Damascus Demands Answers: Joint Investigation into the Strike on Daraa

Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani announced that a joint investigative committee had begun work in Damascus to determine the circumstances of the Jordanian air force strike on Daraa province. He said Damascus had received no prior notification or request to coordinate, and that Syria insists on fully protecting the rights of those killed and injured, as well as respecting its sovereignty.

Al-Shaibani said the committee was set up after Jordanian and Syrian intelligence officials and representatives of the defense ministries met at the two sides’ direction. He stressed that the countries had been in round-the-clock contact, so Jordan could have sent Syria a security notification in advance. The minister also said the incident had been under the country’s leadership’s control from the outset, and assured the victims’ families that the state had not accepted Jordan’s account of events and would defend the interests of all Syrians.

According to the minister, an official statement is not enough: a full official investigation is needed, and the case will be pursued to its conclusion. He noted that in a joint statement, Jordan acknowledged that innocent people had been killed and offered condolences, and that the Jordanian side was cooperating. Al-Shaibani called for a wise response proportionate to the problem, so that a solution would not create a new crisis. He described Syrian-Jordanian relations as the best they had been in 100 years and stressed that the security of the two countries was inseparable.

Jordan and Syria had earlier agreed to form a joint security committee following Jordanian air force strikes on areas around Daraa on Monday evening, as part of Operation “Jordanian Deterrence — Hammoud.” Seven civilians were killed, including three children and a woman, and three others were injured. Damascus continues to demand a full official investigation, protection of the victims’ rights and respect for Syrian sovereignty.

News Q&A

• Why are Daraa province and its surroundings considered an especially sensitive area in Syrian-Jordanian relations—for example, because of the nearby border, smuggling problems or the memory of the events of 2011? — Daraa is a southern border region adjoining Jordan. It is home to the key Nassib/Jaber crossing and networks of cross-border trade and smuggling—including drugs, especially Captagon, weapons and people—so instability there is seen directly by Amman as a threat to national security. Historical memory also matters: the 2011 protests in Daraa became one of the symbols of the beginning of the Syrian uprising, while local armed groups, tribal and family ties on both sides of the border, and “reconciliation” agreements make the region difficult to control. For Jordan, it is at once a buffer zone, a source of risks from refugees and infiltration, a smuggling hub and a potential arena for outside influence.
• What lies behind the name of Jordan’s “Jordanian Deterrence — Hammoud” operation, and what threats along the Syrian-Jordanian border is it intended to address? — The name combines the official framing of “Jordanian Deterrence” with “Hammoud,” a name that in Jordanian military practice usually refers to a fallen service member or a key figure connected to the operation. This gives the action symbolic and mobilizing significance. The operation is primarily aimed at smuggling drugs—Captagon—along with weapons and people; cross-border criminal networks; and deterring armed groups and outside influence in southern Syria. Its goal is to prevent threats from crossing the border and to protect Jordan’s border areas and trade routes.

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Full article: Al-Shaibani: No coordination preceded the bombing of Daraa, and the joint investigative committee has begun its work

Venezuela Plans to Complete Supreme Court Overhaul in December

Dinorah Figuera, a representative of Venezuela’s 2015 National Assembly, published a timetable for renewing the country’s Supreme Court (TSJ). The selection process for new judges, which organizers say is intended to strengthen judicial independence and civil and political safeguards, is taking place as part of political negotiations to restore the functioning of state institutions.

Applications will be accepted from October 28 to November 11. From November 5 to 11, a commission will review candidates’ qualifications and approve evaluation criteria. A preliminary list will be published on November 12. Citizens will have until November 27 to file objections, while candidates will be interviewed. The review of objections will begin on December 5, and the Civil Power Council will review the documents on December 8–10. The process is expected to conclude on December 11, 2026, when the selected candidates will be presented to parliament for formal appointment as Supreme Court judges.

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Full version: Schedule announced for forming a new Supreme Court in December

Floods in eastern Syria claim five lives, including four children

Syria’s Ministry of Emergency and Disaster Management said Thursday evening that the death toll from flash floods and flooding in the countryside around Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor had risen to five, four of them children. The tragedy followed heavy rains that battered the country’s eastern provinces. According to the ministry, one child drowned in a body of water in the village of Hanida, west of Raqqa; two children drowned in a pond in the village of Abu Hayya in the Ain Issa area, north of Raqqa; and another child drowned in a body of water in the village of Hammar al-Ali, west of Deir ez-Zor. The fifth victim was a civilian man near the Suleimani Bridge; preliminary reports indicate he was killed in a traffic accident in the area.

Five people, including two children, remain missing. Search efforts were underway in the Khreibisha area on the Deir ez-Zor–Palmyra highway, near Suleimani Bridge, in the village of Hatuniya east of Aleppo, and in Manbij. The Syrian Civil Defence rescued 25 civilians who had been cut off by floodwaters or whose vehicles were stranded in the water, and helped evacuate 375 families from affected camps. In addition, seven bridges, ferry crossings, and unpaved roads were put out of service. Rescue operations covered Aleppo, Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, Hama, Homs, and Latakia, with support from engineering equipment and specialist services.

The ministry said it had received more than 350 reports of incidents and was responding according to priority: first, threats to life; then the protection of property and the maintenance of roads and public facilities. The Syrian Civil Defence also reported that army helicopters took part in rescuing Interior Ministry road-safety personnel after their vehicles were swept away on the road between Palmyra and Deir ez-Zor. Field teams continue to search for the missing and evacuate families from danger zones.

Throughout October, the authorities repeatedly warned of heavy rain and thunderstorms in Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, and Hasakah, amid severe infrastructure deterioration following the 2011–2024 war. Minister of Emergency and Disaster Management Raed al-Saleh said response teams were continuing their work and had raised readiness levels along the Syrian coast because forecasts called for further downpours. He urged people not to take risks or cross streams or floodwaters, even when shallow, and to follow Interior Ministry instructions about closed roads and alternative routes.

Reports from the Ras al-Ain camp in Hasakah province, in Syria’s far northeast, said rainwater had flooded displaced people’s tents; residents were carrying out their belongings and leaving for relatives’ homes in the city of Hasakah. Flash floods struck Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, and Hasakah from Wednesday evening until Thursday morning, with the heaviest damage in Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor. Searches are continuing for a person who went missing after trying to rescue children from a car west of Raqqa. There were also reports that water had closed the highway between Deir ez-Zor and Damascus in desert areas. Meteorologists expect another wave of flooding overnight and through Friday, so emergency services remain on high alert.

Comments on the news

• What is the Syrian Civil Defence, and how does it relate to the Ministry of Emergency and Disaster Management—are they parallel bodies, or is one subordinate to the other? — The Syrian Civil Defence, often known as the White Helmets, is a volunteer humanitarian organisation that carries out search-and-rescue operations, evacuations, firefighting, and assistance after building collapses; it is not a regular government agency. The Ministry of Emergency and Disaster Management is an administrative body of the opposition’s “Salvation Government” in northwest Syria. They are therefore neither two equivalent government bodies nor simply a case of one being subordinate to the other: the Civil Defence operates as a rescue NGO and coordinates with the ministry and other authorities in opposition-controlled areas, but is not formally one of its departments.

• What is the Ras al-Ain camp in Hasakah province, and why do displaced people still live in tents there years after the active phase of the conflict? — It is a camp for internally displaced people near the border town of Ras al-Ain in northeastern Syria’s Hasakah province. People remain in tents because returning home is still unsafe or impossible: homes have been destroyed, areas remain unstable, political and legal restrictions are in place, security risks persist, and funding and services in the camp are limited. Durable solutions—including housing reconstruction, compensation, and guarantees for safe return—have yet to be put in place.

• Where is Suleimani Bridge, and why is the Deir ez-Zor–Palmyra highway important for local travel and rescue operations? — Suleimani Bridge is on the Deir ez-Zor–Palmyra highway, in the western part of Deir ez-Zor province and the Syrian Badia. It is one of the crossings on the desert stretch connecting the city with Palmyra and the central regions. This route is important because it serves remote communities, is used by humanitarian and rescue convoys, and provides a shorter route for ambulances. If the bridge is damaged or the highway is closed, local residents become more isolated, and aid deliveries and evacuations are delayed.

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Full version: Five dead in floods in eastern Syria, hundreds of families evacuated

Venezuela and the United States: Deals, Pressure and Sovereignty Disputes

For the past two days, attention in Venezuela has focused on a knot of contradictions: the country whose president, Nicolás Maduro, was flown out by U.S. special forces in January 2026 is now governed by Delcy Rodríguez’s interim government, receiving oil concessions from Washington—and at the same time hearing Donald Trump say it should become the United States’ “51st state.” The return of opposition leader María Corina Machado after ten months in exile has sharpened the central domestic dispute: who will lead the country toward elections, and according to whose plan—and who owns Venezuela’s oil?

The oil deal and the question of sovereignty

The main topic in recent days has been a major energy agreement under which Venezuela is giving the United States access to part of its vast reserves. According to El Diario NY, the deal covers 20% of the reserves, while the U.S. company North American Blue Energy Partners is gaining rights to 17 fields, and the Pentagon owns a 35% stake in its parent company. At a rally in Texas, Trump thanked Caracas for the deal, boasted that the first shipment of oil came at “zero cost” to U.S. taxpayers, and immediately joked: “Let’s make it the 51st state, and choose a governor instead of a president”—a quote reported by Prensa Libre.

For the local left-wing press, this is no joke but an admission of annexation. In Aporrea, author Cecile Gerardo Pérez describes “kneeling before the empire.” In his account, Diosdado Cabello, Defense Minister Padrino López and Jorge Rodríguez, who until recently had sworn by anti-imperialism, quickly shifted to “surrendering sovereignty” after January 3. The National Assembly, he says, first rewrote the laws on hydrocarbons and mineral resources to give U.S. companies access to the energy and mining sectors. This is the voice of the losing side, but it captures precisely how Venezuelans describe the cost of the current “warming” of relations: not partnership, but tutelage.

Significantly, criticism of the oil deal has come not only from Chavista media, but from Machado herself. At a press conference at the Andrés Bello Catholic University, she said the agreement “does not reflect the levels of transparency that Venezuelan society wants” (“Este acuerdo no refleja los niveles de transparencia que la sociedad venezolana quiere”), according to Free Malaysia Today. She also mentioned businessman Alejandro Betancourt, whose company is behind the contract. He was investigated in the United States, Spain and Switzerland on suspicion of money laundering, though no charges were ever filed, notes G1. At the same time, Machado stressed that lawful contracts would be honored, though some might be renegotiated on better terms. In an unexpected turn, the leader Washington considers an ally has joined the deal’s critics—though from a liberal rule-of-law perspective, rather than an anti-imperialist one.

The fight over the election timetable

The second point of contention is the transition timetable. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has unveiled a “road map”: by mid-December, a new Supreme Court and National Electoral Council are to be appointed; Delcy Rodríguez would then declare the presidency vacant and start a six-month period for preparing elections, which could take place in 2027, reports Colorado Politics. Rubio stated plainly what leverage the United States holds: “To the extent that they can do business today, it’s because we’re issuing the licenses”—the “general licenses” issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), which authorize certain transactions despite sanctions.

Rodríguez has publicly affirmed her commitment to elections, but has given no date: “There will be elections… the world will see,” reports LRT. Machado, who returned on October 25 and was greeted by crowds of thousands along the route from Barquisimeto to Caracas, said the timetable was “firmly set” and that Rubio had put the elections in 2027: “The date of the election is the date of liberation” (Monitoreamos). But this is precisely where opinions diverge. Ricardo Ríos, an analyst at the consulting firm Poder y Estrategia, warned in comments to Reuters (quoted by vijesti.me) that Machado’s insistence could “disrupt” the U.S. three-stage plan. He also posed an uncomfortable question: what guarantees does the ruling establishment have that it will hand over power if it loses the election? Phil Gunson, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group, added that meeting demands for immediate elections risks “political division instead of a peaceful transition.” Former U.S. ambassador James Story put the contrast most starkly: “Delcy draws legitimacy only from the White House, while María Corina draws it from the Venezuelan people” (quoted by Radio Mitre).

Machado against Washington’s approach

The third story is the friction between Machado and the Trump administration, which has openly backed the interim government. Rubio warned that “you can’t street-protest your way into democracy”—a remark taken as a signal to Machado not to disrupt negotiations in which her movement, Vente Venezuela, did not participate, writes Korean Center, citing Axios. A White House source called the Venezuela settlement Trump’s “greatest diplomatic achievement” and warned that if Machado became “an obstacle,” nobody would win.

Machado herself struck two notes: gratitude for the January 3 operation that opened the “floodgate to freedom,” and firmness on the substance. She called for a transitional justice mechanism, a truth commission, security-sector reform and an agreement with the IMF on the debt. She also made clear that she would not be a prop in someone else’s plan. Interestingly, U.S. analysts at the Cato Institute acknowledge in their commentary that Machado’s return has disproved Washington’s assumption that she was a “destabilizing force,” and that the “stability first, then the economy, then democracy” strategy was flawed: without legitimacy, oil contracts cannot attract serious investment. In other words, the libertarian perspective from the United States here aligns with the Venezuelan opposition’s position against the State Department’s approach.

Sanctions: easing without lifting

The fourth topic is how local lawyers and economists interpret the sanctions “thaw.” Since the start of the year, OFAC has issued 17 general licenses easing restrictions on the oil, gas and mining sectors, but sanctions have not been fully lifted, notes an analysis by Morgan Lewis. On the program “Hablemos de energía,” Venezuelan compliance specialist Cándido Ramírez stressed in an interview with Noticia al Día that License No. 46 effectively requires every sector, especially oil and gas, to have a compliance system—a “framework to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing”—or it will be impossible to operate. For Caracas, this is an ambiguous benefit: access to the market is open, but on U.S. terms and under U.S. oversight, while the licensing framework itself remains a lever of pressure that Rubio has openly threatened to use.

Taken together, Venezuela’s debate over the past two days is not about whether the United States is good or bad, but about the price of its patronage. Chavista writers speak of lost sovereignty; Machado speaks of opaque contracts and the need for a popular mandate; analysts warn of a fragile transition without guarantees; and the interim government talks of elections “before the eyes of the world.” They agree on only one thing: Caracas is not deciding the outcome alone—and that, in itself, has become the country’s main political story.

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Damascus Hands Jordanian Ambassador Protest Note Over Strikes in Daraa

Syria’s Foreign Ministry summoned Jordanian Ambassador Sufyan al-Qudah and handed him a protest note over Jordanian airstrikes on civilian sites in Daraa province in the country’s south. The Syrian news agency SANA reported the move on Wednesday. According to the Foreign Ministry, civilians, including children, were killed in the strikes, and several others were injured.

Jordan says its aircraft struck Islamic State militant positions in the countryside of Daraa on Monday. Syrian authorities say seven people were killed—three children and a woman among them—and three were wounded. The strikes came days after an armed attack on a church in the southern Jordanian city of Karak, in which nine people were reportedly killed.

Against the backdrop of the incident, the foreign ministers of the two countries, Asaad al-Shaibani and Ayman Safadi, spoke by phone on Tuesday and agreed to set up a joint security committee to establish all the circumstances surrounding what happened in Daraa. According to a joint statement, the sides also intend to develop mechanisms for coordination on the ground and intelligence-sharing to counter terrorist threats, while respecting Syria’s sovereignty and protecting civilian lives.

Damascus nevertheless told Jordan that it was completely opposed to operations on Syrian territory without prior coordination. Following the raids, Syria’s General Authority for Ports and Customs closed the Nassib border crossing “due to the current circumstances,” then reopened it. The sides are thus seeking to ease tensions, but the incident in Daraa remains a serious irritant in bilateral relations.

News Context

• Why does Daraa province remain particularly sensitive for Damascus, and what local armed groups and cross-border networks operate there? — Daraa is sensitive because it was the birthplace of the 2011 protests, is a southern gateway to Damascus, and lies near the borders with Jordan and the Golan Heights. After the 2018 “reconciliation” agreements, Damascus gained control of the center, but local networks retained autonomy, and any incident could undermine the agreements and provoke outside intervention. The area is home to remnants of former rebel factions and local “reconciled” groups, including formations linked to the 8th Brigade and Russian forces; clan militias; Islamic State cells in the Yarmouk Basin; and smuggling networks tied to tribal and commercial connections across the Jordanian border. The main flows involve drugs—especially Captagon—as well as weapons, people, and goods.
• What role does the Nassib border crossing play in Syrian-Jordanian relations, and why does its temporary closure matter for trade and security? — Nassib, known as Jaber on the Jordanian side, is the main commercial crossing between Syria and Jordan and a key route for Syrian trade with Jordan and the Gulf countries. It carries exports, imports, transit goods, and humanitarian supplies. A temporary closure disrupts supply chains, pushes up prices, and hurts traders. It also signals heightened risks, including drug and arms smuggling, clashes, or weak border control. That is why the crossing’s operating status is often linked to security, Damascus’s control, and Jordanian concerns over Captagon and Iranian influence.

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Full version: Syria summons Jordanian ambassador to protest strikes on Daraa

Maduro Case in New York Reassigned to New Judge

The criminal case against Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro has officially been reassigned to Judge Analisa Torres following the death of 92-year-old Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein. The reassignment was recorded in documents from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. Hellerstein had overseen the case since March 2020 and handled subsequent filings after Maduro was brought to the United States in January 2026. Torres, who was born in New York and is of Puerto Rican descent, was appointed a federal judge in 2013; before that, she spent nearly a decade serving in New York State courts.

The trial of Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, is scheduled to begin on June 14, 2027. They are charged with conspiracy to commit narco-terrorism, importing prohibited substances, illegal possession of firearms, and torture. The next hearing, scheduled for December, will go ahead as planned: the court will consider defense motions to dismiss the case on the grounds of sovereign immunity.

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Full article: Judge Analisa Torres reassigned to Nicolás Maduro’s criminal case in New York

Iraq’s Prime Minister Donates $10 Million to Damascus Mosque and Mausoleum

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi has donated $10 million from his personal funds to the Umayyad Mosque and the mausoleum of Sayyida Zaynab in Damascus—$5 million for each site. According to the prime minister’s press office, the decision was announced after he visited both shrines with Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani. Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa met him at Damascus airport. This is al-Zaidi’s first official visit to Syria since he took office in mid-May.

The visit follows high-level contacts: in September, al-Zaidi had already met al-Sharaa and al-Shaibani in New York on the sidelines of the 81st session of the UN General Assembly. Before arriving in Damascus, he visited Jordan, where he discussed expanding economic, trade and investment cooperation, as well as joint projects, with King Abdullah II. His visit to Syria is therefore part of a series of regional diplomatic initiatives by the Iraqi prime minister.

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Full story: الزيدي يتبرع بـ10 ملايين دولار للجامع الأموي ومرقد السيدة زينب بدمشق

Venezuela and the United States: Sanctions, Deals and a Struggle for Power

María Corina Machado’s return to Venezuela after ten months in exile, and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s remarks about a “timeline” for reforms, have shaken Caracas. The focus is on who is really running the transition, who is paying for the oil, and who will end up in power. Officials, analysts and opposition figures are arguing over who is using whom: Washington using Delcy Rodríguez’s government, or the other way around.

Dispute Over Machado’s Return and Washington’s Role

Delcy Rodríguez’s government reacted with irritation. The acting president herself called her rival’s return a “show.” “The show could have been avoided; there are airports, after all,” she said on state television, while also calling for “democratic coexistence” and reproaching those “who called for sanctions and foreign aggression” for showing no remorse, AFP reports via RNN. Machado’s camp, meanwhile, extended an olive branch: her press secretary, Claudia Macero, said the opposition leader was ready to sit down “not only with Delcy, but with anyone.”

The second dispute is over who gave the “green light.” A source close to Machado told CNN: “We chose to act autonomously so as not to get in anyone’s way”—Washington did not authorize it, CNN en Español reports. International Crisis Group analyst Phil Gunson disagrees: in his view, entering through Colombia on the eve of the US midterm elections “suggests she was given the green light by Washington.” Trump needs a foreign policy win, and in South Florida, the alliance with Rodríguez and the obstacles to Machado’s return cost Republicans Venezuelan voters, El País writes. Professor Carmen Beatriz Fernández notes that Machado entered through Colombia, not Maiquetía Airport—which means the United States was not involved in the operation.

Sanctions as Leverage

The central issue in the economic debate is Rubio’s frank acknowledgment that sanctions and licenses remain tools of coercion. “To the extent that they can do business today, it’s because we issue exemptions and general licenses,” he said, promising that concessions would not be irreversible and that Washington would judge the interim authorities “by their actions, not their statements,” El Estímulo reports. Rubio also outlined two scenarios: a “phase of reconciliation” or a return to “violence and instability” and a cycle of sanctions.

Former US diplomat Brian Naranjo, who spent 32 years at the State Department and was expelled from Caracas in 2018, believes Washington has leverage but is not using it. Asked why Washington is not applying pressure to speed up the transition, he replied, “because it isn’t interested.” According to him, the administration is “creating the conditions for Rodríguez to stabilize and carry on,” La Mañana Digital quotes him as saying. Significantly, Rubio ruled out discussing immunity for members of the transitional authorities—a subject that, in local debates, is framed as a matter of the elite’s personal security Agenzia Nova.

Oil Deal and Accusations of a “Protectorate”

The third source of tension is oil. Trump announced that he had received one million barrels “as a gift” from Venezuela and promised this would bring down fuel prices in the United States. After Maduro’s arrest, Washington restored relations with the interim government and in August announced access to a fifth of Venezuela’s oil reserves, Primera Hora reports. Rubio defended the deal with a private company—which he calls Nabep/Blue Energy in an interview—operating in fields previously controlled by Chinese and Russian companies. He also countered Machado’s criticism, saying her objection “has nothing to do with the issue of elections” El Estímulo.

This is where assessments of sovereignty diverge. Italy’s Il Post puts it bluntly: “Venezuela has been practically an American protectorate” since January, and neither woman—Rodríguez nor Machado—will openly say that they owe everything to the United States, so as not to irritate Washington Il Post. El Estímulo notes that some Venezuelans expect energy deals to lead to higher wages and better services, but “the machinery of control has not been dismantled” and remains a warning sign El Estímulo.

Elections, Timelines and a Wait-and-See Strategy

The timetable is also under discussion: the State Department wants a new Supreme Court and National Electoral Council in place by mid-December, followed by the president’s departure and elections, likely in 2027 Primera Hora. Naranjo warns that Rodríguez has an incentive to drag things out, and that reshaping the TSJ and CNE is necessary for her “not to make them independent, but to control these institutions.” Fernández predicts the same strategy: “slow everything down and bet on wearing Machado out” El País. Machado herself, according to an AtlasIntel poll, has an approval rating of 57.4% and is calling for elections in 2027. Her party, Vente Venezuela, is not taking part in the dialogue, but has not rejected it either.

Who Is Using Whom? The “Double Game” Debate

The local debate also concerns Washington’s intentions. Critics of Trump in the Spanish-language press claim that it was Trump, not Maduro, who prevented Machado from returning, and that now “things are going very well in Venezuela”—a quote from the US president, El Plural writes. Analysts, meanwhile, stress that Washington’s main risk is the process “going off the rails” without Machado’s participation. The common thread in Venezuelan commentary is that the country has gained a reprieve from sanctions and oil revenues, but at the cost of outside control over the transition. The only question is who will reap the dividends: the interim authorities, the opposition or American companies.

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Jordanian Airstrikes on Southern Syria: Families of the Dead Demand Answers

After a series of Jordanian airstrikes on southern Syria, which Amman called “Operation Jordanian Deterrence — Hamoud,” relatives of those killed demanded an explanation for why civilian homes and farms had been targeted. The son of a 72-year-old man said his father was a schoolteacher and a driver on a route to the Gulf, had no security-related history, and was well known to local residents. Another witness said his neighbor had been in an olive grove when his home was bombed, and that there were no armed men nearby.

Awwad al-Salim said the strike killed his brother, his brother’s wife, their 25-year-old son, and three other children—a girl and two boys. According to him, the family lived in a safe house, raised sheep, had no weapons, and was not involved in drug trafficking. He and other residents are demanding an explanation for why they were targeted.

The Syrian Civil Defence said its teams had responded to reports of airstrikes on four sites in the countryside of Daraa and Suwayda. Preliminary information indicated that the bodies of seven people had been recovered, including three children, three men, and a woman; three others, including a child, were injured. According to the organization, the first strike hit a tent in the village of Taf in the Lajat area, northeast of Daraa, killing five civilians from one family. Also killed were 80-year-old Riyad Qarad in the Shayih farms area near Nasib and 60-year-old Mutlaq Abu al-Khayl in Shuhayb, north of Suwayda. No casualties were reported in a strike on a house in Muzayrib. A correspondent for Syria al-An reported signs of six strikes in western rural Daraa and said that residents of one house were outside at the time of the bombing, while internal security forces were defusing an unexploded rocket.

Jordan says the operation was a response to an attack on a condolence gathering near St. George’s Greek Orthodox Church (Hamoud) in Karak last Friday, in which nine people were killed and 34 others injured. The Jordanian military said the strikes targeted “terrorist organization strongholds” in southern Syria and were “revenge for our martyrs” killed in Karak, adding that those who carried out the attack were linked to the airstrike targets. Jordanian authorities announced the arrest of three suspects: brothers Hazza and Mishal Zaidan Mohammed, and their relative Ahmed Sami Hussein. Public Security Director Obeidallah al-Maaytah said they were all from the same family and held takfirist views.

Syria’s Foreign Ministry expressed regret over the deaths and injuries in Daraa resulting from the Jordanian operation, saying Damascus was continuing to communicate and coordinate with Amman to establish the details and reasons for what happened. The Syrian government stressed that there had been no prior coordination with Jordan on the operation and announced an investigation. The tragedy in southern Syria has thus become the subject of two competing accounts: for some, it was an attack on civilians; for others, a retaliatory counterterrorism operation.

News Explainers

• What is the Lajat area in southern Syria, and why is the village of Taf considered part of a distinct local environment? — Lajat (also known as Laja) is a remote volcanic basalt plateau in southern Syria, spanning parts of Daraa, Suwayda, and Quneitra governorates. Its lava fields, limited road network, and strong tribal, family, and religious ties make it an area where local intermediaries and customs often matter more than formal administrative control. Taf is seen as part of this distinct environment because life there is shaped by geographic isolation, clan and family ties, local dispute-resolution mechanisms, and cross-border connections—not just by its place within a particular administrative unit.

• Why are St. George’s Church (Hamoud) in Karak and the condolence gatherings held there significant, and how does this relate to the name “Operation Hamoud”? — In Karak, Syria (Daraa governorate), St. George’s Church, associated with the name Hamoud, serves not only as a religious center but also as a community space for remembrance. Condolence gatherings there bring together local residents from different faiths, demonstrating neighborly solidarity and the role of local notables. In this context, the operation’s name, “Hamoud,” refers to this local focal point of collective memory, a family, or a local figure of authority, giving the military action a community-based rather than abstractly ideological justification.

• What does the term “takfirist views” mean in the Jordanian and Syrian context, and what legal or social consequences can it have? — “Takfirist views” describes a tendency to declare other Muslims unbelievers (takfir) and is commonly used as shorthand for jihadist extremism. In Jordan and Syria, authorities and local communities use the term to discredit armed Islamist groups. Legally, it can lead to prosecution under counterterrorism laws, surveillance, travel restrictions, and criminal charges; socially, it can lead to stigmatization and suspicion, as well as the risk of unfairly applying the label to religious people.

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Full article: "We want an explanation for what happened": Testimonies from Daraa after Jordanian airstrikes

U.S. Appeals Court Upholds Validity of PDVSA 2020 Bonds

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has upheld the validity of the PDVSA 2020 bonds. The securities were issued in October 2016 as part of an exchange in which bonds due in 2017 were swapped for new bonds maturing in 2020. A 50.1% stake in Citgo Holding, the parent company of oil refiner Citgo Petroleum, was pledged as collateral for the issue. Bondholders representing 39.4% of the total issue agreed to the exchange; in October 2019, PDVSA stopped making payments on the bonds.

The ruling affirmed a decision by Judge Katherine Polk Failla, issued in September 2025, that approval from Venezuela’s National Assembly was not required to issue the bonds. The court also ruled that decisions made by the country’s parliament in 2016 and 2019 have no legal effect on assets abroad. The lawsuit seeking to invalidate the issue was originally filed by PDVSA and affiliated companies, which alleged that the bonds violated constitutional requirements because they had not been authorized by parliament.

The verdict affects the process of selling PDV Holding’s assets in Delaware. In November 2025, a federal judge awarded the company to Amber Energy, an affiliate of the Elliott fund, for $5.9 billion. The decision is being appealed, and the appeals court heard arguments on October 21. The proposed distribution plan calls for more than $2 billion to go to holders of PDVSA 2020 bonds. However, enforcement of the collateral is temporarily restricted under OFAC License No. 5Z, which is in effect until November 5.

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Full story: U.S. Court of Appeals Upholds Validity of PDVSA 2020 Bonds

Amman and Damascus Form Committee After Airstrikes in Southern Syria

Following a sharp escalation in southern Syria, the Jordanian government announced on Tuesday that it was forming a joint committee with Damascus to monitor the fallout from Jordanian strikes. Government spokesperson Mohammed al-Momani said the operation was based on field intelligence about confirmed threats and terrorist activity directed against Jordan’s national security. He said Jordanian authorities were in contact with their Syrian counterparts and coordinating next steps.

Al-Momani said preliminary information indicated that more than 20 Islamic State (IS, a terrorist organization banned in Russia) militants had been killed and a large weapons depot destroyed. He expressed regret over civilian casualties in Syria and stressed that Jordan had avoided striking sites where, according to available information, civilians might be present. Jordanian officials, he said, were continuing to establish the facts alongside their Syrian counterparts.

The spokesperson also stressed that Jordan’s and Syria’s security were inseparable and that the fight against terrorism was a shared task for the two countries. He recalled that a recent attack in the village of Hamoud in Karak province had targeted Jordan. Amman and Damascus, he said, would continue to strengthen their strong fraternal ties.

For its part, the Syrian government said it was closely monitoring developments in the south of the country following Jordanian air force strikes that caused civilian casualties, including children. Damascus said the operation had not been coordinated with the Syrian side in advance and announced a thorough investigation. At the same time, communication channels with Jordan remained open. Syrian authorities offered condolences to the families of those killed, expressed solidarity with the injured and pledged to provide them with the support they needed.

Syria’s Foreign Ministry condemned the Jordanian bombings and the violation of Syrian airspace, calling them a clear breach of good-neighborly principles and Syrian sovereignty. Damascus warned that “suspicious parties” were trying to damage relations between the two countries and sow discord. It announced the urgent formation of a joint commission to assess the situation on the ground and address security, with the aim of ending violations and securing the border. The Jordanian military, for its part, named the operation “Jordanian Deterrence — Hamoud,” linking it to the deaths at a church in Hamoud, Karak, last Friday. Syrian rescue workers reported seven people killed—three children, three men and a woman—and three injured—two men and a child.

News Analysis

• Which armed groups and smuggling routes have traditionally operated in southern Syria along the Jordanian border, and why might Amman and Damascus assess the threats they pose differently? — In southern Syria—in Daraa, Quneitra, Suwayda and the southern outskirts of Damascus—there are local former rebel factions that have undergone “reconciliation” and have been partly integrated into Syrian structures, tribal smuggling networks, criminal groups and Iran-linked militias. Routes run through Daraa–Ramtha, the Nasib/Jaber crossing and the areas around Tafas, Inkhil, Jasim, Nawa and Sanamayn, as well as illegal crossing points near Suwayda and Quneitra. Amman sees the main threats as drug trafficking—especially Captagon, a synthetic amphetamine—arms smuggling, infiltration and Iranian influence. Damascus, by contrast, emphasizes the remnants of rebel groups, foreign support and “smuggling as a conspiracy,” sometimes treating such networks as tools of pressure or bargaining.
• Why has the village of Hamoud in Karak province become the symbolic name for the Jordanian operation, and what political consequences did the attack on the local church have for Jordan? — In Jordanian public discourse, the village’s name became associated with the retaliatory operation following a high-profile attack. The church incident also allowed the authorities to portray the threat as an assault on a religious minority and national unity. Politically, it provided grounds for tightening counterterrorism measures, strengthening intelligence coordination, curbing extremist narratives and demonstrating the protection of the Christian community. At the same time, it intensified debate over the balance between security and civil liberties.
• What coordination mechanisms between Jordanian and Syrian military and intelligence agencies existed before the joint committee was established, and how were they typically used to prevent border incidents? — Before the joint committee was formed, coordination took place through border guard liaison officers, channels between Jordan’s General Intelligence Directorate and Syrian intelligence services, diplomatic missions, meetings at the Jaber/Nasib crossing, exchanges of detainees and information, and the involvement of Russian and international intermediaries and tribal leaders. These mechanisms were used to de-escalate firefights, prevent illegal crossings, coordinate humanitarian convoys and facilitate people’s return.

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Full article: Amman forms joint committee with Damascus to monitor fallout from its airstrikes in southern Syria

Venezuela and the United States: Deals, Ultimatums and Disputes Over Sovereignty

The return of María Corina Machado after ten months in exile, Washington’s publication of a detailed “road map” for the transition, and Donald Trump’s joke about making Venezuela the 51st state all came together over the course of two days. Caracas and Washington are disputing the timeline, the opposition is arguing over its place at the negotiating table, and oil contracts have prompted a debate over who really runs the country.

Machado’s “Show” and the Authorities’ Nervous Response

The opposition leader’s return became the main event. Machado crossed the country in a caravan from Barquisimeto to Caracas—about 400 kilometers (250 miles), greeted by thousands of people—but still did not explain exactly how she entered Venezuela after at least seven failed attempts, according to her team (Cambio Colombia). Acting President Delcy Rodríguez reacted irritably: “This show could have been avoided—there are airports, after all” (El Universo). Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello, secretary-general of the ruling PSUV, limited himself to a smile: “We wish her luck” (Courrier international).

Local analysts heard not confidence in those remarks, but bewilderment. Political strategist Ricardo Ríos, head of the Poder & Estrategia firm, believes Rodríguez used the word “show” to “dampen the mobilizing effect and suggest that the return had been agreed upon.” He calls her remark that “dialogue is not for novices” contradictory, and her response about possible prosecution of Machado evasive—revealing “the limits of her coercive power” (El Diario de Guayana). Political scientist Enderson Sequera went further: “This is the most nervous and unhinged Delcy has been since January 3.” In his view, Chavismo is torn between survival and answering to its base, and so “will bite its tongue with every statement.” Tellingly, Rodríguez called the January U.S. operation “foreign military aggression”—a risky claim for someone Washington regards as a partner.

The Negotiating Table Without the Main Player

The second dispute is over who has the right to speak about the country’s future. Machado is not part of the dialogue that has been taking place since August between the interim authorities and some opposition groups, led by Dinorah Figuera and backed by the United States (Efecto Cocuyo/Infobae). Her press secretary, Claudia Macero, said on Unión Radio that Machado was ready to sit down “not just with Delcy, but with anyone,” and that without her there could be “neither a transition nor credible elections” (Yahoo Noticias). Rodríguez replied by reminding her that “anyone who called for sanctions should feel at least some remorse.”

Views differ within the opposition, too: some criticize the exclusion of the Vente Venezuela party from the talks, while Machado herself says she will not obstruct them. Machado remains barred from running for office, although in the latest round the parties agreed to review laws restricting political activity without naming her specifically.

Washington’s Road Map and Caracas’s Red Lines

The third issue is the U.S. plan, laid out in detail for the first time. A senior, unnamed State Department official described the sequence: a reconstituted Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ) by mid-December, followed by a new National Electoral Council (CNE), and only then a declaration that the presidency is “permanently vacant.” This would formally confirm Rodríguez’s departure and start a six-month countdown to elections (ABC). The key detail is that the CNE would lose its power to disqualify candidates—it “will no longer be able to strike people from the ballot.” Secretary of State Marco Rubio was blunt when speaking to reporters: “Not in 10 years, not in five, not in two—it has to happen quickly” (Anadolu Ajansı).

Rubio also rejected the claim that Washington had blocked Machado’s return, acknowledging that the only time he urged her not to return was immediately after the June earthquakes, when humanitarian aid was the priority (The Canadian Press). He also made clear how Rodríguez’s loyalty would be measured: “We judge by deeds, not rhetoric.” As an example, he cited the extradition of Alex Saab, a former Maduro ally who pleaded guilty and is cooperating with investigators.

Sanctions, Oil and the 51st-State Joke

The fourth issue—and the most painful for national pride—is the economic cost of the deal. Rubio stressed that Venezuela “remains heavily sanctioned” and operates largely under U.S. licenses (El Cooperante). Against that backdrop, Trump joked at a rally in Corpus Christi, Texas: “We’ll make it the 51st state, and elect a governor instead of a president.” He thanked Caracas for granting concessions on 17 oil fields to North American Blue Energy Partners, whose parent company is 35% owned by the Pentagon (El Diario NY). The EFE news agency notes that the agreement gives the United States access to roughly one-fifth of Venezuela’s oil reserves (Proceso Digital).

For Chavismo’s base, this confirms their worst suspicions: the country is paying for sanctions relief with its sovereignty. For some in the opposition, including Machado, who criticized the oil deal, it is proof that Washington struck a convenient agreement with the interim authorities while bypassing democratic demands. Rubio’s response is that she is entitled to her opinion, but the agreement benefits both countries (CNN Brasil). Meanwhile, the U.S. Embassy has fully resumed operations in Caracas, promising support for the energy and healthcare sectors (VTV).

All sides agree on one thing: the coming weeks will matter more than the rhetoric. If the TSJ is indeed reconstituted by December and the CNE stripped of its political powers, Venezuela will have its first chance in years to hold elections with an unpredictable outcome. But if the parties start dragging their feet, Rubio’s warning may come into play: “No one is going to outlast us.”

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Jordanian Airstrikes in Southern Syria: Revenge for the Attack in al-Karak

The Royal Jordanian Air Force struck targets in southern Syria as part of an operation called “Jordanian Deterrence—Hamoud.” The Jordanian military described the sites as “dens of terrorist organizations” and said the action was in retaliation for the deaths of Jordanians in an attack on a church in the village of Hamoud, in al-Karak Governorate, last Friday. According to Amman, the strikes killed and wounded many militants linked to the attackers.

Syria’s emergency management authority said its teams had worked at four sites hit by airstrikes. It reported recovering the bodies of seven people—three children, three men and one woman—while three others, two men and a child, received medical care. Damascus said civilians and children were among the victims and stressed that the strikes had not been coordinated with Jordan in advance.

Syria’s Foreign Ministry said it “categorically rejects” operations on Syrian territory without coordination, and reported maintaining regular contact with Jordan to establish the circumstances and reasons for the strikes. Damascus called for joint efforts that would preserve Syria’s sovereignty and the security of both countries. Against this backdrop, Syria’s General Directorate of Customs and Border Crossings announced that the Nasib crossing on the border with Jordan would close on Tuesday due to the current circumstances.

A correspondent for the Syria Now platform reported from the area around the town of al-Muzayrib on the aftermath of six Jordanian airstrikes in the western part of Daraa Governorate. According to the correspondent, reports indicated that one strike killed seven members of a single family; further casualties were reported in the border town of Nasib. Residents of one of the destroyed houses were outside when it was bombed, preventing further casualties. Internal security forces were working to dispose of an unexploded missile in al-Muzayrib.

The attack that prompted the strikes took place last Friday during a funeral near the Greek Orthodox Church of Saint George in the village of Hamoud, in al-Karak Governorate. Nine people were killed and 34 wounded. Jordan’s Interior Ministry identified the perpetrators as brothers Hazza, believed to have organized and masterminded the attack, and Mishal Zaidan Mohammed, along with their relative Ahmad Sami Hussein. Jordanian authorities said all three were members of the same family, held takfiri views, acted independently and attacked the funeral attendees without prior planning.

Comments on the News

• Why is the Nasib border crossing important for trade and travel between Syria and Jordan, and what are the usual effects of its closure on Syria’s southern provinces? — Nasib (known as Jaber on the Jordanian side) is the main land trade and passenger corridor between Syria and Jordan, on the Damascus–Amman highway. Trucks, transit traffic, fuel and goods pass through it, as do travelers. Its closure cuts off the main legal route, drives up prices and causes shortages in Daraa, Quneitra and Suwayda, harming trade, transport and livelihoods while increasing smuggling and isolating southern Syria. Reopening it, by contrast, boosts the local economy and humanitarian access.

• What does “takfiri views” mean in the Syrian and Jordanian context, and why do authorities use the term to describe the attackers? — “Takfiri” refers to extreme jihadist or Salafist views. Those who hold them declare other Muslims to be takfir—unbelievers or apostates—which is used to justify violence. In Syria and Jordan, authorities use the label to portray attackers as extremist terrorists, distinguish them from the political opposition, justify security measures and win international support. The term, however, can be broad and stigmatizing.

• Why were retaliatory strikes launched in Daraa Governorate and the al-Muzayrib area when the attack took place in Jordan’s al-Karak, and how are these areas connected across the Syrian-Jordanian border? — According to reports, authorities linked the attack in al-Karak to a network with bases and logistical hubs in Daraa and al-Muzayrib. These border areas have smuggling routes and family and tribal ties that span both sides of the frontier. The strikes therefore targeted not the site of the attack itself, but alleged bases, weapons depots or accomplices through which, according to the authorities, people, weapons and supplies moved. Daraa and al-Muzayrib lie close to the Jordanian border and have historically served as a corridor between southern Syria and Jordan.

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Full version: Jordan targets “terrorist dens” in southern Syria as Damascus reports civilian casualties

Delcy Rodríguez announces nationwide visits and support measures for communities

Venezuelan President Delcy Rodríguez confirmed that the government plans to work across all regions of the country to revive local production, strengthen the national economy, and support communities. Alongside National Assembly President Jorge Rodríguez and Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello, she outlined plans for the near future. The president also announced that the Christmas season will begin in the country on Sunday, November 1, with a large concert and cultural events for families.

Summing up the “Pink Month” campaign to raise awareness of breast cancer prevention, Rodríguez said that new comprehensive medical care centers for women had opened. She said the authorities intended to continue protecting the health and well-being of the country’s women. In November, the government will hold events as part of “Purple Month,” focused on combating gender-based violence and protecting women’s rights. According to the president, the government will work with public institutions to create conditions in which survivors can be heard and receive meaningful protection.

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Full version: Delcy Rodríguez reaffirms commitment to deploy across the country to strengthen the national economy and support communities

The Words of the Euphrates and the Memory of Syria: Issa al-Sheikh Hassan’s New Book

Syrian poet Issa al-Sheikh Hassan has published a book with Dar Nard titled Approaches… Thursday’s Lamp… Euphrates Amali, Part One. The book runs to 200 pages in a mid-sized format and is divided into 49 sections. Its title was handwritten by calligrapher Ubaida al-Banki, and the cover features a work by Abboud Hammam that evokes the heritage of the Euphrates. The book grew out of the author’s weekly interactive conversations on Facebook: he collected words from his native Busaldja and its surroundings, tracing how their meanings had changed and checking them against old and new dictionaries, including al-Zabidi’s Taj al-Arus and the Historical Dictionary of the Arabic Language (Doha). In this way, the local vocabulary and culture of the “periphery” meet the academic tradition.

The title invokes a literary heritage: amali refers to the genre of scholarly dictations associated with Abu Ali al-Qali, whose predecessors included al-Zajjaji and whose successors included Ibn al-Shajari (though the genre is most often linked specifically to al-Qali). The word “approaches” underscores that the author does not present his inquiries into spoken language as definitive. Instead, he draws closer to meaning by consulting old and new dictionaries, and sometimes even Google. He also looks for parallels in Turkish and Kurdish, as well as in Sorani and Kurmanji—for example, in his discussion of “waj/wahj”—giving the book a broad philological and cultural scope.

The book resonates with Syrians’ memories and pain: its author has lived through the fate of many forced to flee by hunger and fear. With tenderness and sorrow, he asks what Syrians eat for breakfast now—and whether they have breakfast at all—a question that lays bare the consequences of war and displacement. The people of the “periphery,” he writes, are those who “live in a vast geographical vessel,” far from major cities. They are content with an almost complete independence from the center, while remaining open to successive waves of ideology.

The book also gives special attention to the power of an encouraging word. When the author was 19, Hussein Hamdan al-Assaf said of his first poem: “I expect this young man has a future.” The words worked like magic, much like Imam Muhammad Abduh’s praise of a student who would later become a pioneer of literature and thought, or Saad Zaghloul’s description of Abbas Mahmoud al-Aqqad as a “mighty writer.” The author says that for years he studied the culture of “our people” and gathered enough to pour into a vessel, alluding to Ibrahim Abd al-Qadir al-Mazini and his Qabd al-Rih (Seizing the Wind). The image of a vast reservoir that fills in order to empty and empties in order to fill sounds like a hymn to reading. The article concludes by urging readers to ask themselves what place reading holds in their lives alongside the growing culture of images, and to make reading a daily nourishment, as far as possible.

Comments on the News

• What is Busaldja—the Euphrates area where the author collected local vocabulary—and how does it differ from Syria’s major cities? — Busaldja is a small local community or settlement on the Euphrates, probably in the eastern Syrian region of Deir ez-Zor, rather than a major city. It differs in scale, its river-based rural economy, strong family and clan ties, local dialect, and oral culture. In Damascus, Aleppo, or Homs, institutional culture and urban infrastructure are more prominent, as is a different social way of life.
• Who is the artist Abboud Hammam, and what place does his work hold in the contemporary Syrian art scene, particularly his works on the heritage of the Euphrates? — Abboud Hammam is a Syrian artist associated with the Euphrates region and Deir ez-Zor. His work engages with local daily life, memory, folklore, and the heritage of the river. In the contemporary Syrian art scene, he occupies a more regional, documentary, heritage-focused niche: his work is important for documenting Euphrates culture and voices from the periphery, though it is not necessarily part of the metropolitan mainstream.

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Full version: "Euphrates Amali"… Unearthing the Memory of the Periphery and Documenting Syrians’ Suffering

Venezuela and the United States: Deals, Pressure and Disputes Over Return

María Corina Machado’s return to Venezuela after nearly a year in exile was the biggest story of recent days, immediately exposing tensions between Washington and Caracas. While Donald Trump speaks of “total control” over the country, where U.S. companies have already been granted access on special terms, Venezuelan officials call the opposition leader’s return a “show,” and local economists describe the oil agreements with the United States as a “coalition of two kleptocracies.” Here is an overview of what Venezuelan politicians, experts and media outlets are discussing.

Machado’s return and what lies behind it

Machado confirmed her return on October 25, traveling from Panama through Colombia. Thousands of supporters greeted her motorcade on the journey from Barquisimeto to Caracas. Washington tried to present the return as a diplomatic success of its own: Secretary of State Marco Rubio said that “the conditions that allowed Ms. Machado to return safely are a direct result of U.S.-backed reconciliation talks,” adding that Washington had spent “weeks” urging the transitional authorities to “allow her to return without hindrance” (Despacho 505, El Comercio). Transitional government president Delcy Rodríguez called the return an “unnecessary show” and, without naming Machado, said she hoped that “those who harmed Venezuela, who called for sanctions and foreign aggression, would feel remorse” (CNN). Trump, for his part, offered only this: “She’s a very nice woman. She gave me her Nobel Prize … I hope she’s safe. But things are going very well for us in Venezuela” (El País).

Venezuelan analysts, notably, disagree about the implications. Political scientist Benigno Alarcón of the Polis firm says Machado’s presence “could change the incentives and balance of power between the government, the opposition and the United States,” but “does not in itself mean a transfer of power” (El País). Economist Ricardo Hausmann went further, saying that if the “regime” harms her, “Trump and Rubio will be responsible” (El País). An El Nacional columnist writes that her appearance “shatters the fiction of a managed transition,” in which stability was negotiated “behind civil society’s back” (El Nacional).

The oil deal and a “coalition of two kleptocracies”

The main economic story is the August 31 agreement, which Trump called “the biggest oil deal in the history of the world”: access to 17 strategic oil fields for 25 years, with the participation of Chevron, Repsol, Eni, Shell and BP, and a target output of more than 1.5 million barrels a day (El Cooperante). In an interview with Fox News, Trump explicitly declared that the United States had “total control” over Venezuela: “We’re taking millions of barrels of oil a week” (El Cooperante). Rodríguez’s government defends the agreement, saying it will bring “significant revenue to the state.”

However, critics in Venezuela and across Latin America point to a lack of transparency. In a column for Cambio Colombia, Colombian analyst Hans Blumenthal writes that “rights to the largest oil fields have already been allocated, and the United States is taking the lion’s share.” The key question, he says, is “what Venezuela will get and whether the agreement will remain in place when the country votes freely” (Cambio Colombia). Hausmann described the relationship taking shape as a “coalition of two kleptocracies” (“coalición de dos cleptocracias”), a phrase picked up by many media outlets (Charter97). According to El País, Machado is already criticizing the contract: businessman Alejandro Betancourt, whose company was awarded oil fields, “is not a partner,” and she will respect contracts only if they comply with Venezuelan law (Cambio Colombia).

Dispute over the election date and a “managed transition”

The key point of disagreement is the timeline. Rubio speaks of three stages—stabilization, economic recovery and political reconciliation—and wants “a new Supreme Court by the end of the year and a new National Electoral Council soon after” (Infobae). At the UN General Assembly, Rodríguez promised that elections would be held but gave no date. Trump said it was “too early” for elections. Machado is demanding a specific date: “The election date is the date of liberation” (Cambio Colombia).

Venezuelan editorial commentary sees a trap here: “every month without a date strengthens the position of the powerful and eases the pressure,” while “oil and democracy are moving in opposite directions in Washington” (Cambio Colombia). El País puts the paradox even more sharply: Rubio presents Machado’s return as an achievement of the very negotiating forum from which she is excluded. The talks involve Delcy Rodríguez and Dyonora Figueras, while Machado’s party, Vente Venezuela, is not part of them (El País, Infobae).

The Church, sovereignty and the debate over “forced” intervention

An unexpected but important local story is the reaction of the Venezuelan Episcopal Conference. Its president, Monsignor Jesús González de Zárate, said that the country reached January 3—the date of the U.S. military operation and the detention of Nicolás Maduro—because society “could not find common ground,” and that an outside actor therefore “had to” intervene (Revista Diplomática). Political scientist Leopoldo Puchi, writing in the same publication, strongly disagrees: that logic “shifts the blame for aggression onto the victim” and normalizes intervention, while “a country’s sovereignty does not depend on whether its leaders managed to reach an agreement” (Revista Diplomática). This is a rare example of a domestic Venezuelan debate not directly about the United States, but about how the country legitimizes the U.S. presence.

Sanctions, money and everyday life

Although the sanctions regime has formally been eased, Venezuelan experts are debating where the oil revenue is going. Analysts estimate that oil sold since January is worth more than $13 billion, but there has been no official confirmation, and the revenue is being deposited in a special account without full disclosure (Charter97). The minimum wage remains extremely low: according to figures cited by Venezuelan economists, the legal monthly wage is less than 30 cents, while an income of $240 consists almost entirely of bonuses and covers only about 40% of a family’s food basket (Cambio Colombia). According to Encovi, a survey by Andrés Bello University, 68.5% of households lived below the poverty line in 2025. That is why, El Nacional notes, business elites who once preferred “corporate silence” are now being forced to take a position, while the military reassesses the durability of “Chavismo 3.0” (El Nacional).

Notably, even among government supporters, cautious criticism can be heard. Venezuelan economist Celaya (AVIEM), in a technical analysis, says the energy crisis will require $15–40 billion and five to ten years to address, while sanctions have worsened the shortage of spare parts (QQ). Meanwhile, residents of oil-producing areas interviewed by The Atlantic say that “the Americans came to steal the oil and minerals” and that “nothing has changed” (Charter97). In this way, Venezuela’s debate about the United States is shifting from geopolitics to the question of who actually benefits from the “biggest deal in history.”

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“One in a Million”: Ten Years in the Life of a Syrian Refugee

In 2015, eleven-year-old Israa was selling cigarettes with her father, Tariq, in Izmir’s Basmane Square. Her family was preparing to leave Turkey for Germany, fleeing the war in Syria. There, she happened to meet filmmakers Atab Azzam and Jack MacInnes, who were making a BBC documentary about the journey taken by refugees. The girl caught their attention with her talkativeness, smile and curiosity about the camera, and the filmmakers decided to follow her family and document their journey to Germany.

Together with Israa, her mother Nesrin, her father, and her siblings, they crossed the sea in an inflatable boat to a Greek island, then travelled across Europe by bus, train and on foot, sleeping in tents in the rain and cold until they reached Cologne. The film could have ended there, but the filmmakers kept visiting the family, sharing food and stories with them, and watching as they adapted to a new life. Azzam, who is Syrian, and MacInnes, who speaks German, helped bridge the gap between Israa and the people around her. Against the backdrop of debates over refugees and Brexit, the filmmakers saw a gulf between public rhetoric and the family’s everyday life, and decided to keep filming.

As the years passed, the camera shifted from the family’s moves between countries to Israa growing up: she learned German, started school, and went from child to teenager, while her relationship with her father began to change. Tariq struggled to accept the women in the family becoming more independent, particularly his wife Nesrin, who went from being a less visible presence to standing more on her own. This heightened tensions and threatened the life the family was trying to build. The film links this to Tariq’s past: he was abused by his own father and was arrested five times under Bashar al-Assad. Azzam notes that he grew up with the idea that a man should control women, and with the belief that physical punishment of children was justified. These attitudes clashed with Germany’s different social and legal norms, and with children who were growing up in a new environment and gaining an independence their father was not used to.

Israa is now 22, married, raising two children and living near Cologne. She is improving her German in the hope of getting a job in public services. She says she married someone she loves, whereas in Syria her relatives would most likely have arranged her marriage. Israa did not expect filming to last ten years. She says she felt comfortable with the filmmakers, chose for herself what to share on camera, and even contacted them to capture moments she considered important. They had originally agreed to finish the film when she turned 18, but later events—including the fall of Assad’s regime in December 2024—prompted the filmmakers to continue. Israa wanted to tell her story as she had experienced it, without manipulation and without placing all the blame on her parents.

As filming expanded, the story stopped being only Israa’s and became a portrait of a family whose relationships with one another and with the place they live were changing. The film opens with Israa returning to Aleppo to see her home after the fall of Assad’s regime. The city she left as a child is once again accessible, but returning does not mean restoring her former life. MacInnes believes the film goes beyond a story about refugees to become a broader human story about growing up, change, relationships with parents, and the difficulties that arise when children begin to build independent lives. The viewer does not see Israa at just one moment, but accompanies her as she grows and her dreams, relationships and choices evolve.

Ten years later, Israa is no longer the girl who caught the filmmakers’ attention in a square in Izmir. She is a young mother who returns to Aleppo to visit her home, but continues to build her life in Germany. Her story reaches audiences in the documentary One in a Million, in which she is the central figure. The film opens in cinemas on November 6. It all began with a girl selling cigarettes beside her father and a chance encounter—but her story shows that a refugee’s journey does not end upon reaching a safe place. After that, a whole life begins, with its changes, conflicts and questions about home and belonging.

News Commentary

• What did the fall of Assad’s regime in December 2024 mean for the Syrian diaspora—and why do many people, like Israa, continue to build lives abroad even though a return to Aleppo is now possible? — For the Syrian diaspora, the event brought a mixture of hope, relief and anxiety. The regime’s fall opened up discussions about political transition, refugees’ return, property restoration and family reunification, but it did not immediately resolve the economic collapse, destruction, legal uncertainty or fear of renewed instability. The diaspora is diverse: for some, this is a chance to return and take part in rebuilding; for others, it brings trauma, separated families and concerns about safety. The political and legal possibility of returning is not the same as being able to do so in practice. Aleppo lacks housing, jobs and services, property disputes remain unresolved, and people associated with the opposition still face risks. That is why Israa and many others remain abroad, where they have jobs, their children’s education, stability and personal freedom. For them, returning would mean more than moving: it would mean giving up a life they have built and accepting new risks.

• What is Aleppo’s significance in modern Syrian history, and what has changed in the city during the war—especially for families whose homes and neighbourhoods were destroyed or left empty? — Aleppo has traditionally been considered Syria’s economic and cultural capital: a major commercial and industrial centre, a historic city with a citadel and old markets, and a place with a diverse population and strong family and business networks. In modern history, the city has become both a symbol of the 2011 protest movement and the site of one of the war’s most destructive battles, fought from 2012 to 2016 and involving sieges, bombardment and mass displacement. After the war, many neighbourhoods were emptied or changed demographically, and reconstruction has been uneven: electricity, water, housing and jobs are in short supply. For families whose homes were destroyed, the main problems are rubble, lost documents, property disputes, a lack of compensation and the inability to return even if they wish to. The 2023 earthquake made the situation even worse.

• How are marriages traditionally arranged in Syria, how common is it for relatives to be involved in choosing a spouse, and why does Israa set her own choice against this tradition? — In Syria, marriage often involves the family: mothers, aunts, older relatives and community intermediaries may suggest candidates, check a family’s reputation and put pressure on young people, although customs vary considerably by region, class, religion and degree of urbanisation. Marriage between relatives, including cousins, occurs in some communities, but it is not universal among Syrians. Legally, the bride’s consent is generally required, though social pressure can be intense. Israa contrasts this with her own choice because personal autonomy, emotional closeness and the right to decide for herself who to build a life with matter to her more than following the expectations of relatives or the community.

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Full version: From a Syrian girl selling cigarettes on the streets of Turkey to a film’s leading figure: Who is Israa? ***

Knesset Elections: What Damascus Can Expect from Israel

The Knesset elections scheduled for October 27 are of particular significance to Damascus: they will determine the future of Benjamin Netanyahu and his far-right coalition, as well as the party makeup of the next government. Security issues remain at the forefront of Israel’s election discourse, with Syria regarded as one of the priority fronts in the regional confrontation. Israel’s approach to Syria, however, rests on a strategic consensus: to treat it as a sphere of influence and an opportunity to consolidate military advantages, regard the occupied Golan Heights as part of Israel and refuse to discuss them, fear the emergence of a strong central government, and prevent military threats along its northern border.

The opposition does not take fundamentally different positions on Syria: the differences between the camps are limited, and Netanyahu’s main rivals have military and security backgrounds and share his views on security and regional dominance. Gadi Eisenkot, former chief of staff, leader of the Yashar party and former member of the war cabinet, is said to view Israel’s incursion into southern Syria as leverage for securing political and security arrangements. He links an agreement with Damascus to firm security guarantees, assurances from the United States, and a review of the Turkish and Russian military presence. Naftali Bennett takes a harder right-wing line on buffer zones and the Golan Heights and makes no secret of his wariness toward Syria’s new administration, although media reports say he is willing to consider a change in its behavior.

The real divisions in Israel, then, concern how to manage its security strategy, when and to what extent to use military force, and how far to respond to U.S. diplomacy—not its fundamental objectives toward Syria. Damascus should therefore distinguish between a possible change in the coalition that forms the next government and a possible change in Israeli policy itself. It should not assume that Netanyahu’s defeat will automatically end the strikes or lead Israel to withdraw from occupied Syrian territory. A new government might change its methods and its willingness to reach an agreement under U.S. mediation, but a shift from unilateral measures to negotiations will depend on the cabinet’s position, as well as regional and international conditions.

Three main scenarios are now emerging: the right-wing camp wins enough seats for Netanyahu to form a government again; the opposition bloc wins and forms a cabinet led by Eisenkot or another agreed candidate; or the result is a deadlock that makes a stable government impossible, leading to an extension of the caretaker cabinet’s term or new elections. There is also the risk that Netanyahu will launch a war with Iran: the overthrow of the Iranian regime has already been openly declared as a goal, and reports say Washington thwarted a major Israeli strike planned for October, while Israel’s military leadership disagreed over whether it was necessary and when it should take place. Netanyahu hopes that threats against Iran will give him leverage in government formation even if he loses the election—through an emergency cabinet or by extending the caretaker government’s mandate for several months.

The Syrian government rejects Israel’s policy of justifying aggression on “security grounds” and considers it a violation of Syria’s sovereignty and international law. Damascus has repeatedly demanded that occupation forces withdraw to their positions before December 8, 2024, and that the 1974 disengagement agreement be restored, after Netanyahu unilaterally abandoned it. During his election campaign, Netanyahu presented the occupation of areas entered by the Israeli army as a supposedly necessary measure to protect security and prevent new threats. He also sought to capitalize on events in As-Suwayda in July 2025, releasing a phone conversation with President Ahmed al-Sharaa and claiming that his threats had helped protect the Druze.

A fundamental shift in Israel’s position on Syria is difficult to imagine after the election, though changes in the methods of engagement and negotiations cannot be ruled out, especially if the United States takes a more active role in security initiatives. Syria should therefore not make its policy contingent on the outcome of Israel’s elections or expect Netanyahu’s defeat alone to bring about an automatic settlement. It would be wiser to focus on actions on the ground, prepare for different scenarios, and retain the ability to respond to changing tactics without abandoning core demands.

The most important task for Damascus is to strengthen the domestic front and bridge divisions in Syrian society through legal institutions and open political dialogue that guarantees the participation and rights of all communities and social groups. At the same time, it must firmly defend sovereignty and territorial integrity, reject aggression, and remain flexible in negotiations over implementation mechanisms and security guarantees. This approach will help prevent Syria’s future from becoming hostage to Israel’s election struggle and allow it to act in the interests of lasting domestic consensus.

News Explainers

• What is As-Suwayda, and why did the events there in July 2025 become an argument for Netanyahu during his election campaign? — As-Suwayda is a city and province in southern Syria, with a predominantly Druze population. It is a strategically important area near Damascus and the Golan Heights. In July 2025, clashes broke out between Druze armed groups and Bedouin tribes, followed by the intervention of Syrian security forces and Israeli airstrikes. Netanyahu used these events to portray Israel as the Druze’s protector and an “indispensable” guarantor of security in southern Syria, bolster his image as a strong leader during the Israeli election campaign, and justify Israel’s military presence.
• Who are Syria’s Druze, and why is their situation particularly sensitive for Damascus and Israel? — The Druze are a closed ethno-religious community, a branch of Ismaili Islam, living mainly in As-Suwayda and the Hauran region; they make up a few percent of Syria’s population. Their situation is sensitive for Damascus because of autonomist sentiments, the presence of armed groups, and ties with Druze in Israel and Lebanon. Any conflict could provide a pretext for foreign intervention. For Israel, the Druze are important both as a minority community it regards as “its own” and as a moral argument for operations in Syria, although Syrian Druze are wary of their fate being used as a pretext.
• What is the 1974 disengagement agreement, and what changed along the disengagement line after December 8, 2024? — The Israeli-Syrian Agreement on Disengagement of Forces, signed on May 31, 1974, under U.S. mediation after the Yom Kippur War, established a buffer zone on the Golan Heights, Lines A and B, arms restrictions, and the UNDOF observer mission. After the Assad regime fell on December 8, 2024, Israel declared the agreement effectively void, sent troops into the buffer zone and onto the strategic heights of Mount Hermon, and struck Syrian military sites. The former disengagement line ceased to be observed, and UNDOF’s operations were restricted.
• Who is Ahmed al-Sharaa, and why was his phone conversation with Netanyahu politically significant? — Ahmed al-Sharaa is a Syrian politician and former leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. After the fall of Assad, he became Damascus’s de facto leader and Syria’s interim president. He has sought to present himself as a moderate politician, distancing himself from his radical past. His conversation with Netanyahu was politically significant as a signal of direct contact between Israel and Syria’s new authorities: for Netanyahu, it demonstrated his handling of security; for al-Sharaa, it offered an opportunity to prevent escalation and gain de facto recognition, albeit with the risk of accusations of collusion with Israel.

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Full version: If Netanyahu Disappears: These Four Principles Will Shape Israel’s Approach to Syria

Venezuela and the United States: Deals, Sanctions and Political Scandals

Venezuela is experiencing its strangest political moment in decades: the country is led by interim President Delcy Rodríguez, who took over from Nicolás Maduro after U.S. special forces captured him in Caracas in January 2026, while Washington now openly calls Caracas its “partner” and “friend.” Against this backdrop, opposition leader and Nobel laureate María Corina Machado has unexpectedly returned to the country after ten months in exile, the U.S. Embassy has resumed full operations in Caracas, and Venezuelan oil has become the main subject of negotiations. Local commentators are not debating whether the United States is intervening, but what exactly it is building in Venezuela—a transition to democracy or a new protectorate.

Machado’s return and the question of who gets the credit

The weekend’s biggest surprise was María Corina Machado’s return. After seven unsuccessful attempts to enter the country, she announced on social media platform X, “I’m here. With you” (“Estoy aquí. Con ustedes”), and appeared at a church in Lara state, Despacho 505 reports. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio immediately declared that her safe return was a “direct result” of Washington-backed reconciliation talks, which had already led to the release of hundreds of political prisoners and the return of opposition figures from exile. Dinora Figuera, head of the opposition delegation at the talks, echoed that account, saying Machado’s return “in freedom” demonstrated the “strength” of dialogue.

However, when journalists told Donald Trump about Machado’s return, he first replied, “I don’t know anything about it,” then added only: “She’s a very nice woman. She gave me her Nobel Prize, so how can I say anything else? I hope she’s safe. But we’re doing very well in Venezuela,” La Nación reports. Local analysts read the “but” as an admission that Washington is not changing course on Rodríguez. In an interview on Fox News, Trump explicitly declared that the United States had “total control over Venezuela” and was getting “millions of barrels of oil a week.” El Mundo describes Trump’s language toward Caracas as “colonial, almost colonial,” and Rubio himself as something like “the viceroy of Venezuela.”

The oil deal and its lack of transparency

The economic centerpiece of the story is an August hydrocarbons agreement: the United States gets access to roughly a quarter of Venezuela’s oil reserves, while 17 oil fields have been handed over to Blue Energy Partners, a company linked to businessman Alejandro Betancourt, who has been suspected of money laundering in several countries (though no charges have been brought against him). Rodríguez and U.S. Chargé d’Affaires John Barrett made a show of inspecting production in Zulia state, where, she said, output stands at 115,000 barrels a day, with a target of 120,000 by December, Infobae reports. Rodríguez stresses that the revenue will go toward “salaries, hospitals, schools, and public services.”

Critics see things differently. Harvard economist Ricardo Hausmann has called the emerging relationship “a coalition of two kleptocracies,” while El Nacional columnist David Uzcátegui writes of an “imperial trust” and predicts that after Republicans lose the House in the midterm elections, congressional committees will gain the power to demand contracts and subpoena witnesses under oath. Analyst Hans Blumenthal, writing in Cambio Colombia, sums up Washington’s dilemma: it is easier to do oil business with “the vice president of a deposed dictator who depends on Trump,” but major investment will come only with legitimate government and the rule of law.

“Three phases” with no election date

The formal framework for U.S.-Venezuelan relations is Rubio’s “three-phase plan”: stabilization, economic recovery and reconciliation, followed by elections. In a video address, Barrett described the goal as “clear”: to reach the third phase and hold “free and fair elections,” while also stabilizing the energy system and health care, La Tercera reports. Vietnam’s VietnamPlus describes the full return of embassy personnel to Caracas, including a Marine security detachment, as part of the same plan, launched after the January operation in which more than a hundred people were killed.

But there is no election date, and this is where opinions diverge most sharply. In Caracas, Figuera spoke of “steady progress” while avoiding a timeline; Trump said in September that the country was “not ready yet”; Machado is demanding elections before July 2027 and has coined the slogan “The election date is the date of liberation” (“La fecha de las elecciones es la fecha de la liberación”). The third round of dialogue, at which Jorge Rodríguez and Figuera shook hands, went ahead without Machado, La Tercera notes: the opposition’s most popular figure was left out of the room where her political future is being decided.

Chavismo’s rewritten anti-imperialism

Perhaps the most surprising development at home is the near-total disappearance of anti-American rhetoric from the government. CNN Brasil notes that as recently as January 2, Chavismo called itself anti-imperialist. Now Rodríguez did not use the UN podium to condemn Washington—unlike all her predecessors, including Hugo Chávez, who called George Bush “the devil.” Instead, she spoke of “Venezuela’s revival” and a transition “to full democracy.” The government did not even respond to new U.S. prosecutors’ accusations, brought in October, that Maduro and Cilia Flores organized torture; their trial is scheduled for June 2027. Details are reported by The Worker, a left-wing publication that frames events as imperialist aggression. It is also telling that neither the government nor the opposition is criticizing Trump’s hard-line immigration policies, even though before January both Maduro and Machado condemned the deportation of Venezuelans to a Salvadoran prison.

The cost of the deal: the streets and the figures

Behind the façade of a “historic partnership” lies a harsh social reality, highlighted by local and regional analysts. Annual inflation stood at 466% in September, down from 612% in April. The minimum monthly income of $240 consists almost entirely of bonuses, while the legal minimum wage is less than 30 cents a month. According to a survey by Encovi at Andrés Bello Catholic University, 68.5% of households lived below the poverty line in 2025. Against this backdrop, the Venezuelan Observatory of Social Conflict recorded 652 protests in August—288% more than a year earlier—and on October 17, Venezuelans in exile took to the streets in 17 countries with the slogan “Pongan la fecha” (“Set the date”), Cambio Colombia notes. Blumenthal warns that every month without an election date strengthens the current government and eases the pressure on it, but growing impoverishment could lead to what Washington is trying to avoid: an explosion in the streets.

The conclusion of two days of debate over Venezuela is paradoxical: Machado’s return, the full reopening of the U.S. Embassy and oil contracts are being presented as successes, but confidence in them rests solely on Washington’s word. While Trump praises Rodríguez and Rubio praises the negotiations, the key question raised by Venezuelan experts remains unanswered: will citizens ever be given an election date, or will this “transition” remain an open-ended administration of someone else’s oil?

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Venezuela Launches Food Plan as Domestic Production Grows

Venezuelan President Delcy Rodríguez announced the launch of the “Venezuela Feeds” program and said that locally produced goods now account for more than 90% of the country’s food supply. According to her, this level of production has enabled the recovery of 78% of the country’s agro-industrial base.

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Full article: Delcy Rodríguez launches the “Venezuela Feeds” plan after domestic production tops 90%

Latakia Derby: Hittin Win as Fans Need Medical Assistance

The Latakia derby between Hittin and Tishreen was played in the Syrian football league on Friday. Hittin took all three points, beating their traditional rivals 1–0 in a tense, noisy encounter. A video circulating on social media showed Syrian security personnel carrying unconscious fans from the stands and handing them over to ambulance crews.

The match had to be stopped for about five minutes in the second half as thick smoke filled the stands after fans set off fireworks and flares en masse. The incident added to the drama of an already heated derby, but Hittin managed to hold on to their narrow lead and celebrate an important win over Tishreen.

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Full story: Syrian security forces carry injured fans from stands: Behind the scenes of a heated night at the Latakia derby

Venezuela and the United States: Deals, Sanctions and Disputes Over Transition

Over the past two days, Venezuelan public opinion has been gripped by a paradox: on the same day in Caracas, a massive opposition march demands that a date for elections be announced, police detain the march’s sound technicians, and at the negotiating table the government and opposition, with Washington mediating, announce yet more “concrete results” — from a review of repressive laws to the release of Venezuelan gold frozen in London. At the same time, in the oil-producing state of Zulia, acting President Delcy Rodríguez and U.S. chargé d’affaires John Barrett inspect a field producing 115,000 barrels a day — and present it as a showcase for “renewal.” Three issues are shaping the debate.

Disputes Over the Cost and Timing of the Transition

In a statement by its spokesperson, Tommy Pigott, the U.S. State Department welcomed the third round of dialogue, stressing that the process “continues to strengthen democratic institutions, expand political freedoms and lay the foundations for fair, credible and free elections,” according to EFE and Clarín. The achievements cited include a review of the so-called Law Against Hate (Ley contra el Odio), the appointment of 32 new Supreme Court justices, the unblocking of more than 70 websites, and the creation of a parity commission to manage Venezuelan gold held at the Bank of England.

At the closing meeting with National Assembly president and her brother, Jorge Rodríguez, and opposition negotiator Dinorah Figuera, Delcy Rodríguez herself said: “I welcome and recognize the efforts of the parties at this table to move forward on political guarantees for all” (HRT). She placed particular emphasis on the gold: the funds are to go “toward recovery after the earthquakes of June 2026.” The opposition, meanwhile, remains focused on the key issue — a date for presidential elections. According to Swissinfo, Figuera says both sides have the “political will,” but no specific date has emerged after three rounds of talks, and the next round is scheduled for November 11–15. It is telling that disagreements over the substance of the talks have already begun. In an article for CNN en Español, republished by Local News 8, Venezuelan political scientist Alfredo Mesa notes that, unlike in previous years, Rodríguez did not denounce Washington at the UN General Assembly. Instead, she spoke of a “transition to full democracy” under the three-phase plan of Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

The New Label “Repressive Laws” and Disagreements Over Reform

Among Venezuelan lawyers and human rights advocates, the phrase “repressive laws” (leyes represivas) has prompted mixed reactions. Some see a review of the Law Against Hate as a genuine opening for politicians to return from exile; others point out that the same law has been used against protesters and journalists. The official list of achievements, cited by Infobae, also includes “more than 1,000 political prisoners released since the detention of Nicolás Maduro.” The State Department, however, insists: “We continue to call for the immediate release of all political prisoners.”

The gap between that figure and the demand has sparked controversy. In its report “Venezuela, 300 Days Later,” the Spanish think tank Instituto Coordenadas describes what is happening not as a rupture, but as a “supervised and negotiated transition” (transición tutelada y pactada): Washington sets the course, the “pragmatic Chavismo of the Rodríguez siblings” runs the state, and oil serves as a “financial instrument for political change,” reports El Independiente. The institute’s vice president, Jesús Sánchez Lambás, says plainly that it is necessary to “recognize the fifteen key figures in this change,” while acknowledging that they are “controversial, criticized and far from irreproachable.” Critics go further. “The Trump administration is whitewashing the image of those now working at the Republican’s direction, right before everyone’s eyes,” writes a columnist for El Nuevo Herald, referring to the lifting of sanctions on Jorge Rodríguez. “Delcy plays the Wicked Witch of the West, but she doesn’t swing her broom without permission from her current overseers,” he quips — one of the harshest local assessments of the past two days.

The Oil Deal as a Political Argument

Delcy Rodríguez’s visit to the Zulia oil field with U.S. chargé d’affaires John Barrett is the clearest symbol of a new era. “We want to show the country the progress… that we are moving toward action and production,” she said, according to El Periódico de la Energía. Under an August agreement, Washington gains access to a quarter of Venezuela’s oil reserves; countries that until recently called each other enemies now describe themselves as “partners” and “friends.” The same article notes that the United States has eased sanctions in the oil and mining sectors and lifted restrictions on Rodríguez and her brother.

Washington’s approach is further illustrated by the U.S. Treasury Department’s decision to remove Venezuela from the list of “countries of concern” under the COINS Act, on the grounds that, as it put it, the Maduro regime “no longer exists,” according to Descifrado and Poder360. For local economists, this signals that the investment climate is changing faster than the political one. According to Instituto Coordenadas, the IMF forecasts Venezuelan GDP growth of 5% in 2026 and 7% in 2027, while oil production has exceeded 1.2 million barrels a day. Skeptics in Caracas, however, point to inflation and rolling power outages — challenges the same report acknowledges remain unresolved.

The March, the Detentions and the Question of Trust in the Dialogue

The most painful issue is that negotiations and repression coincided on the same day. After the march near Plaza Venezuela, where about 2,000 people gathered, according to AFP, carrying signs reading “Elections NOW” and “MCM, brave” (MCM are the initials of María Corina Machado), the Vente Venezuela party reported that seven people responsible for the sound trucks had been detained. “The Delcy Rodríguez regime, through the Bolivarian National Police, abducted seven people,” it said in a statement quoted by El Nacional. They were later released, but, as Proceso Digital уточняет, “their equipment used during the protest was confiscated.” The opposition coalition PUD said this was “not an isolated incident,” but “a pattern of persecution and intimidation,” and called for the “dismantling of the repressive apparatus.”

The march carries particular weight because it was the largest opposition rally since January, while Machado herself is in exile in Panama. According to Swissinfo, her return has been thwarted at least seven times. “We are a people who have decided to be free… this is only a glimpse of what is to come,” Notimérica quotes her as saying. The contrast between these words and the State Department’s optimism about “political guarantees for all” lies at the heart of Venezuela’s debate over these two days: the authorities in Caracas and Washington talk about results, while the streets ask what price is being paid for them.

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Suwayda Between War and Diplomacy: Jordan’s Concerns and Damascus’s Accusations

Syria’s southern province of Suwayda is once again at the center of concerns. Warnings are being voiced about a possible resumption of clashes, while Damascus accuses Israel of supporting armed groups. For Jordan, which shares a long border with Syria, this is no distant issue: stability in the neighboring country’s south is seen as part of Jordan’s own national security. Amman is therefore working with Damascus and Washington to cement agreements that could keep Suwayda from sliding back into war.

The Jerusalem Post, citing a Syrian government representative, reported that Damascus fears Druze armed groups may attack government forces in the coming days and does not rule out Israeli encouragement or support for such an operation. According to the representative, the concern has been heightened by groups moving near the front lines and Druze figures’ statements about the possible return of several villages. Reports also mention increased Israeli aerial surveillance over Suwayda, Damascus and southern Syria; an Israeli helicopter landing and the transfer of weapons and ammunition; as well as reports of equipment being moved to Jabal al-Druze and possible preparations for an observation and early-warning base. These reports have not been independently confirmed.

Jordan’s King Abdullah II warned of the danger of continuing what he called Israel’s “aggressive course” in southern Syria. Speaking at the UN, he pointed to repeated Israeli incursions and attempts to create new geographic realities, including ones affecting vital water sources. In a phone call with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the king again spoke about the consequences of escalation and stressed that Jordan supports Syria’s efforts to strengthen security, stability and sovereignty.

Jordanian analyst Fahd al-Khaitan believes a new major military confrontation in Suwayda is unlikely at this stage. In his view, any Druze group that chooses to attack Damascus would face a forceful military response and give the Syrian government a pretext to strike the province. The analyst is confident that Jordan will not intervene militarily in Syria’s internal conflict, but will offer Damascus political support and work with US Special Envoy Tom Barrack to prevent a possible escalation. He considers major military scenarios unlikely before Israel’s elections, since the parties’ calculations are tied to Israel’s political climate.

An official Jordanian source told Al Jazeera Net that Amman categorically rejected calls to open a direct border corridor to Suwayda on humanitarian grounds. Jordan believes this would violate Syrian sovereignty and could entrench the province’s separation from the state. An Israeli proposal to use a bypass road through Jordanian territory to deliver aid to groups in Suwayda was also rejected. Amman insists on respect for Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, maintains daily coordination with the Syrian side at the police, military and intelligence levels, and calls the security of its borders a “red line.” Jordan has previously carried out pre-emptive airstrikes against the positions of smugglers and drug traffickers in Syria, particularly in the areas of Suwayda and Daraa.

A Syrian government representative told the SANA news agency that the Druze community of Suwayda has always been, and remains, an integral part of Syria’s national fabric, and firmly rejected its politicization or its being drawn into Israeli propaganda and elections. Damascus accuses Israel of playing a major, calculated role in undermining civil peace in the province last summer. According to the Syrian side, Israel armed an illegal militia to sow chaos and create a pretext for a wider war. Damascus says it foiled this plan, while US mediation helped halt Israeli shelling that had prevented the government from resolving clashes between Druze and Bedouins. Damascus is now advancing a trilateral “road map” for Suwayda’s reintegration with the United States and Jordan, and calling on the international community to pressure Israel to uphold the 1974 Disengagement Agreement and refrain from interfering in Syrian affairs.

Jordanian Interior Minister Mazin al-Faraya confirmed that Jordan cooperates directly with the Syrian side on security matters every day, including combating smuggling and protecting the border. He said Amman handles the Suwayda file through Syria’s official state institutions and does not interfere in its neighbor’s internal affairs. Jordan is nevertheless concerned that a weakening of central authority or a security vacuum could revive smuggling networks and lead to the emergence of armed zones of influence near the border.

Overall, the situation around Suwayda remains fragile and complex: local tensions are intertwined with Israeli actions, Damascus’s interests, Washington’s mediation and Jordan’s concerns. Amman is balancing firm border protection with support for Syrian sovereignty, seeking neither military intervention nor the emergence of enclaves controlled by outside powers along its frontier. The key takeaway for an international audience is clear: de-escalation in southern Syria matters not only to Damascus and the Druze community, but also to regional security, and any new wave of violence could quickly spread beyond a single province.

Background to the News

• Who are the Druze, how do their religious beliefs and communal organization differ from the main branches of Islam in Syria, and why are they concentrated around Jabal al-Druze? — The Druze are an Arabic-speaking esoteric religious community whose faith traces its origins to 11th-century Ismaili Shiism but is considered a separate religion. The Druze do not proselytize, marriages are usually within the community, and only some initiates (“uqqal”) have access to religious teachings. Unlike Sunni and Shia Islam, the Druze have no unified church hierarchy or five pillars of Islam that are obligatory for all in their traditional form. Community life is organized around elders, religious sheikhs and influential families. Their concentration around Jabal al-Druze (Jabal al-Arab) is explained by migrations from Lebanon in the 18th and 19th centuries, the mountainous terrain’s value as a refuge, Ottoman policies and a desire for communal autonomy. Over time, the area became Syria’s main Druze center.

• How have relations between the Druze and Bedouin tribes in southern Syria developed historically, and why can local disputes over land, water or influence in Suwayda quickly escalate into a nationwide crisis? — Relations between the Druze and Bedouin tribes in southern Syria have historically combined coexistence, alliances, trade and patronage with periodic armed conflicts over grazing land, territory, water and control of roads. Ottoman and French “divide and rule” policies often reinforced these tensions. After independence, land reforms, Baathist policies and struggles for influence among clans and tribes added new sources of conflict. Suwayda has become a particularly sensitive flashpoint: it is a Druze center with cross-border ties, close to Jordan and the Golan Heights, and since 2023 has been one of the centers of anti-government protests. As a result, a local dispute can easily become a nationwide crisis if Damascus, tribal networks, Druze religious and political leaders, and outside actors—including Jordan, Israel, Iran, Turkey and Russia—become involved.

• What exactly does the 1974 Disengagement Agreement between Syria and Israel provide for, and what military and monitoring mechanisms did it establish on the Golan Heights? — The 1974 Disengagement Agreement, concluded after the Yom Kippur War, provided for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of Israeli and Syrian forces, an exchange of prisoners and the return of Quneitra to Syrian control. It established a buffer zone between Lines A and B, where only UN forces may be deployed, as well as zones of limitation on both sides, with restrictions on tanks, artillery and other forces. The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) was established to monitor the agreement, with support from military observers and liaison officers. The agreement is not a peace treaty, but a ceasefire and disengagement arrangement.

• Who is Tom Barrack, and what role does he play in US diplomacy on Syria, Jordan and the southern region more broadly? — Tom Barrack is an American financier, founder of Colony Capital, a longtime ally of Donald Trump and chairman of Trump’s 2017 inaugural committee. In 2024, Trump nominated him to serve as US ambassador to Turkey, and the Senate confirmed him. In the context of Syria, Jordan and the region’s south, his role is linked primarily to Turkey as a key player on Syria. He serves as a political channel between Washington and Ankara on Syrian settlement, border security, refugees, the fight against ISIS and countering Iranian influence. This is less a role as a special envoy for Syria than one of diplomatic coordination through Ankara, taking Jordan’s interests and the sensitivity of southern Syria into account.

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Full article: Warnings of escalation in Suwayda: How is Jordan protecting its borders and preventing an explosion?

Venezuela Reports Increase in Oil Production in Zulia State

Venezuelan President Delcy Rodríguez said Zulia State had set a new record, producing 115,000 barrels of oil in a single day. She made the announcement while reviewing energy projects and agreements between Venezuela and the United States. Rodríguez said developing the sector should strengthen the economy and raise workers’ incomes.

The authorities also plan to expand logistics infrastructure: according to the president, the number of vessels is to increase from 100 to 900. At the same time, they plan to create jobs gradually—first in the food sector, followed by hospitality and industry. Héctor Obregón, head of state oil company PDVSA, said Zulia holds 21.5 billion barrels in oil reserves and is home to more than 24 active production projects.

Venezuela also hopes to begin exporting gas from Zulia next year. To that end, it plans to commission fractionation plants in Ule and Bajo Grande to process associated gas and produce liquefied petroleum gas for domestic use and export. The authorities present the expansion of oil and gas production as part of their drive to revive the economy and strengthen the country’s energy independence.

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Full version: President Rodríguez: Venezuela Sets Production Record with More Than 115,000 Barrels of Oil After Agreements with the United States

Istanbul to Host Foreign Ministers from Seven Countries to Discuss Wars and Trade Routes

On Friday, Istanbul will host the first meeting of the foreign ministers of Türkiye, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, France and Germany. The meeting was initiated by Ankara and will be chaired by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. Talks will take place in a new “R4+E3” format, bringing together four regional countries and three leading European powers.

“R4” is a recently formed group comprising Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Egypt; the first three countries signed the “Mecca Defense Agreement.” The format is intended to support lasting stability and dialogue on regional issues. “E3” refers to the United Kingdom, France and Germany, a grouping established about 20 years ago to coordinate diplomatic efforts on Iran’s nuclear program. This will be the first meeting in this configuration.

According to a source at Türkiye’s Foreign Ministry, Fidan will voice concern over the risk of the war between the United States, Israel and Iran spreading. He will also support Saudi Arabia’s security in the face of Houthi attacks and stress the vital importance of restoring and permanently ensuring freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. In addition, Ankara will reiterate its warnings and proposals aimed at preventing the Russia-Ukraine war from spreading to the Black Sea and ending civilian deaths.

Participants are expected to call on the international community to increase pressure on Israel over the expansion of settlements and settler violence, and to take a firm stance against illegal settlements in Palestinian territories. Another goal is to step up diplomacy to find practical solutions that reduce the threat to shipping routes and regional security posed by the wars in Yemen, Iran and Ukraine.

The meeting is taking place amid uncertainty over the conflict with Iran: US strikes have been suspended, but political tensions between Washington and Tehran have reached a peak, as have mutual threats. US media outlets, including CBS, have reported plans to resume joint Israeli-US strikes on Iran after the US midterm elections. According to leaks, targets could include petrochemical facilities important to the oil sector and nuclear sites, but not civilian infrastructure such as power plants.

The meeting’s significance reflects the political weight of its participants and Türkiye’s aim to strengthen its regional position amid the growth of its defense industry, the strength of its military and the signing of the “Mecca Defense Agreement.” Germany, France and the United Kingdom also have their own interest in reducing the impact of regional instability on energy supplies. Ankara previously proposed an agreement to halt attacks on commercial vessels in the Black Sea, but the initiative failed and drone attacks intensified. NATO recently announced the deployment of patrol aircraft, radars, drones and intelligence personnel in the region.

Comments on the News

• Why are the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait considered critical chokepoints for shipping and energy supplies, and what mechanisms could ensure freedom of navigation there without expanding the military presence? — They are narrow “bottlenecks”: a significant share of seaborne oil and LNG exports from the Persian Gulf passes through Hormuz, while Bab el-Mandeb links the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the route through the Suez Canal. Alternative routes are longer and more expensive, so disruptions quickly drive up insurance premiums, freight costs and energy prices. Freedom of navigation could be supported without a greater military presence through full compliance with the UNCLOS transit-passage regime; diplomatic de-escalation and an end to attacks on vessels; regional hotlines between navies and coast guards; maritime-domain data sharing and satellite monitoring; agreements on incident investigations and neutral arbitration; use of existing coalition forces and convoys without establishing new bases; development of alternative pipelines and logistics routes; and measures to reduce insurance risks.

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Full version: Meeting of foreign ministers from 7 countries in Istanbul: What do we know about it?

Venezuela and the United States: Deals, Sanctions and Election Disputes

The main development of the past two days was the conclusion of a third round of talks between the interim government of Delcy Rodríguez and the opposition faction led by Dinorah Figuera, which is backed by Washington. Almost simultaneously, the State Department publicly praised the agreements reached, while the U.S. Treasury Department removed Venezuela from its list of countries that pose risks to American investment. Against this backdrop, the country saw its largest opposition rally in nearly two years, with protesters demanding that a date be set for presidential elections and that María Corina Machado be allowed to return. It is this combination of rapprochement with Washington and a domestic dispute over who will choose the country’s leadership—and when—that now defines Venezuela’s political agenda.

Dispute Over the Election Date

The most striking divide in the local debate is not between Caracas and Washington, but within the opposition itself and between the opposition and the streets. State Department spokesperson Tommy Pigott said the process “continues to strengthen democratic institutions, expand political freedoms and lay the foundations for free, fair and credible elections” (EFE). Yet no concrete electoral agreement was reached in any of the three rounds, a fact acknowledged by both sides.

Notably, Dinorah Figuera, head of the opposition delegation and a key partner in Washington’s eyes, herself played down expectations. She said presidential elections could take place “late next year or in early 2028,” since they depend on reforming the National Electoral Council—a matter that will only be discussed after the Supreme Court is reformed (La Jornada). This caution contrasts sharply with Machado’s camp, which is demanding elections before July 2027. Her party, Vente Venezuela, has proposed a specific date: July 24, 2027, the birthday of Simón Bolívar (El Espectador).

It was precisely this divide that brought people onto the streets. Around 2,000 people gathered near Plaza Venezuela in Caracas, carrying signs that read “Elections now—and this time they won’t steal them from us” and “Courage, MCM” (La Nación). “We demand presidential elections, a schedule now; we’re not going to wait until 2028,” María Débora Marín, a clothing store owner from Valencia, told La Nación. Vente Venezuela activist Carlos Fernández vowed to “vote Delcy Rodríguez out”: “Delcy, pack your bags, because in 2027 you’re leaving” (swissinfo).

Repression, Seen Differently by Each Side

In Venezuela, political prisoners have become a battleground between official statistics and human rights groups. The State Department is calling for the “immediate release of all political prisoners” and notes that more than 1,000 people have been released since Nicolás Maduro was detained in January (EFE). Human rights organization Foro Penal, however, continues to count more than 320 political prisoners in the country, despite an amnesty backed by parliament (LaRepublica.co). The government consistently denies that there are political prisoners and describes the amnesty as generous.

An incident on the day of the march made the dispute even more contentious: Vente Venezuela reported that seven demonstrators had been detained by officers of the Bolivarian National Police and that their whereabouts were unknown (swissinfo). This undermines the official claim that the protest took place “peacefully” and without repression—and helps explain why the opposition does not trust promises of “political guarantees.”

Sanctions Are Being Lifted—but Not All of Them

The economic track is moving faster than the political one. The U.S. Treasury Department has proposed new rules under the COINS Act (Comprehensive Outbound Investment National Security Act), which initially expanded oversight of foreign investment from China to Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia and Venezuela “under the Nicolás Maduro regime.” Venezuela has now been removed from that list: Treasury’s position is that the Maduro regime “no longer exists” and that Delcy Rodríguez’s government does not meet the previous definition (Infobae).

Venezuelan commentators see this in two ways. El Estímulo describes Treasury’s caveat that restrictions could “later” apply to specific sectors as “a kind of letter that remains in the economic relationship between the two countries”—in other words, Washington is keeping leverage in reserve (El Estímulo). It is telling that Jorge Rodríguez, the interim president’s brother and head of the National Assembly, has also been removed from the OFAC sanctions list, as was Delcy Rodríguez earlier. Both had been on the list since September 2018. As the Turkish think tank ANKASAM observes, Washington “has been negotiating with the very people it had previously subjected to political and economic pressure,” showing that sanctions are not just a punitive tool, but also a bargaining chip (ANKASAM).

Oil in Exchange for Unfreezing Assets

The Venezuelan side frames the substance of the deal primarily in terms of energy. Delcy Rodríguez says the country expects to attract around $76 billion in oil investment over the next five years. Bilateral agreements with the United States involve 17 oil fields and the deployment of 250 drilling rigs. Carlos Ron, Venezuela’s former deputy foreign minister for North American affairs, explained Caracas’s thinking in an interview with the Chinese publication The Paper: resuming contact with Washington is both a real necessity for the oil industry and a way to “avoid military confrontation and preserve domestic peace” (The Paper). At the same time, he stressed that the United States has always viewed Latin America as its sphere of influence, and that Trump is simply “prepared to use force on an unprecedented scale.”

The divide here is fundamental: Washington and analysts close to it speak of “energy diplomacy” accelerating rapprochement, while Venezuelan critics point to the risk of long-term dependence and unresolved questions over revenue distribution and state control of natural resources (ANKASAM). For Caracas, unfreezing assets is also a matter of survival. The sides have agreed to establish a joint commission to manage Venezuelan gold held at the Bank of England, with the funds to be used to help people affected by the two earthquakes on June 24 and to restore public services (AVN).

What Washington Itself Acknowledges

One detail picked up by Venezuelan and Latin American news outlets is that the State Department lists not only reform of the Supreme Court—the selection of 32 new judges—and the unblocking of more than 70 websites among the achievements, but also a review of the Anti-Hate Law, which has been used for years in Venezuela to prosecute critics (EFE). Official Caracas presents this as “progress in governance.” After meeting with Figuera and Jorge Rodríguez at Miraflores Palace, Delcy Rodríguez said she “welcomes and recognizes the efforts made by the parties at the negotiating table to advance political guarantees for all” (HRT).

But this picture comes at a cost, local critics say: María Corina Machado, the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize laureate, is not taking part in the talks and has been unable to return to her homeland from exile in Panama at least seven times. Her supporters believe Washington’s deal with the “heirs of Chavismo” effectively keeps in power people who were until recently described as part of a repressive system. As 18-year-old school graduate and protester Rayeska Puezme put it: “The United States got rid of one big problem—Maduro—but everything else remains… I feel that everything will change, but I don’t see when” (La Nación). This sense of being “in limbo”—rather than the dispute over sanctions lists—is the central tension in Venezuela’s current debate about the United States.

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Jordan Backs Syria’s Sovereignty and Condemns Israeli Strikes

King Abdullah II of Jordan reaffirmed that Amman rejects Israeli attacks on Syrian territory and expressed support for Damascus’s efforts to ensure security, stability and sovereignty. He made the remarks at a meeting with Syria’s foreign minister and minister for expatriates, Asaad al-Shaibani, where the two sides also discussed strengthening bilateral ties and expanding cooperation in energy, transport, trade and investment.

The talks also covered regional developments, including the situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Jordan and Syria stressed the need to step up efforts to ease tensions and safeguard the security and sovereignty of Arab states. Al-Shaibani, in turn, said Damascus would not accept Israeli attacks in southern Syria and warned that they posed a threat to stability across the region.

The Syrian minister also condemned the death of a young man with a disability in the village of Jamla, in Daraa province in southern Syria, following the entry of Israeli forces. In Aqaba, he discussed the development of bilateral relations with Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi and preparations for the third meeting of the Jordanian-Syrian Higher Coordination Council, scheduled to take place in Damascus on November 8–9. The ministers agreed to continue work on strategic projects in food security, energy, water resources and transport, as well as other priority initiatives that can be implemented.

In a joint statement published on Thursday, the governments of Jordan and Syria again condemned repeated Israeli attacks and incursions into Syrian territory and called for them to stop. The ministers also expressed full solidarity with Saudi Arabia and support for measures to protect its security, stability and sovereignty, as well as the safety of its citizens and residents. They also condemned Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia, including strikes on civilian and economic facilities, calling them a violation of international law and an assault on the kingdom’s sovereignty and security.

News Q&A

• What is the Jordanian-Syrian Higher Coordination Council, and which strategic energy, water and transport projects is it expected to agree on at its meeting in Damascus? — It is a bilateral political and economic mechanism established by Jordan and Syria to coordinate trade, border security, energy, water resources and transport following the change of power in Damascus. At the meeting in Damascus, the sides are expected to agree on an electricity interconnection and supplies of electricity from Jordan to Syria, use of gas infrastructure, projects in the Yarmouk River basin and joint water management, as well as opening and upgrading the Nasib/Jaber border crossings, the Amman-Damascus highway and rail and logistics routes.
• Why are the village of Jamla in Daraa province and the presence of Israeli forces in southern Syria considered especially sensitive for the security of Syria and Jordan? — Jamla is in southern Daraa province, near the Golan Heights and the Jordanian border. Any Israeli raid or presence there is therefore seen as a violation of Syria’s sovereignty and the 1974 disengagement agreement, and risks triggering escalation with local armed groups, population displacement and increased smuggling. This is especially sensitive for Jordan because instability and Israeli operations near its border threaten border security, could trigger an influx of refugees and undermine coordination in southern Syria.

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Full article: Jordan and Syria reaffirm rejection of Israeli attacks and discuss strengthening cooperation

Venezuela’s wage growth should be tied to state-owned enterprise reform

The average monthly income of workers in Venezuela’s private sector is about $500, while public-sector employees earn roughly $300, including bonuses, according to a study by Datanálisis. Wages need to rise, but financing an increase through unbacked money creation—as happened in August 2022—could trigger currency devaluation and accelerate inflation. The article’s author argues that wage growth should therefore be supported by increased output and productivity, or by actual government revenue.

One potential source of funding is the reorganization of state-owned companies. The proposal is to bring in private capital and hand management over to private partners to boost output, competitiveness and exports. According to the organization Transparency Venezuela, the country had 914 state-owned enterprises in 2022. The 2025 budget puts their combined workforce at around 500,000, with annual losses of $8–12 billion. The article links their operations to budget deficits and money creation, which began in part to finance PDVSA, the state oil company.

The proposal is to group enterprises according to their political sensitivity. In less sensitive sectors, including agriculture, manufacturing and regional transport, private investors could be offered at least 80% of shares; in regional electricity and mining, 45–79%; and in PDVSA, national electricity and state-owned banks, 20–45%. The author says sales should follow an international audit and be conducted through open auctions or debt-for-equity swaps, with shares set aside for employees and a stock-market listing. Revenue from the reform, estimated at $5–10 billion over three years, could help gradually raise wages by 300–500%, provided production and commercial targets are met. Rather than framing this as a debate over privatization versus state ownership, the author proposes calling the pragmatic approach “productive recovery.” Sustainable growth would also require labor-law reform and agreements that encourage private investment, diversification of production and exports.

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Full version: How can some public employees’ salaries continue to rise without “failing in the attempt”?

Israel and Syria: Why an Open War Could Become a Trap

Israeli leaders repeatedly point out that their positions on Mount Hermon are about 35 kilometers from Damascus. This is more than a military detail; it is a political signal: Israel is demonstrating its ability to threaten any target on Syrian territory. Benjamin Netanyahu, in effect, regards Syria after the fall of the Assad regime not as a potential front, but as an active one. Israel is also seeking to preserve sources of instability in the country, backing armed groups in Suwayda and, since the change of power in Damascus, has repeatedly carried out strikes and operations to show that it can intervene at any moment.

If Netanyahu really pushes the Syrians into a situation where war becomes inevitable, a decision to go to war will not necessarily deter Syria. It is more likely to lead to open conflict whose beginning is clear, but whose course and outcome are difficult to predict. The key question then will not be how much damage Israel can inflict on Syria, but what it can do and control after the war. In this context, comparison with Assad is useful not because of his military might: he was the actual ruler of an authoritarian system, able for decades to harm Syrians and subjugate their will by relying on the army, intelligence services, militias, hundreds of thousands of security personnel, and millions of supporters. And yet, after 14 years of open war, he could not impose his political will on them.

Israel has an advantage over many countries in air power, intelligence, and technology, but the nature of its power is different: it strikes from the air and returns to its bases. This gives it exceptional capacity to destroy, but not to control the political and social environment that emerges after the strikes. Even if Israel mobilizes tens of thousands of soldiers for ground combat or carries out targeted killings in the first phase, that will not be enough to confront a society of nearly 30 million people in a war that could last for years. In this respect, Israel is less capable than Assad: its technological superiority can hit targets, but it cannot shape the desired political and social landscape or prevent local and regional forces—including Turkey, which could intervene directly, and cross-border jihadist groups—from filling the vacuum after the collapse of institutions.

So the most such a war can achieve, without control over its political and social consequences, is to “open up space for instability.” If Israel were to succeed in undermining the new Syrian state, would that make the Syrian front safer? This would be one of the biggest gambles imaginable: what guarantee is there that creating chaos will produce manageable chaos? In recent years, Syria has endured a war many called a civil war, but it quickly ceased to be purely Syrian and became an arena that drew in fighters and regional and international powers. If the Syrians’ war against Assad triggered such extensive foreign intervention, it is hard to imagine what would happen in a direct and open confrontation with Israel.

Syria is not an isolated island: in such a war, it would become an open front in the broadest sense. Any Israeli gamble could quickly create an arena that draws in actors beyond Israel’s control. This is where the paradox lies. Israel wants to prevent a new security threat from emerging on its borders, but by weakening the Syrian state, it could itself create conditions in which such a threat becomes more likely and takes shape faster. If Israel believes that weakening the new Syria is the shortest path to security, it may discover too late that the greatest danger to it could come after the state has been weakened.

This does not mean that a weak Syrian state would benefit Syrians. On the contrary, it is vital for them to avoid being drawn into an unequal war without preparation, because such a conflict—even if Israel fails to achieve its aims—would deprive Syria of the chance to recover and only prolong its tragedy. In other words, Israel’s bet on force and managed chaos could turn into a trap: destruction is easier than controlling the consequences, and the cost of instability will fall primarily on Syrians themselves.

News Background

• What is Suwayda, and why is this southern Syrian region considered especially vulnerable to local armed groups and foreign intervention? — Suwayda (As-Suwayda) is a governorate in southern Syria with a predominantly Druze population. Its vulnerability stems from its peripheral location, weak state institutions, the proliferation of weapons, smuggling, the presence of local Druze armed groups and clan networks, and intervention by Damascus, Iran and Hezbollah, Israel, and Jordan. Protests and local armed groups have grown stronger there since 2023, making the region susceptible to rapid escalation.
• Why is Mount Hermon strategically important in the Israeli-Syrian confrontation, and how is its status linked to disengagement zones and armistice lines? — Hermon (Jabal al-Sheikh) is a mountain range that commands approaches to the Golan Heights, Damascus, the Beqaa Valley, and Galilee. It provides observation, early warning, air-defense and electronic-warfare capabilities, and control over water resources. After 1967, Israel occupied part of the Golan Heights and the western and southern slopes of Hermon. The 1974 Disengagement Agreement established the UNDOF buffer zone, Lines A and B, and areas of armaments limitation. Any dispute over Hermon is therefore seen as a question of changing the armistice lines and the strategic balance.
• Which cross-border jihadist groups operate in Syria, and why are its borders so porous that a local conflict can quickly become regional? — The main groups operating in Syria include Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham in Idlib; Hurras al-Din, linked to al-Qaeda; Islamic State cells in the Badia and near the Iraqi border; and foreign formations such as the Turkistan Islamic Party and Katibat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad. Remnants of pro-regime and smuggling networks also remain in the south, near the borders with Jordan and the Golan Heights. The borders are porous because of the desert terrain, long and weakly controlled frontiers, smuggling, tribal networks, numerous armed proxies, and rivalry among outside powers—Iran, Israel, Turkey, the United States, Jordan, and Russia—which causes local clashes to internationalize quickly.

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Full version: Netanyahu’s threats to Damascus: Will weakening Syria protect Israel’s security?

Venezuela and the United States: Oil Deals, Sanctions and Disputes Over the Transition

After U.S. special forces seized Nicolás Maduro in January, Caracas and Washington went in a matter of months from sanctions confrontation to an oil partnership that Venezuelan and Latin American commentators are already calling a “protectorate.” Over the past two days, local media have focused on three flashpoints: an oil deal with a controversial business partner, the lifting of sanctions on the Rodríguez siblings, and the question of who will allow the country to hold elections, and when—María Corina Machado or the interim administration of Delcy Rodríguez.

The Oil Deal and the Question of Sovereignty

The main source of friction is an 18-page oil contract which, according to an investigation by ProPublica, gives the U.S. side the right to buy 20% of the output of North American Blue Energy Partners (NABEP, a company owned by Venezuelan businessman Alejandro Betancourt) at $30 a barrel, with priority access to the remaining output for 50 years—and, in the event of a “declared national emergency,” to the company’s entire production. As El Universal notes, the document contains no binding provision requiring payment to the Venezuelan state of the promised $200 billion in taxes and royalties, and disputes are to be settled under U.S. law in a federal court in Texas. The parent company is registered in Barbados, where the law protects owners’ anonymity, and the Venezuelan government has no representation at all on its board.

The Italian Institute of International Affairs (IAI) goes further in its analysis, “The Hidden Costs of the Oil Deal”: since 1829, when Simón Bolívar issued a decree, Venezuela’s subsoil resources have been considered a national asset, and the country is now, the authors argue, returning “to the neocolonial situation of the early 20th century.” Their calculations suggest that control over 65 billion barrels would bring the United States’ accessible reserves to more than 100 billion barrels—a 140% increase. Tellingly, IAI observes, the deal has not been backed by a single political faction—either within Chavismo or in the opposition—apart from government spokespeople. Francisco Monaldi, an oil market analyst at Rice University, puts the practical implications this way in The Atlantic: the new hydrocarbons law lets the oil ministry “give you the best deal in Latin America—or the worst,” and then revise the terms. “Oil companies aren’t charities; they’re not nuns. But they understand when they’re doing something that will cause them problems later,” the magazine quotes him as saying.

Dispute Over Sanctions and the “Whitewashing” of the Rodríguez Family

The second story is the effective lifting of sanctions on the Rodríguez siblings. On October 14, Washington removed restrictions on National Assembly President Jorge Rodríguez, who had been placed on the list in 2018 as part of Maduro’s “inner circle.” The Turkish think tank ANKASAM interprets this in its analysis as a shift in policy tools—from pressure to engagement. At the same time, the U.S. Treasury removed Venezuela from the list of countries subject to investment restrictions, explaining that “the Nicolás Maduro regime no longer exists,” and that Delcy Rodríguez, recognized on March 5, 2026, as the country’s interim head of state, does not fall under that legal definition (El Cooperante, Finanzas Digital). The department nevertheless warned that some transactions involving Venezuelan entities may still be subject to controls.

In an editorial titled “Trumpism Whitewashes the Rodríguez Siblings”, Nicaragua’s La Prensa calls this a “reward” for people whose heads were being demanded just recently: “There is little point in demanding justice against her and her brother if the world’s leading power not only recognizes them, but rewards them.” The editorial also makes a key point in the local debate: Machado, the Nobel Peace Prize laureate, has become “persona non grata” to the Trump administration, while Delcy is preparing to attend the Ibero-American Summit in Madrid on November 3–4.

Debate Over Elections and Maduro’s Role

The third flashpoint is the pace of the “transition.” The State Department announced that the third round of talks between the interim government and part of the opposition—delegations led by Jorge Rodríguez and former lawmaker Dinorah Figuera—had produced “concrete results,” including an agreement to review “several repressive laws” (La Nación). But when CNN asked a senior U.S. official in Caracas about Machado’s proposed date of July 24, 2027, he said: “The timetable needs to be measured; we are not setting hard dates… all of this is possible thanks to January 3” (CNN en Español). Against this backdrop, Machado urged Venezuelans to take to the streets on October 22 to demand an election date and the release of political prisoners. Rodrigo Diamanti, an activist with Un Mundo Sin Mordaza, notes that according to human rights groups, more than 324 people remain in prison for political reasons (Martí Noticias).

In a column for El Nacional, Venezuelan journalist Benjamín Tripier puts forward a thought that may surprise outside observers: “The problem isn’t that the United States intervened… the problem is that after removing the symbol, Washington seems to have allied itself with the functional rabble of the Bolivarian Revolution.” “Chavismo 3.0 has already turned the page on Maduro” and, through Delcy, is bargaining not over democracy but over “what it is willing to give up and in exchange for what.” Phil Gunson, an analyst at the International Crisis Group, observes in a BBC report that Maduro’s presence is being deliberately “erased”: in January, Delcy mentioned him in speeches up to 86 times; by April, that figure had fallen to eight. And the government has made no public response to new U.S. allegations that Maduro and Cilia Flores were involved in torture. Meanwhile, Spain’s El Correo reports that Washington has gained access to the archives of Venezuela’s intelligence service, Sebin, which are being used to vet visa applications. The newspaper links this to efforts by Diosdado Cabello, who is wanted with a $25 million reward on his head, to improve his standing with U.S. justice authorities.

The common thread in Venezuelan commentary is concern not so much about U.S. intervention itself as about its cost: oil, intelligence archives and the absence of an election date have all ended up in the same deal. Local experts and the opposition see it as an exchange of sovereignty for the interim government’s survival; Washington calls it “stability.”

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Caracas Says It Controls Revenue From Oil Sales

Jorge Rodríguez, president of Venezuela’s National Assembly and a government representative in negotiations, said the country has full control over the funds received from oil sales abroad. He also noted that Venezuela is now engaged in important cooperation with the United States. Rodríguez called the energy agreement unprecedented and, in his view, the largest oil deal in the past 100 years. He said it should benefit the people and governments of both countries, as well as Venezuela’s economy and the U.S. market.

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Full article: Jorge Rodríguez says Venezuela controls the sale of its oil

Chants of al-Sarout’s name spark controversy in Syrian basketball

A Syrian Basketball League match between Al-Karama and Al-Wahda ended in controversy after some fans chanted the name of Abdul Basit al-Sarout, one of the symbols of the Syrian revolution, who was killed in 2019. The chants sparked heated debate, and both clubs’ administrations issued statements in response.

In an official statement, Al-Karama’s management condemned insults and profanity directed at al-Sarout by a small group of Al-Wahda fans. The club stressed that those who died for Syria’s freedom and dignity deserve respect, and that sporting rivalries do not justify attacks on national symbols. Al-Karama called on the Ministry of Sports and Youth, the Syrian Basketball Federation and the relevant authorities to urgently investigate the incident, identify those responsible and take measures to deter similar behavior, describing the dignity of the dead as a “red line.”

Al-Wahda’s board said the tension had been caused by chants from both sets of fans. It called for compliance with organizational and security instructions and a review of how fans are admitted to the stands. Addressing the dispute over references to al-Sarout, the club said they had been intended as a tribute and contained no insults or attempt to diminish his standing. Al-Wahda stressed that al-Sarout is held in high regard by many Syrians, and that his sacrifice—and those of all who died—matters more than any match or sporting dispute. The club also urged people not to circulate excerpts stripped of context or interpret them as incitement to hatred, noting that Al-Karama and Al-Wahda fans are “family and brothers,” and that what unites Damascus and Homs is more important than any chant or result.

The Syrian Basketball Federation categorically rejected any behavior contrary to the spirit of sport and the principles of fair competition, or that offends national symbols and the dignity of the dead. It announced the formation of an independent committee to investigate all the circumstances surrounding the Al-Wahda–Al-Karama match, and stressed that respect for the dead and national symbols is a “red line that must not be ignored.”

Comments on the story

• Who was Abdul Basit al-Sarout before and during the Syrian revolution, and why does he remain such a divisive figure that mentioning his name at a sporting event prompts official statements from clubs and the federation? — Before the revolution, he was a football goalkeeper, playing, among other teams, for Homs-based Al-Karama. During the Syrian revolution, he became known as a protest participant and performer of revolutionary songs, and later as a commander of rebel groups. He was killed in Idlib in 2019. His legacy is divisive because some Syrians see him as a symbol of revolution and resistance, while others regard him as a rebel and a figure from the armed opposition. As a result, mentioning his name in a stadium is perceived as a political gesture, and clubs and the federation issue statements to distance themselves from politicization and ease tensions.

• How do the historic rivalry and the different roles of Damascus and Homs in the Syrian conflict affect relations between Al-Karama and Al-Wahda fans, and why does the club’s statement stress what “unites Damascus and Homs”? — Al-Karama is associated with Homs, which became one of the early centers of protest and endured a harsh siege, while Al-Wahda represents Damascus, which remained a stronghold of the government. This can give the stands different political and emotional connotations, while the clubs’ historic rivalry overlaps with memories of the conflict. By saying that what “unites Damascus and Homs” matters, the club is emphasizing national unity, easing political tensions and preventing the match from becoming a venue for confrontation.

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Full version: Al-Sarout chants rock Syrian basketball: accusations of insults and an independent investigation

Venezuela and the United States: Deals, Sanctions and Transition Disputes

Venezuela is experiencing its strangest political moment in decades: Nicolás Maduro has been overthrown in a U.S. military operation and is awaiting trial in New York; interim President Delcy Rodríguez is in power; Washington has reopened its embassy in Caracas while simultaneously rewriting the rules governing the country’s oil industry. Over the past two days, local newspapers, columnists and officials have been arguing not over whether Washington was right, but over who is actually running the “transition” and who will receive the oil revenues. Below are the main lines of the debate.

The Dispute over Who Is Leading the Transition

The third round of dialogue between the government and part of the opposition, led by former lawmaker Dinorah Figuera, concluded in Caracas this week, and it has become the focus of the controversy. An anonymous senior U.S. official in Caracas defended the process before journalists, saying that “this process is not about any particular individual, but about a long-term outcome for the Venezuelan people—elections,” and that it is “the best and only process of its kind in 30 years,” as reported by CNN en Español. The official declined to name election dates, citing the need to stabilize the economy and reform the electoral bodies first, and suggested that stability rests on “January 3”—the operation in which Maduro was captured.

The local reaction has been considerably harsher. In El Nacional, columnist Benjamín Tripier writes that the problem is “not Trump,” but that after removing the regime’s symbol, Washington has “apparently allied itself with the functional scum of the Bolivarian Revolution.” He summarizes the creed of the transition’s critics: “cooperation—yes, guardianship—no; investment—yes, opacity—no; stability—yes, postponing democracy—no.” Significantly, even this camp does not deny the intervention itself: Tripier calls it “possibly the best thing that has happened to Venezuela in decades.”

Analyst Daniel Asuaje explains the impasse through game theory in El Universal: a “Nash equilibrium” is impossible because Chavism, the opposition, Washington and oil investors “assess outcomes differently and expect different things from one another.” He points to a paradox: the leader with the greatest support—María Corina Machado, at 52% compared with Rodríguez’s 19% in an AtlasIntel poll—has not been invited to the negotiating table. Trump himself reportedly believes the country is not yet ready for elections; Machado is insisting on a vote on July 24, 2027.

The Oil Deal and Its Hidden Price

The most talked-about local story is ProPublica’s publication of an 18-page oil agreement, covered in detail by El Universal (Colombia). The document, signed by Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, gives the U.S. government a 35% stake in the parent company North American Blue Energy Partners (NABEP), controlled by Venezuelan businessman Alejandro Betancourt. The United States receives the right to purchase 20% of production at $30 per barrel and priority access to the remaining volume for 50 years; if a “national emergency” is declared in Venezuela, it receives the company’s entire output.

The key complaint is that the text contains no legally binding provision requiring payment of the promised $200 billion in taxes and royalties to the Venezuelan state. The parent company’s headquarters are registered in Barbados, disputes are to be resolved under U.S. law in a federal court in Texas, and U.S. citizens hold a majority of seats on the board. For Venezuelan commentators, this means the agreement will be “harder to cancel” for future governments. Speaking to Venezuelan journalist Sergio Novelli, Rubio defended the partner: he said Betancourt has no open cases in the United States, although he is being investigated in Switzerland and Spain on suspicion of money laundering, and that the revenues are monitored by auditor KPMG.

There is also parallel discussion of how exports are being reorganized. According to El Universal, OFAC has barred PDVSA from selling fuel to international vessels, requiring trade to be conducted only through U.S.-approved firms, while the proceeds go not to Venezuela but to accounts controlled by the U.S. Treasury Department. The article also cites the media-criticism organization FAIR, which says Western media “normalize and minimize” U.S. control over Venezuelan oil by presenting it as “business as usual.”

Sanctions, the “Shadow Fleet” and the Indian Route

Washington is tightening and easing the regime at the same time. Energy Secretary Chris Wright said the United States “no longer needs” vessels from the so-called shadow fleet to transport Venezuelan oil, and proposed “moving some ships from the bad-guy fleet to the good-guy fleet,” as reported by El Cooperante. The “shadow fleet” consists of tankers with opaque ownership structures that have transported sanctioned oil. Some of them are being considered for conversion to legal operations, although Energy Aspects warns about the vessels’ age and insurance problems arising from EU and British regulations.

The second direction is the Indian route. In Mumbai, Rubio said India is “ready to refine more Venezuelan oil,” but that there are “sanctions-related obstacles that we will have to address,” reports El Cooperante. He specifically mentioned Reliance Industries and its experience with heavy crude. According to S&P Global, India is expected to receive 13.6 million barrels of Venezuelan oil in October, compared with 10.2 million in May. A report by Descifrado describes this as “adjusting the regulatory framework and OFAC licenses”—in other words, removing restrictions for foreign refiners rather than for Venezuela itself.

The Maduro Case as a Legal Precedent

The third line of debate concerns the fate of the ousted president. Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, pleaded not guilty last week to a new charge of conspiring to use torture; the trial is scheduled for June 2027. As Efecto Cocuyo writes, the United States is prosecuting a head of state for the first time under the 1994 law on torture abroad (Article 2340A), which has been used in only a handful of cases—from Liberian field commanders to the director of a Syrian prison. Attorney Michelle Parádies calls the case “historic” (“un caso histórico” in the original), because the prosecution is based on the claim that Maduro directed and authorized a system of repression, rather than personally carrying out torture.

The local emphasis here is on the international backdrop. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov called Maduro’s capture an “unprecedented Western adventure” showing that the West “can no longer be the main player” in the world, according to Roya News. In Caracas itself, meanwhile, columnist Leopoldo Puchi writes in El Universal, citing the BBC, that the Rodríguez government is “erasing” Maduro’s image and presenting itself as a “new beginning” suitable for relations with Washington.

Protests, Political Prisoners and the Expectations Trap

Finally, the main domestic dispute concerns the price of “stability.” According to Asuaje, 3,495 protests were recorded in the first half of the year—181% more than a year earlier—while income-based poverty fell from 73.2% to 68.5%. The number of political prisoners, according to Foro Penal, fell from 863 to 322, but new arrests continue. The analyst warns of a “Tocqueville paradox”: improvement is distributed unevenly, and this in itself increases conflict. Multidimensional poverty, which includes services, housing and healthcare, remains at 55%.

Republican Mario Díaz-Balart describes what is happening as “progress toward transition” in an interview with Caracol Radio, while acknowledging: “They removed the leader; now you have Delcy and this group of interim terrorists or interim dictators moving toward a transition.” For Venezuelan critics such as Tripier, this is the essence of the dispute: while Washington and some Republicans see a managed transition, local analysts point out that oil contracts, control over revenues and the absence of an election date are entrenching the power of those who inherited the former regime’s apparatus. The parties agree on only one thing: the country has become a laboratory where foreign intervention, a resource deal and the democratic demand converge at a single point—and no one is yet willing to name the outcome.

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Restoring People Is the Foundation of Syria’s National Security

Speaking at the 2026 Global Security Forum in Doha, Syria’s Minister of Emergency and Disaster Management Raed al-Saleh said that the main pillar of national security must be investment in Syrian citizens, protection of their dignity, and their right to live in safety and freedom. According to him, building the state and its institutions begins and ends with restoring people, who are the “compass” guiding the government’s work. The minister stressed that the challenges are compounded by the legacy of decades of authoritarianism and a devastating war: damaged infrastructure, millions of tons of rubble, and extensive mine networks.

According to al-Saleh, the ministry has adopted an action plan along two parallel tracks: strengthening field readiness and responding to everyday and emergency disasters, while also creating the engineering and organizational foundations for a comprehensive national response system and a multisectoral early-warning network. The strategy was supplemented by a detailed study of Syria’s geography and the classification of regions according to environmental risks. On this basis, the number and profiles of centers were determined, with the centers distributed among three operational categories featuring different levels of staffing, training, equipment, and response protocols, so that services can reach every citizen.

The minister paid particular attention to the legacy of the war. The ministry operates around the clock while simultaneously implementing a strategic plan for mine clearance, the removal of remnants of war, and rubble disposal. To this end, the National Center for Mine-Related Affairs was established to oversee strategy, national standards, and the technical and field supervision of organizations and companies. In addition, Presidential Decree No. 59 created a supreme government committee chaired by the minister of emergency situations to restore infrastructure in areas of voluntary return. Priorities include clearing rubble, demining residential and agricultural land, repairing schools, restarting medical facilities, and restoring water, sewage, and electricity networks—all as part of the goal of a “Syria without camps.”

Commenting on rising public expectations and criticism of the pace of the work, al-Saleh called them natural and understandable. He said these demands stem from Syrians’ love for their country and their desire for a rapid recovery after decades of deprivation. He recalled the government’s strong momentum since its formation, its successful management of the operation to deter aggression, and the decisive overthrow of the previous regime in 11 days, as well as the process of lifting sanctions, the eradication of drug trafficking, and preventive measures that spared Syria from the fires that engulfed neighboring countries. In his view, high expectations are the legitimate right of a people who have suffered for a long time. Syrians deserve services that preserve their dignity and uphold justice and equality, while the government nevertheless feels that its efforts remain insufficient given the scale of the sacrifices.

Speaking about international partnerships and sovereignty, the minister explained that Damascus maintains a clear division of responsibilities: the Ministry of Emergency and Disaster Management handles cooperation and partnerships from a technical, technological, and operational perspective, while political frameworks and sovereign decisions remain exclusively under the authority of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Once a political decision has been officially made and its strategic parameters defined, the ministry concludes technical negotiations, establishes working protocols, coordinates implementation, and facilitates the exchange of experience. He also noted a shift from the traditional understanding of security toward “human security,” in which the protection of citizens comes first, so that Syrians feel safe at home, at work, at school, at university, and on the roads.

As part of “disaster diplomacy,” al-Saleh stressed that natural disasters recognize neither geographical nor political borders and remind peoples of their shared fate, helping them overcome divisions. He cited the rapprochement between Turkey and Greece after the February 2023 earthquake, when a Greek humanitarian initiative to send rescuers opened channels for dialogue. According to him, the new Syria seeks to be a source of security and stability and a state that is the first to extend a helping hand. In particular, Damascus sent rescue teams to Venezuela despite the distance and the former regime in Caracas’s previous position toward the Syrian revolution. The minister concluded: “Humanitarian duty must not be politicized.”

Comments on the News

• Who was Raed al-Saleh before his appointment as minister of emergency and disaster management, and is he connected to the Syrian Civil Defence (the “White Helmets”)? — Before his appointment, he headed the Syrian Civil Defence, a volunteer rescue organization known as the “White Helmets.” Yes, he is directly associated with the organization and was one of its key figures.
• What does the goal of a “Syria without camps” mean in the Syrian context, and which camps or informal settlements for displaced people is it intended to close? — This is a government initiative and slogan calling for the gradual closure of camps and makeshift settlements for internally displaced people and their return to their places of permanent residence or to organized housing. It primarily concerns hundreds of informal tent camps and IDP settlements in northwestern Syria, especially in Idlib and the rural areas of Aleppo, as well as makeshift settlements for displaced people in other provinces.
• Which events are meant by the “operation to deter aggression” and the “overthrow of the previous regime in 11 days” that the minister cites as government achievements? — The “operation to deter aggression” refers to the offensive launched by Syrian opposition groups led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham on November 27, 2024. It led to the fall of the Assad regime on December 8, 2024. Thus, “in 11 days” refers to the result of the same operation, not to a separate event.

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Full version: Raed al-Saleh: We employ disaster diplomacy, and Syrians are the pillar of our national security

Citgo Could Earn Up to $8 Billion in 2026

According to Bloomberg News, Citgo Petroleum expects to earn between $7 billion and $8 billion in 2026—approximately $2 billion more than the forecast published in the second quarter. The higher expectations are primarily attributed to expanding refining margins: fuel prices rose faster than the cost of crude oil. Citgo is a Venezuelan oil company registered in the United States that operates three major American refineries; the company itself has not yet officially commented on the forecast. On November 12, it is expected to present its own third-quarter estimates and clarify its earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) for 2026.

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Full version: Citgo Estimates It Will Earn Between $7 Billion and $8 Billion in 2026

Basketball Scandal in Syria Sparks Dispute Over Revolution Symbols

The crisis erupted during a Syrian basketball championship game between Al-Karama of Homs and Al-Wahda of Damascus: an altercation began in the stands before spilling onto social media and the streets. Al-Karama fans began shouting insults at Omar Al-Soma, an Al-Wahda and Syrian national-team footballer whom they consider a supporter of ousted President Bashar al-Assad. In response, some Al-Wahda fans began chanting slogans about Abdel Basit al-Sarout, who was killed in 2019. This sparked anger and debate over whether the chants were insults or an act of remembrance.

Al-Karama’s management condemned the “insults and profanity” allegedly directed by a small group of Al-Wahda fans and stressed that Syrian martyrs deserve to be honored, while sporting rivalry does not justify attacks on symbols. Al-Wahda rejected accusations that its fans had insulted al-Sarout, saying that most of them had been chanting expressions of sympathy and prayers for his soul. The club also called for security arrangements at matches to be reviewed in order to prevent tensions from recurring.

The Syrian Basketball Federation strongly condemned any actions that offend national symbols or the dignity of the dead and established an independent committee to investigate all the circumstances and determine responsibility. Syrian Culture Minister Muhammad Salih intervened in the dispute, calling al-Sarout an “immortal, timeless icon” whose place is among the martyrs and the righteous. He said that respect for the law and the values of the revolution must be upheld in the new Syria. Activist Wael al-Mallah blamed the authorities, which, he said, criminalize glorification of the old regime but do not enforce this in practice, allowing individuals and groups to insult symbols of the revolution.

Journalist Qutayba Yasin, analyzing the videos, drew attention to a confusion in the chants: some Al-Wahda fans began with the word “yarham” (“have mercy”), which Al-Karama supporters mistook for “yal’an” (“curse”). The same fans then clarified through gestures and an explicit chant: “Have mercy on his soul, Sarout.” However, Yasin said that another video shows a small group standing to one side clearly uttering insults. He urged the committee to identify and punish them without blaming the majority, whose chants were intended as remembrance.

The incident sparked a wide public reaction. Angry demonstrations were held in Homs demanding a transparent investigation and punishment for those who insulted the symbols of the revolution. Social media was flooded with tributes to al-Sarout, who was described as a “red line,” part of the Syrian conscience, “the history of the revolution and the memory of the people,” and a symbol of all free protesters. The incident once again placed the name of the “nightingale and guardian of the revolution” at the center of attention—not on the battlefield this time, but in a sports hall—demonstrating Syrians’ acute sensitivity to the issue of revolutionary symbols and the need for clear accountability, respect for the law, and respect for the values of the revolution.

Comments on the News

• Who was Abdel Basit al-Sarout, and why has he become such a sensitive symbol of the Syrian revolution? — Abdel Basit al-Sarout was a Syrian football goalkeeper from Homs who became one of the recognizable figures in the protests in 2011, singing revolutionary songs before later joining the armed opposition. He was killed in 2019. His image is sensitive because, for supporters of the revolution, he is a symbol of peaceful protest that turned into resistance and a “martyr”; for opponents, he was a participant in the armed struggle. As a result, his image, songs, and legacy are perceived as a political choice rather than simply a personal biography.

• How do the political and regional identities of Al-Karama and Al-Wahda differ, and why can their rivalry be perceived as a clash between different political camps? — Al-Karama is associated with Homs, a city that became one of the centers of the protests and intense military operations. As a result, the club and its supporters are often associated with a revolutionary and local identity. Al-Wahda, from Damascus, is closer to the capital’s and state institutions, while its fan base is often perceived as more loyal to the authorities. Their rivalry becomes politicized because, in Syrian stadiums, slogans, banners, and support for a club can be interpreted as expressions of allegiance to one camp or another. At the same time, it would be wrong to reduce all fans to a single political position: the clubs’ identities are regional and diverse.

• What legal and social mechanisms in the “new Syria” determine what counts as an insult to revolutionary symbols and what is permissible remembrance or criticism? — There is still no single, clearly codified law specifically addressing “revolutionary symbols.” In practice, general provisions concerning defamation, incitement to hatred, threats, and “terrorism” apply, along with local courts, committees, revolutionary legitimacy, the authority of martyrs’ families, the media, and social pressure. Remembrance is generally permitted through public mourning ceremonies, art, songs, and memorial events, while criticism is possible as political debate. However, it may be perceived as an insult if it offends the memory of the dead or appears to incite regional or sectarian tensions. The boundary remains disputed and inconsistently applied, depending on local authorities and the context.

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Full version: Between Prayers for Mercy and Insults: Sarout Chants at the Al-Wahda–Al-Karama Match Ignite Syrian Streets

Venezuela and the United States: Oil, Sanctions and Sovereignty Disputes

Venezuelan society is debating an unexpected turn of events: a country that just a year ago called Washington its main threat is now accepting U.S. investment in the oil industry, while acting President Delcy Rodriguez is publicly thanking Donald Trump. Against this backdrop, three disputes are unfolding—over the price of the oil deal, whom Washington is removing from its sanctions lists, and what to do with the memory of Nicolás Maduro.

The Oil Deal and Accusations of “Neo-Colonialism”

On October 17, Rodriguez announced at a forum in Maracaibo that nearly $76 billion would flow into the oil and gas sector over five years. Sixty-one agreements have already been signed and another 44 are under discussion, while production in Zulia has risen from 70,000 to 370,000 barrels per day. As Guancha columnist Jiang Wenzhi writes, this sparked the loudest dispute: the deal touches the sacred Chavista slogan of “oil sovereignty.” Former PDVSA chief Rafael Ramírez called the U.S.-Venezuelan agreement “neo-colonialism,” while former Oil Minister Manuel Quevedo quipped: if everything is going so well, “why isn’t our government announcing it?” In August, left-wing groups took to the streets of Caracas with placards reading “We are neither a colony nor a backyard” and “Yankees, go home.” It is telling that Diosdado Cabello himself—who as recently as late 2025 promised that the United States would not receive “a single drop of oil”—is now reposting government statements in support of the agreement. In the author’s assessment, this is not a split within the government but an ideological rupture between the older generation of Chavistas and those who remain at the helm.

The opposition has also criticized the deal. María Corina Machado said that only a “serious democratic government” could provide investors with stability. Through Venezuelausa, her supporters have warned of the risk of Washington reaching a “corporate peace” with Chavism instead of establishing institutional democracy. Machado also called Alejandro Betancourt, the United States’ new oil partner, “corrupt.” The tone on social media is even more bitter: “When will ordinary people feel it?” and “$76 billion? No, $50”—an allusion to corruption. The deal’s structure also supports the skeptics’ position, as Il Caffè Geopolitico reports: the United States receives a stake in North American Blue Energy Partners, a 100-year concession for 17 fields, the right to purchase 20% of production at market prices, and a preferential right to the remainder, while the state-owned PDVSA is effectively excluded from the arrangement.

Sanctions as a Tool of Political Selection

The second development concerns the targeted lifting of restrictions. On October 14, OFAC removed Jorge Rodriguez—Delcy’s brother and speaker of the National Assembly, who had been under sanctions since 2018—from the SDN list. Earlier, in April, Delcy Rodriguez herself was removed from the list, while measures against the Central Bank and Conviasa were also eased, reports LRT. The Venezuelan publication El Nacional emphasizes that Jorge Rodriguez’s removal does not lift restrictions on Cabello, Tarek William Saab, Vladimir Padrino López, the Maduro family, or entities including PDVSA, Minerven and the Central Bank. In effect, rewards are being given to those who conduct negotiations and change oil legislation, rather than to those who remain on the sidelines.

The “Disappearing” Maduro and Thanks to Trump

The third—and perhaps most unexpected—dispute for outside observers concerns historical memory. As journalist Valentina Gil found for TalCual, in research summarized by BBC Mundo, Rodriguez mentioned Maduro up to 86 times in speeches in January, but only eight times in April—and then only in connection with “his administrative actions.” At the UN General Assembly, she did not mention either Maduro or Chávez even once. Instead, she said: “I want to thank President Trump for his willingness to pursue a path of diplomatic relations and cooperation.” A giant image of Maduro with Cilia Flores is being removed from Caracas, while the slogan “Venezuela renace” (“Venezuela is reborn”) has appeared on the Palace of Justice. Phil Gunson, an analyst with the International Crisis Group, told the BBC: “There is no sense of an intention to actively preserve the memory of Maduro and Cilia Flores… while relations with the United States are always described in positive terms.” Cornell University professor Irina Troconis explains this through the logic of the propaganda machine: the June 24 earthquake became a “highly legible opportunity” to reinvent the image of those in power. At the same time, the Venezuelan government has made no public comment on the new U.S. accusations against Maduro and Flores, including torture allegations—a silence that has itself become a political gesture.

The main dividing line in Venezuela’s debate does not run between those who are “for” or “against” the United States, but between pragmatists in power, for whom American money and the lifting of sanctions are conditions for survival, and old Chavistas and the opposition, for whom the same deal represents a loss of sovereignty and a postponement of elections. For now, it appears, the first side is winning.

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Dollarization Without Sustainable Recovery: Venezuela’s Lesson

An examination of Venezuela’s economic period from 2019 to 2025 shows that de facto dollarization emerged not as the result of an official stabilization program or institutional reform, but as a spontaneous response by the population and private sector to the loss of confidence in the Central Bank and the national currency. After the collapse of oil revenues in 2014, the state’s interventionist model led to a sweeping institutional and monetary crisis, and citizens began using foreign currency as a store of value and for everyday transactions.

At the same time, trade visibly revived in the cities: premium stores, car dealerships, and imported goods appeared. However, this consumer upswing was not accompanied by capital accumulation, a recovery in production, or increased investment. The easing of trade rules and the authorities’ tolerant attitude toward the dollar created space for private importers, but did not represent a full transition to a free market: access to economic activity remained dependent on political restrictions, while the rule of law, judicial independence, and property guarantees were not restored.

The authors therefore regard the revival of trade as merely a temporary and vulnerable form of adaptation, rather than a structural economic recovery. It provided short-term relief for some consumers but did not eliminate the destruction of the productive base or dependence on external shocks. A sustainable exit from the crisis will require deep institutional reforms, protection of property rights, restoration of monetary stability, and a return to predictable rules—informal survival mechanisms cannot replace the institutions needed for long-term growth and broad-based prosperity.

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Full version: On Venezuela’s Economic and Commercial Recovery

“Sufa 53”: Israel Is Reshaping the Buffer Zone in Syria

The “Sufa 53” project, also known as the “Great Storm,” is an Israeli military-engineering project in the countryside of Quneitra in southern Syria. It is being carried out inside the buffer zone established by the 1974 Disengagement Agreement, along the occupied Golan Heights and in the area of operations of UNDOF. Work began in mid-2022 on the outskirts of Hadar and later expanded to the villages of Jabata al-Khashab, Hamidiyah, Qahtaniyah, Ruwaihinah, Bir Ajam, Barika and al-Asha, reaching the southern border triangle.

At the end of 2024, Israel resumed the work at an accelerated pace, taking advantage of the security vacuum following the fall of the Assad regime. Tel Aviv says its actions are motivated by “security considerations” and distrust of Syria’s transitional government, while researchers view the project as an attempt to entrench a unilateral new order on Syrian territory. Against this backdrop, Israel announced the collapse of the 1974 agreement and established control over Syria’s buffer zone, while Damascus insists that the agreement remain in force and demands the withdrawal of Israeli forces.

On October 4, 2026, Israeli forces resumed earthworks under the project near the village of al-Asha in the southern Quneitra countryside. At the same time, raids were reported in the villages of Saida al-Jolan and Abidin in western Daraa. Field observations showed Israeli machinery excavating and building earth embankments. The project includes a road approximately 8 meters wide, embankments up to 5 meters high, as well as observation posts and trenches along the route in the buffer zone near the occupied Golan Heights.

Israeli media describe the road as a first line of defense and attack in the event of a threat from Iran and groups affiliated with it. At the same time, the project’s implementation violates the 1974 Disengagement Agreement. According to the Sijil Center, Israeli forces have advanced 300 to 1,000 meters into the buffer zone and seized extensive agricultural areas. The project is therefore not merely an engineering undertaking, but also an attempt to alter the reality on the ground.

The loss of land has been particularly serious for residents of Jabata al-Khashab. According to sources, approximately 7,000 dunams have been confiscated for the project (one dunam is roughly 0.1 hectares). A local resident, Hassan Saad al-Din Ahmad, said that 16 dunams of his orchard had been taken, while a family close to him lost approximately 2,000 dunams. Ahmad Suleiman, the mayor of Hamidiyah, estimates the damage in the areas of Hamidiyah, al-Hurriyah, al-Rasumah, Abu Shabta and al-Fujayrah at approximately 6,000 dunams. Pastures and wild trees that served as sources of income for local residents have also been destroyed.

The work has also affected the central Quneitra countryside, particularly areas west of Qahtaniyah, Bir Ajam, Barika and Qudna, where Israeli machinery has been operating intermittently. Pastureland has also been damaged, including land belonging to Khaled Hussein al-Nasif west of Bir Ajam. According to Ruwaihinah’s mukhtar, Muhammad al-Ahmad, a significant portion of the land has been lost and access to it has been blocked. The main violations associated with “Sufa 53” are the undermining of the 1974 agreement, incursions into the buffer zone, and the demolition and destruction of vegetation, pastures, fruit trees and wild trees, depriving farmers and herders of their main sources of livelihood.

Comments on the News

• What does the 1974 Disengagement Agreement between Israel and Syria provide for, and what restrictions does it impose on the presence of forces in the buffer zone? — The 1974 agreement was a military agreement on the disengagement of forces after the 1973 war, not a peace treaty. It provided for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of Israeli troops from some of the territories occupied in 1973, including Quneitra, the creation of a demilitarized zone of separation between the parties, and zones limiting forces and weaponry. Oversight was assigned to UNDOF. The presence of Israeli and Syrian armed forces is prohibited in the buffer zone; UNDOF observers and a civilian administration operate there, while restrictions on forces and weapons also apply to adjacent areas. The agreement does not resolve the issue of sovereignty over the Golan Heights.

• What is UNDOF, and what tasks does this UN mission perform in the Golan Heights? — UNDOF, the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, is a UN peacekeeping mission established in 1974 following the disengagement agreement between Israel and Syria. It monitors the ceasefire and the zone of separation, patrols the buffer zone, observes compliance with restrictions on forces and weapons in adjacent areas, investigates violations and maintains communication between the parties.

• Who is a mukhtar in a Syrian village, and what role does he play in local administration and damage assessment? — A mukhtar is a village head or head of the local community—a traditional local leader recognized by the state. He acts as an intermediary between residents and the authorities, assists with civil documents and certificates, coordinates local affairs, and helps the authorities and humanitarian organizations assess damage and needs and distribute aid.

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Full version: Sufa 53: An Israeli project advancing into the Quneitra countryside

Venezuela and the US: Deals, Sanctions and Sovereignty Disputes

Over the past two days, Venezuelan public opinion has focused not so much on the return of US Marines to the embassy in Caracas itself as on the broader context: the country is living under tight American oversight, oil agreements with Washington are expanding, while former President Nicolás Maduro is sitting in a New York prison and has nearly disappeared from official rhetoric. It is at the intersection of these developments—the sell-off of oil rights, Maduro’s disappearance, the lifting of sanctions on government relatives, and the marginalization of the opposition—that the dispute over what is happening to Venezuelan sovereignty is unfolding.

Marines at the Embassy and the “Three-Phase Plan”

The US diplomatic mission announced the reinstatement of a Marine Security Guard detachment after a seven-year hiatus. Marine Corps Commandant General Eric Smith attended the ceremony, while Chargé d’Affaires John Barrett called it “another step toward strengthening relations between the United States and Venezuela and advancing the three-phase plan of President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio,” AFP/Infobae reports. Officially, Caracas regards this as routine protocol, but local critics interpret the symbol differently. In a report from Caracas, Mexico’s La Jornada recalls that the detachment is returning “just nine months after the American military aggression” and calls it “the relocation of the American security apparatus to the heart of the country with the world’s largest oil reserves” (La Jornada). This framing—“protocol” versus “occupation”—sets the tone for the entire discussion.

“Guardianship” over Oil and $76 Billion

The most high-profile economic story is the investment package announced on October 17 for the oil sector, worth nearly $76 billion over five years. It includes agreements with the United States covering 17 fields and 250 drilling rigs; 61 agreements have already been signed. The leading public critic is former Oil Minister and ex-head of PDVSA Rafael Ramírez, who called the US-Venezuelan oil agreements “a new colonialism.” His colleague Manuel Quevedo asks why the agreements are not being announced by the government itself, while left-wing groups have taken to the streets chanting, “Yankees, get out” (The Paper). Alirio Rangel Díaz, a columnist for Diario de Los Andes, goes further: he writes of “guardianship” (tutelaje) under which budget spending is coordinated with the State Department and OFAC, while oil revenues are distributed opaquely—“for the first time in the history of the Republic, we are facing a loss of sovereignty.” Tellingly, government voices are barely heard in this dispute: officials prefer to talk about production in Zulia rising from 70,000 to 370,000 barrels per day rather than about the political cost of the deal.

The Maduro Case: “Prisoner of War” versus Judicial Procedure

While Rodríguez signs oil contracts, the trial of her predecessor continues in New York. On October 15, Maduro and Cilia Flores rejected new charges of complicity in torture, and the trial was postponed until June 2027. That same day, rallies were held in Caracas demanding the release of four “hostages.” Caracas Mayor Meléndez called them “prisoners of war” (prisioneros de guerra), a formulation that, according to commentators, shifts the dispute from criminal law to international humanitarian law (overview). At the same time, BBC Mundo notes that from January to April, references to Maduro in Rodríguez’s speeches fell from 86 to eight, while she has recently been officially referred to simply as “president,” without the qualifier “acting” (BBC Mundo). International Crisis Group analyst Phil Gunson told the BBC: “There is no sense of an intention to preserve the memory of Maduro and Flores,” adding that relations with the United States are discussed in Venezuela “always in positive terms.” Venezuelan political scientist Ángel Lombardi records the same ambiguity in TalCual: most people supported Maduro’s removal because of election fraud, but “a bitter disappointment remains” that the country is now led by someone appointed by Maduro himself.

Sanctions as a Bargaining Chip

Venezuelan analysts link the lifting of financial sanctions on Jorge Rodríguez, the acting president’s brother and head of the National Assembly, to the United States’ extradition of Colombian businessman Álvaro Pulido, an associate of Alex Saab. In Efecto Cocuyo, political scientist Juan Manuel Trak calls it a “win-win” arrangement (ganar-ganar) between Miraflores and the White House: Washington signals its satisfaction with the dialogue, while “Rodrigato” demonstrates its ability to bargain. His colleague Eric Obermaier sees “strategic logic” in the move: Chavism retains room to exercise power and set the agenda for negotiations. At the same time, Trak emphasizes, only personal restrictions have been lifted. Sanctions against the country as a whole remain in place; only general and sectoral licenses are active, while Diosdado Cabello and General Padrino López remain on the OFAC list. A column on Venezuelausa.org develops the same idea: Washington appears to have abandoned “the idealism of institutional reconstruction” in favor of “the realpolitik of corporate peace,” in which stability and oil quotas carry more weight than the voters’ mandate.

Machado, Elections and the Question of Who Is “Interesting”

Against this backdrop, Trump’s comment at the White House sounded particularly pointed. Asked whether he would like to see Delcy Rodríguez run against María Corina Machado in an election, he replied, “Well, that would be interesting” (EFE). The answer does not, in itself, decide anything, but Venezuelan commentators interpret it as an acknowledgment that Machado—the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize laureate—remains outside the US-backed dialogue led by Chavism and part of the opposition under Dinorah Figuera. In an interview with The New York Times, Machado herself said that the United States had “excluded” her from the negotiations and called Washington’s new oil partner Alejandro Betancourt “corrupt”—a scandal that, according to Venezuelausa.org, “caused a political earthquake.” In the end, local voices agree on one point: Venezuela has gained investment and the lifting of some sanctions, but is paying for it with opaque deals, the absence of an election date, and the quiet erasure of both Maduro and Machado from the future political equation.

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Iraq: Weapons Control, Sovereignty and the Threat of a US-Iran Conflict

Khaled al-Yakoubi, an official representative of the Iraqi presidential administration, said that placing all weapons under state control requires reciprocal commitments from major powers, especially the United States: Washington must respect Iraq’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and refrain from interfering in its internal affairs. According to him, this is not merely a wish but an obligation for any prime minister whose legitimacy rests on parliament; the issue is usually included in the government’s programme.

Al-Yakoubi said Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi had persuaded the US side to extend the deadline for handing over weapons until the end of June 2027 during a meeting with US President Donald Trump on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. Washington had previously set September 30 of last year as the final deadline and hinted at economic measures if it was not met. The official believes the new deadline gives political forces and the government enough time to resolve the issue.

He attributed the complexity of the matter to the legacy of developments since 2003 and the fight against al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. In his view, the problem cannot be solved by “pressing a button”: it will require a long series of steps that take into account both security concerns and political agreements.

Speaking about the risk of a new confrontation between the United States and Iran, al-Yakoubi described neutralising Iraq as extremely difficult. The last war spilled across borders and disregarded international agreements: US and Israeli aircraft used Iraqi airspace to strike Iran, while Iranian missiles flew through it in response. Iraq filed complaints with the UN Security Council, but, he said, was not heard and failed to secure any action. Any new escalation, he added, would place the country at the centre of events “whether it wants this or not,” particularly amid economic pressure. He also ruled out any current mediation by Baghdad between the United States and Iran, saying that the issue was “beyond Iraq’s capabilities,” while calculations had become complicated and the conflict’s objectives had become intertwined. Baghdad had previously tried to use its ties with both sides, but now seeks to avoid the consequences of confrontation. Regarding Iranian-Saudi mediation, he said he had no up-to-date information, although he recalled Iraq’s earlier key role before the agreement announced in China.

On the economic front, al-Yakoubi noted that Iraqi oil exports continue to face difficulties because shipments pass through the Strait of Hormuz; deliveries are subject to fees and sums different from those applied previously. The issue of exports was raised during earlier Iraqi-Iranian meetings, but he was unable to confirm whether Iran had rejected or accepted Iraq’s demands, and did not know whether the matter had been discussed at a meeting between the two countries’ foreign ministers.

Comments on the News

• What are the “Popular Mobilization Forces,” and which Iraqi armed groups must be integrated or disarmed as weapons are placed under state control? — The PMF (al-Hashd al-Shaabi) is an officially recognised umbrella structure in Iraq consisting primarily of Shiite militias. It was established in 2014 to fight ISIS and formally forms part of the security system under the administration of the PMF Commission and the commander-in-chief of Iraq’s armed forces. As weapons are placed under state control, the issue is not a single official list, but bringing all brigades under genuine state command. The main focus is on groups that maintain separate command, military and economic structures, particularly those linked to Iran: Kata’ib Hezbollah, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, the Sayyid al-Shuhada Brigades and the Imam Ali Brigades. Some PMF units, including Badr, have already been formally integrated, but the extent of their actual subordination to the state remains disputed.

• Which agreement announced in China is being referred to in the context of Iranian-Saudi mediation, and what role did Iraq play in it? — This refers to the agreement to restore diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, announced in Beijing on March 10, 2023. Iraq was not a signatory, but beginning in 2021 it hosted rounds of direct Iranian-Saudi talks in Baghdad, mediated first by Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi and later by Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani. The Baghdad venue helped bring the parties closer, later serving as a foundation for the Chinese agreement.

• Why does Iraqi oil exports depend on the Strait of Hormuz, and what alternative routes or fees are being discussed to reduce this dependence? — Most Iraqi oil is exported through the southern terminals of Basra in the Persian Gulf, and tankers must pass through the Strait of Hormuz because Iraq lacks sufficient pipeline capacity to bypass it. The northern Kirkuk–Ceyhan route through Turkey is under discussion, but it has limited capacity and periodically becomes inactive. Other possibilities include the Basra–Aqaba project through Jordan, which has not yet been implemented; the old Kirkuk–Baniyas route through Syria, which is unusable; and possible swaps and new corridors through Saudi Arabia or the Red Sea. In this context, “fees” refer mainly to transit tariffs charged by Turkey, Jordan or Syria, as well as insurance costs and expenses associated with military risks—not a fee for passage through the Strait of Hormuz itself.

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Full version: Iraqi presidency to Al Jazeera: We convinced Trump to extend the weapons deadline; their restriction is conditional on respect for our sovereignty

In Rome, Venezuela presents new food security initiatives

Venezuelan President Delcy Rodríguez spoke at the World Food Forum of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) in Rome. She announced the launch of the “Venezuela Feeds” plan, which is intended to bring together all stages of food production and help the country achieve the goal of “Zero Hunger.” Rodríguez stressed that access to food is an inalienable right linked to human life, dignity and development.

The president also said that in the coming days she would present a bill on the local economy to the Venezuelan parliament. According to her, the document will form part of a broader reform program aimed at increasing production, attracting investment and creating conditions for sustainable economic growth. As Rodríguez noted, implementing the food strategy will require government policies, investment, science, technology, financing and international cooperation.

In her speech, Venezuela’s leader linked political stability to the ability to produce and develop the economy. She said that domestic dialogue with the opposition and diplomatic contacts with the United States were helping create a more favorable environment for investment. In Rome, Rodríguez also met with Dominican Republic President Luis Abinader. The sides discussed strengthening diplomatic ties, economic and cultural exchanges, and cooperation in food security.

In addition, Rodríguez held a telephone conversation with Peruvian President Keiko Fujimori. One of the topics was strengthening mechanisms for the safe return of Venezuelan citizens living abroad under the “Return to the Homeland” program. The president’s international activity covered several areas at once—food, the economy, regional cooperation and migration—which, according to the authorities’ intentions, should demonstrate the beginning of a “new political moment” in Venezuela.

Comments on the news

• What is Venezuela’s “Return to the Homeland” program, and what difficulties do citizens wishing to return from abroad face? — This is a government program launched in 2018 to assist the return of Venezuelan migrants. It provides for the organization of repatriation flights and assistance with returning, but does not guarantee full economic reintegration. Returnees face a shortage of jobs, low wages, disruptions in electricity and water supplies, problems with housing and medical care, as well as bureaucratic obstacles and a lack of funds for relocation and the restoration of documents.

• How is the local economy organized in Venezuela, and what specific changes could the announced bill introduce for small businesses, farmers and local producers? — The Venezuelan economy is heavily dependent on the oil sector, while small businesses, agriculture and industry operate amid limited access to credit, an unstable currency, high costs, power outages and complex regulations. The announced bill could potentially provide for simplified registration and taxation of small enterprises, easier access to credit and foreign currency, support for farmers, reduced administrative barriers and measures to protect domestic production. However, the exact substance of the changes will depend on the final text of the law.

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Full version: Delcy Rodríguez consolidates Venezuela’s opening in Rome

Violence in Syrian Families: Victims Stay Silent as They Await a Law

In Syria, women and children remain among the most vulnerable groups, and domestic violence is a persistent problem. In the provinces, there is no clear mechanism for combating it, while victims often remain silent out of shame and fear of social condemnation. Violence is frequently justified as necessary to “preserve the family,” and even women sometimes endorse such explanations. As a result, battered women and children find neither protection nor a safe place to turn.

The case of three-year-old Janat al-Afis, whom her father killed after severely beating her on September 27, was particularly tragic. It emerged that this was not the first time she had been beaten, and that her mother, who had died several months earlier, had also been subjected to violence. The case reflects a broader reality: the deaths of women and children often remain unexplained, while less severe assaults do not become known at all. Victims hesitate to file complaints or seek protection because they fear the consequences, while neighbors and relatives prefer not to intervene, calling what is happening a “family matter.”

Syrian society is deeply attached to the image of the “patient woman,” a label that generations have even taken pride in. As a result, many people consider it acceptable for a strong man to use violence against his wife and children, excusing it as a result of his temper and male authority. The problem is not male leadership itself, but the use of power to inflict harm rather than protect the family—especially when violence is compounded by psychological or financial difficulties or drug addiction. Society not only excuses the aggressor but also shifts the blame onto the victim, trapping women in a vicious cycle of injustice and forced “endurance” out of fear of disgrace.

The article’s author compares a family headed by a despotic man to a miniature authoritarian state. In the author’s view, the methods used to control society under the Assad regime helped entrench brute force within the family as well. The consequences can be seen today in a father who “disciplines” his family through beatings, or in a teacher who slaps a first-grader. Such practices harm people not only physically but psychologically, while also shaping a generation that can easily be manipulated by anyone holding a stick or a weapon. The need for legal and cultural change is therefore becoming increasingly urgent.

Justice Minister Mazhar al-Wais said that a comprehensive law to combat domestic violence is being prepared and is awaiting consideration by the People’s Council. According to him, the legislation would strengthen protection for victims and increase penalties for offenders. In addition, a national strategy for child protection and a program to reform juvenile justice have been developed jointly with other agencies and international organizations. These measures are intended to strengthen legal and judicial protection, rehabilitation, and reintegration, while placing the best interests of the child at the center of policy and judicial procedures. If the authorities seriously enforce strict penalties, results will come sooner than if they rely solely on citizens’ sense of responsibility.

A new law could be an important step toward protecting children and reshaping social habits in Syria. The author stresses that such measures do not constitute an attack on tradition; rather, they seek to correct customs that must change in line with modern life. The development of science and openness to other cultures have strengthened the influence of a modern worldview, but this does not mean rejecting familiar social roles. However, strict limits on the abuse of those roles are necessary for a healthy and cohesive society. An editorial note also states that, before the original material was published, it was necessary to clarify the year in which the girl’s death occurred, document the details, and verify the justice minister’s quotation; the views expressed do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial position.

Comments on the News

• What provisions of Syrian family and criminal law currently regulate beatings and domestic violence, and why are they rarely enforced in practice? — Syria has no single comprehensive law on domestic violence. Beatings and bodily injuries fall under the general provisions of the Penal Code—particularly articles concerning assault and bodily harm, approximately Articles 557–559—but “domestic violence” is not a separate offense. Family relations are regulated by Personal Status Law No. 59 of 1953 for Muslims and by separate codes for religious communities. These laws address marriage, divorce, maintenance, and custody, but do not criminalize violence. In practice, cases rarely reach court: police and prosecutors often treat violence as a “family matter,” pressure the parties to reconcile, there is a lack of shelters and protection programs, proving injuries can be difficult, and women may be economically dependent and afraid of retaliation, stigma, and pressure from relatives. Religious courts and traditional notions of “honor” also play a role.

• How is Syria’s People’s Council formed and how does it operate, and what procedures are required to adopt a comprehensive law on domestic violence? — Under the 2012 Constitution, the People’s Council is a unicameral parliament of 250 members elected for four-year terms by universal secret ballot. It adopts laws and the budget, ratifies treaties, and oversees ministers. After December 2024, the former Council effectively lost its legislative role; a transitional government is in place, while a new parliament or constituent assembly has not yet been formed. Under the regular procedure, a comprehensive law on domestic violence would require drafting by the Ministry of Justice or lawmakers, approval by the Council of Ministers, public consultations, consideration by the relevant parliamentary committee, a majority vote, signature and promulgation by the head of state, and publication. During the transitional period, some provisions may be introduced by decree by transitional authorities before a new parliament is elected.

• Who is Mazhar al-Wais, and what powers does Syria’s Ministry of Justice have when drafting legislation and working with international organizations? — Mazhar al-Wais is a Syrian lawyer who has served as justice minister in Syria’s transitional government since December 2024. He previously served as justice minister in the Salvation Government in Idlib. The Ministry of Justice drafts and legally reviews legislation, coordinates the work of the judicial system and notaries, represents the state in legal matters, and cooperates with the United Nations, international organizations, and NGOs on legal reform, the rule of law, and human rights. However, the ministry cannot enact a law on its own: it proposes and prepares draft legislation, while approval rests with parliament or transitional legislative bodies.

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Full version: Domestic Violence in Syria: Can the Law Break the Wall of Silence?

Venezuela and the US: A Year After January 3—From Shock to the Oil Price Debate and...

Venezuela’s discussion of the United States in October 2026 is unfolding across two different time zones at once. One is the still-fresh shock of the armed operation that Caracas calls nothing less than the “kidnapping” of the president: on the night of January 3, US helicopters struck targets in Caracas, Miranda, Aragua and La Guaira; Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, were captured and taken to New York, while Vice President Delcy Rodríguez was recognized by Washington as head of the transitional government. The other time zone is the almost routine, deeply contradictory life under American “patronage”: talks in Caracas, the lifting of sanctions on Chavista officials, oil deals, and an increasingly heated dispute over who should build a new Venezuela and on what terms.

It is this second layer that is currently generating the most local opinions and irritation. It also exposes the central paradox of Venezuela’s view of the United States: Washington is simultaneously seen as the force that destroyed the old regime and as a force bargaining with its remnants rather than with those Venezuelans regard as the winners of the elections.

First topic: Not “liberation,” but bargaining—and the main scandal surrounding María Corina Machado

The central story of the week was the public rift between Washington and María Corina Machado—the Nobel Peace Prize laureate and opposition leader who, according to her own claims, won the 2024 presidential election. In an interview with The New York Times from Panama, she said explicitly for the first time that the United States had excluded her from negotiations in Caracas. She called the oil agreements being promoted by Washington “obscene corruption” (Spanish: “corrupción obscena”), referring to the transfer to businessman Alejandro Betancourt, owner of NABEP (North American Blue Energy Partners), of control over roughly one-fifth of the country’s oil reserves. This is reported in detail by El Pitazo and Notimérica.

The key local nuance, almost invisible in English-language accounts, is not emotional but institutional. In the analytical program “Punto y Contexto,” El Pitazo director César Batiz reconstructs the State Department’s argument: one cannot negotiate a transition while simultaneously claiming the position of head of the transitional government. “Precisely because you are seeking power, you cannot be the arbiter, negotiator and beneficiary of the agreement at the same time,” he quotes Washington’s reasoning as saying (El Pitazo). Machado responds from the standpoint of a mandate: if I represent the movement that won the 2023 primaries and, according to its account, the 2024 election, why am I absent from the table where the country’s future is being decided?

It is particularly telling that Machado cautiously, but nevertheless clearly, drew a line: a future democratic government would honor contracts “consistent with Venezuelan law,” but Betancourt would not be a “viable partner” for her. She calls him one of the main culprits behind the collapse of the national power grid (Notimérica). This is not a rejection of deals but a signal that their terms and beneficiaries will be reviewed. And that strikes directly at one of the pillars of US-Venezuelan relations.

The reaction from the Chavista camp is also revealing. Diosdado Cabello, secretary-general of the PSUV and the man known in the country as “number two,” responded not to the substance of her claims but to the issue of her return: “Why doesn’t she come back? Let her come to Venezuela—no one is stopping her,” he said, calling her statements about being barred from entering the country “pure straw” (Spanish: “pura paja”—empty talk) (Notimérica). Machado says she has made seven unsuccessful attempts to return, including two after the June earthquakes.

Second topic: Sanctions as currency—“Rodrigato” buys its way out

The second story being hotly debated in Venezuelan media is the lifting of US sanctions on Jorge Rodríguez, Delcy Rodríguez’s brother, president of the National Assembly and the regime’s chief negotiator. This occurred a day after Colombian businessman Álvaro Pulido, who is close to Alex Saab, appeared in a Miami court. He is accused of money laundering, bribing Venezuelan officials and securing multimillion-dollar contracts at the expense of state funds.

Political analyst Juan Manuel Trak directly links the two events in a comment to Efecto Cocuyo: “The extradition of Álvaro Pulido to the United States is not accidental.” In his view, this signals that Washington is “at least satisfied” with the progress of the dialogue, while Chavismo is demonstrating its negotiating ability to secure the lifting of individual sanctions, not just sectoral licenses. “It is a kind of ‘win-win’ between Miraflores and the White House,” he says, adding an important caveat: ordinary Venezuelans “have not seen many changes” since January 3.

Consultant Erik Obermaier describes the situation using the word “tutelage” (Spanish: “tutelaje”): Chavismo retains room to exercise power and control over the country, and the removal of restrictions on Rodríguez is a showcase for this tutelage. The article also notes that Switzerland lifted the freeze on the assets of Marleny Contreras, Cabello’s wife, and Jorge Arreaza (Efecto Cocuyo). Cabello, Padrino López and others remain on the OFAC list—and this too is part of the local debate: in Venezuela, sanctions are viewed not as a moral instrument but as bargaining chips in a deal in which every official is “looking for the best way to come out unharmed.”

For Venezuelan readers, the issue of impunity is especially painful. An author at Runrun.es describes it as “concessions to impunity and the fine print” accompanying authorization to do business with people of questionable reputations, and asks who will ultimately judge the White House’s sincerity—“in the end, history will do so.” The same article offers the concise image of “looking in the rearview mirror” (Spanish: “la mirada desde el retrovisor”), which Chavista rhetoric uses to warn against judging local politics by old standards: supposedly, in order to achieve a transition, it will be necessary to “swallow several toads” (Spanish: “tragarse varios sapos”—an expression meaning to tolerate something unpleasant).

Third topic: Oil, the dollar and the question “How much will be left for us?”

The most widespread, “street-level” issue is the economic price of the American presence. Sociologist and Poder y Estrategia director Ricardo Ríos presented a poll of 1,014 respondents in eight cities—Caracas, Maracaibo, Barquisimeto, Barinas, San Cristóbal, Puerto La Cruz, Barcelona and Ciudad Guayana—on the program “Vladimir a la Carta.” The main conclusion was: “People reject a large-scale oil agreement with the United States if the same government remains in place,” Diario de Los Andes quotes him as saying.

At the same time, Venezuelans see geopolitical benefits in the deal, but are worried about the “fine print”: what share of the resources will remain in the country, how reversible the deal is, and how transparent it will be. According to the poll, the greatest irritation is caused specifically by Betancourt’s role as the agreement’s principal operator. Another highly revealing detail is that 72% support dollarization, although Delcy Rodríguez rejected it, while 51% are willing to receive their salaries in bolívars only if the exchange rate remains stable. Rodríguez’s approval rating has deteriorated: whereas 50% were withholding judgment in February and March, 54% now assess her administration negatively.

Interestingly, questions about the “price” of the deal are also being raised in Washington. State Department spokesperson Tommy Pigott told NewsNation that the talks had “100 percent” support and that there had been “real results” under Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s three-phase plan—“stabilization, economic recovery and political reconciliation, democratic transition”—including reforms to ensure an independent Supreme Court and the repeal of “repressive laws that were used against political speech” (El Cooperante). Rubio, after receiving Dinorah Figuera, the 2015 National Assembly speaker, called what was happening “the best opportunity in more than a generation to restore democracy” and stressed that the goal was not simply elections but a “lasting democracy” supported by institutions capable of preserving it.

Fourth topic: Maduro’s trial and “piracy”—two narratives about legality

Meanwhile, the legal drama surrounding Maduro continues. On October 15, he and Cilia Flores pleaded not guilty in the US District Court for the Southern District of New York to new charges of conspiracy to use torture and expanded narcoterrorism charges. Maduro called the charges “false accusations and testimony against his person,” while Flores said she was “completely innocent.” Judge Alvin Hellerstein postponed the start of the trial from June 1 to June 14, 2027 (Red Uno). The Venezuelan outlet El Nacional reveals the diplomatic background: US prosecutors say Caracas never requested immunity for Maduro, but on May 14 it sent a note asking that Delcy Rodríguez be granted immunity as head of state—a request that was approved on July 20. In other words, Venezuela’s current authorities legally “handed over” Maduro themselves.

In the local and allied press, this story is presented within a completely different framework. Maduro’s son, lawmaker Nicolás Maduro Guerra, called the proceedings “illegal” and “proti

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The World Responds to U.S. Pressure and Flashpoints

Only a few publications in today’s roundup are directly devoted to Washington’s actions and diplomacy. Most of the attention focuses on regional countries’ concern over U.S. pressure on Iran, tensions between the United States and Ukraine’s leadership, and the risk of further escalation around Iran and Yemen. The remaining articles address domestic politics, markets, culture, sports, and other topics, without forming a unified picture of the international response. The review is based on material from El Nacional, El Sol del Sur Tampico, and Vierne5 (Venezuela).

Venezuela Between Modernization, Freedom of Speech, and Trust

Venezuela is facing several challenges at once, and its ability to resume full international ties and restore citizens’ trust in state institutions depends on how they are addressed. The modernization of the country’s main airport in Maiquetía, the resumption of international flights, sanctions and banking restrictions, and the debate over reforming the “Law Against Hate” all reflect a common problem: can the authorities provide not temporary measures, but predictable rules, functioning infrastructure, and genuine guarantees of rights?

Simón Bolívar International Airport in Maiquetía, located near Caracas, remains Venezuela’s main air gateway. For a country that has experienced a decline in international connections, population outflow, and deteriorating infrastructure, its condition is significant not only technically, but also politically and economically. As El Nacional notes, earthquake damage aggravated a problem that had existed beforehand: the airport needed not cosmetic repairs, but systemic modernization.

Peter Cerdá, IATA’s Regional Vice President for the Americas and Chief Executive Officer of the Latin American and Caribbean Air Transport Association (ALTA), said that before the disaster, Maiquetía was already “in unsatisfactory condition.” According to him, the terminal must now be restored in an improved temporary format, while preparations begin on a long-term investment project. Over the next “eight or nine months,” the industry intends to seek the government’s approval of a master plan designed to meet demand over the next 25–30 years.

This approach suggests that the earthquake’s aftermath could become an opportunity not merely to repair the damage, but to reconsider the airport’s entire development model. Maiquetía must be ready to handle future passenger traffic, attract international carriers, and ensure the smooth operation of logistics, trade, and ties with the Venezuelan diaspora.

Infrastructure alone, however, is not enough. Venezuelan aviation lawyer Rodolfo Ruiz of Ruiz & Partners stresses that “Venezuela has a great deal of work ahead.” His main conclusion is even more direct: “If infrastructure does not grow, aviation in Venezuela cannot grow.” This concerns not only runways and terminals, but also the renewal of national airlines’ fleets, access to financing, investment protection, and clear conditions for foreign partners.

Sanctions and restrictions on international payments pose a particular problem. Formally, Venezuela’s foreign-exchange regulations allow funds to be transferred abroad, but in practice banks may refuse transactions or delay them because of sanctions-compliance requirements. As a result, legal permission does not always translate into the ability to purchase an aircraft, pay for leasing, carry out maintenance, or guarantee the repatriation of profits to a foreign carrier. For aviation, where the operation of a route depends on regular settlements, insurance, supplies, and technical support, this becomes a systemic obstacle.

Against this backdrop, LATAM’s decision to resume direct flights between Santiago and Caracas in early 2027, after a break of more than ten years, could be an important signal. The group’s chief executive, Roberto Alvo, linked the airline’s plans to the efforts of the Venezuelan and Chilean authorities, as well as the restoration of consular relations. For Venezuela, the route has significance beyond commercial considerations: it is important for migrants, separated families, businesses, and the restoration of regional dialogue.

For Venezuelans, however, the question of trust in institutions is not limited to aviation and investment. An article in Vierne5 discusses citizens’ distrust of a possible partial reform of the “Law Against Hate.” For critics, the problem lies not only in individual provisions of the law, but also in how it has been applied since 2017—as a mechanism for pressuring journalists, activists, politicians, and citizens who criticize the authorities.

According to Foro Penal, since the law was adopted, at least 927 people have been accused of “inciting hatred.” For many Venezuelans, this figure confirms that vague wording can be used to prosecute people for their statements, rather than solely to combat actual violence or discrimination.

The publication also points to continuing restrictions in the digital sphere. Although some barriers to internet resources have been eased, monitoring by VE Sin Filtro in October recorded 143 domains blocked by at least one internet provider. Among them were 24 active news websites. Under such conditions, statements about liberalization are treated cautiously: the partial lifting of restrictions does not yet amount to lasting protection for freedom of speech.

The central question raised by critical readers is why the authorities are proposing to amend individual provisions of the law rather than repeal it entirely, if they acknowledge that abuses have occurred. The concern is captured in the phrase: “Fear does not disappear when laws are renamed.” Another quotation is also telling: “La malignidad es mala, aunque sea a medias”—“Evil remains evil, even when it appears only halfway.”

Supporters of genuine guarantees are demanding not promises of a softer application of the rules, but clear legal definitions, due process, judicial independence, and protection of constitutional freedoms. In their view, combating hatred, violence, and discrimination is necessary, but it must not become grounds for punishing people for their political views, journalistic work, or public criticism.

The discussion also concerns a possible renewal of Venezuela’s Supreme Court, the TSJ. Yet replacing judges is not seen as an automatic solution to the problem. If the judiciary remains dependent on political power, new appointments may amount to little more than a personnel reshuffle. The public debate involves an opposition delegation, the 2015 National Assembly led by Dinorah Figuera, and the United States, but citizens are demanding transparency from all parties to the negotiations: What guarantees have been agreed? Who will monitor their implementation? And how will the outcome be verified?

On both aviation and the dispute over the Law Against Hate, Venezuela faces the same dilemma. International interest, individual diplomatic developments, and plans to restore flights could mark the beginning of deeper normalization. But the country’s sustained return to regional and global integration is impossible without long-term investment, functioning payment mechanisms, independent institutions, and conditions in which citizens can freely express their views and businesses can plan their activities without the constant risk of sudden restrictions.

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Syria and World Bank Create Reconstruction Fund

Syria and the World Bank have agreed to establish a multi-donor trust fund for the country’s recovery and reconstruction. Under a joint statement, the bank will provide concessional financing, investment guarantees, technical assistance, and support to strengthen the capacity of Syrian authorities. The exact amount to be raised has not yet been announced; the fund will operate according to priorities set by the Syrian state itself.

The World Bank will manage the fund together with donors, institutions, and development partners. Its objectives are to mobilize international support, coordinate aid and financing, accelerate economic recovery, reconstruction, and institutional reforms, and attract private investment. Syrian Finance Minister Mohammed Yusr Barnia called the agreement the beginning of a new phase of cooperation with international partners, while World Bank Vice President Ousmane Dione described it as an important step toward turning promises into concrete and coordinated action.

The scale of the task is enormous: according to a World Bank assessment covering 2011–2024 and published in October 2025, Syria’s recovery could require approximately $216 billion. Of that amount, $75 billion is needed for residential buildings, $59 billion for nonresidential buildings, and $82 billion for infrastructure; direct physical damage from the war is estimated at $108 billion. Aleppo and Rif-Dimashq Governorate are expected to require the largest investments.

The new fund is intended to become a practical mechanism through which international aid, private capital, and reforms can be directed toward priority needs. The World Bank has pledged, together with the International Finance Corporation and other partners, to expand business participation, encourage investment financing, and create new economic opportunities. For Syria, which is seeking to coordinate external support and accelerate recovery, this is an opportunity to move from assessing the destruction to implementing concrete projects and rebuilding the economy step by step.

Comments on the News

• What is Rif-Dimashq Governorate, and why is it considered, along with Aleppo, one of Syria’s key areas for reconstruction? — Rif-Dimashq is a governorate (administrative province) surrounding Damascus. It does not include the city itself, but covers its suburbs, industrial and agricultural areas, transport corridors, and water and energy facilities; for an international audience, it can be compared to a “capital region” excluding the central city. Its importance for reconstruction is linked to its proximity to the capital—which affects security, logistics, and supplies—as well as its large population and need for housing and services, industrial zones, agriculture, and infrastructure, along with its investment and symbolic potential. Aleppo is a northern economic and commercial center and a major industrial and transit hub, making the reconstruction of both regions critical to economic stabilization and the return of residents.
• Who is Mohammed Yusr Barnia, and which areas of Syria’s economic policy does he oversee as finance minister? — Mohammed Yusr Barnia is a Syrian economist and financial manager who serves as finance minister in Syria’s transitional government. As finance minister, he is primarily responsible for fiscal and budget policy: preparing and implementing the state budget, tax and nontax revenues, public debt and treasury management, transparency and oversight of public spending, financial reporting, and public financial management reforms. He coordinates these matters with the Central Bank and the government’s economic bloc, but does not oversee all economic policy single-handedly.

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Full version: Syria and World Bank Agree to Establish Recovery and Reconstruction Fund

New Hydrocarbons Law Set to Accelerate Venezuela’s Development

Venezuelan President Delcy Rodríguez said the new version of the Hydrocarbons Law will be a key instrument for the country’s socioeconomic development and for attracting investment. The law establishes clear rules for investors and requires national companies to participate in oil-production projects—measures the authorities say will strengthen the industry and stimulate the development of related sectors.

According to Rodríguez, a bilateral agreement with the United States will help accelerate the expansion of oil operations and create approximately 324,000 jobs over the next decade. In Zulia state, production has already risen from 70,000 to 370,000 barrels per day, with output expected to reach 400,000 barrels by the end of the year. By 2027, the region is also planned to become a liquefied petroleum gas producer. The authorities intend to develop gas production for domestic, industrial, and commercial needs while exporting surplus supplies, despite continuing problems with electricity supply. A joint technical commission involving the government, industry, investors, and oil chambers will continue monitoring compliance with the agreements.

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Full version: Government highlights socioeconomic impact of new Hydrocarbons Law and projects sustained production growth in Zulia

Viral Al-Karama tifo after thrashing Al-Nawair

In Homs, Syria, Al-Karama fans unveiled an impressive tifo at the Khalid ibn al-Walid Stadium—a giant artwork covering a significant section of the stands. It appeared on Friday during the second-round Syrian Premier League match against Al-Nawair. Videos from the stands quickly spread across Instagram and went viral, while fans continued supporting the team with songs and chants.

The support from the stands seemed to energize the players: Al-Karama dominated the match and won 3–0. After the final whistle, cameras captured exuberant celebrations, with the footballers joining the fans in the stands. The moment became a symbol of unity between the team and its supporters, as well as the return of energy and spirit to Syria’s historic stadiums.

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Full version: Syria trend: Al-Karama’s spectacular tifo floods social media after victory over Al-Nawair

US: Trump, Markets and the Influence of Technology

Today’s review examines a small number of revealing reactions to events in the United States and their consequences beyond the country’s borders: from domestic political disputes surrounding Donald Trump and American farmers’ concerns over his administration’s policies to uncertainty on Wall Street linked to investment in artificial intelligence. Particular attention is paid to the strategic influence of the United States through Starlink and its role in the conflict in Ukraine. The material is based on publications by Eleconomista.es (Venezuela), Resumen Latinoamericano (Venezuela), and Killbait (Venezuela).

From the Fed to US Elections: A Venezuelan View of External Pressure

Decisions by the US Federal Reserve, European stock-market trends, Washington’s sanctions policy, the cultural struggle in Latin America, and the American election campaign have drawn the attention of Venezuelan media and outlets close to the Bolivarian political milieu. These topics share a common theme: Venezuela’s and the region’s domestic economic and political processes are closely tied to US decisions, global markets, oil prices, access to the dollar, and information conflicts.

A report by elEconomista published primarily concerns European financial markets rather than events in Venezuela. Nevertheless, its conclusions have indirect significance for a country where dollar transactions have become part of everyday economic reality and oil exports remain a key source of foreign-currency revenues.

European indices showed moderate growth that day: the EuroStoxx 50 approached 6,200 points, while Spain’s Ibex 35 neared 19,200. Analysts at Link Securities attributed the optimism to an attempt by the technology sector to recover after its recent decline and to expectations surrounding the opening of trading on Wall Street. The market’s main focus, however, was on statements by Fed Chair Kevin Warsh, who did not signal in advance that US interest rates would be raised in October.

Investors interpreted his remarks as a less hawkish signal. According to estimates cited in the article, the probability of a rate hike on October 28 fell from approximately 27% to below 15%. Economist Derek Tang described the Fed chair’s remarks as follows: “It was clear that he wasn’t going to say anything the market could interpret as hawkish.”

For Venezuela, this shift in expectations matters not directly but through the global financial context. A softer US monetary policy could reduce pressure on global liquidity and dollar-denominated assets. This may affect exchange rates, import prices, the availability of foreign currency, and the cost of international transactions. Changes in investors’ risk appetite, as well as movements in the dollar, usually affect commodity markets too—above all oil, which is critically important to Venezuela’s export revenues.

At the same time, assessments of the sustainability of European growth remain cautious. Ecotrader analyst Joan Cabrero believes that the EuroStoxx 50’s rebound is not yet convincing enough. In his words, the 200-day moving average “does not possess magical properties.” In his view, more attractive levels for medium- and long-term purchases of European equities could be near 6,000, and especially 5,800 points. This comment underscores that markets respond not only to facts but also to interpretations: Fed statements may trigger short-term optimism without guaranteeing a sustained recovery.

Another regional interpretation of American influence appears in an interview published by the Venezuelan left-wing outlet Resumen Latinoamericano with Cuban politician and intellectual Abel Prieto, conducted by the Argentine agency NODAL. The chairman of the Casa de las Américas and former culture minister describes relations with the United States as a confrontation with a “very powerful, but not all-powerful” adversary.

Prieto considers US policy toward Cuba to be more than a blockade, calling it a “project of large-scale strangulation.” In his view, restrictions on fuel, food, and medical supplies, along with pressure on tourism, maritime transport, and international cooperation, are intended not only to weaken the Cuban economy but also to provoke a social explosion that could then be used as grounds for “humanitarian intervention.”

This logic resonates with Venezuela’s political milieu, where US sanctions, restrictions on the oil sector, and the risks of external pressure are regularly viewed as elements of a single strategy against the region’s left-wing governments. In this narrative, Cuba and Venezuela appear as parts of a common anti-imperialist front in Latin America, opposing sanctions, neocolonialism, a right-wing resurgence, and US informational influence.

The interview devotes particular attention to defense and public mobilization. Prieto recalls Cuba’s “National Defense Days” and Fidel Castro’s doctrine of the “War of the Entire People.” For Venezuela, this theme echoes ideas of a civil-military alliance, territorial defense, and the need to involve society in protecting national sovereignty.

Prieto also identifies culture and communications as important arenas of conflict. He accuses the United States and “hegemonic” media of portraying Cuba as a “failed state,” concealing the consequences of sanctions, and romanticizing pre-revolutionary Havana under Fulgencio Batista. In contrast, he recalls the racism, poverty, repression, and mafia economy of the 1950s. Similar disputes over historical memory also resonate in Venezuela, where political polarization is often linked to assessments of the period before Hugo Chávez, the role of the oil elite, and the consequences of the Bolivarian Revolution.

Prieto also regards social networks as tools of emotional manipulation. In his view, hatred toward “the communist, the migrant, the feminist, the gay person, the Arab, the Black person, the Muslim” is used to spread neo-fascist sentiments. He urges people not to respond to disinformation with more disinformation: “We must defend Cuba with the truth, with data, with arguments.” In the Venezuelan context, this echoes recurring accusations of an information war against Caracas and highlights the role of alternative media, political education, and public communication.

The interview also contains a warning for the region’s left-wing forces. Prieto links the collapse of the Soviet Union to a defeat in the “culture war” and speaks of the success of right-wing forces in attracting “poor right-wingers”—people disillusioned with traditional politics and receptive to authoritarian or reactionary rhetoric. For Venezuela, this argument is relevant amid social difficulties, corruption, public fatigue, a generational divide, and the risk that discontent will be redirected toward an anti-government agenda.

Young people become the key audience in this concept. Prieto supports the emergence of young bloggers, YouTubers, and other creators capable of speaking in a modern language while preserving “Martíist, Fidelist, Bolivarian, and Guevarist” principles. In this way, Cuba, Venezuela, Bolívar, Chávez, José Martí, Fidel Castro, and Che Guevara are placed within a single symbolic space of the Latin American left.

A very different, but also critical, view of the United States is offered by the Venezuelan outlet KillBait, which reports on the contest for a Senate seat from Michigan. The publication focuses on Democratic candidate Abdul El-Sayed and the use of his name, Muslim background, and middle name, Mohamed, in the political campaign.

El-Sayed frames the social dimension of his campaign as follows: “My name is not the reason you can’t afford gasoline, groceries, a mortgage, rent, or a doctor’s visit. The reason is his policies.” The “his policies” in this statement refer to Donald Trump’s agenda. The article endorses this contrast, presenting attacks on the candidate’s identity as an attempt to distract voters from inflation, high gasoline prices, housing costs, and access to medical care.

According to the article, Trump emphasizes El-Sayed’s middle name and attempts to associate the candidate with Islamism and the Muslim Brotherhood. At the same time, the publication points to the contradiction between such attacks on a Muslim politician in Michigan and Trump’s favorable attitude toward Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

For a Venezuelan audience, the connection between war, oil, and the cost of living is especially clear. The outlet links American rhetoric about the Middle East to conflicts and rising gasoline prices. In a country with the world’s largest proven oil reserves that has experienced fuel shortages, economic instability, and sanctions pressure, the question of fuel affordability is not an abstract American issue but a socially significant one.

The Michigan campaign is also important nationally because it could affect control of the US Senate. El-Sayed’s opponent is presented as Trump-backed Republican Mike Rogers. The publication says the candidate’s personal identity is deliberately pushed to the forefront in place of policy proposals. The author also mentions Rogers’s accusations against El-Sayed and a dispute over who is actually connected to Michigan, noting that, according to the article, Rogers lives in Florida.

Additional episodes—AI-generated videos of Trump, disputes over rally attendance, and the brief tenure of the White House press secretary—are used to create an image of an administration focused on self-promotion and political spectacle. This is not a neutral election report: KillBait explicitly interprets the attacks on El-Sayed as dehumanization and electoral manipulation.

Across all three stories, the United States appears simultaneously as a source of global financial signals, sanctions pressure, cultural and informational influence, and domestic political conflict. For Venezuela and the regional left close to it, this picture serves as a reminder of external dependence: decisions in Washington can affect the dollar, oil, and access to capital, while US political rhetoric can shape perceptions of sanctions, sovereignty, migration, war, and social justice far beyond America’s borders.

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Syrian Families Seek the Truth About Detainees: Raids, Fear and Silence

At dawn on February 16, 2026, an Israeli patrol stormed the home of the family of two brothers—Ali (born in 2007) and Hamza (born in 2006)—in the village of Ghadir al-Bustan in the Quneitra countryside. The boys’ mother, who lost her husband about 10 years ago, said a police dog lunged at her and dragged her more than two meters, then attacked one of her sons and dragged him more than four meters; soldiers tied the other brother’s hands and brutally beat him. For about three months, the woman went to the hospital for rabies vaccinations and anti-inflammatory medication. The scars on her arms and face are still visible, and she and her 13-year-old daughter no longer dare sleep at home at night.

These accounts are just one episode in a broader pattern. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has documented at least 49 Syrians held in Israeli prisons; the Sijil Center reports 257 people detained by occupation forces in southern Syria after December 8, 2024, of whom 34 remain in custody. They include five Syrians detained before the fall of the Assad regime—bringing the total, according to figures as of October 1, to 39 people missing in Israeli prisons. The Syrian Network for Human Rights has also recorded at least 69 people killed by the actions of occupation forces on Syrian territory and approximately 453 ground raids—primarily in Quneitra and Daraa, and less frequently around Damascus—from the fall of the Assad regime until October 6.

The disappearance of Shadi Zaina (born in 2008) from the town of Kanakir in the Damascus area is a separate story. He was abducted in July 2025; phone data showed that the last signal came from the Ruwayhina Dam in the Quneitra countryside, but his family received no information. For nearly four months, his relatives searched hospitals and police stations until one released detainee said that Shadi had been held with them in prison. Meanwhile, some people exploited the family’s fear, attempting to extort money through false promises and AI-generated images. “For four months, I lived in search and fear, not knowing where my son was or what had happened to him,” his mother says. She dreams of hearing his voice and confirming that he is alive; to her, “Shadi is not a number, but a son and a part of my heart.”

Similar anxiety surrounds the fate of twins Muhammad and Mahmoud Mraiwed (born in 2008), who lost their father and six uncles in Sednaya Prison. On September 17, 2025, an Israeli patrol stormed their grandfather’s home and threatened to take him and the twins’ younger brother unless the twins turned themselves in. This brought to the fore the issue of recruiting informants, which was reported on by Haaretz. The twins’ mother says what hurts her most is the thought: “Throughout the years of the revolution, I tried to protect them by every means, and in the end Israel came and took them.” She waits for Wednesday as if it were a verdict, because the occupation forces have made a practice of transferring detainees and releasing some of them before sunset; she says that arresting breadwinners on Monday or Tuesday and releasing them on Wednesday creates the appearance that people are being returned—but her sons never appeared.

Lawyer Ahmed al-Musa believes that such cases fully meet the definition of enforced disappearance under the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance. This involves depriving Syrian citizens of their liberty through nighttime raids and incursions from the occupied Golan Heights, concealing their place of detention, refusing to disclose the detainees’ fate, blocking communication with their families and applying exceptional laws. According to testimony documented by Haaretz and the Sijil Center, many are beaten immediately upon arrival and subjected to continuous interrogations about the smallest details of their lives. Conditions include a lack of heating in winter, insufficient food, daily searches and being kept bound hand and foot around the clock during the war with Iran—with the exception of mealtimes—on the pretext of preventing escape if a missile strikes the prison.

Israel holds some detainees in “administrative detention” or under the classification of “unlawful combatant.” They have repeatedly been accused of belonging to the Quds Force, Hezbollah or Hamas, as well as of possessing and trafficking weapons; the reasons for holding others remain undisclosed. Against this backdrop, relatives are demanding that the Syrian government assume responsibility for the detainees’ fate, handle their cases and seek their release through a clear and transparent process, regularly informing families of developments and of anything known about their loved ones’ whereabouts.

“If our children did something wrong, we have a state, and our state will punish them. Why is Israel taking them?” asks the twins’ mother. She asks only that they be allowed to make a phone call: “I just want to know that they are all right and hear that they are alive.” For many families in Syria, this request has become the basic measure of humanity—not grand statements, but a phone call, confirmation of their health and at least some certainty instead of months of silence.

The International Committee of the Red Cross, for its part, says that since October 2023 its teams have been unable to enter Israeli detention facilities or visit detainees, including Syrians. Suheir Zakout, the ICRC’s information and communications coordinator in Syria, told Syria al-Aan that the committee continues to engage in dialogue with the Israeli authorities on resuming visits. Until access is restored, families remain in anxious suspense: without precise answers, without meetings and without certainty that their loved ones are alive and well.

Comments on the News

• What is Quneitra as a special border area of Syria, and why have raids and detentions there increased since 2024 amid the 1974 disengagement agreement and the occupation of the Golan Heights? — Quneitra is a governorate and city in southwestern Syria near the ceasefire line with Israel. The Golan Heights were occupied by Israel in 1967, while the 1974 agreement created a buffer disengagement zone monitored by the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). After the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, Israel expanded operations in the buffer zone and the Quneitra area, citing a security vacuum and threats from armed groups. This led to an increase in raids, detentions and destruction, undermining the 1974 agreement and heightening local families’ fears.

• What is Sednaya Prison, and why has the mention of relatives dying there become a symbol of past repression for Syrian families while also intensifying fears of new disappearances? — Sednaya is a notorious military prison near Damascus that became a symbol of mass arrests, torture, executions and enforced disappearances under Assad. The mention of a relative dying there confirms for families the scale of the earlier repression, but after 2024 it has also raised fears of new disappearances: the archives and the fates of detainees remain unclear, while detentions by various armed and foreign forces create the same uncertainty.

• What do “administrative detention” and “unlawful combatant” status mean in Israeli legal practice, and why do these categories make it especially difficult for families to obtain information about detainees? — Administrative detention allows a person to be held without charge or trial on the basis of secret material, with the possibility of extending the detention. Under a 2002 law, “unlawful combatant” status allows people suspected of hostile activity to be detained outside the criminal process and without prisoner-of-war status. The secrecy of the evidence, military courts and limited access for lawyers make it difficult for families to obtain information about detainees’ whereabouts, condition and detention terms.

• What do the Sijil Center and the Syrian Network for Human Rights do, and why does their documentation of detentions and raids remain one of the few sources of information for families? — These are human rights organizations that document detentions, disappearances, raids and other violations, collect testimony, maintain databases and publish reports. Their materials remain one of the few sources available to families because official records are closed or destroyed, access to detention sites is restricted and relatives fear reprisals.

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Full version: Raids, Police Dogs and Mysterious Detention: The Circumstances of Israel’s Abduction of Syrians

U.S

The U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has issued General License 60, temporarily easing restrictions on financial operations related to relief efforts following recent earthquakes in Venezuela. The document authorizes the direct transfer of international funds into and out of the country if they are intended for medical, food and logistical assistance, as well as the restoration of civilian infrastructure in affected areas. The authorization applies to humanitarian organizations and individuals from third countries, and also permits the payment of local duties, fees and taxes required to import aid.

The license allows the Venezuelan government and individuals subject to U.S. sanctions to participate in such operations, including cooperation with local ministries in coordinating rescue efforts. U.S. banks and payment processors will also be able to transfer funds from organizations in third countries and will not be required to route amounts related to humanitarian payments through a special government account. However, the measure is temporary and strictly limited: it does not repeal the broader sanctions regime, unfreeze previously blocked assets or authorize commercial operations unrelated to the humanitarian emergency.

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Full version: OFAC lifts sanctions on Venezuela for banking operations to aid earthquake victims

The United States, Technology and Asylum: Risks Through a Venezuelan Lens

Several international publications connected to the United States show how decisions by Washington, private technology companies and migration authorities may be perceived in Venezuela through the lens of dependence, sanctions, security and the fate of the diaspora. However, none of the materials contains direct comments from Venezuelan authorities, experts or civil society organizations; rather, they point to a possible context relevant to a Venezuelan audience.

One article, published under a headline about Donald Trump and the possible broadcast of Nidal Hasan’s execution, is in fact devoted to wildfires in Los Angeles County. The original publication describes a fire destroying expensive homes south of Los Angeles amid strong winds, high temperatures and low humidity. Thus, the provided content confirms neither that Trump discussed the death penalty nor any reaction from Venezuela—or even the subject of the execution itself.

This obvious discrepancy between the headline and the content may itself deepen distrust in international reporting, especially in countries for which U.S. policy has direct economic and political significance. The Venezuelan context also highlights other issues: vulnerability to climate-related emergencies, the availability of government resources to address them, and the contrast between the capabilities of U.S. emergency services and the limitations facing Venezuelan institutions amid a prolonged economic crisis. However, these conclusions are not contained in the publication itself and cannot be presented as its author’s position.

Another story concerns the dispute over Starlink satellite communications in Ukraine. In a Debate article, Donald Trump rejects claims that the United States restricted the system’s operation. “No, we absolutely did not do that,” he said. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, by contrast, said that the system’s previous capabilities had not yet been fully restored, although he expected Washington to take action.

The dispute underscores the dependence of a country at war on critical infrastructure operated by a private Western company and potentially influenced by political decisions made outside the country itself. For Venezuela, where official rhetoric regularly links sanctions and international restrictions to issues of national sovereignty, this example may appear to confirm that commercial services can become strategic instruments.

The mention of Starshield, the military version of the satellite system, is particularly significant. Zelensky links it to intercepting attacks against civilians, yet the story itself demonstrates how blurred the boundary has become between civilian communications, military infrastructure and geopolitics. Control over satellite networks, payment systems, communications and energy technologies is becoming not merely a market issue, but also a matter of security.

For Caracas, the situation is not equivalent to Russia’s war against Ukraine, but sensitivity to external dependence is understandable: Venezuela has already faced financial sanctions, trade restrictions and difficulties accessing international technologies. In this context, Starlink appears not simply as a communications tool, but as an example of how vital infrastructure can depend on decisions made by corporations, foreign governments or their informal arrangements.

The tightening of U.S. immigration policy is an equally acute issue for Venezuelans. In an article by the Nicaraguan outlet LA PRENSA, immigration lawyer Noelia Ramos describes the situation for asylum seekers as “brutal” and unpredictable. According to her, a legal strategy prepared at the beginning of the week may become irrelevant within just a few days.

The article focuses on Nicaraguans, but its conclusions may also be important for the Venezuelan diaspora. Hundreds of thousands of Venezuelan citizens are in the United States as asylum seekers, holders of temporary statuses or participants in unresolved immigration proceedings. Tightened rules, shorter response deadlines and the possible review of decisions already made create uncertainty even for those who have previously received protection.

Ramos compared the dependence of immigration judges on the executive branch with practices that, she said, she had “seen in Nicaragua.” For people who left Venezuela because of political pressure, weak institutions or fears of persecution, this analogy touches on a particularly painful issue: the risk that a protection decision will be determined not only by the individual circumstances of a case, but also by the administration’s political course in Washington.

A separate issue concerns dual citizenship, including Spanish citizenship. Possession of another passport, the lawyer warns, may be used by U.S. authorities as an argument against the need for asylum in the United States. Formally, alternative citizenship does not necessarily deprive a person of the right to protection. However, an applicant may have to prove that the country of second citizenship is unable to provide genuine and effective safety.

“If this administration is looking for anything, it is the perfect excuse to deny asylum cases,” Ramos said. She also accused the authorities of acting “in bad faith” when reviewing cases of people who received refugee status during Joe Biden’s presidency.

Her practical advice is also relevant to Venezuelans: keep complete copies of all documents previously submitted, collect new evidence in advance, check statements for possible inconsistencies, immediately update one’s address with immigration authorities and, where possible, seek assistance from a lawyer. This is especially important because the appeal period has been reduced to ten days: a missed notification or an unprepared response can have irreversible consequences.

Taken together, these stories show that issues involving communications, climate, migration and international politics are increasingly intersecting with vulnerability to external decisions. For a Venezuelan audience, this may be less an assessment of specific events in the United States or Ukraine than a reminder of the cost of dependence on foreign institutions, infrastructure and changing political rules.

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Syria Arrests the “Butcher of Baniyas” as Hunt for Assad’s Executioners Continues

Syrian authorities announced on Thursday the arrest of Ali Kayali, known by the nickname Miraj Ural, who is considered the principal suspect in the mass killings in Baniyas. His detention is the latest in a series of high-profile arrests of prominent members of Bashar al-Assad’s ousted regime suspected of crimes and abuses against the Syrian people. The move is being described as an important milestone for transitional justice: some of those involved have already gone on trial, while proceedings against others are continuing.

Ural was born in 1956 in Antakya, southwestern Turkey. In the 1980s, under Hafez al-Assad, he acquired Syrian citizenship and became known as Ali Kayali. His armed career began decades ago: he joined the left-wing communist organization Ajalcilar and later the militia known as the Iskenderun Brigade Liberation Front. In 1978, he was arrested for bombing the US consulate in Adana and robbing a bank. He passed through 12 Turkish prisons, but escaped in 1980 by bribing a guard after Kenan Evren’s coup. He found refuge in Syria and joined the Syrian army.

When the 2011 revolution began, Ural once again emerged as a leading figure, commanding the pro-government militia known as the Shabiha—“Syrian Resistance–People’s Front for the Liberation of the Iskenderun Brigade.” It was based in the countryside of Latakia and operated as an auxiliary force for the regime’s army. Human rights organizations accuse Ural and his group of war crimes and sectarian crimes against hundreds of civilians. It was during this period that he acquired the nickname “the Butcher of Baniyas.”

He is considered implicated in the massacre in the al-Bayda area of Baniyas on May 2, 2013, as well as in other mass killings, including the killings in Ras al-Nabaa near Baniyas. The Syrian Network for Human Rights says that more than 450 civilians were killed in these two incidents alone, including 92 children and 71 women, who were executed in large numbers and with extreme brutality. Ural has also been accused of playing a role in the Houla massacre in Homs province in May 2012, in which 111 civilians, mostly women and children, were killed.

Among the cases in the same category is that of Ahmad Badr al-Din Hassoun, who was born in Aleppo in 1949. He was a preacher in the city’s mosques and became the republic’s mufti under Bashar al-Assad. Hassoun sided with the regime and called the revolution “a conspiracy by terrorists against Syria’s security”; his opponents nicknamed him the “mufti of barrel bombs.” In 2025, he was arrested while attempting to leave the country and charged with incitement to murder, war crimes and crimes against humanity. On August 24, 2026, the Fourth Criminal Court of Damascus sentenced Hassoun to life imprisonment and ordered the confiscation of his movable and immovable property for the benefit of the state treasury.

Wassim Assad, born in 1980, is a cousin of ousted President Bashar al-Assad and, according to investigators, the leader of a local armed network in Latakia. He is accused of extorting merchants, smuggling fuel and creating armed groups involved in crimes against civilians. On June 21, 2025, he was arrested in a carefully prepared ambush carried out by the General Intelligence Directorate and the Interior Ministry. On August 18, 2026, the Fourth Criminal Court of Damascus sentenced him to death, finding him guilty of establishing groups that carried out mass killings and torture—acts classified as crimes against humanity and war crimes.

Amjad Youssef, born in 1986 in the village of Nab al-Tayib in the al-Ghab area of northwestern Hama, was a junior military intelligence officer under the ousted regime and took part in special operations in southern Damascus. He is accused of detaining, torturing and killing opposition members and civilians, as well as bearing primary responsibility for the 2013 massacre in the Tadamun district. Youssef was arrested on April 24, 2026, during a months-long operation in the Hama countryside. Atef Najib, born in 1960 in Jableh, headed the Political Security branch in Daraa. He is accused of arresting and torturing children in Daraa in 2011 and of involvement in abuses against protesters, including the case of teenager Hamza al-Khatib.

Najib was arrested on January 31, 2025, in the Latakia countryside. The Fourth Criminal Court of Damascus found him guilty of storming the Omari Mosque in Daraa and directing operations against civilians in 2011, and on August 11, 2026, sentenced him to death. Muhammad al-Shaar, born in 1950 in the city of Haffeh in Latakia province, served as interior minister under Assad from 2011 to 2018. He is suspected of widespread abuses, including the suppression of protests and the torture of prisoners, and has also been linked to the Sednaya prison massacre in 2008 and events in Bab al-Tabbaneh in Lebanon in 1986. On February 4, 2025, he surrendered to the Syrian authorities.

Ibrahim Huwayjah is one of the most prominent security officials of the ousted regime. He rose to prominence after Hafez al-Assad’s 1970 coup and in 1987 became head of the Military Intelligence Directorate, replacing General Muhammad al-Khuli. He remained in the post until Bashar al-Assad dismissed him in 2002. His name is associated with Military Intelligence’s direct role in suppressing the 1982 uprising in Hama, as well as with planning the assassination of Lebanese leader Kamal Jumblatt in 1977. Huwayjah was arrested on March 6, 2025, in the Jableh area. On August 17, 2026, Radif Mustafa, head of the Accountability and Prosecution Department at the National Commission for Transitional Justice, urged relatives of victims to file lawsuits and testify against Huwayjah before specialized judicial bodies.

Wajih Ali al-Abdullah headed the Military Affairs Directorate under ousted President Bashar al-Assad and is considered directly responsible for coordinating 13 years of repression from the presidential palace, particularly between 2015 and 2018—years described as “the bloodiest.” The Interior Ministry said he was arrested on May 10, 2026, during a special operation. Colonel Ahmad Habib Ali, born in the village of Harf al-Masitara in the Qardaha area of Latakia, headed the Scientific Studies and Research Center and was responsible for sarin storage facilities and chemical production at Unit 417. He is accused of overseeing the manufacture of around 20 sarin bombs used in attacks on Syrian cities and towns in 2013 and 2017. He was arrested on July 15, 2026, during an Interior Ministry special operation in Latakia. Air Force Major General Ibrahim Mahla, born in 1963 in Ayn al-Arus in the Qardaha area, served as chief of staff of the Air Force’s 22nd Division and is suspected of involvement in airstrikes on civilian areas. He was arrested on May 15, 2026.

Comments on the News

• What is the “Shabiha,” and what role did these pro-government militias play in the early years of the Syrian conflict? — The Shabiha (Arabic for “ghosts”) were informal pro-government militias that emerged in Syria before 2011, primarily from Alawite clan-based and family-linked criminal networks associated with the Assad family’s circle. During the first years of the conflict, from 2011 to 2013, they were used as a semi-legal force to disperse protests, conduct raids, carry out abductions, torture and kill opposition members and civilians, often operating alongside the army and security services. Many were later integrated into the National Defence Forces and other structures.

• What is known about the 2013 Baniyas massacre, and why did it become one of the most prominent episodes in cases against the Shabiha? — In May 2013, regime forces and the Shabiha carried out mass killings in Baniyas and neighboring al-Bayda in Tartus province. According to the UN and human rights groups, at least 248 civilians were killed, including women and children. Many were killed in their homes, while some bodies were burned or thrown into the sea. The massacre became a symbol of sectarian cleansing targeting Sunnis along the coast. It became a major episode in cases against the Shabiha because of the scale of the killings, video evidence, survivor testimony and extensive documentation, as well as the way it demonstrated the impunity enjoyed by pro-government militias.

• What is Sednaya prison, and why did it become one of the main symbols of the Assad regime’s repression? — Sednaya is a Military Security Directorate prison near Damascus, known as a “human slaughterhouse.” Thousands of detainees—including opposition members, activists and civilians—were held there. Systematic torture, starvation, mass executions and the concealment of bodies were practiced at the prison. After the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, the prison was liberated, and the evidence uncovered there—cells, documents and mass graves—made it the central symbol of the regime’s repression.

• What is the Fourth Criminal Court of Damascus, and which former-regime crimes does it hear? — The Fourth Criminal Court of Damascus is one of the courts in the Syrian capital being used in the post-Assad period to hear cases involving crimes committed by the former regime. Its docket may include cases involving enforced disappearances, torture, mass killings and crimes against humanity linked to the security services, the Shabiha, Sednaya prison, the Baniyas massacre and other incidents. The court has also reportedly issued warrants for senior members of the former regime.

• What are the Scientific Studies and Research Center and Unit 417 within Syria’s security structure? — The Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC) is a Syrian state research and development agency that formally worked on civilian and military projects but, according to the United States, the European Union and the United Nations, played a key role in chemical weapons, ballistic missile and other weapons programs. Unit 417 is a division of the SSRC—reportedly linked to Military Intelligence—that was responsible for developing and producing chemical weapons, including sarin. It is subject to international sanctions.

• Why are Latakia, Jableh and Qardaha considered strongholds of the Alawite community and the former regime, and how does this affect trials of security officials from the area? — Latakia, Jableh and especially Qardaha are historic centers of the Alawite community; Qardaha is the ancestral village of the Assad family. Many military personnel, security officers and Shabiha members lived in these areas, which is why they are considered strongholds of the former regime. Trials of security officials from the region are complicated by local support for suspects, witnesses’ fear, the risk of sectarian revenge and collective punishment, distrust of the new justice system, and the possibility that some perpetrators may be hiding or benefiting from clan connections. This requires a careful balance between justice and preventing a new escalation.

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Full version: The Last of Them Is Miraj Ural: Meet 10 of the Most Prominent Figures Involved in Crimes Against Syrians

Maduro and Flores Deny Torture Charges in New York Court

Nicolás Maduro and Cilia Flores pleaded not guilty on October 15 before Judge Alvin Hellerstein in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York after U.S. prosecutors brought new charges. Investigators allege that they were involved in a conspiracy to commit torture; both defendants categorically rejected the claims set out in the indictment, calling them unreliable. At the joint request of the defense and prosecution, the court postponed the next stages of the proceedings: on December 17, it will consider the lawyers’ motions to dismiss the case, while the trial is scheduled to begin on June 14, 2027.

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Full version: Nicolás Maduro and Cilia Flores Plead Not Guilty to New Charges Brought by U.S. Prosecutors

Ben Taub and the Myth of the “Harvester” from Aleppo

In a new article for The New Yorker, American journalist Ben Taub, a 2020 Pulitzer Prize winner, recalls how, at the age of 22, he spent several months in Kilis, Turkey, on the Syrian border. In 2013, he went there to understand how reporters worked in war zones. Years later, Taub rereads his first experience of approaching the Syrian conflict and discovers that the hero celebrated by the Western press may have been little more than a myth he created himself.

Taub took a leave of absence from college to decide whether to devote himself to music or journalism, and had no intention of entering Syria. He was interested in the war correspondents he met at the border: he wanted to understand the ethical and logistical difficulties of working in conflict zones. A professor gave him contacts in Kilis—the last Turkish city on the route to Aleppo. There, Taub settled into the dilapidated Istanbul Hotel, home to freelance journalists, military adventurers, fighters, and spies; a German magazine even called it a “madmen’s hotel.” Because the opposition controlled the border crossings, almost any freelance journalist, aid worker, or fighter could enter Syria: all they had to do was fly to Turkey and cross the border on foot.

Taub’s first Syrian acquaintance was an activist named Ahmed, known by the nickname “Harvester.” Western newspapers described him as a programmer and hacker who led an anti-regime group called the “Aleppo Hackers” and was building a robot to rescue the wounded from under sniper fire. Reports said he had been arrested and tortured, had repeatedly hacked a pro-government television channel, and had received two death sentences in absentia. But the man Taub met wore a black suit and mirrored sunglasses, walked around with a “bodyguard,” and lived in a cramped room without a bathroom in the same hotel. Ahmed worked as an intermediary between journalists and local guides for $50 and boasted that he had taken 87 people into Syria and back. The hotel’s internet connection was so weak that sending an email took minutes, while his “prototype” robot turned out to be a toy car with exposed wires and nonfunctional pincers.

A commander of the Free Syrian Army offered to take Taub to Aleppo, but the journalist refused. He imagined a mother in Aleppo telling him her story, hoping he would carry her voice to the world, while he would be unable to write her story as it deserved. In opposition-controlled areas, journalists were being kidnapped with increasing frequency: experienced correspondents stopped coming, and the war in Syria became a war for freelance reporters—mostly young people with little experience and no editorial support. Once, Taub crossed the border and reached a displaced-persons camp in Bab al-Salam. He remembered his professor’s advice: “Think about who will hold the press conference if you are kidnapped.” There, he met Asaad Hamad, whose wife urgently needed heart surgery, but Turkish authorities would not let them cross the border. Taub wrote their story in the hope that publication would open the doors for them, but his professor replied that there were thousands of such stories and no one would come to save them; a few days later, the woman died.

When Taub returned to Kilis in the summer of 2013, the creation of the “Islamic State” had already been announced, and kidnappings of journalists and aid workers were becoming more frequent. According to Taub, the group’s militants watched Westerners in the city and reported across the border whenever someone left a hotel wearing a bulletproof vest and helmet. During that period, Taub met American journalist Steven Sotloff, who was heading to Aleppo. Taub advised him to avoid a local guide named Yusuf because he had been exposed by the Islamic State, but Sotloff was kidnapped along with Yusuf ten minutes after crossing the border. Taub later learned that someone had read his Facebook messages to Sotloff after the kidnapping, meaning the kidnappers may have known his hotel-room number. That same day, a man claiming to be a British doctor tried to lure Taub toward a truck near a café; the journalist refused and left the city. A year later, the Islamic State released a video of Sotloff’s execution. Taub watched it during his first week at journalism school, then entered the classroom in tears.

Later, people close to Ahmed “Harvester” told Taub that he was a fraud who took money from middle-aged women he met online. According to the journalist, two Canadian women discovered that he had deceived them in the same way; one sent him around $10,000. Ahmed married a 52-year-old French woman whom he met in a Facebook group supporting the Syrian revolution, persuaded her to invest thousands of euros in the “robot,” and in 2014 moved with her to France using a Syrian passport bought on the black market. Bilal, a Syrian technician who had worked with Ahmed, confirmed to Taub that the idea for the robot had been his own: after a sniper killed one of his wife’s relatives, he wanted to help the wounded. Bilal never found out where the donation money had gone. Together with Ahmed’s brother, he also maintained that no one in the family had been arrested or tortured, and that Ahmed had not hacked any television channels. In Taub’s view, the “Aleppo Hackers” group existed only in Ahmed’s stories to the Western press—one major European defense research institute had cited his account. Ahmed himself continues to insist that his version is true.

At the end of the article, Taub returns to Kilis in 2023. Bilal owns a computer shop and the local internet network, which city residents call by his name. The staff at the Istanbul Hotel, where Taub spent the most formative months of his life, do not remember him at all. For Taub, this is a symbolic conclusion: the place where he learned to look at war has almost disappeared from memory, while Bilal’s life has stabilized.

This story is not only about exposing one man. It shows how easily Western media create heroic images from intermediaries’ accounts, how difficult it is to verify a war from a distance, and what price Syrians, journalists, and everyone caught between propaganda, fear, and hope pay. Taub does not try to reduce everything to a simple conclusion: he shows that myths of war arise from a real need for heroes, but they always have authors, consequences, and forgotten victims.

Years later, Taub sees his first trip to Kilis as the point where the romance of war journalism collided with harsh reality. The provincial Turkish city, the hotel, the intermediaries, and the border crossings were not merely a backdrop for him but the main stage on which the great Syrian tragedy unfolded. Returning there, he discovers that the memory of those events has almost disappeared—as has the reputation of the “hero” once created by the press.

Comments on the News

• Where is the Bab al-Salam border crossing, and what role did it play in 2013 for Syrian refugees and foreign journalists? — Bab al-Salam is a crossing on the Syrian-Turkish border in Aleppo province, north of Azaz and opposite the Turkish city of Kilis. In 2013, it was one of the main “gates” between rebel-held northern Syria and Turkey: refugees fled through it from Aleppo and the surrounding areas, while foreign journalists, NGO workers, and opposition activists entered rebel-controlled territory. Control of the crossing changed periodically, but to the outside world it remained a key logistical artery.

• What was the Free Syrian Army in 2013, and which areas of northern Syria, including Aleppo, did it control? — In 2013, the FSA was not a unified army but a broad and loosely organized coalition of armed groups with different commanders and sponsors and no effective central command. In northern Syria, factions affiliated with the FSA controlled or shared control over rural areas around Aleppo—including Azaz, Marea, Bab al-Salam, and others—as well as parts of Idlib and northern Latakia. In Aleppo itself, rebels, including FSA and Islamist groups, held substantial areas, but the city was a scene of fierce fighting; the government retained the western neighborhoods, the city center, and the airport. By the end of 2013, the FSA’s position had weakened because of internal conflicts and the growing strength of jihadist groups.

• Why did Kilis become the main base for foreign journalists, intermediaries, and fighters on the Turkish-Syrian border, and how did its role change after the Islamic State grew stronger? — Kilis is a Turkish city directly opposite Bab al-Salam. In 2012–2013, it became a convenient rear base: it was close to rebel-held northern Syria, relatively safe, and had communications, hotels, smugglers, and intermediaries. Journalists, activists, aid workers, and fighters entered Syria through the city; recruiters, traders, and smugglers also operated there. After the Islamic State grew stronger in 2014 and seized parts of the border region, the crossings became more dangerous, Turkey tightened controls, and Kilis increasingly became a humanitarian and logistical hub for refugees and the moderate opposition. Later, following Turkey’s 2016 operations, its role as a “gateway for journalists” largely faded.

• How did the black market in passports operate in Syria during the civil war, and what did obtaining a Syrian passport mean for leaving for Europe? — During the war, a Syrian passport became extremely valuable because it made it possible to leave the country legally, cross borders, buy a ticket, and then apply for asylum. Officially, passports were issued only by regime authorities, so a black market emerged: stolen and forged passports were sold, along with “genuine” passports obtained through bribes and intermediaries. For a Syrian, obtaining a passport meant a chance to reach Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, or Europe; it helped during checks, visa applications, and registration as a refugee. Some non-Syrians also used forged Syrian passports to pose as Syrians and seek asylum, raising concerns in the EU. Prices rose, and the market was controlled by networks of officials, smugglers, and rebels.

• What did the in-absentia death sentences imposed by the Syrian authorities on opposition figures mean, and how were they used in the propaganda struggle? — An in-absentia death sentence meant that a Syrian court had found a person guilty without the person being present, usually on charges of “terrorism,” armed rebellion, ties to foreign powers, or treason. For the authorities, it was a tool of intimidation, the legitimization of repression, and a demonstration that the regime was “fighting terrorism”; it also prevented defendants from returning and closed off the path to reconciliation. The opposition and human-rights activists used such sentences in propaganda to highlight the absence of fair trials, arbitrariness, and the regime’s brutality. In-absentia verdicts became part of the information war: each side presented them either as a legitimate fight against terrorism or as political repression.

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Full version: The Madmen’s Hotel on Syria’s Border: An American Journalist Recalls His First Lessons in Covering the War

Venezuela Sees U.S. Policy as a Threat to Sovereignty

Venezuela’s agenda in recent years has taken shape at the intersection of sanctions pressure, disputes over the legitimacy of the government, the oil question, and Caracas’s relations with Washington. Against this backdrop, several reports—on Donald Trump’s belligerent rhetoric toward Iran, the cancellation of a live broadcast of a military execution in the United States, and scenarios involving foreign intervention in Venezuela—come together as part of a broader story about power, punishment, and sovereignty.

At a rally in Arizona, Donald Trump once again said that if Iran obtained nuclear weapons, it would allegedly attack the Middle East, Europe, and the U.S. West Coast. He called Iranian leaders “crazy people” and claimed they would use nuclear weapons “within 24 hours.” He used these statements to argue in favor of intervention against Tehran to prevent it from developing its nuclear capabilities, EFE via Yahoo Noticias reported.

Although the EFE report does not present the positions of Venezuelan authorities or experts, such rhetoric carries particular resonance in Caracas. Venezuela has lived for many years under U.S. financial and oil restrictions, trade barriers, diplomatic confrontation, and regular accusations from the United States of corruption, drug trafficking, undermining democracy, and threatening regional security. As a result, portraying yet another Washington adversary as a global danger may be perceived there not as a distant Middle Eastern story, but as a familiar model: economic coercion, political isolation, the demonization of a country’s leadership, and the acceptance of a military option.

Venezuela’s ties with Iran make a possible escalation around Tehran practically significant for Caracas as well. Amid sanctions on Venezuela’s oil industry, the two countries expanded their energy, trade, and technological cooperation. Iran supplied fuel and additives and also assisted Venezuela’s refineries. For Nicolás Maduro’s government, this cooperation became a way to mitigate the consequences of international isolation. Increased U.S. pressure on Iran could complicate cargo transportation, financing, maritime logistics, and the operations of energy partnerships already subject to sanctions controls.

Inside Venezuela, Trump’s words may also reinforce the official argument that the United States uses the language of national security to justify exceptional measures against unfriendly states. Notably, the Arizona speech combined international threats with domestic political mobilization: Trump attacked Democrats, made claims about electoral processes that were not supported by evidence, and criticized Representative Ilhan Omar. To critics of U.S. policy, this appears to be a fusion of foreign conflict, nationalism, and electoral polarization.

Another story, covered by the Spanish service of Deutsche Welle, sparked controversy over the Trump administration’s attitude toward the death penalty and its public presentation. The president canceled the live broadcast of the firing-squad execution of former military psychiatrist Nidal Hasan, who was convicted of killing 13 people at Fort Hood in 2009. However, the execution itself, scheduled for December 3, has not been canceled: the victims’ closest relatives will be allowed to attend if they wish.

Hasan’s execution would be the first military execution of its kind in the United States since 1945. Trump had previously suggested broadcasting it publicly, saying it could serve as a “strong deterrent” and show the world how the United States deals with “terrorists and scum like Hasan.” The initiative, associated with Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, faced opposition from both Democrats and Republicans, as well as from the Catholic Church, human rights organizations, and the United Nations.

For a Venezuelan audience, what matters in this story is not only the fate of the convicted man, but also the very idea of punishment as a public spectacle and a display of state power. In a country where official rhetoric has long portrayed the United States as a power that resorts to threats and coercion, the discussion of televising a firing-squad execution may be seen as supporting accusations that Washington applies double standards in the areas of human rights and the rule of law. Canceling the broadcast does not cancel the execution itself—and this contrast, together with the unprecedented nature of a military firing-squad execution after an 80-year hiatus, became the main source of concern.

The most radical interpretation of Venezuela’s situation is offered in a political and economic article on the Artemio López blog. The author views the country as one of six Latin American cases in which holding elections does not in itself guarantee genuine popular sovereignty. Alongside Venezuela, the analysis examines Brazil, Honduras, Colombia, Bolivia, and Argentina. The Venezuelan case stands out because of the combination of an electoral crisis, external pressure, a struggle over the state apparatus, and the importance of the world’s largest oil reserves.

The author recalls that the National Electoral Council declared Nicolás Maduro the winner of the presidential election on July 28, 2024, while the opposition declared Edmundo González Urrutia the elected president. According to the article, the absence of a complete, verifiable, and publicly accessible set of official voting records made it impossible to resolve the dispute on the basis of a result recognized by all sides.

At the same time, the publication is built around an extremely harsh scenario that requires separate verification: following the alleged “capture of Maduro by U.S. forces” on January 3, 2026, the Trump administration supposedly did not support María Corina Machado as head of the transition process and began negotiations with the executive authorities led by Delcy Rodríguez. In this interpretation, the United States acts not as a neutral defender of electoral procedures, but as an external player guided by governability, geopolitical interests, and prospects for access to Venezuela’s oil sector.

The author formulates the central question as follows: “Who sets the terms of this transition, who controls the strategic resources, and what actual role does Venezuelan society have in decisions about its own future?” In this logic, oil is not merely an economic sector, but the foundation of political autonomy, the distribution of national income, and relations with the United States.

The author urges readers to take a critical view of talk about restoring Venezuela’s oil industry and future U.S. investment. The argument is that declarations about democracy must be compared with actual practice: if an external power simultaneously influences political agreements, engages with de facto centers of power, and shows an interest in strategic resources, there is a risk that democratic language becomes an instrument for reshaping the country in the interests of the stronger party.

At the same time, this approach does not mean automatically defending every decision made by Caracas. The article explicitly states that sovereignty does not require uncritically accepting any declared election result or exempting politicians from accountability. However, under this view, political conflicts should be resolved through verifiable procedures, public oversight, and institutional guarantees—not through military, economic, or diplomatic coercion from outside.

Thus, the three stories are united by a question central to Venezuela: where are the limits of U.S. power? Rhetoric about the possibility of striking Iran raises concerns because of Caracas’s close ties with Tehran; discussion of a public execution intensifies criticism of American militarism and punitive policies; and debates over the future of Venezuelan power once again place oil, legitimacy, and society’s right to determine the country’s political system independently at the forefront.

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Aleppo Military Court Issues New Sentences in Syria Coast Case

The Military Criminal Court in Aleppo announced verdicts on Thursday during the second hearing in a case concerning violations in areas of Syria’s coastal region. Ten defendants appeared before the court: three former military personnel and officers of the ousted regime, and seven employees of the Ministry of Defense. The hearing is part of ongoing proceedings into events on the coast, involving both serious crimes and lesser charges.

The harshest sentences were handed down to two representatives of the ousted regime, Al-Wadah Ismail and Mahir Ali, who were sentenced to death. Mahir Othman was sentenced to 12 years in prison. Muhammad Bakkour of the Ministry of Defense’s 82nd Division received a 20-year sentence for intentional homicide. Ammar Abd al-Aal of the 54th Division was sentenced to three years for torture, while Captain Shanan and Khalid al-Muhaymid, also of the same division, each received two years for participating in torture. Mahmoud Shahin received two months for causing harm, with all defendants receiving credit for time already spent in pretrial detention. Abd al-Raouf Bakr of the 50th Division and Muhammad Zarzouri of the 54th Division were acquitted of intentional homicide charges due to insufficient evidence.

The current hearing continued a series of verdicts in the case. On September 17 last year, the court issued its first rulings, including death by hanging, life imprisonment, a 20-year prison sentence, and the acquittal of one defendant. The trial is being held at the Palace of Justice in Aleppo under Judge Zakaria Bakkara. Nine hearings have taken place since November 18, 2025. A total of 14 people are involved in the case: seven linked to the former regime are charged with crimes against personnel of the General Security Administration and Ministry of Defense forces, while another seven face charges related to crimes against civilians. Files and correspondence extracted from the defendants’ mobile phones were used as evidence.

The case dates back to the bloody events on Syria’s coast in March 2025, when groups of remnants of Bashar al-Assad’s regime attacked state security agencies and military checkpoints. Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa subsequently announced the creation of a national commission of inquiry and fact-finding to determine the causes and circumstances of the events and investigate violations against civilians. In July last year, the commission submitted its final report to the president after visiting the affected areas and collecting hundreds of testimonies in rural parts of Latakia and Tartus. The announcement of verdicts in the case is continuing.

News Analysis

• Why are Latakia and Tartus considered strongholds of the Alawite community, and how is this connected to the particular significance of the March 2025 events on Syria’s coast? — Latakia and Tartus are Syria’s historical and demographic centers of the Alawite community. Alawites are a religious minority, often described as a Shiite sect, traditionally concentrated in the coastal mountains. Under Hafez and Bashar al-Assad, the Alawite elite dominated the security services and political system, and these provinces became the regime’s main stronghold. After Assad’s fall in December 2024, the coast remained a base for supporters of the former authorities. In March 2025, Syria’s new authorities conducted operations against remnants of the old regime and armed groups, leading to clashes and mass casualties among the Alawite population. These events are particularly significant because they revealed the depth of sectarian tensions along the coast, the fragility of the new government’s control, and the risk of a renewed insurgency. The region is also strategically important because of the ports of Latakia and Tartus, as well as the presence of Russian military facilities, although their status after Assad’s fall remains unclear. Thus, March 2025 became a test of the new authorities’ ability to integrate or suppress the Alawite enclave.

• What are Syria’s 82nd, 54th, and 50th Ministry of Defense divisions, and what role do they play in the country’s current security structure? — These are new divisions formed as part of the reorganization of Syria’s Ministry of Defense after the old Syrian Arab Army was dissolved in late 2024. They are being created as integrated formations made up of former opposition factions, officers who changed sides, and new recruits, with the aim of replacing the armed forces of the former regime. The 82nd Division operates in the coastal region, including Latakia and Tartus, and played a central role in the March 2025 operations on the coast. The 54th and 50th divisions are regional formations deployed in central and northern Syria, including areas around Hama, Aleppo, and Idlib, and are responsible for maintaining security and consolidating government control. In the current security structure, they serve as the Ministry of Defense’s principal ground forces and report to the central government in Damascus. They reflect the new authorities’ attempt to build a national army out of disparate armed groups, although problems involving loyalty, coordination, and sectarian balance remain.

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Full version: Death and prison sentences handed down to those involved in violations on Syria’s coast

Venezuela Prepares Public Debt Restructuring Plan

At the annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in Bangkok, Venezuela’s chief economic adviser, Calixto Ortega, said the country was close to officially publishing an analysis of the sustainability of its sovereign debt. According to him, the document is an unconditional government priority. Technical work on the restructuring plan announced in May is continuing, although the timeline had to be adjusted because of operational difficulties following the earthquakes. Venezuela’s total debt is estimated at $150–200 billion, while the process is complicated by the large number of international creditors.

Ortega also rejected official dollarization, calling it an unsuitable solution, and said it was necessary to strengthen the bolívar as the national currency to support production and domestic transactions. The government intends to introduce a medium-term inflation-targeting system and gradually reduce price growth to double-digit levels. Agreements with gold-mining companies are expected to provide an additional source of financial stability: the authorities hope to increase the Central Bank of Venezuela’s precious-metal reserves and strengthen international reserves.

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Full version: Venezuela prevé publicar

Syrian Forces Arrest “Butcher of Banias” Miraj Ural

The Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) reported that Syrian intelligence had arrested Ali Kayali, known as Miraj Ural, while he was attempting to cross the border illegally. He is described as the main suspect in the 2013 Banias massacre. Last week, Syria’s Interior Ministry announced through the Internal Security Forces that it had arrested Jamal Tarabulsi, who served as Kayali’s deputy under the ousted regime of Bashar al-Assad. The arrests have once again drawn attention to one of the darkest figures in the Syrian conflict.

Ural’s biography is complex and contradictory. He was born in 1956 in Antakya, in southwestern Turkey, but for many years presented himself as a Syrian Arab. In the 1980s, under Hafez al-Assad, he obtained Syrian citizenship and became known as Ali Kayali. In the 1970s, he began armed activities against the Turkish authorities, joining the far-left communist organization Ajilcilar and the militia known as the Iskenderun Liberation Front, which sought the region’s return to Syria. In 1978, he was arrested for terrorist attacks, including the bombing of the US consulate in Adana and a bank robbery. He passed through 12 Turkish prisons, then escaped in 1980 by bribing a guard after General Kenan Evren’s coup and found refuge in Syria, where he joined the Syrian army.

With the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in 2011, Miraj Ural re-emerged on the scene. He led an armed shabiha group called the Syrian Resistance—People’s Front for the Liberation of Iskenderun, which was based in the countryside of Latakia and fought alongside regime forces as an auxiliary formation. It was during this period that his name became a symbol of brutal massacres, rather than merely political violence. Human rights groups, international organizations and local organizations have accused him and his group of war crimes and religiously and sectarianly motivated crimes that claimed the lives of hundreds of civilians. This earned him the nickname “the Butcher of Banias.”

Among the most serious accusations is his alleged involvement in the Houla massacre in Homs province in May 2012, in which 111 civilians were killed, most of them women and children. He has also been linked to the massacre in the Bayda district of Banias on May 2, 2013, when hundreds of unarmed civilians were executed—slashed, burned and shot. Ural’s arrest, if confirmed and followed by a fair trial, could represent an important step in the long struggle to hold those responsible for mass atrocities in Syria accountable.

News Commentary

• What is the “shabiha,” and what role did these pro-government militias play in the Syrian conflict? — “Shabiha” is an informal Syrian term—literally meaning “ghosts” or “gangs”—used to describe pro-government militiamen and armed groups linked to the Assad regime and often, though not exclusively, to the Alawite community. The term originally referred to criminal networks and informal guards operating around the Assad family and the security services. When protests began in 2011, the shabiha were used to disperse demonstrations, intimidate, abduct people, carry out extrajudicial killings and perpetrate sectarian violence. They operated as an auxiliary force alongside the army and intelligence services, helping the regime offset shortages of regular troops, guarding checkpoints and taking part in sieges and clearance operations. Later, many of them joined the National Defence Forces and other loyalist militias, while also becoming involved in smuggling and economic exploitation. The term has an intensely negative connotation; not all Alawites are shabiha, and not all pro-government militias are called by that name.

• What is the “Iskenderun Liberation Front,” and why does the question of Iskenderun’s (Hatay’s) status remain disputed between Syria and Turkey? — The Iskenderun Liberation Front is a small Syrian nationalist/opposition group—reportedly an armed formation—that advocates returning Iskenderun (Hatay) to Syria and opposes Turkish control over the region. The dispute has its historical roots in the aftermath of World War I, when the Sanjak of Alexandretta, centered on Iskenderun, was part of the French Mandate for Syria. In 1939, France transferred it to Turkey, which turned it into Hatay Province. Syria has never officially recognized the transfer and continues to regard Hatay as Syrian territory; on some Syrian maps, it is still shown as part of Syria. Turkey considers Hatay an integral part of its territory. The international community largely recognizes Hatay as Turkish, but Damascus’s failure to formally renounce its claims and nationalist mobilization around the issue keep the dispute alive. In the context of the Syrian conflict, the issue has been further aggravated by Turkish military operations in Syria and Ankara’s support for the Syrian opposition.

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Full version: Syrian Intelligence Arrests “Miraj Ural,” Main Suspect in the Banias Massacre

Doubts Surrounding Trump’s Economic and Geopolitical Agenda

Venezuelan media view U.S. policy under Donald Trump as a source of international economic and strategic uncertainty. The focus is on criticism of Washington’s alleged imperial ambitions regarding Greenland, the impact of tariffs on inflation, and U.S. trade ties with Cuba. These events are presented primarily through the lens of their international consequences and the political constraints facing the American agenda, rather than as purely domestic problems for the United States. The material is based on publications by La Vanguardia (Venezuela) and FXStreet (Venezuela).

Venezuela Between U.S. Oil Interests and Expensive Money

Venezuela is once again becoming a focus of U.S. strategic interest amid geopolitical tensions, rising energy risks, and expectations that the Federal Reserve will maintain a tight monetary policy. Donald Trump’s rhetoric about Canada, Greenland, and Venezuela, the war in Iran, fluctuations in gold prices, and movements in U.S. Treasury yields are creating a contradictory picture for Caracas: oil resources could restore the country’s investment importance, but the global financial environment is simultaneously becoming less favorable for risky and sanctions-constrained economies.

As La Vanguardia notes, Trump is using the theme of territorial expansion and national greatness as an important part of his election campaign. His statements about turning Canada into the “51st state,” his portrayal of Greenland as “our new and beautiful Greenland,” and his tariff threats are viewed not as random remarks, but as elements of a strategy of economic, political, and symbolic pressure.

In this context, Venezuela is paying particular attention to Trump’s remark: “What about Venezuela? We’re doing pretty well there too...” For Caracas, it is difficult to view such a reference separately from the oil factor. According to this interpretation, the war in Iran—which has now dragged on for six months, despite Trump previously presenting it as short-term—has contributed to higher gasoline and diesel prices. Washington, facing energy inflation and the political costs of rising prices, may be interested in alternative oil sources outside the Middle East.

It is reported that the United States continues to maintain “oil production projects” in Venezuela approved by interim President Delcy Rodríguez. This highlights the pragmatic nature of relations between the two countries: even during periods of sanctions, diplomatic conflict, and ideological confrontation, hydrocarbons can create channels for negotiations. For Venezuela, this represents a potential source of export revenue, investment, and the restoration of production capacity, but also carries the risk of increasing dependence on decisions made in Washington.

The comparison with Canada and Greenland is revealing in this respect. In the article’s interpretation, Trump sees partners, territories, and natural resources as tools for solving domestic American problems: Canada through tariff pressure and trade threats, Greenland through its mineral resources, oil, and gas, and Venezuela through the world’s largest oil reserves. For a country historically dependent on oil rents and repeatedly caught up in international struggles over access to hydrocarbons, this logic is especially sensitive. It raises once again the question of whether Venezuela is viewed as an independent partner or primarily as territory containing valuable raw materials.

But external conditions are determined by more than oil demand alone. An analytical column by FXStreet warns that the U.S. bond market is pricing in a more aggressive path for Federal Reserve interest rates than indicated by the central bank’s official September projections. Following the September inflation data, expectations of another rate hike intensified: the futures market expects the federal funds rate to reach 4.50–4.75% by April 2027.

The yield on 10-year U.S. Treasury bonds has approached 5.2%, nearly matching the expected earnings yield on the S&P 500. This changes the risk balance for investors: comparable potential returns can be obtained from U.S. government bonds while taking on substantially less credit risk than with equities. According to a Bank of America estimate cited in the article, 37% of fund managers would be prepared to move money from stocks into bonds if the 10-year yield reached 6%; another 19% already consider the current yield attractive. BlackRock, meanwhile, has increased its holdings of short-term U.S. Treasuries and reduced its exposure to U.S. equities to a neutral level.

The FXStreet author believes that large technology companies and the artificial intelligence sector have not yet fully priced in the risk of persistently expensive money. Under a bearish technical scenario for S&P 500 futures, levels of 7,700 and 7,600 points are cited, while a sustained move above 7,900 points would call that forecast into question.

For Venezuela, this is not an abstract Wall Street debate. Higher U.S. interest rates generally strengthen the dollar, increase the appeal of safe U.S. assets, and reduce global risk appetite. For a country facing sanctions, limited access to international capital markets, dependence on oil revenues, and the de facto dollarization of part of its domestic economy, such conditions mean an additional narrowing of opportunities to attract investment, restructure obligations, and restore external financing.

A strong dollar can support the nominal value of oil revenues when converted into local currency, but it does not remove the underlying constraints. Venezuela needs not only higher global oil prices, but also the ability to export crude freely, control its foreign-exchange earnings, import equipment, and attract long-term capital. If investors prefer U.S. bonds to assets in emerging markets, access to resources for the Venezuelan economy becomes even more difficult.

Uncertainty is also affecting the gold market. In an article published by FXStreet’s Venezuelan edition, analysts link the precious metal’s near-term performance primarily to the release of the U.S. Consumer Price Index. For Venezuelan readers, this indicator matters not only as a global market event: U.S. inflation affects Federal Reserve decisions, the dollar’s exchange rate, global liquidity, and the appeal of safe-haven assets.

FXStreet analyst Dhwani Mehta offers the most negative scenario for gold. In her assessment, the metal has approached $4,100 after three days of declines, while trading below key moving averages is increasing selling pressure. She warns that U.S. inflation above expectations “could strengthen expectations of another Federal Reserve rate hike this year,” supporting the dollar and bond yields. Such a combination is traditionally unfavorable for gold.

Gregor Horvat of Wavetraders takes a more cautious position. In his view, below $4,200 “the bears are still alive,” but he does not recommend chasing the downward move. His scenario suggests that gold may be forming a corrective triangle in a range between $4,050 and $4,700. This points to a market without a clearly established direction, capable of disappointing both buyers and sellers.

The most optimistic view comes from independent analyst Mohamad Garib. He believes that if the $4,119 level holds, gold could rebound toward $4,167. “If the price holds at 4,119, a rebound toward the 0.5 arc at 4,167 becomes the preferred scenario,” he notes. At the same time, he estimates that a sustained close below $4,077 would invalidate the bullish scenario.

For Venezuela, gold remains an important symbol of distrust in currencies and the search for protection against financial instability. In a country that has experienced hyperinflation, devaluation, and a decline in the purchasing power of its national currency, fluctuations in gold, the dollar, and U.S. interest rates are perceived as more than technical signals for traders. They indicate how stable or strained the global financial system is becoming—a system on which the Venezuelan economy depends far more heavily than might appear.

Thus, Venezuela is simultaneously gaining an opportunity and facing new risks. U.S. oil interest amid instability in the Middle East could increase Caracas’s importance in Washington’s energy policy. But tight monetary conditions in the United States, a strong dollar, capital flows into U.S. bonds, and weak appetite for risky assets could limit the practical benefits of that interest. For a country with enormous oil reserves, the key question remains: will it be able to turn external demand for its resources into sustainable economic recovery without once again becoming a dependent supplier of raw materials?

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IMF Expects Venezuela’s Economic Growth to Slow in 2026

The International Monetary Fund forecasts that Venezuela’s GDP will grow by 5% in 2026 and accelerate to 7% in 2027. According to the updated World Economic Outlook report, the Venezuelan economy will continue to expand, although its growth rate will slow in the coming year compared with the previous period. The IMF estimates that the country’s GDP grew by 9% in 2025, slightly above the official figure of 8.7% published by the Central Bank of Venezuela.

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Full version: ECONOMIC GROWTH: IMF projects Venezuela’s GDP to rise by 5% in 2026 and 7% in 2027

Syria and World Bank Discuss Financing and Damascus Office

Syria is taking new steps toward economic recovery with international support. On the sidelines of the 2026 annual meetings of the IMF and World Bank in Bangkok, Syria’s finance minister and the head of the country’s central bank met with World Bank Group President Ajay Banga. They discussed current financing, the progress of projects, and opportunities to expand cooperation aimed at rebuilding the Syrian economy.

On Tuesday, the Central Bank said on Telegram that the parties reviewed the implementation of projects already launched and support for key sectors. The opening of a World Bank Group office in Damascus in January was a separate topic; it is expected to improve the coordination and monitoring of programs. In August, the bank approved a $100 million grant to modernize Syria’s financial sector, an important signal after a 14-year suspension of support.

The grant is intended to develop payment systems and banking supervision, as well as upgrade financial-market and retail-payment infrastructure. Plans include modernizing the credit-information system and the core banking system of the Central Bank of Syria, while strengthening the technological foundation and cybersecurity. Syria regained eligibility for financing through the International Development Association in May 2025 after Saudi Arabia and Qatar repaid its debt to the World Bank—approximately $15.5 million—bringing the 14-year suspension to an end.

Against the backdrop of the political transition in late 2024 and the easing of restrictions by the United States, the EU, and the United Kingdom, international institutions have begun working more actively with Damascus. In March, the World Bank approved another grant—$20 million to improve public financial management, including budget preparation, expenditure controls, transparency, accountability, and digitalization. Recovery nevertheless remains difficult: war-related damage is immense, Syria’s debt was estimated at $27 billion at the end of 2024—128% of GDP—and about 67% of the population lives below the poverty line.

News Comments

• What is the International Development Association (IDA), and why was it so important for Syria to restore eligibility for financing specifically through it rather than through other World Bank institutions? — The IDA is the World Bank Group’s concessional financing arm for the poorest countries. It provides grants and long-term loans at very low or zero interest, and eligibility depends on low income and a lack of creditworthiness for ordinary loans from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). This is crucial for postwar Syria: GDP per capita has fallen sharply, the economy has been devastated, and debt sustainability is weak. Standard World Bank loans would therefore either be unavailable or too expensive. Other institutions—the IBRD, IFC, and MIGA—work with creditworthy states, private investment, and risk insurance rather than providing concessional budget support. The IDA, by contrast, makes it possible to finance infrastructure, healthcare, education, and social programs without sharply increasing debt, while also sending a signal to other donors. Clearing the debt therefore opened this specific “window” for Syria, rather than merely restoring symbolic membership.

• Why did Saudi Arabia and Qatar take responsibility for repaying Syria’s debt to the World Bank, and what political or economic interests connect them to postwar Damascus? — The debt was relatively small compared with the scale of reconstruction—around $15 million—but repaying it unlocked Syria’s access to concessional IDA financing. For Riyadh and Doha, this was an inexpensive way to gain influence in postwar Syria and present themselves as responsible regional sponsors. Politically, both states, which had previously supported the anti-Assad opposition, are now seeking to prevent renewed chaos, weaken the remaining Iranian and Russian influence, limit Turkey’s excessive rise, and contain extremism and drug trafficking, including Captagon. Economically, they are interested in reconstruction contracts, energy and transport corridors—including possible gas routes through Syria—access to the Syrian market, and channeling aid through the World Bank more transparently and in ways that benefit their companies. Repaying the debt collectively also strengthens their standing in the Arab and Western worlds as partners in stabilizing Syria.

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Full version: سوريا تبحث مع البنك الدولي دعم التعافي الاقتصادي

Global Concern Over Trump’s Economic and Foreign Policy Course

Today’s review focuses on growing concern about the consequences of Donald Trump’s policies for the global economy, energy security, and relations among allies. Criticism of tariffs is coupled with fears over possible agreements on Russian diesel fuel and the risk of worsening relations with Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Particular attention is given to inflation, U.S. Treasury yields, and the economic policies of Trump and Bessent, whose consequences could extend far beyond the United States. The review is based on materials from Invezz.com (Venezuela), elsiglo.com.gt (Venezuela), and Posta Porteña (Venezuela).

Venezuelan Press on U.S. Debt, Oil, and Multipolarity

Venezuelan publications and outlets targeting Venezuelan audiences link several global issues—U.S. government debt, inflation, oil prices, the war over Ukraine, and technological rivalry—into a single picture of instability in the familiar financial and geopolitical order. The focus is not so much on local assessments or comments by Venezuelan officials as on a characteristic framework of perception: distrust of Washington’s financial policies, particular attention to oil and sanctions, and an emphasis on sovereignty and multipolarity.

In a market commentary, Invezz focused on the decline in U.S. Treasury yields following a drop in oil prices. The yield on 10-year U.S. bonds reportedly fell to 5.192%, while the yield on 30-year bonds dropped to 5.556%. At the same time, the price of Brent crude fell by about 1.7%, to $104.82 per barrel.

For the global debt market, cheaper oil may mean weaker inflationary pressure and, consequently, less need for high interest rates. For Venezuela, however, whose export and budgetary capabilities are closely tied to the energy sector, falling oil prices have a dual effect. They may ease global inflation, while simultaneously reducing the potential revenues of countries dependent on commodity exports and increasing risks to their currency and fiscal stability.

The Invezz article draws attention to a warning from the International Monetary Fund: the combination of inflation, rising government debt, and an investment boom around artificial intelligence could once again push sovereign bond yields higher. As the Fund noted, “the impact could be severe given the fundamental importance of sovereign bond markets.” IMF representative Athanasios Vamvakidis put the problem even more directly: “The market is concerned about its ability to absorb the huge volume of issuance … at a time when central banks are shrinking their balance sheets.”

For Venezuela, this prospect means a harsher external financial environment. Amid sanctions pressure, limited access to international capital, and dependence on oil flows, higher global borrowing costs generally hit countries with vulnerable financial systems harder. Capital becomes more expensive, investors become more cautious, and access to liquidity becomes even more difficult for developing and isolated economies.

The article also mentions a possible energy truce between Russia and Ukraine and the prospect of increased Russian diesel supplies. For a Venezuelan audience, this is not a secondary detail: decisions concerning fuel, refining, and maritime routes can quickly alter global price conditions. In a country where oil remains the main foreign-economic reference point, the geopolitics of major producers is inevitably perceived as a factor in domestic economic stability.

At the same time, the Invezz publication is not only analytical but also commercially oriented. It suggests considering purchases of medium- and long-term U.S. government bonds, or the TLT and IEF ETFs, as a possible strategy if inflation slows. According to this logic, the risk lies in a renewed acceleration of price growth: this could undermine expectations of further declines in yields and support for the bond market. For Venezuela, however, “relief” in the U.S. debt market caused by cheaper oil does not appear unconditionally positive, since lower commodity prices could weaken the country’s export capabilities.

An even sharper interpretation of U.S. financial policy is offered in an opinion column by the Guatemalan publication El Siglo, titled “¡Aleluya! Los alquimistas Trump y Bessent encontraron la ‘piedra filosofal’.” Its author ironically calls Donald Trump and U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent “alchemists” who have supposedly discovered a philosopher’s stone capable of turning an accounting operation into a solution to the debt problem.

The text centers on the hypothetical revaluation of U.S. gold reserves. The United States officially records approximately 261.5 million ounces of gold at the legally fixed price of $42.22 per ounce, while the market price of the metal is significantly higher. The author gives a hypothetical example: if gold were valued at $155,000 per ounce, the reserves could formally approach $40 trillion—the approximate level of U.S. government debt.

However, as the column emphasizes, “revaluing gold would not actually create $40 trillion in new wealth.” Such a measure could expand the Treasury’s ability to issue gold-backed certificates and obtain credit through the Federal Reserve, but spending the funds thereafter would amount to large-scale money creation. In the author’s view, the result would be the risk of unprecedented inflation.

The idea that “certain levels of inflation” could help rapidly reduce the real value of debt comes in for particular criticism. The author sees this as an example of financial repression—a policy in which the government keeps interest rates below inflation, while the losses are effectively borne by savers. The column quotes Nick Giambruno’s explanation: with inflation at 9% and an interest rate of 4%, savings lose approximately 5% of their real value each year.

For Venezuelan readers, this logic is especially familiar because of the country’s experience with inflation, the devaluation of the bolívar, declining confidence in monetary policy, and the de facto dollarization of part of the economy. As a result, suggestions that the United States could ease its debt burden through inflation, a weaker dollar, or a revaluation of gold are perceived not as purely technical budgetary measures but as a risk of shifting the cost of government policy onto citizens’ savings.

The author recalls that after World War II, the United States and the United Kingdom already used negative real interest rates to reduce their debt burdens. At that time, capital controls and interest-rate restrictions were in place, and there was a broad pool of domestic buyers for government debt. The current situation, in his assessment, is different: yields on 10-year U.S. bonds remain above inflation, annual interest payments on the national debt already exceed $1 trillion, and the debt is being refinanced at higher rates.

This criticism reflects a view in which the dollar is not regarded as an unconditionally reliable and neutral global currency. The weakening of the U.S. currency and the rising price of gold are seen as signs of fundamental pressure on the U.S. monetary system. For Venezuela, where dollar transactions are important for imports, savings, oil revenues, and trade, a possible loss of confidence in the dollar could directly affect prices and the population’s purchasing power.

Another aspect of this same picture appears in a publication by PostaPorteñ@, which features an interview with Russian ideologue Alexander Dugin. The material deals with Russia, Ukraine, the United States, energy, and artificial intelligence, but for a Venezuelan audience it is presented within a familiar anti-hegemonic framework: as a dispute over sovereignty, sanctions pressure, and resistance to a unipolar world order.

Dugin is skeptical about possible arrangements concerning diesel supplies or strikes against oil-refining infrastructure. In his view, these are not signs of lasting peace but short-term tactical maneuvers. He argues that Donald Trump acts primarily in accordance with domestic political interests, since rising diesel prices could hurt Republicans in the midterm elections. According to Dugin, Trump is “an extremely unreliable ally” because he can change his position when the political environment shifts.

For Venezuela, diesel, oil refining, transportation, and export routes have long been more than merely economic categories; they are instruments of geopolitical pressure. Sanctions, licenses, exemptions from restrictions, and negotiations over energy directly affect the operation of the oil sector. Thus, discussions of Russian diesel and attacks on energy infrastructure may be perceived as a reminder that fuel and logistics have become part of political confrontation in the modern world.

Dugin also claims that the United States seeks to strengthen its control over the Western Hemisphere and Latin America. This idea echoes official Venezuelan discourse, in which U.S. influence in the region is often interpreted as a threat to sovereignty. He believes that Iran and China are Trump’s main adversaries, while Russia remains a secondary concern for Washington. In his view, however, this does not change the overall picture: the United States still represents a system opposed to multipolarity and BRICS.

Dugin speaks most radically about the West, stating: “We need to support every fault line in the West.” His strategic formula is “the weakening of the West, its division, its dismemberment.” This is no longer a neutral analysis of international relations but an ideological worldview in which Russia and its partners oppose a unified Western center of power. For Venezuela, which is developing political and energy ties with Russia, China, Iran, and other non-Western countries, this narrative serves as an argument for diversifying alliances, markets, and financial channels.

The interview links energy to the risk of military escalation. Dugin does not believe in a lasting truce and anticipates a transition from a “medium-intensity war” to a more direct confrontation between Russia and the West. He describes the situation as a “spiral of mutual escalation” and calls on Russian society to prepare for a severe conflict. For Venezuela, such a scenario is indirectly but significantly important: an escalation could affect oil prices, fuel availability, maritime logistics, sanctions regimes, and the positions of Caracas’s international partners.

Artificial intelligence occupies a separate place in the interview. Dugin calls AI a weapon and a “new battlefield,” arguing that Russia is seriously behind technologically and must create a “sovereign” scientific, military, and intellectual elite. “AI is priority number one,” he says. In this formula, technology, data, software, and digital infrastructure are viewed as elements of state sovereignty.

For Venezuela, which faces technological restrictions, sanctions, and dependence on foreign financial and communications systems, the issue of digital sovereignty also has practical significance. However, the publication offers no specific Venezuelan development program: Russia is presented instead as an example of a state that, in the author’s view, must mobilize science, education, and defense to achieve independence from external pressure.

All three publications are united not by an identical set of facts but by a common way of interpreting global events. U.S. debt is viewed here as a source of risk for the entire international financial system; inflation as a hidden mechanism for shifting losses onto savers; oil as the key to fiscal stability and geopolitical influence; and technology as a matter of national security.

At the same time, it is important to consider the genre of these sources. The Invezz material is a market commentary featuring investment scenarios, the El Siglo column is a polemical text with a satirical and critical tone, and the publication featuring Dugin is an ideological interview lacking a balance of alternative assessments and independent verification of controversial claims. Taken together, however, they show how global markets, the dollar, oil, sanctions, military conflicts, and digital dependence come together for Venezuelan audiences in a single question: to what extent can the country protect its economic and political independence amid a changing world order?

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Southern Syria: A Test for U.S. Diplomacy After Assad

After the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024, southern Syria has evolved from the periphery of the Syrian conflict into one of the Middle East’s most sensitive flashpoints. This is no longer simply a border issue between Damascus and Israel, but a genuine test of Washington’s ability to reshape the region according to a formula based on security and stability rather than a fragile “balance of fear.”

Israel has strengthened its positions near the Golan Heights and continued incursions and strikes, while Damascus, with U.S. support and in a renewed diplomatic context, is seeking security arrangements to limit escalation. The U.S. presence in this situation is not accidental: Washington has shifted from open confrontation with Damascus to a more complex approach—gradually lifting sanctions, supporting domestic stability, encouraging Syrian-Israeli dialogue, and retaining leverage. The meeting between U.S. envoy Tom Barrack and Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani, along with discussions of bilateral relations and regional security, reflects this shift.

Southern Syria—especially Quneitra, Daraa, and Sweida—lies at the intersection of several equations at once: a geopolitical nexus, overland corridors, supply chains and energy pipelines, as well as water resources for Damascus and Jordan. This makes it a point of contact involving Israel, Syria’s internal and national security, Turkish influence, the interests of Arab states, and the fight against the Islamic State. As a result, any disruption there does not remain local: it reverberates simultaneously in Damascus, Beirut, Amman, Riyadh, and Tel Aviv. According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, around 280 incidents of Israeli military incursions into Syrian territory were recorded in September alone.

Washington understands that security cannot be created through military force, buffer zones, or unilateral demands alone. Southern Syria cannot be stabilized without addressing the causes of its fragility: weak state institutions, growing local conflicts, the absence of transitional justice, stalled reconstruction, and the presence of armed enclaves or communities that feel cut off from the central decision-making process. Reports indicate that Sweida province remained outside the authorities’ effective control in Damascus amid tensions with the Druze community. This makes governing the south a test of the new state’s ability to build unified legitimacy.

The U.S. strategy in Syria cannot be understood separately from the rivalry between Israel and Turkey. Israel links its security to preventing any hostile military presence near its borders and is demanding the annexation of large areas in southern Syria, including the strategic peak of Jabal al-Sheikh. Turkey, meanwhile, seeks to consolidate its influence and establish security coordination with Damascus, particularly following the process of dismantling the Syrian Democratic Forces. Israel’s strike on the Abu al-Duhur base and Israeli concerns about the spread of Turkish capabilities in Syria show that the Israeli-Turkish rivalry over Syria’s “strategic depth” has become an integral part of the equation of stability or chaos. This is where the American role becomes apparent—as an inconvenient but necessary mediator.

The apparent U.S. objective is to establish a manageable security mechanism: an Israeli withdrawal or restrictions on Israeli incursions; a Syrian commitment not to pose a direct threat; international guarantees; and a political process preserving Syria’s sovereignty over its territory. Yet the path is filled with serious obstacles: continuing Israeli strikes and incursions, delays in withdrawing troops from occupied areas, Damascus’s limited ability to assert its sovereignty, and the complications surrounding Sweida. Any U.S. agreement will not endure if it is built at the expense of Syrian sovereignty or ignores the aspirations of southern Syria’s residents.

Washington’s success will be measured not by the number of meetings or statements, but by its ability to turn the region’s fragility into lasting security. If U.S. diplomacy does not evolve from crisis management toward building a genuine political solution, southern Syria will remain merely another front in a broader regional conflict. But if it can reconcile Israeli security guarantees, Syrian sovereignty, and the role of Arab and Turkish actors, it may open the door to a “balance of peace” instead of a “balance of fear.”

Comments on the News

• Where is Sweida located, and why has the region’s Druze community historically held a special position in Syrian politics, at times distancing itself from Damascus? — Sweida is a city and province in southern Syria, near the border with Jordan, in the Jabal al-Arab (“Druze Mountain”) region. The Druze are a closed religious community concentrated there. Historically, they enjoyed autonomy under the Ottoman Empire and the French Mandate and maintained their own religious and tribal structures. Because of their peripheral location, concerns about their identity, and distrust of central authorities, the Druze have often kept their distance from Damascus. During the civil war, Sweida became one of the few relatively autonomous areas where local councils and militias played a greater role than the regime.

• What is Jabal al-Sheikh, and why does Israel seek control over this peak, linking it to security on its border with Syria? — Jabal al-Sheikh, or Mount Hermon, is a mountain massif in the Anti-Lebanon range at the junction of Syria, Lebanon, and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. It is a strategic elevation from which large areas of Syria, Lebanon, and northern Israel can be observed. Israel wants to control the Syrian part of the peak in order to obtain early warning, prevent Iranian forces, Hezbollah, or hostile groups from deploying near its border, and retain control over water resources—the runoff from Mount Hermon feeds the Jordan River.

• What is the Abu al-Duhur base, and why do the interests of Israel, Turkey, and Syrian armed groups intersect there? — Abu al-Duhur is a former military air base in eastern Idlib and an important hub on routes connecting Aleppo, Idlib, and Hama. During the civil war, it changed hands several times. Conflicting interests converge around it: Israel seeks to prevent Iran or Hezbollah from using the base; Turkey supports Syrian groups loyal to it and wants to weaken Kurdish forces; and various Syrian armed formations are competing for control of the strategic territory and communications routes.

• What are the Syrian Democratic Forces, and why did their dismantling become a bargaining issue between Turkey, Damascus, and Washington? — The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are a politico-military alliance in northeastern Syria whose core consists of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG). They received U.S. support in the fight against ISIS. Turkey views the SDF as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and demands its dissolution. Damascus wants to restore central authority over the northeast. Washington uses the SDF to fight ISIS and preserve its influence, so the group’s future has become a bargaining issue: Turkey demands its dismantling, Damascus seeks its integration under central control, and the United States wants to maintain a manageable presence and prevent chaos.

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Full version: Southern Syria… Washington Faces a Test of Security

Venezuela to Introduce Food Sovereignty Law

Venezuelan President Delcy Rodríguez announced at the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) World Food Forum that the government would soon submit to parliament a bill on developing the local, community-based and entrepreneurial economy. The document is intended to bring together small producers, cooperatives and large-scale agribusiness to strengthen the national “Venezuela Feeds” program, whose main goal is to eliminate hunger.

Rodríguez stressed that access to food is an inalienable human right and must not be used as a tool of political pressure or international confrontation. She also pointed to a global contradiction: despite humanity’s unprecedented scientific and productive capabilities, millions of people are going hungry, while a significant share of food is lost or discarded. According to her, two hunger hotspots emerged simultaneously in 2025—in the Gaza Strip and in certain regions of Sudan.

Speaking about the situation in Venezuela, the president said that food and nutritional indicators had recovered after deteriorating following the political crisis and international sanctions imposed since 2017. According to FAO data she cited, the rate of undernourishment fell to 5.3% in 2025 and to approximately 3% in the current year, while acute malnutrition among children under five declined from 14.8% in 2019 to 1.3% in 2025. The share of children who were exclusively breastfed reached 73.7%. Rodríguez thanked the FAO and the World Food Programme for their technical support and said that guarantees of land rights and technological innovation formed the basis for a new stage of agricultural development in the country.

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Full version: Delcy Rodríguez announces from the FAO

Syrian Flag in Gaza Tunnels: A Symbol of Unity and Resistance

Footage circulated by the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades—the military wing of Hamas—shows the Syrian revolution flag, which was adopted as the flag of the Syrian state after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, inside one of the tunnels in Gaza. The footage chronicles the combat path of fallen fighter Mahmoud Muhammad Shabana, the son of Muhammad Shabana, commander of the Rafah Brigade, and a fighter in the Raid al-Attar Battalion (“Yabna”), part of the same brigade. The flag was shown in the Rafah tunnels during the “Al-Aqsa Flood” war.

Users drew attention to the symbolic significance of the flag’s appearance. In their view, it was more than a random image, reflecting solidarity between the Syrian and Palestinian peoples and their shared aspirations for freedom and justice. One activist wrote that the flag, raised in the darkness of the tunnels and under siege, symbolizes the unity of free people’s self-sacrifice and confirms the shared cause of Gaza and the Levant (historic Syria). He added that Palestinian and Syrian blood flows through the same artery, while the image carries a “message of steadfastness and pride”: the choice of resistance and freedom comes above all else, and the dawn of the future will break through from these tunnels toward every land that rejects injustice and oppression.

A comment was also circulated on social media: “The Syrian revolution flag—and today, the flag of the Syrian state—appears in the tunnels of Gaza’s mujahideen.” Its author noted that Syrians and Palestinians “have always been brothers in faith and conviction,” wished them relief, an end to their suffering, and a swift victory and liberation from the occupier—just as, in his words, God granted Syrians deliverance from the tyrant of the Levant. The comment became part of the broader reaction to the image’s symbolism.

The appearance of the flag is being discussed amid heightened attention to material published by the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades about their fighters and the tunnels used during the war in the Gaza Strip. Such publications document stages of their journey and reveal details from the battlefield that had long remained out of sight. The image of the Syrian flag in the Rafah tunnels continues to attract attention and active discussion because of its symbolism, associated with solidarity, resistance, and liberation.

Comments on the News

• What is the “Syrian revolution flag,” when did it emerge, and why was it adopted as the flag of the Syrian state after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime? — The “Syrian revolution flag” is a green, white, and black horizontal tricolor with three red stars in the center of the white stripe. Its history goes back to the flag of the Syrian Republic, adopted in 1932 while the country was under the French Mandate. The same flag was used after independence until 1958 and again from 1961 to 1963. Since 2011, participants in the Syrian revolution and the opposition have used it as their symbol, setting it against the red, white, and black flag with two green stars associated with Bashar al-Assad’s regime and the Ba’ath Party. After the regime fell, Syria’s new authorities adopted this flag as the official state flag to emphasize a break with the previous government, draw on the historical continuity of an independent Syria, and unite various opposition forces around a common symbol.

• What does the term “Sham” mean in the Syrian and Arab context, and which historical territories does it encompass? — In the Arab and Syrian context, “Sham” (Arabic: الشام, al-Sham) refers to the historic Levant, or Greater Syria (Bilad al-Sham). Etymologically, the name is linked to the notion of the “left” side: when looking eastward from Arabia, the Levant lies to the left, while Yemen lies to the right. In a narrow sense, “Sham” may refer to Damascus (Dimashq al-Sham). In a broader sense, Bilad al-Sham encompasses the territories of modern-day Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, and Israel. Historically, it also included parts of southern Turkey—such as Hatay/İskenderun—and the Sinai Peninsula. During the early Islamic period, it was a province of the Caliphate divided into military districts (junds): Damascus, Homs, Jordan, and Palestine, later joined by Qinnasrin. After World War I and the Sykes–Picot Agreement, the region was divided into the modern states; today, “Sham” is therefore used mainly as a historical, cultural, and political concept rather than an official name.

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Full version: The Syrian Revolution Flag in al-Qassam’s Gaza Tunnels: What Is the Story?

Saladin Monument in Damascus: Relocation, Restoration and Controversy

The relocation of the Saladin monument, which stood beside the Citadel of Damascus, has raised numerous questions and prompted a mixed reaction in Syria—both among the public and on social media. The Damascus administration says the decision is connected with maintenance and restoration work, as well as the need to repair damage in order to preserve the monument’s artistic value. Authorities say they are already studying and preparing a suitable location where the monument can once again be displayed in a manner worthy of its symbolic status and be viewed from different angles.

The monument is considered one of Damascus’s most prominent artistic and memorial landmarks. It was created by the late Syrian sculptor Abdallah al-Sayed together with Nizar Alloush and Fuad Toubal. Construction began in 1992, and the monument was officially unveiled in 1993, marking the 800th anniversary of the death of Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi. The enormous sculpture depicts Saladin on horseback in a scene recalling the victory at Hattin in 1187 and the capture of Jerusalem. Two warriors stand beside him, while behind them are the Crusader commanders Reynald de Châtillon and Guy de Lusignan, shown as prisoners after the battle. The monument acquired additional symbolic significance because its image appeared for many years on the old Syrian 200-pound banknote.

The monument’s removal from its familiar location at the entrance to the citadel in the center of Old Damascus coincided with a broad public debate, particularly among residents of the capital. Opinions were divided: some supported the relocation, while others opposed it. In a poll conducted by the Syria Now platform, one participant expressed the hope that, after adjustments to the site, the monument would be returned to the citadel, acknowledging its symbolic role in the memory of the place. Another resident noted that the rather bulky monument obstructed pedestrians on the sidewalk along the fortress wall and said that its removal would help improve the area.

On social media, many asked whether the monument should have been relocated instead of addressing the organizational problems at the site. Dr. Khair al-Din Hassan wrote: “What was the solution—to move the Saladin monument, or to improve the area and remove the stalls and violations that have disfigured the surroundings of the citadel?” Activist Abdurrahman al-Saghir agreed with this assessment, saying that the area around Saladin’s statue had effectively become a place for “market stalls.” He supported “relocating it for restoration, then returning it to its former location or placing it somewhere worthy of Saladin’s history.”

Other participants in the debate rejected the idea of treating the monument as an “eternal ancient monument.” Blogger Yasser Arwani pointed out that it is only about 33 years old and therefore cannot be regarded as an untouchable historical symbol. Activist Muaz Salahani countered that the monument had become “a striking landmark and visual focal point” connected with the memory of the place, its people and the city’s visitors. Sihanouk Dibo strongly condemned the relocation, saying that removing Saladin’s statue from in front of the Citadel of Damascus, and from near the house where he died, was “a grave mistake that no argument can justify,” as well as “an attack on identity and a new wound inflicted upon it.” Writer Muhammad Mansour, by contrast, supported moving the monument away from the citadel walls, citing a UNESCO rule: a modern concrete monument should not be placed in front of an archaeological site, and there should be a distance between ancient buildings and new sculptures. It is worth recalling that Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi died and was initially buried inside the Citadel of Damascus in 1193. About two years later, in 1195, his body was moved by order of his son, al-Afdal, to the al-Aziziya Madrasa in the al-Kallasa quarter near the Umayyad Mosque. His renowned tomb is still located there and receives visitors today.

Comments on the News

• What is the Citadel of Damascus as a historical and architectural complex, and why does its status as a cultural heritage site make its proximity to a modern concrete monument a separate subject of debate? — The Citadel of Damascus is a medieval fortress in the Old City of Damascus and forms part of the UNESCO World Heritage site “Ancient City of Damascus.” It includes structures from the Ayyubid, Mamluk and Ottoman periods. A modern concrete monument—for example, a Tomb of the Unknown Soldier—stands near or inside the citadel. Its proximity has sparked debate because heritage status requires the preservation of historical integrity and visual authenticity. Modern structures may disrupt the historic landscape, but they may also be viewed as part of national memory and recent history. This reflects the conflict between heritage preservation and the need to commemorate modern events.

• Who were Reynald de Châtillon and Guy de Lusignan, depicted as prisoners after the Battle of Hattin, and how are their fates connected with the history of the Crusades and the memory of Salah al-Din in Syria? — Reynald de Châtillon was a Crusader, Prince of Antioch and ruler of Transjordan, known for breaking truces and attacking caravans. After the Battle of Hattin in 1187, he was captured and executed by Salah al-Din. Guy de Lusignan, the King of Jerusalem, was also captured at Hattin but was later released; he subsequently became King of Cyprus. The Battle of Hattin was a key victory for Salah al-Din and led to the recapture of Jerusalem. In Syrian and Arab memory, Salah al-Din is a symbol of unity and the struggle against the Crusaders; his tomb in Damascus is a site of remembrance. The fates of the prisoners illustrate his image as a just and merciful ruler, but one who was uncompromising toward those who broke their oaths.

• What is the al-Aziziya Madrasa in the al-Kallasa quarter, and what role did it play in medieval Damascus, given that Salah al-Din’s famous tomb is located there? — The al-Aziziya Madrasa (المدرسة العزيزية) was an Islamic educational institution in Damascus’s al-Kallasa quarter, built in the late 12th century, around 1195–1196, by Salah al-Din’s son, al-Aziz Uthman. It served as a center for the study of Shafi‘i jurisprudence and as Salah al-Din’s burial place. In medieval Damascus, madrasas played an important role in education, religion and politics, and also served as dynastic mausoleums. Salah al-Din’s tomb made the site a destination for pilgrimage and national remembrance, while the complex itself forms part of Damascus’s historic heritage.

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Full version: Removing Salah al-Din from the Citadel of Damascus sparks controversy in Syrian society

Delcy Rodríguez Says Venezuela Is Returning to “Zero Hunger” Goal

Venezuelan President Delcy Rodríguez said at the 2026 World Food Forum in Rome that the country is once again approaching the goal of eradicating hunger. According to Rodríguez, Venezuela had already achieved this benchmark, but international sanctions later negatively affected its production capacity and food supplies for the population. She stressed that the government continues to strengthen social protection and food security, and called on all countries to develop responsible agricultural production while taking nature’s interests into account.

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Full version: Delcy Rodríguez in Rome:

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Syria’s Finance Ministry Denies Rumors About Fund Assets and New Taxes

Syria’s Ministry of Finance categorically denied statements attributed to Minister of Finance Muhammed Yusr Barnia concerning the value of the assets held by Syria’s sovereign wealth fund. According to the ministry, figures circulating in the media and on social networks are not based on any official statements or data. On Sunday, the ministry’s information service stressed that the minister had not announced any figures concerning the value of the fund’s property or assets. The ministry did not disclose the actual value of the assets, limiting itself to denying the claims.

In a separate statement, the Finance Ministry also rejected claims that new taxes or fees had been imposed on trade and service sectors and professions. It explained that the decisions circulating on social media concern local administrative fees and are unrelated to the state’s tax policy. The issue involves Decision No. 57 of September 27, 2026, issued by the executive bureau of the Azaz City Council in Aleppo province. The decision concerns annual administrative licenses for commercial and service establishments and sets fees for professional activities. The ministry noted that such fees are collected by local administrative units to fund and develop their services and do not constitute new taxes imposed by the central government; local councils and executive bodies have no authority to introduce new taxes.

The Finance Ministry also said it was preparing to launch a new tax system in early 2027. The system is intended to stimulate the economy through simplification and incentives for businesses, while reducing the tax burden on people with limited incomes. The planned system will be based on the principles of simplicity, fairness and tax neutrality, while tax rates, according to the ministry, will be among the lowest in the region. The plans also include improving tax compliance, combating corruption and strengthening transparency, which should improve the business climate and cooperation with the private sector.

The Finance Ministry urged citizens and journalists to rely exclusively on the ministry’s official platforms for information about financial and tax decisions and to verify figures and statements before publishing them. The ministry again called on media outlets to be accurate and cite official sources when reporting on the activities of state economic institutions. According to the ministry, these steps should reduce misinformation and strengthen trust in official information. The SANA news agency also reported on the Finance Ministry’s calls for more responsible coverage of economic policy.

News Comments

• What is Syria’s sovereign wealth fund, and why are there so many rumors and denials surrounding estimates of its assets? — Syria’s sovereign wealth fund is a state investment fund created to manage part of the country’s public assets—real estate, stakes in companies and infrastructure projects—and to finance development and reconstruction. Estimates of its assets generate many rumors and denials because they affect the budget, investor confidence, potential privatization and political accusations of opaque resource allocation, while official data are often incomplete or disputed by different parties.
• What is Azaz’s administrative status, and why might decisions by its local council on fees be perceived as the introduction of nationwide taxes? — Azaz is a city in northern Aleppo province, near the Turkish border. It is administered by local structures linked to the opposition and Turkish-backed forces rather than being under the direct control of the central government in Damascus. Its council therefore has the authority to establish local administrative fees to fund services. Such decisions may be perceived as nationwide taxes because the boundaries of authority are unclear, there is no unified tax system across all of Syria, and the media or public sometimes refer to any mandatory payments as “taxes.”

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Full version: Syria’s Finance Ministry Denies the Accuracy of Circulating Figures About Sovereign Fund Assets and Taxes

International Resistance to Trump’s Policies

From Iran to Ukraine and international justice, Donald Trump’s policies are facing growing resistance abroad. Tehran rejects Washington’s position on the Strait of Hormuz, Kyiv refuses to accept U.S. pressure and criticism of Volodymyr Zelensky, while threats against the International Criminal Court are seen as a challenge to the global system of accountability. At the center of the debate is the question of the limits of American influence, unilateral actions, and attempts to impose political solutions amid war. This article was prepared based on reports by La Unión Digital (Venezuela), Sinaloa Hoy (Venezuela), and Bastion (Venezuela).

Energy Truce and the Dispute Over Ukraine’s Sovereignty

Donald Trump’s statements about a possible partial ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine related to attacks on energy infrastructure have sparked a new dispute over who has the right to negotiate an end to the war—and under what conditions. At the center of the discussion are Russian oil refineries, diesel supplies, sanctions, fuel prices in the United States, and Kyiv’s fundamental position: decisions about Ukraine’s future cannot be made without Ukraine.

According to Argentina’s La Unión Digital, Trump announced an agreement that was supposed to cover a halt to attacks on energy facilities. However, Volodymyr Zelensky indicated that the announcement came as a surprise to him. According to Axios journalist Barak Ravid, the Ukrainian president said: “The announcement of the ceasefire was news to me.”

Zelensky stressed that Kyiv would be prepared to accept such an arrangement only if Russia had genuinely endorsed it and if the parties were given clear terms and a start date for the truce. This discrepancy between Trump’s public statement and the Ukrainian side’s reaction became one of the clearest signs of the uncertainty surrounding the initiative.

In an article published by Mexico’s Sinaloa Hoy, the conflict is presented as part of a broader breakdown of trust between Kyiv and Washington. Zelensky rejects the possibility of agreements with Moscow reached at the expense of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and political future. His position is stated in unequivocal terms: “Ukraine’s freedom is not up for negotiation.”

The Ukrainian leader also offered a critical assessment of the proposed U.S.-Russian energy agreement involving Russian diesel fuel. In his view, such an arrangement would be “weak and unfair”: concessions to the Kremlin, Zelensky believes, would not bring peace closer but could instead increase instability. In this context, his refusal to make territorial or political concessions is not merely a diplomatic position, but also a response to fears that major powers may discuss Ukraine’s future without its full participation.

The Uruguayan publication Bastión offers an even harsher interpretation of events. In its account, Trump links the cessation of Ukrainian attacks on Russian oil refineries to the risk of shortages and rising fuel prices, particularly amid tensions between the United States and Iran. At the same time, according to the article, the U.S. president called for a new leader to emerge in Ukraine: “I suggest finding a new leader who can make a deal.”

Zelensky responded to such calls by invoking the right of Ukrainian society to determine its own leadership: “It is for our society, our people, to choose one leader or another.” In wartime, amid daily attacks and martial law, the question of elections is not simply a domestic political issue; it has become part of the struggle for sovereignty and resistance to external pressure.

Energy plays a particularly important role in this story. According to the reports, Trump is seeking an end to attacks on Russian oil infrastructure, fearing the consequences for the fuel market. The Ukrainian side, in turn, is proposing reciprocity: Kyiv is ready to stop attacking Russian energy facilities if Russia stops destroying Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. Thus, oil, diesel, and refineries have become not only economic assets, but also instruments of war, pressure, and negotiation.

Against this backdrop, Ukraine’s Western partners appear divided. While Trump, according to the reports, is seeking a pragmatic energy settlement, the European Union intends to continue applying sanctions pressure on Russia. EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said: “Now is not the time to ease pressure on Russia, and Europe will not do so.”

For Venezuela, whose economy and international relations have been closely tied to the oil sector, sanctions, and access to export markets for decades, this debate has indirect but significant implications. The possible easing of restrictions on Russian diesel demonstrates how flexibly Washington can revise its sanctions policy when domestic fuel prices, energy security, or electoral calculations become priorities.

In Caracas, this episode may be seen as confirmation that sanctions often depend not only on declared principles, but also on geopolitical and economic interests. Restrictions on Venezuela’s oil sector, licenses for foreign companies, and the country’s access to markets have likewise repeatedly become subjects of political bargaining between Caracas and Washington.

At the same time, the original reports contain no direct reaction from Venezuelan authorities, local experts, or political forces. The Argentine, Mexican, and Uruguayan articles do not express Venezuela’s official position; instead, they examine statements by Trump, Zelensky, European officials, and media reports. A Venezuelan interpretation can therefore only be analytical—framed through the issues of oil, sanctions, foreign intervention, and the vulnerability of countries whose fate depends on decisions made by major powers.

The central question remains the same: can an energy truce become a step toward a genuine reduction in violence, or will it turn into a deal that protects fuel markets and the interests of major players without ensuring Ukraine’s security or its right to determine its own future?

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UN Security Council Publicly Affirms Importance of 1974 Agreement with Israel

Syria’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Ibrahim Al-Alabi, said that the Security Council’s confirmation of the need to respect the 1974 ceasefire agreement with Israel was an unprecedented step. In an interview with Al Jazeera on Sunday, he explained that this position reflected the effectiveness of Syrian policy, which is based on isolating Israel and mobilizing international support against it rather than on military confrontation. Damascus, he said, was pursuing this course because it saw it as an effective way to respond to Israeli violations.

Al-Alabi noted that this was the first time the Security Council had publicly announced this position following closed consultations. In his view, it reflected agreement among the five permanent members on Syria’s sovereignty over its territories where Israel carries out incursions and arrests. He recalled that the United Nations had stated that some such actions could constitute war crimes.

The diplomat stressed that Damascus was avoiding military confrontation with Israel and focusing instead on a policy of recovery and reconstruction that was beginning to bear fruit. Syria continues to mobilize the international community against Israel, whose prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, recently refused to recognize the 1974 agreement. Al-Alabi recalled that ambassadors from 45 countries sided with Damascus when Netanyahu decided to cross the Syrian border; these positions resulted from the efforts of the Foreign Ministry and other government bodies.

He said these efforts coincided with US talks and mediation aimed at reaching a security agreement between Syria and Israel. At the same time, Damascus was not ignoring the rights of Syrians in areas entered by the occupying army. According to him, such actions were political and legal tools for countering Israeli violations, which the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights described several days ago as possible war crimes. Syria’s efforts were already putting pressure on Israel: its ambassador to the UN said at a meeting that he had found himself at a “Syrian session” because of Damascus’s extensive diplomatic mobilization.

Al-Alabi believes that Israel is facing growing pressure because it has no grounds to justify its presence in a region that Israel’s UN ambassador called small, expressing surprise at the world’s interest in it. Syria is committed to international law, agreements and UN Security Council resolutions, whereas Israel, he said, ignores all of them. This gives Damascus stronger negotiating leverage and helps it preserve its sovereignty while avoiding military confrontation during the recovery phase. The region wants a stable Syria, which serves the interests of the entire world; this was demonstrated by the historic visit of the UN secretary-general and several European foreign ministers to Damascus. Syria’s Foreign Ministry welcomed the Security Council’s reaffirmation of the need to respect the 1974 agreement, made after discussions on Israel’s continuing incursions into southern Syria.

News Comments

• What is the 1974 Disengagement Agreement between Syria and Israel, and what role do the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) play in ensuring compliance with it on the Golan Heights? — This is the Disengagement of Forces Agreement between Israel and Syria, signed on May 31, 1974, after the Yom Kippur War. It established a ceasefire, created a buffer zone—the area of separation—on the Golan Heights, and established zones limiting weapons and troop deployments, known as Alpha and Bravo. To monitor compliance, the UN Security Council established UNDOF through Resolution 350. UNDOF patrols the area of separation, ensures that it contains no military forces, verifies restrictions on weapons, maintains contact with both sides and reports violations to the Security Council. Its mandate is renewed every six months. The agreement is not a peace treaty, but for a long time it provided relative stability along the border.

• Which areas in southern Syria—for example, Quneitra and Daraa—border the Golan Heights, and why are they considered especially sensitive in Syrian-Israeli relations? — Quneitra Governorate directly borders the Golan Heights, including the city of Quneitra, which lies near the ceasefire line and was partially destroyed in 1974. Daraa Governorate is farther south and borders Jordan, while also being close to the Golan Heights and Damascus. These areas are sensitive because they form a strategic corridor toward Damascus and the Israeli border. Any presence of forces hostile to Israel—Iranian forces, Hezbollah or Syrian troops—is viewed by Israel as a threat. In addition, the areas saw fighting during the civil war and were controlled by rebel groups, while Israel has repeatedly carried out strikes there. Quneitra and Daraa therefore remain areas of heightened attention in Syrian-Israeli relations.

• Which UN Security Council resolutions concern the status of the Golan Heights and the Syrian-Israeli conflict? — The key resolutions are: Resolution 242 (1967), which established the “land for peace” principle and called for the withdrawal of forces from occupied territories; Resolution 338 (1973), calling for a ceasefire and negotiations; Resolution 350 (1974), which established UNDOF and approved the Disengagement Agreement; and Resolution 497 (1981), which declared Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights null and void and without international legal effect. Also important are the resolutions extending UNDOF’s mandate and Resolution 2334 (2016) on the illegality of settlements, although it primarily concerns the Palestinian territories. Resolutions 242 and 338 remain the basis for resolving the Syrian-Israeli conflict.

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Full version: Syria’s UN envoy to Al Jazeera: Security Council decision on the need to respect the 1974 agreement sets a precedent

Venezuela to Strengthen Energy Cooperation with Africa at Cape Town Forum

A high-level Venezuelan delegation will take part in African Energy Week 2026, to be held in Cape Town from October 12 to 16. The forum will focus on concluding agreements and granting concessions across the energy value chain, as well as attracting capital for new projects. Venezuelan representatives will hold talks with African oil companies and investors on restoring the country’s hydrocarbons sector, cooperating on workforce training, and expanding energy trade.

The delegation will include Ricardo Gómez, Deputy Minister for Trade Policy at the Ministry of Hydrocarbons; Celia Bejarano, rector of the Venezuelan University of Hydrocarbons; and Carlos Espinosa, an adviser to the ministry’s oil division. The visit will build on the rapprochement that began after the African Energy Chamber traveled to Caracas in February. At that time, the chamber signed a memorandum of cooperation with the Ministry of Hydrocarbons and state-owned PDVSA on exploration and production, refinery modernization, supplies of liquefied petroleum gas and bitumen to Africa, and technical training. The parties also established a joint working group to seek investment and coordinate strategic projects. Venezuela retains its status as an honorary member of the African Petroleum Producers’ Organization (APPO).

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Full version: Venezuela participará en la African Energy Week para afianzar cooperación energética

Crafts Exhibition Ends in Aleppo: Tradition Meets Modernity

An exhibition of traditional crafts and time-honored trades has ended in Aleppo, Syria. Held under the slogan “Every Craft Has Its Own Story,” it brought together artisans, artists, and owners of small workshops. The organizers sought to revive crafts threatened with extinction, help their products combine authenticity with modernity, and pass accumulated knowledge on to new generations.

The event was part of the “Sawn” heritage-preservation project, dedicated to Aleppo’s traditional crafts and the city’s intangible cultural heritage. Project director Rumaysa Sheikh said participants were selected according to specific criteria, with women making up the majority; men accounted for only 20%. Women who practice traditional crafts at home were trained in entrepreneurship, marketing, digital pricing, project licensing, and visual brand creation. Participants also toured Aleppo’s old markets, while the final exhibition operated for three evenings near the city’s citadel.

Participants ranged in age from 17 to 60, demonstrating that an interest in handicrafts can unite different generations. Artist and woodcarver Ahmad Hindawi presented a work reviving an almost forgotten craft: he combined wood carving with decorative elements and Arabic calligraphy. He said wood carving had ceased to be merely part of furniture and had become an art form in its own right, producing wall panels and art objects for the home. He dreams of restoring Aleppo’s former reputation as a center of the craft through specialized schools, training courses, and even inclusion in the school curriculum.

Macramé artisan Raghda Wazzan spoke about developing this heritage and expanding its uses. Historically, macramé was associated with sailors’ fishing nets, while in Aleppo it became especially known for plant hangers. Today, she creates home décor and household items from macramé, bringing it back into residents’ interiors, introducing children and young people to the craft’s history, and inspiring them to create new original designs. One exhibition visitor said she was proud of the resilience of local artisans and expressed hope that Aleppo’s products would reach international markets.

The exhibition provided a platform for presenting traditional skills to a broad audience while helping artisans build connections with the modern market. The project is an attempt not merely to preserve Aleppo’s craft heritage, but also to adapt it to the demands of contemporary life. Organizers and participants want traditional trades not to disappear, but to shine again with modern touches and remain part of the city’s identity and economy.

News Commentary

• What is the “Sawn” project, and which local or international organizations support the preservation of Aleppo’s intangible cultural heritage? — “Sawn” (صون) means “preservation” or “protection” in Arabic. It is an initiative to safeguard and transmit Aleppo’s intangible cultural heritage, including traditional crafts—wood carving, macramé, embroidery, and soapmaking—as well as music and culinary practices. The project documents the knowledge of older artisans, trains young people, and helps craftspeople enter the market. It is supported by UNESCO, Syria’s Ministry of Culture, the Directorate-General of Antiquities and Museums (DGAM), the Aleppo Citadel Foundation, local NGOs, and craft associations. International donors include the EU, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), ALIPH, and others.

• Why has Aleppo historically been considered a center of wood carving, and which schools or artisan dynasties shaped this tradition? — Aleppo stood along major trade routes and was a significant craft center under the Mamluks and Ottomans. The region had abundant walnut, oak, pine, and mulberry wood, while mosques, madrasas, palaces, and the citadel created demand for carved decoration. An “Aleppo school” of carving developed, featuring arabesques, geometric and floral patterns, openwork carving, muqarnas, calligraphy, and inlay with mother-of-pearl, bone, and silver—unlike the Damascene school, known for its mosaic inlay. The tradition was passed down through family dynasties and guild associations. Well-known families include Al-Attar, Al-Sabbagh, Al-Halabi, and Al-Najjar, although names may vary across sources.

• How did macramé enter Aleppo’s craft tradition, and why did plant hangers become its local specialty? — Macramé—from the Arabic mikramah, meaning “ornament,” “veil,” or “fringe”—came to Aleppo through Mediterranean trade and craft networks. In the 20th century, it was actively developed by Armenian families and women’s schools and associations, which combined it with local embroidery and textile traditions. Plant hangers became a local specialty because Aleppo’s homes and courtyards traditionally contained many plants, including jasmine, geraniums, and roses. Suspended woven baskets saved space, decorated walls and ceilings, and suited shaded courtyards. After the war, macramé plant hangers became an accessible home-based trade for women and a symbol of bringing greenery and comfort back to the devastated city.

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Full version: Aleppo’s Traditional Crafts Resist Extinction and Regain Their Luster with Contemporary Touches

Hasakah, Robot Iris and Trump’s Awards: Social Media Review

The October 10, 2026, episode of the program “Shabakat” (“Networks”) focused primarily on events in Syria’s Hasakah. After the process began of integrating local forces into official institutions and handing over heavy weapons, social media users were divided: some welcomed the restoration of security and the raising of the Syrian flag in the city, while others warned that calls for unrest could derail the settlement and undermine stability.

The technology segment discussed trials by the British delivery service Evri of a new robot called Iris, which can walk and climb stairs. However, audiences reacted skeptically: critics asked whether the machine could cope with rough terrain and bad weather, and whether it would lead to job cuts. The decision by U.S. President Donald Trump to honor the heads of American technology companies with prestigious scientific awards also sparked considerable debate. Many saw it not as an objective assessment of innovation, but as a political calculation linked to mutual interests and election financing.

The third topic was the rapid expansion of Israeli investment on Playa Venao beach in Panama, which, according to the program, has been accompanied by the displacement of local identity. This angered residents and Panamanian social media users, who condemned the growing settler practices and the exclusion of local communities from their own land.

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Full version: "Shabakat" discusses developments in Hasakah and Trump’s honoring of technology giants

Rubio Urges Venezuela to Support Dialogue for Further Progress

After meeting with Dinorah Figuera in the United States, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio highlighted the progress made in dialogue between Venezuela’s political sides and urged all of the country’s political and civic forces to join the process. He said the effort enjoys full support at the highest levels of the U.S. government. Rubio acknowledged that the talks remain difficult, but said they have already produced notable results and are expected to continue contributing to further achievements.

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Full version: Marco Rubio Recognizes Achievements of Dialogue in Venezuela and Calls for Support for the Process

Syrian Refugee Who Survived War Twice: A Story of Hope and Loss in Gaza

Syrian refugee Waad al-Sindi has become a symbol of double displacement: fleeing the war in Syria, she reached the Gaza Strip from Egypt through border tunnels. She dreamed of stability and a new life with her husband and children, but instead found herself and her family at the heart of a brutal war and famine.

She says she entered Gaza hoping for a new life, but war soon broke out—a war she calls genocide. “Unfortunately, we went from one war into another, and this one turned out to be far worse than the one we experienced in Syria,” Waad says. As the war expanded and food shortages intensified, the family faced unbearable conditions. Her husband went to aid distribution points to obtain some flour for the children, promising to return with food. He never came back: after a long search and a night of waiting by the roads, his body was found in the refrigerators of the Nasser Medical Complex. “A man lost his entire life over a sack of flour... My husband was everything to me,” she says bitterly.

Comparing life during the war in Syria with what is happening in Gaza, Waad emphasizes that the events in the Strip surpass any previous experience. According to her, Gaza has lost the most basic conditions for human life. She recalls horrifying scenes during forced displacement under shelling and gunfire from the al-Sultan area in Rafah: an elderly man who could no longer go on under fire told his son, “My son, leave me and keep going.” The Syrian woman concluded her testimony by expressing hope that the war would end and that she would be able to leave Gaza and see her family. She dreams of a normal life for her children—without tents or trips to fetch water—and demands that they be guaranteed the basic right to education and a dignified life, like all the children of the world.

According to the Palestinian Ministry of Health in Gaza, 74,228 people have been killed and another 175,188 wounded during three years of Israeli aggression in the Strip. Since the ceasefire agreement of October 11 last year, the ministry says, more than 1,445 people have been killed and more than 5,000 Palestinians wounded.

Comments on the News

• What were the main causes and stages of the Syrian war that forced millions of Syrians, including Waad al-Sindi, to seek refuge in Egypt, and what was their legal status there? — Causes: the Assad regime’s repression of peaceful protests in 2011; the conflict’s transformation into a civil war; intervention by external powers; the rise of Islamist groups, including ISIS; chemical attacks; sieges of cities; and economic collapse. Stages: 2011—protests and a violent response; 2012–2013—militarization and the fragmentation of the opposition; 2014–2015—the expansion of ISIS and the beginning of coalition airstrikes; 2015–2018—Russia’s intervention and Assad’s recapture of territory; 2019–2020s—Idlib, Turkish operations, a humanitarian crisis, and a frozen conflict. Millions of Syrians fled to Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt. Egypt attracted refugees because of its relative stability, historical ties, and initially more accessible entry requirements. Legal status: after 2011, Egypt gradually tightened its rules—from visa-free entry to visas and residence permits. Many Syrians remain without legal status; they are registered with UNHCR but do not have permanent residency, face restrictions on employment and access to services, and risk detention and deportation. Waad al-Sindi is one example of a Syrian refugee who ended up in Egypt because of this conflict.

• What are the border tunnels between Egypt and the Gaza Strip, how did they emerge, and why did civilians—including Syrian refugees—use them to enter Gaza? — They are a network of underground passages beneath the Egypt–Gaza border, primarily along the Philadelphia Corridor near Rafah. They emerged as smuggling routes but expanded sharply after 2007, when Israel and Egypt imposed a blockade on Gaza following Hamas’s takeover. The tunnels were used to deliver goods, fuel, construction materials, and weapons, as well as to transport people, since the official Rafah crossing was often closed or subject to strict restrictions. Civilians, including some Syrian refugees—especially Palestinians from Syria or people with family ties in Gaza—used the tunnels as an illegal alternative when legal entry into Gaza through Egypt was impossible. However, the route was dangerous and illegal; after 2013, Egypt intensified its campaign against the tunnels and destroyed most of them, so this route largely ceased to operate.

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Full version: Syrian woman sought refuge in Gaza from the war, only for her husband to return in pieces... What happened?

Trump’s Diplomacy: Iran, Russia and Political Calculations

The focus is on Donald Trump’s attempts to establish a new line in relations with Iran and Russia. Reports of a possible deal with Tehran, an unusual agreement with Vladimir Putin on diesel-fuel supplies, and the influence of the upcoming midterm elections on decisions concerning Iran have intensified debate over the consistency and credibility of the US president’s foreign policy. These steps are viewed not only as geopolitical maneuvers but also as part of Trump’s domestic political strategy.

This article is based on reports by RTVE, Facebook and Los Angeles Times (Venezuela).

Oil, Diesel and Iran: US, Russian and Venezuelan Energy Diplomacy

Reports of simultaneous US contacts with Russia concerning both a settlement with Iran and diesel-fuel supplies demonstrate how closely diplomacy, sanctions, energy prices and domestic politics are intertwined today. For Venezuela, which maintains political and energy ties with both Moscow and Tehran and has itself lived under US restrictions for many years, these developments have clear strategic significance. However, it is important to distinguish contextual interpretation from documented facts: neither the RTVE report, nor the Los Angeles Times article based on an AP report, nor the short Diario SUR post contains statements by Venezuelan authorities, parties, experts or organizations.

At the center of the first story is Russia’s attempt to facilitate negotiations between Washington and Tehran. According to RTVE, Vladimir Putin told Donald Trump that the United States and Iran “can and should” reach a peace agreement. The Kremlin is proposing, among other things, moving Iran’s enriched uranium to Russia in order to break the deadlock surrounding the nuclear program. According to the report, Trump thanked Moscow for its involvement and assured it that he would not attack Iran before the US congressional elections.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, for his part, stressed: “We have never left the negotiating table,” adding that “everyone must respect our rights.” His warning against “unilateral positions” particularly echoes the rhetoric of countries opposed to sanctions and external pressure. Russia’s position that diplomatic possibilities are “far from exhausted” fits the line Caracas has traditionally supported on the international stage: rejecting military escalation, externally imposed regime change and economic blockade in favor of negotiations and the principle of noninterference.

For Venezuela, a possible reduction in tensions surrounding Iran has not only political but also economic implications. Caracas and Tehran are oil-producing countries that have faced various forms of US sanctions and have developed cooperation in refining, fuel supplies, trade and technical assistance. A military conflict with Iran or increased pressure on it could raise volatility in the oil market, complicate trade routes and intensify geopolitical pressure on Venezuela’s partners. At the same time, an agreement between the United States and Iran could alter the balance of oil supply and competition in markets where Caracas is seeking to increase exports.

At the same time, attention was drawn to reports that the United States was prepared to purchase Russian diesel fuel. According to the Los Angeles Times, Trump reached an agreement with Putin on the immediate supply of more than 300,000 tons of Russian diesel, to be followed by several million more tons in the following weeks. The aim was to lower fuel prices for American “farmers, ranchers and truck drivers” ahead of the congressional elections.

To implement such supplies, the US Treasury Department would reportedly have to issue a temporary license allowing Russian diesel to be supplied to the global market until April 2027. In the more politicized wording of Diario SUR, the decision is presented as a move by a president “driven into a corner by the polls.” The emphasis on the need to make fuel cheaper shows that diesel and gasoline prices remain among the most sensitive factors shaping electoral sentiment, even in the world’s largest economy.

From Venezuela’s perspective, such a shift could be seen as an illustration of the flexibility and selectivity of sanctions policy. The United States may condemn Russia while simultaneously viewing Russian fuel as a tool for containing domestic prices and inflation. For a country with the world’s largest proven oil reserves that has nevertheless experienced fuel shortages, refining crises, dependence on external supplies and export restrictions, this contradiction is particularly striking.

For many years, Venezuela has faced financial and oil sanctions limiting exports, investment, access to technology, international settlements and refining capabilities. Against this background, a temporary easing of restrictions on Russian diesel could reinforce a common argument in Caracas: energy sanctions are determined not only by stated foreign-policy principles but also by Washington’s current economic, strategic and electoral interests.

The contrast is also underscored by the history of US relations with Venezuela’s oil industry. Washington has repeatedly used selective licenses, including licenses issued to Chevron at various times, to regulate contacts with Venezuela’s oil sector. The possible import of Russian diesel could therefore be viewed as confirmation that access to markets and the easing of restrictions often depend on the needs of the US economy—energy prices, the migration agenda, elections or regional security.

The decision has drawn criticism outside Venezuela. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy called it “a weak decision by strong partners” and said it provides Russia with resources to continue the war. Democratic US Congressman Don Beyer described the move as “irritating” and said that Trump was “lifting sanctions on Russian fossil fuels.” These assessments, however, do not represent Venezuela’s position and cannot substitute for a reaction from Caracas.

For Venezuela’s economy, the liberalization of Russian petroleum-product supplies could have mixed consequences. Additional volumes of Russian diesel could intensify competition for markets, buyers, transport routes and prices, including for Venezuelan heavy crude and refined products. But the very fact that the United States is prepared to adjust restrictions when energy needs arise also confirms that hydrocarbons remain a geopolitical lever. For an economy heavily dependent on oil, this means both risks and an argument in favor of more predictable trade rules, as well as an easing of restrictions on PDVSA.

Thus, Moscow and Washington’s contacts over Iran and diesel fuel are united by a single logic: international energy remains simultaneously an instrument of diplomacy, a source of budgetary and social risks, and a crucial factor in domestic politics. In Venezuela, where fuel costs affect transportation, food, agriculture, social stability and support for the government, these developments inevitably acquire additional significance. But a specific official reaction from the country to Russia’s mediation on Iran or to US purchases of Russian diesel would require direct statements from Venezuelan sources, which are absent from the publications cited.

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Satellites Show Water Transfer Between Dams in Southern Syria

Satellite imagery recorded rapid changes in the water surfaces of several dams in southern Syria in September 2026, as authorities took emergency management measures to address both drought and pollution. The main focus was Daraa Governorate, where water conditions directly determine the fate of agriculture. Al Jazeera’s Open Source unit analyzed time series from Sentinel-2 imagery to track changes at three dams before and after the water transfer and discharges.

The most noticeable changes occurred at Tsil Dam. From September 21, the reservoir appeared severely contracted, with water remaining only in the deepest part of the basin while broad stretches of land were exposed around it. By September 23, slight expansion had begun along the northern edges. After September 26, when the water transfer began, the water surface clearly grew larger and the exposed clay banks began to recede. In the October 6 image, the reservoir had expanded particularly significantly compared with September 21, covering a substantial portion of areas that had previously been dry.

The reason was a decision by the Daraa Water Resources Directorate to send approximately 500,000 cubic meters of water to Tsil. But the measure had a downside: Ghadir al-Bustan Dam, from which the water was taken, began to shrink noticeably. On September 23, its reservoir still appeared relatively broad, around the time pumping began. By October 3, however, the water level had fallen considerably, and dry strips of land appeared along the northern and southern edges—a visible indication of how much water had been taken to save Tsil and nearby crops. The Syrian Arab News Agency, SANA, reported that on September 24 the directorate began transferring approximately 500,000 cubic meters from Ghadir al-Bustan to Tsil, completing the operation on September 27.

Daraa Water Resources Director Hani Abdullah explained that the operation was necessary to replenish Tsil’s depleted reserves, which were intended to irrigate surrounding lands. He said the water was needed to support farmers and ensure continuous irrigation of active crops, particularly potatoes and vegetables, while maintaining constant oversight of water reserves and the needs of agricultural areas. This was not the first such measure of the year: on April 21, the directorate announced an additional release of water from Tsil to support crops. At the time, SANA reported that the dam held approximately 3.8 million cubic meters, with water being directed to irrigate around 600 hectares of crops and fruit trees. Such measures show how heavily the authorities depend on transferring water between dams and redistributing available resources.

Another crisis area is Ibtaa Dam. On September 18, 2026, the directorate announced emergency intervention to address stagnant and polluted water in its reservoir. The plan called for opening the spillway and discharging the polluted water through an approximately 10-kilometer earth canal into the reservoir of the West Tafas Dam. At the same time, intensive laboratory testing was carried out to monitor water quality and ensure that it was safe for irrigation. SANA linked the pollution to a sharp decline in the inflow of fresh water in recent years and the dam’s heavy reliance on partially treated wastewater.

Sentinel-2 imagery confirms the dramatic changes at Ibtaa. On September 16, the body of water appeared extensive and dark green, which may indicate an accumulation of algae and stagnant water. As the discharge began on September 21 and 23, the reservoir gradually contracted. By September 26, it had receded even further—a response to the opening of the spillway and the diversion of water toward Tafas. Against this backdrop, the directorate intensified warnings to farmers in the areas of Tsil, Ghadir al-Bustan, Nawa and nearby villages, insisting on strict compliance with the agricultural plan and an end to unauthorized interference in irrigation networks.

All these emergency measures are unfolding against a backdrop of a sustained decline in groundwater levels and a reduction in annual inflows. Local authorities face a dual challenge: saving the current agricultural season while ensuring a sustainable supply of drinking water to the cities and villages of southern Syria. The story of the Tsil, Ghadir al-Bustan and Ibtaa dams shows that the struggle for water in Daraa has become not merely a seasonal problem, but a constant test of resilience for the agricultural sector and local communities.

News Comments

• Where exactly in Daraa Governorate are the Tsil, Ghadir al-Bustan and Ibtaa dams located, and which settlements and agricultural lands depend on the water from each of them? — All three dams are located in Daraa Governorate in southwestern Syria, within the Yarmouk Basin. Tsil is situated near the settlement of the same name in the southwestern part of the governorate; Ghadir al-Bustan is near the village of the same name in the northwest; and Ibtaa is near the town of Ibtaa in the central-eastern/northeastern part. Each dam primarily serves the settlement it is named after and the surrounding agricultural lands. The exact list depends on the canal network and the season, but the affected area generally includes neighboring villages and farms in the same wadi.

• How is the Daraa Water Resources Directorate connected to Syria’s central Ministry of Water Resources, and what powers does its director, Hani Abdullah, have? — The Daraa Water Resources Directorate is a local branch of Syria’s Ministry of Water Resources. It reports to the central ministry, implements its policies at the governorate level, manages state dams, canals and pumping stations, issues water-use permits and tackles violations. As its director, Hani Abdullah has administrative and technical authority within Daraa, including water allocation, infrastructure operation and maintenance, oversight of illegal connections, and preparation of proposals for the ministry. Major decisions concerning interprovincial and transboundary waters remain the responsibility of the central authorities.

• What does “unauthorized interference in irrigation networks” mean in the Syrian context, and why is it being addressed specifically in Daraa? — In the Syrian context, “unauthorized interference in irrigation networks” includes illegal connections to canals and pipes, installing pumps without permission, opening or closing gates, building makeshift dams, illegally drilling wells, and taking water outside the established schedule. Daraa is cracking down on these practices because of severe water shortages, the agricultural nature of its economy, competition between farmers and districts, and efforts by the central authorities to restore control over water infrastructure after the conflict and prevent local groups from taking it over.

• How are Daraa’s dams and canals connected to the Yarmouk River Basin and the transboundary distribution of water between Syria, Jordan and Israel? — Daraa’s dams and canals lie within the Yarmouk Basin. They collect winter and spring water that would otherwise flow into the Yarmouk and direct it toward irrigation in the governorate. The Yarmouk flows along the Syrian-Jordanian border, then through Jordan before joining the Jordan River; downstream are Jordan and Israel. Water distribution is governed mainly by bilateral agreements: the 1987 Syrian-Jordanian agreement and the 1994 Jordanian-Israeli agreement. Because Syria is upstream, its dams and canals in Daraa affect the volume of flow available to Jordan and, indirectly, Israel. They are therefore part of transboundary water politics.

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Full version: Satellite Images Track Southern Syria’s Dams’ Response to Drought and Pollution

Delcy Rodríguez Calls for Strengthening the Bolívar Instead of Dollarizing the Economy

Venezuelan President Delcy Rodríguez said at the opening of the 82nd annual assembly of the business organization Fedecámaras in Caracas that dollarization would not solve the country’s economic problems. According to her, sustainable growth must be based on strengthening the national currency—the bolívar—which should support trade transactions, financial settlements, and access to credit. Rodríguez emphasized that long-term stability requires banking and lending policies focused on supporting production, while Venezuela, like other countries, can use foreign currency for productive needs. She also said that the government is working to improve the circulation of foreign currency in the market, seeking to balance supply and demand and make currency-exchange operations more efficient.

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Full version: Delcy Rodríguez Rules Out Dollarization and Reaffirms Monetary Sovereignty for Venezuela’s Growth

“Sufa 53”: Is Israel Building a New Bar-Lev Line in Syria?

Following the fall of the Assad regime, Israeli actions in Syria have ceased to be limited to repeated strikes and raids. A new phase has begun in the Quneitra area: a return to excavation, bulldozer clearing and the fortification of positions. All of this is being carried out במסגרת a project Israel calls “Sufa 53” (“Great Storm”), prompting the question: is Israel building a new “Bar-Lev Line” on Syrian soil? This is not merely about walls or barbed wire—the project is part of a broader attempt to create new Israeli “security borders” within Syria’s geography.

The project is being carried out in the demilitarized zone established by the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement, at a depth of 300 to 1,000 meters, according to the Sijill Center. The Israeli army is using bulldozers to level the ground, digging trenches, building embankments and erecting fortifications, destroying extensive areas of vegetation, pastureland and trees. In terms of its engineering logic, this work resembles the historic Bar-Lev Line, built by Israel in Sinai after 1967: it too relied on embankments and trenches to impose a new reality on the ground.

The system includes a parallel military road up to 8 meters wide and approximately 70–90 kilometers long, facilitating the movement of patrols and equipment. Deep and wide trenches are also being dug to impede armored vehicles and infantry, while earth barriers around 5 meters high are being built to block visibility and conceal movements. These measures are supplemented by technological systems, including observation towers, sensors and permanent cameras.

The work began in mid-2022 with the construction of a military road for heavy equipment near the village of Hader in northern Quneitra, and later expanded southward through areas near Jubata al-Hashab, Hamidiyah, Qahtaniyah, Bir Ajam and Brika, reaching the vicinity of al-Asha. Israel links the project to an old security concept supposedly intended to prevent possible attacks by Iran-backed armed groups. However, these claims are contradicted by the fact that the project has continued even after the departure of Iranian militias and the fall of the Assad regime on December 8, 2024. In September, Israel’s defense minister called the area a “security zone,” while Israel’s representative to the United Nations justified the actions as necessary to prevent cross-border threats and a repeat of an attack like October 7 from Syrian territory.

“Sufa 53” raises questions not so much about the project’s engineering features as about Israel’s goal of unilaterally redrawing the military-geographical space. What began as a defensive project along the occupied Golan Heights has evolved into broader incursions into Syrian lands occupied after December 8, 2024, and an attempt to replace the 1974 arrangements with new facts on the ground. The danger lies in the absorption of a significant part of the buffer zone and movement beyond the observation lines into Syrian territory, violating the international agreement and the legal and practical status of the zone and the border. If the project becomes a long-term military structure, it could turn into a bargaining chip and a political basis for redefining Israel’s “security borders” in Syria.

From the outset, the Syrian administration adopted a pragmatic position, prioritizing the restoration of the state, but it took a firm stance toward “Sufa 53.” Syria’s Foreign Ministry condemned the Israeli violations and practices, calling them “a flagrant violation of the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement and a gross disregard for the principles of international law and national sovereignty.” Damascus insists on a return to the arrangements that existed before December 8 and to the Disengagement of Forces Agreement. Israel’s actions are testing the international community’s commitment to international law and its refusal to legitimize the imposition of facts by force. Recent wars have shown that defensive lines, embankments and trenches do not provide absolute security: the Bar-Lev Line held out against the Egyptian army for only a few hours during the October 1973 war.

Comments on the News

• What did the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement between Syria and Israel provide for, and what role did UN forces (UNDOF) and the demilitarized zone around Quneitra play in it? — The agreement, signed on May 31, 1974, under UN mediation, ended the active phase of the Yom Kippur War. It provided for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from territory occupied in 1973 east of the 1967 line, including Quneitra, and the creation of a buffer, or demilitarized, zone between the parties. Israeli and Syrian military forces were prohibited from being present there; Syrian civilian administration and police were restored in Quneitra, but without the army. Established under UN Security Council Resolution 350, the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) monitored the ceasefire, patrolled the buffer zone and arms-limitation zones, investigated violations and reported them to the Security Council. The demilitarized zone around Quneitra served as a physical barrier, reducing the risk of direct clashes and separating Israeli forces from Syrian forces.

• What was the Bar-Lev Line in Sinai, why was it considered a powerful defensive system, and why was it breached by the Egyptian army within a matter of hours in October 1973? — The Bar-Lev Line was a system of Israeli fortifications along the eastern bank of the Suez Canal, created after 1967 and named after Chief of Staff Haim Bar-Lev. It included a chain of forts, sand embankments 20–25 meters high, minefields, wire obstacles, artillery positions, pipelines for pumping burning oil into the canal and early-warning systems. It was considered powerful because it was intended to delay an Egyptian offensive, give Israel time to mobilize its reserves and allow its air force and armored units to launch a counterattack. However, on October 6, 1973, Egypt launched a surprise offensive on Yom Kippur. Massive artillery fire, airstrikes, water cannons used to breach the sand embankments, pontoon bridges and infantry equipped with anti-tank weapons enabled the line to be overcome quickly. Israel was caught off guard, the forts were lightly staffed, reserves had not been mobilized, and the line had been designed as a warning barrier rather than an impenetrable wall. As a result, the Egyptians established bridgeheads on the eastern bank within a few hours.

• Who were the “Iranian militias” mentioned in the article, and why did Israel associate them with a threat from Syrian territory before the fall of the Assad regime? — “Iranian militias” is a collective term for armed formations created, financed, trained or directed by Iran and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, primarily through the Quds Force, to support the Assad regime and advance Iranian interests in Syria. They include Lebanon’s Hezbollah; Iraqi Shiite militias such as Kata’ib Hezbollah, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, the Badr Organization and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba; Afghanistan’s Fatemiyoun Brigade; Pakistan’s Zainabiyoun Brigade; and local Syrian formations loyal to Iran. They operated in southern Syria, including the Quneitra and Golan Heights areas. Israel regarded them as a threat because Iran was using them to expand its military presence near Israel’s border, potentially transfer missiles, drones and precision-guided munitions to Hezbollah, create a new front on the Golan Heights and use Syria as a land corridor for supplying its proxies. Before Assad’s fall in December 2024, Israel carried out strikes against these militias’ facilities and Iranian forces in Syria to prevent Iran from entrenching itself and opening a second Lebanese front. After the fall of the Assad regime, Iran’s presence in Syria weakened, but the threat did not disappear entirely.

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Full version: Is Israel Building a New “Bar-Lev” Line in Syria?

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Latin America Pushes Back Against U.S. Pressure

Cuba is challenging Washington’s moral leadership, Chile is rejecting U.S. pressure over the Magellan region, and reports about Donald Trump’s position on Iran and the expansion of the American military presence are heightening concern across Latin America. The regional agenda is focused on defending sovereignty, security issues, and growing diplomatic tensions. This article is based on publications by ADN Radio (Venezuela).

Chile Debates Sovereignty After Moving Closer to the United States

The Chilean president’s address to the UN General Assembly and confirmation that the country would join the “Shield of the Americas” initiative promoted by Donald Trump have sparked a domestic debate about the limits of cooperation with Washington in the security sphere. As noted in a segment of the program Una pausa necesaria on ADN Radio, the decision is viewed not only as a diplomatic gesture but also as a matter of national independence and sovereignty.

The radio segment’s announcement places particular emphasis on the “harsh critical assessments” voiced by Senator Ricardo Lagos Weber. His position reflects concerns held by part of Chile’s political establishment: participation in U.S.-initiated defense mechanisms could have consequences extending beyond formal international cooperation. The dispute centers on the powers of the state, the independence of foreign policy, and the possible extent of Washington’s influence over regional security.

The segment itself contains no statements by Venezuelan authorities, experts, or citizens and is not a reaction from Venezuela; it is a Chilean radio report. However, it can also be viewed through a Venezuelan lens—as evidence that even in neighboring countries, cooperation with the United States in military, intelligence, and strategic affairs is prompting public questions.

For Caracas, such a debate is particularly sensitive. Venezuelan political culture—both at the government level and among a significant part of society—has traditionally viewed the expansion of American influence in Latin America in the context of interventions, sanctions, political pressure, and the struggle for control over regional affairs. Chilean doubts about the “Shield of the Americas” may therefore be interpreted in Venezuela as an expression of broader wariness toward U.S.-led security systems.

The Venezuelan approach usually links defense issues with economic and political independence. For Caracas, pressure from Washington is inseparable from sanctions, restrictions on the oil sector, international isolation, and accusations of creating a threat to regional security. Within this framework, the participation of South American countries in American defense initiatives could raise concerns about the strengthening of Venezuela’s political and military encirclement, although the country is not mentioned directly in the Chilean radio report.

It is notable that in Chile the dispute is unfolding within an institutional framework—through senators’ assessments, discussions of state powers, and the defense of sovereignty. This gives the issue a deeper meaning than an ordinary report about an international agreement. The ADN Radio segment shows that cooperation with the United States in the security sphere remains not a technical matter in Latin America, but a subject shaped by historical memory, national dignity, and geopolitical choice.

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Southern Syria: Between Military Security and Everyday Fear

The incident involving Ahmed Kabul—a young man with a disability who was wounded and detained by Israeli forces in Jabata al-Khashab north of Quneitra and later released—was just one episode in the тревожная daily reality of southern Syria. He was not near a military facility, but that did not protect him from being shot and detained. Reports at the time also said that farmland west of Abidin in western Daraa had come under fire, while two artillery shells struck Tel al-Ahmar al-Sharqi in southern Quneitra.

Such incidents cannot be reduced to isolated injuries, detentions, or localized shelling. When the road to a field, passage between villages, or approach to a secondary highway is accompanied by the risk of encountering a checkpoint, being searched, or being shot at, the meaning of the place itself changes. Land ceases to be merely a source of income and a means of ordinary travel—it becomes entangled in the calculations of military power.

Arib al-Rantawi, an adviser at the Al-Quds Center for Political Studies, warns that oppression and violations of sovereignty can create an environment of anger and alienation whose consequences are difficult to control. At the same time, he does not say that southern Syria is inevitably heading toward a broad confrontation, or that all local anger will turn into armed conflict. The question is different: what does repeated military friction do to people’s relationship with their land and with the very notion of security?

Field reports show that this is not a one-off incident. On October 4, a correspondent for Syria al-An reported that Israeli military vehicles had resumed earthworks and the construction of embankments near the village of al-Asha in southern Quneitra as part of the “Sufa 53” project. In the days that followed, incursions, checkpoints, searches of passersby, and military movements were reported in villages in Quneitra and western Daraa.

Al-Rantawi does not view southern Syria as a copy of Gaza, nor does he present Israeli raids as an inevitable prelude to a major war: each arena has its own history, social structure, local forces, and state calculations. In his view, however, October 7 was an exposing moment that struck at the image of the Israeli army as being based on intelligence superiority, deterrence, and rapid strikes. It once again raised the question of the difference between possessing military power and being able to turn it into a political outcome and lasting security.

A report by the Al Jazeera Center for Studies describes Israel’s strategy as follows: through raids and the establishment of positions inside Syria beyond the disengagement line, it seeks to consolidate military and political superiority and pressure Damascus in negotiations. The holding of border points and high ground, including Mount Hermon and Tel al-Ahmar, is linked to early warning around the Golan Heights and to maintaining southern Syria as a buffer and demilitarized zone. Damascus, meanwhile, prefers a diplomatic approach and is seeking a security agreement that would lead to the withdrawal of Israeli forces from areas occupied after December 2024, while keeping negotiations open because it does not want a military confrontation at this stage.

The historical parallel with the Bar-Lev Line is a reminder that fortifications do not create security by themselves. More than half a century ago, the line was not merely an embankment and a chain of fortified positions along the Suez Canal, but part of a concept that relied on geographic protection to consolidate the reality created after the 1967 war. The October 1973 war demonstrated the limits of the belief that military engineering could provide permanent invulnerability. Moshe Dayan said that breaching the line would require American and Soviet engineering equipment, but Egyptian forces opened breaches in the embankment within the first hours, and elements of the line were turned into isolated positions.

The comparison between the Bar-Lev Line and “Sufa 53” is not an exact military analogy or a prophecy that history will repeat itself. But the two stories converge on a broader question: a fortification does not become security simply because it exists. Embankments, trenches, and posts provide greater opportunities for surveillance, maneuver, and control, but they do not by themselves resolve the political contradiction that produced fear and alienation. Near villages and fields, fortifications can turn from an instrument of deterrence into part of the problem. The “Sufa 53” project began in mid-2022 in the disengagement zone along the occupied Golan Heights; according to Al Jazeera, it includes an eight-meter-wide road, five-meter-high earth embankments, observation posts, and trenches. Syria’s Foreign Ministry considers the completion of this work a violation of the 1974 Agreement on Disengagement.

Israel presents its military activity in southern Syria as a necessary measure to prevent potential threats and protect security. Amnesty International notes that Israeli officials have linked the military presence in Syria to countering threats from Hezbollah or Iran-linked groups, as well as to strikes on weapons depots and air-defense systems. But security is measured not only by what force prevents at a particular moment, but also by what it leaves behind. When fields, roads, and villages become extensions of military space, the question arises: do fortifications and raids provide longer-term security, or do they merely postpone tensions, shifting their cost into the future? In May, Amnesty said that the deliberate destruction of civilian homes in Quneitra province since December 2024 should be investigated as a war crime. The organization used satellite imagery to verify damage to or destruction of 23 civilian structures in three villages, documented testimony about the demolition of homes, gardens, and farmland, and identified nine military bases built by Israeli forces in Quneitra and Daraa since December 2024. In the village of Hamidiyah and its surroundings, according to Amnesty, Israeli soldiers on December 8, 2024, ordered women and girls to leave their homes, while most of the men were detained for questioning until the afternoon; at least 10 families were ordered to leave. Satellite imagery from December 17, 2024, showed tracks left by heavy machinery and new embankments, followed by the construction of a military base less than 300 meters east of the affected area in January 2025. According to an analysis by Amnesty’s Evidence Lab dated August 23, 2025, 14 structures and the walls surrounding them were completely destroyed.

The situation in southern Syria may continue to develop according to a model of managed friction: limited raids, localized shelling, detentions, and the consolidation of positions without sliding into a broad confrontation. But this calm is deceptive, because the cost of such actions is measured not only by their immediate results, but also by the slow accumulation of consequences within local society. A checkpoint can regulate movement, while a trench or military position can strengthen surveillance, but neither answers the political question that remains after the vehicles leave: the memory of those who were stopped or denied access to their land lasts longer. This does not mean that southern Syria is doomed to explode. To avoid that outcome, it must be recognized that people’s everyday lives are not a detail that can be separated from security calculations; clear political and military agreements can reduce tensions if the rules of disengagement are restored, fields, roads, and villages are removed from the logic of military operations, and people are guaranteed access to their land.

In al-Rantawi’s reading, October 7 and the subsequent war in Gaza demonstrated the limits of Israel’s military superiority: an advantage in the ability to strike and the speed of destruction do not by themselves resolve the question of political outcomes, nor do they guarantee that military control can be transformed into lasting security. In southern Syria, the paradox appears differently: the broader military control becomes without a horizon that protects sovereignty, people’s lives, and their right to the land, the more likely it is that what is presented as deterrence will turn into open resentment whose outcome the region does not yet know. So who creates security—the one who establishes control over the land, or the one who guarantees that the land itself will not become a permanent source of fear and alienation?

Comments on the News

• What changed in Syria in December 2024, and why does the article link this to the expansion of Israeli operations in the south? — In December 2024, Bashar al-Assad’s regime fell: the armed opposition captured Damascus, Assad left the country, the Syrian army collapsed, and Iran’s presence was sharply weakened. A power and security vacuum emerged. Israel took advantage of this to expand its operations in the south: it deployed troops in the 1974 buffer zone, seized strategic high ground, launched strikes against military facilities, and established new positions in the Quneitra and Daraa areas. The article links the expansion of Israeli operations specifically to the disappearance of Syrian military control and the weakening of deterrence.

• What is the international legal status of the Golan Heights and the 1974 disengagement zone, and why does Damascus consider Israel’s work a violation? — The Golan Heights are Syrian territory occupied by Israel since 1967. UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 497 deem the 1981 annexation illegal; only the United States recognized Israeli sovereignty in 2019, a position not accepted by most of the international community. The 1974 disengagement zone is a buffer zone under Syrian civil administration and the supervision of UN forces (UNDOF); the presence of Israeli troops and construction work there violate the 1974 agreement. Damascus considers any Israeli activity in the zone a violation of Syrian sovereignty and an attempt to change the status quo.

• Why is the “Sufa 53” project called that, and how is its name connected to Israel’s practice of creating control zones? — “Sufa” (Hebrew for “storm”) is a code word, while “53” refers to the number of strongpoints or positions planned for the new control zone in southern Syria. The name continues Israel’s practice of assigning code names to military zones and operations, as in southern Lebanon, in order to establish a de facto “security zone” without legally recognizing it.

• Who is Arib al-Rantawi, and what does the Al-Quds Center for Political Studies do? — Arib al-Rantawi is a Jordanian political analyst and writer, and director of the Al-Quds Center for Political Studies in Amman. The center conducts research on the Palestinian issue, regional security, and political processes in the Middle East.

• Where was the Bar-Lev Line located, and what fortifications did it consist of? — The Bar-Lev Line ran along the eastern bank of the Suez Canal in Sinai, Egypt, after 1967. It consisted of a chain of strongpoints (“maozim”), sand embankments, trenches, bunkers, and artillery and tank positions, and was intended to repel an Egyptian offensive.

• What is known about the villages of Jabata al-Khashab, Abidin, and al-Asha, and why have they become points of military friction in southern Syria? — These are Syrian villages in the south of the country, in the Quneitra and Daraa areas, near the Golan Heights and the 1974 disengagement zone. Since December 2024, Israeli forces have expanded their presence there, turning these communities into points of military friction. They lie along the routes used by Israeli troops and near strategic high ground, provoking protests from local residents and Damascus.

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Full version: هل يدفع فائض القوة الإسرائيلي الجنوب السوري إلى الانفجار؟

Cabello Calls for Keeping Law Against Hate Incitement

Diosdado Cabello, secretary-general of Venezuela’s ruling United Socialist Party (PSUV), said that opposition forces calling for the repeal of the Law Against Hate, Peaceful Coexistence and Tolerance had previously committed punishable acts against citizens. According to him, keeping the law in place is necessary to curb statements and actions that threaten public peace and the stability of state institutions. Cabello described criminal penalties as an undesirable but necessary measure capable of preventing the spread of extremist and fascist movements, and characterized criticism of the law by opposition representatives as an attempt to evade responsibility for violence documented in previous years.

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Full version: Diosdado Cabello defiende vigencia de la Ley contra el Odio y cuestiona posturas de sectores opositores

A Glass of Water as a Test: Minister Checks Damascus Airport Road

Syrian Transport Minister Yarub Badr conducted a practical inspection of the new road to Damascus Airport: he placed a glass of water on the car’s dashboard and drove along the route to assess the smoothness of the surface and the quality of the infrastructure. The Ministry of Transport published a video on Facebook, prompting a broad but mixed response. Some saw it as evidence that the official was willing to go “into the field,” while others viewed it as a reason for doubt and criticism.

The experiment is based on a simple visual principle popularized by a Japanese automobile company to demonstrate suspension performance and road smoothness: the stronger the vibrations and bumps, the more the water moves in the glass; if it remains still, the surface has presumably been laid smoothly. Many praised the minister for visiting the site, but some asked what vehicle had been used, while others noted that the “glass test” is not an official engineering standard and cannot replace modern instruments for measuring road quality.

One user wrote that the most valuable thing is to check road quality on-site rather than rely solely on words: “A simple glass of water conveyed a great meaning: when small details become a criterion for performance, infrastructure becomes a symbol of the state’s dignity.” The user expressed hope that this level of attention would extend to all of Syria’s streets, cities, and rural areas. Reports said that the inspection was attended by Muaz Najjar, director of the General Directorate of Road Transport, as well as ministry engineers and representatives of the contractor.

Other commenters supported the minister, noting that it is important not to limit inspections to paperwork, even if the test appears simple. However, they stressed that the project must be monitored at every stage, since the quality of a road becomes apparent over time and under load, not only on the day it opens. In their view, an on-site inspection should form part of a documented technical system with strict acceptance criteria and precise engineering tests, rather than relying solely on visual impressions.

Thus, the “glass test” evolved into a broader debate about the value of simple field inspections and the need for verified engineering standards. One comment read: “Real work is visible when a project continues to be maintained and supported so that it retains its standard... Maintenance is the greatest achievement.” Participants in the discussion agreed that responsibility does not end when the road is completed: it continues through monitoring, quality control, and ensuring public safety, while the ultimate assessment will be provided by time and the continued maintenance of the infrastructure.

Comments on the News

• What significance does the road to Damascus Airport have for the capital, and which districts or settlements does it connect? — The road to Damascus Airport is a strategic transport artery linking the capital with the international airport. It is important to Damascus as the main access route to the country’s air gateway, serving passengers, freight, diplomats, humanitarian aid, and economic activity. It also serves the southern and eastern suburbs, including Jaramana, Babbila, Kafr Batna, Sayyida Zaynab, and settlements in Eastern Ghouta, connecting residents with jobs, markets, and government institutions. The road’s condition affects safety, travel times, and the recovery of the capital region.

• Who is Yarub Badr, and what priorities has he outlined as Syria’s transport minister? — Yarub Badr is a Syrian engineer and politician who served as transport minister in the Salvation Government in Idlib and, after the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, joined Syria’s transitional government as transport minister. His priorities include rebuilding roads, bridges, and airports; repairing key routes, including the road to Damascus Airport; improving road safety; resuming domestic and international air services; modernizing public transport; attracting investment; and coordinating with contractors to accelerate projects.

• What is Syria’s General Directorate of Road Transport, and how does it interact with the Ministry of Transport and contractors? — Syria’s General Directorate of Road Transport is a government body within the Ministry of Transport responsible for regulating and developing road transport, operating bus stations, and overseeing public and freight transport. It interacts with the ministry as a subordinate agency, receiving policy directives, funding, and development plans. The directorate works with contractors through tenders, contracts, and technical supervision: it selects contractors, monitors the quality and deadlines of road and infrastructure repairs, ensures compliance with standards, and maintains accountability. In the context of the road to Damascus Airport, it may act as the project owner or coordinator together with the Ministry of Transport.

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Full version: "With a Glass of Water, Japanese-Style"... Syrian Transport Minister Tests Damascus Airport Road

Criticism of Trump’s Policies and His Security Rhetoric

Today’s review examines reactions to Donald Trump’s governing style and his statements on security. Particular attention focused on warnings about a possible threat from Iran to Los Angeles, as well as support for CNN’s lawsuit against the president. Commentators have also criticized his administration for prioritizing personal and political interests over its stated agenda aimed at the public good. The material is based on reports by Sinaloa Hoy and Instagram (Venezuela).

Controversy in the US and Chile Intensifies After Controversial Statements

Harsh statements by politicians in the United States and Chile sparked public and political backlash: in California, Donald Trump was criticized for remarks about a possible Iranian threat to American cities, while in Chile, lawmaker Javier Olivares came under fire for sexism after commenting on Michelle Bachelet’s possible return to presidential politics.

According to Sinaloa Hoy, at a rally in Nebraska, Trump said that Iran could “destroy” Los Angeles or San Diego as “a small price to pay.” He linked the statement to the confrontation with Tehran and Iran’s alleged nuclear ambitions.

For California authorities, this rhetoric was not an abstract discussion of international politics but a direct reference to the safety of residents in the state’s two largest cities. California Governor Gavin Newsom called Trump’s words “disgusting and disqualifying.” Los Angeles Mayor Karen Bass stressed: “The president’s job is to protect the country, not threaten it.”

San Diego Mayor Todd Gloria demanded that Trump retract his remarks and apologize. In his view, the city’s residents deserve a president who values their lives and takes the duties of commander in chief seriously.

The White House later attempted to clarify the statement, saying that Trump meant American cities could face a risk if Iran were not deterred. However, the explanation did not resolve questions about the content and tone of the speech.

The Mexican publication examines the situation primarily through the reaction of American authorities and does not reflect Venezuela’s position. It contains no comments from Venezuelan politicians, experts, or civil society organizations, nor does it analyze Caracas’s relations with Tehran and Washington or the possible economic and domestic political consequences for Venezuela. At the same time, the story may resonate politically with Venezuelan criticism of US sanctions, pressure, and military rhetoric, although the publication itself does not draw that connection.

Meanwhile, in Chile, the possible return of former President Michelle Bachelet to the presidential race became the subject of heated debate. A post by Vivo al Día Valparaíso quotes her response to a question about running for a third time: “I think so.” The cautious phrase once again raised the possibility of a Bachelet campaign to return to La Moneda Palace.

Javier Olivares, a lawmaker from the People’s Party, criticized the legacy of Bachelet’s two administrations, linking their decisions to Chile’s current problems in education and taxation. But the personal part of his statement drew the greatest backlash. Olivares told the former president to “go home,” look after her grandchildren, and stay out of political debate.

He also said that Bachelet should follow Evelyn Matthei’s example and “prepare and make good cazuelas”—a traditional Chilean home-cooked dish. In the Chilean context, the reference to cazuela was especially revealing: a familiar image of domestic cooking was used as an argument against women’s participation in public politics.

Critics viewed the lawmaker’s words not merely as disagreement with Bachelet’s political legacy, but as gender-based humiliation of a woman who had twice held the country’s highest office. Olivares has the right to dispute the results of her administrations; however, according to his opponents, reducing the discussion to her role as a grandmother and homemaker replaces debate about programs and reforms with stereotypes about the “proper” place of women.

The comparison with Matthei was also politically charged. Evelyn Matthei represents the right and previously served as a mayor, while Bachelet remains one of the leading figures in Chilean center-left politics. By contrasting the two influential women, Olivares effectively called on both of them to abandon their political roles.

The controversy showed that Bachelet retains considerable symbolic influence in Chile: even the suggestion of a new campaign immediately mobilizes both supporters and opponents. The dispute concerns not only assessments of her two presidential terms, but also the broader conflict over “old politics,” elites, reforms from the past decade, and the limits of acceptable rhetoric toward women politicians.

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Syria Arrests IS Commander Accused of Homs Mosque Bombing

Syria’s Interior Ministry announced the arrest of Islamic State commander Khalid Raid Biruni, known as Abu Hassan Dushka. According to the ministry, he was apprehended during a special operation in the town of Hujayra, in the Damascus countryside. He is accused of preparing and using improvised explosive devices, organizing sectarian attacks, and being responsible for the bombing of the Ali ibn Abi Talib Mosque in the Wadi al-Dhahab district of Homs—a predominantly Alawite area, belonging to the community of former President Bashar al-Assad—in December 2025. Eight people were killed in the attack. In January, authorities announced the arrest of two more suspects, while the investigation is ongoing.

Although Syrian authorities blamed IS, a small Sunni group called Saraya Ansar al-Sunna claimed responsibility. Experts consider it a front for IS. The attack sparked mass protests by Alawites in Homs and other areas, intensifying fears of a new wave of sectarian violence following earlier rounds of clashes.

IS seized vast territories in Syria and Iraq in 2014, but suffered a military defeat in Syria in 2019. Despite this, its cells remain active, particularly in the Badia desert, and periodically claim responsibility for attacks on Syrian security forces. The latest arrest shows that the threat of extremism and sectarian tensions remain a serious challenge for the country.

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Full version: Syria Arrests IS Commander Accused of Homs Mosque Bombing

Venezuela Opens the José Antonio Abreu International University of Music

Venezuelan President Delcy Rodríguez officially opened the José Antonio Abreu International University of Music in the presence of diplomats, ministers and leaders of the country’s musical system. She called the institution a tribute to the memory of the founder of El Sistema, who viewed music as a space for social interaction and inclusion. The university will transform technical programs into full university degrees in performance, composition and musical instrument making. The institution will begin operating under Rector Rony Morales, with more than 520 students in its initial intake; classes will be held at 18 branches across the country.

Rodríguez emphasized that more than 1.3 million children and adolescents study in Venezuela’s Simón Bolívar National Orchestra System, which is why the authorities view music as both a right and a tool for peaceful coexistence. She also linked the university’s opening to the achievements of Venezuelan youth in other fields and announced that the second “Viva el Sistema Fest” would soon take place. At her direction, musicians are to take to the streets across the country ahead of the Christmas season. The festival will also express solidarity with those affected by the recent double earthquake and continue Venezuela’s international cultural diplomacy.

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Full version: Delcy Rodríguez inaugurates the “José Antonio Abreu” University of Music

Syria Arrests Deputy of “Baniyas Butcher” Miraj Ural

Syria’s Interior Ministry Internal Security Forces announced Sunday the arrest of Jamal Tarabulsi, who served as the deputy of Ali Kayali, known as Miraj Ural, under the ousted regime. According to the ministry, Tarabulsi participated alongside militias loyal to Bashar al-Assad in combat operations supporting government forces, including battles in the countryside of Hama, Idlib and Aleppo during the years of the Syrian revolution. The ministry described the arrest as a move against a figure close to Ural, who was regarded as the right-hand man of pro-government factions.

Ural’s deputy was arrested approximately ten months after the last recorded movement of groups under his control. At the beginning of 2026, reports said that units supporting the ousted regime, led by Miraj Ural, had arrived in the city of Tabqa in Raqqa province to support the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and fight alongside them. Syrian security sources at the time linked the group’s appearance in Tabqa to clashes between the forces of Syria’s new government, led by President Ahmed al-Sharaa, and the SDF, after the SDF failed to implement the March 10, 2025 agreement.

As early as July 2017, local media reported that Tarabulsi had been wounded when an improvised explosive device detonated in his car in Aleppo; at the time, it was not specified who was behind the assassination attempt. Later, the Internal Security Forces published a photograph of Tarabulsi with Ural on their official accounts, accusing him of involvement in the 2013 massacres in Baniyas and al-Bayda. These allegations add to claims about his role in combat operations on behalf of the former regime.

Ural himself is a figure with a long and bloody history. He was born in 1956 in Antakya, southwestern Turkey, but always presented himself as a Syrian Arab. In the 1980s, under Hafez al-Assad, he obtained Syrian citizenship and became known as Ali Kayali. In the 1970s, he began armed activity against the Turkish government, joining the left-wing communist organization Acilciler (“The Impetuous”), known for violence, and the Iskenderun Liberation Front militia, which declared a struggle to return the region to Syria. In 1978, he was arrested for terrorist attacks, including the bombing of the US consulate in Adana, and for bank robbery; he passed through 12 Turkish prisons. In 1980, Ural escaped after bribing a guard amid General Kenan Evren’s coup, took refuge in Syria and joined the Syrian army. When the Syrian revolution began in 2011, he re-emerged, leading an armed shabiha structure called the Syrian Resistance—Popular Front for the Liberation of Iskenderun. It was based in the countryside of Latakia and fought as an auxiliary force for the regime’s army.

Human rights, international and local organizations have accused Ural and his group of war crimes and sectarian crimes that claimed the lives of hundreds of civilians, earning him the nickname “the Butcher of Baniyas.” Among the most prominent allegations is his involvement in the Houla massacre in Homs province in May 2012, when 111 civilians were killed, most of them women and children. He is also accused of participating in the massacre in Baniyas’s al-Bayda district on May 2, 2013, where hundreds of unarmed people were executed—killed, burned and shot.

Comments on the News

• What were the “shabiha,” and why were these militias considered an integral part of Syria’s state machinery of violence? — The “shabiha” were irregular pro-government militias, predominantly Alawite, linked to the Assad family and the security services. They operated as a parallel force, dispersing protests and participating in kidnappings, torture, killings and smuggling. They were considered part of the state machinery of violence because they were closely connected to the mukhabarat, the Republican Guard and the Assad clan; operated with impunity; and were used to suppress the opposition and intimidate communities along sectarian lines, even though they were not formally part of the regular army.

• What was the March 10, 2025 agreement between Syria’s new government and the Syrian Democratic Forces, and what issues was it intended to resolve? — The agreement, signed on March 10, 2025, between Syria’s transitional government and the SDF, provided for the integration of the SDF and the northeast’s associated civilian institutions into the Syrian state. It was intended to address the incorporation of the SDF into the national security forces; the transfer to Damascus of control over border crossings, airports and oil and gas fields; governance of the northeast; guarantees of the rights of Kurds and other communities; rejection of the country’s partition; and a political settlement. Its implementation remained difficult because of mistrust, disputes over command and the influence of external actors.

• Why did Baniyas and al-Bayda become symbols of sectarian massacres in Syria, and which communities suffered in these events? — Baniyas and al-Bayda became symbols of sectarian massacres in March 2025, when mass reprisals against Alawite civilians began following attacks on security forces by remnants of Assad’s supporters. Killings, disappearances and the destruction of homes were documented in these areas, prompting accusations of collective punishment. Alawites suffered most, while some reports also indicated that individual Christians and other minorities were affected; thousands of people were forced to flee. These events became a symbol of the risk of sectarian revenge and the weakness of minority protections during the transitional period.

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Full version: Syrian security announces the arrest of Miraj Ural’s right-hand man

Venezuela’s Power Grid Gains 150 MW from New Unit in Zulia

Venezuelan authorities have commissioned the TZ5 thermal power unit at the General Rafael Urdaneta Complex (Termozulia) in the municipality of La Cañada de Urdaneta, Zulia state. The unit has added 150 MW to the country’s National Electric System, which should improve power distribution and increase the stability of electricity supplies to local communities. Electricity Minister Rolando Alcalá announced this during a broadcast on state television channel Venezolana de Televisión, noting that the work was carried out as part of the national plan for the maintenance, organization, and technical servicing of the energy sector to meet growing demand.

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Full version: National government adds 150 megawatts to the power grid from Zulia state

Israel Launches New Raid in Quneitra: Searches, Drones and a Dead “Suspect”

The situation in southern Syria has escalated once again. Israeli forces entered the village of Al-Asbah in Quneitra province and, according to the Al-Ikhbariya television channel, began searching homes. The Israel Defense Forces said they had killed a “suspect” who, according to their account, had attempted to infiltrate an Israeli facility in the security zone in southern Syria. According to the Syrian side, illumination rounds were fired over Al-Hamidiyah at the same time, while drones flew overhead, heightening anxiety among local residents.

The raid came after Israeli forces resumed earthworks on Sunday along the separation line with the occupied Golan Heights, west of the village of Al-Asha. Damascus describes this as a continuation of violations in the buffer zone covered by the 1974 Separation of Forces Agreement. The project, known as “Sofa-53,” or “The Great Storm,” was launched by Israel in 2022 and has gradually expanded from the Hadar area in northern Quneitra through Jabata al-Khashab and Al-Hamidiyah to Qahtaniyah, Ruwayhinah, Bir Ajam and Breikah.

According to the Syrian side, the project’s expansion has already rendered thousands of dunams of farmland unsuitable for cultivation and grazing, while also damaging waterways and the natural environment. Following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government on December 8, 2024, Israel further expanded its military operations in Syria and moved forces into the buffer zone in the occupied Golan Heights and nearby areas. Syria is demanding the withdrawal of Israeli forces and insisting that the 1974 agreement be upheld, while Israel says its actions are driven by security concerns.

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Full version: Israeli occupation forces advance into rural Quneitra and announce the killing of a “suspect”

Trump Between Consolidating Power and Election Risks

Venezuelan publications examine Donald Trump’s domestic strategy through his management style, the expansion of federal security initiatives, and active campaign rhetoric. The focus is on the impact of partisan polarization on society, divisions among rural voters, and the administration’s efforts to strengthen its control over federal institutions. At the same time, the reports point to Trump’s vulnerability in the midterm elections and the possible political consequences of his policies. This overview is based on materials from CNN en Español, Facebook, and El Argentino Diario (Venezuela).

Venezuela Assesses the Role of the United States and Right-Wing Forces in the Region

Spanish-language reports on U.S. politics, artificial intelligence, and the election campaign in Brazil present Venezuelan audiences with a broader picture: state resources, technological leadership, and regional alliances are increasingly becoming tools of political influence.

One such topic was U.S. Vice President J. D. Vance’s statements about government-funded advertisements supporting Donald Trump that were broadcast several weeks before the midterm elections. In a CNN en Español report, Vance claims that the advertisements are “not partisan.” In Venezuela, however, such wording inevitably sounds controversial.

Venezuelan politics has long been shaped by disputes over equal campaign conditions, access to state media, and the use of public funds. As a result, the issue is generally assessed not only by the official status of a statement or advertisement, but also by its actual effect: does it strengthen the incumbent authorities’ position ahead of a vote? In this context, promoting the image of the American president during an election period may be perceived as political campaigning, regardless of how administration officials characterize it.

At the same time, the CNN report contains no statements from Venezuelan politicians, experts, or public figures and offers no separate analysis of the consequences for the country. The Venezuelan dimension arises primarily from local experience, where the boundary between government communication and partisan promotion has remained a subject of heated debate for many years.

Another line of discussion concerns Washington’s technology policy. According to a CGTN en Español report, Donald Trump announced the creation of a new federal “Superintelligence Task Force” intended to coordinate U.S. efforts in artificial intelligence and preserve American global leadership in the field.

For Venezuela, such an initiative appears broader than an internal administrative reform in the United States. The country faces U.S. sanctions, restrictions on financial operations, and difficulties accessing certain technologies. Therefore, statements about U.S. leadership in AI may be viewed as a signal that technological superiority is becoming an independent instrument of international pressure.

Artificial intelligence affects more than scientific research: it is linked to cybersecurity, data processing, the media, defense, logistics, and economic competitiveness. For Caracas, this heightens the issue of digital sovereignty. Limited access to Western technologies is pushing Venezuela to diversify its partnerships, particularly with China, Russia, and other states that do not support U.S. sanctions policy.

The presentation of the news through the Chinese international media network CGTN en Español also places the American initiative within the framework of competition between Washington and Beijing. For Venezuela, which maintains political and economic relations with China, the two powers’ struggle for leadership in AI could have direct consequences. It may create opportunities to introduce technologies in education, medicine, and government administration, while also widening the technological gap if computing capacity, software, and critical infrastructure come under the control of a limited number of leading countries.

The regional dimension of this rivalry is also evident in South American politics. Although the Argentine report nominally focuses on artificial intelligence, it is in fact centered on Argentine President Javier Milei’s intervention in Brazil’s election campaign. The report does not express a Venezuelan position and contains no comments from Caracas, but it describes developments that could alter the regional balance of power.

Milei openly supported Flávio Bolsonaro and called Brazil’s president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, a “thief, convict, and totalitarian.” The remarks sparked a diplomatic dispute: Brazil’s Foreign Ministry, Itamaraty, recalled its ambassador to Argentina, Julio Bitelli, for consultations. According to polling data cited in the article, Lula is credited with 40% support, while Flávio Bolsonaro has 36%.

Sources close to Milei present his support for Bolsonaro Jr. as an ideological commitment. One unnamed official stated: “Milei is sincere in his wishes. He believes in change and is convinced that Brazil should be part of it.” Other administration representatives claimed: “Simply reaching the runoff would already be a victory for Flávio. Milei has invested personally to make it happen.”

However, the author points to a contradiction in this strategy. A Bolsonaro victory could strengthen the right-wing conservative bloc that Milei seeks to join alongside Trump, but it would also create a powerful rival for the Argentine president. A far-right leader in South America’s largest economy would inevitably gain greater opportunities to compete for regional leadership.

For Venezuela, the outcome of such a confrontation would have indirect but significant importance. Lula remaining in power would mean that Brazil continued to have a major partner that generally favors diplomatic contacts and negotiations, although it criticizes Caracas on certain issues. A Bolsonaro victory, by contrast, could return Brazil to a more confrontational policy toward Nicolás Maduro’s government and closer coordination with Washington.

A change in Brazil’s political course could affect MERCOSUR, regional integration, and approaches to the Venezuelan crisis. For Caracas, the question is not only whether pressure from right-wing governments will increase, but also whether Milei, Bolsonaro, and their allies will be able to form a united front. Their rivalry for leadership in Latin America could instead limit such consolidation.

Taken together, these stories show that, for Venezuelan audiences, American political advertising, the federal AI strategy, and Brazil’s elections are connected by a common theme: power and influence. The issue is who controls state resources, critical technologies, and the region’s political agenda—and how these tools may affect countries seeking to preserve room for an independent foreign and digital policy.

government-funded advertisements promoting the image of President Donald Trump and beginning to air just weeks before the midterm elections are “not partisan.”"> ❮ ❯

Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib: Syrian Educator and Journalist

Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib (1886–1969) was a Syrian writer, journalist, and Salafist thinker, as well as one of the prominent figures of the Islamic and Arab renaissance. He was born in Damascus, in the historic al-Qaymariya quarter, into a well-known family of ulema whose roots were traced to Iraq and to Sheikh Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani. His father, Sheikh Abu al-Fath al-Khatib, was a Damascene scholar who taught and preached at the Umayyad Mosque and headed the al-Zahiriyah Library until the end of his life. From a young age, Muhibb al-Din was distinguished by his nationalist and Arab views and defended Islamic identity; his later move to Cairo largely shaped his intellectual work.

He began his education in Damascus, first at the al-Taraqqi Model School, where he received his primary education in 1896, and then at the Maktab Anbar School. Having lost his parents at an early age, he was forced to leave school, but he did not abandon self-education. He spent long hours working in the al-Zahiriyah Library, communicating with leading scholars and reading avidly. His spiritual father and mentor was Sheikh Tahir al-Jazairi, who guided him toward reading the classical heritage, copying rare manuscripts, and engaging with Damascene scholars, including Ahmad al-Nuwaylati, Jamal al-Din al-Qasimi, and Muhammad Ali Muslim. At the same time, he developed a fondness for such journals as al-Hilal and al-Muqtataf and began submitting articles to the Beirut newspaper Thamarat al-Zaman. He later moved to Beirut to complete his secondary education, and then to Istanbul, where he enrolled simultaneously in the faculties of literature and law. However, he did not graduate: the Ottoman secret services pursued him for his political activities and for founding the Association of the Arab Renaissance.

His life was marked by frequent moves and political activity. Muhibb al-Din obtained a position as a translator at the British consulate in Hodeidah, in western Yemen, but stopped in Egypt on the way, where he met his teacher Tahir al-Jazairi, his friend Muhammad Kurd Ali, and figures such as Sheikh Muhammad Rashid Rida and Rafiq al-Azm. He joined the secret Ottoman Society of Consultation and, on the instructions of its leaders, founded a branch in Yemen. There, he also became involved in education and publishing: he established a printing press and the newspaper al-Arab. After the Ottoman Constitution of 1908, the society emerged from the underground under the banner of “Union and Progress,” but Muhibb al-Din and Rashid Rida disagreed with it politically and left. He returned to Damascus, resumed his work in the Association of the Arab Renaissance, and took part in editing its newspaper. After coming under pressure from the authorities, he moved to Egypt in 1909. There, he worked with the newspaper al-Mu’ayyad until Rashid Rida invited him to teach at the School of Preaching and Guidance in 1913. In late 1912, together with young Syrians, he took part in establishing the Ottoman Party for Administrative Decentralization, and in early 1913 he was elected the party’s assistant secretary-general. With the outbreak of World War I, he became a political activist: the Arab societies of Cairo and Damascus chose him as their representative to negotiate with the leaders of the Arabian Peninsula, but British intelligence arrested him in the Persian Gulf and transferred him to Basra.

In 1916, after the beginning of the Arab Revolt, al-Khatib moved to Mecca. There, he established the Amiriya Press and headed the newspaper al-Qibla, becoming its first editor-in-chief. In 1918, after the withdrawal of Ottoman forces, he returned to Damascus and joined the new Arab administration associated with Emir Faisal ibn Hussein. He was assigned to oversee the government newspaper al-Asima. However, in 1920, when Damascus came under French control, he was forced to leave for Cairo. There, he worked for a time at the newspaper al-Ahram, and later established his own independent publishing and cultural institutions. Cairo became the most stable and productive chapter of his life: he continued writing and publishing and helped shape the intellectual agenda.

In Egypt, al-Khatib founded the Salafiyah Library and its printing press, turning them into instruments for disseminating the Islamic heritage. He supervised the scholarly preparation and publication of numerous classical texts, regarding this work as part of his reformist project. In 1924, he began publishing the monthly journal al-Zahra, which continued until 1929 and featured material on history, literature, language, civilization, and intellectual affairs. Its contributors included scholars and men of letters such as Sheikh Muhammad al-Khidr Hussein. Then, in 1926, he founded the journal al-Fath al-Islamiyya, which was published until 1948. His activities were not limited to the press: in 1927, he played a key role in establishing the Association of Young Muslims. He also edited the journal al-Azhar for several years and became one of the first figures to actively disseminate Salafist thought in Egypt and the Arab world.

Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib’s legacy is vast. Through his articles and books, he had a notable influence on intellectual reform and the popularization of Islamic culture. Among his best-known works are his commentary on Imam al-Bukhari’s Sahih, the 14-volume encyclopedia al-Hadiqa, the book Dhu al-Nurayn Uthman ibn Affan, and Al-Azhar: Its Past and Present. He also translated and prepared works such as The Raid on the Islamic World, The Direction of Human Waves Toward the Arabian Peninsula, The Message of Islam to the First Generation, and With the First Generation. These works established his reputation as one of the leading publishers, translators, and thinkers of the 20th-century Arab world.

Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib died on December 30, 1969, in Cairo, at al-Katib Hospital in the Dokki district, following surgery. He was 83. His death marked the end of an entire era in Syrian-Egyptian journalism and Islamic education. From Damascus and Istanbul to Yemen, Mecca, and Cairo, his journey reflected the turbulent history of the Arab world in the early 20th century: the struggle for Arab identity, Ottoman repression, the Arab Revolt, French control, and the search for new forms of cultural revival. Today, al-Khatib is remembered not only as a political activist, but also as a tireless editor, publisher, and guardian of the Islamic heritage whose influence extended far beyond Syria and Egypt.

News Commentary

• What was the Association of the Arab Renaissance, and why did the Ottoman authorities persecute its members? — The Association of the Arab Renaissance (Jam‘iyyat al-Nahda al-Arabiyya) was a secret or semi-secret Damascene society of the early 20th century that brought together Arab intellectuals, ulema, and reformers. It advocated the cultural and political revival of the Arabs, reform, decentralization, and expanded rights for the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman authorities, particularly under Abdul Hamid II, regarded it as a threat to the empire’s unity, a separatist movement, and a challenge to the sultan’s authority. Its members were therefore persecuted, arrested, and exiled. After 1908, some of its demands became legal, but repression of Arab activists continued under the Young Turks.

• Who was Sheikh Tahir al-Jazairi, and why is his mentorship considered important for Damascene reformers? — Sheikh Tahir al-Jazairi (1852–1920) was an Islamic scholar of Algerian origin, a Salafist reformer, educator, and public figure in Damascus. He promoted a return to the Qur’an and Sunnah, ijtihad, the purification of religion from innovations, and educational reform. His mentorship was important because through him Damascene reformers, including Jamil al-Qasimi and Abd al-Razzaq al-Bitar, encountered Salafist and Arab revivalist ideas. He connected the Algerian anti-colonial experience with Syria’s intellectual milieu and helped nurture a generation that combined religious reform with Arab self-awareness.

• What was the al-Zahiriyah Library at the Umayyad Mosque, and why was it a center of attraction for Damascene ulema? — Al-Zahiriyah was a historic library and madrasa in the Umayyad Mosque complex in Damascus that housed manuscripts on Islam, history, and the Arabic language. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, it was a center of scholarship: scholars taught there, ulema gathered, debates were held, and reformers worked. It attracted Damascene ulema because of its rare manuscripts, access to instruction, the prestige of the Umayyad Mosque, and its role as a platform for Salafist and reformist education, particularly through the work of Tahir al-Jazairi.

• How did Salafist ideas and the Arab national revival intersect in the Syrian context of the early 20th century? — In Damascus, the two movements were often intertwined. Salafists called for a return to Islam’s primary sources, ijtihad, and educational reform, while supporters of the Arab revival advocated the advancement of the Arabic language and culture and a higher status for the Arab provinces. Their common platform included criticism of stagnation, Ottoman centralization, and “Turkish domination,” as well as a search for an authentic identity. The Salafist memory of early Islam and the Arab role in it reinforced the idea of an Arab revival. Not all Salafists were nationalists, and some remained loyal to the Ottoman Empire, but the reformist circles around al-Zahiriyah and the Association of the Arab Renaissance combined Islamic reform with Arab cultural and political awakening.

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Full version: Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib: A Syrian Thinker Who Combined Journalism and Preaching

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UNHCR Announces Greater Support for Affected Venezuelan Communities

During his first visit to Venezuela, UN High Commissioner for Refugees Barham Salih met with families rebuilding their lives after the recent earthquakes, as well as people returning home after several years away. He visited affected areas and temporary shelters, where he saw residents’ resilience, hope, and determination to build a safe and dignified future.

Salih held talks with local authorities and humanitarian organizations. UNHCR continues to assist earthquake survivors and internally displaced communities, while the head’s visit marks strengthened cooperation with Venezuelan institutions. The main focus will be humanitarian assistance, protection, and support for the most vulnerable groups.

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Full version: ACNUR Backs Reintegration Plans for Communities Following Venezuela’s June 24 Earthquakes

Israel Resumes “Sufa-53” Project in the Golan Buffer Zone

On Sunday, heavy machinery was once again operating in southern Syria’s Quneitra province: Israeli occupation forces resumed earthworks for the “Sufa-53” project on the outskirts of Al-Asha village. According to a correspondent for Syria Now, vehicles were seen digging the ground and building earthen embankments, with the work recorded west of Al-Asha. This occurred alongside new incursions by Israeli forces into the villages of Saida al-Joulan and Abidin in the western part of Daraa province on Saturday.

“Sufa-53” is a military engineering project that Israel is carrying out in the countryside of Quneitra, inside the separation zone. It began in mid-2022 from the outskirts of Hadar toward the villages of Jabata al-Khashab and Hamidiya in the north, then continued through Qahtaniya, Ruwayhina, Bir Ajam and Briqa in the central area, and has now reached Al-Asha in southern Quneitra. According to the Sijill Center, which monitors Israeli operations in Syria, the project includes an eight-meter-wide road reinforced by five-meter-high earthen embankments, as well as observation posts and trenches along the route in the buffer zone near the occupied Golan Heights.

The project is linked to the 1974 Agreement on the Disengagement of Forces between Syria and Israel, concluded after the October 1973 war. It established the “Alpha” and “Bravo” lines between Syrian and Israeli positions, with a buffer zone between them monitored by the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). After the fall of the regime on December 8, 2024, Israel intensified its work, taking advantage of the security vacuum: incursions into the buffer zone extended from 300 to 1,000 meters. As a result, large areas of agricultural land were seized—7,000 dunams (about 700 hectares) near Jabata al-Khashab and 6,000 dunams (about 600 hectares) near Hamidiya and Hurriya—while vegetation, grazing land and wild trees that had provided local residents with a source of income were almost completely destroyed.

After Bashar al-Assad was overthrown on December 8, 2024, Israel declared the collapse of the 1974 agreement and occupied Syria’s buffer zone. Damascus, in turn, reaffirmed its commitment to the agreement and demanded the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied Syrian territories. In August, the newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth reported on the “New East” project—Israeli fortifications on the Golan Heights. According to the report, the army had completed 80% of the trench digging along the buffer zone, from Majdal Shams to the Yarmouk basin in Daraa province. The projects significantly overlap: “New East” is intended to fortify the entire Israeli-Syrian border with trenches four meters deep and wide, high earthen embankments, a system of ditches designed to delay enemy infantry, and a security strip containing approximately nine company-level checkpoints and patrols in villages and open areas, particularly in the southern Golan sector.

Amid the escalation on Saturday, occupation forces opened fire on homes in Saida al-Joulan during the incursion and, according to the SANA news agency, attacked several journalists covering the raid. Earlier that day, they shelled the outskirts of Abidin in Daraa province.

Speaking at the UN General Assembly in September, Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa said that since the fall of the regime, Israel had carried out around 500 air and artillery strikes, conducted more than 1,200 incursions, and made approximately 300 arrests and detentions of Syrians. He reaffirmed Syria’s commitment to the 1974 Agreement on the Disengagement of Forces, called on Israel to withdraw to the lines of December 8, 2024, and stressed: “The Golan Heights will remain Syrian land.”

News Comments

• What are the “Alpha” and “Bravo” lines, and how are they connected to the Golan buffer zone? — The “Alpha” and “Bravo” lines are demarcation lines established by the 1974 Agreement on Disengagement between Israel and Syria. “Alpha” runs on the Israeli side, while “Bravo” runs on the Syrian side. The space between them forms the separation zone, or buffer zone, where the parties are prohibited from maintaining a military presence and which is patrolled by UNDOF.

• What is UNDOF, and why does its presence not prevent Israeli engineering work in the separation zone? — UNDOF is the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, established in 1974 to monitor compliance with the agreement between Israel and Syria, patrol the separation zone and the areas of limitation on armaments. Its mandate is observational rather than enforcement-based: peacekeepers are not authorized to use force to prevent violations. They can only document them, report them to the UN Security Council and negotiate with the parties. Therefore, UNDOF’s presence does not prevent Israeli engineering work if Israel carries it out; the response is limited to protests and reports.

• What is the Sijill Center, and why is its data on the “Sufa-53” project considered an important source? — The Sijill Center is a Syrian documentation and research center that collects and analyzes information about violations in the occupied Syrian territories, including the Golan Heights. Its data on the “Sufa-53” project—Israel’s plan to build 53 wind turbines on the Golan Heights—is considered an important source because it is based on documentary materials, satellite imagery and local testimony. The data reveals the project’s scale, aims and consequences for the occupied territory and may be used for diplomatic and legal efforts to oppose Israeli expansion.

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Full version: The Israeli army resumes work on the “Sufa 53” project in the Golan Heights—what do we know about it?

Trump’s “Superintelligence Force”: A New Phase in the US-China Tech Rivalry

Donald Trump has announced the creation of an American “Superintelligence Force,” presenting the development of advanced artificial intelligence as a matter of national power and the United States’ strategic superiority over China. The reaction has focused on Washington’s efforts to turn AI from a primarily domestic technology issue into a key instrument of geopolitical competition. This material is based on reports by CiberCuba, Instagram, and Infobae (Venezuela).

The US AI Breakthrough Widens the Technology Gap

The creation of the “Superintelligence Force” by Donald Trump’s administration is the latest indication that the United States is shifting the development of advanced artificial intelligence systems toward national security, economic leadership, and geopolitical rivalry. Venezuelan media and outlets targeting Venezuelan audiences have covered the initiative primarily as part of Washington’s struggle to preserve its lead in the technology race, including its competition with China.

As CiberCuba reports, the new structure is supposed to bring together the efforts of federal agencies, major technology companies, and critical infrastructure owners. Trump said that the United States must “continue to lead” the development of this field, while superintelligence itself could become something “more significant than the Industrial Revolution and the internet.”

Venezuela’s Diario Avance uses similar wording, presenting the new initiative as a tool for coordinating government efforts intended to “protect the interests and improve the lives of all Americans.” The publication is primarily factual and contains no comments from Venezuelan specialists or officials. For local audiences, however, such rhetoric is inevitably viewed through the lens of the gap between global technology centers and countries facing financial, sanctions-related, and infrastructure pressures.

Infobae places particular emphasis on the rivalry between the United States and China. The head of the new structure, Jay Clayton, stated the task in stark terms: “The risk of not being first is high.” According to him, losing the lead would intensify both known and not yet fully understood threats, particularly those posed by “adversaries.” In this framework, artificial intelligence becomes not merely a commercial technology but a strategic resource linked to defense, intelligence, cybersecurity, data control, semiconductors, and computing capacity.

The “Superintelligence Force” is expected, within 120 days, to assess the technology’s risks and opportunities and establish cooperation among federal agencies, businesses, civil and religious organizations, and critical infrastructure providers. The issues under consideration include cybersecurity, biological and chemical threats, the protection of critical systems, employment, and consumer rights. The participation of intelligence officials, leaders from the defense technology sector, and the Federal Trade Commission underscores that the White House views AI as an element of state power, not merely as an innovation market.

At the same time, the Trump administration is relying less on mandatory regulation than on voluntary corporate self-regulation. The heads of Google, xAI, Anthropic, Meta, Nvidia, and OpenAI signed an agreement that the president called “morally binding.” It provides for internal control mechanisms, independent review groups, external audits, and oversight by boards of directors. However, the agreement is not legally binding, meaning that the key rules governing the technology’s development will still largely be shaped within the American government and corporate centers of power.

For Venezuela, the news matters not because the country is directly involved in developing advanced models, but because of the possible consequences of a new technological division of the world. Venezuela’s economy faces sanctions, a shortage of investment, problems with energy and digital infrastructure, limited access to international financing, cloud platforms, advanced chips, and equipment. At a time when the United States is concentrating the resources of the White House, the defense sector, intelligence agencies, and the largest technology corporations, countries with limited access to capital and computing capacity risk falling even further behind.

The acceleration of the AI race could provide Venezuela and other countries in the region with new tools for education, medicine, public administration, data processing, and the digitalization of services. At the same time, however, it increases the risks of dependence on foreign platforms, cyberattacks, information control, and external decisions regarding access to technology. For the banking sector, energy, communications, and public services—which are developing amid unstable infrastructure—this issue has very practical implications.

The deepening technological confrontation between the United States and China could also reduce the room for maneuver for countries not integrated into the Western financial and technological system. On the other hand, it increases the importance of alternative partnerships with China, Russia, and other states willing to supply telecommunications solutions, digital infrastructure, and equipment without the conditions imposed by Washington. Dependence on alternative suppliers, however, does not mean technological independence; it merely shifts the center of external influence.

The promotion of the term “superintelligence” instead of the more familiar “artificial intelligence” is also significant. This is not merely a matter of vocabulary. In American political rhetoric, the new concept turns technological advantage into a symbol of national power and global leadership. For Venezuela, where technological sovereignty is often associated with political independence and resistance to external pressure, this US mobilization appears to confirm that digital technologies are becoming a new arena in the struggle for influence.

The publications do not provide a detailed position from Caracas, assessments by Venezuelan experts, or an analysis of the state of the country’s AI infrastructure. Nevertheless, the overall message of their coverage is clear: for countries with limited resources, AI is ceasing to be a neutral innovation. It is becoming a question of sovereignty, access to knowledge and infrastructure, economic dependence, and the ability to participate in shaping international rules that are currently being written by the largest powers and technology corporations.

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Mustafa al-Sibai: From Homs to Leader of Syria’s Muslim Brotherhood

Mustafa al-Sibai (1915–1964) was one of the key figures in Syria’s Islamic movement. He became the first general leader of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, but his biography extended beyond religious activity: he was a preacher, politician, journalist, publisher, university lecturer, and author. A native of Homs, he was elected to parliament from Damascus, took part in drafting the constitution, and left a significant mark on the country’s public life. Al-Sibai died on October 3, 1964, before reaching the age of 50.

He was born in Homs in 1915, during World War I, and came of age against the backdrop of the Ottoman withdrawal, the arrival of the French, and the rise of the Great Syrian Revolt. His family belonged to a prominent Homs lineage: his ancestors had served as preachers at the Great Mosque. Mustafa memorized the Quran and studied religious sciences under his father’s guidance, graduating from a Sharia secondary school in 1930. In 1933, he went to Egypt, enrolled in the fiqh department at al-Azhar, and progressed from receiving an ijaza to earning a master’s degree and a doctorate, which he received in 1949 for his dissertation “The Sunnah and Its Place in Islamic Law.” As early as 1932, he was arrested by the French authorities in Syria, and in 1934 the British detained him in Cairo for taking part in an anti-colonial demonstration.

While studying in Egypt, al-Sibai met Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna and came under his influence. After returning to Syria, he founded the local Muslim Brotherhood organization and became its first general leader. According to some researchers, the movement took shape in 1945–1946 through the merger of several Islamic associations under his leadership. The French imprisoned him from 1941 to 1943; after his release, he held a conference in Homs where it was decided to establish the Futuwwa organization. Later, the groups “Muhammad’s Youth” and “Muslim Youth” united under the name Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Sibai was elected head of the Syrian and Lebanese branch. The organization took part in the national struggle against French aggression in 1945: its detachments delivered food and weapons and carried the wounded under fire.

Beginning in 1950, al-Sibai taught Islamic law at the Faculty of Law at Damascus University. In 1955, he was tasked with establishing a faculty of Sharia and became its first dean; later, he founded the Arab Institute, which eventually became the Arab-Islamic Institute. In 1949, he was elected a deputy from Damascus and joined the Constituent Assembly that drafted the 1950 constitution. There, he became involved in the dispute over the article concerning the state religion. Speaking from the parliamentary rostrum, he said: “In Islam, there is no clergy possessing the final word... We will retain our parliament, deputies, laws, and institutions, but with spiritual elevation, clean hands, and upright morals.” Ultimately, the constitution established that “the religion of the president of the republic is Islam,” while the preamble included a reference to the state’s adherence to Islam; al-Sibai regarded this as a clear indication of the state religion.

Al-Sibai passionately supported revolutions against colonial rule. He took part in demonstrations in Egypt and was imprisoned; the British accused him of supporting the revolt of Rashid Ali al-Gaylani in Iraq, arrested him, deported him to Palestine, and handed him over to the French. During the 1948 Palestinian catastrophe, he was among the first volunteers in the Arab Liberation Army. He trained a Muslim Brotherhood battalion at the Qatana camp and entered Jerusalem with it via Jericho. After the Nakba, he called for an annual “Zionist Danger Week,” demanded that the Palestinian issue be taught as a compulsory subject, and ran a column titled “The Stolen Pearl” in the magazine Hadarat al-Islam.

Al-Sibai advanced the idea of “Islamic socialism,” took part in the 1949 elections under the name “Islamic Socialist Front,” and published the book The Socialism of Islam, which appealed to Gamal Abdel Nasser. Although he belonged to the Muslim Brotherhood, which Nasser had banned, he refused to support Syria’s separation from Egypt, which brought their union to an end. Under Baathist rule, he spent the last three years of his life partially paralyzed and turned to writing after a state of emergency law banned his political and public activities. Six months before his death, he witnessed Baathist tanks demolishing the Sultan Mosque in Hama in 1964. He died at the age of 49, leaving behind a rich national and intellectual legacy, as well as a movement that searched for a leader of comparable stature.

News Comments

• What did “Islamic socialism” mean in the Syrian context of the 1950s, and how did it relate to Baathist ideology and Nasserist Arab socialism? — In 1950s Syria, “Islamic socialism” was a reformist current that combined demands for social justice, anti-feudalism, and redistribution with Islamic principles, including zakat, the prohibition of usury, and the responsibility of the wealthy toward the poor. Its main proponent was Mustafa al-Sibai, founder of Syria’s Muslim Brotherhood and author of The Socialism of Islam. It was close to Baathist ideology in its anti-imperialism, Arab nationalism, support for land reform, and criticism of the elites, but the Baath understood socialism as a secular project of the Arab nation rather than an Islamic one. Nasserist Arab socialism was state-centered, secular, and statist, with a one-party system; Islamic socialists accepted part of its social program but insisted on an Islamic moral and legal framework.

• What prompted the episode involving the destruction of the Sultan Mosque in Hama in 1964, and why is it considered an important milestone in the history of relations between Syrian Islamists and the authorities? — In April 1964, an uprising against the Baathist regime that had come to power after the 1963 coup broke out in Hama. Its causes and broader context included secular reforms, the arrest of Islamic activists, and restrictions on the influence of the ulema and local notables; the historic Sultan Mosque became the center of the protest. The authorities suppressed the uprising by military force, and the mosque was destroyed—according to different accounts, as a result of shelling or demolition. The episode is considered the first major armed confrontation between Syrian Islamists and the Baath, as well as an important milestone because it established a pattern of “protest–repression–radicalization” that later led to the tragedy of Hama in 1982.

• How did Syria’s Muslim Brotherhood under Mustafa al-Sibai interact with Hassan al-Banna’s Egyptian organization, and why was their activity banned after Syria united with Egypt? — Mustafa al-Sibai studied in Cairo, was associated with Hassan al-Banna, and founded the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1940s as a related but organizationally independent structure. He maintained contacts with the Egyptian leadership and adopted al-Banna’s ideology of Islamic reformism. After the establishment of the United Arab Republic in 1958, Nasser banned all political parties, including the Muslim Brotherhood, in order to establish one-party control; the ban on the Egyptian organization following the 1954 assassination attempt against Nasser was an additional factor. Syria’s Muslim Brotherhood initially supported the union but was forced underground; the ban marked the beginning of its long-running conflict with the state.

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Full version: Mustafa al-Sibai: The Biography of a Pioneer of Syria’s Islamic Movement

Venezuela Again Proposes Talks with Guyana over Essequibo Dispute

The Venezuelan government reaffirmed to the international community its unwavering position: Caracas rejects the 1899 Paris Arbitral Award, calling it illegal and fabricated. One hundred and twenty-seven years after it was issued, Venezuelan authorities stated that the document was legally invalid from the outset and once again emphasized the country’s historical rights to the territory of Guayana Esequiba.

A statement circulated by Foreign Minister Félix Plasencia also confirmed Venezuela’s readiness for direct dialogue with Guyana. Venezuela believes that negotiations based on the 1966 Geneva Agreement—the only valid legal instrument, in its view—could lead to a practical and mutually acceptable settlement of the dispute, while also creating conditions for good-neighborly relations, economic cooperation, joint development, and investment in the region.

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Full version: Venezuela Reiterates Willingness to Engage in Dialogue with Guyana over El Esequibo

US: Trump’s Payments and the Wall Dispute Through Venezuela’s Eyes

Venezuelan and regional media are simultaneously focusing on two aspects of US policy that directly affect Latin American countries: Donald Trump’s promises of cash payments to Americans and a court-ordered suspension of construction of the border wall near Big Bend National Park. In one case, the issue is domestic electoral mobilization through social support; in the other, it is migration policy, whose consequences are felt by millions of people, including Venezuelans leaving the country in search of safety and work.

The regional outlet Teleceiba Internacional reported that Trump had once again promised US voters $5,000 checks for every adult citizen, as well as $100 subsidies for 20 million retirees. The report presents these statements as international news and contains no comments from Venezuelan politicians or experts, nor any assessment by its own editorial staff.

The promises were made in the context of the upcoming midterm elections and were linked to the prospect of a Republican Party victory. Thus, economic assistance is presented not only as a social measure but also as a campaign tool: Trump is using the issue of direct payments as an argument to mobilize voters.

For Venezuelan audiences, this story is inevitably viewed against the backdrop of the country’s prolonged socioeconomic crisis. Amid inflation, declining incomes, migration, and many families’ dependence on remittances from relatives abroad, the promise of a one-time dollar payment highlights the gap in purchasing power and government capacity. At the same time, the report does not examine where funding for such programs might come from, how legally and financially feasible they are, how they could affect Medicare, or how Trump’s political opponents are responding to the initiative.

The link between social support and political competition is also particularly sensitive in Venezuela. Government assistance programs and the distribution of resources have long been the subject of disputes over clientelism, citizens’ political loyalty, dependence on the authorities, and the transparency of budget spending. American campaign promises are therefore read not only as news about the United States, but also as an example of how material support becomes part of the struggle for votes.

Another issue of importance to the region concerns the US-Mexico border. As El País reports, federal judge Kathleen Cardone temporarily halted projects to build a wall, roads, and other border infrastructure in the Big Bend area. The ruling affects a stretch more than 800 kilometers long—approximately one-quarter of the entire US-Mexico border.

The court injunction was based on risks of “serious and irreparable” environmental damage, including to Big Bend National Park. The Trump administration justified the work by citing the likely diversion of migration flows to the area and the threat of expanding cartel activity. However, local residents, landowners, and environmental organizations pointed to the danger to nature, private property, and access to the Rio Grande. Presidio County resident Bill Guerra-Addington told the court: “They’re taking the river away from us, and it’s devastating.”

For Venezuela, the dispute over Big Bend goes far beyond Texas’s environmental agenda. Venezuelans remain one of the largest groups of migrants attempting to reach the United States through Central American countries and Mexico. Border fortification, the expansion of surveillance systems, and the construction of roads and barriers do not eliminate the reasons forcing people to leave—economic instability, low incomes, problems with public services, and political uncertainty. But such measures alter migration routes, making them longer, more expensive, and more dangerous.

The Venezuelan reading of this story focuses on the human cost of migration deterrence. Closing some border sections may force migrants to seek more remote crossings, become more dependent on transporters and smuggling networks, and expose themselves to risks in desert and hard-to-reach areas. For families considering emigration as a means of survival and a search for a future, decisions by US courts, agencies, and environmental organizations have very practical consequences.

The temporary halt to construction in Big Bend does not mean a definitive change in US migration policy. Rather, it represents a pause in the ongoing dispute between border protection, environmental requirements, the rights of local communities, and the reality of Latin American migration. From this perspective, the wall remains a symbol of contradiction: Washington seeks to restrict border crossings, while crises in the countries of the region continue to push people northward.

Both stories show how strongly US domestic policy affects Venezuela and its diaspora. The payment promises demonstrate the scale of America’s financial capacity and the use of social policy in electoral competition. The dispute over the wall is a reminder that border decisions are made far from Venezuelan cities, yet can determine the routes, costs, risks, and fate of those forced to seek a life outside the country.

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U.S. and Venezuela Restore Ties After Nearly Two Centuries of Upheaval

Diplomatic relations between Venezuela and the United States began in 1835, shortly after Venezuela left Gran Colombia. In 1836, the two countries signed their first treaty on peace, friendship, navigation, and trade. Over the decades, relations weathered civil wars, dictatorships, revolutions, and changes of political regimes, but were preserved by trade and economic ties.

The first official break occurred in 1908, when Washington closed its diplomatic mission in Caracas because of disputes with the government of Cipriano Castro. After Juan Vicente Gómez came to power, Venezuela agreed to negotiations, and relations were restored in 1909. The country subsequently became an important oil supplier to the United States, and in 1939 the American mission in Caracas was granted embassy status. Despite political crises and disagreements with various Venezuelan governments, relations did not break down again for a long time.

The situation changed sharply after Hugo Chávez came to power in 1999: disputes over oil, trade, and sovereignty were compounded by ideological confrontation. In 2008, Chávez expelled the U.S. ambassador, but diplomatic channels were soon restored. The final break occurred on January 23, 2019, when Nicolás Maduro announced the severance of relations, and the U.S. embassy suspended operations in March. On March 5, 2026, Caracas and Washington announced the restoration of diplomatic and consular ties with the participation of Delcy Rodríguez. Nearly two centuries of history have shown that relations can be severed with a single decision, but restoring them requires lengthy negotiations and political will.

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Full version: Two Centuries of Breaks Between Venezuela and the United States

Before winter, villagers near Qamishli repair mud houses

As winter approaches, residents of villages around Qamishli in northeastern Syria are returning to the task of repairing mud houses. Young people gather to prepare a mixture of earth, straw, and water, then climb onto the roofs to renew the layer of clay that protects the homes from rain and keeps them warm. This is how an old village tradition of mutual assistance is maintained before the rainy season.

The work begins with transporting the earth and straw and mixing them with water. The mixture is left for several hours or up to two days—depending on the type of soil—after which it is mixed again. The young people then carry it onto the roof, smooth it with a trowel, and spread an even layer over the walls and ceilings. Such work usually begins with the arrival of autumn and milder weather; if the forecast calls for a rainy season, the need for repairs increases. In some homes, metal sheets or plastic coverings are placed over the clay to reduce leaks.

The method draws on the properties of earthen construction: in winter, such a house is warmer, while in summer it retains less heat. For many residents, a mud house is part of a way of life inherited from their fathers and grandfathers. Young people note that combining a concrete foundation with layers of clay provides better insulation than relying entirely on concrete: concrete houses require more fuel for heating, and fuel is becoming more expensive. One elderly man recalls that house repairs used to be an event that brought together many villagers: some transported earth, others brought straw, prepared the clay, or worked on the roofs. Families provided food for the volunteers as part of the local practice of “faz‘a”—mutual assistance—and when it was another house’s turn, dozens of people came to help. According to him, the tradition has weakened because of the emigration of young people and changes in village life.

Today, repairs are increasingly becoming an individual matter: the homeowner relies on their family or a few acquaintances. This reflects changes in social ties, as construction and repairs have ceased to be the collective responsibility of fellow villagers. Nevertheless, some forms of cooperation remain: young people gather to help prepare the clay and carry it onto the roofs. The pace of repairs depends on the condition of the roof, the type of materials, and the family’s ability to maintain the house. Another young man views the situation in a harsher economic context: many people can no longer afford to build with blocks and concrete, and turning to clay is linked to its low cost. Wealthier people are abandoning mud houses in favor of modern construction, while others continue to rely on them because they lack the means for more expensive options; moreover, fuel prices are rising, and clay retains heat well.

The pace of applying the clay coating, which locals call “siyāj,” also depends on changes in construction techniques. Some families are switching to metal sheets or covering their roofs with awnings, reducing the need for annual repairs: some houses are now repaired once every two or three years. The time needed to prepare the clay mixture also varies, depending on the source of the earth. Thus, the old practice is simultaneously being preserved, adapted to new conditions, and shaped by the economic difficulties faced by residents of northeastern Syria.

News Context

• Where is Qamishli located, and what role does the city play in northeastern Syria, particularly in the context of Kurdish self-government and the conflict? — Qamishli (Al-Qamishli; Arabic: القامشلي, Kurdish: Qamişlo) is located in the far northeast of Syria, in Hasakah Governorate, on the border with Turkey—opposite the Turkish city of Nusaybin—and not far from the Iraqi border. It is one of the region’s largest cities and the de facto capital of Kurdish self-government in northeastern Syria—the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), associated with the SDF/YPG. The city is strategically important as a transport and trade hub and as the center of an oil- and agriculture-producing region. Since 2012, it has been controlled by Kurdish forces, but it still contains an enclave held by the Syrian government, including the airport and parts of the city, making it an area of rivalry and negotiations among Damascus, the SDF, Russia, the United States, and Turkey. Turkey regards the YPG as an extension of the PKK and has repeatedly threatened operations in the area. Qamishli is also important for the distribution of humanitarian aid and the administration of camps for displaced people.

• What is “faz‘a,” and what are its historical roots, rules, and significance for mutual assistance in Syrian villages? — “Faz‘a” (Arabic: فزعة, faz‘a) is a traditional form of collective mutual assistance in Syrian villages, particularly in rural and tribal communities. Its roots lie in tribal customs and Islamic principles of solidarity (ta‘āwun), as well as in the need to survive in an arid climate with limited state involvement. The rules are as follows: assistance is provided at the request of an elder, mukhtar, or neighbor; it is generally unpaid or based on the expectation of a reciprocal favor; relatives, neighbors, and fellow villagers take part; and the work may involve harvesting, construction, weddings, funerals, natural disasters, or crises. Refusing to participate may lead to social disapproval. Faz‘a strengthens social ties and mutual trust and helps communities survive crises. During war and economic collapse, it often replaces or supplements humanitarian aid, supporting displaced people, poor families, and farmers.

• What does the term “siyāj” mean, and how does this clay coating differ from other traditional methods of covering homes in northeastern Syria? — “Siyāj” (as pronounced locally; Arabic: سياج, siyāj) in northeastern Syria generally refers to a clay-and-straw coating or plaster for the walls and/or roofs of traditional earthen houses. It is made from local clay, water, chopped straw or chaff, and sometimes ash or lime. It is applied by hand in layers, and once dry it forms a strong, breathable, and relatively water-resistant surface. Unlike walls made from sun-dried bricks or stone, siyāj is not a structural material but a protective finishing layer. Unlike concrete and cement, it is inexpensive and environmentally friendly, provides insulation, and regulates humidity. Unlike reed mats or tents, it is a permanent covering for permanent homes. In other parts of Syria, similar coatings may be called “tin” or “mūna,” but “siyāj” has become established specifically in the local building tradition of the northeast.

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Full version: Fleeing the cold and high prices, Syrians repair their mud homes in the Qamishli countryside

Trump’s Pressure: Venezuela and the Region Against Interventionism

The new digest examines reactions in Venezuela and across the region to Donald Trump’s foreign policy, which critics describe as interventionist and based on sanctions, threats of military pressure, and political interference. The focus is on the risks of escalation involving Venezuela and Iran, Washington’s alleged influence on the situation in Brazil, and Trump’s broader role in regional and global politics. Some materials address resistance to his policies within the United States—from the courts, Congress, and other institutions. The review is based on materials from Cubadebate (Venezuela) and Perfil (Venezuela).

Pressure on Cuba and Venezuela Linked to Struggle for Sea Routes

The interception of the Grace tanker bound for Cuba and the debate over strategic control of Venezuela, the Panama Canal, the Falklands, and South American sea routes are creating a unified picture in the Latin American agenda: U.S. actions are viewed not only as sanctions or law-enforcement policy, but also as part of a struggle for influence, resources, and the region’s transport links.

As Cubadebate reports, on September 5 the U.S. Coast Guard stopped the Grace between Cuba and Mexico. The vessel was sailing to the island carrying fuel. According to the U.S. side, the ship used methods characteristic of the so-called “shadow fleet,” while a Mexican inspection team found “large quantities of fuel” in its ballast tanks.

The Cuban publication places particular emphasis on the phrase “oil blockade,” which, it notes, was used by Reuters and The Guardian. The report interprets the incident not as a one-off vessel inspection, but as an expression of an ongoing policy aimed at restricting energy supplies to Cuba. The Coast Guard’s statement—“Grace transitaba hacia Cuba, transportando combustible” (“Grace was sailing to Cuba, carrying fuel”)—becomes, in this interpretation, confirmation that Washington is deliberately obstructing fuel deliveries to the island.

Cubadebate argues that the pressure goes beyond ordinary trade and financial restrictions. In the publication’s assessment, it includes patrols near Cuba, vessel inspections and interceptions, as well as the creation of risks for international carriers that may refuse to operate routes because of possible consequences. In this logic, the sanctions affect not only the government but also the population: fuel shortages are linked to disruptions in electricity supplies and social hardship.

This issue is particularly relevant to Venezuela. The country has long faced restrictions targeting its oil sector, problems with international payments, insurance, shipping, and access to markets. As a result, the situation surrounding Cuba is viewed through the familiar lens of secondary sanctions and extraterritorial pressure. Caracas and Havana maintain a political alliance, while fuel supplies have traditionally been an important part of their bilateral relations.

A broader geopolitical interpretation was offered by economist and historian Mario Rapoport in an interview with the Modo Fontevecchia program, published by the Argentine outlet Perfil. He linked U.S. pressure on Venezuela to Washington’s interest in the Falkland Islands, Antarctica, and routes between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.

According to Rapoport, “the attack on Venezuela was a guarantee that this passage would be protected in Central America.” This phrase does not describe a specific military operation, but expresses his geopolitical assessment: in his view, Venezuela matters to Washington not only as an oil power, but also as an element of a strategic arc linking the Caribbean, Panama, the South Atlantic, and Antarctica.

In this interpretation, control over Venezuela is connected to the security of Central American communications and the Panama Canal, while interest in the Falklands is linked to the search for alternative interoceanic routes around Cape Horn. Rapoport suggests that the United States may seek a more direct presence in the area of Tierra del Fuego or the Falkland Islands. He describes the latter as a kind of “aircraft carrier” for protecting communication between the two oceans.

The historian also recalled the U.S. intervention in the Falklands in 1831, led by Captain Silas Duncan—two years before the British occupation of the islands in 1833. In his argument, this episode serves as an illustration of the long history of outside intervention in Latin America.

Rapoport also takes a critical view of Argentine President Javier Milei’s rapprochement with Donald Trump. In his opinion, such a policy could increase the dependence of national policy on U.S. interests. In Venezuelan political discourse, this criticism echoes the position of Nicolás Maduro’s government, which contrasts its own sovereignty-oriented course with that of regional governments aligned with Washington.

Both publications approach the issue from a political rather than a strictly neutral news perspective. The Cuban article sees the Grace case as part of a campaign to restrict vital imports. The Argentine expert views Venezuela as a link in the struggle for control over sea routes and spheres of influence. Together, these stories reflect a widespread regional perception of sanctions, maritime control, and diplomatic pressure as instruments of a broader rivalry over sovereignty, resources, and the strategic communications of the Western Hemisphere.

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Unknown Explosions at Taftanaz Military Airfield in Idlib

A series of explosions of unknown origin rang out Friday morning near Taftanaz military airfield in Syria’s Idlib province. According to eyewitnesses, the first blasts were heard at around 8 a.m., and leftover wartime munitions most likely detonated. Footage circulated by “Syria Now” shows thick columns of smoke rising above the airfield; a correspondent reported that the explosions continued for approximately an hour and a half.

Taftanaz was Syria’s second-largest helicopter airfield. However, fighting took place there during the Syrian conflict, and the facility came under the control of opposition groups. Later, following the de-escalation agreement concluded in March 2020 by Turkish and Russian presidents Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Vladimir Putin, the airfield was converted into a Turkish observation post.

The latest explosions are not the first such incident in northwestern Syria: an entire series of detonations occurred there in September. The most recent took place at a military facility near the village of Al-Is in the southern part of Aleppo province. In addition, on September 9, a temporary weapons and military-waste depot exploded in Sarmada, in the Idlib countryside, killing 14 members of the Ministry of Defense and injuring several others. Meanwhile, five people were killed in Binnish at the beginning of the same month when a vehicle carrying munitions exploded.

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Full version: انفجارات تهز مطار تفتناز العسكري بريف إدلب

Trump Says Relations with Venezuela’s Authorities Are Improving

In an interview with TIME magazine, U.S. President Donald Trump said that Washington maintains good relations with Venezuela’s current authorities, led by Delcy Rodríguez. He said that American companies are returning to the country’s oil sector, benefiting both the United States and Venezuela. Trump also expressed confidence that elections would take place in the country and said he was ready to discuss the issue with Rodríguez, but called it premature to set a specific date. The interview took place shortly after the two leaders met in New York, where they discussed the political transition, the state of Venezuela’s economy, and the restructuring of the country’s public debt.

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Full version: ‎Trump says that

Syria Denies Reuters Report on Talks with Hezbollah

Reuters, citing six sources, reported that representatives of the Syrian government and the Lebanese movement Hezbollah had held direct talks in Turkey. According to the agency, it was the first meeting of its kind, aimed at reducing tensions between the sides. However, Syria’s Foreign Ministry told the Syria Now platform that it denied reports that such meetings had taken place in Turkey.

According to the sources—including two Syrian officials, a U.S. representative and a senior Lebanese security official close to Hezbollah—the sides had met secretly at least once last month. Representatives of Hezbollah, along with Syrian intelligence officers and officials from Syria’s Foreign Ministry, took part in the meeting. It was organized at the invitation of Turkish security and intelligence agencies and was viewed as an attempt to ease tensions.

All the sources spoke on condition of anonymity because the matter concerned a sensitive meeting that had not previously been reported. Syria’s Foreign Ministry, Turkey’s Foreign Ministry and Defense Ministry, and the U.S. State Department did not respond to Reuters’ requests for comment; Hezbollah’s press office declined to comment. Thus, the information has not yet been officially confirmed, and the parties have not publicly acknowledged it.

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Full version: Damascus Denies.. Reuters: Talks Between Syrian Officials and Hezbollah in Turkey

Latin America Assesses Trump’s Policies

The materials reflect Latin America’s mixed reaction to the foreign-policy course of Donald Trump’s administration: concern over possible U.S. intervention and tighter immigration policies, skepticism about Trump’s popularity among Latin Americans, and close attention to Washington’s role in regional and international conflicts. U.S. policy appears not only as a domestic agenda but also as a factor affecting state sovereignty, diplomatic relations, and the choices of Latin American voters. This review is based on materials from Facebook and Instagram (Venezuela).

Elections and Oil: How Venezuela Reacted to Trump’s Remarks

Venezuelan media view Donald Trump’s statements about possible elections in the country primarily in the context of Caracas’s relations with Washington, oil cooperation, and the issue of national sovereignty. Publications by regional outlets Yaracuy al Día and Diario Yaracuy al Día focus not only on the electoral outlook but also on the practical cost of diplomatic dialogue—access to oil resources, investment, and international recognition of Venezuela’s government.

The remarks came after Trump’s meeting with Venezuelan President Delcy Rodríguez in New York on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. The U.S. president said elections would be held in the country, but stressed that it was still too early to discuss specific dates. According to Diario Yaracuy al Día, he told TIME magazine: “I would talk to her about it, but there will be elections.”

Such statements are particularly sensitive in Venezuela. Any outside discussion of the electoral process is viewed through the experience of sanctions, U.S. pressure on the country’s political system, and disputes over the international legitimacy of the authorities in Caracas. As a result, Trump’s cautious statement that no date had yet been set is presented locally not as a simple announcement about elections, but as evidence of continuing negotiations between the two governments.

At the same time, oil became the central theme of Venezuela’s reaction. Trump said that the United States and the Rodríguez administration were “working well together.” He also spoke of producing a “huge amount of oil” in Venezuela to replenish U.S. strategic reserves. Among the companies he said were expanding or advancing their operations in the country, he named Exxon, Chevron, and other major corporations.

The U.S. president portrayed this cooperation as mutually beneficial: “We make a lot of money, but Venezuela also makes a lot of money.” For Venezuelan audiences, the phrase directly links the issue of political dialogue to the country’s principal national resource. Oil remains the foundation of Venezuela’s economy, its key source of foreign-currency revenue, and a crucial factor in its relations with the United States.

Against the backdrop of years of restricted access to global markets, sanctions pressure, and aging oil infrastructure, the possible return or expansion of U.S. companies’ presence could be seen as a source of investment, export revenues, and technological support for the industry. At the same time, it raises the question of the political price of such agreements and whether the electoral agenda is becoming part of a broader arrangement centered on energy resources.

The materials do not include assessments from opposition politicians, independent experts, or official representatives of the Venezuelan government. They rely primarily on Trump’s statements and a summary of reports by Noti Tarde. Still, the choice of emphasis is telling: local outlets highlight the U.S. president’s acknowledgment of working contacts with the Rodríguez administration and the possibility of mutual benefit from oil cooperation.

Thus, in the Venezuelan reading, Trump’s remarks about elections do not appear to be an isolated declaration about a democratic procedure. They become part of a broader discussion about Caracas’s sovereignty, the international recognition of its government, U.S. sanctions policy, and control over oil revenues. In this logic, Venezuela’s political calendar, foreign companies’ access to its fields, and prospects for economic recovery are closely interconnected.

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Gas Pipeline Explosion Near Damascus Cuts Power to Three Plants

On Wednesday evening, a gas pipeline exploded in the eastern suburbs of Damascus, triggering a massive fire. According to Syria’s energy authorities, the damaged line supplied fuel to the Tishrin Thermal Power Plant in the Harran al-Awamid area. The flames were so intense that they could be seen from various parts of the capital, particularly from the eastern side toward the highway leading to Damascus International Airport, while the blast was heard even in Eastern Ghouta.

The consequences were immediate: the Syrian Electricity Company announced that three plants—Deir Ali, Nasiriyah and Tishrin—had gone offline. Shortly after the explosion, power was cut across wide areas of Damascus, including a complete blackout at the foot of Mount Qasioun. The company warned that the interruption of gas supplies would sharply reduce available generating capacity, meaning that outages would affect the capital and its surrounding areas, while scheduled power cuts would become considerably longer.

Emergency and firefighting crews are working at the scene, but efforts to extinguish the blaze have been complicated. Energy Ministry technicians are struggling to shut the gas valves because fuel continues to flow through the damaged pipe. The Syrian Civil Defense said it had dispatched teams to help fight the fire, but the uninterrupted gas flow is making containment a serious challenge that will require time. Energy Minister Mohammed al-Bashir has arrived at the scene.

The cause of the explosion has not yet been officially identified: the Interior Ministry and security agencies have issued no immediate explanation. Sabotage has not been ruled out, given previous attacks on energy facilities in the Badia and Jazira regions, nor has a technical failure at the plant itself. There is also no confirmed information about casualties. Meanwhile, disruptions to the power supply are already being felt across Damascus and its surroundings, and the scale of the consequences could continue to grow.

News Context

• What is the Tishrin Thermal Power Plant, and why could its shutdown cause widespread power disruptions in Damascus and the surrounding areas? — The Tishrin Thermal Power Plant is one of Syria’s largest thermal power stations and a key component of the national power grid. It supplies a significant share of the electricity generated for Damascus and neighboring areas. Its shutdown creates a sharp power deficit which, amid aging networks, fuel shortages and limited reserves, quickly leads to rolling blackouts and widespread disruptions in the capital and its suburbs.
• What are the Badia and Jazira regions, and why are previous attacks on energy facilities there important for understanding the sabotage theory? — The Badia is a vast desert and steppe region in eastern and southeastern Syria; the Jazira is the northeastern region between the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, consisting mainly of the provinces of Hasakah, Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor. Oil and gas fields, pipelines and power lines are concentrated there. Previous attacks on energy facilities in these areas—for example, by ISIS—show that armed groups have both the capability and the motive to carry out sabotage. Therefore, following a new outage, the sabotage theory appears more plausible: such attacks have repeatedly caused power disruptions across the country.

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Full version: Explosion and fire on a gas line east of Damascus disrupt three power plants

Delcy Rodríguez Meets Chinese Ambassador on PRC Anniversary

Venezuelan President Delcy Rodríguez held a diplomatic meeting with Chinese Ambassador Lan Hu ahead of the 77th anniversary of the proclamation of the People’s Republic of China, celebrated on October 1. The talks were also attended by Foreign Minister Félix Plasencia, Venezuela’s ambassador to China, Remigio Ceballos, and Deputy Foreign Minister for Asia, the Middle East and Oceania Eduardo Ramírez. Rodríguez congratulated China on the historic date marking the founding of the PRC in 1949 at Tiananmen Square under the leadership of Mao Zedong. She also conveyed her congratulations to the Chinese people and the Chinese community in Venezuela on the occasion of the Moon Festival, or Mid-Autumn Festival, which celebrates the harvest, family unity and the preservation of traditions.

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Full version: Delcy Rodríguez led meeting with Chinese Ambassador Lan Hu

Aleppo: Public Hospitals Between Ruin and Hope

Aleppo residents complain about the dire condition of public hospitals: infrastructure has been destroyed, equipment is worn out, and medical staff work under enormous pressure. Private clinics have become a luxury beyond the reach of most families. Even dedicated doctors cannot make up for the lack of basic supplies and proper treatment conditions.

Many link these problems to the legacy of the fallen regime. Hospitals that people call “slaughterhouses” rather than places of healing were used for repression and humiliation, and human rights violations were documented there. Restoring trust and ensuring decent medical care require profound changes, not merely cosmetic repairs.

The hospital that causes residents particular distress is Al-Razi, named after the renowned Arab physician. It is primarily associated with burns and fractures. People describe overcrowded wards, a tense atmosphere, and a lack of equipment, with patients treated by young residents without an experienced specialist permanently present. Mohammed recalls how his daughter suffered severe burns: he could not even obtain a wheelchair—the one offered had no wheels; staff said the elevator “might work, or it might not,” and there was only one nurse in the burns unit.

Another story concerns Qadriya, whose broken arm was improperly put in a cast at the hospital. She later had to have the arm broken and treated again. “There was neither comfort nor attention to patients in the hospital, especially on the upper floors,” she says. At Aleppo University Hospital, a resident in pediatric surgery complains about poor instrument sterilization, which causes many patients to develop postoperative infections. A shortage of disinfectants and some doctors’ failure to follow procedures hinder recovery.

According to the same staff member, medicines are constantly in short supply: “For a month, we did not receive even paracetamol.” Even basic materials, such as surgical sutures, are often brought by patients’ relatives. This places an additional burden on families amid rising prices and the unaffordability of private treatment. Staff at Zahi Azraq Hospital also report poor sterilization, acute shortages of medicines, consumables, and equipment, as well as daily confusion and overcrowding that interfere with their work.

A resident at Zahi Azraq says equipment has to be shared between departments. For example, a defibrillator is moved from the intensive care unit to the emergency department when a patient’s heart stops—a direct threat to life. Such examples show the pressure on medical workers when even minimally safe conditions are absent. Aleppo Health Director Mohammed al-Hajj Mustafa said on the Voice of Aleppo program that, after the previous decline, public hospitals are now being repaired and modernized.

He noted that work is under way in the intensive care and operating units at Al-Razi, a new emergency department is being established, and new projects are being prepared in Aleppo province. The Hospital Administration conducts regular inspections of public and private clinics, as well as medical centers. However, healthcare remains part of the devastation inherited from the Assad regime. Hospital reconstruction is continuing, but order, public outreach, and respect for doctors are no less important: a safe and calm environment also depends on citizens’ understanding of the current difficulties. Fair access to basic healthcare for all Syrians is a humanitarian priority that cannot be postponed; if everyone fulfills their role, the crisis facing public hospitals may become a thing of the past.

News Comments

• Who was Al-Razi, after whom Al-Razi Hospital in Aleppo is named, and why is his name considered important to Arab medicine? — Abu Bakr Muhammad ibn Zakariya al-Razi (865–925), known in the West as Rhazes, was a Persian scholar, physician, alchemist, and philosopher. He was born in Rayy (Iran) and worked in Baghdad and other cities. His name is important in Arab medicine because he wrote Kitab al-Hawi (The Comprehensive Book of Medicine), one of the earliest medical encyclopedias, as well as Kitab al-Mansuri. He was the first to provide clinical descriptions of smallpox and measles and to distinguish between them. He also studied hygiene, diet, and mental health. His works were translated into Latin and remained standard textbooks in Europe and the Islamic world for centuries.

• What is the “Voice of Aleppo” program, and what role does it play in covering Aleppo’s problems? — Voice of Aleppo is an independent media initiative—a radio and online platform—created to cover life, problems, and the humanitarian situation in Aleppo. It gives local residents an opportunity to speak about their needs, documents violations, and disseminates information about humanitarian crises, destruction, shortages of medicines and food, and the fate of displaced people. Its role is to give Aleppo residents a voice, draw the attention of the international community and the media to their problems, and help facilitate assistance.

• How exactly were Syria’s public hospitals used by the security services and military for repression and humiliation under the Assad regime? — According to numerous reports by human rights organizations, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the Syrian Network for Human Rights, Syria’s public and military hospitals became instruments of repression under the Assad regime. Wounded protesters brought to hospitals were interrogated, arrested, and often tortured in the wards by security service personnel. Doctors and nurses were forced to provide the names and details of patients with gunshot wounds, leading to arrests. Military hospitals were used to detain people, where humiliation, beatings, and torture were carried out and medical care was withheld. Hospitals became an extension of the repressive apparatus: medical neutrality was violated, while opposition-minded patients were denied treatment or handed over to the security forces. This was used to suppress protests and intimidate the population.

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Full version: Aleppo’s public hospitals: A crisis seeking treatment

Seven killed as bus comes under fire in Syria’s Homs

Unknown assailants opened fire on a civilian bus on the Masyaf Bridge in Syria’s Homs province. According to the SANA news agency, at least seven people were killed and four others were injured and taken to hospitals. Homs’s head of internal security said the target was a bus belonging to one of the companies and that the attack was being treated as an attempt to undermine the city’s security and stability. He vowed that the crime would not go unpunished. France’s AFP news agency, citing an anonymous source, added that the bus was carrying engineers and workers from a private energy company.

The attack came amid a series of alarming incidents in different parts of Syria. According to official media reports, shortly beforehand an explosion occurred on a gas pipeline near one of the main power plants in the Damascus suburbs, while two days earlier the authorities described damage to another gas pipeline in the east of the country as “sabotage.” Since late 2024, following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Syria’s new authorities have faced security problems in several regions, including Damascus and its outskirts.

This was not the first such incident. On August 22, an explosion near a bus carrying internal security forces outside Damascus wounded several personnel; earlier that month, 14 people were injured when a passenger bus exploded in Jaramana, a Damascus suburb. In July, Syrian authorities linked two simultaneous explosions near a hotel where French President Emmanuel Macron was staying during a visit to Damascus to an Islamic State cell. These incidents underscore how fragile security remains in the country.

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Full version: 7 killed in shooting targeting a bus in Homs

Caracas Hosts International Forum on the Future of Oil and Gas

The VIOGS 2026 International Oil and Gas Conference has begun in Caracas, bringing together around 650 participants, including energy company executives, government officials, and members of the diplomatic corps. Major international players named among the participants include Chevron, ExxonMobil, BP, TotalEnergies, and Repsol. According to journalist and political analyst Saverio Vivas, their participation indicates growing confidence in Venezuela’s energy sector and could pave the way for large-scale private investment. Tickets for the event, priced at $2,950, sold out completely.

Vivas said that oil production in the country had stabilized at 1.2 million barrels per day—nearly 30% higher than at the beginning of the year—and could eventually reach 1.4 million barrels, thanks to the world’s largest crude oil reserves. Working sessions are also addressing the restoration of gas-fired power generation and the export of surplus electricity and gas to Colombia, Brazil, and Caribbean countries. Particular attention is being paid to reforms that would allow private companies to manage production and exports directly, increasing the sector’s efficiency and transparency while improving the supply of electricity and household gas to the population.

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Full version: Oil and Gas Summit: A meeting bringing together business leaders amid Venezuela’s oil boom

Trump, the US and Venezuela: Influence in Question

Venezuelan and regional coverage assesses the consequences of US policy during the Trump era—from contacts with the opposition and pressure on Caracas to criticism of American influence and double standards. It also focuses on political instability and electoral disputes within the United States, the state of economic confidence, and Washington’s actions in the security sphere. The materials portray the United States as an influential but increasingly controversial player in the region. The text was prepared based on material from Instagram (Venezuela) and Revista Abril (Venezuela).

Venezuelan Opposition Debates Resources, Elections and the Role of the US

In Venezuela, the political conflict once again comes down to questions that have long been inseparable for the country: who controls its oil and mineral resources, who receives the resulting revenues, whether competitive elections are possible, and how much external involvement in a change of power is acceptable. Two publications—an emotional appeal on Instagram and a column by Elías Corvo in Revista Abril—express different shades of opposition criticism but agree on the main point: Venezuela’s natural wealth should not serve the interests of a narrow group of ruling officials or become the subject of opaque agreements with foreign powers.

In the first publication, the author sharply accuses Nicolás Maduro’s inner circle of plundering the country and suppressing political opposition. Its central image is of a state that protects access to oil, gold and other minerals but is unable to provide its citizens with even basic living conditions. The wording about extracting resources while the authorities “leave the people in the dark”—“dejando el pueblo oscuro”—refers both to recurring power outages and to the sense of political disenfranchisement.

Against this backdrop, the wealth beneath the ground is perceived not as the foundation of development or national sovereignty, but as a source of corruption, secret contracts and elite privileges. Venezuela has some of the world’s largest hydrocarbon reserves, yet the economic crisis, sanctions, declining production capacity, weak infrastructure and corruption scandals have made the resource issue particularly painful. For government critics, oil and minerals have become symbols of a mechanism through which those in power retain influence without improving the daily lives of most of the population.

The author of the Instagram publication openly supports María Corina Machado, calling her “our leader,” and regards restrictions on her political participation as evidence that genuine electoral competition is absent. In his view, the authorities find it easier to protect their own deals and interests than to allow full-fledged elections: “But it is even more difficult for them to allow elections to take place at all.”

The publication places responsibility on figures close to Maduro—Vice President Delcy Rodríguez, National Assembly President Jorge Rodríguez and Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello. They are called the “brains of Maduro’s communism”; the author accuses them of robbing and humiliating citizens. References to alleged illegal contracts and “Delcy’s gifts” reflect a widespread view in opposition circles that decisions in strategic sectors are made to serve a limited group of officials rather than society. At the same time, the publication does not seek to verify the accusations or present the government’s position: it is an openly mobilizing political statement built on sarcasm, emotional language and ridicule.

Elías Corvo’s column in Revista Abril shifts the debate over resources and democracy to another level—the possible role of the United States in Venezuela’s political transition. The author acknowledges that the opposition has the right to seek international support, especially when domestic political mechanisms are closed. However, he argues that such support should be assessed not only by whether it helps weaken Maduro, but also by its cost to Venezuelan sovereignty.

Corvo poses the central question this way: is the opposition prepared to demand transparency, popular control over oil and guarantees of the country’s independence from Washington—or will it accept external rule if that makes it possible to change the government in Caracas? In the author’s view, the opposition’s democratic credentials should be measured not only by its struggle against an authoritarian government, but also by the limits it is prepared to recognize before coming to power.

The article pays particular attention to María Corina Machado’s position. Corvo recalls that she gave Donald Trump a physical Nobel Peace Prize medal, thanking him on behalf of Venezuelans for his “extraordinary leadership” and stating: “We can count on President Trump.” In the context of Trump’s statements about possible US leadership of Venezuela, control over oil revenues and influence during the transition period, the gesture takes on special political significance, in the author’s view.

Corvo does not claim that Machado supports every possible plan proposed by Washington. But he regards the absence of clearly stated public “red lines” as meaningful silence. For a country where oil has been the foundation of state power, the social model, sanctions disputes and international pressure for decades, the question of control over oil revenues cannot be secondary.

The article notes that Machado later criticized the oil agreement between Washington and Delcy Rodríguez’s interim government. She asked who had actually signed the document, what guarantees it provided and what benefit citizens would receive, emphasizing that the country’s natural wealth belongs to the Venezuelan people. Corvo interprets this as an important clarification of her position: Machado does not reject the United States as a partner and is not opposed to American investment, but demands legitimacy and transparency in specific agreements. Nevertheless, the author believes this is insufficient if the opposition does not define the limits of external influence more explicitly.

As a regional warning, Corvo turns to Nicaragua. Some members of the local opposition welcomed the possibility of a US operation against Maduro, hoping it would weaken authoritarian networks in the region and increase pressure on Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo. Other activists, however, warned that a political transition must not mean moving “from dictatorship to occupation.” In the author’s view, this formula also applies to Venezuela: resistance to domestic authoritarianism must not lead to the abandonment of national political self-determination.

The column proposes answering fundamental questions in advance: what kind of external assistance can be considered acceptable, who will oversee its implementation, what the timeframe and mandate of foreign involvement will be, how elections and civilian oversight will be guaranteed, and who will have the right to control oil revenues and to whom they will be accountable.

Thus, the two Venezuelan reactions demonstrate the shared core of the opposition debate. Some accuse the current authorities of turning natural wealth into an instrument of personal and political enrichment, leaving citizens without electricity, prosperity or a choice. Others warn that a change of power must not lead to new opaque control over the same wealth—this time by foreign states or companies. In both cases, Venezuela’s oil, gold and resources are viewed as an issue not only of economics, but also of dignity, democracy and society’s right to manage its own country.

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Sabotage of Gas Pipeline Disrupts Gas Supplies in Syria

A fire broke out on a gas pipeline between the Shoula and Deir ez-Zor areas in Syria on Monday evening. According to Syria’s state-run SANA news agency, the cause was an explosion on the pipeline resulting from sabotage. Hisham al-Salih, a representative of the gas sector at the Syrian Petroleum Company, said the fire had halted the transfer of gas from the Al-Jabsa plant toward power stations.

Firefighters immediately began isolating the section before and after the fire zone to prevent the flames from spreading. Al-Salih noted that efforts to extinguish the fire were ongoing and that gas pressure in the area was falling. The territory between Shoula and Deir ez-Zor is an important hub of Syria’s gas infrastructure, containing facilities and pipelines involved in gas transportation and extraction. As a result, incidents of this kind immediately affect the country’s energy sector.

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Full version: Due to sabotage... Fire halts gas flow between Shoula and Deir ez-Zor in Syria

PSUV to Hold Nationwide March Commemorating Chávez’s Victory

Diosdado Cabello, secretary general of Venezuela’s United Socialist Party (PSUV), called for a nationwide mobilization on October 7 to commemorate Hugo Chávez’s victory in the 2012 presidential election. As part of the events, the party will also organize joint activities with the PSUV’s youth wing to honor the memory of Robert Serra—a young political activist and supporter of “Chavism”—whose death anniversary falls during this period. Cabello stressed the continued relevance of Chávez’s ideas, as well as the party’s commitment to peace and national sovereignty. He added that, following the recent double earthquake, PSUV activists continue to work in La Guaira state, providing direct assistance to those affected and paying particular attention to people in need of medical support.

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Full version: PSUV calls for nationwide mobilization on October 7 to commemorate the 2012 victory and Robert Serra’s legacy

Syria: ISIS Cell Leaders Planning Attacks Arrested

Syrian security forces have announced the arrest of four leaders of an Islamic State (ISIS) cell that, according to the authorities, planned and carried out attacks in various parts of the country. Syrian state television reported that the cell was involved in kidnappings, planting explosive devices and assassinations, and that its activities began in Raqqa before spreading to Aleppo, Idlib and Homs.

A statement from the Internal Security Forces said that, after monitoring the suspects’ movements, four leaders were arrested in Raqqa, along with several members in Aleppo, Idlib and Homs. During the raids, security forces seized ready-to-use explosive devices, various types of weapons, ammunition and hand grenades. According to the agency, initial interrogations showed that the group was preparing attacks targeting the security and stability of the region. The investigation is continuing in preparation for referring the detainees to a competent court.

This is part of broader efforts by Syria’s new authorities, who overthrew Bashar al-Assad’s regime in late 2024 and joined the US-led coalition against ISIS last year. On September 17, the Internal Security Forces said operations were continuing in the town of Al-Sanamayn in Daraa province, stating that an armed group that engaged their patrol in combat was linked to ISIS. The authorities regularly announce the arrests of the organization’s leaders and members, including the arrest of a prominent military commander in the north of the country in August.

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Full version: Syria announces dismantling of an Islamic State-affiliated cell

What Rwanda Can Teach Syria: Justice After Mass Atrocities

Rwanda’s experience does not provide Syria with a ready-made model, but it offers a framework for comparing how transitional justice is built after mass atrocities. The period in question runs from 1994 through the end of 2003—the time when the accountability system was created and began operating; later outcomes cannot be retrospectively transferred to this stage.

The first lesson concerns evidence of results. Within several years, Rwanda had established the International Criminal Tribunal, a national court system for genocide cases, the legal basis for gacaca courts, a fund for survivors, and a new constitution. But the mere existence of institutions did not prove that justice had been achieved, that assistance had reached those in need, or that reconciliation had taken place. A law, mandate, or fund creates a pathway toward an outcome but is not evidence that the outcome has been achieved. Transitional justice mechanisms should therefore be assessed by their real impact on accountability, truth, victims’ rights, fair-trial guarantees, institutions’ ability to restrain themselves, and public trust. For Syria, the method is most valuable; any Rwandan arrangement is relevant only insofar as it addresses a genuinely comparable Syrian problem.

The second lesson concerns objectives. Rwanda’s mechanisms dealt with criminal accountability, but they also served as tools for managing detention, refugee returns, property disputes, and the restoration of public authority. The temporary release in 2003 of some prisoners who had confessed to their crimes is illustrative: it was intended to reduce prolonged detention and prepare for the work of the gacaca courts, but it raised concerns about the security of survivors and refugees and the reintegration of those released. A procedure may serve governance well and justice poorly, and the danger increases when the same mechanism seeks both to ensure accountability and to consolidate political power. Where the effects cannot be separated, a mechanism must be assessed by its impact on both justice and governance.

The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda shows both what international criminal justice can and cannot achieve. It was established by United Nations Security Council Resolution 955 and given jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II committed in Rwanda in 1994, as well as the same crimes committed by Rwandan citizens in neighboring countries that year. Its jurisprudence established important precedents in international criminal law: in the 1998 Akayesu case, the first international conviction for genocide, the court recognized that rape and sexual violence can constitute genocide when committed with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a protected group as such. However, the tribunal sat in Arusha, Tanzania; its proceedings were lengthy; and by the end of 2003 it had considered only a limited number of defendants, mainly from the former regime, and could not handle the enormous volume of cases. Witness support and the information center in Kigali helped with access and communication, but did not eliminate the distance between the international proceedings and affected communities.

Rwanda sought to address the scale of the problem by distributing the workload among several judicial levels. National legislation divided suspects into categories based on their roles and actions, while the 2001 law on gacaca courts left the most serious cases—organizers, leaders, and those accused of rape—to ordinary courts. Lower-level cases were referred to gacaca courts, which were also tasked with gathering information and reducing the burden created by mass detention. This arrangement was not without problems: the tribunal took precedence over national courts and could request that cases be transferred to it, while national courts and gacaca faced heavier workloads with fewer resources and weaker defense capabilities. The scale of the cases placed intense pressure on fair-trial guarantees.

This was particularly evident in the guilty-plea procedure: Organic Law No. 08/96 required the disclosure of information in exchange for various legal consequences, creating incentives for strategic confessions and attempts to shift blame onto others. Defendants had the right to choose a lawyer, but the state was not required to pay for legal services, creating a risk of inequality between the parties. Death sentences for the most serious offenders heightened concerns about the fairness of the process and hindered cooperation with states that did not extradite suspects to jurisdictions where the death penalty applied. This risk is also relevant to Syria: retaining the death penalty could lead countries holding Syrian suspects or evidence against them to refuse extradition or cooperation in prosecutions.

Gacaca courts demonstrate the same problem at the local level. They were not spontaneous people’s courts, but a state-created criminal process inspired by local methods of dispute resolution. They were established by law and provided for public hearings, a right of appeal, and punishment for false accusations. But gacaca courts were not ordinary professional courts: their judges lacked professional training, while possessing powers to conduct investigations, summon people, and order temporary detention. By the end of 2003, the legal framework had been issued, amended, and tested, but national court proceedings had not yet begun. The question remained whether lay judges could apply legal safeguards in an atmosphere of fear and trauma, amid unequal local power relations and limited access to legal assistance. Formal guarantees and practical capacity are different things.

On the question of truth, confessions and public testimony can reveal information, identify participants, and give survivors recognition of their suffering. But they can also produce accounts shaped by sentence mitigation, local pressure, or fear, and endanger survivors, witnesses, and defendants. The disclosure of information is not the same as verified truth. Rwanda created a needs-based fund financed by 5 percent of domestic revenues; the 1996 law on criminal prosecution provided for civil claims and a compensation fund; and a ministerial order that same year established an administrative process for certain abandoned and unregistered rural lands. However, the documents do not prove that these measures led to comprehensive reparations, broad compensation, or successful property restitution.

The investigation of crimes attributed to all sides required the same discipline. A UN Commission of Experts reported conclusive evidence of genocide against the Tutsi and evidence of serious violations by both sides, but found no evidence that certain elements of the Rwandan Patriotic Front intended to destroy the Hutu as a group, while noting limitations of time, personnel, and investigations. The tribunal’s jurisdiction legally extended to crimes committed by any side, including members of the RPF. But findings, jurisdiction, subsequent prosecutorial choices, and proof of individual responsibility are different things. Equal treatment means applying consistent standards in investigation, legal classification, and proof to every alleged perpetrator; it does not mean assuming equivalence between allegations whose equivalence has not been established.

By the end of 2003, Rwanda had laid the foundations of a multilevel accountability system under exceptionally difficult conditions. But questions remained open about the fairness of detention and trials, the protection of witnesses and survivors, the adequacy of safeguards, and the relationship between justice and the consolidation of power. The available sources support cautious conclusions, not claims that justice or reconciliation had been achieved.

For Syria, Rwanda’s experience is more a mirror for difficult questions than a template. It is a reminder to define objectives clearly, measure results, protect fair-trial guarantees and victims’ rights, prevent mechanisms from being captured by those in power, and carefully sequence each step. The most useful lesson is the discipline of distinguishing between things: institutions are not the same as justice, confessions are not truth, jurisdiction is not proof, and governance needs are not accountability. Any arrangement will have meaning only to the extent that it genuinely addresses comparable Syrian problems.

Comments on the News

• Which international mechanisms—for example, the UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria or the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism (IIIM)—are already collecting evidence of mass atrocities in Syria, and how could this material be used by future courts? — The key mechanisms are the UN Commission of Inquiry (COI, established by the UN Human Rights Council in 2011), which documents violations and publishes reports, and the IIIM (established by the UN General Assembly in 2016), which collects, preserves, and analyzes evidence of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide and prepares case files for future proceedings, but does not itself conduct trials. The OPCW Investigation and Identification Team also identifies those responsible for chemical attacks. UNITAD (2017–2024) collected evidence of crimes committed by ISIS, primarily in Iraq; its material may be relevant to Syrian cases, although its mandate did not directly cover Syria. These materials may be used by national courts exercising universal jurisdiction, a future ad hoc tribunal, or the ICC if jurisdiction exists. COI reports more often provide context, while IIIM, OPCW, and UNITAD materials may serve as evidentiary foundations, subject to chain-of-custody requirements.

• Which countries are already pursuing cases against Syrian nationals under universal jurisdiction, and why does the absence of the death penalty in their laws become a condition for transferring suspects? — Germany (the Koblenz trials of Anwar Raslan and Eyad al-Gharib, as well as investigations into senior Syrian officials), France (arrest warrants for Bashar and Maher Assad, Ali Mamlouk, Jamil Hassan, and others over chemical attacks), the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, Spain, the United Kingdom, Canada, and several other countries are conducting investigations or cases under universal jurisdiction. The absence of the death penalty matters because European and international norms—the ECHR, the EU Charter, and the ICCPR—prohibit extraditing or transferring a person to a country where they may face execution, or require assurances to that effect. If the receiving state itself does not apply the death penalty, it can accept the suspect and conduct a fair trial, removing the legal obstacle to transfer.

• Which Syrian human rights organizations and associations of families of detainees and missing persons play a key role in documenting violations and supporting survivors? — Human rights organizations include the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), the Syria Justice and Accountability Centre (SJAC), the Violations Documentation Center (VDC), the Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression (SCM), the Damascus Center for Human Rights Studies (DCHRS), the Syrian Human Rights Committee (SHRC), and the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR). Family associations include the Association of Families of the Disappeared and Detained in Syria (SAFDD/AFDD), “Mothers of the Missing,” local committees of detainees’ families in Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, Idlib, and the northeast, as well as initiatives focused on locating missing persons and collecting DNA. They document violations, provide legal and psychosocial assistance, seek the release of detainees, and demand the right to truth.

• Which Syrian officials, commanders, and armed-group leaders—from government forces to the opposition, ISIS, and Kurdish units—already appear in international investigations or arrest warrants, and how is jurisdiction determined for their prosecution? — Those appearing in international investigations and warrants include Bashar al-Assad, Maher al-Assad, Ali Mamlouk, Jamil Hassan, and Abdul Salam Mahmoud. In Germany, Anwar Raslan and Eyad al-Gharib have been convicted, while cases against senior officials are under investigation. Among ISIS leaders, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who was killed, and other commanders have been the subject of cases handled by national courts in Iraq, Germany, Sweden, and elsewhere. Some opposition commanders from Ahrar al-Sham, Jaysh al-Islam, and Nour al-Din al-Zenki, as well as Kurdish forces such as the YPG and Asayish, have been accused of war crimes, although there are fewer international warrants. Jurisdiction is determined by territory, the nationality of the suspect or victim, universal jurisdiction over core international crimes, and the ICC’s mandate when a case is referred by the Security Council or accepted by a state. For ISIS, the UNITAD mandate is important; for Syria, the IIIM is central.

• What local mechanisms for dispute resolution and reconciliation exist in Syria—tribal councils, religious courts, and reconciliation committees—and how do they differ from Rwanda’s state-created gacaca courts? — Syria has tribal councils (shuras, sheikhs, and al-urf), religious courts (Sharia, Christian, and Druze), local reconciliation committees—for example, in Daraa, Homs, and Aleppo—mediators using jaha, and the practice of sulh, or reconciliation. These mechanisms are informal and local, lack a unified legal basis, and often address land, family, and commercial disputes and minor crimes. They may order compensation or the return of property, but they do not investigate mass atrocities. Rwanda’s gacaca courts were state-run community courts mandated to hear genocide cases, with elected judges, simplified procedures, and the possibility of guilty pleas and reduced sentences. They formed part of an official policy of justice and reconciliation. Syrian mechanisms do not have such a mandate, are not controlled by a central authority, do not guarantee international justice standards, and often substitute social peace for accountability.

• How does Syria’s division into zones of control—Damascus, Idlib, the northeast, areas under Turkish influence, and areas influenced by Russia, the United States, and Iran—affect access to evidence, witnesses, and detainees, as well as the possibility of unified transitional justice? — Fragmentation creates different legal and security regimes: the government controls central archives, prisons, and courts; Hayat Tahrir al-Sham controls Idlib; the Syrian Democratic Forces control the northeast and camps such as al-Hol and Roj; Turkey controls northern enclaves; and Russia, Iran, and the United States maintain military presences. This complicates the collection of evidence—there is no unified access, archives are dispersed, and the risk of destruction is high—as well as witness protection, because of displacement, reprisals, and distrust, and access to detainees, given the many prisons and actors and the absence of a single register. Unified transitional justice is difficult: local proceedings are possible but risk being selective. Coordination among the IIIM, national courts, and a future mechanism is needed, along with guarantees of accountability and protection of rights.

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Full version: Rwanda’s lesson for Syria: Could death sentences allow killers to escape justice?

Venezuela Presents Its Approach to Combating Crime at UN Congress

Venezuela is participating in the 15th United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, being held in the United Arab Emirates from September 26 to October 1. The event focuses on accelerating crime-prevention measures, strengthening criminal justice and the rule of law, and protecting people and the environment in the context of the digital age and implementation of the UN 2030 Agenda. The country’s delegation is headed by Ambassador to the UAE Nabil Abdul Khalek and also includes representatives of the prosecutor’s office, the diplomatic corps, and Venezuela’s Permanent Mission to international organizations.

In his national statement, Abdul Khalek thanked the host country and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime for organizing the forum. He stressed that Venezuela views crime prevention not only as a responsibility of the state and law-enforcement system, but also as the result of civic participation. The country’s representative highlighted measures to promote legal awareness, equal access to justice, social integration, and the protection of vulnerable groups. He also called for the use of digital technologies to modernize criminal justice and combat organized crime. The delegation stated its readiness to cooperate with the international community through technical assistance, dialogue, and the exchange of successful practices, in accordance with international law.

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Full version: Venezuela participates in the 15th United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice

Outcry over Shtayyeh’s accusations against Ahmed al-Sharaa

A widespread wave of debate and outrage erupted on social media after a video circulated showing Fatah leader and former Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammed Shtayyeh sharply attacking Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa. Speaking at a debate at Oxford University, Shtayyeh said that al-Sharaa was “sleeping in the same bed as the Americans and Israelis,” adding that Israel had nevertheless dared to strike Damascus and seize new areas in southern Syria. His remarks prompted angry reactions from activists and political writers, many of whom called them offensive and unexpected given Syria’s current circumstances.

Political researcher and analyst Yasser al-Za’atara noted that criticizing Syrian-Israeli contacts on the grounds that they amounted to normalization or were futile amid the “Zionist rampage” would be understandable, and that similar statements had already been made. However, he himself went on the offensive against Shtayyeh, saying that hearing such words from an official of a movement that had ceded 78% of Palestinian land to the Zionists, then agreed to turn what remained into territory disputed and subject to negotiations, and later headed a government under an authority that “sanctifies” security cooperation with the enemy could only be viewed as insolence. In his view, the Palestinian people’s and the Palestinian cause’s central problem lies precisely in this movement, its organization and its authority, regardless of how many officials within it may change.

Many writers and users drew attention to the contradictory nature of Shtayyeh’s speech: he began by addressing Ahmed al-Sharaa as a “dear friend” and then shifted to a direct accusation. They said it was truly shameful for such humiliating expressions to come from a Palestinian figure addressing the Syrian president, who faces Israeli threats every day while parts of his country are occupied amid fears of further Israeli expansion. It was emphasized that al-Sharaa refuses to cede Syrian territory and insists on the return of the Golan Heights, fully aware of how much this demand complicates Damascus’s relations with the US administration, which previously recognized Israeli sovereignty over the heights.

In the same context, observers warned of the negative consequences of such statements, describing them as absurd and offensive. They argued that Shtayyeh’s words, or those of anyone else, only deepen the rift between the two countries and open the door to strife between brothers. Calls were made to keep any Palestinian disagreements with the Syrian leadership within proper political bounds and to completely avoid language involving accusations of treason, vilification and personal insults.

One comment that stood out was posted by a user named Ahmed al-Tamimi, who wrote that such speeches “neither add nor take away anything.” Others had been saying the same things for a long time, he added, and repeating them now merely reflected a loss of direction. In the same post, he sarcastically remarked that this was precisely what some “masters” excelled at: empty noise and useless philosophizing in front of others. The reaction reflects widespread rejection of the use of political disagreements for personal insults, as well as demands that discussion of relations with Syria remain objective and responsible.

Comments on the news

• Who is Ahmed al-Sharaa, and how did he come to power in Syria if the article calls him president? - Ahmed al-Sharaa, also known as Abu Mohammed al-Julani, is the former leader of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which controlled Idlib province. After Bashar al-Assad’s regime fell in December 2024 following an offensive by opposition forces, he became Syria’s de facto leader. In January 2025, representatives of Syrian factions declared him president for a transitional period at a meeting; the appointment did not result from nationwide elections but reflected the balance of power after Assad’s overthrow. This is why the article calls him president, although his legitimacy remains transitional and is disputed by some Syrians and international actors.

• Which areas in southern Syria did Israel seize, and why are they strategically important to Damascus? - After Assad’s fall in December 2024, Israeli forces entered the demilitarized zone in the Golan Heights, including the Quneitra area, Mount Hermon (Jabal al-Shaykh) and several communities along the 1974 disengagement line. Israel also carried out strikes and established forward positions in Quneitra and Daraa provinces. These areas are important to Damascus because they lie 40–60 kilometers from the capital, control approaches to it, provide surveillance and early-warning capabilities, and affect water resources and routes toward Lebanon. Losing control of them weakens Damascus’s security and reduces Syria’s strategic depth.

• Why do the Golan Heights remain a key point of dispute between Syria and Israel, and how did the US recognition of Israeli sovereignty over them affect the parties’ positions? - Israel captured the Golan Heights in 1967 and annexed them in 1981, but the UN and most countries consider them Syrian territory occupied by Israel. For Syria, the issue concerns sovereignty, territory and water resources; for Israel, it concerns security and control of a strategic highland. In 2019, the United States recognized Israeli sovereignty over the Golan, strengthening Israel’s position and easing diplomatic pressure on it, but this did not change the position of the UN or most states. Damascus continues to demand the return of the heights, although its ability to achieve this has weakened since the civil war. The US recognition also complicated any future negotiations by creating a precedent for unilaterally changing the status of territory.

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Full version: How did users on social media react to Mohammed Shtayyeh’s attack on the Syrian president?

Iraq and Syria Agree to Facilitate Cross-Border Trade

On Sunday, Iraq and Syria agreed on new measures to facilitate trade and transport links through their border crossings. Key steps include the electronic exchange of customs data, streamlined passage for transit trucks, and the expansion of the Rabia border crossing. The agreements were reached via videoconference. Iraq was represented by Omar Adnan al-Waeli, head of the Border Crossings Authority, along with officials from the customs and land transport authorities. Syria was represented by Qutaiba Badawi, head of the General Directorate of Border Crossings and Customs, and ministry officials.

The sides agreed to establish direct communication channels between Iraqi and Syrian border crossings to exchange information and coordinate their work, as well as to remove obstacles hindering a stable flow of trade. Electronic customs-data exchange should reduce processing times and allow officials to verify cargo information, including descriptions, weights, and customs duties. The two countries also agreed to grant reciprocal access to their drivers, reducing the burden on carriers and supporting trade. The passage of transit trucks across the border will be streamlined separately.

New lanes for commercial traffic and passengers will be designated at the border crossings, along with special routes for fuel tankers, fuel-oil tankers, and trucks carrying perishable goods. The Rabia border crossing will be expanded by 100 dunams (100,000 sq. m) to increase its capacity for trucks and tankers. These steps are part of Iraq’s efforts to strengthen ties with Syria through the Rabia, Al-Walid, and Al-Qaim crossings. Passenger traffic through Al-Walid is expected to resume after passport halls and roads are completed—likely at the beginning of next year—while passenger traffic continues through Rabia and Al-Qaim.

The new agreements follow economic talks held during the first week of September by Iraqi Trade Minister Mustafa Nizar al-Ani and Syrian Minister of Economy and Industry Mohammad Nidal al-Shaar. They discussed increasing bilateral trade and expanding Iraqi exports to Syria. The meeting took place on the sidelines of the 118th regular session of the Economic and Social Council of the League of Arab States. The sides discussed expanding economic cooperation and removing barriers, particularly to the access of Iraqi goods—such as cement and asphalt—to the Syrian market. Iraq and Syria confirmed that they would continue coordinating efforts to implement these measures.

Comments on the News

• Which Syrian border crossings correspond to Iraq’s Rabia, Al-Walid, and Al-Qaim crossings, which Syrian provinces do they connect, and who controls them on the Syrian side? — As of February 2024, Iraq’s Rabia crossing in Nineveh Governorate corresponds to Syria’s Al-Yarubiyah crossing in Hasakah Governorate, which is controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES). Iraq’s Al-Walid crossing in Anbar Governorate corresponds to Syria’s Al-Tanf crossing in Homs Governorate, which is controlled by the US-backed opposition group Maghawir al-Thawra and US forces; the crossing is closed. Iraq’s Al-Qaim crossing in Anbar Governorate corresponds to Syria’s Al-Bukamal (Abu Kamal) crossing in Deir ez-Zor Governorate, which is controlled by Syrian government forces and allied Iranian militias.

• How had Syria’s participation in the League of Arab States changed by the 118th session of the Economic and Social Council, and why is this important for Syrian-Iraqi economic agreements? — Syria’s membership in the League of Arab States was suspended in 2011, but it was restored on May 7, 2023, at the summit in Jeddah. By the 118th session of the League’s Economic and Social Council, held in Cairo in February 2024, Syria was again participating as a full member, allowing it to take part in Arab economic decisions and negotiations. This is important for Syrian-Iraqi economic agreements because Syria’s return to the League gives bilateral deals Arab legitimacy, facilitates trade, the reopening of border crossings (Al-Qaim/Al-Bukamal and Rabia/Al-Yarubiyah), and participation in Arab economic frameworks such as the Greater Arab Free Trade Area and a customs union. This supports the implementation of Syrian-Iraqi projects in trade, transport, and energy.

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Full version: العراق وسوريا يتفقان على ترتيبات لتسهيل التجارة وحركة المسافرين

Trump Says He Discussed Venezuela’s Elections With Delcy Rodríguez

U.S. President Donald Trump said that during a meeting with Venezuelan President Delcy Rodríguez in New York on Tuesday, they discussed holding elections in the country. Responding to reporters outside the White House, Trump called Rodríguez “very gracious and wonderful” and praised cooperation in the oil sector, saying that under her leadership, Venezuela was receiving significant revenues for its people. The meeting took place on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly and was the leaders’ first face-to-face meeting, which both sides presented as a step toward strengthening relations between Washington and Caracas. Trump’s statement also confirmed Rodríguez’s remarks: the following day, she announced at the UN that elections would be held in Venezuela. Following the talks, the countries said they intended to develop respectful diplomatic relations and signed agreements in the energy sector and on cooperation to support both countries’ economies.

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Full version: Trump Says He Spoke With President Delcy Rodríguez About Elections in Venezuela During Their Meeting in New York

Gulf Cup: A Story That Grows With Every Generation

The Gulf Cup—the regional football tournament for the Arab Gulf states—began quietly, with its contours not yet fully defined. The first matches felt more like an introduction, as national teams searched for their identity and players took their first steps on the big stage. Tactical systems were still unclear, differences in class did not appear consistent, and the pace was calmer and slower. Yet the tournament already contained the seed of something significant: over time, it grew into a major event and transformed a modest sporting forum into a date that fans await with passion.

The tournament created a shared sporting memory for the peoples of the region. The rivalry was not limited to wins and losses; it carried a sense of belonging, fans’ pride in their national teams, and each country’s desire to prove its presence. The stands filled with songs and flags, while matches became social events extending far beyond the field. With every edition, spectators discovered new names, gave players nicknames, and created stories that continued to live on after the final whistle.

Over time, the picture changed: matches became hotter and faster, and the character of the national teams emerged ever more clearly. Individual talent alone was no longer enough for a player—discipline, following instructions, and moving within a collective system were also required. Training centers, stadiums, and coaching methods developed; coaching staffs had a stronger influence, and competition became more demanding and closer to the public’s expectations.

This progress was not isolated from world football: Gulf national teams followed different footballing schools, brought in foreign coaches, and introduced more professional training programs. Players increasingly faced strong opponents at club level or in overseas leagues, which helped them cope better with pressure and improve their tactical understanding. Even so, the value of the Gulf Cup cannot be reduced to goals, a place in the standings, or the names of the winners: it also has a human and cultural dimension no less important than the sporting one.

It would be unfair to judge the tournament solely by its final results. Organization, stadium quality, attendance, and the national teams’ ability to discover new talent for the future also matter. Not every match is equally exciting; there are periods of caution and decline, but that does not diminish the value of the experience. The Cup gives young players a rare chance to prove themselves under pressure from the stands and the media: success brings confidence and a path into the professional ranks, while failure teaches that talent requires discipline, hard work, and patience. National teams should therefore view the Gulf Cup as a stage of development rather than a temporary event: victory is important, but it should not be the only objective. The tournament’s future depends on its ability to develop without losing its unique spirit—so that the stands remain alive, the competition stays strong and fair, and players and fans feel part of a story larger than a single match. Ultimately, the Gulf Cup is not 90 minutes, a league table, or merely a trophy raised aloft; it is the story of the Gulf countries, renewed every time, growing with each generation, and living more powerfully in fans’ memories than in the official record of results.

Comments on the News

• Which countries traditionally take part in the Gulf Cup, and how have the list of participants and the tournament format changed since its founding? — Traditionally, the Gulf Cup (officially, the Arab Gulf Cup) is contested by the six member states of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. The tournament was founded in 1970. Iraq later joined periodically—from the 1970s, then after an interruption following the 1990–1991 war, and again from the 2000s onward—while Yemen joined in the 2000s. The format has changed from a single round-robin group (with five or six teams) to a group stage with two groups and playoffs (semifinals and a final); in recent years, eight teams have usually participated. Some editions were held with an incomplete lineup or against a backdrop of political conflicts, such as the blockade of Qatar from 2017 to 2021.

• Why are there differences between the names “Arab Gulf Cup” and “Persian Gulf Cup,” and how does this reflect regional politics and history? — The difference is linked to a political dispute over the name of the body of water. The Arab Gulf states and the organizers use the name “Arabian Gulf” and “Arab Gulf Cup,” emphasizing the region’s Arab identity and the participation of Arab national teams. Iran and international geographic convention insist on the historical name “Persian Gulf.” Therefore, in Iran and in neutral or academic sources, the tournament may be called the “Persian Gulf Cup,” although officially it is a competition for Arab countries, not Iran. The name thus reflects Arab-Iranian rivalry, pan-Arab nationalism, the history of British colonial influence, and the policies of the Gulf states.

• Which well-known football academies and training centers in the Gulf countries, such as Aspire Academy in Qatar, contributed to the rise in the national teams’ level described in the article? — In Qatar, a key role was played by Aspire Academy, opened in 2004, and the Aspire Football Dreams project; its graduates formed the core of the Qatar national team that won the 2019 Asian Cup. In Saudi Arabia, notable institutions include Mahd Academy and the academies of Al-Hilal, Al-Nassr, and Al-Ittihad. In the UAE, there are the academies of Al-Jazira and Al-Ain, club football schools, and programs run by the UAE Football Association. In Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman, national football academies and club training centers play a significant role, including the Bahrain Football Association Academy and the Oman Football Association Academy. These structures improved early training, scouting, and infrastructure, gradually increasing the competitiveness of the Gulf national teams.

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Full version: This “war” began quietly—and now it is heating up

Germany Discusses Fast-Track Deportation Centers with Partners

German Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt said Berlin, together with Austria, the Netherlands, Denmark, Greece and the European Commission, is examining the possibility of creating special centers for the rapid return and deportation of migrants who have no right to remain in the country. At a press conference following a ministerial meeting on migration in Munich, he explained that Germany is drafting new rules to regulate irregular migration, including the accelerated return to countries of origin of people who have already received deportation orders.

At the same meeting, European Commissioner for Internal Affairs and Migration Magnus Brunner said the number of irregular migrants arriving in Europe had fallen by 55 percent in recent months, while the number of asylum applications had dropped by roughly one-third. He said this had been achieved through stronger border controls and closer cooperation among EU countries. Brunner stressed, however, that Europe needs additional tools to increase the share of return decisions that are actually enforced, while the EU border agency Frontex needs a broader mandate and greater powers to protect the bloc’s external borders and combat smuggling networks.

Participants in the Munich meeting also discussed implementation of the European Pact on Migration and Asylum and stronger cooperation with countries of origin and transit. A Europe-wide trend is emerging toward linking border controls with partnerships that facilitate the return of people who do not meet the conditions for protection or residence permits. However, the creation of fast-track return and deportation centers remains dependent on legal and administrative agreements between participating countries, as well as agreements with countries of origin or third countries. Berlin’s announcement that it is examining such centers does not mean they will begin operating: neither their locations nor the categories of migrants they would affect have been finalized.

Responding to a question about Syrians, Dobrindt stressed that Berlin distinguishes among three groups: those convicted of serious crimes; those whose applications have been rejected and who have no legal prospects of remaining; and those integrated into society and the labor market. According to him, Germany seeks to return the first category, encourage the voluntary return of the second, and provide pathways to residence permits and integration for the third, in accordance with current rules. These remarks take on particular significance given the sharp differences in the legal and social status of Syrians in Germany: some remain subject to protection applications or deportation decisions, while others have already put down roots and become integrated.

A separate issue is integration through professional employment. In an earlier report, Al Jazeera covered Syrian doctors who had fled to Germany and had to complete diploma-recognition procedures, language exams and licensing requirements before entering the labor market. Germany’s need for doctors in various specialties opened the way for these professionals, but the path to practicing medicine remained tied to overcoming administrative and professional barriers. Syrian doctors are the largest group among foreign medical professionals in the country: according to the German Hospital Federation, more than 5,700 of them were working in clinics as of 2024. The federation’s vice president called Syrian medical professionals “extremely important to the German healthcare system,” while the ifo Institute for Economic Research warned that the mass return of Syrian refugees could reduce economic productivity and worsen the shortage of skilled workers.

The latest data from Germany’s Federal Statistical Office show that in 2025, German citizenship was granted to 65,774 people who had previously held Syrian citizenship—the largest group among all former nationalities in naturalization statistics. Their average period of residence in the country before receiving citizenship was eight years. These figures show that the debate is not limited to returns: it concerns the fate of a broad segment of people who have moved into a more secure legal status within Germany. The consequences of any large-scale return of Syrians extend far beyond residence permits and asylum; they directly affect the labor market, particularly sectors already facing an acute shortage of workers.

News Commentary

• Who controls Damascus today, which political forces determine the situation in Syria, and how does this affect the possibility of refugee returns? - After the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024, Damascus has been controlled by transitional structures led by Ahmed al-Sharaa (the former leader of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham). The situation is shaped by several forces: the interim government; Islamist groups; the Syrian National Army (SNA), under Turkish influence in the north; the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the northeast; Druze and local militias in the south; and foreign actors including Turkey, the United States, Russia, Iran and Israel. For refugee returns, this means considerable uncertainty: there is no unified chain of command or security guarantees, while the risks of repression, arbitrary detention and clashes between factions remain, alongside economic collapse and destroyed infrastructure. As a result, large-scale returns remain limited and depend on stabilization, amnesties, and the restoration of housing and public services.
• Which regions of Syria are considered relatively safe for returns, and which remain areas of active fighting or instability? - There are no absolutely safe areas. Damascus and its suburbs, Latakia, Tartus, Homs, Hama, parts of Aleppo and some areas of central Syria are considered relatively calm, although localized clashes and arbitrary arrests remain possible there. Unstable and dangerous areas include the northern countryside of Aleppo and areas controlled by Turkish forces and the SNA—Afrin, Azaz and Jarabulus—as well as Idlib and its countryside; the northeast—Hasakah, Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor—because of confrontations involving the SDF, tribal forces and Islamic State cells; the south—Daraa and Suwayda—where local conflicts and protests continue; and the Badia desert and border areas, where remnants of militant groups operate and foreign strikes occur.
• How do Syria’s laws on military service and political persecution affect men’s and opposition members’ decisions not to return? - Under Assad’s regime, military service for men aged 18 to 42 was strictly enforced, while evasion could lead to travel bans, arrest, confiscation of property and imprisonment. After 2024, the former army was formally disbanded, but the new authorities and factions may carry out mobilization, and there are no uniform guarantees against conscription or repression. Opposition members, activists, journalists, former prisoners and anyone who fears revenge or persecution by new or former structures also refrain from returning. The absence of a transparent amnesty, a unified judicial system and protection against arbitrary detention heightens these fears. Many men and political refugees therefore prefer to remain abroad until genuine legal protection is established.
• Why do Syrian doctors make up the largest group of foreign medical professionals in Germany? How is medical education organized in Syria, and what factors drive them to emigrate? - Medical education in Syria has traditionally been free and lasts about six years at public universities, including those in Damascus, Aleppo and Tishreen. It combines theoretical training with clinical practice, after which graduates receive a license. The war destroyed the healthcare system, hospitals, equipment and the safety of medical workers; salaries fell, while specialization and career development became nearly impossible. Germany faces a shortage of doctors, particularly in rural areas, while diploma-recognition programs, language courses and the presence of a large Syrian diaspora have created a path to employment. Many Syrian doctors arrived as refugees after 2011, learned German and completed the recognition procedure—known as Approbation—enabling them to fill vacancies. Syrians consequently became one of the largest groups of foreign medical professionals in Germany: they are pushed out by war, repression, the economic crisis and a lack of prospects, and attracted by demand for doctors and relative stability.

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Full version: Germany Examines Fast-Track Deportation Centers; EU: Irregular Migration Down 55%

Second Round of Venezuela Government–Opposition Dialogue Ends

The Venezuelan government and representatives of the National Assembly elected in 2015 have completed the second round of talks, which consisted of seven working sessions: two plenary meetings and five technical groups. Discussions focused on freedom of information, pluralism, and strengthening democratic and state institutions.

The parties supported the authorities’ decision to continue suspending administrative measures against news portals, websites, and electronic platforms, and called on state and private media to promote democratic coexistence. They also agreed to hold technical discussions on the use of the radio-frequency spectrum and review the legislation currently governing this area.

As part of judicial reform, a Council for Reviewing the Documents and Requirements of Supreme Court Candidates was established. It consists of seven legal experts. At its next session, the National Assembly is expected to form the preliminary committee of the Judicial Candidates Nomination Committee and publish an official work schedule. Representatives of the parties also agreed to continue reviewing laws concerning the transformation of the judicial system. The third round of talks is scheduled for mid-October. Parliamentary Speaker Jorge Rodríguez said that four types of elections—parliamentary, municipal, gubernatorial, and presidential—would be held in the country within the time frames stipulated by the Constitution. He also rejected claims that María Corina Machado was being prevented from returning to Venezuela.

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Full version: Government and National Assembly 2015 Conclude Second Round of Dialogue with Agreements on Media and the TSJ

Chilean and Venezuelan Leaders Open Path to Restoring Relations

Venezuela’s acting president, Delcy Rodríguez, held a bilateral meeting with Chilean President José Antonio Kast on the sidelines of the 81st session of the UN General Assembly in New York. The talks took place in a friendly atmosphere and focused on beginning a new stage of normalization and strengthening bilateral ties following the diplomatic rupture between the two countries in 2024. Both delegations called the meeting a step toward resuming dialogue and diplomatic engagement; Rodríguez said that Chile and Venezuela were once again finding common ground through negotiations and mutual respect.

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Full version: Delcy Rodríguez: “Chile and Venezuela meet again through dialogue and diplomacy”

The US and Syria: A New Era After Sanctions and the Caesar Act

US-Syrian relations are entering a new phase, unlike the decades of rupture, isolation and sanctions. Washington has lifted a broad package of restrictions and removed Syria from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, where it had been listed since 1974. This opens the way for Damascus to rebuild its economy and integrate into the global financial system. A key step was the repeal of the Caesar Act, signed by Donald Trump on December 18, 2025, as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2026. This completed the dismantling of the comprehensive sanctions program launched on July 1, 2025, although targeted sanctions against Bashar al-Assad and individuals involved in human rights violations, drug trafficking and terrorism remain in place.

The lifting of sanctions does not mean an alliance. It means new relations built around overlapping interests, mutual understanding and coordination on political and security issues. Washington is pursuing conditional, pragmatic diplomacy and is prepared for a functional partnership with Damascus. The Trump administration has set four objectives regarding Syria’s new authorities: to support Syria’s stability and territorial integrity; prevent terrorist organizations from finding a safe haven; protect religious and ethnic minorities; and ensure that Syria does not threaten its neighbors and lives peacefully alongside them. This reflects a shift in US policy: a stable Syria now serves US interests, while instability could bring back ISIS, chaos, migration, and Iranian and Russian influence.

In the economic sphere, the changes are reflected in the opening of channels for international financial transfers, including SWIFT. This should facilitate imports and exports and restore confidence in Syrian financial transactions. US companies Mastercard, Visa and Chevron have already taken initial steps into the Syrian market, while an American business delegation representing 50 major companies visited Damascus to discuss investment, reconstruction and long-term partnerships. The lifting of sanctions does not benefit only American businesses: it removes the legal risks that prevented companies from the Gulf states, Turkey and Europe from entering the market. However, full reintegration requires Syria to establish a legal and financial environment that improves banking compliance and provides suitable financial infrastructure.

The fight against terrorism remains central to relations between Washington and Damascus. It is a test of the Syrian state’s ability to control security and prevent extremist groups from returning. Syria’s joining the international coalition against ISIS in 2025 demonstrated its desire to be regarded as a partner in strengthening stability, but the United States expects concrete results that will reduce the threat. A new formula is taking shape: the more effectively Syrian state institutions combat extremists, the less Washington needs to rely on independent armed groups. This was reflected in the dissolution of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the beginning of the integration of their units and territories into state institutions; Presidential Decree No. 13, which granted Kurds cultural and language rights; the appointment of Mazloum Abdi as a presidential adviser in August 2026; and the appointment of Ilham Ahmed as a member of the People’s Council.

The most difficult test remains the question of relations with Israel. Washington wants Syria to be stable, but Israel’s security remains a priority for it. This creates a contradiction: Israeli strikes and incursions continue, as does the right wing’s refusal to withdraw from the occupied Syrian territories. Syria needs US pressure on Israel to restrain its aggressive policy, as well as a security agreement that would restore arrangements resembling the 1974 disengagement agreement without reducing the security of southern Syria to Israel’s demands alone. In return, Washington wants guarantees that the border will not become a threat to Israel, and therefore continues its mediation. The first round took place in August 2026, followed by four more, but Israel’s intransigence led to a deadlock.

From its relations with Washington, Damascus expects not only political and economic support, but also a tool for deterring Israeli aggression and managing the conflict with an aggressive policy aimed at undermining Syria’s stability and territorial integrity. The lifting of sanctions is seen as removing economic and legal threats: Syria is moving from requests for exemptions to requests for financing and investment. It needs long-term financial openness, as the cost of reconstruction is estimated at approximately $216 billion. On the diplomatic front, it is seeking the full restoration of relations with Washington and the reopening of the US embassy, although the travel advisory remains at Level 4.

At the same time, Syria needs more than the United States. Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, other Gulf states, the Arab world and Europe are important to it, as are carefully calibrated relations with Russia and China. It is in Syria’s interest not to replace old dependencies with new ones. Despite the lifting of sanctions and removal of the main restrictions, the path ahead will not be entirely smooth: strategic and security-related conditions and demands continue to determine its pace, limits and speed.

Comments on the News

• What exactly did the Caesar Act prohibit, and why is its repeal considered more significant for foreign banks and investors than Syria’s removal from the US list of state sponsors of terrorism? — The Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019 imposed sanctions on the Assad government, its officials and any foreign individuals providing substantial financial, material or technological support to Damascus—in the oil, construction, military, aviation, telecommunications and other sectors. The key element was secondary sanctions: under the threat of being cut off from the dollar system and the US market, foreign banks and companies avoided any transactions with Syria. That is why the repeal or suspension of the act is more important to them than removal from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. SST status primarily restricts US aid, arms exports and certain financial operations, whereas the Caesar Act created a global “sanctions shield” against investment and reconstruction.

• What territory and forces did the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) control before their dissolution, and why does their integration into the Syrian army and state institutions remain one of the most difficult issues in northeastern Syria? — Before their dissolution or integration, the SDF controlled northeastern Syria: Hasakah, Qamishli, Raqqa, eastern Deir ez-Zor, parts of the Aleppo countryside, the al-Hol camp, oil and gas fields, border crossings with Iraq and part of the border with Turkey. Their core consisted of the Kurdish YPG and YPJ, but the coalition also included Arab, Assyrian, Turkmen and Armenian units. Integration is difficult because of Turkey’s opposition, as it considers the YPG and PKK terrorist organizations; Damascus’s concerns about losing control over the army, oil and borders; demands for Kurdish autonomy versus a unitary state; interethnic and tribal tensions; and unresolved questions concerning the chain of command, disarmament and the future of US support.

• Who are Mazloum Abdi and Ilham Ahmed in Syria’s Kurdish political movement, and what political disagreements accompanied their appointments to state positions? — Mazloum Abdi (Ferhat Abdi Şahin) is the commander-in-chief of the SDF and one of the leading Kurdish military figures, associated with the YPG. Ilham Ahmed is a prominent Kurdish politician, co-chair of the Syrian Democratic Council and a representative of the autonomous administration in northeastern Syria. Their appointments to state positions as part of the integration process were viewed controversially. Turkey and its allies saw them as legitimizing “terrorist” structures; Damascus feared the emergence of parallel centers of power; some Arab tribes and minorities demanded equal representation; and Kurdish groups insisted on preserving autonomy and their military force. Disputes concerned powers, federalism, control over resources and borders, and whether the appointments would genuinely integrate the SDF rather than simply rename its structures.

• What was the 1974 Agreement on Disengagement of Forces on the Golan Heights, and why might Washington and Damascus view it as a model for a new security agreement with Israel? — The 1974 Agreement on Disengagement of Forces was signed by Israel and Syria with US mediation after the Yom Kippur War. It provided for a ceasefire, the withdrawal and separation of forces, the creation of a buffer zone under the control of UN forces (UNDOF), limited-arms zones and an exchange of prisoners. The agreement maintained relative calm on the Golan Heights for decades. It may serve as a model for a new agreement because it offers a framework of demilitarized zones, UN monitoring, force limitations, phased withdrawals and security guarantees. For Damascus, this would be a way to restore its influence over the Golan Heights and avoid Israeli strikes; for Washington, it would provide a model for stabilization without a comprehensive peace treaty. The difficulties include Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights in 1981, US recognition of that annexation in 2019, Syria’s demand for the full return of the territory, and Israel’s concerns about an Iranian presence.

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Full version: How Syria Avoided Israel’s Difficult Traps in Washington

Post About Trump and Xi Turned Out to Be About Argentina’s Crisis

A post by Argentine media outlet Canal 26, published under a headline about a meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping, in fact contains no information about either U.S.-Chinese talks or Venezuela’s reaction to relations between the two powers. As follows from the post, it concerns the internal crisis of Argentina’s military healthcare system, IOSFA.

The article focuses on the resignation of retired Colonel Ariel Guzmán, who headed the Instituto de Obra Social de las Fuerzas Armadas y de Seguridad—the organization responsible for social and medical support for Argentina’s armed forces and security forces. His departure comes amid the organization’s severe financial difficulties: IOSFA’s debt to healthcare providers exceeds 200 billion Argentine pesos.

The post also mentions a protest by the ATE trade union. Representatives of the organization say that some medical services have been suspended and warn that the crisis could put around 600 jobs at risk. Thus, the text centers on the financial problems of Argentina’s state healthcare system and a labor dispute, not international politics.

Despite the headline about the U.S.-China summit, the article contains no statements by Donald Trump or Xi Jinping, does not describe the course of their alleged meeting, and offers no assessment of the strategic rivalry between Washington and Beijing. It includes no information about possible agreements, trade disputes, technological competition, or the regional consequences of U.S.-Chinese contacts.

The post cannot, moreover, be regarded as a Venezuelan reaction. It quotes no Venezuelan government officials, local experts, civil society organizations, or political forces. Nor does it analyze issues that could be important to Caracas: the oil sector, U.S. sanctions, economic ties with China, foreign-policy strategy, or the impact of U.S.-China relations on Latin America.

As a result, the Canal 26 post represents a mismatch between its stated subject and its actual content. Instead of a report on Trump and Xi Jinping or an analysis of Venezuela’s position, readers are presented with an account of the crisis facing Argentina’s IOSFA.

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al-Sharaa: The Golan Heights Are Syrian Land, Talks with Israel Stall

Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa spoke in New York at a discussion session of the Atlantic Council moderated by Brett McGurk. He addressed talks with Israel, the Golan Heights, regional security, foreign military presence, the political transition, and relations with neighboring countries. His central message was that Damascus continues to pursue diplomacy but is not prepared to trade away the security and rights of Syrians.

According to him, negotiations with Israel have repeatedly come close to an agreement, but Tel Aviv backed away at the last moment for various reasons. Al-Sharaa stressed that a lasting peace must be based on protecting the security and rights of Syrians, as well as the withdrawal of Israeli forces from territories occupied after the fall of the previous regime. He called the Golan Heights Syrian land recognized by the UN and said the issue was not open to discussion. He recalled a joke he made during a conversation with Trump: why not give New Jersey to Israel, since the Golan Heights do not belong to Israel while New Jersey belongs to the United States? At the same time, he said, the Golan Heights belong to their inhabitants, and no president has the right to dispose of them.

Regarding the events of October 7, al-Sharaa said he understood the suffering of innocent people but rejected attempts to make those events the foundation of all policy or to define attitudes toward Syria through them. He urged people to understand the situation in Gaza, where, he said, more than 70,000 people—including women and children—had been killed. In his view, basing Israel’s policy toward Syria on the logic of October 7 was irrational and only increased security threats. If Israel wants guarantees, it should respect the security of others and change course, because stability in the region benefits everyone, including Israelis.

Speaking about the foreign military presence, al-Sharaa said Damascus sought Syria’s full sovereignty and the absence of foreign military bases. The new authorities, he said, inherited Russia’s presence and chose dialogue with Moscow; the number of Russian bases had fallen from approximately 170 to two, which had been repurposed to train the Syrian army. He called the withdrawal of US troops the most successful such withdrawal for the United States—one carried out safely and by mutual understanding, without war. In the northeast of the country, he added, the state controlled most of the territory, while the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) had been dissolved and were operating under state auspices. At the same time, he distinguished between integrating an armed group and relations with the Kurdish community, whose rights to culture and language had been recognized in a separate decree.

In the political sphere, al-Sharaa said the People’s Council would form a committee to review laws and another committee that would begin drafting a constitution. He expected the process to be completed before the end of the five-year term. As he described it, the transition began with the consolidation of security, followed by a national conference, the publication of the Constitutional Declaration, the formation of a government, and elections to the People’s Council. He acknowledged that the elections had not been perfect but said they were appropriate for the stage. The Constitutional Declaration, signed on March 13, 2025, establishes a five-year transitional period from the date it enters into force. Asked whether he might run for president, he said he had not yet considered it and was focused on serving the people and developing the country, but did not rule out participating if the task required his presence: “I will run to do it, because evading responsibility or fleeing from it does not always free one from it.”

He also addressed Lebanon and Iraq. According to him, Damascus’s approach to Lebanon was based on strengthening the government and institutions, as well as placing weapons under state control; no weapons should operate outside the law or the authority of Beirut. Syria, he noted, wanted to improve Lebanon’s economic and social conditions and overcome the legacy of the previous regime by discussing political reforms and the proper implementation of the Taif Agreement, since instability in Lebanon directly affects Syria. Speaking about Iraq, he said the American war had left a heavy legacy and contributed to the expansion of Iranian influence, while the Iraqi prime minister was trying to limit the weapons of groups operating outside state institutions. He also mentioned a project to connect Iraqi oil fields to Syrian ports as an alternative to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Suez Canal. He described relations with the government of Iraqi Kurdistan as very good, including economic cooperation and security coordination.

On building the army and security agencies, al-Sharaa said the process began with dissolving factions and bringing weapons under state auspices within a unified army, after which admission criteria were developed and training camps established. However, the need to prevent the country’s collapse and fill the vacuum after the regime’s fall forced the authorities to quickly accept a large number of people willing to serve, initially without applying stringent selection requirements. He acknowledged that incidents had occurred during the transitional period, including within the army and security forces, and that some countries were helping train Syrian forces.

Responding to questions about his past and ties to al-Qaeda, al-Sharaa denied involvement in the September 11 attacks: “I had nothing to do with that; I was thirteen years old at the time.” He expressed regret over the victims in the United States and the Middle East. In response to repeated questions about his former oath of allegiance, he said the circumstances had been different and had pushed many young people in that direction. Regarding American journalist Austin Tice, he said he had met with Tice’s mother and introduced her to his own mother, who had once believed that he had been killed. According to him, around 150,000 Syrians were still listed as missing. The national authority for missing persons sought to draw on international experience in forensic medicine and criminalistics, while the government was trying to share with Tice’s family any information it received, without disclosing details related to security and intelligence.

Comments on the News

• Which UN resolutions establish the status of the Golan Heights as Syrian territory, and why does Israel consider them part of its country? — The status of the Golan Heights as occupied Syrian territory is confirmed primarily by UN Security Council Resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), which call for Israel’s withdrawal from occupied territories and a settlement based on the “land for peace” principle, as well as Security Council Resolution 497 (1981), which declared Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights null and void and without international legal effect. Annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the “Occupied Syrian Golan” also affirm Syrian sovereignty. Israel considers the Golan Heights part of its country because of their strategic importance—their elevation and control over northern Israel and Mount Hermon—water resources, including the Sea of Galilee basin, historical and biblical ties, and security considerations following their capture in 1967. In 1981, Israel annexed the territory, but the UN does not recognize the move; the sole exception is the United States, which recognized it in 2019.

• What are the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and why is their dissolution and integration into state structures considered important for northeastern Syria? — The SDF are a multinational military alliance created in 2015 with US support. Their core consists of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG/YPJ), alongside Arab, Assyrian, Turkmen, and other formations. The SDF played a key role in defeating the Islamic State and controls a significant part of northeastern Syria, including oil and agricultural areas, the al-Hol camp, and prisons holding Islamic State militants. Their dissolution and integration into state structures could restore Damascus’s central authority in the northeast, prevent the country’s division, reduce the threat of a Turkish invasion—Ankara considers the SDF linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)—settle Kurdish rights, ensure the management of resources and camps, stabilize the region, and prevent a new cycle of war and humanitarian crisis.

• Which Russian military bases remain in Syria, and why has their number fallen from approximately 170 to two? — The main Russian facilities remaining are Hmeimim Air Base in Latakia and the naval facility in Tartus; a logistics center in Tartus is also sometimes mentioned. The reduction from approximately 170 facilities—including temporary bases, forward posts, observation points, and airfields established during the 2015–2017 operation—to two permanent bases is explained by the end of the main phase of the military operation, the reduction of the contingent after the defeat of the Islamic State, and the need to concentrate forces at permanent bases. In addition, after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024, Russia lost the support of the previous authorities, was forced to evacuate many facilities, and concentrated on Hmeimim and Tartus. Their future, however, depends on negotiations with Syria’s new authorities.

• What is the Taif Agreement, and how is it connected to Syria’s role in Lebanon? — The Taif Agreement (1989) was an accord developed under the auspices of the League of Arab States that ended Lebanon’s civil war (1975–1990). It redistributed power among the Christian and Muslim communities, weakened the powers of the Maronite president, and strengthened the roles of the Sunni prime minister and Shiite speaker of parliament. Its connection to Syria is that Taif recognized Syria’s “special relationship” with Lebanon and effectively legitimized the temporary Syrian military presence introduced in 1976. The agreement provided for the withdrawal of Syrian troops, but Damascus interpreted this as something that could occur after stabilization, and the troops remained until 2005, when Syria withdrew them following the assassination of Rafik Hariri and the Cedar Revolution.

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Full version: Al-Sharaa in an extensive interview: What did he say about Israel, October 7, September 11, and running for president?

Delcy Rodríguez Urges Guyana to Resume Essequibo Talks

Speaking at a UN forum, Venezuelan President Delcy Rodríguez once again asserted the country’s historical rights to the territory of Guayana Esequiba and officially called on the Guyanese authorities to resume dialogue under the 1966 Geneva Agreement. She stressed that the border dispute should be resolved directly by the two states involved in the conflict, rather than through external bodies. According to Rodríguez, bilateral agreements are generally more enduring and can lead to a practical, mutually acceptable solution.

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Full version: Presidenta Rodríguez Reafirmó Derechos de Venezuela sobre el Esequibo e Instó a Guyana a Negociar bajo el Acuerdo de Ginebra

New Jersey Joke Over the Golan Heights: al-Sharaa Rejects Sovereignty Deal

Syrian social media reacted strongly to President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s remarks about the occupied Golan Heights and his conversation with U.S. President Donald Trump. The statements were made on Wednesday during a discussion session moderated by former U.S. official Brett McGurk. The event was organized by the Syria Project at the Atlantic Council in New York on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly.

Al-Sharaa described details of an earlier conversation with Trump at the White House. According to him, he joked when Trump said that the Golan Heights were under Israel’s sovereignty. He allegedly said: “Why not give New Jersey to the Israelis? Today you don’t have the Golan Heights to give away, but you do have New Jersey. And since it is full of Democrats who do not vote for you, it would be good to give the state to the Israelis.” The story sparked a wave of comments because it combined sarcasm with a direct political refusal.

At the same time, al-Sharaa emphasized the fundamental political meaning behind the joke: “Aside from the joke, the Golan Heights belong to their people, and therefore neither the president of Syria, nor the president of the United States, nor anyone else has the right to renounce them or cede them to others.” This approach confirms that the Golan Heights are Syrian land and that no one has the right to give away something they do not own. It also means that restoring the rights of Syrians is not a matter for bargaining or concession.

Al-Sharaa’s statements received broad support on Syrian platforms. Activists and observers described them as a “strong statement” by the Syrian president, who himself comes from the Golan and has a developed political vision. Commentators noted his diplomatic style: delivering a decisive blow to his opponent while accompanying it with a joke and a slight smile to soften the effect. Others saw it as evidence of notable diplomatic skill amid the difficult circumstances Syria is facing.

Some users offered more measured assessments, linking the foreign-policy position to domestic issues. They expressed disagreement with the government’s economic policy amid difficult living conditions, high prices, and hunger, but acknowledged that the move reflected positively on al-Sharaa because he was insisting on clear conditions before any talks about an agreement or peace. In their view, he could have used his position to act as though he owned the land and avoided the issue through silence, but instead refused to cede the Golan Heights, insisting that they belonged to the Syrian people. Some called it a “statement for the history books” and widely reposted the phrase, “Why not give them New Jersey?”

News Comments

• Who is Brett McGurk, and what role did he play in U.S. policy toward Syria and the Middle East? — Brett McGurk is an American diplomat who served as the U.S. president’s special envoy to the international coalition against ISIS (2015–2018), senior director for the Middle East at the National Security Council, and, under President Biden, coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa. In Syria policy, he was a key architect of the campaign against ISIS, coordinated actions with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), sought to balance the interests of Turkey and Kurdish forces, and advocated a limited U.S. military presence. He resigned in December 2018 in protest against Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw American troops from Syria.

• What is the Syria Project at the Atlantic Council, and what objectives does it pursue in discussions of the Syrian conflict? — The Syria Project at the Atlantic Council is a research and analytical initiative of the American think tank Atlantic Council—not a government body, but an influential institution in Washington. Its objectives include monitoring and analyzing the Syrian conflict, developing recommendations for U.S. and allied policymakers, documenting human-rights violations and war crimes, supporting Syrian civil society and the democratic opposition, facilitating a political settlement, countering extremism, and discussing post-conflict reconstruction. The project serves as a platform for experts, diplomats, and Syrian activists.

• What significance does Ahmed al-Sharaa’s Golan Heights heritage have for his political position and his standing inside Syria? — Ahmed al-Sharaa, better known as Abu Mohammed al-Julani, the leader of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, was born in Saudi Arabia, but his family comes from the Golan Heights—a Syrian territory occupied by Israel in 1967 and annexed in 1981, an annexation not recognized by the international community. This background gives him, in the eyes of some Syrians, the image of a person connected to a national tragedy and resistance to Israel, strengthening his nationalist positions and hostility toward normalization with Israel. However, his jihadist past and links to al-Qaeda have generated distrust both inside Syria and abroad. His Golan roots may be used to bolster his legitimacy among conservative and patriotic circles, but they do not dispel accusations of extremism.

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Full version: "Why not give them New Jersey?".. al-Sharaa recalls his response to Trump regarding the Golan Heights

A Chair, Humor and Protocol: Ahmed al-Sharaa’s Gesture in New York

Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa briefly interrupted a meeting with the Syrian diaspora in New York and asked for his chair to be replaced with one like those used by the attendees. This was the second such incident: a year earlier, he had asked for his chair to match that of Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani. The simple detail drew attention and literally brought the chair from the background into the foreground.

Reactions were divided. Some saw the gesture as spontaneous and modest—a signal that al-Sharaa was sitting among members of the diaspora and considered himself one of them. Others criticized the move. The president himself explained with a smile that the seat prepared for him was uncomfortable; in a widely circulated video, he says: “Last time, it was interpreted as modesty… honestly, it’s uncomfortable.” Thus, the symbolism of the gesture remained open to differing interpretations, ranging from support to criticism.

The scene raised questions: Does every presidential visit have its own protocol? When does protocol dictate where someone sits, and does it determine the shape of the chair? Not all visits by heads of state are governed by the same protocol rules. The U.S. State Department distinguishes between state, official, working and private visits. In some government-visit guidelines, meetings with diaspora communities and local groups are excluded from the official program unless special arrangements have been made. Therefore, a meeting with a community does not automatically become an “official ceremony” simply because the president is present.

There is no universal protocol rule requiring a president to sit in a chair of a particular design. However, seating at official events may be governed by precise rules of precedence and ceremony. The UN Protocol and Liaison Service provides advice on protocol and diplomatic etiquette and prepares seating plans for a number of official events. In its protocol guidelines, the State Department notes that seating arrangements vary depending on the event, while the positions of the host, guest of honor and other distinguished guests are determined by precedence. Protocol primarily concerns a person’s place and position within the hierarchy of the scene, rather than a special chair of a different color or shape. Replacing a chair does not indicate a change in the order of the individuals present, so this fact alone is insufficient to conclude that protocol was violated.

The meeting took place in New York alongside al-Sharaa’s participation in the 81st session of the UN General Assembly. He arrived at the head of an official delegation that included Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani and Minister of Emergency and Disaster Management Raed al-Saleh. This was his second visit to New York for General Assembly meetings. According to the SANA news agency, the meeting addressed the latest developments in Syria, the path toward recovery and revival, and the role of Syrians abroad. Participants were given an opportunity to propose ideas and apply their experience during the reconstruction phase.

Comments on the News

• What is Ahmed al-Sharaa’s political and military background, and how did he become president of Syria? — Ahmed al-Sharaa, also known as Abu Mohammad al-Julani, began as a jihadist in Iraq after 2003 and was linked to al-Qaeda. In 2012, he founded Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria, an al-Qaeda affiliate. In 2016, he announced a break with al-Qaeda and renamed the group; in 2017, he established Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which took control of Idlib. In November–December 2024, HTS led an offensive that resulted in the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. On January 29, 2025, at a meeting of military factions, al-Sharaa was declared president of Syria for a transitional period. He also dissolved parliament, the old army and HTS.

• What is the SANA news agency, and how do its materials reflect the position of the Syrian government? — SANA, the Syrian Arab News Agency, is Syria’s state news agency, founded in 1965. It publishes official statements, decrees, military reports and news reflecting the authorities’ position. Under the Assad regime, SANA served as a mouthpiece for the government and the Ba’ath Party. After December 2024, it continued to operate as a state agency and report the position of the transitional authorities led by Ahmed al-Sharaa. Its materials are not independent and represent the official viewpoint.

• How large is the Syrian diaspora, particularly in the United States, and what political influence does it have? Why is it being involved in Syria’s reconstruction? — The Syrian diaspora is estimated at roughly 15–18 million people, including descendants, although exact figures vary. Depending on the estimate, between 150,000 and 300,000 Syrians and Syrian Americans live in the United States. Their political influence is relatively limited but is growing through organizations such as the Syrian American Council and the Syrian Emergency Task Force, which lobby Congress and shape public opinion. The diaspora is being involved in Syria’s reconstruction because it has capital, professional expertise, business ties and remittance networks. It can invest in the economy, support humanitarian projects, and lobby for the lifting of sanctions and international support for the new government.

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Full version: Al-Sharaa leaves his chair for the second time and chooses a seat among the attendees—is this a breach of protocol?

Venezuela and the US Intend to Strengthen Dialogue and Cooperation

Venezuelan President Delcy Rodríguez reported meeting with US President Donald Trump, describing it as historic. The sides discussed strengthening bilateral relations and developing cooperation in strategic areas, including energy, mining and security, as well as other issues of mutual interest.

Rodríguez thanked Trump and the US government for assisting Venezuela following the earthquakes on June 24 and for supporting the country’s return to participation in multilateral international forums. According to her, the historic ties between the two countries should be developed under the new political circumstances through dialogue and diplomacy focused on concrete results and collective benefits for the Venezuelan people.

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Full version: "Historic meeting": Delcy Rodríguez and Donald Trump open a new stage of dialogue and bilateral cooperation

13 Years Behind a Wall: Syrian Man Reunites with Family After Regime Falls

Muhammad Zakkour from Latakia in northwestern Syria spent more than 13 years in a hiding place behind a wall he built himself in his grandfather’s house. After being arrested during the early years of the Syrian revolution, he was released, but was detained again and began fearing a third prison sentence. Convinced that disappearing was the only way to avoid another arrest, he created a space behind the wall about one meter wide and roughly three meters high. Because of its cramped, enclosed conditions, relatives compared the shelter to a grave.

He never went outside the hiding place. His wife passed him food, water, clothes and medicine through a small opening in the wall. For years, he slept, ate and prayed away from ordinary life, hearing the voices of the children in the house but unable to show himself to them. His wife became not only his link to the outside world but also the only person who knew he was alive; she also had to support the family.

To those around him, his disappearance became a death. His brother, who lived in Turkey, even held mourning gatherings, believing that Muhammad had died, although he was only a few meters from his relatives—behind the wall. His wife concealed the truth even from the children, fearing that one of them might accidentally let it slip. Zakkour later explained that a child could easily reveal what they knew, so keeping the children silent was part of protecting the secret. Even illness was not enough reason for him to come out: when he felt unwell, he described his symptoms to his wife, who went to a doctor, explained his condition and returned with medicine.

One day, security officers searching for him broke into the house and asked his daughter about her father. The girl stood before them, unaware that the wanted man was behind the same wall, and insisted that she knew nothing about him; the search yielded nothing. After the security forces left, the girl suffered an extreme attack of fear, and her condition deteriorated, eventually leading to diabetes, according to the family. When her father was sent to prison, his wife was pregnant; while he was in hiding, she gave birth to a boy who, like the other children, grew up believing that his father was dead.

The long-awaited moment came after the regime fell and the release of prisoners was announced. The mother placed a refrigerator in front of the opening separating her husband’s hiding place from the rest of the house. Then, crying with joy, she called the children and said: “Your father is behind this wall.” At first, the children did not believe her—it seemed to them that their mother had imagined his presence out of grief. But she asked them to move the refrigerator. When the hiding place was opened and their father appeared before them after all those years, the shock was overwhelming: the children froze, and some fainted.

News Explainers

• What is Latakia, and why is the city considered a stronghold of the Alawites and the former regime? — Latakia is a major port city on Syria’s Mediterranean coast and the center of the province of the same name. Historically, the region, together with Tartus, has been home to a concentrated Alawite population—a religious community and branch of Shia Islam to which the Assad family belongs. In the 1920s, the French authorities even created a separate “Alawite State,” reinforcing the community’s local identity. Under the Assad regime, the Alawite elite was widely represented in the army, intelligence services and Republican Guard, while Latakia and Tartus became the regime’s informal fiefdom: the area where the Assad family originated and lived (Qardaha), as well as a base for the security forces. That is why the city and province are seen as strongholds of the Alawites and the former regime.

• What were Syria’s security services (the mukhabarat), and how did they act against opponents of the regime? — “Mukhabarat” is an Arabic word meaning intelligence or security service. In Syria, it refers to an extensive system of several parallel intelligence agencies, including General Intelligence, Military Intelligence, Air Force Intelligence and Political Security, all reporting to the president and the Ba’ath Party. They controlled society through surveillance, networks of informants, censorship and fear. The regime used mass arbitrary arrests, torture, enforced disappearances, extrajudicial executions and imprisonment in facilities such as Sednaya against its opponents. During the 2011 protests, the mukhabarat played a key role in suppressing demonstrations and detaining activists, while also fueling violence—one of the factors that turned peaceful protests into an armed conflict.

• How was the 2011 Syrian revolution connected to the fall of the regime in December 2024? — The revolution began in March 2011 with protests in Daraa, sparked by the arrest and torture of teenagers, and quickly spread across the country under slogans calling for freedom and dignity. The regime’s harsh response—shooting at demonstrators, mass arrests and torture—led to the militarization of the uprising, the creation of the Free Syrian Army and the emergence of numerous armed groups, as well as foreign intervention by Russia, Iran, Hezbollah, Turkey, the United States and others. By 2018, with support from Russia and Iran, the regime had regained control of most of the country, but it had not addressed the conflict’s underlying causes: authoritarianism, corruption, the economic crisis and sectarian politics. By 2024, its allies had weakened—Russia because of the war in Ukraine, and Hezbollah because of its conflict with Israel—while the opposition retained a foothold in Idlib. In November and December 2024, an offensive led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham resulted in the capture of Aleppo, Hama, Homs and Damascus; on December 8, Assad fled. Thus, the fall of the regime in December 2024 was the culmination of a long process set in motion by the 2011 revolution and the brutal response to it.

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Full version: His children thought he was dead: Why did a Syrian man hide for 13 years in a prison he built in his home?

International Reaction to Press Restrictions Under the Trump Administration

Resistance to the Trump administration’s alleged attempts to limit media access and coverage of the UN’s work is becoming the main story of the day. Major American broadcasters and news organizations are suspending operations, facing exclusion from the news pool, and turning to the courts—transforming the issue from an ordinary political dispute into a question of press freedom and the accountability of government institutions. This material is based on reports by AFP and Facebook (Venezuela).

The Venezuelan Context: Media Freedom, Sanctions, and Dialogue with the US

Two Venezuelan publications, formally devoted to different topics, show how events surrounding the Donald Trump administration can be interpreted through the lens of the long-standing confrontation between Caracas and Washington. At the same time, both of the materials provided differ substantially from their headlines: the AFP report, presented as a reaction to restrictions on American television networks’ access to coverage of Trump’s activities, actually discusses possible US-Iran talks. Meanwhile, the teleSUR post, published under a headline about CNN being barred from covering events at the UN, focuses on an alleged meeting between Trump and Venezuela’s acting president, Delcy Rodríguez.

Although the first text contains no specific Venezuelan comments, the issue of pressure on the press is particularly significant for the country. For years, independent journalists, radio stations, print publications, and digital platforms in Venezuela have faced blockages, administrative restrictions, and other forms of pressure. Consequently, possible actions by the US administration against disfavored media outlets may be seen not only as a domestic dispute in the United States, but also as a troubling international example of the vulnerability of press freedom.

Washington regularly condemns Caracas over the state of civil liberties and restrictions on journalists. Against this backdrop, measures that could appear to be the selective exclusion of media outlets from the presidential press pool, or punishment for inconvenient coverage, provide Venezuelan authorities and their supporters with an argument against American criticism. In this interpretation, the United States itself is demonstrating a willingness to pressure the media when their work becomes politically inconvenient.

Venezuelan society could interpret the situation in different ways. Government supporters may portray it as proof of the West’s double standards and the selective application of the principle of free speech. Independent journalists and opposition-minded citizens, by contrast, may see a dangerous precedent: if a powerful American administration confronts the press through administrative bans, this risks normalizing methods well known to media outlets in countries with restricted information environments.

In Venezuela, access to independent information is directly linked not only to public debate, but also to coverage of sanctions, oil negotiations, migration, relations with the United States, and everyday socioeconomic conditions. The weakening of international standards protecting journalism could deprive local reporters and human rights advocates of an important point of support.

The second publication shifts attention from media freedom to diplomacy, sanctions, and economic interests. According to the version presented in the teleSUR material, Donald Trump and Delcy Rodríguez may have met in New York on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly as part of an attempt to restore direct diplomatic contacts. Caracas, the report claims, continues to seek the lifting of sanctions imposed in 2025.

In this interpretation, Rodríguez serves as a key representative of the Venezuelan state in the negotiations. Her delegation reportedly discussed energy, mineral extraction, and debt issues with American officials and international creditors. For a country whose export revenues depend heavily on the oil industry, such talks are of paramount importance. Access to investment, financing, and global markets depends on the sanctions regime and the prospects for relations with the United States.

The publication also places the potential dialogue within an especially harsh political framework, describing the meeting as the first in person since the “kidnapping” of Nicolás Maduro and Cilia Flores by US forces in January 2026. This wording reflects Venezuela’s official-oriented approach, according to which Washington’s actions are regarded as an encroachment on the country’s sovereignty. From this perspective, talks with the United States appear not as a retreat from confrontation, but as a pragmatic and necessary tool for protecting national interests.

In this context, energy, extractive industries, and debt represent more than a set of economic topics. For Caracas, they are tied to the possibility of easing external isolation, expanding room for financial and political maneuver, attracting investment, and securing recognition for its representatives on the international stage.

Thus, from the Venezuelan perspective, American policy is linked to two complementary narratives. The first concerns how conflicts between governments and journalists can affect global perceptions of media independence. The second concerns how sanctions, oil restrictions, and diplomatic contacts with Washington shape Venezuela’s prospects for economic normalization and the protection of its sovereignty.

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Israel Blows Up Sites Near Qalaat Jandal and Intensifies Strikes in Southern Syria

Israeli forces have once again stepped up operations in southern Syria, blowing up sites near Qalaat Jandal fortress on the slopes of Mount Hermon, including a former post belonging to the army of the ousted regime and a border outpost. In addition, after midnight, artillery fired two shells at farmland on the outskirts of the town of Jamlah, west of Daraa. Earlier, strikes hit several areas in the countryside of Quneitra, near Western Samadaniyah, the Bir Ajam forest and the village of Rafid, where, according to local media, four artillery shells exploded.

According to the Sijil Center, which monitors Israeli military operations in Syria, the wadis of Abidin and al-Raqad in the Yarmouk Basin area in western Daraa province came under fire at dawn. Illumination shells were also fired over Wadi Abidin. New ground raids were reported in the same area: eight Israeli vehicles entered the areas of Qudna and Ain Zivan, heading toward Tal Ahmar al-Sharqi, and then withdrew, while two tanks and two armored vehicles advanced deeper into Wadi al-Raqad.

In central Quneitra province, field sources reported that Israeli forces set up a temporary checkpoint on Monday morning, consisting of approximately 10 military vehicles, at the entrance to the Rasm al-Halabi area. These incidents continue a series of escalations in southern Syria after Tel Aviv declared the 1974 disengagement agreement void following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024. Since then, Israeli forces have expanded their presence and entrenched themselves in the buffer zone.

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Full version: Israeli occupation forces blow up sites near Qalaat Jandal and intensify shelling and incursions in southern Syria

Energy, Debt and Mining at the Center of Rodríguez’s U.S. Visit

Venezuelan President Delcy Rodríguez plans to discuss energy, sovereign debt and the mining sector with U.S. partners while attending the UN General Assembly in the United States, Reuters reports, citing anonymous sources. The official program also includes high-level meetings on multilateral cooperation, sustainable development and technical cooperation between Venezuela and UN agencies, funds and programs. The sources did not disclose any possible agreements or specify which U.S. representatives would take part in the talks. In addition, confirmation is expected of a meeting between Rodríguez and President Donald Trump after the two countries conclude energy agreements. The agreements provide for the development of 17 strategic fields and a controlling stake for the U.S. side in projects linked to more than 65 billion barrels of proven oil reserves.

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Full version: Reuters: Oil, Mining and Debt at the Center of President Delcy Rodríguez’s U.S. Agenda

Series of Explosions at Syrian Army Depots: Accident or Sabotage?

A powerful explosion rocked a military base near the town of al-Eis in southern Aleppo province, followed by a whole series of secondary detonations inside the facility. According to the state-run SANA news agency, which cited Faisal Muhammad Ali, head of Aleppo operations at the emergency management department, rescuers evacuated four injured people, while specialists continued evacuating residents from nearby homes in case of further incidents. Activists circulated videos on social media showing fireballs and fragments flying across the military facility as a result of the explosions.

The incident in al-Eis became the latest link in a chain of incidents at Syrian army weapons and ammunition depots that occurred in different parts of the country during September alone. On the first of the month, a vehicle carrying ammunition exploded near Bensh in the Idlib countryside; on the ninth, a weapons and ammunition depot exploded near Sarmada in the same province. On September 12, ammunition detonated at a military depot in al-Dumayr near Damascus; on the 18th, a similar incident occurred in the Ayash area of Deir ez-Zor province. The series culminated in powerful explosions at a depot in al-Eis on September 21.

The frequent recurrence of such incidents in different parts of the country over such a short period has triggered a wave of doubts among bloggers and activists. Many believe that what they have witnessed does not resemble a series of accidental incidents, but rather intentional explosions or the result of sabotage. “What is happening makes absolutely no sense! Every few days we hear about an explosion at a weapons depot—and it is only natural to ask: what is the real cause of this chain of events?” one user wrote. Another asked: if improper storage was to blame, why was the problem not addressed after the very first incident?

Particular criticism was directed at what commentators called the Defense Ministry’s “suspicious silence” and delay in issuing official explanations. In their view, the military authorities should have launched a broad investigation after the second explosion and informed the public of its findings. “Silence is no longer a solution—whatever the case, the situation is serious and frightening, and we are losing dozens of people,” an appeal to the ministry stated. Activists are demanding urgent explanations—whether the cause was deliberate sabotage or a failure in the storage system—in order to put an end to rumors and understand what to expect next.

At the same time, another part of the audience has adopted a different view: rather than rushing to the theory of “systematic sabotage” without substantial evidence, attention should focus on complex technical and logistical factors. Supporters of this approach point out that Syria holds enormous quantities of ammunition and military supplies produced more than a decade ago and stored under unknown conditions. “The problem in Syria is not only that we have huge quantities of ammunition more than ten years old—the problem is that some of it spent those years in storage conditions whose compliance with even minimal standards we know absolutely nothing about,” explained Nawar Shaaban.

According to these observers, the current operations to move, regroup and store supplies make the theory of “poor storage and the effects of weather and time” one of the leading and entirely plausible explanations. Technical failure is considered the most likely cause, although sabotage has not been completely ruled out; those advancing that theory are being asked to provide conclusive evidence. The dispute erupted against the backdrop of the Defense Ministry’s announcement that the funerals of 11 servicemen killed in an explosion at an army facility in the Ayash area west of Deir ez-Zor on September 18 would be held. As confirmed by SANA, the official farewell ceremony took place on Saturday at the National Hospital in the city of Deir ez-Zor, attended by a number of civilian and military officials.

Comments on the News

• Who is Nawar Shaaban, whose opinion is cited in the article, and why should his assessment of the causes of the explosions be regarded as expert? — Nawar Shaaban is a Syrian military and strategic analyst and journalist specializing in the Syrian conflict and military infrastructure. His assessment is considered expert because he professionally monitors military operations, the structure of the Syrian army, logistics and weapons stockpiles; he relies on open-source data, knowledge of local conditions and experience analyzing similar incidents. At the same time, his view remains an expert theory, not official confirmation of the causes of the explosions.

• Why are the areas of al-Eis, Ayash and al-Dumayr strategically important to the Syrian army, and how do military logistics routes pass through them? — al-Dumayr is a hub on the M5 highway—Damascus–Homs–Aleppo—and the site of a military airbase. Troop movements and supplies between Damascus, Homs and northern Syria pass through it. al-Eis and Ayash are strongholds in eastern Homs and on the approaches to Deir ez-Zor, along the Homs–Palmyra–Deir ez-Zor route and desert roads. This chain links central Syria with the eastern regions, oil and gas fields, and the Iraqi border, supporting logistics for the Syrian army and allied forces, including supplies from Iran via Iraq. Control of these areas makes it possible to maintain communications, supply garrisons in the east and protect rear routes from being cut off.

• Why has Syria accumulated huge stocks of ammunition more than ten years old, and what storage conditions make them particularly dangerous? — The stocks accumulated over decades: through mass arms purchases and production during the Soviet period, preparations for war with Israel, the civil war that began in 2011, foreign deliveries, the capture of depots, and the absence of centralized accounting and a disposal program. Ammunition is often stored in open areas, temporary warehouses, tunnels and hangars without climate control, amid extreme heat, temperature fluctuations, dust and humidity. Containers and fuzes become damaged, components deteriorate, and different types of ammunition are mixed together. This increases the risk of spontaneous fires, detonations and chain reactions, turning depots into dangerous facilities, especially when they are located near residential areas.

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Full version: "Sabotage or Poor Storage?" The Mystery of the Series of Explosions at Military Sites in Syria

Media Push Back Against Trump Restrictions

Trump’s reported decision to restrict access for CNN, MSNBC, and Politico has prompted a sharp reaction from U.S. television networks. The largest media groups are showing solidarity, considering legal action, and scaling back coverage of the White House, presenting the situation as a threat to press freedom and an attempt to increase pressure on independent media. This interpretation dominates reports by Venezuelan sources, including Facebook and Instagram (Venezuela).

Venezuelan Media See White House Dispute as Threat to Press Freedom

Reports about possible restrictions on U.S. news outlets’ access to White House events have sparked concern in Venezuela not so much over yet another U.S. domestic political conflict as over the state of press freedom. Venezuelan authors view the episode as an example of how the executive branch might try to influence journalists by selecting who is allowed to ask difficult questions.

A La Jornada report claims that the White House stripped CNN, MS NOW, and Politico of their press credentials because of the critical nature of their coverage. Against this backdrop, the largest U.S. television networks—CBS, ABC, NBC, and Fox—reportedly suspended joint coverage of the president’s public events, demonstrating solidarity with their colleagues. The affected outlets are said to be preparing a lawsuit, treating the dispute as an issue of protecting press freedom.

The Venezuelan source presents the events not as a technical accreditation procedure but as a risk of government interference in journalists’ professional work. In this interpretation, the decision by competing television networks to abandon the usual format of joint coverage is more significant than the administrative restrictions themselves: an attack on one newsroom could create a dangerous precedent for the entire information sector.

The Venezuelan context gives this story particular significance. In the country, relations between the authorities, independent newsrooms, opposition information sources, and international platforms have long been politicized. As a result, a story about sanctions against inconvenient journalists abroad is understood through the familiar experience of struggling for access to official information and the right to criticize those in power. For local audiences, the solidarity shown by CBS, ABC, NBC, and Fox—networks with differing political positions, interests, and audiences—looks like an example of the profession defending itself collectively.

The author of an Instagram post offers an even more direct assessment. In his view, neither the president nor any other government official should be able to decide alone which journalists are allowed to ask questions. A leader who “decides at his own discretion who may ask him questions” is “acting like a dictator,” the author warns.

The criticism is directed primarily at the selective treatment of information. The phrase “solo leo, solo escucho y solo miro lo que me conviene” translates as “I read, listen to, and watch only what benefits me or corresponds to my beliefs.” In the author’s assessment, such a practice means pushing inconvenient voices out of the public sphere and turning access to those in power into a privilege reserved for loyal media outlets.

At the same time, the Venezuelan commentary draws a line between personal choice and government action. “Eso puede funcionar para un privado pero no a un gobierno” means “that may be acceptable for a private individual, but not for a government.” Citizens have the right to choose their news sources according to their own preferences, but the state wields far greater power: it affects society’s access to information, the quality of public debate, and the ability to hold leaders accountable.

Thus, the Venezuelan reaction takes the U.S. conflict beyond the familiar confrontation between the “left” and the “right.” The central principle is that press freedom should not depend on a media outlet’s political sympathies toward those in power. Restricting questions, selecting “acceptable” journalists, and discrediting critical newsrooms are viewed as signs of a broader system of information control.

These publications contain no comments from Venezuelan politicians or experts, but the choice of emphasis itself—media solidarity, the defense of the right to ask questions, and the danger of government pressure—creates a clear moral and political assessment. For the authors in Venezuela, the story serves as a reminder that wherever pressure is brought to bear on journalists, it affects not only individual newsrooms but also society’s right to receive information and criticize those in power.

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Delcy Rodríguez to Represent Venezuela at UN General Assembly

The Venezuelan government has confirmed President Delcy Rodríguez’s participation in the United Nations General Assembly in New York. The authorities described her trip as confirmation of the country’s continuing role on the international stage and an opportunity to convey the “voice of the nation” to the organization’s member states. The official delegation will spend a week engaged in diplomatic work focused on active participation in multilateral debates, where Rodríguez will present Venezuela’s positions to the international community.

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Full version: Government Confirms President Delcy Rodríguez’s Participation in UN General Assembly

Syria Detains Ex-Officers Accused of War Crimes

Syrian internal security forces are continuing a campaign to pursue former officers suspected of violations and war crimes. On Sunday, they announced the detention of former military pilot Brigadier General Zakaria Muhammad Sanun, who held command positions in the army of Bashar al-Assad’s ousted regime. This came a day after reports of the arrest of former Major General Ahmed Muhammad Ismail, who headed the Republican Guard’s staff under the previous regime. Both cases are part of a broader hunt for former commanders accused of involvement in violations during the years of war.

According to security sources, Sanun, an Air Force brigadier general, headed the operations department of the 22nd Division from 2012 to 2020. The division oversaw air operations at three military airfields. He is described as one of the main figures involved in planning and carrying out war crimes and airstrikes against civilians during the years of the Syrian revolution. He directly commanded operations from Hama Military Airfield and the Tiyas (T4) and Shayrat air bases—from which combat aircraft took off to strike civilian areas. Sanun was handed over to the competent authorities to complete the investigation and face trial.

Ismail began his service as a platoon commander and later commanded a company in the 2nd Battalion of the 101st Airborne Regiment. In early 2016, he was promoted to head of the operations department of the same regiment and, according to internal security forces, directly participated in directing military attacks on Aleppo, Daraa and Eastern Ghouta between 2011 and 2024. He later advanced through several command positions: he served for six months as chief of staff of the Republican Guard, for a year as deputy commander of the 14th Division, which specializes in airborne operations, and then became commander of the same division, remaining in that post until the fall of Assad’s regime on December 8, 2024.

In a broader context, last Friday security forces in Tartus detained five senior officers and commanders of the former regime’s Air Force. The province’s internal security commander, Colonel Abdel Aal Muhammad Abdel Aal, said that special units had carried out a series of targeted operations. Since the fall of Assad’s regime, the authorities have announced the detention of many former officers, officials and security personnel as part of efforts to pursue those implicated in violations against civilians during the years of war. In June, Syrian Interior Ministry spokesman Nour al-Din al-Baba said that 5,989 detainees of various military ranks from the ousted regime were being held by the Counterterrorism Directorate. Syrian security forces continue to make arrests and conduct investigations, preparing to refer those involved to court.

News Comments

• What was Syria’s 22nd Division known for, and why is its operations department considered one of the main focuses of investigations into airstrikes on civilian areas? — The 22nd Division—most often referring to the Syrian Air Force’s 22nd Air Division, based at Shayrat Air Base—was known as a key aviation formation involved in combat operations against rebels and, according to investigations, in the use of chemical weapons. Its operations department is considered one of the main focuses of investigations because airstrikes, including attacks on civilian areas, were planned, approved and coordinated there. Documents, flight logs, orders and targeting data may help establish the chain of responsibility and intent.

• Why is Shayrat Air Base considered one of Syria’s best-known military bases, and what role did it play in the civil war? — Shayrat is an air base in Homs province known as the home of the Syrian Air Force’s 22nd Air Division. It became internationally known after the United States struck it on April 7, 2017, with 59 Tomahawk cruise missiles in response to the chemical attack in Khan Shaykhun. During the civil war, the base was used to launch Syrian air operations against rebels in Homs, Hama and Idlib, as well as for logistics and support for government forces. It was repeatedly mentioned in investigations into the use of chemical weapons and attacks on civilian sites.

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Full version: The arrest of the Republican Guard chief of staff and an Air Force brigadier general in the ousted Assad regime

Explosions at Syrian Army Site near Al-Eis South of Aleppo: Rescuers Unable to Reach It

Syria’s state news agency SANA reported a powerful explosion at one of the Syrian army’s sites in the Al-Eis area south of Aleppo, followed by a series of further blasts. Faisal Mohammed Ali, head of civil defense operations in Aleppo, said that explosions in the Al-Eis area were still continuing, preventing ambulances and rescue teams from reaching the site. He also warned civilians not to approach the blast zone while rescue operations were under way.

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Full version: SANA: Explosion at Syrian Army Site near the Town of Al-Eis South of Aleppo

Paraguay and Venezuela Aim to Strengthen Bilateral Cooperation

The presidents of Paraguay and Venezuela, Santiago Peña and Delcy Rodríguez, said after a working meeting at the Miraflores Palace in Caracas that the unity between the two countries needed to be strengthened. Following the talks, the parties signed a joint agreement, while Peña thanked Venezuela for its welcome and the spirit of cooperation, emphasizing his desire to bring the peoples of Paraguay and Venezuela closer together. Rodríguez noted that cooperation should benefit both countries, their peoples, and Latin America as a whole, since regional integration helps address modern challenges. The meeting was part of the governments’ efforts to strengthen diplomatic relations and open a new stage of cooperation.

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Full version: Presidents of Paraguay and Venezuela Agree to Build Unity After Working Meeting

Hakan Fidan: Ankara and Washington seek creative solutions on sanctions

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said that Ankara and Washington are working on “creative ideas” to lift the US sanctions imposed on Turkey over its purchase of the Russian S-400 air defense system. In an interview with NTV, he did not disclose details but expressed hope for positive steps. The sanctions were imposed in 2020, when Washington also removed Turkey—a NATO member—from the F-35 fighter jet program.

The issue remains sensitive amid earlier promises. In an interview with Al Jazeera, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said he had received a promise from US President Donald Trump regarding the F-35s and was awaiting its implementation. Reports said that at the July NATO summit, Trump promised to lift the sanctions under the CAATSA law—the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act—and consider selling F-35 fighter jets to Ankara. However, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu admitted on Fox News that he had asked Trump not to advance the deal, warning that it would upset the balance of power in the Middle East and undermine Israel’s air superiority.

According to the head of Al Jazeera’s bureau in Ankara, Turkey is seeking not only to lift restrictions on a number of defense industry executives but also to secure the ability to conduct banking transactions for the defense sector—something that would require CAATSA to be repealed. It remains unclear which specific “creative” mechanisms are being discussed with Washington, but the issue affects the interests of NATO, Russia, and Israel. As a result, any steps taken by the United States will be closely monitored both in Ankara and beyond.

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Full version: Fidan: We are working with Washington on “creative ideas” to lift the sanctions against us

The World Watches Trump’s Tougher Foreign Policy

The focus is on reports of a possible security and Greenland oversight agreement involving Denmark, the growing influence of the United States in Latin America, and Donald Trump’s confrontational attitude toward the press. Venezuelan sources view these developments as evidence of Washington’s drive to strengthen its power unilaterally, expand its territorial and strategic ambitions, and pressure independent media. The material is based on publications by Facebook (Venezuela), Facebook (Venezuela), and Le Grand Continent (Venezuela).

The US Links the Unblocking of Venezuelan Media to Its Strategy

In Venezuela, the restoration of access to several news websites has become not only a significant change for users who have faced digital restrictions for years, but also a subject of foreign-policy interpretation. According to TVV Noticias, US Deputy Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Juan Pablo Segura called the unblocking of digital media “a compelling signal” of continuing progress under the three-stage plan of Donald Trump’s administration.

According to the US official, access to previously unavailable media outlets was restored as a result of Washington’s policy, pursued “since January 3.” Thus, the United States presents the development not as an independent domestic decision by Caracas, but as the result of the US diplomatic and political strategy toward Venezuela.

For Venezuelan society, access to information is particularly important. The blocking of independent outlets and digital platforms has long been viewed as one of the tools used to control the public sphere. In these circumstances, unblocking websites could give citizens greater opportunities to obtain alternative news and discuss government decisions without having to constantly rely on VPNs, foreign services, and circumvention technologies.

However, the removal of restrictions by itself does not mean that press freedom has been fully restored. Questions remain about the scope and durability of the unblocking, as well as which specific outlets have become available again. The publication also contains no comments from Venezuelan authorities, local journalists, or independent experts. The main interpreter of the development is a US representative, underscoring the situation’s international, rather than merely domestic, dimension.

A more open digital environment could also have practical consequences beyond politics. It could potentially facilitate the work of online projects, access to economic data, the development of the advertising market, and communication among citizens, media outlets, and businesses. But the durability of these changes will depend on whether they become part of a systematic policy or remain a temporary step amid negotiations and external pressure.

The issue of sovereignty and Washington’s influence also arises in another international story, concerning the alleged agreement between the United States, Denmark, and Greenland. According to an article in Le Grand Continent, Donald Trump said that an agreement with Denmark would give the United States broad freedom of action to ensure the security of Greenland and the United States itself. In particular, Washington would, according to him, be able to block the creation of foreign military bases and investments it considered sensitive.

Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, for her part, emphasized that the agreement “recognizes the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Denmark” and should strengthen security in the Arctic and the North Atlantic. Greenland’s Prime Minister Jens-Frederik Nielsen said the treaty would “guarantee and strengthen” the security of Greenland, Denmark, the United States, and the Western alliance “in everyone’s interest.”

Nevertheless, such wording may cause concern among Venezuela’s political audience. Official Caracas has traditionally built its rhetoric around the principles of noninterference, control over national resources, and opposition to unilateral US influence. From this perspective, Washington’s right to influence foreign investment or military infrastructure in Greenland could be perceived as limiting the territory’s autonomy, even with its sovereignty formally preserved.

The provision that the agreement would remain in force even if Greenland became independent is particularly significant. For supporters of a strict interpretation of national self-determination, this could mean long-term obligations narrowing the island’s room for maneuver in future foreign and economic policy. In oil-producing Venezuela, where strategic resources are especially sensitive, such a mechanism could also be associated with major powers’ struggle for influence over territories, infrastructure, and investment flows.

Against this backdrop, the unblocking of media in Venezuela and the debate over the Greenland agreement converge around a broader question: where is the line between international cooperation, security, and external political influence? In Venezuela’s case, Washington directly links expanded access to information to its strategy. In Greenland’s case, the United States speaks of security, while critics may see the proposed mechanisms as an attempt to establish long-term strategic control.

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Germany Prepares Mass Review of Syrian Refugees’ Status

The Swiss newspaper Neue Zürcher Zeitung reported that Germany’s Interior Ministry plans to increase pressure on roughly half a million Syrian refugees in an effort to encourage them to leave the country. According to government sources, Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt is expected to soon instruct the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees to revoke the “protection statuses” of a significant number of Syrians. The relevant order is expected to appear after elections to the parliament of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and Berlin’s House of Representatives this coming Sunday. It could sharply increase the number of Syrians required to leave Germany.

As of July 31, 2026, 912,386 Syrian citizens lived in Germany—slightly fewer than the approximately 936,300 recorded at the end of December 2025, and 4% fewer than at the end of 2024. The decline is mainly attributed to the naturalization of more than 300,000 Syrians in recent years. Nevertheless, more than half a million Syrians in Germany still hold one of the two main forms of protection: refugee status under the Geneva Convention or subsidiary protection.

Since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime on December 8, 2024, fewer than 10,000 Syrians have voluntarily returned home, according to Germany’s Interior Ministry. At the same time, between December 2024 and July 2026, at least 14,182 Syrians voluntarily left Germany, including 7,725 people who used the German Foreign Ministry’s voluntary return program. The program covers travel expenses and provides €200 per adult and €100 per minor, reintegration assistance of €1,000 for adults and €500 for children and teenagers, capped at €4,000 per family, as well as medical support in certain cases. It is difficult to assess how strongly Syrians wish to return: in the last survey conducted before Assad’s fall, 94% of Syrian refugees said they wanted to remain in Germany permanently.

By the end of July 2026, Germany had 14,579 Syrians required to leave the country; 11,528 of them held a Duldung, a document temporarily suspending deportation. Germany had not deported people to Syria since 2012, until resuming deportations in December 2025 by expelling one convicted person, followed by three more operations in January 2026 involving people found guilty of crimes. The German Foreign Ministry regularly assesses the security and humanitarian situation in Syria, while international reports stress that the country remains unsafe, particularly for women and children. Expert Daniel Thym does not expect protection statuses to be revoked collectively because of the enormous administrative burden, but predicts a rapid increase in the number of Syrians required to leave Germany. According to him, the new measures will not affect those who are “integrated” into the labor market and do not receive social benefits.

As for integration, the unemployment rate among Syrians in Germany was approximately 31.4% in August 2026—slightly above the average for people from the “main countries of origin of asylum seekers.” Employment prospects improve with length of residence: by the end of 2023, around 61% of Syrians who had lived in Germany for seven years or more were integrated into the labor market. Around 80,000 Syrians work in occupations experiencing labor shortages. Men are mainly employed in transport and logistics (22%), hospitality and catering (14%), healthcare (11%), and construction (9%), while women work primarily in social and cultural services, such as childcare (28%), and healthcare (18%).

Men account for 59% of Syrians living in Germany, while women make up 41%; minors account for 32%, and the average age is 27. More than 60% of Syrians who applied for asylum between 2017 and 2023 were married, while approximately 56,200 Syrian children were born in Germany between 2019 and 2024. By ethnic background, more than 60% of Syrians who applied for asylum since 2015 identify as Arab, while around one-third identify with the Kurdish minority. More than 90% are Muslim, fewer than 2% are Christian, and around 1% are Yazidi.

Comments on the News

• Who replaced Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, and which political and armed forces currently control different parts of the country? — After Assad’s regime fell in December 2024, central authority in Damascus passed to a transitional administration formed around former leaders of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and Ahmed al-Sharaa, who was declared transitional president. There is no unified control over the entire country: Damascus, central Syria, Idlib, and parts of Aleppo are controlled by the transitional government and former HTS structures, which are attempting to integrate various factions into a new army; the northeast—Hasakah, Qamishli, Raqqa, and eastern Deir ez-Zor—is controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces, dominated by Kurdish units and backed by the United States; the north and northwest—Afrin, Azaz, al-Bab, Jarabulus, and Ras al-Ayn/Tal Abyad—are controlled by the pro-Turkish Syrian National Army and Turkish forces; the south—Daraa, Quneitra, and Suwayda—is controlled by local, tribal, and Druze militias; the eastern desert and border areas are zones controlled by tribal forces, remnants of ISIS, and the U.S. garrison at al-Tanf; in the southwest, Israel retains control of the buffer zone in the Golan Heights and Mount Hermon. The situation remains unstable, and the boundaries of control may change.

• In which regions of Syria do Kurds, Yazidis, and Christians live in concentrated communities, and how has their situation changed since Assad’s fall? — Kurds live mainly in the northeast—Hasakah, Qamishli, Derik, and parts of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor—as well as in Aleppo, particularly Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh, and historically in Afrin. After Assad’s fall, Kurdish forces strengthened their de facto autonomy in the northeast, but remain under pressure from Turkey and dependent on agreements with Damascus and the United States. Yazidis are concentrated mainly in Afrin, as well as in Hasakah and Qamishli. Many remain displaced following the 2018 Turkish operation; their property and religious sites have suffered damage, and they are particularly vulnerable in areas controlled by the SNA. Christians live in Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, Maaloula, Wadi al-Nasara, Latakia, and Tartus, as well as in Hasakah and Qamishli. After Assad’s fall, some experienced fear and attacks on churches and cemeteries, although the new authorities have promised protection. Overall, their situation has improved in terms of moving away from Baathist repression, but threats from radical groups, the economic crisis, and mass emigration remain. In the northeast, Christians and Yazidis are protected by the SDF but also continue to suffer from instability.

• Which areas of Syria are considered most dangerous for return by international organizations, especially for women and children, and what specific threats do they face there? — International organizations, including UNHCR, OCHA, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International, warn that no part of Syria is completely safe for return. The areas considered most dangerous include: the northeast, particularly the al-Hol and Roj camps and the provinces of Hasakah, Deir ez-Zor, and Raqqa, where threats include ISIS cells, unexploded ordnance and mines, arbitrary detention, sexual and gender-based violence, human trafficking, child recruitment, and a lack of healthcare and education; the northwest—Idlib, Afrin, and Ras al-Ayn/Tal Abyad—where there are active hostilities, Turkish and drone strikes, abuses by pro-Turkish groups, abductions, forced displacement, early marriage, and child labor; the south—Daraa, Suwayda, and Quneitra—where there are local clashes, blood feuds, abductions, drug smuggling involving Captagon, mines, and limited access to services; and the eastern desert, or Badia, and border areas, where ISIS ambushes, mines, smuggling, and human trafficking occur. Women and children face particular risks, including sexual exploitation, forced marriage, domestic violence, child marriage, recruitment, psychological trauma, detention in camps, and a lack of documentation.

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Full version: Swiss newspaper: German plan could lead to nearly half a million Syrians leaving

Most Venezuelans Link Economic Recovery to the End of Sanctions

According to the polling firm Hinterlaces, 81% of Venezuelans believe that economic recovery is linked to the end of blockades and restrictions. At the same time, 7% of respondents believe that the economic situation would worsen under such circumstances, while 12% were undecided or declined to answer.

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Full version: 81% of Venezuelans Attribute Economic Recovery to the End of Blockades, According to Hinterlaces

Former Adra Prison Chief Sentenced to 60 Years in U.S. for Torture

A federal court in Los Angeles has sentenced 74-year-old Samir Ousman al-Sheikh, the former head of Syria’s Adra Prison, to 60 years in prison. Judge Hernán Vera handed down the sentence on Thursday. Al-Sheikh, one of the symbols of the ousted Assad regime, was found guilty by a jury in March 2026 on several counts.

The jury found al-Sheikh guilty of conspiracy to commit torture, three counts of torture, visa fraud, and attempted naturalization fraud, the U.S. Department of Justice said. According to investigators, while running Adra Prison—also known as Damascus Central Prison—from 2005 to 2008, he ordered prisoners to be tortured and personally took part in the abuse in order to suppress political opposition. In 2020, he deceived U.S. immigration authorities by concealing his past in order to gain entry to the country.

Prosecutors said al-Sheikh ordered subordinates to inflict physical and psychological pain on prisoners and sometimes personally participated in the abuse. Three victims testified in court: they had been tortured and had seen and heard others being tortured. Prisoners were strapped to a device known as the “flying carpet,” which forcefully folded the body in half at the waist; suspended from the ceiling in chains for hours or days; brutally tied inside automobile tires; and held in cramped, infested, damp and cold cells teeming with insects. Evidence also showed that al-Sheikh sent two prisoners who refused to torture political detainees, along with another whose letter of support was intercepted by guards, to the prison’s underground “Wing 13,” where they were held in tiny cells and tortured.

A separate group of charges concerned al-Sheikh’s lies to U.S. immigration authorities: he falsified information about his past while seeking a green card and citizenship. Those deceptions formed the basis for the visa-fraud and attempted-naturalization-fraud charges. U.S. Assistant Attorney General Taissén Dova called al-Sheikh the highest-ranking former Assad regime official to be personally tried and convicted outside Syria, and warned human rights violators that they would find no safe haven in the United States. Bill Essayli, the First Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Central District of California, added that people who commit such brutality should never find refuge in America.

Al-Sheikh entered the United States in 2020 and had been in custody since his arrest in July 2024. The sentence was handed down after a jury found him guilty in March 2026. The case is a rare example of a senior member of Syria’s prison system being prosecuted outside Syria and sends a signal that, even years later, those responsible for mass torture may still be brought to justice.

Comments on the News

• What is “Wing 13” at Adra Prison, and why is it considered one of the most terrifying places in Syria’s prison system? — “Wing 13” is a special section of Adra Prison, located northeast of Damascus. It was operated by Syrian military intelligence and used to hold political prisoners, activists and opposition members. It is considered one of the most terrifying places because torture was systematically used there, including the “flying carpet,” beatings, electric shocks, rape and mass executions. Many prisoners died from torture, hunger and unsanitary conditions. “Wing 13” became a symbol of the Assad regime’s repressive apparatus.

• Why is the torture method called the “flying carpet,” and how widely was it used in Syrian prisons? — The “flying carpet” is a method of torture in which a prisoner is strapped to a flat surface, such as a board or sheet of metal, or suspended, and then beaten—often on the back and feet—or subjected to electric shocks. The name refers to the body’s position, as if it were “floating” or suspended. The method was widely used in Syrian prisons, particularly in Adra, Sednaya and Mezzeh, to obtain confessions and punish prisoners. It caused fractures, spinal injuries and death, and has been documented by human rights organizations.

• What position did Samir Ousman al-Sheikh hold in Syria’s prison hierarchy, and why is his conviction in the United States considered an important precedent for prosecuting Assad regime officials? — Samir Ousman al-Sheikh was a former brigadier general in Syrian military intelligence and head of Adra Prison from 2005 to 2008. He held a senior position in the prison hierarchy and controlled torture and detention conditions. His conviction in the United States in 2024 for torture and conspiracy is considered an important precedent because it was the first time a Syrian regime official was convicted under the U.S. Torture Statute (18 U.S.C. § 2340A), which allows prosecution for torture committed outside the United States. It signals an end to impunity and lays the groundwork for holding other Assad regime officials accountable.

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Full version: U.S. court sentences Syrian Samir Ousman al-Sheikh to 60 years in prison

The World Reacts to Trump’s Policies

Mexico’s negotiations with Trump, Saudi Arabia’s search for Chinese support amid regional tensions, the reassessment of strategies in Europe and the United Kingdom, and criticism of restrictions on the media, immigration policies, and the expansion of presidential powers all show how U.S. actions are reshaping the international agenda. This article brings together key assessments and reactions to Washington’s foreign and domestic policies. The overview is based on reports by Contexto Tucumán (Venezuela), Yahoo Noticias (Venezuela), and Impacto (Venezuela).

U.S. Migration and the Power Dispute in Mexico Through the Region’s Eyes

Donald Trump’s immigration policy has become a source of significant conflict within the U.S. Republican Party, particularly in Florida, where the votes of Cuban, Venezuelan, and other Latin American communities carry considerable political weight. At the same time, the region’s Spanish-language press is focusing on another issue: allegations of family influence and privilege surrounding Mexico’s ruling elite. Both stories center on the question of how politicians’ decisions and conduct affect people whose families, status, and well-being depend on government policy.

Florida Congresswoman María Elvira Salazar, the daughter of Cuban immigrants and representative of the 27th District, has publicly criticized Trump’s immigration policy. In a campaign video, she addressed the president, saying: “Mr. President, your immigration policy has gone too far.” As Contexto Tucumán reports, Salazar said that in July the administration detained more than 50,000 people, about half of whom had no criminal record.

According to her, “the same Latinos who brought you to the White House in 2024 feel betrayed today.” This wording is particularly significant in South Florida, where immigration is not an abstract statistic but an issue affecting families with unresolved legal status, asylum seekers, and people dependent on humanitarian programs.

Salazar is not calling for a blanket amnesty. She says migrants must be guaranteed “a dignified life in the promised land,” while combining this approach with border control and changes to the asylum system. Her position is linked to the Dignity Act, a bill that would strengthen border security, reform the asylum system, and create a path toward legal status for some undocumented migrants. The congresswoman has also previously urged the White House to exercise caution when ending Temporary Protected Status, a form of temporary protection that is critically important to people from countries experiencing humanitarian and political crises, including Venezuela.

As Yahoo Noticias notes, Salazar is known for her tough stance against the governments of Cuba and Venezuela and has previously supported many of Trump’s initiatives, including pressure on Caracas. Her distancing from the president on immigration therefore does not appear to constitute a complete political break. Rather, it seems to be an attempt to combine a conservative, anti-authoritarian agenda with the concerns of Latino voters whose relatives and acquaintances may face detention, deportation, or the loss of temporary protection.

This calculation is especially apparent in Florida. About three-quarters of Salazar’s district’s residents identify as Latino, while Miami-Dade remains one of the key centers of political life for Cuban and Venezuelan immigrants. Florida politicians often influence Washington’s policy on sanctions, relations with Caracas, humanitarian mechanisms, and immigration issues. For many Venezuelans, the United States is both the main destination for emigration and the most important foreign-policy ally in the confrontation with Nicolás Maduro’s government.

The growing activity of ICE is heightening these concerns. According to the data cited, the number of arrests has risen by 15%, while the White House is reportedly demanding that the agency meet daily arrest targets. For the Venezuelan diaspora, this is viewed through the experience of the mass exodus caused by the country’s economic crisis, repression, and the destruction of state institutions. A hard-line immigration policy may affect people who left Venezuela not only in search of work but also for their personal safety.

The response from conservative commentators demonstrated the depth of the internal party conflict. Fox News host Tomi Lahren described Salazar’s position as a betrayal and suggested that Trump withdraw his support for the congresswoman. Democrats, meanwhile, accuse Salazar of inconsistency, pointing to her support for increased ICE funding. The dispute is therefore not only about the humanitarian aspect of raids: it has become an electoral test for Republicans, who need Latino votes while simultaneously relying on tougher immigration enforcement.

Another Spanish-language article, published by Impacto.mx, shifts the focus to Mexico and examines the reported cancellation of the U.S. visa of Andrés Manuel López Beltrán, the son of former President Andrés Manuel López Obrador. Columnist Emma Espín­dola uses the episode as an opportunity to criticize family influence, political privileges, and the system of loyalty within the ruling Morena movement.

López Beltrán, known as Andy, does not hold public office. However, in the author’s view, he behaves as though he represents the Mexican state. His letter to Trump demanding an explanation for the visa decision has drawn particular criticism. Espín­dola interprets the move not as a defense of national dignity but as an attempt to turn a personal problem into an interstate conflict. In her sharply polemical column, she calls him the “Prince of Lies” and accuses him of “delusions of grandeur.”

The author argues that the support López Beltrán has received from Morena representatives, lawmakers, and governors demonstrates how dependent the “Fourth Transformation” movement is on personal and family loyalty. In her account, the political system rallied around a man who “is not an official or a public servant” and has no formal basis for speaking on behalf of the country.

Espín­dola also contrasts Morena’s official rhetoric of austerity and modest government with reports about López Beltrán’s alleged luxurious lifestyle. She mentions a stay at a five-star hotel in Tokyo, purchases at Prada, and the possible acquisition of an expensive work by artist Yayoi Kusama. These episodes are presented as an illustration of the gap between the slogans of austeridad—frugality and the rejection of privilege—and the behavior of people close to the former president.

The column also mentions other Mexican politicians whose U.S. visas may reportedly have been canceled. The author links these cases to investigations and suspicions involving corruption, fuel smuggling, and the awarding of contracts through associates. The article does not, however, provide independent verification of the allegations listed or examine the legal grounds for possible visa decisions. Its aim is not a neutral reconstruction of events but the creation of a political portrait of a government the author views as being built on clan ties, nepotism, and a lack of internal accountability.

For audiences familiar with Venezuela’s experience of power concentrated around a leader, a family, and a party inner circle, this criticism may sound particularly familiar. In both stories—the U.S. dispute over deportations and the Mexican column about the former president’s son’s visa—the central theme remains the same: political decisions and the personal privileges of elites have direct consequences for migrants, families, and communities that are often less protected than those making decisions on their behalf.

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UN Security Council: Syria, Israel and Türkiye Exchange Accusations

At a UN Security Council meeting devoted to Syria, Damascus, Israel and Türkiye exchanged sharp accusations, while international participants called for an end to Israeli operations on Syrian territory. Syria’s Permanent Representative Ibrahim al-Alabi said Damascus wanted to pursue diplomatic solutions and was ready for a security agreement mediated by the United States and supported by the Security Council. At the same time, he stressed that this “in no way” meant accepting occupation or abandoning the rights of the Syrian people.

Al-Alabi accused Israel of incursions into Syrian villages and strikes on sites inside the country. According to him, Damascus had engaged in the US initiative in good faith and opened the door to dialogue, but Israel responded with strikes, raids and violations. The Syrian diplomat also said that the country was building institutions, completing military and administrative integration, intensifying the fight against the “Islamic State” and drug-trafficking networks, and cooperating with the UN, the OPCW and the IAEA.

In response, Israel’s representative Danny Danon said that his country was holding direct talks with the Syrian government in pursuit of a security agreement. Israel’s conditions, he said, were that Damascus must establish control over all its territory and that foreign forces or armed groups must not use it to threaten Israel. Danon explained the retention of the buffer zone in the Golan Heights as a security measure intended to prevent a cross-border attack like that of October 7, 2023. He also accused Türkiye of stationing around 20,000 troops, operating 100 bases and outposts, and controlling approximately 5% of Syrian territory, as well as expanding its military influence and supporting Hamas and Hezbollah.

Türkiye’s representative, Ahmet Yıldız, rejected the accusations, saying that Ankara’s military cooperation with Damascus was conducted with the consent of the Syrian government. He refused to compare what he called lawful bilateral cooperation with Israel’s presence, stressing: “Strengthening Syria’s national capabilities is a sovereign right that poses no threat to a third party.” Yıldız described Israel as an occupying power and demanded an end to the escalation, the withdrawal of troops from Syrian territory and full compliance with the 1974 Disengagement Agreement. In his closing remarks, the Israeli diplomat said Israel would like to see Syria and Lebanon independent, but that actions rather than statements should be the basis for judgment. He accused Damascus of failing to fulfill its commitments to combat terrorism and implement the “road map.”

In an additional statement, al-Alabi referred to reports by the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) and an international commission which, he said, had documented continuing Israeli violations of Syrian sovereignty and international law, as well as their consequences for civilians. He added that Druze and Kurdish officials had rejected attempts at external contact or support and had joined the work of state institutions. Damascus, he said, would continue to engage with efforts led by US President Donald Trump, but in a way that did not undermine Syrians’ rights or legitimize the occupation. Claudio Cordone, the UN Deputy Special Envoy for Syria, called for an end to Israeli violations of Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, describing Israel’s presence and actions in the south of the country as violations of the 1974 agreement. The United Kingdom, Denmark, Russia, China, Bahrain, Greece and Latvia also called on Israel to withdraw its troops and respect the agreement, while Latvia linked the continuation of military activity in the disengagement zone and on the Golan Heights to Security Council Resolution 2824 and the 1974 arrangements.

The situation in As-Suwayda was also discussed separately at the meeting. Cordone said that resolving the province’s problems and determining the future of its Druze community should remain in the hands of Syrians themselves and take place within a united Syria. He called for work on the province’s “road map” to resume, detainees to be released and the fate of missing people to be determined. The United States expressed concern about the escalation in As-Suwayda, called for restraint and dialogue, supported the provincial “road map” and welcomed steps to integrate the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into state institutions. Türkiye’s representative, by contrast, accused Israel-backed armed Druze groups of destabilizing As-Suwayda, blocking supplies and aid to civilians, and obstructing examinations for students.

On the nuclear issue, the United States, the United Kingdom, Denmark and Türkiye welcomed Damascus’s cooperation with the IAEA. Washington urged Syria to continue strengthening its safeguards system and adopt the Additional Protocol. On September 9, the IAEA Board of Governors decided to terminate the provisions of its 2011 resolution concerning Syria’s previous non-compliance with its safeguards agreement. The agency said Syria had provided the necessary information and access. At the same time, the Board confirmed that Syria remained bound by its safeguards agreement under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and remained subject to routine IAEA safeguards, although the provisions of the 2011 resolution had been terminated and the Board was no longer dealing with a separate item on Syria’s implementation of the safeguards agreement.

During the humanitarian segment of the meeting, Tom Fletcher, UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, said that more than two million internally displaced people had returned home in Syria since December 2024—the highest return figure in two decades. However, around 5.5 million people remained displaced within the country, including approximately 800,000 in camps. Fletcher warned that a lack of investment and funding could lead to a new wave of displacement and worsening services; the food and education sectors had received only 26% of the funds required. He called for support for the Syrian government’s “Syria Without Camps” initiative, while the United Kingdom announced £68 million in humanitarian assistance for Syria this year.

On economic recovery, Cordone said that during his latest visit he had seen progress in the work of institutions despite difficult economic conditions, as well as increased cooperation between the Syrian authorities and the UN. Syria, he said, sought to strengthen its role as a regional energy and trade corridor, and he urged donor countries to facilitate investment and economic engagement. China called for action on unemployment and inflation, support for reconstruction, and continuation of the Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political process in line with Resolution 2254. Somalia stressed the need for constructive international economic engagement, while Greece said political openness should be reflected in economic recovery and opportunities for young people. Latvia noted that full recovery required sustained international support, structural reforms and long-term investment, while Denmark pledged $76 million in development assistance and said it intended to increase its support for reconstruction beginning in 2027.

The meeting’s conclusion showed that deep disagreements lie beneath discussions of Syria’s stability. Damascus is demanding respect for its sovereignty and an end to Israeli strikes; Israel insists on firm security guarantees and the preservation of control; and Türkiye rejects the accusations and is calling for the withdrawal of Israeli forces. International appeals once again focused on the 1974 agreement, Resolutions 2824 and 2254, and humanitarian and economic assistance. Whether these words turn into concrete steps—troop withdrawals, funding, reconstruction and improvements in Syrians’ lives—will depend on diplomacy, including US mediation efforts.

News Commentary

• What is the 1974 Disengagement Agreement between Syria and Israel, and what zones and restrictions does it establish in the Golan Heights? — The 1974 Disengagement Agreement is a military accord between Syria and Israel concluded after the Yom Kippur War with US and UN mediation. It established a ceasefire line and three main elements: 1) a zone of separation, or buffer zone, between the Alpha Line on the Israeli side and the Bravo Line on the Syrian side, where military presence is prohibited except for UN forces (UNDOF); 2) zones limiting weapons and troops on both sides of the buffer zone, restricting the number of soldiers, tanks, artillery pieces and other weapons; and 3) additional zones farther inside the territory with even stricter restrictions. The agreement is not a peace treaty and does not determine the final status of the Golan Heights; the 1974 line remains the de facto line of separation. Israel annexed the Golan Heights in 1981, a move not recognized by most countries, with the exception of the United States, which recognized it in 2019.

• How does As-Suwayda differ from other Syrian provinces, and why does its Druze community play a special role in Syrian politics? — As-Suwayda is a southern Syrian province whose population is predominantly Druze, along with Christians and Bedouins. The Druze are an esoteric monotheistic community distinct from Sunni and Shia Islam, with their own religious leaders and strong internal cohesion. The province is distinguished by its relative autonomy, mountainous terrain and lower level of involvement in the civil war: it was not under the permanent control of ISIS or major opposition groups, although local armed formations operated there. The Druze community plays a special role because the province is strategically located near the borders with Jordan and Israel, has cross-border ties with Druze communities in Lebanon and Israel, retains influence in the security services and can mobilize large numbers of people for protests. In 2023–2024, As-Suwayda became a center of anti-government protests over the economic crisis and demands for decentralization. The Druze balance between Damascus, local autonomy and external actors, making their position important for stability in southern Syria.

• What are the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and why is their integration into Syria’s state institutions controversial? — The SDF is a coalition made up primarily of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG/YPJ), along with Arab, Assyrian, Turkmen and other formations. It was established in 2015 with US support to fight ISIS. The SDF controls northeastern Syria, including oil fields and camps holding ISIS detainees. The debate over integration has several causes: Damascus demands the restoration of centralized control and the dissolution of the SDF as a separate army; Türkiye considers the SDF linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and threatens military action, demanding disarmament; the SDF wants to preserve its forces, secure decentralization and Kurdish rights, and integrate as a separate corps or collectively; while the United States and the coalition favor integration to stabilize the country and combat ISIS but face a Turkish veto. Russia is acting as a mediator. Command structures, oil revenues, the status of Kurdish areas and the future of the US presence are also disputed.

• What are the main provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 2254, and why does it remain a key framework for a political settlement in Syria? — UN Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015) sets out a road map for Syria’s political process. Its main provisions are: a ceasefire, except in the fight against terrorist groups designated by the Security Council; negotiations among Syrian parties under UN auspices; the creation, by mutual consent, of a transitional governing body with full executive powers to prepare a new constitution and hold elections; free and fair elections under UN supervision within 18 months, with the participation of all Syrians, including those in the diaspora; preservation of Syria’s sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity; humanitarian access; protection of civilians; and the release of detainees. It remains a key framework because it is the only political basis agreed at the Security Council level and supported by Russia, the United States, Türkiye, Arab countries and European states. The Geneva talks and the Constitutional Committee also refer to it. However, it has not been implemented because of disagreements over Assad’s role, the definition of terrorism, foreign intervention and the lack of unity among the major powers.

• What is the IAEA Additional Protocol, and what obligations does it impose on a state that ratifies it? — The Additional Protocol to an IAEA safeguards agreement is a legal instrument that expands the agency’s ability to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear activities. It was developed after the 1991 Gulf War to strengthen safeguards. A state that ratifies the protocol must: provide the IAEA with broader information about its nuclear fuel cycle, research and development, and imports and exports of sensitive materials and equipment; grant IAEA inspectors wider access to nuclear facilities and other locations, including with short notice and through repeated visits; issue entry visas to inspectors without delay; permit environmental sampling, satellite imagery and other methods; and submit annual declarations on nuclear materials and activities. The protocol allows the IAEA to verify that all nuclear material is under safeguards and that no undeclared nuclear material or activities exist. Ratification is voluntary, but it is often required for cooperation in the nuclear field.

• Why does Türkiye maintain a military presence in northern Syria, and how is this connected to its campaign against Kurdish formations and support for certain opposition groups? — Türkiye maintains a military presence in northern Syria primarily to prevent the establishment along its border of an autonomous Kurdish entity linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which Ankara considers a terrorist organization. Following Operations Euphrates Shield (2016), Olive Branch (2018), Peace Spring (2019) and Spring Shield (2020), Türkiye controls the areas of Afrin, Azaz, al-Bab, Jarabulus, Ras al-Ayn and Tel Abyad. It supports the Syrian National Army (SNA), a coalition of opposition groups that serves as a proxy force: it administers territory, fights the SDF/YPG and ISIS, and provides security. The presence is also connected to plans to return Syrian refugees, the struggle for influence against Russia, Iran and Damascus, and the protection of Turkmen and Arab populations. Türkiye’s priority is to prevent Kurdish formations from growing stronger; it therefore demands the dissolution of the SDF and uses the SNA to pressure it. At the same time, Ankara balances its support for the opposition with negotiations with Russia and Damascus.

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Full version: Syria, Israel and Türkiye exchange accusations at the Security Council as calls are made to end incursions

Venezuela’s Government Resumes Dialogue with 2015 Parliament Delegation

The second round of talks between the Venezuelan government and a delegation from the National Assembly elected in 2015 has begun in Venezuela. The meeting was led by parliamentary speaker Jorge Rodríguez and politician and former lawmaker Dinorah Figuera. The agenda includes institutional and political guarantees, the development of priority agreements, and measures to overcome the national crisis. The sides also plan to resume discussions on deepening judicial reform and renewing the membership of the Supreme Court—issues that were already raised during the first meeting, held in August.

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Full version: The second round of dialogue between the Government and the 2015 National Assembly delegation begins

Three security personnel killed in clash with IS cell in Daraa

Syria’s Internal Security Forces said Thursday that three of their personnel were killed and several others wounded in a clash with an armed group linked to the Islamic State (IS) in the city of al-Sanamayn, Daraa province. According to the agency, the group was led by a wanted man. The gunfight began when patrols went to the home of a man suspected of having ties to IS and came under fire; shots were later also fired as they attempted to enter another house in the same area. Three security personnel were killed and five others wounded.

After the battle, the Internal Security Forces said they had deployed across the city, begun pursuing members of the group and those involved in the attack, and imposed a temporary curfew. In a separate statement, they confirmed that the armed group belonged to IS and said they had begun storming the location where it was hiding after establishing a cordon. The group members were given time to surrender, but no response was received. The agency also released footage it described as showing a reinforced deployment of security forces and “a cordon to strengthen stability and the rule of law.”

Syria’s Interior Ministry spokesman, Nour al-Din al-Baba, explained that the Criminal Investigation Department in al-Sanamayn had suspected a criminal cell and, while monitoring it, launched an operation to arrest its members, after which a gunfight broke out. He said the cell coordinated with people suspected of links to IS in Daraa province, and that a network of contacts and mutual interests existed between the two groups. He also confirmed that the cell had previously taken part in criminal activities; searches across the city are continuing, and a large quantity of weapons has already been seized.

The incident comes amid efforts by the Syrian government and security forces to restore stability after the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024. Syrian authorities previously announced that they had joined the international coalition against IS. IS periodically claims responsibility for attacks, mainly targeting Syrian security forces, after calling on its fighters to battle the new authorities. Since then, Syrian intelligence services have carried out numerous operations and arrested officers, militia commanders and former officials implicated in crimes against Syrians.

News commentary

• Why do Daraa province and the city of al-Sanamayn remain areas of activity for cells linked to IS, and what role has this southern region played in the Syrian conflict since 2011? — Daraa is a southern province bordering Jordan, where anti-government protests began in 2011 and are considered the starting point of the Syrian uprising. After 2011, the region became one of the centers of the armed opposition, including the Southern Front and the Free Syrian Army. In 2018, Assad’s regime regained control of most of Daraa through “reconciliation” agreements, while local groups, weapons and clan militias remained in place. Al-Sanamayn is a city on the strategic Damascus–Daraa highway and an important hub for smuggling, arms and drug trafficking—particularly captagon—as well as local tribal and family conflicts. After 2018, weak governance, unemployment, revenge killings and parallel security structures persisted there. Dormant IS cells and affiliated groups, such as remnants of Khalid ibn al-Walid in the Yarmouk Basin, have exploited these conditions to carry out killings, terrorist attacks and assaults on security personnel. After Assad’s fall in December 2024, the power vacuum, incomplete integration of local factions into the new security forces and smuggling networks once again created favorable conditions for IS activity in the south. In addition, southern Syria remains a strategic corridor between Damascus, Jordan and the Golan Heights, making the struggle for control of the region particularly significant.

• What are Syria’s Internal Security Forces mentioned in the article, and how do they relate to the Interior Ministry, the army and other security structures after Assad’s fall? — The “Internal Security Forces” (ISF; Arabic: al-Amn al-Dakhili, often translated as Internal Security Forces) are police and gendarmerie formations of Syria’s new government. They were created after December 2024 on the basis of the structures of the Idlib Salvation Government, which was linked to Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), and parts of former rebel groups. They perform police functions: maintaining order, patrolling, controlling roads and checkpoints, protecting government facilities, and combating crime, smuggling and IS cells. They sometimes also take part in counterterrorism raids. Formally, the ISF falls under the Interior Ministry and is supposed to report to it, but in practice its commanders and structure remain closely connected to HTS and the new leadership in Damascus. The Interior Ministry is responsible for the civilian police, passports, migration, prisons and public security. The army, under the Defense Ministry, is a separate structure: regular armed forces being formed from former factions. It conducts combat operations and major counterterrorism operations but is not supposed to handle routine policing. Other security structures after Assad include the General Intelligence Directorate, Military Intelligence, the State Security Service, as well as local and tribal militias, the Southern Operations Room and others. The boundaries between them are blurred: Assad’s old intelligence services have been dissolved or reorganized, new agencies partly overlap, and in areas including Daraa and al-Sanamayn, actual security is often provided by local factions rather than by a single Interior Ministry–army chain of command.

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Full version: Internal Security surrounds an Islamic State cell in the Daraa countryside… What are the details of the operation?

Latin America Against U.S. Pressure

The leaders of Brazil and Mexico are publicly rejecting Washington’s interference and the conditions it seeks to impose, while Venezuelan materials criticize U.S. sanctions and the broader role of its foreign policy. Disputes over Donald Trump’s economic policies and his conflicts with international partners also remain in focus. This review is based on materials from euskalherria-donbass.org and es-us.noticias.yahoo.com (Venezuela).

Sanctions and Sovereignty: Venezuela in the Debate over External Pressure

The Venezuelan agenda has once again found itself at the intersection of the humanitarian crisis, sanctions policy and the broader debate over the role of the United States in the world. Against the backdrop of two devastating earthquakes measuring 7.2 and 7.5 in magnitude, which, according to the figures cited, claimed more than 6,500 lives, Caracas is demanding that the U.S. restrictions be eased or lifted, arguing that they obstruct the delivery of aid, equipment and reconstruction financing. At the same time, a published interview with British-Lebanese researcher Gilbert Achcar places Venezuela within the broader context of a quarter-century of American wars, sanctions and attempts to influence the political systems of other countries.

According to an EFE report, Venezuela and the United States are negotiating the creation of conditions under which resources for post-crisis reconstruction can enter the country without obstruction. For Caracas, the issue is not merely a routine diplomatic procedure: the authorities view it as a matter of sovereignty and of the state’s ability to respond to an emergency without facing the risks of a financial blockade and restrictions on international transactions.

Michelle Muschett, UNDP Regional Director for Latin America and the Caribbean, said that sanctions “absolutely” affect the arrival of international aid. In her words, the discussion should not be conducted solely in geopolitical terms: “This is about people, human lives, and the possibility of building a future.” This assessment is particularly important for the Venezuelan side because it comes not only from the government of Nicolás Maduro, which has long accused the United States of economically strangling the country, but also from a representative of an international organization.

UNDP estimates the required reconstruction costs at approximately $21 billion. Around 70% of the total damage reportedly concerns housing. The destruction affected not only homes but also basic utilities, employment, family incomes and social infrastructure. People have been forced to seek temporary accommodation with relatives or in other areas, while restoring water supplies, electricity, roads and livelihoods creates an additional burden for an economy already suffering from limited access to external financing and a prolonged migration crisis.

Muschett noted that it would take Venezuela years to rebuild on its own. UNDP is using drones and artificial intelligence technologies to assess the condition of buildings, but technical solutions are insufficient without access to funds, materials, equipment and international aid channels. UN humanitarian affairs chief Tom Fletcher had also previously called for the sanctions regime to be eased wherever it could obstruct emergency assistance: “It is important that humanitarian exemptions exist so that nothing necessary for humanitarian support is subject to sanctions.”

Within Venezuela, such statements reinforce the widespread view of sanctions not as a targeted instrument of pressure on the political leadership, but as a measure whose consequences fall primarily on the population. In the aftermath of a natural disaster, this argument becomes even sharper: the restrictions are associated with an inability to repair homes, clear rubble and restore hospitals, water supplies and power more quickly.

Gilbert Achcar’s interview adds a global context to this debate. The researcher describes the 25 years since the September 11 attacks as an era of U.S. “imperial overexpansion.” In his assessment, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq did not produce the political results Washington had promised, but caused enormous destruction and loss of life among the populations of the countries attacked. The United States, Achcar emphasizes, “remains the most powerful state in the world” and is capable of causing colossal damage, although the limits of its influence have become more apparent than they were at the beginning of the 21st century.

Iraq occupies a special place in his argument. Achcar considers the neoconservative regime-change project a complete failure: the destruction of the state apparatus generated chaos, while one consequence of the intervention was increased Iranian influence. For a Venezuelan audience, this assessment resonates with long-standing distrust of U.S. foreign-policy rhetoric about promoting democracy and protecting human rights. In the country’s political culture, the experiences of Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya are often viewed as warnings about the cost of foreign intervention in countries with strategic resources or independent policies.

Venezuela is mentioned directly in the interview. Achcar argues that Donald Trump’s current approach differs from the earlier model of exporting liberal democracy: “Today, instead of replacing regimes it considers disobedient, the United States tries to preserve them, limiting itself to forcing them to cooperate.” He continues: “His approach to Venezuela is fully consistent with this: he removed Maduro, while the rest of the apparatus was simply forced to cooperate with Washington, without attempting to impose democratic elections or restore the so-called liberal opposition.”

These statements are presented in the interview as Achcar’s analytical position, not as an independently confirmed editorial account. However, the logic of this argument fits well with Venezuela’s anti-interventionist perception: the United States is supposedly interested less in a democratic transition than in subordinating existing state structures to its foreign-policy and economic agenda. In a country with the world’s largest proven oil reserves, questions about cooperation with Washington, sanctions and political pressure are inevitably linked to control over export revenues, resources and the conditions governing access to global markets.

Achcar also calls the decades-long blockade of Cuba “criminal,” arguing that it has driven the population into “absolute hunger” and punishes people more than the government. In Venezuela, the Cuban case is seen as a warning for Latin America as a whole. Financial, oil and trade restrictions against Caracas have long been interpreted in the same way: as a mechanism affecting not only officials and state-owned companies but also the country’s access to medicines, equipment, international payments and investment.

At the same time, Achcar’s criticism of the United States does not amount to justification of other world powers. He calls Russia’s invasion of Ukraine a “terrible crime” and places primary responsibility for the war on Vladimir Putin. At the same time, the researcher believes that the U.S. invasion of Iraq and NATO expansion have served as evidence for many countries of Western double standards on issues of international law.

Achcar also speaks separately about Gaza, describing what is happening there as genocide carried out by an industrially developed state with the support of Western powers. In his view, the gap between Western countries’ reaction to the war in Ukraine and their position on Gaza became “the final nail in the coffin” of the rules-based liberal world order. In Venezuela, where official rhetoric has traditionally expressed solidarity with Palestine and sharply criticized the actions of Israel and the United States, this assessment finds favorable political and cultural ground.

This perspective is also rooted in the Bolivarian tradition. Memories of the struggle for independence, the symbolic role of Simón Bolívar, and the history of coups, blockades and foreign interventions in Latin America have fostered lasting skepticism toward promises of external “democratization.” It is widespread not only among government supporters, although the government itself uses this language most consistently.

As a result, the humanitarian tragedy following the earthquakes and the broader criticism of U.S. foreign policy merge into a single Venezuelan framework. For Caracas, the country’s recovery depends not only on the scale of the destruction and the speed of international assistance, but also on a revision of sanctions restrictions. For supporters of the anti-interventionist position, Iraq, Afghanistan, Cuba, Gaza and Venezuela become parts of a single narrative about the crisis of American hegemony. At the same time, Achcar’s assessments remain primarily the position of an invited researcher rather than a neutral news report: in this framework, Venezuela serves as an example of a broader dispute over sovereignty, resources, humanitarian responsibility and the limits of external pressure.

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Damascus and Washington Discuss Lifting Sanctions and Banking Cooperation

During a phone call with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani stressed the importance of completing the executive and technical procedures related to lifting sanctions on Syria. According to the Syrian Foreign Ministry, the two sides discussed bilateral relations, ways to develop them, and strengthening cooperation between Damascus and Washington, as well as a number of regional developments. Al-Shaibani expressed Syria’s appreciation for the U.S. steps toward lifting sanctions and emphasized the need to continue coordination so that these decisions produce tangible results for the economy and banking sector.

The Syrian Foreign Ministry said the two sides agreed on the importance of continuing to support Syria on stability and economic growth amid the “positive momentum” in bilateral relations. Damascus is focusing on completing the technical and executive aspects related to lifting the restrictions so that the economic and banking sectors can genuinely feel the effects of Washington’s policy shift. The banking sector is particularly important to Syria: the government seeks to strengthen foreign economic ties, support reconstruction, and attract investment while expanding its international contacts.

Al-Shaibani also insisted on continued coordination with Washington so that political steps on sanctions would have a practical and tangible impact on economic and banking activity. According to the Syrian Foreign Ministry’s statement, the talks addressed regional developments and Syria’s role in supporting stability in the political and economic spheres. The two sides also reaffirmed their commitment to continued consultations and coordination on matters of mutual interest.

The U.S. State Department, in a statement attributed to spokesperson Tommy Pigott, said Rubio discussed regional security issues and expanding cooperation between the United States and Syria with al-Shaibani. The U.S. secretary of state stressed the importance of further integrating all minorities in Syria and commended Damascus’s progress in cooperating with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

On September 9, the IAEA Board of Governors announced the conclusion of the decision concerning Syria’s noncompliance with its nuclear obligations under its safeguards agreement pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This followed the fulfillment of relevant technical and legal requirements and came amid U.S.-Syrian talks on bilateral cooperation and regional developments. The negotiations are taking place as Damascus expands its foreign ties and hopes to gain economic and banking benefits from easing restrictions, support reconstruction, create broader conditions for trade and investment, and turn political steps on sanctions into practical results.

News Commentary

• Which specific U.S. sanctions programs—such as the Caesar Act, OFAC sanctions, and export and investment restrictions—apply to Syria, and what technical conditions are required for their full repeal? — Several layers of U.S. sanctions apply to Syria: (1) the OFAC Syrian Sanctions Regulations (31 CFR Part 542), based on a series of executive orders (EO 13338, 13460, 13572, 13573, and 13582) and the IEEPA; these freeze regime assets and prohibit new investment, oil imports, U.S. exports, and financial transactions involving sanctioned persons; (2) the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019, incorporated into the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act, which imposes sanctions on the Syrian government, the Central Bank, and foreign persons providing significant support to the regime; (3) export controls administered by the Bureau of Industry and Security under the EAR and by the State Department under ITAR, including an arms embargo and restrictions on dual-use goods, aviation, and oil and gas equipment; and (4) additional restrictions resulting from Syria’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism (SST) and from nonproliferation laws. Full repeal would technically require: presidential certification or a decision that Syria has changed its conduct, including ending support for terrorism, abandoning weapons of mass destruction and chemical weapons, ending attacks on civilians, and complying with U.N. resolutions; repeal of the Caesar Act by Congress, which would require legislative action rather than merely an executive order; revocation by the president of the relevant executive orders and termination of national emergencies; removal of individuals and organizations from OFAC’s SDN list and lifting of sectoral prohibitions; removal of Syria from the SST list by the secretary of state, requiring certification that Syria has not supported terrorism for six months and assurances regarding future conduct; cancellation of BIS and State Department export restrictions; and resolution of nuclear and chemical issues with the IAEA and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Full repeal would require a combination of legislative, executive, and regulatory steps rather than a single act.

• What did the IAEA Board of Governors’ decision regarding Syria’s noncompliance with its safeguards agreement under the NPT mean, and which nuclear facilities or obligations were involved? — In June 2011, the IAEA Board of Governors formally found Syria in noncompliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA (INFCIRC/407) under the NPT and referred the matter to the U.N. Security Council. The case concerned an undeclared nuclear facility at Deir ez-Zor, also known as Al-Kibar, which Israel destroyed in 2007. The IAEA concluded that it was a nuclear reactor that Syria was required to declare, provide design information for, and make available to inspectors. Syria denied that the facility was nuclear, describing it as a non-nuclear military site. The Board’s decision meant that Syria had violated its obligations under the safeguards agreement by failing to declare nuclear material and a facility and by failing to ensure verification and cooperation with the IAEA. The decision did not impose automatic sanctions but opened the way for consideration by the U.N. Security Council. The IAEA also called on Syria to sign and bring into force an Additional Protocol and resume cooperation.

• Which banking restrictions—disconnection from SWIFT, a ban on correspondent banking relationships, or the blocking of Syrian Central Bank assets—are most critical for the Syrian economy, and why is lifting them considered a condition for recovery? — The most critical restrictions for the day-to-day economy are disconnection from SWIFT and the absence of correspondent banking relationships, particularly access to U.S. dollar clearing. SWIFT enables the transmission of payment messages; without it, banks cannot conduct international settlements. Correspondent relationships with foreign banks are necessary for trade, imports, remittances, and humanitarian operations. Their absence, compounded by the threat of U.S. secondary sanctions, deters even banks in third countries. Blocking the assets of the Central Bank of Syria freezes foreign-exchange reserves and limits monetary policy, but payment and correspondent-banking isolation is what paralyzes the private sector and foreign trade. Lifting these restrictions is considered a condition for recovery because without international banking channels Syria cannot pay for imports of food, medicine, and equipment, attract investment, obtain loans, or reintegrate into the global economy. This would require removal from OFAC sanctions lists, lifting bans on correspondent banking and blocking sanctions, and restoring access to SWIFT, which depends on the EU and Belgium, as well as a decision by SWIFT.

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Full version: Syria discusses with the United States accelerating implementation of sanctions relief to support the economy and banking sector

Venezuela’s New Oil Strategy: From Expectations to Recovery

Over more than a century, Venezuela has gone through several models for managing its oil industry: concessions, the 1975 nationalization, the liberalization of the 1990s, and the subsequent strengthening of state control. However, the current situation differs fundamentally from the conditions of the past: the industry has faced years of underinvestment, the nationalization of assets, the destruction of infrastructure, an exodus of specialists, and financial restrictions. As a result, major international companies are no longer showing the same interest in Venezuela as they did during the previous oil reform.

Recovery must rely not only on the major players that remain, but also on small and medium-sized domestic and foreign companies capable of providing capital, technology, and operational capacity. The new law provides for production-sharing contracts in the hydrocarbons sector, allowing cooperation arrangements involving PDVSA and the relevant ministry to be negotiated on a case-by-case basis. This model could accelerate the return of production, the repair of facilities, and the restoration of markets, provided investors are guaranteed transparent rules, reasonable returns, and protection for their investments.

The state should retain ownership of natural resources and regulate the industry, while the private sector can assume responsibility for financing, technology, and commercial risks. PDVSA must become an efficient and predictable partner, while legal stability must include clear obligations, mechanisms for recovering investments, and procedures for resolving disputes. At the same time, industry development must benefit the entire country by creating jobs, supporting Venezuelan suppliers, expanding technical education, and developing local equipment manufacturing. The success of this new stage should be measured not by statements, but by actual investment, restored wells, increased production, and the participation of domestic businesses.

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Full version: Realities in a New Oil Era

On Foot Across the Desert: Syrian Walks to Mecca After a Dream

Abdullah al-Naif, from the village of Zugheir al-Jazira in the western countryside of Deir ez-Zor, decided to travel to Mecca on foot—at a time when airplanes reduce thousands of kilometers to just a few hours. His long journey began across harsh desert terrain, and he has already reached the outskirts of Tadmor (Palmyra). This is neither a search for adventure nor a sporting challenge: according to Abdullah, he set out in response to a dream that appeared three times. In the vision, he was told that upon arriving in Mecca, he should complete 200 readings of the Quran. He therefore made his decision and set off, carrying his belongings and everything he needed.

As he advances, more and more people encounter him along the road: they stop, talk to him, record their meetings on video, and offer food, water, or other assistance. His long journey is thus turning into a series of brief encounters in which Abdullah feels the concern and support of others. When he reached the city of al-Sukhnah, road-security personnel noticed him, took him in, cared for him, and made sure he was safe. A local resident also gave him shelter and supplied him with what he needed, after which Abdullah continued on his way. Videos circulating online show passersby stopping to speak with him, while Abdullah tells them about the reason for his journey and the story of his dream.

Abdullah’s story quickly became material for posts made by the people who meet him. However, his relatives have urged others not to bother him or turn his journey into a way of collecting views. They are asking people to give him space so that he can continue his journey peacefully. Between the desert of Deir ez-Zor and the road to Mecca, the young man continues to walk.

The main paradox of Abdullah’s journey lies in his choice of means, not his destination. In an age when airplanes shorten distances and cars cross deserts, he has chosen the route used by travelers centuries ago. Details of the journey—including the full route, total distance, and arrival date—remain unclear. Nevertheless, he continues to walk on his own two feet, attracting the interest and attention of those he meets along the way.

Comments on the News

• What is al-Sukhnah known for, and why is it considered an important stop on the route from Deir ez-Zor to Palmyra? — Al-Sukhnah is a small city in the Syrian desert (the Badia), in Homs province. It is known for its hot sulfur springs and its historic role as a caravan stop between Palmyra and Deir ez-Zor. During the modern conflict, its importance grew because of its strategic location: a key road linking central Syria with the eastern provinces passes through al-Sukhnah, while important oil and gas fields are located nearby. Control of the city therefore made it possible to influence communications and logistics between Deir ez-Zor and Palmyra, making it both an important stop and a military position.

• How are vows based on recurring dreams traditionally viewed in Syria, and why might the pilgrim’s relatives ask people not to turn his journey into a public spectacle? — In Syria’s popular religious tradition—among both Muslims and Christians—recurring dreams are often regarded as a sign or a call from a saint or divine power, prompting a person to make a vow (nazr): to undertake a pilgrimage to a holy site, give alms, or perform another ritual. Such a vow is considered a personal covenant between a person and God (or a saint), and fulfilling it requires sincerity (ikhlas). Relatives may ask people not to turn the journey into a public spectacle in order to avoid ostentatious piety, the evil eye, and envy, as well as to protect the pilgrim from unnecessary attention, gossip, or danger. Publicity may be seen as violating the vow’s private nature and risking the replacement of its spiritual meaning with outward display.

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Full version: From Syria to Mecca on foot… Why did Abdullah choose a journey reminiscent of the Companions’ era?

It Is Becoming Harder for Trump to Pursue His Agenda

Institutional, political and economic resistance to Donald Trump is intensifying. Against the backdrop of legal obstacles, Democratic concerns and criticism of pressure on the Federal Reserve, signs that his political immunity is weakening are becoming increasingly apparent. These developments show that the United States remains deeply divided and that the president’s agenda is facing growing constraints. This article is based on reports by Canal 12 Misiones (Venezuela) and France 24 (Venezuela).

US Decisions Increase Risks for Latin America

Two developments in US politics—the conflict between Donald Trump and the Federal Reserve, and the Supreme Court’s decision on mail-in voting rules—show how economic and institutional decisions in Washington reverberate far beyond the United States. Although neither report represents the direct position of Venezuelan authorities, politicians or experts, both help assess the significance of these developments for Venezuela and Latin America as a whole.

A report by Argentina’s Canal 12 Misiones focuses primarily on the dispute between Trump and Federal Reserve Chair Kevin Warsh after the US interest rate was raised by 0.25 percentage points, to a range of 3.75–4%. Trump is demanding that rates be cut to “1% or lower” and insists that this be done “quickly.” Warsh, by contrast, emphasizes the central bank’s independence and the need to continue fighting inflation: “Inflation is too high and has remained so for too long.”

The report does not constitute a Venezuelan reaction: it contains no sources from Venezuela and does not examine specific consequences for the country. Its immediate focus is Argentina’s vulnerability to tighter US monetary policy. The rise in yields on 10-year US Treasury bonds above 5% was accompanied by an increase in Argentina’s country risk to more than 500 points. Analyst Roberto Silva of Oficina de Inversiones de Cohen explained that higher US base rates “increase the cost of financing new dollar-denominated debt,” making it more difficult to service floating-rate obligations and refinance on international markets.

For Venezuela, the significance of these processes is primarily indirect. Higher US interest rates generally strengthen the dollar, reduce investor interest in risky assets and increase the cost of external financing for developing countries. Venezuela is already constrained by sanctions, limited access to international credit and unstable oil revenues. The issue, therefore, is less about new borrowing than about a deterioration in the external environment: a stronger dollar, possible fluctuations in oil prices and declining appetite for investment in the region.

Another important example of limits on Trump’s power concerns the electoral system. As noted in a France 24 analysis, the US Supreme Court prevented the president’s administration from introducing new federal restrictions on mail-in voting ahead of the 2026 midterm elections.

The proposed measures included uniform envelope requirements, mandatory identification features and barcodes, as well as the possibility for the US Postal Service to refuse to forward ballots that did not meet the established standards. However, the court ruled that the states would retain their existing procedures until the legal proceedings were completed. This does not constitute a final ruling that the initiatives are illegal, nor does it abolish mail-in voting. The decision primarily rules out changing the rules at the last minute, when election administrators are already preparing for voting and, in some cases, have begun sending out ballots.

Justice Brett Kavanaugh supported suspending the introduction of the restrictions for 2026, but allowed that similar rules could receive legal justification in the future. Justices Samuel Alito and Clarence Thomas, by contrast, dissented from the majority’s decision.

For a Venezuelan audience, this story is particularly revealing as an example of institutional checks on executive power. The US Constitution leaves the organization of elections primarily to the states, while the judicial system can temporarily block actions by the White House. Amid polarization, this demonstrates the role of competing centers of power—courts, local administrations and election authorities—in protecting the stability of procedures.

The dispute also once again exposed the issue of fraud allegations. Trump continues to call mail-in voting “a completely corrupt and out-of-control disaster,” even though US courts and election officials have found no evidence of widespread fraud. Lisa Brown, an election administrator in Oakland County, Michigan, recalled: “In 2020, he claimed there was fraud. There was never any evidence of it. Those elections were accurate, secure and fair.” According to her, political statements do not change the “security or accuracy” of the electoral process.

Tammy Patrick of the Election Center said that after the Supreme Court’s decision, election organizers “breathed a sigh of relief,” as the immediate threat of disruption to the process nationwide had been removed. “Voters need to understand that the midterm elections will be secure. They will be legitimate,” she stressed. David Becker of the Center for Election Innovation and Research acknowledged that Trump’s rhetoric had created additional difficulties for local officials, but said he did not expect it to lead to chaos.

The scale of the dispute is also explained by the statistics: approximately 47 million Americans, or 32% of the electorate, voted by mail in the 2024 elections. This method was used by 37% of Democrats and 24% of Republicans. Technical requirements for ballots therefore have not only administrative but also partisan significance: changes may affect different groups’ access to voting in different ways.

For Venezuela, both stories are important as an illustration of how US decisions affect the region. Fed monetary policy changes financial conditions across Latin America, while the institutional dispute over mail-in voting shows how strongly confidence in elections depends on judicial independence, stable rules and the ability of state mechanisms to restrain political pressure.

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Qasioun: Damascus’s Guardian Mountain and Memory of the Ages

Mount Qasioun rises above Damascus to a height of about 1,153 meters. It is regarded not merely as a natural landmark, but as the city’s beginning and guardian. Geologists describe it as a domed elevation formed during the Late Cretaceous period, around 100 million years ago. More than 500,000 trees grow on its slopes, while springs and fountains bubble up there. Two historic water sources link it to Damascus—the Roman Thora and the Umayyad Yazid.

The mountain’s name is shrouded in legend. Some historians believe it is Aramaic and signifies strength, severity, and firmness. Yaqut al-Hamawi described Qasioun as a mountain rising above Damascus, with caves, traces of prophets, and a cemetery of the righteous. According to Damascene tradition, the first generation of Adam’s descendants lived on its slopes; Cain killed Abel there, while angels comforted Adam in the “Cave of Gabriel.” Legends say that the mountain sighed and split open, forming the Cave of Blood. In the “Cave of Hunger,” tradition holds, forty prophets died of starvation.

Damascus’s religious memory is also tied to Qasioun. Ibn Asakir wrote that the prophet Ibrahim (Abraham) was born at the foot of the mountain near the village of Barzeh, where he had a place of prayer. Later, the site became the Maqam of Ibrahim, as well as the burial place of 70,000 martyrs and 700 prophets. Ibn Jubayr mentioned that the hill of al-Nayrab at its foot was the home of Hannah, the mother of Maryam (Mary), while the caves served as refuges for prophets, including Yahya, son of Zakariya. Damascenes take pride in the belief that Qasioun became a refuge for Isa (Jesus) and his mother. They associate it with the Quranic verse: “We sheltered them on a hill where there was tranquility and a spring.” There is also a tradition that the White Minaret east of Damascus will be the place where Christ descends.

Ancient cities and neighborhoods spread out at the foot of Qasioun. The most prominent is Salihiyah, founded in the 12th century by the al-Qadama al-Maqdisi family. It is home to the al-Umariyah and al-Atabekiyah madrasas, as well as the mausoleum of Lady Fatima Khatun. The heart of Salihiyah is considered to be the neighborhood of Sheikh Muhyi al-Din ibn Arabi, with its mosque and the al-Salimiyah tekke. The slopes are also home to the Rukn al-Din neighborhood, founded by the Ayyubids, the Circassian Quarter, the Muhajirin neighborhood, and Ottoman palaces. Historians and travelers wrote about Qasioun, while Sheikh Ali al-Tantawi saw the entire world in miniature there: after climbing the mountain and looking over Damascus and its Ghouta oases, he felt as though he were seeing the whole earth gathered into a single panorama.

In modern times, Qasioun did not remain untouched by change. From a natural boundary of Damascus, it became an area of urban expansion and later a strategic, security, and military facility of the state. Its summit and slopes housed the Qasioun Battalion of Saraya al-Difa, the Republican Guard command, and other structures. With the outbreak of the Syrian revolution, a large part of the mountain became a restricted military zone. Trenches were dug there and headquarters were carved into the rock, turning Qasioun into one of the regime’s military strongholds and a guarantee of its grip on the capital. After the fall of the Assad regime on December 8, 2024, Qasioun became the first place visited by President Ahmed al-Sharaa after entering Damascus. He then visited the Umayyad Mosque and his home in the Mezzeh neighborhood, while Qasioun served as the backdrop for his address to the Syrian people.

Qasioun has long captured the hearts of poets. Nizar Qabbani inscribed its rocks into his verses, addressing the mountain:

“He who came alone from the cities of wind… embrace me like a child, Qasioun.
Has she gone mad from my longing for her… Is this al-Sham (Damascus), or am I the mad one?”

Khalil Mardam Bey saw in Qasioun an indestructible summit and a crown of stars, while Adib al-Taqi and Ahmed Rami composed endless nostalgic lines about it. Even today, Qasioun remains youthful on the shoulders of the nights, standing proudly upright—a guardian of Damascus, the memory of the ages, and the beginning of creation.

News Comments

• What was Saraya al-Difa, and what role did it play in Syria’s security system? — Saraya al-Difa (Arabic for “Defense Companies,” also known as the Defense Companies) was an elite paramilitary formation created in Syria in the 1970s and led by Rifaat Assad, the brother of President Hafez Assad. It operated as a praetorian guard parallel to the regular army, protecting the Assad regime and family, helping suppress internal opposition—including during the events in Hama in 1982—and being used to prevent coups and control the security apparatus. After Rifaat Assad’s unsuccessful attempt to seize power in 1984, the formation was disbanded and partially integrated into the Republican Guard and other security agencies.

• What is the Ghouta, and why has this oasis historically been vital to Damascus? — The Ghouta (Arabic: الغوطة, al-Ghouta) is a historic oasis and green belt around Damascus, particularly East Ghouta. Fed by the Barada and A’wj rivers and an extensive network of canals, it supplied the city with food—vegetables, fruit, and grain—for centuries. It also provided water, clean air, and cool temperatures, while serving as a strategic buffer and agricultural base. Control of the Ghouta was therefore always critical to Damascus’s survival and security. During the civil war, East Ghouta became an opposition stronghold and a scene of siege and fighting. Historically, however, its primary importance was as “the breadbasket and garden of Damascus” and a natural defensive belt.

• What is the White Minaret (the Minaret of Isa), and why is it associated with the descent of Christ? — The White Minaret, or Minaret of Isa (Arabic: المنارة البيضاء / منارة عيسى), is the eastern minaret of the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus. In Islamic eschatology, it is associated with a tradition that, according to the hadiths, before the End of the World the prophet Isa (Jesus) will descend from heaven onto this white minaret in Damascus to fight the Dajjal (the false messiah, comparable to the Antichrist) and restore justice. The minaret is therefore regarded as a symbolically important site associated with the awaited Second Coming of Jesus in Islamic tradition.

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Full version: "The Cave of Gabriel and Abel’s Blood"—the story of Mount Qasioun from the beginning of creation to the fall of Assad

Talks Between Venezuela’s Government and Opposition Resume

The Venezuelan government and a group of former opposition lawmakers began the second stage of a U.S.-backed political dialogue on September 17. Opposition delegation head Dinorah Figuera arrived in the country on Monday and met with National Assembly President Jorge Rodríguez. Figuera had previously taken part in the first round of talks, which began on August 12. At that time, the parties agreed to a comprehensive reform of the Supreme Court and to return Venezuelan assets frozen at the Bank of England to help people affected by the June 24 earthquake. The negotiating process also received diplomatic support from the United Kingdom: Minister for Latin America Chris Elmore told Parliament that the talks had been viewed positively and announced plans to appoint a British diplomat with a permanent residence in Caracas. Venezuelan authorities welcomed the upgrading of diplomatic representation and once again declared their intention to recover national funds held abroad.

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Full version: National government and opposition sectors resume political dialogue in Venezuela this Thursday

Syrian Refugees in Jordan: Between Return and Anxiety

Muhammad al-Deyri, a Syrian refugee in Jordan, is eagerly awaiting his return home. He stresses that his decision is not related to any bad experiences in Jordan, but rather to his desire to return to his country and resume his life there. “Jordan welcomed us, received us and sheltered us in a difficult moment, but one’s homeland remains one’s homeland,” he told Al Jazeera. At the same time, al-Deyri does not hide his concerns about the next stage: he is worried about the economic situation and the possibility of the internal conflict resuming, turning the decision to return into a mixture of homesickness and anxiety.

The situation of Syrian refugees in Jordan is entering a new phase amid the continued return of Syrians to their homeland following the fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024. After a surge in the first few months, the pace of departures has slowed, while hundreds of thousands of registered Syrian refugees continue to live in the kingdom, including tens of thousands in the Zaatari and Azraq camps. Yusef Taha, an official representative of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Jordan, notes that the pace of return slowed after a significant increase at the beginning of the voluntary repatriation process, particularly following Assad’s fall.

According to Yusef Taha, 77,054 refugees live in Jordan’s camps, accounting for 21% of the kingdom’s total 366,077 registered refugees. The Zaatari camp has 45,364 residents, while Azraq camp has 31,536. The number of Syrian refugees registered with the UNHCR in Jordan is 343,142, or 93.7% of all refugees registered in the country, according to data updated as of September 1, 2026.

Jordanian Interior Ministry spokesman Abdel Karim Abu Dلو said that the number of Syrians in Jordan is approximately one million, while 231,720 Syrian refugees returned to their homeland for permanent resettlement between December 8, 2024, and September 12 of this year. The consequences of the refugees’ departure are already becoming apparent in sectors linked to their presence, especially in the governorates of Irbid and Mafraq and in the city of Ramtha in northern Jordan.

In the housing sector, apartments outside the camps where Syrians lived have become vacant, affecting demand for rentals. The presence of Syrian workers and competition in the restaurant industry, construction, painting and confectionery sectors have also declined, although Egyptian workers continue to maintain their positions in some of these fields. The economic impact is concentrated mainly on labor rather than capital, alongside declining demand for housing, certain services and local activities.

In Mafraq governorate, where the Zaatari camp is located, returning to Syria has become a constant topic of conversation among refugees—both those who have already decided to leave and those waiting before determining their future. Today, the camp looks different than it did in previous years, but tens of thousands of its residents remain there, and for many, the decision to leave depends on the conditions awaiting them inside Syria. Al-Deyri’s story reflects some of the considerations Syrians face: the decision is linked not only to the desire to return, but also to whether returnees will be able to resume work, provide for their families and live amid stable conditions in Syria.

Yusef Taha noted that Jordan has introduced a number of concessions and procedures. In July, the Interior Ministry allowed Syrians to apply for departure and return to Syria without requiring a security card or work permit, regardless of how the applicant entered Jordan and without requiring refugee status. To submit an application, applicants must be over 18 and hold a valid Syrian passport. Approval is expected to be issued within approximately one working week, and applications may be submitted online. The UNHCR says it is committed to supporting refugees who voluntarily choose to return to Syria, helping make their return sustainable, and providing advice and information about return-related difficulties, including documentation issues. From September 1, 2026, all UNHCR-registered refugees in Jordan—both those in the Zaatari and Azraq camps and those living elsewhere—will be eligible to receive 70 Jordanian dinars per person to support their return. Some families classified as belonging to the most vulnerable categories will receive an additional one-time payment of 210 dinars per family.

Comments on the News

• What is a “security card” in Jordan, and why is its removal as a requirement for applying to leave for Syria considered an important change for Syrian refugees? — A “security card” is a document or permit issued by Jordanian security services—usually the General Intelligence Directorate or the Interior Ministry—confirming that a person has no legal problems and is permitted to access services, work, reside legally and leave the country. Many Syrian refugees do not have such a card because they entered unofficially, left a camp without permission or lost their documents. Removing the security-card requirement for applying to leave for Syria means that refugees can request voluntary return without undergoing the prior security screening that often blocked their departure. This is important because it makes return easier for those unable to regularize their status in Jordan and reduces the risk of arbitrary detention, although return must remain voluntary and safe.

• How do the Zaatari and Azraq camps differ in terms of history, administration and living conditions, and why do most Syrian refugees in Jordan live outside them? — Zaatari opened in 2012 near Mafraq. It grew spontaneously and became a large town with a market, shops and an informal economy; it is managed by the UNHCR and the Jordanian authorities. Azraq opened in 2014 as a more strictly planned “model” camp with prefabricated caravans, but it is located in a remote desert area, is less economically active and is more isolated. Zaatari offers more services and social life, while Azraq involves greater control and dependence on aid. Most Syrian refugees in Jordan—around 80–90%—live outside the camps, in Amman, Irbid, Mafraq, Zarqa and other cities, because the camps are not compulsory for everyone, many refugees arrived before they were established or obtained sponsorship to leave, and they seek employment, education, family connections and more affordable housing. However, life outside the camps is accompanied by poverty, a lack of legal status and limited access to work.

• Which political and armed forces currently control different regions of Syria, and how does this affect security and access to services for returnees? — Following the fall of Assad’s regime in December 2024, the map of control remains fragmented: the new authorities in Damascus, led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and Ahmed al-Sharaa, control most central and southern areas; the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) control the northeast; Turkey and its allies control northern enclaves; local militias are influential in the south; and Islamic State cells remain active in the desert. For returnees, this means serious risks, including checkpoints, arbitrary detention, military service, landmines and destroyed infrastructure. Access to services is limited: cities lack sufficient housing, hospitals, schools and jobs, while instability persists in northeastern and border areas. Humanitarian organizations advise checking the safety of the route and the status of the destination area before returning.

• What does “most vulnerable categories” mean in UNHCR terminology, and according to what criteria do families receive the additional 210-dinar payment? — In UNHCR terminology, “most vulnerable categories” refers to refugees with particular needs and risks: women and girls who head households; unaccompanied children; elderly people without support; people with disabilities or chronic illnesses; survivors of violence, torture and trafficking; pregnant and breastfeeding women; large families; people without documents or legal status; and those without income who depend on aid. The additional payment of 210 Jordanian dinars—usually a monthly payment or part of cash assistance—is intended for families that receive a high vulnerability score in a UNHCR assessment. Criteria include income below the poverty line, unemployment, debt, poor housing conditions, limited access to health care and education, family composition, disability or chronic illness, and legal status. The payment helps cover basic needs such as rent, food and medicine; the exact amounts and criteria may change depending on program funding.

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Full version: The return of Syrians from Jordan continues, and Zaatari has not emptied

Chilean Politics and Messi Football News: What the Posts Contain

Two social media posts presented as material on regional and international affairs are in fact devoted to entirely different topics: a dispute over the consequences of a right-wing course in Chile and the emotional anticipation of a possible farewell match for Lionel Messi with the Argentina national team.

In an Instagram post, the author discusses Chilean politics and attempts to separate an assessment of economic results from partisan labels. The central argument is stated directly: “Chile has not become poorer” (“Chile no ha sido más pobre”) because of governance “along Republican lines.” At the same time, the author notes that the country’s economy continued to grow under left-wing President Gabriel Boric, although this growth is described with the word “pauperrimo”—that is, extremely weak, almost negligible.

In the author’s view, Chile’s situation cannot be explained solely by the presence of Republicans in power or by the form of political leadership itself. Economic results, the post claims, were the consequence of a specific set of measures, rather than an automatic result of the government belonging to either the right or the left. This approach calls for rejecting the simplistic formula that conservative rule inevitably leads to impoverishment while the left guarantees social progress.

Particular attention is devoted to José Antonio Kast, whom the author refers to by the initials JAK. According to this assessment, his possible or current political influence does not mean that Chile will automatically lose all of the progress it has previously achieved. At the same time, however, the author acknowledges that the country’s social gains “are at risk” (“están en riesgo”). Thus, the post does not amount to unequivocal support for a right-wing course: it combines recognition of Chile’s economic resilience with concern about the future of its social, labor, pension, and other public guarantees.

For a Venezuelan audience, this argument may be especially sensitive. In Venezuela, discussions of development, crisis, and social policy have for decades been built around the opposition between “social gains” and the “neoliberal threat.” In this context, Chile is often seen as an example of a more stable economy, but also as a country marked by significant inequality and prolonged disputes over its pension, labor, and social systems. Therefore, the call to assess not the ideological label but the specific decisions may be perceived as a criticism of familiar explanations that attribute states’ successes and failures solely to whether their governments belong to the left or the right.

At the same time, this material remains a personal political and economic assessment. It presents no statistics, official data, or expert comments; the author’s conclusions are based on their own interpretation of Chile’s economic growth and the risks facing the country’s social achievements.

The publication by Argentina’s Canal 26 on Facebook is entirely different in nature. Its headline mentions U.S. weapons in space and a “real war of the galaxies,” yet the actual text contains no analysis of U.S. policy, competition with China and Russia, Venezuela’s position, sanctions, or international security. Instead, the post is devoted entirely to football and Lionel Messi’s presumed farewell match for the Argentina national team.

According to the publication, Argentine Football Association president Claudio “Chiqui” Tapia confirmed that Messi had agreed to play against Benin on October 6 at the Monumental Stadium. The event is presented in an emphatically emotional and patriotic tone: fans are invited to “be moved to tears,” while Messi is portrayed as the main symbol of the Argentina national team and a figure who unites the country around football.

Thus, there is a clear discrepancy between the Canal 26 post’s headline and its actual content. This is not a report about geopolitics or space weapons, but an emotional sports publication about Messi. It contains no Venezuelan experts or politicians and offers no assessments of U.S. policy; nor does it relate to Venezuela’s economy, domestic politics, or Caracas’s relations with Moscow and Beijing.

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