new wave of conflicts, the strengthening of Shiite and Sunni groups, the involvement of Hezbollah, fighting near Bushehr, strikes on targets in Iraq — all of this is offered to the reader as the outline of a possible major regional catastrophe that could resonate in Europe as increased migration pressure, intensified terrorism and new internal upheavals.

Notably, among German figures in the ticker there is essentially only one direct, extended quote — from CDU politician Johann Wadephul. Bayerischer Rundfunk names him “foreign minister” in the piece, although de facto he is an influential foreign policy voice of the opposition union. Nevertheless his position is reflected fairly fully and becomes a kind of concentrate of the German approach. Wadephul says: “I do not believe that [regime change in Iran] will happen.” According to him, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio (in the ticker he appears as Außenminister) assured that the goal of the strikes is to destroy Iran’s nuclear and missile programs to remove the threat to Israel. Controlled regime change, Wadephul emphasizes, is in any case “unrealistic,” and chaos in Iran is “not in Europe’s interest.”

In that short formula — “chaos in Iran is not in Europe’s interest” — there is a whole layer of German and European lessons from Iraq and Libya. In Berlin distrust of the “regime change” strategy, traditionally associated with the US, has long taken root. The German, and more broadly European, approach increasingly proceeds not from the idea of rapid democratization of authoritarian regimes but from a priority of managed stability: collapsing states, “failed states,” are seen as sources of terrorism, uncontrolled migration, arms smuggling and nuclear risks. By speaking of “European interests,” Wadephul is effectively voicing not abstract values but very practical tasks: to prevent a new flow of refugees, stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction, curb energy price hikes and preserve predictability in the EU’s immediate external periphery.

The fact that Bayerischer Rundfunk highlights this quote and in this expanded form shows how deeply rooted in the German consciousness is the thought: better a bad but functioning state apparatus in Tehran than another version of post-Gaddafi Libya or post-Saddam Iraq. BR’s reporting noticeably contains fewer romantic expectations of a quick transition to democracy and far more fear of chaos and a power vacuum.

Between the lines of the ticker one can also see tensions within NATO, especially between Washington and Berlin. Donald Trump is mentioned as a loud, irritated critic of allies, primarily Germany, which refuse to participate in the military defense of the Strait of Hormuz. He calls NATO’s position “quite shocking” and says the alliance is making a “very stupid mistake” by not taking more active involvement. From the German perspective this scene is familiar: the United States again demands a larger military contribution, while Berlin appeals to legal constraints, public opinion, the need for a UN mandate, and domestic disputes over the 2-percent defense spending target.

Thus the BR ticker places the Iran war into a broader and long-running German debate about “Bundesfähigkeit” — Germany’s ability to be a “reliable ally.” The central question of this debate is: how far is the country willing to go with the US in operations that do not look like a direct defensive response to an attack and are not sanctioned by multilateral institutions. In BR’s reporting there is a sense that public and political majorities still lean toward a limited, cautious role: diplomacy, sanctions, participation in missions under EU or UN auspices — yes; direct involvement in another Middle Eastern war initiated by Washington — no.

Another important layer is the economic and humanitarian consequences of the conflict, which Bayerischer Rundfunk emphasizes. The ticker cites warnings from UN agencies that if the war drags on at least until June, the number of people acutely in need of food assistance could increase by roughly 45 million. In the German context this is presented not as a statistic “somewhere far away” but as part of a large chain of crises in which Germany and the EU long position themselves as donors, mediators and supporters of multilateral governance. The connection between military actions, disruptions to trade and logistics chains, rising food and fuel prices, and then the exacerbation of political instability and migration waves is underscored.

At the same time the reporting style remains characteristically German: a dry, almost bureaucratic ticker tone, abundant references to international organizations, and an absence of highly colored vocabulary create an atmosphere of distance and self-control. Unlike many American or Israeli war pieces, which contain emotionally charged, patriotic or heroic elements, the BR report has neither pathos nor calls for a “hard response” or “fighting absolute evil.” The risks of escalation, the humanitarian dimension, legal and political frameworks, and the views of various states — from France and Canada to Turkey, whose accusations against Israel of “political killings” and targeted eliminations are conveyed without an explicit judgment but with an obvious hint that the legality of such actions remains an open question — are brought to the fore.

BR does not explicitly voice the historical parallels that suggest themselves, but the German reader easily fills them in. Memories of Gerhard Schröder’s refusal to participate in the Iraq War in 2003, the controversial decision not to support the military intervention in Libya in 2011, the Syrian war and the 2015 migration crisis — all this context makes the current Iran escalation look especially worrying. Germany has already seen how the destruction of states in the Middle East leads to mass displacement and deep domestic conflict over refugee reception, the rise of right-wing populism and societal polarization. That is why today in German discourse the word “chaos” in relation to Iran sounds like a direct warning: Europe could again find itself not only an external observer but also a primary recipient of the consequences of others’ wars.

Finally, the structure of the ticker itself shows that Bayerischer Rundfunk seeks to set a frame in which Germany remains part of the Western camp but does not dissolve into the American logic of force. The ticker carefully collects statements not only from Trump and US representatives but also from Emmanuel Macron, Canadian politicians, Turkish leadership and the UN. Germany appears more as a quiet player: others — above all Trump — speak about its position more often than it does itself. But that, in essence, reflects Berlin’s real self-perception: the country prefers to speak the language of cautious diplomacy, and if a loud remark is issued, it will be like Wadephul’s words: without illusions about “regime change,” clearly betting on containing escalation and preventing the conflict from spreading to a level where it becomes an existential problem for European security.

Thus, in Bayerischer Rundfunk’s interpretation the Iran war appears not as a field for heroic narratives but as a threatening yet familiar scenario: the US and Israel pursue a forceful line against Tehran; Iran responds asymmetrically; the region balances on the edge of a large war; the UN warns of a humanitarian catastrophe; and Germany, while remaining in the Western bloc, consciously keeps a step aside from the military logic. Behind this restraint lie the lessons of Iraq, Libya and Syria, an internal aversion to war as a policy instrument and a cold understanding: the disintegration of Iran would hit Europe no less than the Middle East itself. In this sense the German journalistic perspective, presented in the BR ticker, becomes a reflection of a broader strategic intuition: keep distance, but stay in the game; remain an ally, but not a participant in another “experiment” of regime change in an unstable region.