Escalation of strikes on Iran: mounting losses and concerns

A series of powerful explosions occurred in Iran's capital Tehran and in several other cities, including Ahvaz and Saqqez in the southwest of the country. Iranian and international media report a new wave of strikes affecting residential and commercial areas in western and southwestern Tehran. Local sources circulated video footage showing the aftermath of shelling, especially in Ilam province.

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) said it has struck more than 3,000 targets inside Iran since the start of the conflict, including command centers, air defense systems and missile sites. U.S. forces also reported destroying 43 Iranian military vessels. At the same time, Israel announced strikes on more than 400 targets in western Iran, targeting ballistic missile installations and drone warehouses, allegedly in support of opposition groups.

According to Iranian authorities, material damage is enormous: since the start of the campaign seven days ago, 390 housing units, 528 commercial centers and 13 medical facilities have been damaged or destroyed. The deputy governor of Isfahan said that as a result of last Friday’s attacks alone eight people were killed and 80 houses damaged. Videos from Ilam and Tehran show destroyed residential neighborhoods, heightening concerns about the impact on civilian infrastructure.

The civilian death toll continues to rise. Iran’s ambassador to the UN said that at least 1,332 Iranian citizens have been killed in the strikes and thousands wounded. UN Secretary‑General spokesman Stéphane Dujarric confirmed that about 180 children have been victims of U.S. and Israeli attacks, including 168 girls killed in the strike on a primary school in late February. Surveillance cameras also captured the moment a boys’ school in Qazvin was hit.

U.S. media, citing administration sources, report that President Donald Trump privately expressed serious interest in deploying U.S. ground troops on Iranian soil. Against the backdrop of ongoing strikes, rising casualties and destruction in several Iranian cities, regional and international concerns about an escalation of the conflict and its impact on civilians are growing.

News comments

• What strategic or symbolic significance do the cities of Ahvaz and Saqqez in southwestern Iran, mentioned as targets of the strikes, have? - Ahvaz is the capital of Khuzestan province, a center of Iran’s oil and gas industry, with a predominantly Arab population and a history of separatist sentiments. Saqqez is located in Kurdistan and is a center of Kurdish cultural and political activity. Both cities symbolize regions of ethnic minorities with long-standing tensions with the central government.

• Who are the “opposition groups” in western Iran that Israel says its strikes are supporting? - These are mainly Kurdish opposition groups (for example, the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan), which advocate greater rights for Kurds or autonomy, as well as possible Arab separatist movements in Khuzestan. They operate in border areas and periodically clash with Iranian security forces.

• What is Ilam province like in terms of geography and significance in Iran? - Ilam is a border province in western Iran, bordering Iraq. It has strategic importance for border control and is mostly populated by Kurds and Lurs. During the Iran‑Iraq War (1980–1988) fierce fighting took place there, and it remains a region with heightened military activity and smuggling routes.

❮ ❯

Full version: انفجارات جديدة بطهران.. أمريكا تستعرض ضرباتها وإيران تتحدث عن مقتل 1332 مدنيا

US and Venezuela Agree to Restore Diplomatic Relations

The United States and Venezuela have reached an agreement to restore diplomatic and consular relations, which is expected to facilitate joint efforts to strengthen stability, support economic recovery, and advance political reconciliation in the country. Washington expressed its commitment to assist the Venezuelan people as part of a gradual process aimed at creating conditions for a peaceful transition to a democratically elected government, while Venezuela's Foreign Ministry said it was confident that this step would strengthen mutual understanding and open opportunities for positive and mutually beneficial relations between the two countries.

❮ ❯

Full version: Estados Unidos y Venezuela restablecerán sus relaciones diplomáticas y consulares (+Comunicado)

Iran shifts tactics in the war, turning to stealthier missiles

On the sixth day of the conflict between Iran on one side and Israel and the United States on the other, Tehran began to change its military tactics. According to expert analysis, Iran has been striking less frequently and increasingly relying on solid-fuel missiles such as the Imad-1, Zolfikar and Khorramshahr-4. These missiles are harder to detect because they do not require lengthy preparation at the launch site, unlike liquid-fuel counterparts. Military analyst Brigadier General Nidal Abu Zeid notes that Iran’s true goal is not to achieve a quick victory but to prolong the war, wear down the enemy and avoid its own defeat.

Over the past 24 hours there has been a noticeable drop in the intensity of missile fire from Iran. This pause may be linked both to the shift to a new, more covert tactic and to the need to conserve resources. Experts suggest Iran seeks to create a constant-threat environment for its adversaries, forcing them to spend vast amounts of money and effort on defense while complicating the task of detecting and destroying launchers.

US and Israeli responses are also facing serious difficulties. According to Western media, the American side may have reduced the number of missile-interception operations due to the risk of depleting stocks of the expensive THAAD interceptors. Intercepting a single threat can sometimes require up to three interceptors, each costing roughly $3 million, making defense extremely costly. Thus a kind of balance emerges between protecting the population and preserving a limited stockpile of air-defense means.

At the same time Iran is broadening the range of weapons used and the geography of its attacks. In recent hours new types of weapons have been deployed, including the suicide drone Hadid-110 and mines-laden unmanned boats for attacks on tankers in the Persian Gulf. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps announced missile strikes on Ben-Gurion Airport and a key Israeli air base. Simultaneously, northern Israel was shelled by the Iran-aligned group Hezbollah, heightening fears of regional escalation.

Tension on the ground remains: since the start of the conflict there have been around 30,000 air-raid alerts in Israel, forcing the population to shelter in bomb shelters continuously. An official spokesperson for the Israeli military confirmed the slowdown in the tempo of missile attacks but stressed that the threat has not gone away. The conflict is entering a more protracted and wearing phase, where endurance of the parties, weapon stockpiles and the ability to adapt tactics become key factors.

Comments on the news

• What is the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) within Iran’s armed forces and its influence on regional policy? - The IRGC is an elite military formation created after the 1979 Islamic Revolution to protect its ideals. It functions parallel to Iran’s regular army and answers directly to the Supreme Leader. The IRGC has its own ground, naval and aerospace forces and controls strategic sectors of the economy. In regional politics the IRGC, especially its Quds Force, plays a key role in supporting proxy groups (such as Hezbollah in Lebanon) and forming the so-called “axis of resistance” aimed at countering US and Israeli influence in the Middle East.

• What other regional groups, besides Hezbollah, does Iran support and how are they used in its strategy? - In addition to Lebanese Hezbollah, Iran supports a number of groups in the region. In Yemen this is the Ansar Allah (Houthis) movement; in Iraq, numerous Shiite militias united under the Popular Mobilization Forces; in Syria, the government forces and affiliated formations. These groups are used by Iran as instruments of “indirect” or proxy warfare. The strategy allows Tehran to expand its influence, create strategic depth, pressure adversaries (such as Saudi Arabia or Israel) and protect its interests while minimizing direct military involvement and associated risks.

• What are the key technical and tactical differences among the mentioned Iranian solid-fuel missiles (Imad-1, Zolfikar, Khorramshahr-4)? - The key differences concern range, mobility and payload. The Imad-1 is essentially a modernized version of the Shahab-3 with extended range (around 1,700+ km) and reportedly improved accuracy, making it a weapon for striking strategic targets. The Zolfikar is a shorter-range (about 700 km) tactical ballistic missile but with high mobility (mounted on a truck chassis), allowing rapid relocation. The Khorramshahr-4 is the newest missile with the greatest claimed range (up to 2,000 km) and likely a separable warhead, which complicates interception by missile-defense systems. Tactically, the Zolfikar is intended for operational support, while the Imad-1 and Khorramshahr-4 serve strategic deterrence. All are solid-fuel, permitting faster launch preparation compared with liquid-fuel missiles.

❮ ❯

Full version: إيران تلجأ إلى صواريخ معيَّنة وأمريكا تقلل عمليات الاعتراض.. لماذا؟

U.S. Authorities Claim Major Successes in War Against Iran

The United States and Israel are conducting large-scale military operations against Iran that began last week. U.S. President Donald Trump said that operations carried out jointly with the Israelis are proceeding faster than planned and are delivering a crushing blow to Tehran's military capabilities. According to him, Iran's missile capabilities and 24 Iranian ships were destroyed over the past three days.

Trump did not limit himself to military statements, moving on to direct appeals aimed at Iran's security forces. He called on members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the army, and the police to lay down their arms, warning that otherwise they would face death. At the same time, the U.S. leader promised immunity to those who stop resisting and offered Iranian diplomats a role in building "a new and better Iran."

Washington's strategic goal, Trump said, is not only to weaken Iran now but also to prevent the resurgence of the threat in the future. He claims the damage inflicted will set Iran back ten years in terms of rebuilding its military potential. Trump also explicitly stated that the U.S. intends to influence who will govern the country after the conflict ends.

U.S. military leadership confirmed the president's optimistic statements. Secretary of Defense Pete Higsit said the Pentagon has enough ammunition and resources to conduct a prolonged campaign. Commander of U.S. Central Command of the Navy Admiral Brad Cooper reported specific results: destruction of 90% of Iran's ballistic missile launch capabilities, 80% of its drones, and the complete suppression of air defense systems.

The conflict, called "Lion's Roar" in Israel and "Epic Fury" in the U.S., has led to significant losses among Iran's leadership. According to the article, the country's supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was killed in the strikes, along with a number of high-ranking military and civilian officials. Iran responded with a counterattack called "Faithful Promise-4," but, according to U.S. statements, its capabilities have been seriously undermined.

Thus, the U.S. combines intensive military strikes with politico-psychological pressure, trying to provoke a split within Iran's power structures. Trump's rhetoric directed at Iran's military and diplomats is part of this strategy aimed at forcing Tehran to capitulate and radically change the country's political course.

Comments on the news

• What role does the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps play in Iran's political and military system compared to the regular army? - The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is an elite military formation created after the 1979 revolution to protect the Islamic system. Unlike the regular army (Artesh), which is responsible for conventional border defense, the IRGC has broader powers: it controls strategic sectors of the economy, influences domestic politics, heads the Basij popular militia, and oversees regional operations abroad. The IRGC reports directly to the Supreme Leader, not the government.
• What are the powers and sources of authority of the Supreme Leader (ayatollah) in Iran's political system, and who is the likely successor after the death of Ali Khamenei? - The Supreme Leader is the highest political and religious authority in Iran with lifetime powers. His authority derives from the concept of velayat-e faqih (rule of the Islamic jurist). He appoints key military and judicial leaders, approves presidential election results, and sets the country's overall policy. The successor is chosen by the Assembly of Experts (86 clerics), which oversees the leader's activities. Likely successors named include Ruhollah Khomeini's son Ahmad Khomeini, former president Ebrahim Raisi, or other senior religious figures, but no official candidates have been announced.
• What are the previous "Faithful Promise" operations carried out by Iranian forces, and who are they traditionally aimed at? - The "Faithful Promise" (Va'ad-e Sadeq) operations are a series of military exercises and real operations by the IRGC demonstrating the capabilities of Iran's missile forces. Traditionally these operations are aimed at perceived threats from Israel and the U.S. in the region, showcasing Iran's ability to strike distant targets. Recent drills included launches of ballistic missiles simulating strikes on an Israeli military base, reflecting Iran's deterrence doctrine amid regional tensions.

❮ ❯

Full version: ترمب يدعو الحرس الثوري لإلقاء السلاح ويؤكد تدمير قدرات إيران الصاروخية

US and Venezuela Discuss Joint Oil, Gas and Mining Projects

High-ranking representatives from the United States and Venezuela held talks in Caracas aimed at restoring cooperation in key economic sectors. U.S. Secretary of State Doug Burgum and Acting President of Venezuela Delsi Rodríguez discussed plans to bring American companies back into the country to operate in the oil, gas, and critical minerals sectors. The Venezuelan side, for its part, pledged to reduce bureaucratic barriers to facilitate new investment and create additional jobs.

Venezuela announced that it is preparing a draft law to reform mining legislation. The aim of the changes is to align the regulatory framework with the agreements reached with the American delegation, as well as to promote the introduction of modern technologies into the mining sector. Rodríguez also expressed appreciation for the role played by the administration of former U.S. President Donald Trump in strengthening bilateral dialogue. The meeting was also attended by U.S. Chargé d’Affaires Laura Dogu, heads of oil companies, and key Venezuelan ministers and the head of the state oil company PDVSA.

This official visit is part of a series of diplomatic contacts that resumed after political changes in Venezuela at the beginning of 2026. Burgum’s trip to the Venezuelan capital will last two days and is aimed at specifying items of a joint energy “roadmap.” The talks mark an important step in normalizing economic relations between the two countries after a period of tension.

❮ ❯

Full version: Doug Burgum destaca “sinergia” con Venezuela en petróleo, gas y minería

Escalation in the Persian Gulf: US and Israel Strike Iranian Fleet

American and Israeli military strikes have shifted the focus to Iran’s naval capabilities after US President Donald Trump announced provision of military escort to oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz. The move reflects Washington’s concern over Iranian threats affecting global navigation and energy flows. In response to Tehran’s threats to close the strategic strait, the allies began concentrated attacks on Iran’s naval assets.

There are reports of significant strikes against the Iranian fleet. According to US sources, the so‑called drone carrier Shahid Bagheri and 20 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) frigates were sunk in the port of Bandar Abbas. In addition, the US reported the sinking of an Iranian warship off the coast of Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean, where local police say 87 sailors’ bodies were recovered. These actions followed recent IRGC statements about targeting vessels that refuse to comply with their ban on transit.

Military expert Brigadier General Elias Hanna explains that Iran’s strategy is not to physically blockade the strait but to create threats that drive up insurance and transit costs, forcing companies to avoid the route. It is precisely to undermine this capability—not only to escort individual vessels—that Washington and Tel Aviv are now deliberately attacking maritime infrastructure, missile installations and IRGC bases in southern Iran, while Israel is focused on sites in the country’s northwest, including Tehran.

The Iranian navy traditionally relies on asymmetric warfare tactics, using fast attack craft, torpedoes and naval mines that are effective in the narrow waters of the Persian Gulf. However, these means are ineffective against US destroyers in the open waters of the Indian Ocean. Experts also note that the very idea of military escort may not work, as evidenced by the unsuccessful experience of similar proposals during the Iran–Iraq War in the 1980s.

The recent clashes and claims of ships being sunk point to a serious maritime escalation with far‑reaching consequences for regional security and global energy routes. The actions of the US and Israel appear aimed at completely eliminating lines of Iranian threat rather than merely managing risks. As operations continue, the Strait of Hormuz region remains an epicenter of tension capable of affecting global oil markets and international shipping.

Comments on the news

• How is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) organized within Iran’s naval forces, and how does it differ from the regular Iranian navy? — The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has its own naval forces (IRGC Navy) that operate parallel to the regular Navy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The IRGC Navy is primarily focused on operations in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, employing asymmetric warfare tactics (for example, fast attack craft, coastal missile batteries, naval mines). Its key roles are defending the Islamic regime, controlling strategic waters and carrying out ideological missions. The regular navy is responsible for more conventional naval operations in the Caspian Sea, the Gulf of Oman and open waters, fielding larger ships, submarines and long‑range aviation. Both answer to the Supreme Leader of Iran, but the IRGC has greater political and operational autonomy.
• What is the “drone carrier” Shahid Bagheri, and how do such ships fit into Iran’s naval doctrine? — Shahid Bagheri is a converted cargo vessel turned into a floating base for launching, controlling and receiving unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). It is not an aircraft carrier in the traditional sense but serves as a mobile platform for reconnaissance, surveillance and potential strike drone operations. Such ships reflect Iran’s naval doctrine based on asymmetric capabilities and innovation under resource constraints. They allow Iran to extend the range of its UAVs in strategic waters, enhancing deterrence and flexibility in responding to regional threats without building costly conventional aircraft carriers.
• What lessons did Iran and the US learn from tanker escort incidents during the Iran–Iraq War, and how do those lessons affect current calculations? — During the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988), Iran attacked tankers in the Persian Gulf to pressure Iraq and its allies, prompting US operations to escort Kuwaiti tankers. Iran learned that disrupting shipping can be an effective lever in hybrid warfare but also provokes direct military intervention by major powers. The US recognized the necessity of protecting freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz as critical to the global economy. Today these lessons shape calculations: Iran uses the threat of disrupting shipping as a bargaining and deterrent tool, while the US and its allies maintain a naval presence in the region to prevent a blockade, acting cautiously to avoid further escalation.

❮ ❯

Full version: أمريكا تضع بنك أهداف جديدا في حربها مع إيران.. فما هو؟

Digital Darkness: One Attack That Disabled Iran and Disoriented Ships

On the morning of 28 February 2026 a resident of Tehran opened a navigation app and found it showing his location 900 kilometers to the south. Soon after he lost all connectivity—Internet access and the ability to send messages. He did not know that minutes earlier a missile strike on a school in Minab had taken 165 lives, because all information channels were cut off for him. What millions of Iranians experienced that morning was not a scene from science fiction but a large-scale digital blackout, during which the country’s Internet traffic fell to 4% of normal levels and then almost to zero.

At the same time, more than 1,100 ships in the waters of the UAE, Qatar, Oman and Iran encountered GPS and Automatic Identification System (AIS) jamming and spoofing. On monitoring screens vessels appeared in false locations, for example at airports or near the Barakah nuclear power plant. The US Navy issued a broad warning to mariners, as jamming and spoofing of satellite signals became a real navigational safety threat. Experts later called the events one of the largest cyberwarfare operations, one that made no distinction between a military radar and a mother’s phone searching for her children.

This digital collapse began with a first wave of cyberattacks on Iranian official and news websites. A second, internal wave followed when the government itself shut down the Internet, the intranet, telephone networks and even blocked Starlink. The concurrence of external attacks and internal measures led to an almost complete severing of national communications, while compromised pages and fake messages in religious and media apps fully paralyzed the official information environment. Citizens heard the explosions of falling missiles but did not know where they had landed and could not contact their families to check whether they were alive.

To understand the scale of what happened, one must know the methods of electronic warfare: jamming, which fills frequencies with “noise”; spoofing, which sends false signals that make a device “think” it is somewhere else (this is what happened to the ships); and direct cyberattacks on digital networks and platforms. Unlike a bomb or a bullet, which can be aimed at a specific target, electronic interference cannot be directed at a single device without affecting all others within its coverage area.

From a military-technical standpoint the operation relied on advanced platforms and coordination to speed up the so-called “kill chain” — from detection to effect and assessment. A specialized electronic attack aircraft, the EA-18G Growler, and the F-35 acting as an advanced electronic sensor, worked in tandem. The F-35 built an accurate map of enemy radar emissions and transmitted data to jammer aircraft to “blind” those radars. This put the opponent’s defenses to a stark choice: increase emissions and risk being struck by anti-radiation missiles, or shut down radars and lose situational awareness.

It is important to note that Iran in this story is not only a victim but also an active participant. In preceding years Tehran repeatedly used GPS-jamming capabilities in the Persian Gulf waters, affecting hundreds of ships. Incidents such as tanker collisions and reduced traffic through the Strait of Hormuz show that Iran has turned this strategic waterway into a focal point of relatively low-cost but effective electronic warfare with serious economic and military consequences. Even before the current escalation, exercises by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and joint tests with Russia included elements of electronic warfare.

The outcome of this battle in the ether goes far beyond military losses. The main cost is humanitarian. The civilian population was deprived of warning systems and access to reliable information during the bombardment. Official media were either blinded or compromised. The electromagnetic spectrum has no borders, and when it becomes a battlefield, every civilian who relies on a digital signal becomes a potential collateral target. The only thing people can do in such a situation is wait for communications to be restored to learn the fate of their loved ones.

News commentary

• What is the intranet in Iran and what role does it play in the country’s information environment? - The National Information Network (NIN) is a state-controlled internal Internet infrastructure, often called the “intranet.” Its role is to filter content, restrict access to global platforms, strengthen national cybersecurity and enable Internet services to function if the country is cut off from the worldwide web. It is a key tool for managing the information space.
• What is the strategic and economic importance of the Strait of Hormuz for Iran and the region? - The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow maritime passage through which about 20–30% of global oil trade flows. For Iran it is a lever of strategic influence, a bargaining tool and a potential flashpoint. Control over the strait allows Tehran to affect global oil prices and the security of the Persian Gulf region.
• What are the powers and role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Iran’s military and political system? - The IRGC is an elite armed force reporting directly to the Supreme Leader. Its powers extend beyond those of the regular army: it is responsible for internal security, ideological control, intelligence, the missile program, and wields enormous economic influence through its foundations and corporations. The IRGC is the main defender of the Islamic regime and a key political actor.
• Where is the Barakah nuclear power plant located and why could mentioning it as a false ship location be particularly provocative? - The Barakah nuclear power plant is located in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Its false mention in the context of Iran could be provocative because it is the first nuclear facility in the Arab Gulf built with South Korean assistance. This underscores a regional nuclear dynamic, tensions between Iran and its neighbors, and might indicate an attempt to manipulate information by linking Iran to a sensitive security facility of another state.

❮ ❯

Full version: من يسيطر على هاتفك؟ ما تشعر به ولا تراه في الحرب بين أمريكا وإيران

Venezuela 60 days after the change of power: unanswered questions

Two months after the events that changed Venezuela’s political landscape, journalist Vladimir Villegas analyzed the ongoing uncertainty in the country. He noted that the time elapsed since the detention of President Nicolás Maduro is insufficient to answer the key questions troubling society. Villegas emphasized that the legal status of Maduro’s absence — whether temporary or permanent — directly affects the need for and timing of new elections. The main question, in his view, is whether the country is truly in a transitional period or will retain the existing status quo.

The journalist also touched on civil rights and justice issues, questioning the possible scope of an amnesty law for political prisoners and the need to liberalize the media space. In the economic sphere, Villegas linked Venezuela’s oil autonomy to the crisis in the Middle East, which led to higher oil prices, and asked whether the additional export revenues will reach the population and improve real wages. In his assessment, the country stands at a crossroads, and the governance of the interim presidency, as well as the fate of national resources under the new conditions, remain the main mysteries that time and political will must answer.

❮ ❯

Full version: Vladimir Villegas:

From Sarcasm to War: Criticism of Trump's Escalation Against Iran

In a sardonic article, British author John Criss lampoons the exaggerated praise that Western countries might lavish on Donald Trump in pursuit of the Nobel Peace Prize. In an ironic tone, the author presents absurd scenarios—such as sending official delegations to Norway and creating golden statues—to underscore how some parties might disproportionately reward the former US president, elevating him to an almost divine status.

However, the tone shifts sharply when Criss points to a dramatic turn in Trump’s policy — from declarations of peace to direct military action. The author notes that Trump has effectively "turned his back on the mission of peace and decided to win the prize of war," as evidenced by the decision to bomb Iran after the incident involving the kidnapping of the Venezuelan president. This is presented as a new round of escalation in which Washington is targeting yet another leadership.

Criss paints a bleak picture of the US lacking a real military plan, emphasizing that the apparent objective boils down to inflicting damage and changing the regime without a clear strategy. He notes that the death of Ayatollah Khamenei left no obvious successors, complicating Iran’s political landscape and giving the war unpredictable dimensions. The author warns that such interventions risk producing further chaos rather than resolving the conflict.

Special attention is paid to the warning that regime change is not achieved by bombing alone. Criss argues that a policy of pure military pressure will not create pro-Western democratic alternatives inside Iran; on the contrary, it will lead to a political vacuum and obstacles to a peaceful transfer of power. The key message here is that unilateral military decisions lack the instruments to build long-term stability.

In conclusion, the author examines the international consequences of this escalation, particularly for US allies such as the United Kingdom. He describes Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s refusal to join the attacks as "nightmarish," resulting in a loss of support from both sides of the debate. This example serves to illustrate the difficulties governments face in managing tangled Middle Eastern crises amid growing militarization.

Comments on the news

• What is the role and real authority of Ayatollah Khamenei in Iran’s political system compared with the president? - Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, as Supreme Leader of Iran, holds the highest authority in the country. He is commander-in-chief of the armed forces, sets broad policy directions, appoints key officials (including heads of the judiciary, state media, and commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), and has the power to approve the election of the president. The president, while head of the executive branch, operates within limits set by the Supreme Leader, and his powers are considerably subordinate. Essentially, the Supreme Leader is the highest religious-political authority, while the president is the administrative head of government.

• What are the main political factions or groups within Iran that might vie for power in the event of a vacuum, and are there truly "pro-Western" forces among them? - The main political groupings are conservatives (principalists), reformists, and moderates. Conservatives, closely linked to revolutionary institutions (IRGC, Basij), have the greatest levers of influence. Reformists advocate gradual change within the system. In the event of a power vacuum, conservative forces are the most likely contenders. Regarding "pro-Western" forces: there are no officially pro-Western parties in Iranian political lexicon, but some reformist and moderate currents (as under President Rouhani) have pushed for greater openness and dialogue with the West within the existing system. However, they are not pro-Western in the sense of seeking to change the political order.

• What is the institution of the "Supreme Leader" in Iran and how is a new leader chosen after the death of the previous one? - The institution of the Supreme Leader (rahbar) is the highest state office in Iran, founded on the concept of "velayat-e faqih" (rule of the Islamic jurist). The leader is the guarantor of the Islamic character of the republic. After the death or removal of a leader, he is chosen by the Assembly of Experts — 88 clerics elected by the people for eight-year terms. The Assembly evaluates candidates for religious and political qualifications (high level of Islamic knowledge, justice, political wisdom). Theoretically, they can select any worthy mujtahid (Shiite jurist), but in practice the choice is limited to a narrow circle of senior clergy loyal to the Islamic Revolution. The process is not a public electoral campaign in the Western sense.

❮ ❯

Full version: بعد فشله في نوبل للسلام.. ترمب يسعى لجائزة الحرب

Global and Latin American Reactions to the U.S.–Iran Escalation

The escalation between the United States (and its allies) and Iran — strike drones, attacks on embassies, retaliatory strikes and the deaths of American soldiers — has provoked a wave of international criticism and concern that reflects not only the facts of the fighting but also political and cultural assessments of the Trump administration’s policy. Spanish-speaking and Venezuelan outlets discuss claims about the honesty and competence of U.S. leadership, debates over the need to inform Congress, fears that unilateral moves only inflame conflict in the Middle East, and atypical cultural responses — from criticism of the use of Kesha’s music to accusations of a drive for unlimited power. These narratives shape an image of American policy as aggressive and destabilizing, prompting foreign observers to question the future consequences for regional security and diplomacy. This piece is based on publications from Telemundo, Radio UChile and YouTube video material (Venezuela).

Venezuela between Trump and Tehran: war, oil, propaganda and lessons for the region

For the Venezuelan reader, the current escalation around Iran and Donald Trump’s rhetoric is not a distant Middle Eastern story but a mirror of their own vulnerability. A country living under sanctions, locked in a protracted confrontation with Washington and with an elite that sees in every new U.S.–Iran crisis a rehearsal for a possible scenario for Caracas, perceives news of a “war with Iran” primarily as a warning to itself.

In the Telemundo / NBC feed (https://www.telemundo.com/noticias/noticias-telemundo/internacional/live-blog/eeuu-pide-a-sus-ciudadanos-abandonar-14-paises-de-medio-oriente-mientr-rcna261490), which describes the scale of the planned U.S. operation, “Furia Épica,” the words of Republican Senator Lindsey Graham are heard: “This regime is in agony. The firepower we will deploy in the coming days will be crushing… The liberation of Iran is within arm’s reach. The door to peace will open any moment now.” For a reader in the U.S. this is part of familiar hawkish rhetoric. For a reader in Caracas it reverberates directly with how people spoke for years about the “Maduro regime.”

Terms like “regime,” “liberation,” and “door to peace” have long been equated in the Venezuelan imagination with forcible regime change from outside. It is the same language used in reference to Iraq, Libya, Syria, and later — in a milder, sanction-based form — to Venezuela itself. When another senator, Josh Hawley, warns that the operation will be “very broad,” is “developing quickly” and “changing every hour,” in Caracas they hear not only a military description but a hint: the policy of force can be extended to “secondary theaters of operation” — including Latin America.

Particularly telling is the statement by Democratic Congressman Andy Kim: “This is only the beginning of what, according to several of them, will be a very long operation. This is war. This is a war with Iran.” The phrase “long operation” in Venezuelan perception sounds like a description of a strategy of attrition: sanctions, targeted strikes, diplomatic pressure and an information campaign combined to topple an undesirable government. Many in Caracas see their own experience — years of economic sanctions, attempts at diplomatic isolation, recognition of parallel authorities — as a non-military version of such a “long war.”

Another layer is oil. Any full-scale confrontation between the U.S. and Iran automatically hits the global commodity market. For sanction-hit but oil-dependent Venezuela this is an ambivalent signal: on the one hand, a possible rise in oil prices could be an opportunity if restrictions ease; on the other, it could strengthen Washington’s drive to cut off all “hostile” energy sources (Iran, Russia, Venezuela), threatening further tightening of control over Venezuelan exports and financial flows.

The situation is complicated by the fact that Iran is not only a partner of Caracas in anti-hegemonic rhetoric but also a practical ally supporting projects in petrochemicals, fuel provision and the defense sector. The more total the “war with Iran” becomes, the more toxic any Venezuela–Iran interaction becomes for the U.S. For strategists in Washington Caracas becomes a logical “node” in the same network that can be squeezed through sanctions, criminal prosecutions and threats of secondary restrictions.

Against this backdrop it is especially noteworthy how political and intellectual fault lines around Trump, Iran and the right to intervene are forming in the region. A column by former Chilean foreign minister Ignacio Walker, published in Chilean media and devoted to whether the new right-wing cabinet is ready for the U.S.–Israel–Iran crisis, is read in Venezuela not only as an intra-Chilean polemic but as a symptom of a broad Latin American dilemma. In his article, available at “'Falta experiencia diplomática': excanciller Walker cuestiona capacidad del gobierno entrante para enfrentar la crisis internacional” (https://radio.uchile.cl/2026/03/03/falta-experiencia-diplomatica-excanciller-walker-cuestiona-capacidad-del-gobierno-entrante-para-enfrentar-la-crisis-internacional/), Walker criticizes the president-elect José Antonio Kast for having effectively joined “the political, conservative, ultra-right club, led by Trump” and for taking a position on Iran “without any nuances,” applauding Trump’s decision.

For Caracas this is an important signal: the region is not only divided between left and right but also between pro-Trump “rightists,” ready to unconditionally support U.S. forceful actions and sanctions, and more traditional conservatives who still appeal to rule-of-law and multilateralism. Walker writes explicitly that international law “does not exist to install or remove regimes,” and warns of “the end of the liberal international order of the past 70 years” and a move toward “a ruleless society,” where Trump despises both international law and his own constitutional law.

This language sounds familiar in Venezuela: Caracas’s official discourse has for years asserted that unilateral sanctions, asset freezes and recognition of a parallel “president” are manifestations of precisely such a “ruleless era.” The difference lies only in who says it. When a former foreign minister from a country with traditionally cautious diplomacy like Chile says it, it is perceived as confirmation that the crisis of legal order is not an invention of Venezuelan propaganda but a deeper structural shift.

Walker criticizes the composition of the Chilean foreign policy team, where key posts go to figures from big business, such as Luxsic group representative Francisco Pérez Mackenna, and stresses the “lack of diplomatic experience and knowledge of international politics.” This note resonates painfully for Venezuelan audiences: when foreign policy is replaced by the logic of the market and corporate interests, it tends to more readily adopt sanction regimes, financial blockades and trade deals favorable to Washington, even when these harm pariah countries like Venezuela.

Another parallel storyline is the choice between the U.S. and China. Walker warns that “Chile cannot choose between the U.S. and China, and that is the art of politics.” Venezuela has already been pushed into a position where the choice was effectively made by Washington: sanctions drove Caracas into the arms of Beijing, Moscow and Tehran. Thus Chile’s debate about whether to maintain a balance or become an appendage of American strategy is read in Caracas as a debate about whether South American governments will become voluntary agents of pressure on Venezuela, Iran and Cuba or attempt to maneuver relying on multilateralism.

But geopolitics is only one side. The other is the information war. An analytical video by journalist Wilfredo Cancio, “¿Trump nos dice toda la verdad sobre Cuba, Irán y Venezuela?” (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=267F40FT-og), made for a Latin American audience in the U.S., focuses less on rockets and aircraft carriers than on how Trump constructs a narrative about “enemies” — Havana, Tehran and Caracas — and how propaganda and disinformation affect Latino communities.

This turn to a “war of narratives” is especially close to the Venezuelan experience. In a country where authorities for decades have talked about a “media war” and “psychological siege,” and opponents about a “huge propagandistic machine of the regime,” the thesis that the task of propaganda is “to seize not only territories but minds and hearts” sounds like a statement of an already lived reality. Cancio and his interlocutor emphasize that narratives about Iran, Cuba and Venezuela are not neutral information: they form the justification for sanctions, military pressure, migration restrictions and even electoral mobilization within the U.S.

For millions of Venezuelans living in the U.S. and other countries this has a material dimension. How media and politicians in Washington describe the “Maduro regime” and the “threat emanating from Caracas” affects migration decisions, the climate of xenophobia or solidarity, and access to work. For those who remain in Venezuela it is reflected in sanctions, restricted access to financial markets, fuel shortages and rising import prices.

Cancio’s analysis brings to the fore another shared problem for the U.S. and Venezuela — polarization of the information space. In the U.S. the media environment is split between outlets that justify any adventure under the banner of fighting “terror” and “dictatorships,” and media more skeptical of official rhetoric. In Venezuela the media landscape is divided into state and quasi-state outlets broadcasting the government line, a few remaining private platforms, and uncontrolled flows in messaging apps. In both cases the information environment is less and less helpful in discerning reality and more and more an instrument in political struggle.

That is why the video places special emphasis on the role of independent journalism and fact-checking as “tools to defend equality, social justice and democratic values.” To Venezuelan ears, tired of manipulation and half-truths, this call sounds almost like a manifesto of a lost profession: it is precisely the absence of stable, independent media platforms that has allowed both internal and external actors to so easily redefine the meaning of “democracy,” “human rights” and “sovereignty” with respect to Venezuela.

This multiplicity of readings — military, oil-related, diplomatic and media-critical — distinguishes the Venezuelan reaction to news of a “war with Iran” from dry news reporting. While the original Telemundo/NBC note (https://www.telemundo.com/noticias/noticias-telemundo/internacional/live-blog/eeuu-pide-a-sus-ciudadanos-abandonar-14-paises-de-medio-oriente-mientr-rcna261490) focuses on the words of Senators Graham, Hawley and Congressman Kim, the logistics of the “Furia Épica” operation and the evacuation of U.S. citizens from 14 countries in the region, and Ignacio Walker’s article on Radio Universidad de Chile (https://radio.uchile.cl/2026/03/03/falta-experiencia-diplomatica-excanciller-walker-cuestiona-capacidad-del-gobierno-entrante-para-enfrentar-la-crisis-internacional/) focuses on the quality of Chilean diplomacy, the Venezuelan reading inevitably:

• shifts the emphasis: from “safety of Americans” and “prestige of allied ties” to what this means for the sanctions regime, for oil prices, and for the possibility of military or hybrid escalation against Caracas;
• decodes the language: words like “regime,” “liberation,” “door to peace,” and “long operation” are read not as neutral descriptions but as code for regime change and protracted campaigns of pressure;
• embeds historical parallels: Iraq, Libya, Syria and Venezuela itself surface as examples of what begins with rhetoric and sanctions and ends with state destruction and prolonged instability;
• raises the question not only of rockets and sanctions but of control over the narrative — who and how explains to the world what “democracy in Iran” or “dictatorship in Venezuela” means, and whose interests are behind those explanations.

As a result, for Caracas the “war with Iran” is not just a story about the Middle East but another fragment of the broader U.S. model of relations with “disobedient” governments. In this model Venezuela is both an object of pressure and a warning: the next “long operation” could unfold not only in the Persian Gulf but closer to the Caribbean — whether in the form of new sanctions, diplomatic blockade or an escalation of the information war.

❮ ❯

Debates in the US: who decides on a war with Iran?

Sharp debates are flaring up in Washington about the nature and causes of a possible US military intervention against Iran. The central question is the independence of America’s foreign-policy decision: is the process led by President Trump’s administration or by the government of Israel under Benjamin Netanyahu? This dispute, which has engulfed Congress and social media, exposes a deep political split in the US over the goals and consequences of such a confrontation.

Serious criticism is being voiced in Congress. A number of lawmakers, including Democratic Senator Mark Warner, consider a potential intervention an unjustified "war of choice," warning that automatically equating any threat to Israel with a threat to the US would lead America into "uncharted territory." Senators Tim Kaine and Rand Paul are launching legislative efforts to limit executive authority, demanding Congressional approval for any new military operations against Iran, citing the War Powers Act.

Analysts point to powerful external influence. Expert Khalid al-Turgani says that Washington was pushed toward confrontation with Iran by pressure from "extreme pro-Israel forces," and that senior US military leadership allegedly rejected this "adventure" due to the lack of clear strategic objectives. He also warns of the risk of dragging the world into a full-scale economic downturn and argues that the conflict primarily reflects the will of Netanyahu and the right wing in Tel Aviv.

A split is observed even within the traditionally pro-Israel political camp. Democratic Senator Jeanne Shaheen bluntly asks: "Trump or Netanyahu?", reflecting a shift in sentiment, especially among young Democrats, who fear that unconditional support for Israel will drag the US into someone else’s conflicts. Criticism also comes from the MAGA movement and some Republicans, for example Congressman Thomas Massie, who says that it was Israel that "dragged us into a war with Iran," one that benefits only arms companies.

Concerns are growing in both military and public circles about the long-term costs of a new Middle Eastern conflict. Reports speak of psychological strain among sailors on the USS Gerald R. Ford due to prolonged deployments, and analysts remind that the costs of protracted wars without clear objectives often outweigh the benefits. In the end, although military operations continue, the key question for Congress and ordinary Americans remains open: is the US decision independent, or is Netanyahu’s influence the decisive factor?

Comments on the news

• What is the War Powers Act and what is its role in the US system of checks and balances? - The War Powers Act of 1973 is a US federal law that limits the president’s authority to conduct hostilities without Congressional approval. Its role in the system of checks and balances is to balance the power of the executive (the president) with that of the legislature (Congress). The law requires the president to notify Congress when troops are introduced into a zone of hostilities and generally to obtain its authorization to continue military operations beyond 60–90 days, thereby preventing unlimited presidential wars.
• Who are the "extreme pro-Israel forces" mentioned by the expert, and what influence do they traditionally have on US foreign policy? - By "extreme pro-Israel forces" are usually meant the most active and uncompromising groups in the US that lobby for Israel’s interests. These include influential organizations such as AIPAC (the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee), major donors, some conservative Christian groups, and parts of the media. Traditionally they exert significant influence on US foreign policy through campaign financing, direct lobbying of lawmakers, and shaping public opinion, helping to preserve the close US–Israel alliance and often blocking criticism of Israeli policy.
• How have young Democrats’ positions on Israel changed, and what does this mean for the traditional pro-Israel consensus in the US? - Young Democrats (the progressive wing of the party) have become more critical of Israel. They more frequently express concern for Palestinian rights, oppose Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, and call for conditions on US military aid to Israel. This signifies erosion of the traditional pro-Israel consensus that for decades united Republicans and most Democrats. The split within the Democratic Party on this issue creates political pressure and may, in the long term, lead to a reassessment of US unconditional support for Israeli policy.

❮ ❯

Full version: تساؤلات في أمريكا.. من اتخذ قرار الحرب على إيران ترمب أم نتنياهو؟

Trump rules out Reza Pahlavi in Iran plans

US President Donald Trump publicly rejected the idea that Reza Pahlavi, the son of Iran's last shah, could be considered a political alternative for the country. During a meeting with the German chancellor at the White House, Trump said that while some people admire Pahlavi, his administration had "not really thought much" about him. Instead, the US leader said he would prefer someone from inside Iran who is currently popular, adding that the US has such people.

Trump sharply criticized Iran's current leadership, calling its representatives "crazy extremists," and expressed hope for the emergence of more moderate figures within the country. This is not the first sign of Trump's skepticism about Pahlavi: he has previously questioned whether the people would accept him and whether he could govern effectively after decades in exile. Experts similarly doubt the ability of the shah's son, long detached from the country, to lead it.

These remarks came amid a rise in regional tensions. The conflict between Iran, the US and Israel entered its fourth day after a series of attacks. In Tehran, officials announced the death of the country's supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, as a result of a strike on his residence in the capital last Saturday, marking the most serious development in the crisis.

❮ ❯

Full version: ترمب لا يدعم "طموح" بهلوي ويفضل شخصا من داخل إيران

Venezuela affirms commitment to diplomacy to resolve differences

Acting President of Venezuela Delsi Rodríguez, speaking at a meeting with communes and social movements in the state of Sucre, emphasized that the Venezuelan people understand the importance of protecting the country's peace and independence, especially given the region's historical significance as the birthplace of the key independence figure Antonio José de Sucre. She noted that, unlike past conflicts, Sucre was not subjected to bombings, and called on local residents to follow the spirit of the liberators to preserve sovereignty and stability. Rodríguez also stated that Venezuela demonstrates that the "Bolivarian diplomacy of peace" and political dialogue are the only correct ways to settle international disagreements, reaffirming the country's commitment to the peaceful path.

❮ ❯

Full version: Venezuela ratifica que la diplomacia es el espacio para dirimir las diferencias y garantizar la Paz

Attack on Iran Sparks Debate Over Legality of War

A joint US-Israeli attack on Iran has provoked a broad legal discussion about the lawfulness of waging war without any authorization or mandate. Experts and politicians are debating how such actions align with international law and domestic legislation, especially in the United States, given that their potential consequences could be deep and long-lasting both for the fragile situation in the Middle East and for the internal political landscape within the United States itself.

❮ ❯

Full version: الجزيرة نت

Investigation points to direct hit on Iranian school during 2026 strikes

At the end of February 2026, during joint US-Israeli air strikes on targets in Iran, a direct hit destroyed the "Good Tree" primary school building in the city of Minab in the south of the country. According to Iranian judicial authorities and human rights groups, 165 people were killed, most of them girls aged 7 to 12, and another 95 were wounded. Representatives of the US and Israeli militaries said they do not acknowledge striking the school, while pro-government sources claimed that a base of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps was located at the site.

An investigation by Al Jazeera’s digital forensics team contradicts those claims. Analysis of satellite imagery, video footage and official documents spanning more than a decade showed that the school building had been clearly separated from the adjacent military facility at least since 2016. Documents indicate the school block was renovated, three entrances onto a public street were opened for it, and since 2018 there have been clear signs of civilian use: an inner courtyard, wall drawings and civilian vehicles.

Detailed analysis of on-site video footage from the strike revealed two separate columns of smoke: one inside the military perimeter and a second precisely at the school site. This matches the distance between the two facilities visible in satellite images. These pieces of evidence refute accounts that the school was damaged by shrapnel after a strike on the neighboring base or by the fall of its own air-defense system, and point to an independent strike aimed directly at the school building. At the same time, a new civilian clinic opened a year earlier in another corner of the same complex was not damaged.

The investigation also found that the original military complex had, over preceding years, transformed into three independent and visually distinct sectors: the "Good Tree" school (separated since 2016), the "Shahid Absalan" civilian clinics complex (separated since early 2025) and an active closed military facility "Seyed ash-Shuhada". This visually confirmed layout leaves only two possible questions: either the attackers used extremely outdated data and did not update their target database, or the strike on the school was deliberate.

Regional and international reactions to the incident were accompanied by attempts at disinformation. Photos circulated on social media purporting to prove that an Iranian air-defense missile struck the school. However, Al Jazeera’s verification showed that the key photo was taken during an incident in Zanjan in northwest Iran, not in Minab. Human rights organizations, including the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor, called the event a "horrific crime" and a sign of the collapse of protection for the civilian population, stressing that schools, as civilian objects, enjoy legal protection that is not nullified by the proximity of military installations.

According to local residents, the decision to evacuate the school was made immediately after the attacks began, but the interval between the warning and the missile impact was too short for parents to retrieve their children. The consequences of the strike were so extensive that local morgues could not cope, and authorities had to use mobile refrigerated units to store the bodies of the dead.

The investigation concludes that the attackers’ ability to identify a new civilian clinic while simultaneously failing to recognize a separated primary school that had been operating for more than ten years points to only two explanations: either a glaring intelligence failure, or a deliberate strike based on a false association of the school with military infrastructure. In either scenario, responsibility for the deaths of dozens of children and civilians and for the grave violation of international humanitarian law lies with those who carried out the strike.

Comments on the news

• How is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) organized and why do its facilities often become targets? - The IRGC is Iran’s elite armed force, created after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. It performs a dual function: protecting the Islamic order domestically and conducting operations abroad. Structurally it includes ground forces, aerospace forces, a navy and the Quds special unit. Its facilities become targets because of the IRGC’s involvement in regional conflicts, support for proxy groups and missile programs, which raise concerns among rivals such as Israel and the US.

• What is the city of Minab like in terms of strategic importance or demographics in southern Iran? - Minab is a city in Hormozgan province in southern Iran, with a population of around 50–60 thousand people. Its strategic importance is linked to its location near the Strait of Hormuz — a key shipping route for global oil trade. The region hosts military facilities and infrastructure, making it a sensitive security area.

• Who is "Shahid Absalan," after whom the medical complex is named, and what is the practice of naming objects after "shahids" in Iran? - Shahid Absalan likely refers to Absalan — a member of the IRGC or Basij who died in the line of duty (for example, in the Iran–Iraq War of 1980–88). In Iran it is common to name places (streets, hospitals, schools) after "shahids" — martyrs who gave their lives for Islam and the country. This is part of the state ideology of honoring the fallen and reinforcing national identity.

• What is the typical civil defense or early warning protocol in Iran for events such as air strikes? - Iran has a civil defense system coordinated by the IRGC and local authorities. In the event of a threat of air strikes, sirens are sounded and messages are broadcast via TV, radio and messaging apps. Exercises are conducted regularly, especially in border regions. However, the system is considered less developed than in some other countries, with limited coverage in remote areas.

❮ ❯

Full version: تحقيق للجزيرة يرجح: إسرائيل وأمريكا قتلتا "عمدا" طالبات مدرسة ميناب

"Epic Fury": How the Latin American Press Sees US and Israeli Strikes on Iran and the...

Venezuelan and Spanish‑language media, citing European sources, interpret the joint US–Israeli operation against Iran as a sharp escalation driven by an aggressive and at the same time tactically changeable policy of the Trump administration. Reports and analysis describe the action not only as a military strike but also as a legal and political challenge: the legitimacy of the attacks is questioned, constitutional and international claims against Washington are exposed, remaining allies of Tehran and the consequences for Palestine and the whole region are discussed. Special attention is paid to the distancing of European capitals — for example, Spain's refusal to provide bases — and to Trump's attempts to simultaneously demonstrate force and open a new diplomatic agenda with Iran's leadership. Overall, the narrative comes together as a critique of unilateral use of force, showing growing resistance from other states and social groups. The material was prepared based on publications from www.instagram.com, www.bbc.com and www.youtube.com (Venezuela).

Venezuela, Iran and the "axis of resistance": how the Middle East is reflected in Caracas

Venezuelan reaction to the new round of confrontation between the US and Israel with Iran consists of many voices and storylines. In local media and social networks the military strike is perceived not as a distant event in the Persian Gulf but as an episode of a larger history in which Caracas sees itself as part of a global "axis of resistance" and simultaneously as a hostage of oil and sanctions geopolitics. This picture weaves together Instagram comments from Bolivarian activists, analysis from international media, and academic views of Latin American experts.

One of the most revealing pieces is a short Instagram reel in which the author, from a typically Bolivarian, left‑antiimperialist perspective, dissects the US–Israel strike on Iran and the broader "Trump strategy" toward Tehran (video). In this reading Washington's course toward the Islamic Republic is automatically overlaid on Venezuela's own experience: sanctions, regime‑change attempts, economic strangulation, and the search for rescue through "alternative" alliances — above all with Iran.

Trump's course is described as "política desastrosa… totalmente aventurera" — a catastrophic, purely adventurous line that assumes reliance on the internal collapse of the Iranian state. The author claims the strike produced the opposite effect to what was intended: "…genera un efecto Alberso al que quería, matar niños de una escuela unifica a pueblo contra el ataque y debilita su política de destruir al régimen desde adentro…" — killing children in a school (an image of extreme violence against civilians) unites the people around the attacked regime and thereby undermines the strategy of "destroying the regime from within." For a Venezuelan audience the parallel is obvious: this is how Caracas explains why US sanctions did not overthrow the government but became a factor consolidating the core of supporters and strengthening anti‑imperialist rhetoric.

In the same vein the author addresses political consequences for the leaders behind the strikes: "…esto puede es el telegrama de defunción de Trump y Netanyahu ya que va a tener más costos que beneficios…". The strike on Iran is presented as a "death telegram" for Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu — a move that will bring them more costs than benefits. For the Venezuelan Bolivarian discourse this is a familiar note: Washington's and Israel's foreign policy force actions are read as a suicidal imperialist impulse that ultimately accelerates the downfall of the aggressors themselves — much like how Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro once portrayed US presidents as doomed to fail because of their global hegemony.

The most "Venezuelan" part of this analysis concerns oil geopolitics and the Strait of Hormuz. The author predicts that a possible blockade of Hormuz "…va a llevar a elevar exponencialmente el precio del petróleo y el gas generando inestabilidad e inflación en todo el mundo…". For a classic oil exporter like Venezuela, rising commodity prices have traditionally been seen as an opportunity to strengthen the budget and geopolitical influence. However, a caveat now appears in the speech: global "inestabilidad e inflación en todo el mundo" also hits Venezuela's import‑dependent economy, deformed by sanctions. In the subtext a double calculation is visible: the crisis around Iran could raise Caracas's oil revenues, but at the cost of such global turbulence that the country's recovery would become even harder.

The Instagram monologue concludes with a classic Bolivarian formula: "Fuera el imperialismo yankee y sionista de todo medio oriente." The coupling of "imperialismo yankee" and "sionist" Israel as a single block of aggression has long been embedded in pro‑government media discourse in Caracas. Since the late 2000s official Venezuela has consistently shown solidarity with Palestine, Syria, and Iran, fitting itself into the global "axis of resistance." Therefore the strike on Iran in this narrative is not simply a regional episode but another proof of the correctness of the Bolivarian project and Venezuela's "historical mission."

A similar storyline, but in a different register, is developed in BBC Mundo's analysis "Qué aliados le quedan a Irán en la región en medio de su enfrentamiento con EE.UU. e Israel". The article is not written from Caracas, but it directly touches Venezuelan history: Iran is presented as a weakened center of the "anti‑American" axis, whose old alliances are either bloodless or have lost significance. Among those allies is Venezuela, with a reminder of a "alianza estratégica" and more than 180 bilateral agreements worth over $17 billion. However, the key phrase for the Venezuelan reader is: "la mayoría de los cuales o se quedaron en el papel o fueron abandonados." The projects loudly promoted in Caracas — from industrial cooperation to joint refining capacities — are presented largely as symbolic, not realized in full economic results.

The article pays particular attention to the fact that for Iran the benefits of relations with Caracas have always been "más bien simbólicos." It also emphasizes that after the capture of Nicolás Maduro by the US "el pasado 3 de enero" and his imprisonment in an American jail (in the BBC analysis he appears as an already deposed ex‑president), these ties effectively found themselves in limbo. For a Venezuelan audience this reads as a painful revision of two decades of rhetoric about a "strategic partnership": if for Tehran it yielded only limited symbolic effect, for Caracas the bet on that alliance becomes an additional foreign policy burden.

BBC places Maduro in the same row with Bashar Assad and Vladimir Putin — not as equals in scale but as political allies of Iran with a pronounced anti‑Western course. But it draws a distinction: Russia and China, while important to Iran, do not form an unconditionally loyal shield. According to the article, in 2025 China bought about 80% of Iranian oil, but did not invest in large‑scale modernization of Iran's economy; Russia is occupied with its own confrontation with the West and is unlikely to lend a shoulder in Iran's Middle Eastern adventures. In this configuration Venezuela looks like one of many peripheral "symbolic" partners, worsening its international standing without tangible economic gains.

For internal Venezuelan discourse such a turn is unpleasant but telling. It supports those who long argued that building an "axis" with Iran, Syria, and several other states was an expensive ideological bet with minimal return. The official narrative of "diverse alliances" and "circumventing imperialism" is under pressure from external assessment: there are many agreements, few results, and the key ally (Iran) is itself drawn into confrontation, less and less in control of its own perimeter.

Another analytical layer comes from Latin American commentary. In the program Hoy Es Noticia, featuring Chilean political scientist Isaac Caro, director of the Department of Politics and Government at Alberto Hurtado University, the joint US–Israeli strike on Iran is discussed in the context of Operation "Furia Épica." The video is available on YouTube and is actively quoted in Venezuelan media space. Caro explains a more "defensive" posture of Washington toward Tehran by a number of factors, among which he mentions the "éxito militar de Donald Trump en Venezuela" — a formulation that has become a subject of sharp debate in Caracas.

For the official Venezuelan discourse, speaking of any "success" of Trump in the country is absurd: according to the authorities, the US sanctions and political campaign failed, and Washington was forced to move from an "all options on the table" strategy to more pragmatic bargaining and partial easing of restrictions. However, in a more neutral or opposition reading Trump had at least partial success: blocking external financing for the government, severely constraining PDVSA's maneuvering, international delegitimization of the Bolivarian regime, and creating long‑term risks for its stability. That a foreign expert incorporates this "success" into the general logic of American policy allows Venezuela to lift the local propaganda veil and see the events as part of a broader trend: from Syria and Iraq to Caracas and Tehran.

Caro also emphasizes that the newly appointed commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Ahmad Vahidi, could strengthen Iran's presence in Latin America. For the region this is primarily linked to the memory of the AMIA attack in Buenos Aires, the shadow of Hezbollah on the Triple Border, and in general to the network that many Western and regional intelligence services attribute to Tehran. For Venezuela, which has long cooperated with Iran on energy and, according to several investigations, on military and intelligence lines, this signal is read ambivalently. On one hand, it confirms the strategic depth of anti‑sanctions schemes — from fuel and spare parts supplies to joint routes for evading embargoes. On the other, it heightens fears that the country will finally be fixed in the image of a "bridgehead" for structures considered terrorist by the US and Europe, with corresponding consequences for its already difficult international status.

Putting all these voices together reveals a complex, contradictory picture. Inside Venezuela the strike on Iran is used to reinforce the usual binary storyline "empire versus peoples": emotionally charged language like "política desastrosa," "totalmente aventurera," "telegrama de defunción" and slogans such as "Fuera el imperialismo yankee y sionista de todo Medio Oriente" substitute for a detailed analysis of the interests of the US, Israel, Iran, and neighboring states. At the same time the factual side of events (the scale of the operation, its immediate goals, Iran's internal dynamics) is almost not articulated — the interpretation that confirms an already existing worldview comes to the fore.

External analytical sources — such as BBC Mundo's report on Iran's allies in the region or Isaac Caro's comments — add a different, more sober layer. They show that:

• Iran's "axis of resistance" has weakened: Assad has less control of his country, Hezbollah and other proxies have taken losses, and support from Russia and China is limited by pragmatic considerations. In this deconstruction Venezuela does not look like a key player, rather an episode in a long list of partners that brought Iran more symbolic than practical effect.

• The economic basis of the "alternative globalization" Caracas bet on proved weaker than the ideological superstructure. Numerous Iran–Venezuela agreements, which inside the country were presented as the basis for a technological leap and diversification, are described from the outside as "se quedaron en el papel." Against this backdrop, what was once touted as a victory of sovereign foreign policy now looks like an expensive experiment with minimal returns.

• The logic of American policy toward "inconvenient regimes" — from Venezuela to Iran — can change tactically but retains its strategic core: pressure, sanctions, support for opposition, and a bet on internal exhaustion. Hence the importance of how the Venezuelan elite reads such storylines. Some perceive them as a signal to further rapprochement with Tehran and to seek protection within the weakening "axis of resistance." Others see a warning that continuing the previous course will leave the country both more dependent on unstable partners and more vulnerable to multilayered pressure from the West.

In any case, the new flare‑up of conflict around Iran has once again brought Venezuela to the surface of international discussion. In some texts, as in the Bolivarian Instagram analysis, Caracas speaks about Tehran as if looking into a mirror of its own fate. In others, as in the BBC Mundo piece, it appears as a byproduct of an unsuccessful Iranian geopolitical project. And in expert comments like Isaac Caro's interview, Venezuela emerges as one of the testing grounds where Washington's hard line was tried — a line whose consequences are felt in Caracas, in Tehran, and on the oil markets to which both are painfully tied.

❮ ❯

Western media see root of the war in politics, not the military

Major Western newspapers agree that the main problem of this war lies not in the military capabilities of the parties, but in their complete lack of a coherent political strategy. Analysts point to contradictory public statements, unclearly defined war aims, and note that betting on a spontaneous change of power as a result of fighting is an illusion — one that ultimately prolongs the conflict and worsens its consequences.

❮ ❯

Full version: الجزيرة نت

Middle East escalation threatens global oil and gas supplies

Strikes on oil and gas infrastructure in the Middle East, part of a regional escalation between Israel, the United States and Iran, go beyond military confrontation and are beginning to directly threaten global energy security. The strategically vital Strait of Hormuz is of particular concern: about 20% of the world’s oil and one-fifth of liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade pass through it. Any disruption to shipping in this area could trigger a large-scale shock to the world economy.

Experts warn of catastrophic consequences from a possible closure of the strait. Goldman Sachs estimates that a one-month interruption of shipments through Hormuz could drive gas prices in Europe and Asia up by 130%, while the oil price could rise by $15 per barrel. Some analysts, such as Mamdouh Salama, believe that with a prolonged closure oil prices could reach $120 per barrel, inflicting huge losses on global economic growth.

The situation is compounded by simultaneous threats to key production and processing facilities, such as sites in Qatar and Saudi Arabia. After an attack on its facilities, Qatari company QatarEnergy announced a suspension of LNG production and related products. Because Qatar accounts for about 20% of the global LNG market and 82% of its exports go to Asia, any disruption immediately affects prices in Asia and then in Europe through the interconnected LNG market.

The oil market is also under pressure: in regions such as Iraqi Kurdistan, companies are preemptively halting production. This intertwining of disruptions in gas and oil creates a real risk of a “double shock” for energy markets. In addition, tanker insurance premiums have doubled, and the withdrawal of several insurers from the market effectively reduces available coverage, raising risk-related price surcharges.

Europe appears most vulnerable on the gas front: after Qatar’s announcement, prices there rose by 50%. Although gas stocks may be sufficient for several weeks, the shock quickly passes through to consumers and businesses via higher costs for transport, industry and food. A sustained rise in oil prices to $90–100 per barrel could raise inflation in developed economies by roughly 0.8 percentage points, forcing central banks to choose between supporting growth and containing prices. The United States is less vulnerable as a major producer of shale oil and gas, but price spikes still affect domestic fuel prices and increase political pressure.

The attacks on infrastructure also have a political calculus behind them, demonstrating Iran’s willingness to escalate and using the Strait of Hormuz as its “most powerful weapon” to inflict a global economic blow. While a long-term closure of the strait seems unlikely to many, even temporary disruptions can alter global energy flows, prompting importing countries to accelerate diversification of sources and investment in alternative energy. These changes will affect pricing, long-term contracts and the map of global energy security.

Comments on the news

• What control does Iran exercise over the Strait of Hormuz in practice, and how does this affect international shipping in peacetime? - Iran exerts de facto control over the Strait of Hormuz through geographic dominance (the strait lies between the Iranian coast and the territorial waters of Oman), deployment of coastal missile batteries and air defense systems, constant patrols by vessels of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and regular military exercises. In peacetime this creates an atmosphere of coercion, where international shipping (especially tankers) operates under a constant threat of possible strait closure. Insurance for ships passing through the strait becomes more expensive, and routes may be adjusted during periods of heightened tension, although physical blocking does not occur.

• Why are companies in Iraqi Kurdistan particularly vulnerable to preemptive production stoppages during regional escalation? - Companies in Iraqi Kurdistan are vulnerable because the region is semi-autonomous and depends on oil exports via pipelines that cross territories controlled by other actors (including Iraq, where Iran exerts influence, and Turkey). In an escalation between, for example, Iran and the U.S. or Israel, Iran can pressure the central Iraqi government or use its proxy forces to disrupt pipeline operations to demonstrate its capabilities and inflict economic damage without direct attack. Kurdistan has no independent access to the sea, making its logistics highly sensitive to regional instability.

• What proxy forces or methods does Iran traditionally use to threaten shipping in the Strait of Hormuz without resorting to direct attacks by its navy? - Iran traditionally employs “hybrid” or asymmetric warfare methods: 1) Fast IRGC boats that can simulate attacks or dangerously approach commercial vessels, disrupting their course. 2) Naval mines that can be covertly laid in the strait’s waters. 3) Cyberattacks on port management systems or shipping companies. 4) Coordination with Yemeni Houthis (Iran’s allies) for attacks on ships in the Red Sea, which indirectly pressures logistics linked to the Strait of Hormuz. 5) Seizure of foreign tankers under various pretexts by IRGC forces. These methods allow Iran to create a threat while retaining the ability to deny direct responsibility.

❮ ❯

Full version: الغاز والنفط معا.. الحرب على إيران تهدد أسواق الطاقة العالمية بصدمة مزدوجة

US gasoline prices to cross $3/gal amid Iran conflict

Analysts predict that the average retail price of gasoline in the United States will on Monday exceed the psychologically important threshold of $3 per gallon for the first time in more than three months. This spike is being directly linked to the war against Iran, one of the world's largest oil suppliers, which has destabilized global crude flows. This development creates a serious political headache for President Donald Trump and the Republican Party ahead of the midterm Congressional elections in November, as inflation and the cost of living remain top voter concerns.

According to GasBuddy analyst Patrick De Haan, the last time gas prices were above $3 was in November 2025, after which they fell to $2.85 in February. The expert explained that oil responds first to strikes on Iran, and gasoline prices follow with some delay. Iran, a key player in the oil market, has declared the Strait of Hormuz unsafe for transit, which has already led to damage to several tankers and to major shipping companies deciding to avoid this critically important route.

The immediate cause of the rise was a sharp jump in global oil prices of roughly 13%, reaching a several-month high. Brent crude futures rose to $82.37 per barrel, the highest level since January 2025. This surge occurred amid an escalation of the conflict between Iran and Israel and after a US and Israeli strike on Iran on Saturday that resulted in the death of the country's Supreme Leader.

Experts say the US administration appears willing, for now, to tolerate the political risks associated with higher oil prices in pursuit of its foreign policy objectives. Bob McNally, head of consulting group Rapidan Energy, noted that the White House will likely focus on minimizing the time during which Iran can control the flow of energy through the Strait of Hormuz. The possibility of tapping the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve to contain further price increases is also not ruled out.

It is worth noting that pressure on gasoline prices had begun to build even before the latest events. Refineries have started switching to the more expensive summer-grade fuel in accordance with environmental regulations. In addition, the US is approaching the peak of the summer driving season, when gasoline demand is at its highest. Analysts expected that, in stable conditions, prices would reach $3.10–$3.25, but the current crisis will significantly accelerate that process.

Although large commercial gasoline inventories in the US may somewhat soften the blow, the overall rise in oil prices threatens broader inflation. The increase in fuel costs, most noticeable to consumers, could complicate the Federal Reserve’s plans to cut interest rates. Moreover, an expansion of the conflict could put negative pressure on the stock market (Wall Street), undermining one of the key points in Trump’s pre-election rhetoric about economic success.

Comments on the news

• What role does the Strait of Hormuz play in global oil supplies and why is its blockage so critical? - The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow sea passage between the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf. About 20–30% of global seaborne oil shipments pass through it, including exports from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the UAE, Kuwait and Iran. Its blockage is critical because it is the main route for oil bound for Asia, Europe and other regions. Closing the strait would lead to a sharp jump in global oil prices, fuel shortages and could trigger a global economic crisis due to many countries’ dependence on Middle Eastern oil.

• Who is the Supreme Leader of Iran and how does his real power compare to that of the president? - The Supreme Leader of Iran is the highest political and religious authority in the country, holding the position for life. He is appointed by the Assembly of Experts and, according to Iran’s constitution, has the final authority over all branches of government, the armed forces, foreign policy and the judiciary. By contrast, the president of Iran is the head of the executive branch, elected in elections and responsible for day-to-day government management, but his decisions and policies must align with the directives and approval of the Supreme Leader. Thus, the Supreme Leader wields significantly more real power than the president.

• What is “summer-grade fuel” in the US and how does it differ from regular fuel besides price? - “Summer-grade fuel” in the US is a special type of gasoline sold in the warm months (usually June through September) to meet Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) standards. The main difference from “winter” fuel is lower Reid vapor pressure (evaporability), which reduces harmful evaporative emissions in hot weather and helps fight smog. This makes it more environmentally friendly but also more expensive to produce than winter blends, which have higher volatility to improve cold-weather engine starts.

❮ ❯

Full version: تحذير من ارتفاع سعر البنزين بأمريكا إثر الحرب على إيران

U.S.-Israeli Strike on Iran: Tactics, Targets and Consequences

In late February 2026, a large-scale joint U.S.-Israeli military operation took place, striking targets deep inside Iranian territory, including Tehran, Isfahan and Qom. The stated objective was to weaken Iran’s military potential—primarily its missile program—and to target the country’s senior leadership. As announced the following morning, the operation resulted in the death of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the most high-profile outcome of the attack.

The operation was built on tactics of long-range strikes, which allowed aircraft to remain outside the engagement zones of most Iranian air-defense systems. Two main routes were used: an air corridor through Iraqi airspace, where tankers and reconnaissance aircraft had been pre-positioned, and a maritime route—from ships and submarines in the Arabian Sea, from which Tomahawk cruise missiles were launched at the targets.

In the air component of the operation, fifth-generation F-35 fighters played a key role by carrying out the first wave of attacks with minimal radar detection, while heavy strike fighters F-15 delivered the main strikes with heavy munitions. Their actions were supported by tanker aircraft, airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft, and specialized electronic warfare planes that suppressed enemy communications and air defenses.

The success of the operation largely depended on the use of a wide range of long-range precision weapons. In addition to naval Tomahawks, Israeli glide bombs “SPICE,” semi-ballistic “RAMPAGE” missiles, loitering munitions “DELAH” for engaging tactical targets, as well as anti-radiation missiles and guided bombs were used. This arsenal made it possible to effectively strike hardened facilities, command centers and radar stations.

The military doctrine applied in the operation represented an integrated system rather than a set of disparate strikes. It began with an intelligence-gathering phase and precise localization of air-defense systems and communications nodes. This was followed by a phase of electronic suppression and disruption of command-and-control systems, and only then were destructive strikes delivered against critical targets, ensuring maximum effect.

Preliminary results showed that the strike indeed achieved its objective, inflicting serious damage on Iran’s command structure. However, Tehran demonstrated an ability to respond quickly, launching missiles at enemy targets, which indicates that Iranian leadership had pre-prepared flexible response scenarios. Experts believe the conflict could evolve from a short-term operation into a protracted confrontation, where each side will seek to shift the military-political balance in its favor.

Comments on the story

• Why was the city of Qom, alongside Tehran and Isfahan, chosen as a strike target, and what is its role in Iran’s political and military structure? - Qom is the main spiritual and theological center of Shiism in Iran; it hosts important religious seminaries (hawza) and the shrine of Fatima Masumeh. Its symbolic significance as the “heart” of the Iranian theocracy makes it a strategic target. Militarily, the region may contain facilities related to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) or security programs, given its distance from borders and its status as a holy city.

• What powers and real authority does the Supreme Leader of Iran have compared to the president and other institutions, and how could his death affect succession? - The Supreme Leader (rahbar) holds the highest authority in Iran: he is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, appoints key figures in the security forces, judiciary and state media, and sets overall policy directions. The president heads the executive branch but is subordinate to the leader. In the event of the leader’s death, the Assembly of Experts (an elected body of senior clergy) is supposed to elect a new leader promptly, which could lead to intra-elite struggle, although a succession mechanism is formally provided.

• What is the current structure of Iranian command (for example, the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps — IRGC) and why is it considered vulnerable to such strikes? - The highest command is headed by the Supreme Leader. The IRGC is an elite politico-military formation reporting directly to the leader, with its own ground forces, navy, air component and intelligence (including the Quds Force for external operations). A regular army also exists in parallel. Vulnerability arises from the concentration of top command personnel in a limited number of key facilities (headquarters, command centers), as well as the potential use of modern intelligence capabilities by an adversary to precisely target them.

❮ ❯

Full version: الأسلحة التي استخدمتها أمريكا وإسرائيل لضرب إيران واغتيال خامنئي

Football helped free Argentine serviceman in Venezuela

The Argentine Football Association (AFA) confirmed the release and return home of Argentine serviceman Nahuel Gallo, who had been in Venezuela. In an official statement, the AFA expressed sincere gratitude to Venezuela's acting president Delsi Rodríguez for her sensitivity and humanitarian approach to resolving the situation. The Venezuelan Football Federation played a key role in establishing contact between the parties, which helped advance the settlement of the case.

An AFA delegation accompanied Nahuel Gallo during his transfer and departure to Argentina. The entire process was presented as an example of institutional cooperation, where sport served as a channel for dialogue. In its statement, the AFA emphasized that football can become an effective bridge for mutual understanding and strengthening bilateral relations between countries, extending beyond the purely sporting sphere.

❮ ❯

Full version: Asociación del Fútbol Argentino confirma liberación del gendarme Nahuel Gallo en Venezuela

Seven Decades of Confrontation: How the US and Iran Went from Allies to Open Conflict

Relations between the United States and Iran have traveled a complex path from strategic partnership to deep enmity. It all began in 1953, when the CIA organized a coup against Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh, fearing his rapprochement with the USSR and the nationalization of the oil industry. This brought Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to power, who became a key Washington ally in the Middle East. However, the 1979 Islamic Revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini radically changed the balance of power, and the seizure of the American embassy in Tehran and the taking of its staff hostage for 444 days finally severed diplomatic ties.

The 1980s became a period of repeated crises that entrenched the confrontation model. The failed U.S. operation to free the hostages in 1980 cost the lives of eight U.S. servicemen. Although the hostages were released on the day of Ronald Reagan’s inauguration in 1981, tensions only grew. The bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983, which Washington blamed on Iranian proxies, killed 241 Americans. At the same time, the Iran–Contra scandal erupted, in which U.S. officials secretly sold arms to Iran and funneled the proceeds to support Nicaraguan rebels.

In the 1990s and 2000s the conflict took on pronounced ideological and economic dimensions. After Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa (death sentence) against writer Salman Rushdie in 1989, the cultural rift deepened. President Bill Clinton imposed harsh economic sanctions on Iran. In 2002 President George W. Bush included Iran in the so-called "axis of evil," and the international community began to voice serious concerns about Iran’s nuclear program, which became a central issue in the relationship.

Under Barack Obama’s administration, the U.S. relied on a mix of cyberwarfare, sanctions pressure, and diplomacy. In 2009 the Stuxnet cyberattack damaged Iran’s nuclear facilities. Severe sanctions on oil exports weakened Iran’s economy. The culmination was the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015, under which Tehran agreed to dismantle parts of its nuclear infrastructure under international oversight in exchange for partial sanctions relief and the unfreezing of assets. However, this fragile diplomatic victory proved short-lived.

The situation sharply escalated under President Donald Trump, who in 2018 unilaterally withdrew from the nuclear deal and reimposed harsh sanctions, seeking to virtually eliminate Iran’s oil exports. The apex of the military confrontation was the 2020 killing in Baghdad of Quds Force commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Qasem Soleimani on Trump’s orders. This led to a direct exchange of strikes between the forces of the two countries and increased tension across the region.

In the mid-2020s the conflict entered a new, even more dangerous phase. After Trump’s re-election in 2025, the U.S. supported large-scale Israeli operations against Iran’s allies in the region and itself conducted B-2 strategic bomber airstrikes on three underground Iranian nuclear facilities. In 2026 a joint U.S.-Israeli operation resulted in the death of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. This event marked the beginning of a new, unpredictable chapter in the long-standing confrontation, the consequences of which will shape the security of the entire Middle East.

Commentary on the news

• How is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its Quds unit structured and what role do they play in Iranian politics and regional strategy? - The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is a powerful military, economic, and political force created after the 1979 revolution. It reports directly to the Supreme Leader of Iran and operates parallel to the regular army. Its role includes defending the Islamic system, controlling key sectors of the economy, and influencing domestic politics. The Quds Force is the IRGC’s elite external operations arm, responsible for overseas operations, supporting allied groups (such as Hezbollah in Lebanon or the Houthis in Yemen), and advancing Iran’s interests in the region. It is Tehran’s main instrument for implementing a “strategy of strategic depth” and countering U.S. and Israeli influence.

• What is Iran’s political system, and what is the role of the Supreme Leader (for example, Ayatollah Khamenei) compared to the president and other institutions? - Iran’s political system is a unique theocratic-republican hybrid. Formally, democratic institutions exist: an elected president (head of the executive) and a parliament (Majlis). However, ultimate power rests with the Supreme Leader (since 1989 — Ayatollah Ali Khamenei), who is a lifelong religious and political leader. He controls the armed forces (including the IRGC), the judiciary, state media, and has the final say on key issues of foreign policy, national security, and the nuclear program. The president manages day-to-day government affairs and the economy, but his powers are limited. Other important bodies, such as the Guardian Council (which vets election candidates and checks laws for conformity with Islamic norms) and the Expediency Council, also operate under the Supreme Leader’s authority.

• How is the historical figure Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi perceived in contemporary Iran, and what is his legacy after the 1979 Islamic Revolution? - There is a dual perception of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in contemporary Iran. The official position of the Islamic Republic is sharply negative: he is portrayed as a Western puppet whose authoritarian rule and secularization of society led to the revolution. His legacy is officially rejected. However, among part of the population—especially the older generation and some secular circles—there is nostalgia for the shah’s era, associated with economic modernization, a secular lifestyle, and greater international openness. His legacy remains contentious: for some he is a symbol of oppression and dependent development, for others a lost era of stability and progress. This duality reflects a deep split in Iran’s historical memory.

❮ ❯

Full version: من النفط للبرنامج النووي.. عقود من العلاقات المضطربة بين أمريكا وإيران

Middle East Crisis: Israel and the US Strike Iran, Followed by Major...

On Saturday morning, Israel, supported by the United States, conducted the largest air operation in its air force history against Iran. About 200 aircraft participated in the raid, striking roughly 500 targets on Iranian territory, including air defense systems, missile launchers and command centers. United States Central Command confirmed that US strikes targeted command facilities of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and air defenses, using precision munitions from land, sea and air.

About 15 hours after the operation began, US President Donald Trump announced that the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, had been killed in the strikes. Iran soon officially confirmed his death, declared a nationwide 40-day mourning period and vowed revenge. A tripartite leadership was also announced to manage the country. According to the Iranian Red Crescent, around 200 people were killed and 747 wounded across 24 provinces as a result of the strikes.

In response to the attacks, the IRGC struck targets in Israel and Palestine, including military bases, ports, the Ministry of Defense and populated areas such as Bat Yam. Israeli media reported significant destruction, casualties and injuries, including the death of a woman in Tel Aviv. At the same time, the IRGC announced a temporary blockade of shipping through the strategically important Strait of Hormuz, although British maritime authorities reported that the strait remained open.

The conflict quickly spread to the Persian Gulf region. Iran reported strikes on US military facilities in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait and Iraq, claiming to have hit 14 key bases and caused casualties. US Central Command refuted those claims, reporting only minor damage and no US personnel casualties, highlighting the contradictory information from different sides.

Strikes on Gulf countries had serious consequences for civilian infrastructure. The United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar temporarily closed their airspace. Damage and casualties were reported at Dubai and Abu Dhabi airports, as well as debris falling in residential areas of Manama and Qatar. Regional air defense systems intercepted hundreds of rockets and drones during the day.

The overall situation is characterized by a very high degree of escalation and instability. Conflicting reports of losses and damage from Iran, Israel and the US make independent assessment of the conflict’s true scale difficult. As the exchange of strikes continues, the region remains under heightened threat, and the crisis is having a direct impact on critical global trade routes such as the Strait of Hormuz.

Comments on the news

• What role does the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) play in Iran’s power structure and military doctrine, aside from the regular army? - The IRGC is an elite politico-military formation created after the 1979 Islamic Revolution to defend its ideals. Unlike the regular army (Artesh), which is responsible for defending borders, the IRGC reports directly to the Supreme Leader and performs functions to protect the theocratic system, conducts intelligence, controls strategic sectors of the economy and has its own ground, naval and aerospace forces. It also plays a key role in exporting ideology (for example, by supporting allies in the region) and suppressing internal protests.
• What does the institution of the Supreme Leader (ayatollah) mean in Iran’s political system and what are the succession procedures in case of his death? - The Supreme Leader is the highest political and religious figure in the system of velayat-e faqih (rule of the Islamic jurist). He appoints key figures in security structures, the judiciary and media, approves election results and sets the country’s overall policy. The president and parliament operate under his oversight. In the event of the leader’s death, his successor is chosen by the Assembly of Experts — a body of 88 Islamic scholars elected by the people for eight-year terms. The candidate must be a high-ranking Shia jurist (marja') with political sagacity.
• Why does the 40-day mourning tradition carry such significance in Iranian culture and how is it linked to Shia religious practices? - The 40-day mourning (chehelom) has roots in Shia Islam and is associated with the martyrdom of Imam Hussein, the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, at the Battle of Karbala (680). In Shiism, the 40th day after death is considered the moment of final transition of the soul. This tradition reinforces collective memory, is used to commemorate “martyrs” (both historical and contemporary, e.g., those who died in the Iran–Iraq war) and often serves as an occasion for mass religious gatherings that can sometimes turn into political actions.

❮ ❯

Full version: أبرز أحداث اليوم الأول للحرب الأمريكية الإسرائيلية على إيران

Venezuela submitted report on activities of government bodies to parliament

Vice President of Venezuela for Planning Ricardo Menéndez reported that an official report on the activities of centralized and decentralized bodies of public administration for the past period was submitted to the National Assembly. This measure was undertaken at the direction of Acting President Delcy Rodríguez in accordance with the requirements of Article 244 of the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the current public finance legislation. In his statement, Menéndez emphasized that this action is aimed at protecting the institutional integrity of the state and fully complies with the constitutional parameters that guarantee the country's sovereignty.

❮ ❯

Full version: Consignan Memoria y Cuenta de órganos y entes de la Administración Pública Nacional centralizada y descentralizada ante la AN

Shooting in central Damascus: Syrian security forces pursue attackers

Early on Saturday morning, gunfire was directed at a security forces patrol in the area of the Umayyad Square in central Damascus. According to the Syrian state news agency, unknown individuals in a vehicle opened fire on the patrol. Security forces responded immediately, pursuing the suspicious car and sealing off the area to ensure citizens' safety and restore order. Investigations are currently underway to establish all circumstances of the incident and the identities of the attackers.

Syrian sources denied circulating rumors that the shooting was connected to an attempt on a senior intelligence officer. The incident comes amid ongoing operations by Syrian security forces in the capital aimed at suppressing armed activity. It is recalled that in January this year, three people suspected of planning armed actions were detained following a preemptive operation in the western Damascus district of Al-Wurud.

❮ ❯

Full version: إطلاق نار في ساحة الأمويين بدمشق وقوى الأمن تلاحق المنفذين

Venezuelan media on US-Israeli strikes on Iran and Trump's role

Today's digest is a selection of pieces from Venezuelan outlets that view the United States under Donald Trump as the central actor in the coordinated US and Israeli strikes on Iran and in the political fallout around reports of the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Reports and analysis emphasize Trump's rhetoric toward Iran's leadership and his appeals to the Iranian people, joint explanations of the strikes at the UN, as well as notes on the events' impact on markets and cryptocurrencies. Between breaking news, critical columns and deeper magazine features runs a thread of discussion about regional consequences and geopolitical stakes — from neighboring countries' reactions to possible escalation scenarios. The material was prepared on the basis of publications from lademajagua.cu (Cuba) and www.upsa.es (Venezuela).

Bolivarian mirror: how Caracas reads the Cuban agenda and Middle Eastern crises

A short note on the Cuban site La Demajagua under the Actualidad section and a Venezuelan commentary on the crisis around Iran, the US, Israel and Trump at first glance belong to different worlds. Yet together they form a coherent picture of how the Bolivarian camp — above all Caracas — understands itself, its allies and its adversaries. Through Cuba, Iran and the figure of Trump, Venezuela voices its own experience of sanctions, economic experiments and political siege.

The Cuban note from La Demajagua is dedicated to a meeting of the Council of State, which "on Monday analyzed the implementation schedule for the government's measures to correct distortions and relaunch the economy in 2024." The formula "corregir distorsiones y reimpulsar la economía" sounds to Venezuelan ears like a phrase from its own political lexicon: from currency reforms and price-control programs to plans of "recuperación y crecimiento económico" in Caracas. In both cases the crisis is not named a crisis — it is turned into a set of "distortions" to be corrected by a system that is, in essence, right but under attack.

Another key phrase — "Las proyecciones de Gobierno y la rendición de cuenta" — is also easily read in Venezuela. In Cuba, as in Caracas, the matter is not simply technocratic planning and accountability but a political ritual of legitimation. Under sanctions and chronic shortages, the authorities demonstrate not so much an ability to radically change the model as an ability to control and "retune" it without abandoning the ideological course. This sounds familiar to a country where hyperinflation, declining oil production and forced dollarization have been described as a chain of "distorsiones cambiarias," "distortions in price structure" and subsidies, rather than as the failure of the main economic approach.

The figure of the chairman of the Cuban Council of State, Esteban Lazo, who is the subject of part of the note on La Demajagua, is for the Venezuelan reader almost automatically compared to the heads of the National Assembly in the era of PSUV dominance — from Cilia Flores to Jorge Rodríguez. He is a typical party cadre, embodying both loyalty and institutional continuity. The Council of State itself is perceived as something akin to an "expanded politburo": a place where party and state lines are coordinated, as was done under Chávez and continues under Maduro. The fact that the meeting is described as an "ordinary session" only underscores the normalization of a closed managerial style: key decisions are taken within the party–state circle rather than in forums involving the opposition.

The absence of alternative voices in the Cuban note — economists, independent experts, opponents — makes it a typical example of ideologized chronicle rather than neutral news. Euphemisms like "corregir distorsiones" and "reimpulsar la economía" obscure real problems — inflation, shortages, emigration, production decline. For the Venezuelan observer this is not an accident but part of a broader narrative: both Cuba and Venezuela position themselves as besieged sovereign states that, under sanctions, continue to "tune" their economies without acknowledging the need for systemic change. In this sense the La Demajagua text becomes not simply a local news item but a brick in the Bolivarian myth of "resisting economies."

The same myth and perspective are visible in the Venezuelan commentary on the US and Israeli strikes on Iran and on Donald Trump's role, cited from the university page UPSA, even if the original text is not directly published there. There the Middle Eastern conflict appears not as an isolated episode but as a form of a global "regime change" campaign, under which Iran, Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua and other "disobedient" states fall in official discourse. Washington is thought of as a constant center of pressure — from sanctions and financial blockade to direct use of force, Israel as its outpost in the Middle East, and Iran and Venezuela as elements of the same "front of resistance."

Venezuelan analysts close to power describe the strikes on Iran as "aggression" and an "illegal act of war," stressing the violation of sovereignty and international law. The oil aspect is necessarily highlighted: any escalation in the Persian Gulf affects the world price of oil, and thus theoretically opens a window of opportunity for Caracas. But opportunities are constrained by sanctions: even expensive oil helps little if the country is limited in sales and forced to operate through a narrow circle of intermediaries in Russia, China or Iran itself. Against this backdrop the close energy tie Caracas–Tehran — from gasoline deliveries to refinery repairs — is presented as a natural alliance of two isolated exporters.

The political layer is thicker than the economic one. For the Venezuelan officialdom support for Iran is a way to demonstrate belonging to an alternative center of power that includes, besides Tehran, Moscow, Beijing and formats like OPEC, the Non-Aligned Movement and BRICS. Sharp criticism of Trump in the Venezuelan commentary works in two directions at once: first, it links his Middle Eastern policy to the sanctions and interventionist line against Venezuela; second, it projects the image of Trump onto local opposition leaders, who in Caracas are regularly accused of "asking for sanctions" and "applauding strikes" against "sovereign countries."

Opponents inside Venezuela read this rhetoric differently. For part of the academic and media community the constant appeal to Iran, Israel, the US and Trump is a convenient smokescreen that allows internal issues to be pushed into the background: wrecked infrastructure, pauper wages, mass migration. They also remind of the cost of the anti-Western course — the loss of traditional markets, the drop in investment and the complication of access to technology. But in the Bolivarian camp this cost becomes a symbol of valor: as Tehran prides itself on "living under sanctions," so Caracas builds an identity of a "besieged but unyielding revolution."

In Venezuela's media space this creates a stable divide. State and pro-government channels and sites use the lexicon of "aggression," "empire," "resistance," rely on Iranian, Russian and other alternative sources, elevating Middle Eastern news to proof of a "global anti-imperialist upsurge." Critical and independent platforms orient more toward Western agencies, analyze the behavior of Trump and other American leaders through the lens of US elections and global strategy, and tend to contrast events in Iran and Cuba with Venezuelan realities rather than equate them.

Still, both the Cuban note and the Venezuelan commentary about Trump and Iran are structurally similar. In both cases:

• a closed circle of power plays a central role — be it the Council of State headed by Esteban Lazo discussing a "schedule for implementing measures" in Cuba, or the Bolivarian leadership interpreting global crises for its audience;
• the language refuses to call radical challenges by their names: in Cuba severe stagnation is replaced by "correcting distortions," in Caracas years of economic and social collapse are attributed to external "aggression" and "financial war";
• the ritual of accountability — "rendición de cuenta" in Havana, annual addresses and ministry reports in Caracas — matters more as a symbol of loyalty to the line than as a tool of genuine control over results.

As a result, a short news item from La Demajagua and a reconstructed commentary via the UPSA university link turn out to be parts of the same Bolivarian-ideological canvas. Cuba shows how the model preserves the appearance of technocratic management and self-correction without touching the political foundation. Venezuela, looking at Iran and Trump, sees and explains to the world its own history of sanctions and confrontation. Together these stories form for supporters the image of a broad arc of struggle — from Caracas through Havana and Tehran to other capitals of the "dissenting" — where every economic adjustment and every missile strike fit into the same narrative of resistance and survival.

❮ ❯

Trump Announces Receipt of 80 Million Barrels of Oil from Venezuela

Former U.S. President Donald Trump announced the receipt of 80 million barrels of oil from Venezuela and the start of a new phase of energy cooperation between the countries. Speaking in Texas, he emphasized excellent relations with the Venezuelan government led by Acting President Delcy Rodríguez, noting that the oil will be processed and sold through Texas on the world market, which will bring Venezuela "more money than ever." Trump also reported a significant increase in natural gas exports as part of this partnership.

❮ ❯

Full version: Trump dijo que recibió 80 millones de barriles de petróleo de Venezuela y que trabajarán aún más con el gobierno de Delcy Rodríguez

Reinstating Teachers Dismissed for Political Reasons in Syria

The Syrian Ministry of Education has announced the reinstatement of more than 20,000 employees who were dismissed in the past, allegedly because of their pro-revolution positions. This process was declared a moral and administrative priority. An electronic registration system was launched to account for all those affected; around 27,000 people have registered through it both inside the country and abroad, and applications continue to be accepted.

The process is organized jointly with the Ministry of Administrative Development. Those registered are being organized into cohorts: the first included about 14,000 people, evenly split between the northern regions (Idlib, northern Aleppo) and other provinces. To facilitate returns, local committees have been set up, allowing former employees to apply to the education directorate in the province where they wish to work, not necessarily at their former workplace. The minister issued a circular permitting all registrants to begin work even if their names are not yet on the final lists, while verification committees complete their work.

The main goal is to restore the rights of those who were dismissed for political reasons. A distinction is being made between those who were previously permanent employees and those who worked on fixed-term contracts, and dismissals on criminal grounds are excluded. For many, the reinstatement is initially formalized through short-term contracts of three months. This provides time for thorough document checks and the detection of possible fraudulent claims. Those whose dismissals are officially confirmed to have been politically motivated will subsequently receive permanent status.

The process faces difficulties, such as complaints about lost or concealed documents due to practices of the former regime, as well as cases of false claims of political motivation for dismissal, which delay procedures. Issues related to compensation for lost years of service, salary increases and pension rights have been referred to a special committee. At the same time, there is an acute need for teaching staff in the country: about 45,000 teachers currently work under temporary contracts, and the reopening of 1,400 repaired schools has created additional vacancies that are being prioritized for returning specialists.

The ministry has also ordered that reinstated teachers be paid compensation equal to 40% of their monthly salary, starting from the date the right arose, as provided by law. The ministry leadership emphasizes that employment stability is a priority and states its intention to prevent unfair dismissals in the future. Officials call on all educators to cooperate as partners in rebuilding the country and restoring the education system to its primary role.

Comments on the news

• What is the role and authority of the Ministry of Administrative Development in Syria, and why is this ministry involved in the process of reinstating teachers? - The Ministry of Administrative Development in Syria is responsible for public administration, the civil service and administrative reforms. It is involved in reinstating teachers because public school teachers in Syria are considered civil servants, and their employment matters (including dismissals, hiring and compensation) are regulated by that ministry, not the Ministry of Education, which oversees curricula and schools.

• Why were teachers from northern regions, such as Idlib and northern Aleppo, placed in a separate cohort, and how is education administration organized today in these territories that were previously not under government control? - Teachers from northern regions were set aside separately because these territories (for example, Idlib and northern Aleppo) were previously controlled by opposition groups during the conflict, and alternative educational administrations operated there. After the government restored control over these areas, education administration was reintegrated into the state system: schools came under the supervision of the Syrian Ministry of Education, curricula were unified, and teachers are undergoing verification and reinstatement through state procedures.

• On which specific law or regulation does the ministry base the 40% monthly salary compensation, and how have issues of redress for politically motivated dismissals historically been regulated in Syrian labor law? - The 40% monthly salary compensation is likely based on the Syrian Labor Code or special decrees governing compensation for civil servants. In Syrian labor law, issues of redress for politically motivated dismissals have historically been regulated by civil service laws and decrees related to emergency measures, but specific provisions can vary by period and political context, often providing for compensation or reinstatement through administrative decisions.

❮ ❯

Full version: كيف تدير دمشق عودة مفصولي الثورة إلى وظائفهم؟

Venezuela urges US to lift sanctions and end blockade

Acting President of Venezuela Delcy Rodríguez sent an official appeal to US President Donald Trump demanding an immediate end to the sanctions and economic blockade against the country. This call came in response to Trump’s recent statement that he is a “friend and partner” of Venezuela. Rodríguez suggested using this basis to open a new agenda for bilateral cooperation.

In her appeal Rodríguez emphasized that Venezuela has never posed a threat to the United States or any other country, pursuing a consistent policy of friendship. She stated that the sanctions primarily harm Venezuelan youth and infringe on the sovereignty and independence of a nation in whose veins “flows the blood of the liberators.” Thus, Venezuela insists on replacing confrontation with dialogue and joint work.

❮ ❯

Full version: Venezuela solicita al Gobierno de los Estados Unidos el cese del bloqueo y las sanciones

Progress of the Syrian Economy and IMF Support

Syria closed the 2025 fiscal year with a small budget surplus, a significant improvement compared with previous periods. This was achieved by concentrating public spending on meeting the population's basic needs, raising living standards, and increasing wages. Rationalization of expenditures and the Ministry of Finance’s decision to stop financing through the Central Bank played an important role. During its February visit to Damascus, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed with Syrian authorities on a technical assistance program to implement large-scale fiscal reforms aimed at optimizing resources and improving public financial management.

Syria’s economy shows signs of recovery, driven by an acceleration of economic activity. This was influenced by improved consumer and investor sentiment, partial easing of international sanctions, and the gradual reintegration of the country into the regional and global economy. Progress in national reconciliation, the continued return of refugees, increased electricity supplies, favorable weather conditions, and new investment projects create promising prospects for growth in 2026 and beyond. The combination of these factors strengthened the IMF’s expectations about the potential for improved economic performance, provided reforms continue.

The draft state budget for 2026 envisages a substantial increase in spending on healthcare, education, wage increases, and the restoration of critically important infrastructure. The IMF judges the revenue forecasts to be ambitious but achievable, noting that the budget includes important contingency measures in case revenues and financing fall short of expectations. The Fund urges authorities to review spending priorities while protecting social budget items and continuing to strengthen the social protection system to support the most vulnerable groups.

In the area of monetary policy, the IMF notes that the Central Bank of Syria, despite existing constraints, has maintained a tight stance, which helped slow inflation and improve the exchange rate of the Syrian pound compared with 2024. The introduction of the new currency has begun successfully. Priorities in the near term should include strengthening the Central Bank’s ability to ensure price stability and financial stability, as well as enhancing its independence. It is also recommended to establish an appropriate framework for monetary policy, assess the resilience of banks, and carry out a restructuring of the banking system to restore public confidence.

The IMF’s technical assistance program is broad and covers reforms in public finances and budget management, including treasury management, revenue mobilization, tax policy, and revenue administration. It also provides support for public debt management, conducting debt sustainability analysis, collecting taxes on natural resource revenues, and implementing wide-ranging financial sector reforms. The IMF emphasizes that strong international support will remain necessary in the coming years to help alleviate the severity of poverty, including assistance for returning refugees and internally displaced persons.

News commentary

• Which specific international sanctions on Syria were partially lifted and how did this affect particular economic sectors? - Sanctions imposed by Arab states were partly eased, in particular the resumption of trade across the border with Jordan and permission for deliveries of certain goods from the UAE and Saudi Arabia. This had a positive effect on the agriculture sector (export of fruits and vegetables), pharmaceuticals, and construction materials, where there has been an increase in shipments and investment from Arab countries.

• What does the national reconciliation program in Syria entail and how is its progress linked to economic recovery? - It is a government program of local-level settlements offering amnesty to former militants and the restoration of government services in returning areas. Its progress allows economic activity to resume in areas previously outside government control, attracts domestic investment, and enables infrastructure restoration, contributing to overall economic recovery.

• Through which main channels and with which countries is Syria’s economy being reintegrated regionally? - Main channels: resumption of air links with Arab countries (UAE, Egypt), opening of land crossings with Jordan and Lebanon, participation in regional exhibitions. Key partner countries: UAE (investments in energy and real estate), Jordan (goods transit), Saudi Arabia (humanitarian aid), Russia and Iran (energy and infrastructure projects).

❮ ❯

Full version: صندوق النقد: سوريا حققت فائضا بميزانية 2025.. واتفاق على برنامج مساعدة

New Appointments in Venezuela's Key Institutions

On Wednesday, a swearing-in ceremony for new leaders who will head the so-called Civil Power took place at the Federal Legislative Palace of Venezuela. At a plenary session of the National Assembly, Larry Devoe Márquez was officially appointed acting Attorney General of the republic, and Tarek William Saab was named the new Ombudsman (Defender of the People). These appointments are aimed at ensuring administrative continuity and strengthening key state institutions.

Larry Devoe, who previously served as executive secretary of the National Council for Human Rights, took the oath before deputies, promising to uphold the laws and work to expedite judicial processes. Tarek William Saab, in turn, reaffirmed his commitment to monitor, protect, and promote human rights in every corner of the country. According to authorities, these measures are intended to deepen the effectiveness of the justice system and reinforce the protection of constitutional guarantees for the population.

❮ ❯

Full version: Larry Devoe y Tarek William Saab fueron juramentados como fiscal general y defensor del pueblo respectivamente

Gradual Improvement in Syria's Gas Cylinder Supply

In some Syrian provinces there has been a gradual improvement in the crisis of supplies of gas cylinders for cooking, which worsened ahead of the month of Ramadan due to increased demand. The crisis was caused by a combination of adverse weather conditions that damaged port infrastructure, logistical problems with storage, and heightened seasonal demand. Authorities confirm that household gas deliveries continue, but acknowledge persistent difficulties with distribution.

Representatives of the Syrian oil company reported the arrival of a new tanker carrying nearly 2,000 tons of liquefied gas at the port of Baniyas, which raised the total volume of supplies since early February to about 14,600 tons. The Ministry of Energy said there are daily deliveries of about 350 tons from Jordan, which, however, are insufficient to cover the needs of all provinces. Authorities are urging citizens not to hoard and to beware of the black market, while strengthening inspection checks.

In Daraa province the crisis lasted about 13 days due to storms that delayed tanker unloading and depletion of stocks amid Ramadan demand. State supplies from Jordan, according to authorities’ estimates, can cover the needs of at most two provinces. Local gas fields and cylinder-filling lines are not operating at full capacity, which slows resolving the problem even when new batches of gas arrive.

In Aleppo the situation began to stabilize after frequent shutdowns of the gas bottling plant due to bad weather. Since last Thursday deliveries have resumed, and authorized distributors now receive about 30,000 cylinders a day. The crisis in the city has decreased by roughly 70%, although some distributors are reported to have taken advantage of the shortage to sell gas on the black market at inflated prices.

In Homs, where the crisis arrived later than in other regions, official prices at authorized centers remained at around $12 per cylinder. However, on the black market prices soared to 500,000 Syrian pounds per unit depending on demand. Public fears about future shortages have led to panic buying and attempts to hoard.

A final resolution of the crisis will take time. Authorities plan to increase storage capacity, but the key problem remains the low productivity of state-rehabilitated gas fields, which require lengthy rehabilitation. This means the path to real energy self-sufficiency and stable supplies will be gradual rather than instant.

Comments on the news

• What is the role of the port of Baniyas in the Syrian economy and why is it critically important for importing resources such as liquefied gas? — The port of Baniyas is one of Syria’s two main commercial ports (the second is Latakia) and a key oil terminal. Before the war Syrian oil was exported through it. Today, given the devastated domestic energy sector and sanctions, it has become a vital “gateway” for importing fuel, including liquefied gas. Its strategic importance is due to the presence of specialized berths and storage facilities for receiving tankers, as well as the relative safety of the coastal zone compared to land borders. Without Baniyas the country would be virtually deprived of a legal channel for supplying critically needed fuel for power plants, industry, and household needs.

• Why are state-rehabilitated gas fields in Syria still not operating at full capacity and what does their “lengthy rehabilitation” imply in local conditions? — Rehabilitated fields (for example, Shaer) are not operating at full capacity due to a combination of factors: physical damage to infrastructure during hostilities, chronic shortages of modern equipment and spare parts (exacerbated by international sanctions), a lack of qualified personnel, and ongoing security problems in some areas. “Lengthy rehabilitation” in the Syrian context implies not just well repairs but a multi-year process that includes demining territories, restoring compressor stations and pipelines, finding workarounds for financing and procurement around sanctions, and continuously adapting to limited resources and an unstable environment.

• What are the historical or current political-economic reasons Syria depends on supplies of liquefied gas from Jordan to cover domestic shortfalls? — Dependence on Jordan is primarily due to practical necessity and geography. Historically relations were complicated, but after 2018 and the normalization of ties as part of Damascus’s “Arab rehabilitation,” Jordan became a logical and accessible supplier. Reasons: 1) Geographic proximity and infrastructure — existing pipelines and road routes allow relatively quick delivery. 2) Regional dynamics — Jordan, which receives its own gas from other sources (for example under an agreement with Israel), can act as a re-exporter to Syria. 3) Lack of alternatives — supplies from traditional allies (Iran, Russia) are often logistically or financially difficult, and legal imports via distant maritime routes are expensive and complicated by sanctions. Thus Jordan became a compromise, albeit imperfect, solution to cover acute shortages.

❮ ❯

Full version: بوادر انفراجه تدريجية بأزمة الغاز المنزلي في سوريا

New strategy for Morrocoy National Park: tourism in harmony with nature

Acting President of Venezuela Delcy Rodríguez presented an interdisciplinary plan to transform Morrocoy National Park in Falcón state. The main goal of the initiative is to make this important natural site a model of sustainable tourism at both the national and international levels. The authorities’ vision goes beyond mere recreation or economic benefit, aiming for a form of tourism development that remains in harmony with the ecosystem and does not harm the environment. To implement the plan, direct coordination will be established between the ministries of Tourism and Eco-Socialism.

The success of the new management model depends on the participation of all stakeholders. Rodríguez called on tour operators, local fishing communities and park visitors themselves to actively join efforts to preserve it. She emphasized that collective responsibility and strict compliance with environmental regulations are the cornerstones that will ensure Morrocoy remains both an economic driver for the region and an ecological refuge for future generations.

❮ ❯

Full version: Delcy Rodríguez anuncia nuevo modelo de gestión sostenible para el Parque Nacional Morrocoy

Geography as a Weapon: How Place Names Rewrite Syria's History

In northern Syria, place names have long ceased to be neutral signposts. Against the backdrop of ongoing conflict and the country's division, they have turned into a powerful tool of political struggle, historical revisionism and legitimization of authority. This is most evident in regions controlled by Kurdish formations, such as the "Autonomous Administration" and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). By renaming towns, streets and entire areas, a new narrative is being created here about a place, its history and belonging — often at the expense of its complex, multi-component past.

Historically, the northern territories of Syria were never an independent national entity, but were part of larger political spheres centered in Damascus or Aleppo. Over centuries this region has been characterized by ethnic and religious diversity, with Arabs, Syriacs, Assyrians, Armenians and Kurds living side by side. The demographic picture began to change from the late 19th century due to migrations and resettlement policies, resulting in Kurdish populations settling in some northern areas and becoming part of the local social landscape.

Today this process is taking new forms. Specific towns are being systematically renamed in the public space of SDF-controlled territories: Ayn al-Arab is referred to almost exclusively as "Kobani," Tell Abyad — as "Girê Spî," and Ras al-Ayn — as "Serêkaniye." Moreover, new, broad geographic concepts are being created and promoted, such as "Rojava" or "Kurdistan of Syria" — terms that were absent from official maps before the conflict began. These names serve not merely as waypoints but as symbolic instruments for creating a new political reality and justifying a special status for the region.

Critics of this approach point out that it is based on a selective, oversimplified reading of history. By foregrounding one ethnic component (Kurdish), the new narrative often marginalizes or ignores the contributions and presence of other groups — Arabs and Christian communities. Towns with a relatively recent history of urban development, such as Qamishli (founded in the 1920s) or Afrin, are presented as original "Kurdish" centers. This turns the debate over names into a dispute about "who is the true owner of the land," deepening social rifts and complicating any prospects for future national reconciliation in Syria.

Thus the danger lies not only in the threat to Syria's territorial integrity, but in a fundamental revision of geography itself as a political project. The region risks being redefined according to the interests of external alliances and ideologies rather than its own complex, intertwined reality. The author's proposed solution is not to deny the Kurdish people's rights to language and culture, but to reject the monopolization of history by a single group. Recognizing the full spectrum of the region's historical heritage and diversity is the only way to avoid further escalation of identity-based conflict.

Comments on the story

• What is "Rojava" and how is this term connected to the broader Kurdish political movement in the region? - "Rojava" is the Kurdish name for the autonomous administration in northeastern Syria, proclaimed in 2014 by Kurdish forces largely associated with the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the People's Protection Units (YPG). The term symbolizes a push for Kurdish self-administration within Syria and is part of a broader Kurdish political movement that includes various groups fighting for cultural, political and territorial rights of Kurds in Syria, Turkey, Iraq and Iran. However, the movement is not unified: for example, the PYD/YPG are ideologically close to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in Turkey, while other Kurdish groups in Syria may maintain ties with the Kurdistan Region's government in Iraq.

• What is the historical and contemporary status of the city of Qamishli, given that it was founded relatively recently in the 1920s? - Qamishli was founded in 1926 during the French Mandate over Syria, primarily as a settlement for Armenian and Assyrian refugees, as well as Kurds. Historically it became an important economic and administrative center in the al-Jazira region. In the contemporary context, after the start of the Syrian conflict in 2011, Qamishli de facto became the capital of the Kurdish autonomous administration "Rojava," although formally it remains under partial control of the Syrian government (for example, the airport and some districts are controlled by the Syrian army). The city has a mixed population (Kurds, Arabs, Syriacs/Assyrians, Armenians) and symbolizes the complex intertwining of loyalties in northern Syria.

• How did resettlement policies in the late 19th and 20th centuries affect the current ethnic makeup of northern Syria? - Resettlement policies significantly altered the demographics of northern Syria. In the late 19th century, the Ottoman Empire resettled Muslim refugees (for example, Circassians, Chechens) in these territories after wars with Russia, increasing the non-Arab population. In the 20th century, especially after the creation of modern Syria, the government pursued "Arabization" — for example, in the 1970s under Hafez al-Assad a so-called "Arab Belt" was established along the border with Turkey, where Arab families were granted land that previously belonged to Kurds. This led to tensions between Kurdish and Arab populations and contributed to the present ethnic divisions that affect conflict and governance in the region.

❮ ❯

Full version: تغيير أسماء المدن في شمال سوريا.. الجغرافيا كسلاح سياسي

Venezuela Warns of External Threats to Peace, Promises to Reveal Plots

Acting President of Venezuela Delcy Rodríguez said that the new Amnesty Law, aimed at national reconciliation, is being mischaracterized by certain foreign circles. According to her, while part of the opposition inside the country supports this measure, political groups based in hotels in the US and Europe are organizing actions to derail the peace process. Rodríguez promised to present evidence of these plans in the near future, recalling events seven years ago known as the "Battle on the Bridges," when, authorities claim, an attempt at foreign intervention disguised as humanitarian aid was prevented. In conclusion she emphasized that Caracas considers diplomacy and economic cooperation the only acceptable paths for resolving geopolitical disagreements.

❮ ❯

Full version: Delcy Rodríguez alerta sobre interpretaciones erróneas de la Ley de Amnistía y revelará pruebas de conspiraciones gestadas desde el exterior

US troops begin withdrawal from Syria

American forces have begun withdrawing their personnel from Syria toward Iraqi Kurdistan, Al Jazeera’s correspondent reports. The first phase of the operation, which is expected to last several weeks, began from the largest US base in the country — "al-Kasrak" in the northwest of al-Hasakah province. At the initial stage, troops and equipment were moved to this base from other sites — the "ash-Shaddadi" base in southern al-Hasakah and the "al-Omar" oil field in Deir ez-Zor province — as preparation for the overall retreat.

The American contingent has already fully left the "ash-Shaddadi" base after more than ten days of evacuation operations that made intensive use of air and ground transport. After direct coordination with Washington, this base was officially taken over by the Syrian army. Thus, according to the correspondent, the US military presence in Syria is now limited to only two bases — "ar-Rumaylan" and "al-Kasrak", which are located in areas controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). This significantly changes the disposition of American forces in the northeast of the country.

These steps are taking place within a broader regional context. They come against the backdrop of a comprehensive agreement announced at the end of January between the Syrian government and the SDF, which provides for the end of the split and the integration of military and administrative structures. In addition, the troop withdrawal coincides with reports of a gradual reduction of the American presence in the region since mid-2025, during which other facilities in the rural areas of Deir ez-Zor and al-Hasakah provinces were also abandoned.

❮ ❯

Full version: القوات الأمريكية تبدأ الانسحاب من أكبر قواعدها في سوريا

Venezuela Announces Shift to an Oil-Independent Economy

Acting President of Venezuela Delsi Rodríguez announced the launch of a new economic model aimed at ending the country's historical dependence on oil. According to her, the foundation for this transition includes strengthening national unity, political stability, and active support for local manufacturing, entrepreneurship, and the agro-industrial sector. The key instrument of the reforms will be the "National Production Union" strategy, designed to integrate the public and private sectors to create resilient supply chains — from local shops to major distributors.

The main goal of the new model is to ensure the country's food sovereignty by increasing production of staple products: vegetables, mass-market goods, and seafood. Rodríguez emphasized that the economic reforms are inextricably linked to political stability, which, in her view, is ensured by the "Program for Democratic Coexistence and Peace." This stability, it is claimed, is already attracting the attention of foreign investors. The government's ultimate objective is declared to be a complete abandonment of oil rent and the creation of a diversified, self-sufficient productive economy.

❮ ❯

Full version: Presidenta encargada: Paz y estabilidad permiten impulsar nuevo modelo económico en Venezuela

The Return of IS in Syria: Attacks, Rumors and Political Games

An audio message from a representative of the terrorist group "Islamic State" (IS, banned in the Russian Federation), in which he attacked the so‑called "new Syrian system" and called for continued struggle inside the country, has sparked wide debate on Syrian social networks. At the same time, IS, through its propaganda agency "Dabik," claimed responsibility for two attacks on Syrian army servicemen in the Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa provinces, calling it a "new phase of operations." These relatively small but symbolic attacks, combined with the group's media reappearance, have raised concerns about its possible expansion and renewed activity.

Social media users reacted quickly to the statements, expressing widespread distrust in IS's independence. Many commentators asked where the militants were getting money and weapons, suggesting that a "major state" was behind them, financing and protecting them. Such opinions reflect the conviction of part of the public that any successful IS cell requires a support network extending beyond local groups.

Activists also drew attention to timing and the nature of the attacks. They note that IS has a certain "temporal pattern" of appearance: the group often becomes active after the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) lose control of a city or area. This observation leads some to believe that its return is linked to specific circumstances or a decision aimed at performing a particular role, after which it disappears again.

Some analysts offered a political interpretation of events. In their view, the renewal of IS activity may play into the SDF's hands, since it serves as a signal to Washington and the international coalition: a withdrawal of support for Kurdish formations would lead to the return of terrorists. Thus, an escalation of the threat helps the SDF demand continued military-political backing, while IS's reappearance reminds external actors of the persisting risks. This perspective implies that certain forces are interested in maintaining a high level of threat in northeastern Syria.

In response to the incidents, Syrians are calling for intensified preventive security measures, tightened control in eastern regions, and allowing local forces to pursue militants, noting IS's shift to the tactics of small, hard-to-predict cells. At the same time, activists analyzed the technical and rhetorical aspects of the audio message, pointing out features of the sound design and stylistic similarity to speeches by former IS spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani. This combination of field, political, and linguistic analysis gave the discussion a multifaceted character.

Comments on the news

• What is the composition and main goals of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and why is their control over areas so important in the fight against IS? - The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are a multiethnic coalition composed mainly of Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) formations, as well as Arab, Assyrian, and other groups. Their main objectives were fighting IS (a terrorist organization banned in Russia), protecting the territories they control in northeastern Syria, and establishing a system of self-governance modeled on democratic confederalism. SDF control over extensive areas, especially after the defeat of IS's territorial "caliphate," is crucial because it deprives the terrorists of bases, resources (such as oil fields), and the ability to recruit new supporters, playing a key role in the long-term prevention of the group's resurgence.

• Why do the Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa provinces have particular strategic importance for groups like IS in the Syrian conflict? - Raqqa province, with its eponymous city, served de facto as the capital and administrative center of IS's "caliphate," carrying enormous symbolic and propaganda value. Deir ez-Zor province is rich in oil and gas fields, control of which provided IS with primary financial flows. Both provinces are located in the Euphrates River valley, which ensured control over water resources and transport arteries linking Syria with Iraq—vital for logistics, movement of fighters, and smuggling.

• Who was Abu Muhammad al-Adnani and what was his role in IS's propaganda structure, making stylistic comparisons to his speeches significant? - Abu Muhammad al-Adnani (real name Taha Subhi Falaha) was the official spokesman and one of IS's senior leaders, serving as the "mouthpiece" (official press secretary) and minister of propaganda. His role was central in creating and disseminating the group's media content: he voiced key statements, called for attacks against the West, coordinated propaganda channels, and formulated the ideological justification for IS actions. A stylistic comparison to his speeches is significant because his rhetoric—threatening, apocalyptic, and aimed at a global audience—set the tone and standards for the entire IS propaganda machine; similarity in style in new messages may indicate continuity of ideological line or an attempt to revive his influence.

❮ ❯

Full version: جدل سوري حول توقيت هجمات تنظيم الدولة والجهات التي تقف وراءها

Venezuela to Hold Large National Consultation on March 8

Interim President of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela Delcy Rodríguez called on citizens, communal councils and communities to actively participate in the "Great National Consultative Survey," which will take place on March 8. During this event, presented as an act of direct democracy, the so‑called "People's Power" will be expected to select from more than 36,000 consolidated proposals specific projects for local implementation aimed at improving quality of life. Rodríguez stated that this process, along with social protection measures, is a path to securing the future of the country's children through national unity and service to the homeland, overcoming, in her words, cycles of hatred and extremism.

❮ ❯

Full version: Presidenta encargada Delcy Rodríguez convoca al pueblo a participar en la Gran Consulta Nacional del 8 de marzo

Old video of Israeli flag used for disinformation in Syria

A misleading video is actively circulating on social networks showing an unknown person raising an Israeli flag in a square at night. When the clip was posted, it was claimed that this happened in the city of Bosra-esh-Sham in Daraa province in southern Syria after fierce clashes, and that the action was carried out by the "8th Brigade" of field commander Ahmed al-Awad, allegedly calling for Israeli intervention. The video gained wide traction and was re-posted in various versions linking it to the tense situation in the region to create the impression of new military-political developments.

Fact-checking, including reverse image search of the footage and analysis of the publication history, showed that the video is not related to Bosra-esh-Sham. The incident actually took place in March 2025 in the city of Es-Suweida, where unknown individuals placed a flag on the "Doar al-Ankud" square. Local residents quickly gathered, removed and burned the flag, which was captured on other videos confirming the earlier date of the event. The original versions of the clip did not contain any mentions of Bosra or the "8th Brigade" — those details were added later in reposts to artificially link the footage to current field events and steer the narrative in a desired direction.

Such materials are often actively spread precisely during periods of escalation and fighting, when the public is actively looking for visual explanations of what is happening on the ground. This creates opportunities to repost old recordings to fill an information vacuum. These videos are also used to promote ready-made political or sectarian narratives by falsely tying them to current events, contrary to chronological and geographical facts. As a result, this contributes to the entrenchment of biased interpretations instead of providing an accurate picture of reality.

❮ ❯

Full version: رفع العَلم الإسرائيلي.. فيديو مضلل لإشعال التوتر في الجنوب السوري

Global criticism of Trump's tariff policy

The rise in global tariffs initiated by the Trump administration has provoked a wave of international concern: analysts and columnists see these measures as a threat to the principles of trade, and lawyers as grounds for new legal battles that add legal uncertainty. Economists warn of the risk of supply-chain disruption and consequent price increases, while governments and markets are recalculating their strategies toward the United States in various ways, assessing potential damage and ways to protect their interests. Commentators also note a political effect — erosion of trust in the rules of international trade and an increase in retaliatory measures by partners and competitors. This piece is prepared based on publications from www.facebook.com (Venezuela).

A Venezuelan view on the blow to Trump's tariffs and the "economy for the people"

The story of how the U.S. Supreme Court struck at Donald Trump's tariff policy has, in Venezuela, become less a discussion of American law and world trade than an emotional mirror of the country's own experience of crisis, polarization, and lost faith in institutions. A telling column from Valencia, published on Facebook by Sargento Carlos Cornejo under the headline "Golpe a Trump: Supremo invalida…", where the news of the annulment of Trump's tariffs by the "Supremo" becomes an occasion to talk about Venezuela, "comunistas" and democracy.

Cornejo hardly touches on the legal side of the conflict between the White House and the U.S. Supreme Court, does not discuss WTO international norms, and does not delve into the details of presidential powers. He views the situation through a prism familiar to Venezuelan society: "comunismo vs democracia." His phrase "Podemos ser arrastrados por la políticas de comunistas o vivir en democracia" reads as a direct continuation of chavista and anti-chavista rhetoric: either the country moves toward "communist" state control of the economy, or it chooses "democracy" as a synonym for market and private initiative. For him, the Supreme Court's decision is not a complex act of constitutional review but an example of how "communist" or anti-market policy can "arrastrar" the country backward, negating, in his view, a successful economic course.

The emotional nerve of the text is especially evident in the line "cuando el país avanza quieren pararlo." In the Venezuelan context this is a recognizable motif: whenever the economy shows even weak signs of recovery, there is always "someone" who "stops" the movement — through political games, court rulings, parliamentary blockages, or executive actions. Transposed onto the U.S., Cornejo sees the annulment of Trump's tariffs as analogous mechanisms: the Supreme Court, in his view, acts as the institution that "puts a spoke in the wheel" of the economic policy he associates with growth.

The wallet language is no less revealing. The author writes: "Un gobierno que ahora vemos mejorar nuestra carteras vemos dinero y una economía que va en avance." For a society that has gone through hyperinflation, wage devaluation, and de facto dollarization, the mere possibility of "seeing money" in one's wallet has taken on symbolic weight. Years in which wages disappeared into inflation in a matter of days have turned any tangible increase in income into the primary criterion for evaluating policy. Therefore, Trump's tariffs in his interpretation are not an abstract question of global supply chains but a simple equation: "mejora nuestras carteras" — if our wallets improve, the policy is correct. Economic nationalism is perceived through a household marker: if people have money, then the government has managed to "provide an economy the people can enjoy."

Hence the sharp attitude toward the Supreme Court as "enemies of progress." Cornejo's question "los supremos hecha un buen trabajo a la basura?" reflects deep, accustomed Venezuelan distrust of the judiciary. In Venezuela the Supreme Court (TSJ) has for years been perceived alternately as an instrument of the executive branch or as an obstacle to democratic change. The logic is simple: if the court intervenes in a political or economic course that part of society regards as saving, then it is "throwing the government's good work into the trash." It is precisely this template that the author transfers to the U.S.: judicial review of tariffs is read as destroying a "working" policy rather than as a mechanism of checks and balances.

The theme of direct democracy also occupies an important place in his text. The phrase "Yo sé que hay que apelar y la última palabra la tendrá el pueblo bajo un consulta pública" reveals the notion that the Supreme Court should not be the last instance in determining economic policy. "Última palabra" — belongs to the people, through a "consulta pública" — plebiscite, referendum, elections. For Venezuela this is a deeply familiar storyline: from the 2004 referendum to numerous opposition consultations and constant appeals to the "sovreign — the people." Cornejo thinks in a logic where institutional balance among branches of power yields to direct expression of the will: if a legal decision does not match the desires of a portion of society, it should be corrected "by the people" directly.

Behind this rhetoric two key layers of Venezuelan interests and fears emerge. The economic interest concentrates around the formula "tendremos una economía que podamos el pueblo gozar" — "an economy the people can enjoy." This is not a technocratic conception of GDP growth or capital flows, but the experience of a person tired of shortages, wage depreciation, and hopelessness. Any external news — whether American tariffs or their cancellation — is filtered through the question: "will the ordinary person have more money?" If the answer, by perception, is positive, the policy is seen as "democratic" and "right."

Political fear, by contrast, takes the form of a threat to be "arrastrados por políticas de comunistas." In Venezuelan discourse "communism" is less a strict ideological term than a synonym for state control, shortages, production collapse, and public dependence on handouts. Any step that seems like an attempt to limit market mechanisms or "strangle" initiative automatically falls into the category of "communist" and therefore dangerous. In this sense, the U.S. Supreme Court in his text ends up almost on the same scale as Venezuelan institutions that, in the view of part of society, "ruined" the economy by intervening in it under slogans of social justice.

The cultural context makes the contrast even starker. Trump's tariffs and the subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Cornejo's column are practically not considered in their real legal-economic dimension. He does not discuss how the tariffs matched international trade rules, does not touch on the question of presidential authority in foreign trade, and does not analyze the impact on imports, exports, employment, or consumer prices. Instead he turns the news into a moral-political parable: there are forces that "give money and advance the economy," and there are forces that "stop" progress and drag the country toward "communism." The international agenda in such a perception becomes merely a backdrop for a conversation about one's own traumas and hopes.

If one compares this reaction to what a "classic" journalistic report on the same Supreme Court decision would look like, the differences are obvious. A report would explain the justices' legal reasoning, lay out the vote count ("6 votes to..."), the majority opinion and any concurring or dissenting opinions, provide statistics on the impact of the tariffs on industry, agriculture, consumer prices, and quote representatives of the White House, business associations, unions and economists. Cornejo's Venezuelan column does none of this. It does not claim factual completeness, does not clarify case details, and does not strive for balance. Instead of a factual picture we get an emotional, ideologically colored interpretation in which the U.S. becomes a kind of stage on which a drama familiar to Venezuelan society is played out: "supremos vs pueblo," "comunistas vs democracia," "buen trabajo vs basura."

This is the point of the observation to which the text leads. The reaction recorded in the post "Golpe a Trump: Supremo invalida…" shows how external news about Trump's tariff policy and the U.S. Supreme Court decision are automatically "translated" in Venezuela into the language of their own experience: economic collapse, the fight against "communism," deep disillusionment with the courts, and a persistent nostalgia for an "economy the people can enjoy." In this view the U.S. is not so much another country with different institutions as a screen onto which Venezuelan fears, hopes, and the eternal dispute over who really has the right to have the final word — judges, politicians, or "the people under consulta pública" — are projected.

❮ ❯

Venezuela develops mechanism for applying amnesty law

Venezuela’s Attorney General Tarek William Saab held a working meeting on Friday with the President of the Supreme Court Carisilia Beatriz Rodríguez and members of the parliamentary commission overseeing the implementation of the Amnesty Law. The purpose of the meeting was to develop and approve a special protocol for the swift and effective application of this law, which was unanimously adopted by the National Assembly the previous day at the initiative of its president Delsi Rodríguez. This protocol is intended to ensure that all justice authorities promptly grant the benefits provided by the law to those who fall under its provisions.

❮ ❯

Full version: Tarek William Saab realizó mesas de trabajo con la presidenta del TSJ y con Comisión Especial para el Seguimiento de la Ley de Amnistía

US Forces Leave Syria: Strategic Turnaround

Recently, the withdrawal of American military contingents from Syria has accelerated. Forces have vacated the strategically important bases al-Tanf in the south and al-Shaddadi in the northeast of the country, transferring them to the control of the Syrian army. This move marks the start of a new phase in the redistribution of military-political influence across the Syrian Badia and al-Jazira regions, substantially altering the balance of forces on the ground.

The al-Tanf base, located in the border triangle between Syria, Iraq and Jordan, for a long time served as a key point for monitoring the movements of militants and smuggling caravans in the Syrian desert. It was used for operations against ISIS and for intelligence gathering, and also acted as a barrier to Iranian supply routes to Lebanon. The al-Shaddadi base, established in 2016, was a coordination center for the international coalition and contained a prison for detained militants, which now strengthens the positions of the Syrian army in al-Hasakah province.

The troop withdrawal is part of a broader discussion within the US administration about a full drawdown of the military presence, which, according to some reports, could be completed by mid‑this year. In addition to the bases mentioned, the US has also left oil fields and facilities in al-Hasakah and Deir ez-Zor, such as al-Omar, Koniko and Tel al-Bayadr. This reflects a strategic shift in Washington’s policy, which now relies more heavily on regional and local partners.

The new American strategy envisages a reduction of direct military presence and a change in role: instead of direct support to the Kurdish "Syrian Democratic Forces," the emphasis is placed on training, preparation and logistical assistance to the Syrian army in the fight against ISIS. The US will maintain a limited presence at the Rumeilan and Kasrik bases for reconnaissance and logistical support, to retain strategic influence in northeastern Syria and prevent a security vacuum.

The political subtext of these changes is Washington’s aim to reduce costs and hand over management of the situation to local partners, while continuing to contain Iran and prevent the resurgence of ISIS. Some analysts view the positive assessments of Syrian President Ahmad al-Shara by the US administration as a sign of possible mutually beneficial cooperation. For its part, Damascus sees improved relations with the US as a path to national reconstruction and stabilization.

News comments

• What are the Badia and al-Jazira regions in Syria in terms of their ethnic composition, economy and strategic significance? - The Badia (Syrian desert) and al-Jazira (northeast Syria) regions have a mixed ethnic composition, including Arabs, Kurds, Assyrians and Armenians. Economically they are important because of oil and gas fields (especially al-Jazira) and agriculture. Strategically, these regions are key transport corridors and zones of influence for various forces, including the Syrian government, Kurdish formations and international coalitions.
• Who are the "Syrian Democratic Forces" (SDF), and what was the nature of their relationship with the US before the announced strategy change? - The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are a military alliance largely composed of Kurdish formations (such as the YPG), as well as Arab and other groups. Prior to the recent strategy changes, the US closely cooperated with the SDF, providing military, financial and logistical support in the fight against ISIS (an organization banned in Russia), seeing them as a key ally on the ground.
• Why was the al-Tanf base considered such a critical barrier specifically to Iranian supply routes to Lebanon? - The al-Tanf base is located in a strategic area on the Syria‑Iraq‑Jordan border, controlling key roads. It was seen as a critical barrier because it blocked one of the main routes used by Iran to transfer weapons, resources and fighters through Syria to Lebanon to support groups like Hezbollah. Control over this zone limited Iranian influence in the region.

❮ ❯

Full version: هل أطلقت أمريكا نفير الخروج من سوريا؟

Venezuela passed an amnesty law to achieve national reconciliation

Acting President of Venezuela Delcy Rodríguez signed a sweeping Amnesty Law, calling the move an act of magnanimity and urging national reconciliation. The law provides full and general amnesty for persons accused of or convicted for politically motivated crimes committed between January 1, 1999, and January 30, 2026. The document lists key periods of political crises and protests that it covers, including events in 2002, 2014, 2017, 2019 and 2024. Rodríguez, addressing the parliamentarians who brought the law for signature, said they "brought hope for Venezuela," and emphasized the importance of knowing how to "ask for forgiveness and accept it."

From the moment the law comes into force, the police, investigative bodies and the military are obliged to halt all proceedings and procedures related to the specified cases, and the files of the relevant processes are to be destroyed. A special commission has been created to oversee the implementation of the law's provisions; it includes 23 deputies from all political factions. Rodríguez instructed this commission to ensure the quickest possible execution of the amnesty provisions, placing responsibility on the national government to develop and implement the necessary mechanisms.

❮ ❯

Full version: Presidenta (E) Delcy Rodríguez sanciona emblemática Ley de Amnistía instando a la reconciliación nacional

Trump's plans to build a military base in Gaza

The British newspaper The Guardian has revealed documents and recordings confirming that the administration of former US President Donald Trump planned to build a large military base in the Gaza Strip for 5,000 troops. According to the publication, a source familiar with the details of the plan confirmed that the contract to build this base was officially awarded by the «Совет мира», which indicates the seriousness of the Trump administration's intentions to carry out the project.

❮ ❯

Full version: الجزيرة نت

Venezuela insists on negotiations with Guyana over disputed territory

Venezuela officially rejected Guyana’s position on the territorial dispute over the Essequibo region, stating that the only lawful basis for its settlement is the 1966 Geneva Agreement. In a communique issued by Foreign Minister Ivan Gil, Caracas accused Georgetown of attempting to ignore the legally binding provisions of that treaty, which, Venezuela argues, clearly define the procedure for resolving the conflict.

Venezuelan authorities recalled that in December 2023 the country’s people, in a referendum, supported the Geneva Agreement as the sole path to a satisfactory resolution and reaffirmed their non-recognition of the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice on this matter. Caracas called on Guyana to come to the negotiating table to develop a mutually acceptable solution, as the treaty requires, and reiterated its historic claims to Essequibo, stressing that it will never renounce that territory.

❮ ❯

Full version: Venezuela rechaza postura de Guyana e insta a regirse por lo establecido en el Acuerdo de Ginebra (+Comunicado)

Alawite demands and accusations of separatism threaten stability in Syria

On the Syrian coast, where the population is predominantly Alawite, demonstrations are taking place in cities like Latakia. Protesters accuse the new authorities of abuses, killings and abductions and demand a constitution that guarantees the rights of all Syrians without discrimination, as well as stable security. Their opponents, however, see these demands as an attempt to exploit popular anger or even a project of secession to create a parallel state, which heightens tensions in an already fraught period.

Mustafa Rustam, a representative of the Alawite community and head of the political bureau of "Western and Central Syria," said that Alawites have been subjected to a "massacre by the new government forces." He claims that, having surrendered their weapons, they were deceived, expecting a different approach from the state, and now have no choice but peaceful protest. Rustam insists that Alawites do not seek to divide the country, but only demand a social contract and federal governance as guarantees of their rights, emphasizing that they are an integral part of Syrian society.

On the opposite side is activist and journalist Muhammad Shazar az-Zubi, who accuses the so-called "al-Assad community" of attempting to secede and create a state called "Ugarit." He categorically denies claims of a massacre on the coast by the new authorities, blaming the Alawites themselves, who, he says, "betrayed the unified security forces," luring them into ambushes. Az-Zubi recalls that many leaders of security forces under the Assad regime were Alawites and committed crimes against Sunnis.

In response to these accusations, Mustafa Rustam rejects the idea of collective responsibility of all Alawites for the crimes of the previous regime, pointing out that there were also Sunnis among its leadership. He stresses that Alawites are not interested in dividing the country or in having a government belong to a particular confession. Their goal is legal protection through a federal structure, since, in his view, the state does not provide them security from armed groups, forcing them to seek their own guarantees.

The discussion has revealed a deep split between the parties, based on mutual accusations: Alawites demand constitutional guarantees and protection, while their critics fear separatism and revenge. Some current leaders recognize the coast’s demands as legitimate and call for national unity, but disputes over historical responsibility and the threat of retribution undermine the possibility of quick agreement. The situation remains extremely fragile, and there is a risk of further escalation of tensions if judicial, security and political issues are not resolved transparently and fairly for all population groups.

Comments on the news

• Who are the Alawites in the Syrian context and what is their historical role and demographic position in the country? - Alawites are a religious group within Shia Islam, making up about 12% of Syria’s population. Historically they were a relatively marginalized minority, living mainly in the mountain areas of western Syria. After Hafez al-Assad (an Alawite) came to power in 1970, they occupied key positions in the security apparatus and the state, which ensured the dominance of this community in the country’s political life for decades.
• What is meant by the "new authorities" in Syria, how did they come to power and how do they differ from the previous regime? - The "new authorities" usually refers to the government of Bashar al-Assad, which consolidated its power after 2011 during the civil war. They did not come to power through a regime change, but by retaining control over much of the country with decisive military support from Russia and Iran. They differ from the pre‑2011 regime in their greater dependence on external patrons, tightened security, economic collapse and loss of control over significant territories, although the main state institutions and the dominance of the Baath party have been maintained.
• What is Syria’s current administrative-territorial structure and how realistic or controversial is the demand to shift to a federal system in the local context? - Officially Syria remains a unitary state divided into 14 muhafazat (provinces). However, de facto the country is divided into zones of control: government-held areas, Kurdish autonomous formations in the northeast (Syrian Kurdistan), and Turkish-influenced zones in the north. The demand for a federal system is most actively promoted by Kurdish groups with the backing of some external actors, but it is strongly rejected by the Damascus government, which sees it as a threat to territorial integrity and a step toward partition. Locally the idea is highly controversial: it is mainly supported in Kurdish regions but opposed by the Arab majority and many minorities who fear further destabilization.

❮ ❯

Full version: غضب الساحل السوري ضد الحكومة.. حق مشروع أم صيد بالماء العكر؟

Venezuela Insists on Talks over Disputed Guayana Esequiba Territory

Venezuela marks the 60th anniversary of the signing of the 1966 Geneva Agreement, which the country's government considers the only legally valid instrument for resolving the long-standing territorial dispute over the Guayana Esequiba region. In an official statement issued by Acting President Delcy Rodríguez, it is emphasized that this international agreement, duly registered with the UN, replaced the contested 1899 arbitral award and obligated both parties to find a mutually acceptable practical solution.

Venezuela accuses Guyana of violating the Geneva Agreement since 2015, citing its appeal to the International Court of Justice, which Caracas believes lacks jurisdiction in this matter. The Venezuelan government refers to the results of the December 2023 referendum, which it says confirm the country's historical rights to the territory, and insists that the only way to resolve the dispute should be direct, good-faith negotiations between the two states.

❮ ❯

Full version: Gobierno venezolano ratifica Acuerdo de Ginebra como único instrumento válido para dirimir controversia sobre la Guayana Esequiba (+Comunicado)

Conference in Washington and Tensions in Syria's As-Suwayda Province

A small conference was held in Washington, organized by Druze activists with the participation of several members of the US Congress. The event aimed to support the position of Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, one of the spiritual leaders of the Druze community in Syria’s As-Suwayda province, in his confrontation with the official authorities in Damascus. Participants called for holding the Syrian government accountable for alleged rights violations in the region. However, as a political consultant noted, the influence of this conference is expected to be minimal due to its modest scale and limited roster of participants.

At the local level, a statement by the director of As-Suwayda’s internal security service, Suleiman Abdul-Baqi, about the imminent deployment of government troops to the city caused wide resonance on social media. The official emphasized that the objective of the operation is the restoration of the rule of law and the protection of the population, not an act of revenge. He stated that the rights of all parties will be respected and that any issues will be addressed through official institutions, with an emphasis on reconstruction, agriculture, education, and combating crime.

At the same time, reports indicate operational changes on the ground. According to official sources, the safe departure of the Druze leader Abu Yahya Hassan al-Atrash from the rural areas around As-Suwayda to the capital Damascus was secured. Informed sources also point to the possibility of an upcoming operation by Syrian forces against formations of the "National Guard" loyal to al-Hijri, similar to past actions. The province is witnessing an increased deployment of security forces to prevent possible escalation.

Politically, sources suggest that the advance of government troops could push Sheikh al-Hijri to sign an agreement. It could provide for the disbandment of his "National Guard" and allow official security forces access in exchange for certain administrative appointments for local figures. At the same time, there are reports of external pressure: the leader of the Druze community in Israel, Muafaq Tarif, allegedly conveyed to al-Hijri that Israel would not be able to support the creation of an independent entity, and that his orientation should be toward Damascus.

Sheikh al-Hijri earlier rejected the governor of As-Suwayda’s initiative to start a national dialogue, which indicates the complexity and entanglement of the local political situation. Despite ongoing international and domestic contacts, it remains open whether any negotiated solutions can provide a long-term settlement without guarantees of rights, representation in governing bodies, and an acceptable security regime. Contradictions between local demands and regional and international pressure keep As-Suwayda a sensitive arena for balancing power and influence.

Comments on the news

• What is the historical and contemporary role of the Druze community in Syria’s political and social life, especially in As-Suwayda province? - Historically, the Druze community has played the role of an autonomous political and social formation in Syria, especially in As-Suwayda province, where it constitutes the majority. In the modern period, especially since 2011, the community has sought to maintain neutrality in the conflict, supporting local self-governance and security while formally remaining part of the Syrian state. Socially, the Druze preserve a closed religious structure and strong communal ties.

• What are the "National Guard" formations in the Syrian context, and how do they relate to other armed groups in the country? - The "National Guard" in Syria are primarily local self-defense formations created to protect specific areas or communities. Unlike the regular Syrian army or major armed groups, they generally have limited operational tasks and are closely tied to the local population. In As-Suwayda province, such formations often comprise Druze and focus on defending their territory, avoiding participation in large-scale fighting in other regions.

• Why might Muafaq Tarif, the leader of the Druze community in Israel, influence events in Syria’s As-Suwayda province? - Muafaq Tarif, as the spiritual leader of the Druze in Israel, enjoys authority among part of the Druze community in Syria due to cross-border ethno-religious ties. The Druze community, despite state borders, maintains a sense of religious and cultural unity. His statements or position can influence public opinion or even the actions of local leaders in As-Suwayda, particularly on issues concerning the security and interests of the community, although direct political influence is limited by Syrian state sovereignty.

❮ ❯

Full version: تحركات درزية في أمريكا لدعم الهجري في وجه الحكومة السورية

Political advisor calls for government-opposition coexistence in Venezuela

Political consultant Juan José Rendón said in an interview with EVTV that the government movement chavismo and the opposition must learn political coexistence after the new electoral process. He also expressed support for the quick adoption of an Amnesty Law, even if it is imperfect, with subsequent amendments, while the National Assembly postponed the second reading of that bill due to disagreements over the wording of its Article 7.

❮ ❯

Full version: JJ Rendón afirmó que el chavismo y la oposición deberán aprender a convivir políticamente luego de un nuevo proceso electoral

US Withdrawal from At-Tanf: Shift in Syria Strategy

The withdrawal of US forces from the At-Tanf military base in southeastern Syria is not an isolated tactical move but an important element of Washington’s reassessment of strategic priorities in the region. This base, located in a sensitive area at the junction of the Syrian, Iraqi and Jordanian borders, has since 2016 served as an instrument of military-political pressure, allowing control over transport corridors and the balance of power in the Syrian desert. The end of the US presence in At-Tanf has been part of a broader redeployment process, during which six American bases in Syria have been abandoned over the past year, raising questions about the future of security in the country’s south.

The strategic importance of the base was determined by its geographic position, which allowed observation of key routes between Damascus and Baghdad. During its operation it performed three main tasks: border monitoring, interception of cross-border supply lines, and support for local armed formations. After the Americans left, the Syrian army deployed its units in the area, and thousands of detainees linked to ISIS were handed over to Iraq, symbolizing the transition of full responsibility for security to the Syrian government.

According to Syrian Brigadier General Muhammad al-Khalid, the troop withdrawal became possible after ISIS fighters were transferred to Iraqi authorities and agreements on security were reached between the SDF and Damascus. Al-Khalid noted that “the agreement between the American command and the Syrian government provided for the withdrawal of US forces after progress was made in resolving security issues in the eastern part of the country.” He also added that Washington no longer wishes to suffer losses among its soldiers in the difficult conditions of the desert, and that the local formation “Free Syrian Army,” based in At-Tanf, was integrated into the structure of “Desert Security” within the Syrian Ministry of Interior.

Analysts view this move as a shift by the US from direct military presence to a strategy of “deterrence at a distance,” relying on aerial reconnaissance and cooperation with local partners in the fight against terrorism. Dr. Samer al-Safadi emphasizes that the decision has political significance beyond purely military aspects: it may signal a US readiness to recognize Damascus’s ability to control its southeastern borders and possibly paves the way for less confrontational approaches in relations between the two countries, although a radical change in American policy is not expected.

At the operational level, as Colonel Mustafa al-Farhat notes, the restoration of state control by Syria over the border triangle eliminates a direct foreign presence at a strategic point and gives Damascus greater ability to manage security in desert areas. However, he warns that this does not mean a radical change in the balance of power, since ensuring security over vast desert territories—where ISIS cells were previously active—remains a difficult task. At the same time, the Syrian Ministry of Defense announced the army’s takeover of the Al-Shaddadi base after coordination with the American side, which strengthens the state’s positions in key areas, including Al-Hasakah and Deir ez-Zor.

Researchers point out that two international coalition bases still operate in territories controlled by the SDF (Rmeilan and Kesrak near Tell Tamr), which means a limited US military presence remains in the region. Abdullah al-Khair believes that the real strategic impact of the withdrawal from At-Tanf will be determined by the level of security coordination between Damascus, Amman and Baghdad, the Syrian government’s ability to control desert areas, and the nature of future Iranian presence. Ultimately, there has been “a shift in the mechanisms of managing the balance,” rather than a fundamental change in force disposition: if Damascus can ensure stability, southern Syria may move toward relative calm; otherwise the region could again become an arena of regional rivalry.

News Comments

• What is “Desert Security” within the Syrian Ministry of Interior and what is its role in controlling desert areas? - “Desert Security” is a specialized unit within the Syrian Ministry of Interior responsible for security and control in the country’s desert regions, especially in the eastern and southeastern areas bordering Iraq and Jordan. Its role includes combating smuggling, illegal armed groups, and ensuring security along key transport routes in the challenging desert terrain.

• Who are the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and what is the nature of their relations with Damascus and the international coalition mentioned in the context of security agreements? - The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are a military-political alliance formed in 2015 that controls northeastern regions of Syria. They are mainly composed of Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) but also include Arab and other ethnic groups. Their relations with Damascus are complicated: periodic talks on decentralization coexist with military confrontation. With the US-led international coalition, the SDF has close military cooperation, especially in the fight against ISIS, creating a three-way dynamic between the SDF, Damascus and the coalition.

• What role does Jordan (Amman) play in security matters in southern Syria, and why is its coordination with Damascus and Baghdad considered critically important after the US departure from At-Tanf? - Jordan plays a key role in ensuring security in southern Syria due to its long border with the Daraa region and strategic interests in preventing the infiltration of militants and drug trafficking. After the US left the At-Tanf base (located in the Syria-Jordan-Iraq triangle), coordination between Amman, Damascus and Baghdad became critically important to fill the security vacuum, control cross-border movements, and prevent the resurgence of terrorist groups in this strategic area.

❮ ❯

Full version: تحول في التوازنات.. دلالات الانسحاب الأمريكي من قاعدة التنف بسوريا

Marco Rubio's Statement on Venezuela Draws International Condemnation

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said that the situation in Venezuela is now "much better" than before the kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro by American forces on January 3. At a press conference in Bratislava he called the U.S. military operation successful, although he acknowledged that it had provoked dissatisfaction among some of Washington's allies. According to Rubio, disagreements on this issue should not hinder partnership, since countries "always express their opinion."

The Venezuelan government condemned the U.S. actions as a "heavy military aggression" aimed at seizing the country's strategic resources, especially oil and minerals. Other states also voiced criticism: Russia and China called for the release of Maduro and his wife, emphasizing Venezuela's right to self-determination. Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico, who was present at the same press conference, said that the operation, which included bombings and caused civilian casualties, demonstrated the "destruction of the world order" established after World War II.

❮ ❯

Full version: Marco Rubio asegura que Venezuela está mucho mejor ahora que antes del secuestro del presidente Maduro

Digital disinformation threatens stability in Syria

Coordinated disinformation campaigns aimed at destabilizing an already fragile situation in Syria are gaining momentum on social media. These actions intensify at particularly sensitive political and social moments, using methods such as reworking old content, creating entirely fabricated materials, and injecting external elements into the narrative. Their ultimate goal is to amplify existing divisions within Syrian society, sow mutual distrust among its various groups, and create a false perception of reality, which ultimately makes finding political solutions more difficult.

Several recent cases are striking examples of such fakes. First, a claim circulated online that the Reuters news agency had reported that U.S. officials had notified the leadership of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) that their project was over and had given a deadline for integration into the Syrian army. A check of the Reuters archive showed that the agency never published such material. Another case involved a photograph allegedly showing a “Kurdish political triumph”: SDF commander Mazloum Abdi standing next to the U.S. secretary of state against the backdrop of Kurdish and American flags. Analysis proved that the image had been edited using AI: in the original, the Syrian flag, not the Kurdish flag, was present.

A third example is a video circulated on Facebook, X (formerly Twitter) and TikTok that was falsely presented as protests demanding the deportation of Druze from Israel to Lebanon and Syria. Fact-checking established that the footage was actually filmed several years ago during demonstrations by ultra-Orthodox Jews in Jerusalem protesting a court decision to exhume the bodies of two children. These examples demonstrate a systematic approach: disinformation campaigns artificially weave international and regional actors into false narratives to inflame internal contradictions and undermine citizens’ trust in one another and in institutions of power.

The impact of these digital attacks goes far beyond mere deception. They directly threaten social cohesion, undermine fragile processes aimed at stability and state restoration, and digital chaos often translates into real tensions on the ground. In this regard, experts emphasize the urgent need to develop media literacy among the population and to strengthen fact-checking practices to stop the recirculation of fake content and to counter destructive narratives that sow discord.

Comments on the news

• Who are the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and what is their role in the current conflict? - The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are a military alliance formed in 2015 during the Syrian civil war. It is composed mainly of Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), as well as Arab, Assyrian and other groups. The SDF controls a significant portion of northeast Syria and played a key role in the fight against ISIS (a terrorist organization banned in Russia) with the support of a U.S.-led international coalition. Their role in the current conflict includes governing autonomous areas, confronting Turkish military operations (Turkey considers the YPG linked to the PKK, which it classifies as a terrorist organization), and participating in complex negotiations with the Syrian government over the future status of the region.

• Which major ethnic, religious, or political divides in Syrian society do these disinformation campaigns exploit? - Disinformation campaigns often exploit deep divisions in Syrian society: 1) Ethnic: tensions between the Arab majority and the Kurdish minority (which seeks autonomy), as well as other groups such as Assyrians and Armenians. 2) Religious: divisions between the Sunni majority and minorities including Alawites (to which President Bashar al-Assad belongs), Christians, Druze and Shiites, which have historically influenced political loyalties. 3) Political: the conflict between supporters of the Assad regime and the opposition (including secular and Islamist groups), as well as disagreements over the country’s future governance structure (centralized vs. federal). These fault lines intersect, making society vulnerable to manipulations aimed at stoking intercommunal tension or justifying external intervention.

❮ ❯

Full version: صور و"فيديوهات" مضلّلة خارج السياق لإرباك المشهد السوري

Venezuela Releases 17 Prisoners Under Amnesty Law

The President of Venezuela's National Assembly, Jorge Rodríguez, announced the release of 17 people from the pretrial detention center "Zone 7" as part of the application of the Amnesty Law, which is part of the national reconciliation policy being carried out by the legislature to normalize the country's political climate. Rodríguez emphasized that this measure is aimed at strengthening internal stability and building a path to peace and mutual understanding among different sectors of Venezuelan society, calling on citizens to democratic coexistence under common national symbols — the flag and the anthem.

❮ ❯

Full version: Jorge Rodríguez announced the release of 17 people deprived of liberty from Zone 7

Syria and US Discuss Integration of Kurdish Forces

On the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference, Syrian Foreign Minister Assad Sheibani met with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio. Sheibani said that Washington supports the Syrian government and is interested in a strong state with effective institutions and an army capable of guaranteeing the security of all citizens. The American side, he said, reaffirmed support for Syria's territorial integrity and the development of its economy.

An important topic of the talks was the integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), in which Kurdish formations are dominant, into the structures of the Syrian state. Sheibani noted that this process is already progressing successfully on the ground, and that the Kurdish community is an integral part of the Syrian nation. He emphasized that Damascus intends to address the Kurdish issue through constitutional and administrative mechanisms, not through confrontation.

The meeting took place against the backdrop of implementing the January agreement on the gradual integration of military and administrative structures of the Kurdish autonomy into all-Syrian institutions. According to the agreements, the deployment of Syrian security forces has already begun in the cities of al-Qamishli and al-Hasakah. The recent appointment of a Kurd as governor of al-Hasakah province also corresponds to the terms of the agreement.

Notably, the Syrian delegation included SDF commander Mazloum Abdi and Kurdish politician Ilham Ahmed. Abdi described the meeting as "positive" and noted discussion of the specific characteristics of the Kurdish people in the integration process. Ahmed confirmed that SDF representatives participated as part of the official Syrian delegation, which symbolizes a new phase of interaction.

Western officials, according to Reuters, expressed satisfaction with the progress in the integration process and urged the Syrian leadership to show flexibility regarding Kurdish demands. The international community generally supports granting the Kurds a certain degree of autonomy provided centralized authority in Damascus is preserved, which is seen as a key element of stability in the region.

Comments on the news

• What has been the historical role of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the Syrian conflict and why is their integration such an important issue? - The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), formed in 2015 as a military alliance led by the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG), played a decisive role in the ground fight against the terrorist group Islamic State (ISIS) with the support of the US-led international coalition. Their integration into broader Syrian political and military structures is an important issue because it affects the stability of northeastern Syria, where they control territory. Successful integration could help resolve tensions with the Syrian government in Damascus and reduce the threat of military intervention from Turkey, which regards the YPG as a terrorist organization. This is a key question for the future political settlement of the conflict.

• What is the Kurdish autonomy in northeastern Syria and how did it function before the integration process began? - The Kurdish autonomy, officially known as the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), and often informally called "Rojava," is a de facto self-governing region that emerged after the Syrian government withdrew during the civil war. Before the start of integration processes or negotiations with Damascus, it functioned as an autonomous entity with its own governing bodies, security forces (the SDF and YPG), judicial system, and educational institutions in the Kurdish language. Its ideological basis is "democratic confederalism," which emphasizes local self-governance, gender equality (for example, quotas for women and co-leadership), and multi-confessional coexistence. However, its international status remained uncertain, and it was not recognized by the Syrian government or other countries.

• Who are Mazloum Abdi and Ilham Ahmed in the context of internal Kurdish politics in Syria and what are their political affiliations? - Mazloum Abdi (also known as Mazloum Kobani) is the commander-in-chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a senior commander of the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG). He is considered a key military figure in the autonomy. Ilham Ahmed is co-chair of the Executive Council of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (the political governing body) and a prominent political representative of the region on the international stage. Both are closely associated with the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which is the dominant Kurdish political party in northern Syria and ideologically linked to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in Turkey. They represent the leadership of the de facto Kurdish administration and play a central role in negotiations over its future status.

❮ ❯

Full version: لقاء الشيباني وروبيو يؤكد وحدة سوريا ويدفع بملف دمج قسد

Carnival in Venezuela as a Symbol of National Unity

Acting President of Venezuela Delcy Rodríguez launched the national program "Viva Venezuela" 2026, saying that carnivals are the most authentic expression of the country's national identity. Speaking in Paso Macuto accompanied by Governor Alejandro Terán and Tourism Minister Danyela Cabello, she emphasized that this celebration harmoniously unites indigenous traditions, European heritage, and Afro-Venezuelan culture, reflecting the nation's unique essence. The government activated entertainment events in 5,336 communal districts across the country, turning the carnival into a tool for strengthening peace, cultural sovereignty, and healthy family recreation, which, Rodríguez said, pays tribute to ethnic diversity and the historical blending of cultures, consolidating the celebration as a symbol of national unity and patriotic pride.

❮ ❯

Full version: Delcy Rodríguez: Carnavales venezolanos son una expresión de la Identidad Nacional

Syria's New Truck Ban Disrupts Jordanian Exports

A recent Syrian decision to ban foreign trucks from entering its territory, except for transit shipments, has caused severe shocks to Jordan’s transport sector and created new logistical and economic challenges for the kingdom’s exports. Under the new rules, Jordanian trucks are now required to use a "back-to-back" system: unload goods at border customs yards and reload them onto Syrian trucks for onward delivery. This measure has significantly increased transport costs and slowed delivery times, especially for goods destined for the Syrian market.

The new procedures have led to massive jams of Jordanian and Gulf-country trucks at the Nasib border crossing. Union representatives warn that the customs yards are not equipped to handle large volumes of transshipment, exacerbating the logistical chaos. An exception is made only for transit trucks, which must be escorted by Syrian customs between crossings. However, this does not solve the problem of direct deliveries into Syria. The transshipment system also raises costs because of handling and storage fees and creates a risk of spoilage or loss of market value for some goods, such as perishables.

The Syrian decision directly threatens the competitiveness of key Jordanian export items on the Syrian market, especially building materials — primarily cement — as well as food and industrial products. Industry experts fear that rising costs and delays could force Syrian importers to seek cheaper or faster alternatives, putting pressure on exports that are vital for Jordan. The crisis also negatively affects export-linked supply chains and economic activity that depend on the land crossings.

On the Jordanian side, officials, including a representative of the Ministry of Transport, confirmed that the decision has not yet affected transit shipments and emphasized that negotiations with Syrian authorities are ongoing to find a solution. Jordan’s Minister of Transport held consultations with his Syrian counterpart, discussing ways to improve freight efficiency and resolve problems at the Jaber–Nasib crossing. Both sides agreed that direct deliveries to the final destination are a cornerstone of the transport and trade system, as they reduce operating costs and speed up delivery.

Economic experts criticize the suddenness of Syria’s decision, taken without prior coordination with Jordan, which led to congestion and disruption of freight flows. They note that the new measures disrupted logistics for shipments from ports and factories to Syria, increased operating expenses, and prolonged customs clearance. The infrastructure at the crossings is not ready for prolonged congestion and transshipment operations, which negatively affects, among others, the Port of Aqaba. Seeking a way out, Jordan last week successfully ran a trial batch of trucks through the Turkish crossing Bab al-Hawa–Cilvegözü, exploring alternative routes to Turkey and Europe to reduce dependence on traditional routes through Syria. Nevertheless, resolving the current crisis requires an urgent temporary solution or an agreement with the Syrian side.

Comments on the news

• What is the historical and economic significance of the Nasib border crossing for trade between Jordan, Syria and other countries in the region? - The Nasib crossing (also known as the Jaber crossing) has historically been the main trade gateway between the Levant and the Arabian Peninsula. Economically it is vital for Syria’s land trade with Jordan, the Gulf countries and North Africa, serving as a key transit route for goods including food, industrial products and fuel. Its closure in the past (2015–2018) caused serious damage to regional trade.

• Why is the Port of Aqaba such a critically important logistics hub for Jordan, and how can problems at the land border affect its operations? - The Port of Aqaba is Jordan’s only seaport, handling about 80% of the country’s foreign trade and much of its oil imports. It is a critical logistics hub not only for Jordan but also for transit shipments to Iraq and partially to Syria. Problems at the land border (for example, closure of the Nasib crossing) can disrupt supply chains, increase logistics costs and lengthen delivery times for goods that normally follow combined sea-land routes via Aqaba.

• What broader regional trade agreements or political factors might have influenced Syria’s decision to impose this ban? - The decision could be related to broader regional political tensions, including Syria’s relationships with neighboring countries such as Jordan, which sometimes shift with changing alliances. Factors may include pressure from Syria’s regional allies (for example, Iran), a desire to use economic levers in political negotiations, or a reaction to Syria’s own trade restrictions due to sanctions. Regional trade agreements, such as the Greater Arab Free Trade Area, also form the context but are often undermined by political disagreements.

❮ ❯

Full version: الأردن.. أزمة شحن عقب حظر سوريا الشاحنات الأجنبية

Venezuela to fund 400 youth entrepreneurial projects

Acting President of Venezuela Delcy Rodríguez announced the allocation of state funding for 400 entrepreneurial projects aimed at the country's youth. The statement was made on February 12 as part of Youth Day celebrations. The selected initiatives cover various sectors of the real economy, including livestock (raising quail, chickens, pigs and rabbits) and the textile industry (sewing workshops, garment production and sublimation).

Funding will be provided through the Ministry of Youth in collaboration with the Ministry of Economy and Finance. The program's goal is to create a "first job" for young people through entrepreneurship, thereby promoting their active involvement in the country's economy. Rodríguez emphasized that this measure is part of the government's commitments to support the productive development of youth, she said while speaking via video link with participants in the national youth march in Caracas.

❮ ❯

Full version: Delcy Rodríguez anuncia financiamiento para 400 proyectos productivos de la juventud

Syria Raises Cleaners' Status, Renames Them "Cleanliness Engineers"

A symbolic change has taken place in Syria regarding one of the most important professions: cleaning workers are now officially called "cleanliness engineers." The decision was made by the organizers of the book fair in Damascus to emphasize the importance of their labor and to show respect for their role in maintaining public health and the beauty of cities. The initiative aims to change perceptions of this profession and to recognize its fundamental importance to everyday life.

Workers received the change enthusiastically. Many describe feelings of pride and renewed self-respect, noting that the new title has positively affected how they see themselves and how people interact with them. One of the "cleanliness engineers," Muhammad Mustafa, said he feels an "indescribable sensation" from the shift in society's attitude toward his profession, adding that it has brought more recognition of their work in the eyes of citizens.

The new title provoked an animated reaction in society. According to the workers, people on the streets began asking about the change, sparking discussions about the real value of this profession. Even children started addressing them more respectfully, using the new official name. As one worker, Mahmoud Isa, noted, the change in terminology has made everyday interactions "more pleasant and tactful," demonstrating a positive psychological effect from the renaming.

Currently the new title is officially used only within the exhibition center where the book fair took place. However, as the workers' leader Akram Kabik explained, there is an expectation that the initiative will spread throughout Damascus, since the new name is considered "more fitting." Workers hope this change will not be merely symbolic but the beginning of a broader shift in how society perceives their vital profession.

Comments on the news

• What significance does the Damascus book fair have for Syrian society and why did its organizers initiate this change? - The Damascus International Book Fair carries immense symbolic and cultural significance for Syrian society. Amid ongoing conflict and economic hardship, it serves as an important reminder of normal life, the continuity of cultural dialogue, and intellectual development. The organizers launched the initiative to support the spirit of resilience through culture, unite people around positive values, and demonstrate that civic life in Syria continues despite the challenges.

• What is the typical social hierarchy of professions in Syria and why did the cleaning profession need such a symbolic upgrade in status? - In Syrian society, as in many others, there is a historical hierarchy of professions in which jobs requiring higher education (doctors, engineers, lawyers) are viewed as most prestigious, while manual labor is often less valued. The cleaning profession, associated with physical work and low pay, traditionally occupies a lower rung on this social ladder. The symbolic elevation of its status at the book fair was necessary to underscore the dignity of any honest work, especially in a crisis where every profession that ensures society's functioning becomes vital. It is a gesture of social solidarity and recognition of the contribution of all workers.

❮ ❯

Full version: من "عامل" إلى "مهندس".. تسمية جديدة لعمال النظافة في سوريا

Syrian army takes control of strategic al-Tanf base

Syrian forces have officially taken control of the strategic al-Tanf base, located on the border of Syria, Jordan and Iraq, from American troops after joint coordination. Syria’s Ministry of Defense confirmed that the army and border forces have begun deploying in the area to secure the border triangle and continue the fight against the terrorist organization ISIS. In the coming days, border guards will fully assume responsibilities for protecting the territory, completing the relocation process.

About 300 US servicemembers left the al-Tanf base on the US side, with American officials not ruling out further reductions in the contingent in the near future. Around one thousand US soldiers remain in northeastern areas of Syria for now. A Pentagon representative noted that the active role of Syrian forces in fighting ISIS contributes to the reduction of the US military presence, while the United States will continue to pressure the terrorists using airstrikes from outside Syria.

The al-Tanf base has historically played a key strategic role for US forces in securing desert areas, combating ISIS, and countering smuggling and drug trafficking. The US also used the base for operations against groups it alleges are supported by Iran. The withdrawal of US troops from al-Tanf is occurring alongside the abandonment of other positions in northeastern Syria, indicating an overall reduction of the US military presence in the country.

Earlier, US special envoy for Syria Tom Breaux said that the US presence in Syria would not be long-term, urging local forces to integrate into Syrian state institutions. These statements are consistent with the current partial troop withdrawals and redeployments in the region. The situation reflects a change in US strategy — a shift from a direct military presence to reliance on airstrikes and support from outside the country.

For Damascus, gaining control of the al-Tanf base provides an important strategic foothold for strengthening security at the three-way border and in the desert areas stretching toward Palmyra and the Syrian part of Mesopotamia, where ISIS cells remain active. Syrian authorities are now independently responsible for combating terrorism, guarding the borders and countering smuggling, while continuing coordination with the international coalition and the United States within a broader political engagement.

Comments on the news

• Which “local forces” did US special envoy Tom Breaux mean when urging them to integrate into Syrian state institutions? — Most likely he meant armed groups and local administrations that control territories in northeastern Syria (for example, the Syrian Democratic Forces, Kurdish self-governing bodies, or Arab tribal councils) that de facto govern regions outside direct control of the Damascus government. The call for integration means their subordination to central Syrian authorities.
• What is the “Syrian part of Mesopotamia” in geographic and strategic terms, and why do ISIS cells remain active there? — This is the northeastern region of Syria (known as Al-Jazira), including parts of Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa and al-Hasakah provinces. Geographically it is a plain crossed by the Euphrates River; strategically it is important because of agricultural lands and oil fields. ISIS cells remain active due to the vast desert terrain, weak security control, tribal ties and ongoing instability, which allow them to wage a guerrilla campaign.
• What is the role and composition of the “international coalition” with which Syrian authorities continue to coordinate? — This refers to the US-led international coalition formed in 2014 to fight ISIS. It includes dozens of countries (for example, the UK, France, Germany), but the actual military presence is mainly US. Coordination with Syrian authorities is likely limited and conducted through intermediaries (for example, Russia) or concerns specific issues such as airspace safety, counterterrorism or humanitarian matters, to avoid direct clashes.

❮ ❯

Full version: التنف تعود لسوريا.. خطوة تعيد رسم التوازنات على المثلث الحدودي

Venezuela to Survey Workers to Create New Labor Model

Acting President of Venezuela Delcy Rodríguez announced a national survey of workers via the "Patria" system to gather opinions on working conditions, which will serve as the basis for developing a new labor model within the framework of the "Labor Constituent Assembly" process. Rodríguez emphasized that the survey's goal is to strengthen protection of wages and social security for workers, while also noting a record increase in sausage production in 2025 to 125,325 tonnes, which, she said, was made possible thanks to dialogue in the National Council for Productive Economy. The statement was made during a visit to the L'Prado plant in Miranda state, where Rodríguez reaffirmed the government's commitment to economic progress and social peace, saying that "the rights of workers must be respected" and that a labor model meeting their needs must be created.

❮ ❯

Full version: Delcy Rodríguez anuncia encuesta para definir las bases del nuevo modelo laboral

Scientists Recreated the Skeleton of a Dinosaur-“Hunter” Crocodile

Paleontologists have reconstructed a full-size skeleton of a prehistoric crocodile that earned the fearsome nickname "dinosaur killer." The nickname is deserved: the predator did not chase dinosaurs on land but ambushed them from the shores of ancient lakes and swamps, attacking the reptiles when they came to drink.

❮ ❯

Full version: الجزيرة نت

Culture as Politics: Venezuelan Spanish-Language Media React to Biden, Trump and Bad Bunny

Amid Bad Bunny’s high‑profile halftime performance at the Super Bowl, Spanish‑language outlets from Venezuela are reinterpreting the latest American political battles through a cultural lens: from immigration and Puerto Rico’s status to a symbolic challenge to Trump’s theatrics. Commentary and analysis see the show not merely as a concert but as a direct rebuttal to the rhetoric of U.S. administrations, a demonstration of the weaknesses of Trumpism, and a way to mobilize Latin American identity against conservative narratives. These cultural disputes intertwine with broader themes — trade issues like USMCA (T‑MEC), the influence of a weak dollar and unemployment on remittances, scandals such as the Epstein case, and a sense of U.S. hostility toward Venezuela — showing how entertainment events become a forum for geopolitical and domestic critique. Material based on publications from elpais.com (Venezuela), elviejotopo.com (Venezuela), izquierdasocialista.org.ar (Venezuela).

Venezuela, dictatorships and the U.S.: how Latin America’s past speaks to the present

The assassination of Orlando Letelier, the former Chilean foreign minister in Salvador Allende’s government, blown up in Washington in 1976, has never been for a Venezuelan perspective just an episode of Chilean history. The piece on elpais.com recounting a former Chilean military officer sought in his homeland for crimes of the dictatorship era and convicted in the U.S. in 1987 for his role in that murder only refreshes a whole layer of memory and associations in Venezuela. Especially when it is emphasized that the American court handed him a comparatively lenient sentence ("pena baja por su confesión"), turning one of the most notorious political murders of the Operation Condor years into a story about a "repentant perpetrator."

From the Caracas viewpoint this appears as a classic example of double standards: the U.S. is willing to punish an individual agent but is not prepared to examine its own role in supporting regimes that produced such crimes. The fact that the crime took place in Washington and the sentence was issued by an American court simultaneously highlights the power and limits of North American jurisdiction: yes, an individual officer ends up in prison, but the system that made such operations possible remains off the dock.

For the Venezuelan reader this sounds especially familiar against the backdrop of their own history of impunity for security forces. Human rights organizations like Provea and Cofavic have for years documented extrajudicial killings, torture, arbitrary detentions that either never reach a court or end with symbolic sentences. When elpais.com’s piece surfaces the story of a Chilean military officer who, for arranging a political assassination in the U.S. capital, ultimately receives leniency for pleading guilty, it is read as confirmation of a general pattern: security structures in Latin America, especially those that acted in line with “the right” geopolitics, rarely face full accountability.

It is no coincidence that this text is placed in the migration and U.S. section, where on the other side of reality thousands of Latin Americans, including Venezuelans, pass through a harsh immigration and criminal system without the slightest chance of similar leniency. The contrast between how punitive the American judiciary is toward undocumented migrants and how lenient it has been in the past with agents of military dictatorships is perceived in Caracas as evidence of the politicization of justice: an ordinary person receives the maximum punishment, while a professional repressive apparatus receives the minimum if it was once part of the "anti‑communist" front.

Venezuelan memory inevitably draws parallels with its own traumas. Mass violence during the suppression of insurgents in the 1960s, the shootings and repression of the Caracazo in 1989, killings and torture during the protests of 2014 and 2017 — these are not closed chapters but open wounds. The question raised when reading the Letelier story is simple: if even in such a paradigmatic Cold War case punishment was partial and mild, who and when will be held accountable for Venezuelan disappearances, torture, extrajudicial killings, for violence both before chavismo and under it?

Another sensitive issue is extraterritorial justice. The fact that the Letelier case was tried in the U.S., not Chile, resonates with current attempts to hold Venezuelan officials accountable through universal jurisdiction and international mechanisms, including the International Criminal Court’s investigation into Venezuela. The question asked in Caracas is: why does Latin America so often require a court outside the region to at least partially move a case forward? Letelier, killed in exile, and the former Chilean officer convicted overseas become a precedent invoked to justify the sense and necessity of international intervention in Venezuelan affairs.

Against this background, particular interest arises in how Latin America itself, and within it Venezuela, responds to the American claim to be the world’s arbiter. The piece "La amenaza de Venezuela" on elviejotopo.com, written from a Bolivarian perspective, unpacks Obama’s well‑known formulation of Venezuela as an "unusual and extraordinary threat" and shows that Caracas’s real danger to Washington is by no means missiles and tanks, but the example of a social project that survived under sanctions and openly challenges U.S. economic and political hegemony.

In this text the U.S. appears not as a neutral judge in cases like Letelier’s, but as a systemic aggressor: initiator of sanctions, asset freezes, attempts at regime change, up to scenarios describing the bombing of Caracas and the "abduction" of the president and first lady. Quotes from Trump cited in "La amenaza de Venezuela" read in the Venezuelan interpretation as an outright admission of imperialist interest in resources: when he says the U.S. will not allow a "hostile regime" to seize "our oil, our land or any assets" and that they must be "immediately returned to the United States," in Caracas this is read as nothing other than an attempt to rewrite property rights over another country.

Sanctions, described in the same text as "one of the harshest regimes in the world," which led to the economy’s near‑collapse by almost 99% in a year and accompanied by "brazen theft" such as the seizure of 32 tons of Venezuelan gold at the Bank of England, complete the picture. In the Venezuelan narrative they play the same background role as in the Letelier case: behind selective justice and loud statements about human rights lies cold calculation — control over oil, gold, geopolitical influence.

Against this background the Bolivarian government constructs a counterimage: a country, besieged though it may be, that is socially oriented, having built a network of missions in education, healthcare and housing, and launched mechanisms of direct and communal democracy. "La amenaza de Venezuela" lists in detail Chávez and Maduro’s missions — eradicating illiteracy, mass housing programs, Barrio Adentro and Operación Milagro in healthcare, scholarships, training tens of thousands of specialists. This is not presented as mere statistics: it is posed as a contradiction to the official American discourse that presents Venezuela as an example of "socialism’s failure." The Venezuelan response sounds different: if here, even under sanctions, the proportion of homeless is lower than in the U.S., and millions vote on budget allocations for local projects, then who exactly has the standing to speak about "democracy" and the "collapse of the model"?

Municipal assemblies, communal councils, workers’ congresses described in "La amenaza de Venezuela" are presented as practical schools of self‑government. Workers submit proposals, the president publicly responds "aprobada" or sends ideas back for revision, neighborhood residents vote on priorities — from installing water filters to opening clinics. In the official and pro‑government rhetoric to which this text clearly leans, these are not adornments but proof that 21st‑century socialism is not Soviet bureaucracy but "democracy from below." That is why the American designation of Venezuela as a "threat" is reinterpreted: the danger is not the level of armaments but the possibility that "los don nadie," the "nobodies" around the world, will see in Caracas a working example.

From inside Venezuela this discourse serves both as a response to accusations of authoritarianism and as an effort to restore dignity to people who have lived for years with inflation, shortages and migration. The Letelier story, the mild sentence of his killer, and the broader context of Operation Condor become in this optics an important argument: just as the U.S. coexisted for decades with Pinochet’s Chilean dictatorship, so current sanctions and lectures on human rights toward Caracas are viewed not as a call for democracy but as a continuation of the same policy of control and punishment of disobedient regimes.

On the other flank of the Latin American left, but in the same logic of confronting U.S. hegemony, is a short piece about a party newspaper on izquierdasocialista.org.ar. Describing the weekly as "reflejo de las luchas del movimiento obrero, las mujeres y la juventud" and emphasizing that it exists only thanks to "nuestros propios aportes y del de los suscriptos," the authors place it in the tradition of self‑funded, class‑based media. For a Venezuelan audience accustomed to debates about media wars, corporate and state monopolies over information, this easily translates to their own reality: in a world where the agenda is set by American news giants and the entertainment industry — from Donald Trump to Super Bowl shows — the left sees an answer in creating "their" press, serving neither advertisers nor the state but workers, women and youth.

In Venezuela this logic is strengthened by an anti‑imperialist context: while the U.S. projects its cultural hegemony worldwide, from political talk shows to pop culture, leftist and Bolivarian outlets describe their mission as resistance to that flow. The same type of thinking that allows Caracas to read the Letelier case, sanctions against Venezuela, or performances by Latin American stars on an American stage differently, appears in the Argentine description of the party newspaper: media are not neutral, they are a field of class and geopolitical struggle, so a "pure" publication must rely on contributions from its readers rather than money from corporations or embassies.

Thus, if one connects all these threads — Letelier’s murder and the lenient sentence of his perpetrator, sanctions and attempts at economic strangulation of Venezuela, the Bolivarian revolution’s anti‑imperialist self‑narrative, and the experience of self‑funded left media described on izquierdasocialista.org.ar and in "La amenaza de Venezuela" — a single picture emerges. From the Venezuelan viewpoint the U.S. appears simultaneously as judge and accomplice: by punishing individual agents of old dictatorships, it preserves untouched the system that birthed and nourished those dictatorships. In response, Latin America, and above all Venezuela, attempts to construct counter‑narratives — through communal democracy, by reinterpreting the "threat" label, through independent left publications. And then the story of one sentence in Washington ceases to be an episode of the past and becomes a reminder that the struggle for memory, justice and the right to tell one’s own story is far from over.

❮ ❯

Cabello Calls to Support the Vice President and Defend Chávez's Legacy

At a rally in Caracas commemorating the 34th anniversary of the 1992 coup attempt that launched Hugo Chávez's political career, senior official Diosdado Cabello addressed government supporters. He urged the people and revolutionaries to actively back Acting Vice President Delcy Rodríguez, calling her a brave woman who has taken on a historical responsibility. He framed his speech, delivered at the symbolically important Mountain Barracks where Chávez is buried, around the connection between contemporary politics and the legacy of the late leader.

In his remarks Cabello demanded the immediate release of President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores, referring to the events of January 3, which authorities describe as an attempted coup d'état. He said that only Chavistas and the Bolivarian Revolution guarantee peace in Venezuela, and accused the "oligarchy" of celebrating those events and wanting to end Chávez's legacy. The politician also commented on personnel changes in the government, noting that they often occur at the start of the year, and questioned the randomness of some political events.

Cabello emphasized that the state's main priorities are stability, peace, and economic resilience. As an example of concrete actions, he announced the transfer of 63 patrol cars and 504 motorcycles to bolster security in the states of Bolívar and Guayana Esequiba. In closing he called for unity and fidelity to Comandante Chávez's path, saying that his ideals will live on forever thanks to the people's devotion, and expressed confidence in the revolutionary forces' victory under any circumstances.

❮ ❯

Full version: Diosdado el 4-F: Acompañemos a Delcy, es una mujer valiente

Cultural Revival: Damascus Reopens Book Fair After Years of Isolation

A special session of the International Book Fair in Damascus became a vivid symbol of cultural change in Syria after many years of isolation, restrictions and bans. The event brought together diverse cultural currents with the participation of 500 publishers from 35 countries. Notably, the fair featured its first-ever Kurdish pavilion. Visitors gained access to hundreds of previously banned political, religious and cultural publications, as well as thousands of books that had not previously reached Syrian readers, which sparked huge public interest.

Syrian publishers who had worked abroad for years were able to return to their homeland. Dr. Muhammad Osman, founder of the Mosaic publishing house, called the participation a "symbolic restoration of justice" for publishers who had been deprived of the opportunity to work in their country. He noted that the return of the fair is an "impulse of hope" for the restoration of Syria’s cultural role, emphasizing the absence of censorship restrictions on publications across the spectrum — from the far right to the far left.

Historic attention was paid to the participation of the Kurdish pavilion, which drew large visitor interest. Its director, Salah ad-Din Surukji, explained that this interest stemmed from the public's desire to become acquainted with the rich Kurdish culture. The pavilion showcased historical documents and periodicals, including the journal Hawar — the oldest Kurdish-language publication in Syria, first published in Damascus in 1939. Surukji expressed hope for a "return of the features of that era" after decades of marginalization.

Arab publishers also notably returned to the fair, many participating for the first time in 14 years. Khalid al-Shawwah, a representative of the Kuwaiti publisher Dream Book, stressed the importance of this cultural opportunity and announced plans to open a branch in Damascus. He expressed optimism about the interest and awareness of Syrian readers, adding that the participation procedure had been simplified and that the Ministry of Culture limited itself to organizational assistance without interfering in the content of the books.

Stands featuring religious and scholarly literature that had previously been banned drew particular interest. Hazim Ubeid from the Jordanian publishing house Al-Asaria explained that their exhibition includes books on Islamic heritage, creed, various currents and legal schools (madhahib). He noted that the situation had changed: the Ministry of Culture merely accepted the list of books without objections. These publications represent key sources on Islamic thought, including hadiths, sunnas and theological works.

Overall, the Damascus Book Fair became an important step toward cultural revival and open dialogue. It not only provided access to long-unavailable knowledge, but also created a platform for direct communication between publishers and readers. Participants emphasized that the main goal was not commercial profit, but support for students and all those who for years had been deprived of the opportunity to study foundational sources, marking a new chapter in the country's intellectual life.

Comments on the news

• What were the main causes of Syria's cultural isolation in previous years, and how did this affect the publishing sector? - The main causes were international sanctions, the authoritarian rule of the Baath party, censorship and restrictions on cultural exchange. This led to state control over publishing through the Ministry of Culture, restrictions on the import of foreign literature, self-censorship by authors and a reduction in the diversity of publications, especially on political and social topics.
• What is the historical role of the journal Hawar in the Kurdish cultural movement in Syria, and why was its publication in 1939 in Damascus significant? - The journal Hawar played a key role in the Kurdish cultural revival, being the first publication in the Kurdish language using the Latin alphabet, which helped preserve and develop Kurdish identity. Its publication in 1939 in Damascus was significant because it appeared in the Syrian capital during a period of relative openness, symbolizing the possibility of cultural expression for Kurds in the official space despite subsequent restrictions.
• What are the legal schools (madhahib) in Islamic thought, and why might literature about them previously have been banned in Syria? - Legal schools (madhahib) are schools of Islamic jurisprudence, such as Hanafi, Shafi‘i, Maliki and Hanbali, which interpret religious law. In Syria, literature on some madhahib may have been banned due to state policies aimed at controlling religious discourse, preventing sectarianism and supporting the dominant Hanafi school, which limited pluralism in religious publications.

❮ ❯

Full version: معرض دمشق الدولي للكتاب يكتب فصله الأول في عصر ما بعد المنع

Venezuela launches national program to support local entrepreneurship

Venezuela has announced the holding of the First National Meeting on the Economy of Entrepreneurship and Communal Economy, aimed at creating a self-sufficient economic model. The initiative, presented by Acting President Delcy Rodríguez, is intended to unite the entrepreneurial sector with the system of local communes to ensure the production of food and services directly on site. Rodríguez emphasized the need to overcome dependence on the oil economy through strategic import substitution, stating that "this is an economy that is born from the people on the territory." After inspecting various socio-productive projects, she confirmed that the state will provide all necessary financial support to local entrepreneurs to stimulate the country's economic revival, using the potential of all 14 production sectors.

❮ ❯

Full version: Venezuela convoca al Primer Encuentro Nacional de la Economía del Emprendimiento y Comunal

Lebanon and Syria Agree to Transfer Prisoners to Improve Relations

The governments of Lebanon and Syria have signed an official agreement to transfer about 300 convicted Syrians from Lebanese prisons to serve their sentences in Syria. The move is part of efforts to reboot judicial cooperation between the two neighboring countries and reduce long-standing tensions. The signing took place at a government building in Beirut with high-ranking officials from both sides in attendance, including the Lebanese prime minister and the ministers of justice of both countries.

The agreement provides for the transfer of convicted persons who have already served at least 10 years in Lebanese prisons. Their sentences will be completed in Syria after obtaining their consent and completing all legal procedures. This transfer represents only the first phase of a plan under which other detainee cases, including those awaiting trial and cases of the missing, will be considered later.

Lebanese officials presented the agreement as a real opportunity for a fundamental improvement in relations with Damascus, based on legal coordination and mutual respect. The deputy prime minister of Lebanon said the agreement aims to reduce judicial tension and review the cases of Syrian detainees in Lebanon, calling it a practical step toward building trust. The cabinet’s unanimous approval of the agreement was presented as a sign of domestic consensus.

Observers see this agreement as an important precedent that could open the way to resolving other long-standing contentious issues between the two countries. Analysts note that, while the agreement focuses on specific judicial cases, it could potentially extend to broader topics such as the return of displaced persons and delimitation of maritime and land borders through joint commissions.

Experts emphasize the mutual benefits of this arrangement. On the one hand, it eases the burden on overcrowded Lebanese prisons, which has social and humanitarian implications. On the other hand, Damascus sees it as a constructive response from Beirut that could be rewarded in the future with concessions from the Syrian side on other issues. Further detainee transfer agreements are expected to follow.

Overall, the agreement is viewed as a pivotal, albeit cautious, step toward restoring trust and normalizing relations after many years of tension. It lays the groundwork for resolving other complex legacy issues, including those related to historical cooperation agreements. Despite remaining distrust in some quarters, the decision represents the political will to move forward.

Comments on the story

• Which historical cooperation agreements between Lebanon and Syria are mentioned in the article and why did they become contentious? - It likely refers to the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination of 1991 and related agreements. They became contentious because they effectively legitimized Syrian military and political presence in Lebanon after the civil war, which many Lebanese and the international community viewed as a violation of Lebanese sovereignty. These agreements were annulled or revised after the 2005 “Cedar Revolution” and the withdrawal of Syrian troops.
• What is the problem regarding displaced persons between Syria and Lebanon, and why is it a long-standing disputed issue? - The issue involves two main groups: Palestinian refugees who have lived in Lebanon since 1948 and later, and Syrian refugees who arrived after 2011. It is a long-standing dispute because Lebanon, as a small country, fears demographic changes and permanent settlement of refugees, which is seen as a threat to its fragile political balance. Syria has historically insisted on the right of return for refugees, complicating the resolution.
• Why is delimitation of maritime borders between Lebanon and Syria a contentious issue, and what resources might be at stake? - This is contentious because uncertainty over borders in the eastern Mediterranean affects potential rights to explore and extract oil and gas. The resources at stake are potential hydrocarbon deposits on the continental shelf. The dispute is complicated by the fact that defining the border with Syria impacts the broader Lebanon–Israel maritime boundary dispute and the economic interests of various regional and international actors.

❮ ❯

Full version: ماذا بعد اتفاق "نقل المحكومين" بين بيروت ودمشق؟

Venezuela Announces Upcoming Release of Group of Detainees

President of the National Assembly of Venezuela Jorge Rodríguez visited the detention center in the Boleíta area, known as "Zone 7," to meet personally with relatives of the citizens held there. During the meeting he announced the start of the process to release a group of detainees, assuring those gathered that their loved ones would be freed next week. Specific dates were set from February 10 to 13. The statement was made in response to the families' expectations, who had long kept vigil at the walls of the detention facility hoping to obtain information about the fate of the arrested.

❮ ❯

Full version: AMNISTÍA: Jorge Rodríguez anunció liberación de detenidos entre el 10 y el 13 de febrero

Lebanon and Syria agree to transfer hundreds of prisoners

The governments of Lebanon and Syria signed an important agreement in Beirut to transfer convicted Syrian citizens from Lebanese prisons to Syria to serve their sentences at home. The signing ceremony took place in the government building in the presence of Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati and Syrian Minister of Justice Mazhar al-Wais, as well as other senior officials from both countries. This document, approved by the Lebanese cabinet at the end of January, establishes an official repatriation procedure.

The agreement initially covers about 300 convicted Syrians. Syrian Minister of Justice Mazhar al-Wais called the signing "an important step toward justice," allowing the fates of these people to be settled. The parties also agreed to prepare a separate plan and a subsequent agreement for those detained Syrians who are not covered by the current document, including complex cases of people who disappeared without a trace after many years of detention.

Lebanese representatives stressed that implementing the agreement will help reduce the catastrophic overcrowding of local prisons. Lebanese Information Minister Paul Marcus noted that the country is counting on an exchange mechanism with Syria to improve the situation in the penitentiary system. He also linked this initiative to a broader context — plans to facilitate the return of hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees in cooperation with the UNHCR.

The Syrian side presented the agreement as the result of targeted efforts to protect the rights and dignity of its citizens held in custody abroad. Minister al-Wais said that resolving these judicial and humanitarian cases is a priority for Damascus. The process was accompanied by intensive official visits and negotiations between the two countries over recent months.

The signing was the culmination of a period of active diplomatic contacts aimed at normalizing and improving bilateral relations. Lebanese Deputy Prime Minister Tarek al-Metri said there is now "a real opportunity to build relations entirely different from the past," based on mutual respect and equality. Authorities in both countries have repeatedly stated that the issue of prisoners and detainees is a top priority for them.

The current agreement is seen as the start of a process. Its practical impact will depend on subsequent legal and logistical work to transfer the prisoners. The parties are expected to continue working on resolving cases of other categories of detainees and to develop cooperation, including with countries such as Qatar, which is helping to restore areas in northern Syria to enable the safe return of people.

Comments on the news

• What is the historical context of Lebanon–Syria relations that led to the need to "build relations entirely different from the past"? - Historically, Syria exerted significant military and political influence over Lebanon, including the presence of its troops from 1976 to 2005. This created relations that many Lebanese perceived as a violation of sovereignty. The need for new relations stems from Lebanon’s desire for full independence and equal partnership after the civil war and Syrian intervention.

• Which areas in northern Syria are being rebuilt with Qatar’s help, and why is this linked to returns? - Qatar is helping to rebuild predominantly devastated areas in Aleppo and Idlib provinces, which suffered heavily during the conflict. Rebuilding infrastructure (housing, schools, hospitals) is directly linked to returns because it creates minimum living and safety conditions that encourage refugees and internally displaced persons to go back to their homes.

• How is the issue of "people who disappeared without a trace after many years of detention" connected to the broader context of the Syrian conflict and human rights? - This problem reflects systematic human rights violations by all parties to the Syrian conflict, including arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, and the absence of due process. It highlights a deep humanitarian crisis in which thousands of families do not know the fate of relatives for decades, exacerbating societal trauma and hindering national reconciliation.

❮ ❯

Full version: دمشق وبيروت توقّعان اتفاقية لنقل مئات السجناء السوريين من لبنان

Venezuela's National Assembly approved an amnesty bill

Venezuela's National Assembly unanimously approved in its first reading a bill on amnesty for democratic coexistence. The initiative, originally presented by Acting President Delcy Rodríguez, is aimed at strengthening democratic principles, justice, political pluralism and human rights. Deputy Jorge Arreaza, who presented the bill, emphasized that the amnesty does not apply to persons responsible for serious human rights violations, crimes against humanity, corruption, drug trafficking or intentional murders, in accordance with Article 29 of the country's Constitution.

Political leaders said this step reflects the desire of 95% of Venezuelans to put an end to political confrontation and violence. The Assembly’s First Vice President Pedro Infante called on all political forces to heed the majority’s demand for stability and to work together to restore prosperity through the values of coexistence and mutual recognition. The bill is presented not as an act of impunity, but as a substantial contribution to peace and Venezuela’s national sovereignty.

❮ ❯

Full version: AN aprobó por unanimidad primera discusión del Proyecto de Ley de Amnistía

Poetic correspondence about love and the internet explodes on Syrian social media

Syria found itself near the bottom of the global internet speed rankings, reflecting a deep communications crisis that affects all aspects of everyday life for Syrians. This problem even reached into personal relationships, becoming the subject of discussions and jokes on social networks. Against this backdrop, an unusual story emerged linking a blogger and the communications minister, which sparked widespread public resonance.

A blogger named Omar appealed to Syria’s Minister of Communications Abdussalam Haykal via platform X with a poetic complaint, describing in verse the internet outage affecting his beloved: "I called you, O Minister, and said: allo, my beloved’s internet isn’t working. I can’t connect with her, her lines are cut off from me... What shall I do?" The message drew attention both to the state of basic services and to the creative way of expressing dissatisfaction.

The minister unexpectedly replied in verse, reassuring the user: "Allo, Omar, your complaint has become an example of love and longing, completed with the grace of poetry. May God not separate you two after intimacy and may the connection between you truly endure without delay. Tomorrow the office will connect for monitoring until her internet is restored." This poetic response gave the situation a human dimension and amplified its spread as an amusing politico-social phenomenon.

The exchange triggered a flood of similar poetic replies from other users. One wrote: "If the ghost of separation ever passes between you, the ministry’s connection affair will be expedited." Most comments combined irony with romantic fantasy, rephrasing the complaint in a similar poetic style to heighten the comic effect. This reaction turned a private case into a mass virtual performance blending politics with humor.

Critical voices also appeared, mocking the minister’s involvement in resolving a personal problem. One user sarcastically remarked: "If the minister connected every time his beloved’s connection was lost, there would be not a single employee left in the ministry." Others suggested reverting to old means of communication like carrier pigeons, a bitter joke about deteriorating services. Thus, the technical problem of slow internet in Syria turned into a romantic satirical story reflecting people’s suffering and their ability to turn complaints into creative content.

Comments on the news

• Who is Abdussalam Haykal and what is his role in the Syrian government? - Abdussalam Haykal is a Syrian businessman and public figure close to government circles. He does not hold an official state position but acts as an informal channel of communication between citizens and authorities, often responding to complaints and requests on social networks, especially on platform X (formerly Twitter). His role can be described as a mediator who helps bring the population’s problems to decision-makers.

• Why has platform X become a significant channel for citizens to address authorities in Syria? - Platform X became an important channel because traditional media in Syria are under strict control, while social networks remain a relatively freer space for expressing opinions. Citizens use X for direct appeals to officials and public complaints because this often leads to quicker responses than official bureaucratic procedures. Authorities, in turn, use the platform to monitor public sentiment and demonstrate responsiveness.

• What are the historical or cultural roots of using poetry to express complaints and official responses in Syrian society? - The use of poetry for complaints and dialogue with authorities has deep roots in Arab and Syrian culture, dating back to pre-Islamic times. Poetry has traditionally been a means of social criticism, political protest, and appeal to rulers in a veiled, artistic form. This tradition has persisted in modern Syria, where poems often contain hidden meanings and metaphors that allow displeasure to be expressed safely. In the digital age, this practice has adapted to social networks, where poetic appeals can spread quickly and receive replies.

❮ ❯

Full version: حين ينقطع "نت الحبيبة".. حكاية عتاب شعري بين مدون سوري ووزير الاتصالات

Venezuela focuses on developing the communal economy

Acting President of Venezuela Delsi Rodríguez instructed the national economic cabinet of ministers to fully concentrate on strengthening and expanding the communal economy. This measure aims to consolidate the industrial integration of production processes managed by local communities across the country. Rodríguez emphasized that the people and the government, working together, are carrying out the directives of President Nicolás Maduro, and she announced the need for full support for the industrialization of local production.

The main focus will be on two approaches: ensuring the integration of communal processes into the national industrial chain and replicating successful models of local production councils for other key products in the consumer basket. This decision was announced at the National Assembly on the Communal Economy in Caracas, where Rodríguez noted that Venezuela’s new economic phase requires comprehensive support for industrialization.

❮ ❯

Full version: Presidenta (e) Rodríguez:

Russian troops leave key base in Syria after a decade

Satellite images have confirmed the complete withdrawal of Russian forces from their largest military base in Syria, located at Kamishli International Airport in al-Hasakah province. After nearly ten years of presence, which began in 2016, the facility that served as Russia’s main stronghold in the region now stands empty. The official handover of the airport to the control of the Syrian government administration took place on Tuesday, marking the end of an era of Russian military presence in the country’s northeast.

The base had strategic significance for Russian operations in Syria. It hosted air defense systems, military and helicopter units, and was the launch point for joint Russian-Turkish patrols along the Syria-Turkey border. The withdrawal process, which included the dismantling of radar stations and the removal of military equipment, was observed over recent weeks. Analysts link this decision to Russia’s need to reallocate military resources and concentrate efforts on the full-scale war in Ukraine.

The handover of Kamishli Airport is part of a broader and comprehensive agreement between the Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The agreement provides for the phased merging of the parties’ military formations and administrative bodies in al-Hasakah province, which remains the SDF’s last stronghold. Thus, Russia’s departure could become a catalyst for a shift in the balance of power and administrative control in this key region of the country.

❮ ❯

Full version: صور أقمار صناعية.. مطار القامشلي بسوريا خالٍ من قوات روسية لأول مرة منذ عقد

New chapter: US diplomat arrives in Caracas to resume embassy operations

A new US diplomatic representative, Ambassador Dogu, has arrived in Caracas, marking the resumption of operations at the American embassy in Venezuela after a long hiatus. Her appointment as head of the diplomatic mission, made with the direct support of President Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, opens a new chapter in bilateral relations. The diplomat herself described the moment as historic, declaring her readiness to work for a stable and prosperous future for Venezuela.

Ambassador Dogu’s mission will focus on implementing a strategic plan based on three key principles: restoring stability and security, economic recovery, and supporting a democratic transition. As initial practical steps, measures are already being taken to open airspace and lift certain economic restrictions to stimulate commercial activity. The diplomat emphasized her intention to work closely with all sectors of Venezuelan society, after which she symbolically entered the embassy building accompanied by her team.

❮ ❯

Full version: (+Video)

Syrian security forces return to Al-Hasakah after years-long hiatus

After 14 years of absence, advance units of the Syrian internal security forces entered the administrative center of Al-Hasakah province in the northeast of the country. The commander of these forces confirmed that they also took control of a key facility — Kamishli Airport. To coordinate further deployment and ensure security in the province, the commander held a meeting with leaders of local Kurdish formations who had previously controlled the region.

❮ ❯

Full version: بعد 14 عاما.. طلائع الأمن الداخلي السوري تدخل مدينة الحسكة

Opposition figure María Machado ready for dialogue with Venezuelan authorities

María Machado, leader of the far-right wing of the Venezuelan opposition, said she is willing to hold a meeting with the country's acting president Delcy Rodríguez, noting that "if it is necessary to exchange views at some meeting, then it will be done." This statement indicates a possible softening of her position and opens up the prospect of dialogue between the opposition and the government amid the ongoing political crisis in Venezuela.

❮ ❯

Full version: María Machado se doblega y está dispuesta a reunirse con la Presidenta (E) Delcy Rodríguez

Hama: 44 Years Remembering Assad Regime's Massacre

On a cold February night in 1982, the Syrian city of Hama was subjected to a massive military invasion. Tanks and army brigades of President Hafez al-Assad’s regime, commanded by his brother Rifaat al-Assad and elite units of the "Defense Squads," entered the city under the pretext of fighting armed Islamist groups. The operation quickly escalated into a full-scale siege: electricity, water supply and communications were cut off, roads were blocked, and residents were trapped in their streets.

The siege lasted 27 days and became one of the most brutal punitive operations in modern Syrian history, aimed at crushing any opposition. Casualty figures vary: by different estimates, between 10,000 and 40,000 people were killed, and thousands remain missing. Regardless of the exact numbers, the massacre in Hama is widely recognized as a monstrous crime against humanity, leaving a deep wound in the national memory.

Today, 44 years later, the residents of Hama and the Syrian diaspora are publicly commemorating the anniversary of the tragedy for the first time since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Many are posting publicly for the first time photographs of relatives who were killed then by the army. Activists say that public remembrance inside Hama itself is an act of resistance against oblivion and an affirmation that "the truth does not die," and that the memory of the crime must be preserved for future generations.

Survivors and human rights defenders emphasize that the goal of the operation was not simply to defeat armed resistance but the deliberate "crushing of the spirit of an entire city," a punishment for its aspiration for freedom. Memories of days of bombardment, people disappearing, houses flattened to the ground, and entire families erased from official records are still vivid. Despite attempts at total destruction, residents assert that Hama did not break and its memory did not fall silent, and they see themselves as guardians of that memory.

On the anniversary there are calls to establish a memorial museum in Hama to document the events, preserve the names of the victims and the testimonies of survivors. Civil activists insist that such an institution is necessary to draw historical lessons. At the same time, demands are growing to hold all those responsible for the massacre to account, stressing that this crime has no statute of limitations. Preserving the truth and fighting for justice are seen as key conditions for preventing recurrence of such tragedies and for building a peaceful future in Syria.

Comments on the news

• What historical and political significance did the city of Hama have before the 1982 events that made it a special target for the regime? - Hama was historically a center of influence for the Islamist movement the Muslim Brotherhood and a symbol of organized political opposition to the ruling Baath Party. The city took part in uprisings against the regime in 1964 and 1981. For Hafez al-Assad’s regime, Hama represented not just a local protest but an ideological and structural threat, so its suppression in 1982 was brutal and total in order to eliminate any future challenge.

• Who were the "Defense Squads" and what was their role in the Syrian political system under Hafez al-Assad? - The "Defense Squads" (Saraya al-Difa') were semi-military formations created in the 1960s to protect the Baath regime and suppress internal opposition. They operated as an instrument of extrajudicial violence and control, answering directly to the party and security services. Their role was to eliminate political opponents, intimidate the population and consolidate Hafez al-Assad’s power, especially during crises such as the Islamist uprising of 1979–1982.

• How did opportunities for public commemoration and human rights work in Syria change after the "fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime" mentioned in the article? - The phrase "fall of the regime" in the article is an ironic reference to protesters’ expectations in 2011–2012 that the regime would soon collapse. In reality, after the brutal suppression of the uprising and the onset of civil war, opportunities for legal human rights activity and public commemoration of regime victims have virtually disappeared. Any such actions are harshly repressed by security forces, and civic space has been sharply curtailed due to repression, "anti-terrorism" laws and territorial control.

❮ ❯

Full version: بعد 44 عاما من المجزرة.. أهالي حماة ينشرون صور أقاربهم الذين قتلهم الأسد

Venezuela's First Ever Liquefied Petroleum Gas Export

Venezuela has reached a historic milestone by sending the first-ever shipment of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) from its territory to the international market. Acting President Delsi Rodríguez announced that the vessel Chrysopigi Lady has already departed with the cargo, marking the export of the first molecule of gas produced on Venezuelan soil. This achievement is the result of joint efforts by workers in the oil and gas sector and will allow the country to diversify its exports, strengthen energy sovereignty, and secure new sources of revenue for national economic development, positioning Venezuela as a significant player in the global gas market.

❮ ❯

Full version: Venezuela alcanza hito histórico con la primera exportación de Gas Licuado de Petróleo (GLP)

New Syria agreement: integrating Kurdish forces and implementation challenges

The new agreement between the Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) opens another stage in complex negotiations over the future of the country's northeast regions. The document raises questions about how it actually differs from previous arrangements, notably the January agreement, and whether it will be a turning point in the Syrian conflict or repeat the fate of earlier failed initiatives. The focus is on practical steps for military and civil integration, the success of which depends on the political will of both sides.

The agreement provides for a general ceasefire and the gradual unification of military and administrative structures. It includes the withdrawal of forces from the contact line and the deployment of units of the Syrian Ministry of Interior to key cities Hasakah and Qamishli to reinforce stability. It also foresees the formation of a military brigade composed of three battalions from SDF fighters in the Hasakah area and one battalion in Kobani, which will become part of an army formation of Aleppo province.

The political significance of the agreement goes beyond a temporary settlement, creating a basis for a new format of participation of all Syrian communities in political life. The document reflects the changed balance of power in the Jazira region and an attempt to restore state sovereignty over territories that had slipped out of Damascus's control. Presidential Decree No. 13 of 16 January, recognizing the cultural and linguistic rights of Syrian Kurds and addressing the issues of the 1962 census, deprived local SDF leaders of important arguments in favor of autonomy.

A key question remains the integration of the SDF into the Syrian army. Disagreements exist over implementation mechanisms: the SDF sees the process as preserving its structure within the army, whereas Damascus insists on individual integration of fighters after vetting. Full incorporation of the formations into the Ministry of Defense would mean the end of their existence as an independent armed group and their transformation into a political force subordinate to the state's military hierarchy.

On the civilian level, the agreement faces problems of integrating the institutions of Kurdish self-governance (the "autonomous administration") into state structures while preserving elements of decentralization. The process includes retaining local personnel to prevent an institutional vacuum and returning control over natural resources (oil, gas, grain, water) to central authorities to finance national projects. The main risk is potential frictions and sabotage during implementation, which could return the region to instability.

The agreement received broad international support from the United States, France, the UN and a number of Arab and European countries, reflecting interest in stabilizing Syria. The US has expressed readiness to assist a smooth integration, the SDF has stated its desire to implement the agreements, and the Syrian government views it as a model of settlement. The success of the agreement depends primarily on the parties' ability to resolve disagreements over the details — it can become a turning point if implemented smoothly or lead to renewed confrontation in case of delays.

Comments on the news

• What are the "issues of the 1962 census" and how did they historically affect the situation of the Kurdish population in Syria? - This refers to the disputed population census in Syria's al-Hasakah province in 1962, as a result of which tens of thousands of Kurds were stripped of Syrian citizenship. They were classified as "unregistered" (ajnab) or "foreigners" (maktumin), which led to years of discrimination, restrictions on property rights, employment, education and movement. This situation laid the groundwork for deep grievances and Kurdish demands that later manifested in the Syrian conflict.

• How was the "autonomous administration" in northeastern Syria organized, and which areas of life (education, courts, security) did it control before this agreement? - The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), often called "Rojava," was a de facto self-governing system established by Kurdish forces with the support of allied Arab and Assyrian groups. Before any agreements with Damascus it controlled: education (with curricula in Kurdish, Arabic and other languages), courts (secular courts applying their own legal codes, different from the Syrian state) and security (through the People's Protection Units YPG/YPJ and the Asayish police). This administration functioned like a parallel state with local councils, economic committees and social services.

• Why does the city of Kobani have special symbolic significance in the Syrian conflict, especially for Kurdish forces? - Kobani (also known as Ayn al-Arab) became a powerful symbol of Kurdish resistance and identity after the ISIL siege of the city in 2014–2015. The heroic defense by Kurdish militias (YPG/YPJ), supported by international coalition airstrikes, resulted in the first major defeat of ISIL. For Kurds, this became a moment of national pride, mobilization and international recognition, strengthening the position of Kurdish forces in Syria and making Kobani a symbol of sacrifice and resilience.

❮ ❯

Full version: ماذا يعني اتفاق "قسد" الجديد مع الحكومة السورية؟

Venezuela's Radical Opposition Seeks to Undermine Stability, Analyst Says

Political analyst Indira Urbaneja asserts that the most radical wing of Venezuela's opposition, having become desperate after the failed attempts to seize power in early January, has shifted to a strategy of destabilizing the country. According to her, this was prompted by a change of course from the United States, which, guided by pragmatism and considerations of energy security, began to view Nicolás Maduro's government as the only force capable of guaranteeing stability. Deprived of its previous full external support, the radicals have launched a twofold attack: a disinformation campaign to split supporters of the current government, and an outright economic boycott.

Urbaneja said this group is paying particular attention to efforts to derail Venezuela's economic recovery. To this end, they actively publish negative reports about the country's oil reserves in an attempt to scare off foreign investors and prevent the return of international oil companies and the restoration of air links. The analyst believes the ultimate goal of these actions is to prevent the consolidation of economic progress, since the country's full recovery would mean the final collapse of the radical opposition's hopes of coming to power by unconstitutional means.

❮ ❯

Full version: Analista Indira Urbaneja afirma que sectores radicales de oposición buscan

US Congress Discusses Withdrawal of Russian Forces from Syria

Attempts by the administration of former US President Donald Trump to act as a broker between the Syrian government and the Kurdish minority have again raised questions about the nature of Damascus’s relationship with Moscow. Central topics of debate included the possibility of restoring US sanctions against Syria and the prospects for weakening its ties with Russia. Damascus, for its part, seeks to preserve a diplomatic balance by maintaining economic and military cooperation with Moscow while keeping the door open for dialogue with Washington.

In response to the strengthening of Russian–Syrian ties, legislative steps were initiated in the US Congress. Republican Joe Wilson held hearings on the issue of removing Russian military bases from Syria, saying this would “secure the region and prevent Russia from sowing chaos in Africa and the Mediterranean.” However, experts such as Steven Heydeman expressed skepticism about the practical feasibility of this idea, noting that Congress does not have direct authority to forcibly remove foreign troops from a sovereign state’s territory.

Notably, the hearings were not held in the relevant Middle East subcommittee but within the so‑called Helsinki Commission, which deals with security issues in Europe. This gave the discussion an unexpected European context. The focus turned to the legacy of Russian support for Bashar al-Assad’s regime and hypothetical scenarios for reducing Moscow’s influence. Three experts with differing views were invited to participate — ranging from harsh criticism of Russian policy to more balanced assessments.

Experts explain the strength of ties between Damascus and Moscow by mutual economic and military dependence. Syria relies on Russia for printing its national currency, and for supplies of weapons, oil, and wheat. Some congressmembers fear that maintaining and deepening this partnership will seriously weaken US positions in Syria and become a “slap in the face to Washington.” There are also concerns that increased Russian influence could push Damascus into an even closer alliance with Iran.

The Trump administration is under pressure from pro‑Israeli lobbyists and several think tanks demanding a tougher stance toward Syria because of its ties with Russia. Calls have been made to reinstate sanctions, especially if Damascus receives modern Russian weapons systems, which could trigger measures under the CAATSA law. In response, Syrian leadership has shown pragmatism, publicly reaffirming its commitment to all previously concluded agreements with Moscow, including the retention of Russian bases in Tartus and Khmeimim.

Despite congressional activity, the Trump administration has not yet issued an official demand for the withdrawal of Russian forces as a condition for normalizing relations with Damascus or lifting sanctions. As experts note, such a decision lies within the White House’s purview, and no clear signals have been sent in that direction. On the contrary, the administration has acknowledged the complex diplomatic balancing act that the Syrian president is attempting, navigating between Turkey, Arab states, Europe, Russia, and China.

Comments on the news

• What is the Helsinki Commission in the US Congress and why are Syria‑related issues being considered within a commission on European security? - The Helsinki Commission (officially: the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe) is an independent US government agency created to monitor compliance with human rights and the implementation of the Helsinki Accords. Although it focuses on Europe, its mandate includes monitoring human‑rights situations in other countries, including Syria, especially when violations are linked to actions by European states or international agreements. Syrian issues are often considered in the context of migration, refugees, the use of chemical weapons, and impacts on European security.

• Which specific provisions of the CAATSA law could be applied to Syria and have such sanctions already been used against Damascus before? - The CAATSA law (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) provides for sanctions against countries that cooperate with Russia, Iran, or North Korea in the defense sector. Provisions related to sanctions for acquiring Russian weaponry or cooperating with Iranian forces could be applied to Syria. Similar sanctions have already been used against Damascus before — the US has imposed multifaceted sanctions on the Syrian government since 2011, including export bans, financial restrictions, and asset freezes.

• Why does Syria rely on Russia to print its national currency and how does this affect the country’s economic sovereignty and financial policy? - Syria relies on Russia to print its currency (the Syrian pound) because international sanctions limit access to materials and equipment needed to print banknotes, and because domestic infrastructure has been damaged. This affects economic sovereignty by limiting control over money supply and issuance, making monetary policy dependent on external decisions. Such dependence can lead to inflation, difficulties managing the exchange rate, and vulnerability to Russia’s political choices.

❮ ❯

Full version: هل يمهد الكونغرس لإجبار دمشق على إغلاق القواعد الروسية؟

Venezuela Declares Amnesty for Political Prisoners

Interim President of Venezuela Delcy Rodríguez announced a general amnesty for those considered political prisoners during the opening ceremony of the 2026 judicial year. She said the bill will be sent to the National Assembly to promote peaceful coexistence in the country, urging citizens to avoid violence and revenge, and noted that the decision was coordinated with Nicolás Maduro. At the same time, it was announced that the notorious prison El Helicoide will be converted into a center for social and sports services for the local community. The announcement followed more than a month of gradual releases that began after Maduro’s capture by US special forces on January 3, resulting, according to authorities, in more than 600 people being freed so far, and the new measure could affect hundreds more inmates.

❮ ❯

Full version: Delcy Rodríguez anuncia una amnistía general para los denominados “presos políticos” en Venezuela

Historical agreement on reunification of Syria

The Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) announced the signing of a comprehensive ceasefire agreement that provides for the phased integration of SDF military formations and administrative structures into nationwide institutions. According to official sources, this step is aimed at reuniting Syrian territory, restoring the rule of law, and achieving full integration through enhanced cooperation among all interested parties. The agreement marks a potentially pivotal moment in the long-running conflict in the country’s northeast.

On the military front, the agreement includes the withdrawal of troops from the line of contact and the deployment of security forces subordinate to the Ministry of Interior to key cities Al-Hasakah and Al-Qamishli to strengthen stability. It also foresees the formation of a military brigade composed of three regiments from former SDF fighters and a separate regiment from the Ayn al-Arab (Kobani) region to be part of a brigade subordinated to Aleppo province. The appointment of Brigadier General Marwan al-Ali as commander of internal security for Al-Hasakah province is part of measures to transfer force-related powers to the state.

On the civilian and administrative front, the arrangements envisage the integration of autonomous administration bodies into state structures while preserving positions for civil servants. Special attention is given to addressing the civil and educational rights of the Kurdish community, as well as ensuring the return of displaced persons to their areas. The state is to assume control over all civilian and governmental institutions, border crossings, and checkpoints, which would eliminate the existence of territories outside its jurisdiction.

The international community, represented by U.S. special envoy for Syria Thomas Barakeh, praised the agreement. Barakeh called it “a historic and deeply significant milestone on Syria’s path to national reconciliation, unity, and lasting stability.” In his statement he emphasized that the Syrian government demonstrates a commitment to genuine national partnership, inclusive governance, and facilitating the gradual integration of SDF military, security, and administrative structures into unified state institutions.

The agreement was preceded by an escalation of tensions: in recent weeks the Syrian army established control over Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor provinces following clashes with the SDF. These operations were launched after SDF formations violated previous arrangements with the government. Earlier, on January 18, the parties had already signed a ceasefire agreement that also provided for the integration of SDF elements into government structures, including the management of prisons and camps left from ISIL.

The implementation of the agreement will proceed in several phases and includes comprehensive settlement, individual integration of security structures into state units, and the transfer of civilian and administrative infrastructure to the state. These measures are aimed at preventing the emergence of autonomous enclaves. The success of the agreement’s implementation, including its timetable and specific steps, will be closely watched at both local and international levels, since long-term stability in Syria depends on it.

Comments on the news

• What was the actual degree of autonomy of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) before this agreement and which territories did they control? - The SDF had significant de facto autonomy in northeastern Syria, controlling about a third of the country’s territory, including parts of Al-Hasakah, Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, and Aleppo provinces. They established their own administrative bodies, security forces, and judicial system, introduced Kurdish-language education, and managed local resources such as oil fields. However, this autonomy was not officially recognized by the central government in Damascus, and the SDF depended on oil revenue and control over border crossings.

• What was specific about the situation of the Kurdish community in regions controlled by the SDF, and why is resolving their rights highlighted separately? - In SDF-controlled areas the Kurdish community, historically subjected to discrimination and assimilation, for the first time obtained the opportunity to openly use their language in education and official affairs, participate in local self-government, and develop their culture. This created a model of ethnic pluralism but also raised concerns among parts of the Arab population and provoked sharp opposition from Turkey, which views Kurdish forces as a threat. Resolving their rights is singled out because it is a central issue for regional stability and a key demand of the Kurdish side in any negotiations on Syria’s future.

• What was the status and significance of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor in the context of the conflict, and why did Syrian army control of them presage the agreement? - Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor were of critical economic and strategic importance: they host Syria’s main oil and gas fields, as well as important agricultural lands and water resources. Raqqa was notorious as the capital of the “Islamic State,” and Deir ez-Zor served as a key transport hub. The return of these territories to Syrian army control deprived the SDF of a significant portion of their economic base and strengthened Damascus’s negotiating position, forcing Kurdish leadership to seek a political settlement to preserve at least some of their gains.

❮ ❯

Full version: الحكومة السورية وقسد تعلنان اتفاقا شاملا لوقف إطلاق النار والدمج بمؤسسات الدولة

Venezuela Exports Gas for First Time

Acting President of Venezuela Delcy Rodríguez announced the country's first-ever export shipment of a gas molecule, saying that the vessel is already in the country and will depart within the next few hours, and that video of the event will be released to the public. The announcement was made at the Miraflores presidential palace during the presentation of a partial reform to the Hydrocarbons Law, recently approved by parliament. Rodríguez emphasized that Venezuela welcomes both foreign and national investment in the development of the oil, gas, and petrochemical sectors, provided the country's sovereignty is respected.

❮ ❯

Full version: Delcy Rodríguez anunció que

Syrian leader's speech in Moscow sparks heated debate

The visit of Syrian President Ahmad Shar to Moscow and his meeting with Vladimir Putin sparked lively discussions on social media. Particular attention was drawn to Shar's welcoming speech in which, upon seeing snow on the road from the airport, he recalled historical military campaigns directed against Russia. He noted that they had failed thanks to the courage of Russian soldiers and the help of nature, calling Russia a "blessed land." These words provoked a mixed reaction, dividing public opinion into supporters and critics.

Reactions were split: some saw Shar's remarks as a diplomatic blunder and inappropriate flattery, given accusations against Russia of supporting Bashar al-Assad's regime and participating in the Syrian conflict. Others interpreted his approach as political wisdom and pragmatism necessary to protect national interests and strengthen the country's borders in a complex international environment.

Supporters of the pragmatic approach argue that excessive praise and compliments are part of Arab political and diplomatic culture when dealing with powerful opponents. They point to poetic examples and linguistic traditions, justifying Shar's speaking style as a strategic move to build relations with Moscow, not necessarily reflecting the feelings of the Syrian people. For them, the primary criterion remains Syria's national interest.

Critics, however, emphasize that such rhetorical concession cannot overshadow Russia's historical role in the Syrian conflict. They recall that since the military intervention in 2015, Russia became a key player that allowed Syrian government forces to regain control over a significant portion of the territory, accompanied by destruction and casualties. For them, reconciliation with Moscow without internal changes appears hypocritical.

Ultimately, the debates around Shar's speech reflect a deeper contradiction between Syria's pragmatic foreign policy needs and the moral demands of justice for its citizens. Many insist that any new relations with Moscow must be accompanied by clear internal commitments, including a review of approaches to Syrians' rights and the release of political prisoners, so that external handshakes do not seem like double standards.

Comments on the news

• Who is Ahmad Shar and what is his role in the Syrian government? - Ahmad Shar is a senior Syrian diplomat and politician who served as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Syria. He is a long-time ally of President Bashar al-Assad and has played a key role in international negotiations and diplomatic missions, representing the Syrian government's interests, especially since the conflict began in 2011. His role is often associated with strengthening ties with allies such as Russia and Iran, and attempting to legitimize Damascus's position on the world stage.
• What exactly are the accusations against Russia regarding support for the Assad regime, aside from the 2015 military intervention? - In addition to direct military intervention, Russia is accused of multifaceted support for the Assad regime, including: diplomatic cover at the UN (for example, use of the veto to block resolutions against Syria), economic assistance (investments, trade deals), arms and equipment supplies, intelligence cooperation, and political legitimization of Assad through international forums. Russia also participated in creating "de-escalation zones," which critics call a way to strengthen government control.
• What is meant by "Arab political and diplomatic culture" in the context of relations with great powers? Are there other examples from Syria's history? - "Arab political and diplomatic culture" here refers to traditional strategies of Arab states such as flexibility, pragmatism, and the ability to navigate between major powers to preserve sovereignty or secure advantages. Examples in Syria's history include: the policy of President Hafez al-Assad (Bashar's father) during the Cold War, when Damascus balanced between the USSR and the West, as well as earlier periods such as cooperation with France and Great Britain after World War I, despite colonial influence.

❮ ❯

Full version: "أرض مباركة".. جدل سوري بعد إشادة الشرع بروسيا وجنودها

Venezuelan Military Swear Allegiance to Acting President

The Armed Forces and security agencies of Venezuela held a solemn ceremony swearing allegiance to acting President Delcy Rodríguez as Commander-in-Chief. The event, held on January 28 at the University of the Armed Forces, was led by Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López, who, on behalf of the military and security structures, confirmed unconditional support for Rodríguez, calling her the supreme authority of the Bolivarian Revolution and the guarantor of the country's course toward peace, democracy, and national reconciliation in this unprecedented situation for Venezuela.

❮ ❯

Full version: FANB y Organismos de Seguridad Ciudadana juraron lealtad ante la presidenta encargada Delcy Rodríguez como Comandante en Jefe

Israeli forces detain a Syrian in al-Quneitra province

On Wednesday, Israeli military forces entered the rural area of Syria's al-Quneitra province in the south of the country and detained a young man. The incident occurred at the Ayn al-Qadi farm; the identity of the detainee has not been specified. The event follows recent Israeli activity in the same region, where on Tuesday Israeli aircraft sprayed unknown substances over agricultural lands. According to Syrian state media, this is the second such incident this week.

These actions come despite a recent agreement between Syria and Israel on 6 January 2024 to establish a communication mechanism under U.S. supervision to coordinate information exchange and reduce military escalation. However, the Israeli army continues to regularly shell Syrian territory, carry out ground incursions—especially in the rural areas of al-Quneitra and Daraa—detain civilians, and destroy crops. The situation has been exacerbated since 1967, when Israel occupied much of the Syrian Golan Heights, and after political changes in Syria in December 2024 when it announced the suspension of the 1974 disengagement agreement and occupied the buffer zone.

Syrian authorities say that the ongoing violations by Israel severely limit the country's ability to restore stability and hinder government efforts to attract investment to improve the economic situation. These incidents undermine confidence in diplomatic mechanisms and create additional obstacles to peace and economic recovery in the region.

❮ ❯

Full version: سوريا.. قوة إسرائيلية تتوغل في ريف القنيطرة وتعتقل شابا

Venezuela Aims for Oil-Giant Status with $1.4B Investment

Acting President of Venezuela Delcy Rodríguez announced plans to invest $1.4 billion in the country's oil and gas sector in 2026. This is a significant increase compared to nearly $900 million invested in 2025. The strategic goal is to turn Venezuela — which possesses the world’s largest oil reserves — into one of the leading global producers of hydrocarbons. Rodríguez stated that Venezuela should become an oil giant on par with Russia, the United States, and Saudi Arabia, stressing that having enormous reserves should finally bring real development to the country.

Rodríguez presented these investments as a historical necessity to ensure the future and socio-economic well-being of the Venezuelan people. She noted that, despite more than a decade of international sanctions, the state oil sector has remained operational. The acting president expressed gratitude to oil industry workers for their efforts under these difficult conditions, saying their work deserves recognition.

❮ ❯

Full version: Delcy Rodríguez estima 1.400 millones de dólares de inversión petrolera en 2026

Restoring Control in Syria's East Opens New Economic Prospects

The Syrian government is regaining control over key eastern regions of the country, including the provinces of Al-Hasakah, Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor, creating conditions for significant economic transformations. Implementation of the January 18 agreement between Damascus and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) is expected, providing for the integration of autonomous institutions into state structures and the transfer of management of oil and gas fields to central authorities. The extension of the ceasefire agreement for 15 days creates conditions for a new phase of governance in the region.

The Al-Jazira region in northeastern Syria, covering about 41% of the country's territory, has exceptional economic importance. This area, known as the "breadbasket of Syria," contains roughly 64% of the country's water resources and produces more than half of the national wheat harvest, exceeding 2 million tonnes annually. In addition, the region accounts for about 62% of cotton production, making it critically important for the textile industry and food security.

The economic statistics are impressive: the provinces of Raqqa, Al-Hasakah and Deir ez-Zor together produce more than 55% of Syrian wheat, and the region's livestock sector is estimated at approximately $3.17 billion. Before the crisis, Al-Hasakah held the largest sheep population in Syria—over 3 million heads. Although the region's contribution to the national economy fell from 27% at the start of the millennium to 19% before 2011 due to conflicts, its recovery could become a turning point.

Experts emphasize the structural significance of these changes. Dr. Usama al-Qadi, advisor to the Ministry of Economy and Industry, notes that regaining control over the eastern regions will allow the state to secure important revenues for the treasury, improve living standards and create broad employment opportunities in the oil, agricultural and industrial sectors. Economist Abdus-Salam al-Omar adds that this gives the state an opportunity to revise wheat policy and reduce dependence on imports.

However, the region faces serious challenges. Analyst Yunis al-Karim points to the need to ensure security, combat the effects of drought and provide "genuine support" for water supply and the restoration of infrastructure such as the fertilizer plant. He also warns that hasty investments could lead to losses, as international companies might exploit weaknesses in state data and capacities.

Regarding energy, Syria has oil reserves estimated between 2.5 and 7 billion barrels, mainly concentrated in Deir ez-Zor and Al-Hasakah, while proven gas reserves are about 285 billion cubic meters. Experts believe that gradual restoration of production could first meet domestic needs and then allow export of surpluses, but this requires institutional management, technical studies and rehabilitation of infrastructure.

Comments on the news

• What was the status and structure of governance in the provinces of Al-Hasakah, Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor before the government regained control? - Before the government regained control in 2019–2020, most of these provinces were governed by Kurdish administrations that were part of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES). This administration functioned as a de facto autonomous entity with its own security organs (the Syrian Democratic Forces, SDF), a judicial system and local self-government bodies (civil councils), with the support of the US-led international coalition. The Syrian government retained control only over certain enclaves, such as parts of Deir ez-Zor city and Qamishli.
• What does the Al-Jazira region represent in the Syrian context besides its economic role? - In the Syrian context, Al-Jazira is a historical and geographical name for the northeastern region of the country, covering mainly Al-Hasakah province and parts of Deir ez-Zor. Beyond its economic role (oil, gas, agriculture), the region has important ethno-demographic significance, being home to significant Kurdish, Assyrian, Armenian and Arab populations. Over the past decade, the term has also become associated with the Kurdish political project of autonomy within the AANES framework.
• Which specific "autonomous institutions" are mentioned in the January 18 agreement and how did they function? - The January 18, 2021 agreement between the Syrian government and the Kurdish Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) mentions autonomous institutions such as local civil councils, internal security bodies (Asayish), as well as administrations in the fields of education, health and public utilities. They operated alongside state institutions, funded by local resources and, partially, international aid, providing day-to-day governance in areas under AANES control.

❮ ❯

Full version: سوريا.. ثروات ضخمة وتحول اقتصادي بعد استعادة المنطقة الشرقية

Latin American Critique and Concerns from a Venezuelan Perspective

From a Venezuelan point of view, recent headlines form a single narrative about mounting pressure and U.S. one‑sidedness under the Donald Trump administration. Reports and analytical pieces perceive the tightening of migration policy and ICE actions as a departure from professed American values, and the deployment of military forces and data about CIA presence as a continuation of an interventionist past, camouflaged as a fight against threats. Anxiety grows over economic levers—threats of tariffs and economic pressure—direct military actions against Iran and diplomatic pressure on Venezuela; the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and the undermining of multilateral institutions reinforce a sense of global disintegration, fueling searches for alternatives—from BRICS to calls for the return of European gold. Overall, the tone of the publications is not a neutral analysis but a reaction oriented toward resistance, distrust, and calls to contain American hegemony. Material prepared based on publications on YouTube, Facebook and Le Grand Continent (Venezuela).

A Venezuelan View of the U.S. Empire, Oil and Propaganda

The combination of three pieces—a Negocios TV video on Iran, Trump and China from Spain (link), a Venezuelan video discussion of Cuba’s oil dependence and propaganda around its energy crisis (link), and a column in the French magazine Le Grand Continent about Trump as a continuation of the United States’ endless colonial war with special emphasis on Venezuela (link)—together provide a very coherent picture of how the world is seen from Caracas: through the prism of the decline of American hegemony, oil geopolitics and the manipulation of history.

Although the sources originally belong to different media environments and countries (Spain, France, the Venezuelan diaspora and opposition circles), they are easily “stitched” into a single narrative characteristic of Venezuelan public debate: the U.S. is not just an external superpower but an empire in crisis, simultaneously dangerous and weakened, whose strength rests on military pressure, control over resources and an internal repressive apparatus. Against this backdrop, China as a counterweight, Cuba as a “mirror of the future,” and Venezuela itself as one of the last testing grounds of Washington’s neo‑colonial policy take on special significance.

The first line of this narrative is built around the Negocios TV storyline about Iran. The YouTube description highlights the growing U.S. military pressure: deployment of the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, destroyers with Tomahawk missiles and F‑15E fighters, while the Iranian side theatrically calls the carrier an “achievable target.” For the Venezuelan viewer this immediately evokes memories of Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya, long cited in official discourse as proof of the “aggressive character” of the U.S. Moreover, such scenes overlap with Venezuela’s own experience—the Trump era, when toward Caracas the formula “all options are on the table” was used, exercises were held offshore, and the threat of direct intervention was discussed not as an abstraction.

Particular resonance also comes from the fact that China appears in the same piece. According to the description, Xi Jinping issues a stern warning to Washington, rejecting any intervention against Iran and demanding respect for its sovereignty. In Venezuelan optics this is read almost as a direct extension of Caracas’s arguments: China long ago became a key creditor and investor in the oil, mining and infrastructure sectors, and official propaganda builds it into the image of a “floor” in the emerging multipolar world. Therefore a scene in which Beijing stands up for Tehran’s sovereignty is read as confirmation of the broader line: China defends the principle Venezuela also asserts—rejection of sanctions, blockades and threats of external invasion.

The same material weaves an internal American storyline into the foreign policy line: harsh migration raids in Minnesota, the Trump administration’s legal defeat for violating migrants’ procedural guarantees, the deaths of two civilians—Alex Pretti and Renee Good—during operations, and the summons of the acting head of ICE to court under threat of contempt charges. For a Venezuelan audience this picture has a double meaning. On one hand, for millions of migrants from Venezuela and the region it is a vivid reminder of the risks: even fleeing economic and political crisis leads them into a system perceived as repressive and often racist. On the other— for official rhetoric it is perfect material to accuse Washington of “hypocrisy”: the U.S. lectures Caracas on human rights while allowing civilian deaths and undermining its own rule of law by clashing with federal judges. The figure of Judge Patrick Schiltz, forcing ICE leadership to appear in court, becomes a vivid image of institutional conflict that Venezuelan political speech readily uses as an example that “they too have a democratic crisis.”

This intertwining of external militarism and internal harshness toward migrants fits the old thesis of an “empire in decline”: the weaker U.S. global dominance becomes, the more it relies on force—on aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf and security forces at its borders. At the same time every escalation around Iran is immediately read in Caracas through an energy lens: conflict in the Strait of Hormuz means volatile oil prices, and Iran, like Venezuela, is an oil exporter under U.S. sanctions. The Spanish piece, emphasizing Iran’s missile tests and rhetoric about “achievable targets,” inadvertently strengthens among Venezuelan readers the sense of a “shared fate” of sanctioned countries, balancing between resistance and the risk of a large‑scale war.

The second layer of the “Venezuelan view” unfolds in the domestic regional field—around Cuba’s electricity crisis, the island’s oil dependence and the Havana regime’s propagandistic techniques. The video featuring economist and oil trading expert Tulio Rodríguez, circulated in Venezuelan opposition circles (recording on Facebook), is presented as an analysis of what a possible halt of Mexican oil shipments would mean for Cuba’s economy. But the textual preface emphasizes something else—exposing a historical falsehood by the leading Cuban program Mesa Redonda anchor Arleen Rodríguez Derivet, labeled “a Castroist talking head” and “journalist” in quotes.

The occasion is her claim that José Martí “did not know electric light” and that, they say, “life in darkness” is natural for Cuban history. The Venezuelan author recalls dates: electricity appeared in Havana in 1889, Martí died in 1895, and he previously lived for a long time in New York—one of the world’s fastest‑electrifying capitals. The conclusion is harsh: “history will not remember Martí, but her—as utterly ignorant about his life and work.” And then a formula familiar to Venezuelan audiences sounds: “it is not Martí who lives in darkness, it is the official discourse that lives in darkness, which extinguishes dates, context and facts to justify the current apagones.”

This phrase works as a transparent metaphor for Venezuela. “Apagones de hoy” refers to both Cuban and Venezuelan blackouts; “extinguishing dates and facts” is a recognizable propagandistic tactic here, when inflation figures, oil production statistics or the scale of the energy collapse are replaced by slogans and heroic portraits. The case of the Cuban anchor is used as a mirror: just as in Havana Martí is instrumentalized to normalize life in the dark, in Caracas Bolívar and Chávez are heroicized to exhort people to “endure” shortages of light, water and fuel.

The figure of Tulio Rodríguez in the headline is also deeply Venezuelan. He is assigned the role of “oil trading expert” who “explains what it means for the Cuban economy if Mexico stops oil shipments to the island.” And although the excerpt does not present his arguments, context makes clear that this concerns the Venezuela–Cuba–Mexico triangle and how the erosion of subsidized deliveries (first from Caracas, then from Mexico City) corner Havana. For the Venezuelan opposition audience this is confirmation of the collapse of “Bolivarian oil solidarity,” where oil was exchanged for doctors, advisors and political backing. Now, with PDVSA weakened and sanctions and production collapse limiting exports, Cuba seeks substitutes, and Mexico’s refusal or reduction of supplies is perceived as another nail in the coffin of the regional project linking Caracas and Havana.

A Venezuelan viewer will see in this not merely a Cuban story but their own present and possible future. Massive power outages in a country with some of the world’s largest oil reserves, mutual accusations of “sabotage,” and constant rewriting of statistics—all this makes the story about “Castroist propaganda” almost a self‑portrait. Where Martí and Havana are discussed, it is easy to mentally substitute Bolívar and Caracas.

The third piece—a Le Grand Continent column “El imperio no se detiene: Trump y la guerra colonial sin fin de Estados Unidos” (full text at the link)—offers a broader theoretical frame for what Venezuelan discourse long calls “imperialism.” The authors, proceeding from a European context, argue that a second Trump term is not a random deviation but a radicalization of a centuries‑old colonial tradition of the U.S. And it is Venezuela that figures as the “latest example” of intervention in a long sequence of “restorations of control” over unruly territories.

The article explicitly states that in the “long history of interventions” Venezuela is merely another episode of “reasserting control,” accompanied by sanctions, threats and pressure on the population. The authors place the attacks on Caracas alongside the 1898 war against Spain over Cuba and Puerto Rico, Theodore Roosevelt’s policies to control the Panama Canal, and President Polk’s stance toward Mexico. By doing so, what Western media often frame as a “democratic crisis in Venezuela” is translated into another plane—the logic of imperial governance of the periphery.

Particularly telling is how the column describes the “kidnapping of dictator Nicolás Maduro”—a formulation that is contradictory in itself. On one hand, the authors do not shy away from criticizing the regime by calling him “dictator,” but on the other they emphasize a colonial technique: seizing a leader, removing him, holding a show trial or elimination as a way to subdue a “province.” A parallel is drawn with practices of empires that centralized power by eliminating rebellious monarchs in colonies. For Venezuelan perception, where plans for U.S. special operations to change the regime have long been part of political folklore, this framing reads like confirmation: the dispute is not about Maduro’s personality but about a superpower’s right to decide a whole country’s fate.

The text then broadens the frame to include Canada and Greenland as objects of a “new form of conquest,” fed by colonial imagination. In a key paragraph it is noted that in both Venezuela’s and Greenland’s cases the Trump administration aimed to “possess and manage mineral and energy resources, turning foreign territory into an economic, strategic and military beachhead.” For a reader in Caracas this is almost a literal description of how local discourse interprets U.S. interest in the Orinoco Belt and the national oil company PDVSA. The comparison with Greenland reinforces the sense that this is not about a “failed democracy” but about a valuable piece of the planet over which great powers struggle.

This line is linked to a renewed reading of the Monroe Doctrine, to which the authors pay special attention. In their version, Trump added his own “corollary” to the old formula “America for Americans,” turning the Western Hemisphere into an almost feudal domain where external players should not enter and internal ones must not resist. In strategic documents such as the National Security Strategy 2025, the authors say, this is formalized as a partial shift away from Europe and Southeast Asia to concentrate on the “backyard.” For Venezuela, sitting on the edge of the Caribbean and the Orinoco basin, this means one thing: pressure will only intensify, and any attempts to lean on China or Russia will be interpreted by Washington not as ordinary foreign relations but as a challenge to its monopoly over the region.

The column makes another move important for Venezuelan perception: it places the U.S. alongside other modern empires—Japan in early 20th‑century Manchuria, Russia in Ukraine, China regarding Taiwan. Such a comparative perspective is familiar in Caracas rhetoric: there has long been talk of a “world of empires” in which Washington, Moscow and Beijing play by similar rules, defending their “zones of interest” and imposing conditions on weaker states. But the fact that European authors explicitly call U.S. actions “colonial” and warn that Greenland may become a “graveyard of international law” is perceived as important external legitimation: what has been said in Venezuela for decades is finally uttered in the West without euphemisms.

Put together, the three described storylines—the Spanish report on Trump, Iran and China, the Venezuelan video on Cuban apagones, and the French column on the “endless empire”—form almost a textbook example of how the “Venezuelan view” of the world is formed. On one level there are concrete facts: aircraft carriers and missiles, migration raids and court rulings in the U.S., power outages in Havana, reductions in oil flows from Venezuela and Mexico, doctrines and Washington’s strategies. On another level there is a dense network of interpretations: the U.S. as aggressor and hypocritical judge, China as defender of sovereignty, Cuba as laboratory and warning, Venezuela as the “last colony” in a chain stretching from the Philippines to Greenland.

For internal Venezuelan debate these materials serve a dual function. They simultaneously feed the official anti‑imperialist narrative (emphasizing military pressure, sanctions, attempts to control resources) and arm the opposition with arguments against the Cuban‑Venezuelan propaganda machine (exposing manipulations of history, substitution of facts by myths about heroes, and the justification of poverty and darkness by appeals to the past). Spanish and French sources add the effect of “external recognition”: criticism of the U.S. and criticism of the Cuban‑Venezuelan propaganda bloc now come not only from Caracas but also from Madrid, Paris, Miami.

As a result, the image of the U.S. in this Venezuelan mirror is quite contradictory: it remains a powerful state capable of sending aircraft carriers to Iran’s shores, threatening regime change in Caracas or redrawing the Arctic map, but at the same time a country with sharp internal contradictions, brutal treatment of migrants, institutional conflicts and, essentially, a colonial mentality inconsistent with its own declarations about human rights and the rule of law. For a society experiencing its own energy and political collapse, this worldview is convenient: it allows blaming external pressure for its own woes while critically viewing the models that for decades were presented as exemplars—both in Havana and in Washington.

❮ ❯

Venezuela Reached Record Oil Production and Is Preparing a Law Reform

The president of Venezuela's National Assembly, Jorge Rodríguez, announced a significant achievement in the country's oil sector. According to him, by the end of 2025 Venezuela reached a production level of 1.2 million barrels of oil per day. Rodríguez called this result, which previously seemed impossible, and thanked the oil industry workers who achieved it despite serious difficulties. He also expressed appreciation to representatives of private oil companies operating in the country.

At the same time, Rodríguez announced an upcoming reform of the Hydrocarbons Law. The amendments, in particular, will expand the scope of the law. It will regulate not only crude oil extraction and fuel production, but the entire chain of petroleum refining products. In addition, the updated law will clearly define the rules for all companies — both foreign and Venezuelan — engaged in exploration and development of deposits on the country’s territory.

❮ ❯

Full version: Jorge Rodríguez:

Escalation in Kobani: Syrian army and Kurdish forces accuse each other of violating the...

Clashes have flared again in the area of the town Ayn Al-Arab (Kobani) in northern Syria's Aleppo province. The Syrian army accused the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF, predominantly Kurdish militias) of violating the ceasefire, claiming a large-scale attack using drones. The SDF, in turn, categorically denied these accusations and said that government forces were the first to break the truce by launching a ground offensive. The mutual accusations have led to fierce fighting that has been ongoing for several hours, sharply increasing tensions in the region.

According to the Syrian army operations command, SDF forces attacked army positions using more than 25 suicide drones. As a result, it is claimed, four pieces of military equipment were destroyed, and strikes also hit the strategic M4 road and several nearby villages, causing injuries among the civilian population. The army also accused Kurdish formations of trapping families in the area of the village of ash-Shuyukh, where later clashes occurred with local residents. The military command said it is studying options for retaliatory measures on the battlefield, indicating the possibility of further escalation.

The Syrian Democratic Forces rejected all the accusations. In a statement on the social network X they claimed that the Syrian army violated the ceasefire by starting artillery fire and a ground attack on the settlement of Hirab Ashka southeast of Kobani. Moreover, the SDF said these government actions were carried out "with air support from Turkish reconnaissance aircraft." According to them, combat between the sides has been continuing for more than three hours, indicating a protracted and intermittent nature of the fighting.

Tensions arose against the backdrop of a recently announced ceasefire. The Syrian Ministry of Defense on Tuesday evening announced a ceasefire on all sections of the front for four days as part of agreements reached with the SDF, and on Saturday extended the calm for another 15 days. However, the mutual accusations of violations that followed almost immediately demonstrate the extreme fragility of that agreement and the difficulties of implementing it at once on the ground, calling its long-term effectiveness into question.

The current incident occurs in the context of a broader agreement of January 18 between the Syrian government and the SDF. It envisaged a ceasefire and the start of a process to integrate Kurdish formations and institutions into the structures of the Syrian state. That agreement was reached after a major offensive by the Syrian army during which it regained control over extensive territories in the east and northeast of the country. Previously, the SDF had already refused to implement a similar agreement from March 2025. Against the background of ongoing violations, the chances of a durable ceasefire depend on the actual fulfillment of the agreements and the establishment of lasting calm on the ground, which is part of President Ahmad ash-Shara's administration's efforts to assert control over the entire territory of Syria after the events of December 2024.

Comments on the news

• What strategic significance does the M4 road have in northern Syria and why is control over it important for the conflicting parties? - The M4 road is a key transport artery connecting Aleppo with Latakia through Idlib province. It is vital for logistics, trade and troop movements. Controlling it allows a side to dominate supply lines, influence the economy and block enemy movement, making it a strategic prize in the conflict.
• Who are the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in terms of their political goals and territorial governance, beyond their Kurdish composition? - The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are a military-political alliance led by Kurdish groups but including Arab, Assyrian and other militias. Their political goals focus on creating a decentralized system of governance in northeastern Syria, emphasizing democratic self-administration, minority rights and gender equality. They administer territories through local councils and civil administrations, seeking autonomy within Syria.
• What are the "events of December 2024" against which President Ahmad ash-Shara's administration seeks to establish control over territory? - The "events of December 2024" refer to a hypothetical or recent episode of escalation in Syria, possibly involving military clashes, political crises or external intervention that intensified the struggle for control over key regions. Against this backdrop, President Ahmad ash-Shara's administration (a figure that may be speculative or pertaining to a future scenario) seeks to consolidate its authority to stabilize the territory and counter the influence of other parties to the conflict.

❮ ❯

Full version: سوريا.. "25 مسيّرة" تشعل جبهة عين العرب واتهامات متبادلة بين الجيش و"قسد"

Venezuela ready for dialogue with the US, but demands an end to interference

Acting President of Venezuela Delcy Rodríguez announced the country's readiness for direct talks with the United States to resolve historical disagreements. Speaking to employees of the state oil company PDVSA, she emphasized that the dialogue should be conducted "eye to eye," based on the principles of Bolivarian diplomacy. Rodríguez also highlighted the resilience of the national energy sector, which reached operational self-sufficiency in 2025, and confirmed plans to export oil to friendly countries as a key means of funding social programs.

In domestic policy, Rodríguez sharply condemned foreign interference, calling for an end to the "orders from Washington" for Venezuelan politicians. She presented the "Commission for Coexistence and Peace" as a forum for national dialogue, but excluded groups she labeled "fascist" and accused of promoting violence. According to her, Venezuela has the necessary maturity to resolve its internal conflicts independently, without international guardianship.

At the same time, Rodríguez outlined plans to reform the Hydrocarbons Law, aimed at attracting large national and international investments into the oil and gas sector modeled on the successful "Anti-Blockade Law." In conclusion, she called for Venezuelan unity in defending sovereignty and demanded the release of President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores, who, she asserted, remain detained following the events of January 3.

❮ ❯

Full version: Delcy Rodríguez exige fin al intervencionismo de Washington en la política venezolana

Sheikh of the Shammar tribe urges Syrian unity, warns of conflict threat

Sheikh Mani Hamidi al-Jarba, head of the influential Arab Shammar tribe in Syria, called for restoring central government control over the country’s entire territory. At the same time, he expressed serious concern about the situation in the al-Jazira region in northeastern Syria, where, he said, preparations for a large-scale military confrontation are underway. The sheikh stressed that his tribe naturally supports the unity and sovereignty of Syria.

Al-Jarba called for seeking diplomatic and political solutions through negotiations to spare the region from armed clashes and prevent bloodshed. He particularly noted the strength of Arab–Kurdish relations in al-Jazira, emphasizing the importance of peaceful coexistence among different communities and preventing a slide into ethnic or religious conflict. According to him, this region has historically been a place of genuine shared living among various groups without a sense of racial distinction.

The Shammar tribe is one of the most significant Arab tribes living in the al-Jazira region, especially in Deir ez-Zor province. The tribe has ancient Arab roots, and its history of settlement on the banks of the Euphrates spans many centuries, which has given it strong demographic and political influence within the social structure of eastern Syria.

Recently the Shammar tribe has actively participated in military events in the country’s east. It took part in a united Arab tribal movement that opposed control of the region by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), where Kurdish formations are dominant. That collective role, it is noted, became one of the key factors that forced the SDF to make concessions in line with agreements previously reached with the government.

Comments on the news

• What is the historical and contemporary role of tribal structures like the Shammar tribe in Syria’s political and social life, especially outside major cities? - Historically, large tribes such as the Shammar played a key role in social organization and dispute resolution in Syria’s rural and desert regions, where the presence of the central state was weak. They functioned as networks of mutual support, provided security, and represented the interests of their members to authorities. In the modern Syrian conflict their role has become even more significant. With the collapse of state institutions, tribal structures often assumed functions of local governance, resource distribution, and even forming armed units for self-defense. Their loyalty became a battleground among the government, Kurdish forces (SDF), and other groups. However, tribes are not monolithic, and disagreements can exist within them regarding support for any given side.
• What is the al-Jazira region in Syria in terms of its ethnic composition, economic significance, and why is it contested by various forces during the conflict? - The al-Jazira region in northeastern Syria is a multiethnic territory inhabited by Kurds, Arabs (including both settled populations and tribes like the Shammar), Assyrians, Armenians, and other groups. Economically, it is Syria’s breadbasket and energy heart: the country’s main oil and gas reserves are concentrated here, as well as extensive agricultural lands (notably for wheat and cotton). These resources and the region’s strategic location (bordering Iraq and Turkey) have made al-Jazira the subject of fierce dispute. Competing for control are: the Syrian government (seeking to restore access to the resources), Kurdish self-defense forces (SDF, aiming for autonomy within this predominantly Kurdish region), Turkey (which views Kurdish dominance as a threat and conducts military operations), and earlier — the terrorist organization ISIS. The demographic balance and the rights of different ethnic groups are also central issues in this conflict.

❮ ❯

Full version: قبيلة شمر تؤكد التزامها بوحدة سوريا

Venezuelan authorities condemn opposition for backing military attacks

Acting President of Venezuela Delcy Rodríguez sharply condemned the actions of far-right opposition groups in the country, in particular the figure of María Corina Machado. According to Rodríguez, Machado’s supporters publicly welcomed the military attacks carried out against Venezuelan territory on January 3. She called it shameful that Venezuelans thank foreign forces for bombings and aggression against their own country, and questioned their national affiliation, saying that the true feelings of the people are rejection of any violence that causes suffering to the population.

During a public event in La Guaira state, Rodríguez also reported on the progress of work to restore homes damaged as a result of the recent military attacks. She stressed the need for an urgent review of political practices in Venezuela, to move away from interests that promote violence or support foreign intervention. Rodríguez confirmed the government’s commitment to directly assist the victims and rebuild infrastructure, stating that politics should serve as an instrument of peace and sovereignty, not as a justification for aggression against the Venezuelan people.

❮ ❯

Full version: Delcy Rodríguez sobre postura de MCM ante agresiones militares:

Syrian delegation in Washington opposes plans to divide the country

A senior official of the internal security service of Syria’s Es-Suwayda province, Suleiman Abdel Baki, made a visit to Washington. The purpose of the trip was to inform U.S. authorities about the real situation in the region and to discuss its future within a united Syrian state. The delegation, which also included politicians from Syrian-American organizations, held meetings with U.S. officials and members of Congress, seeking to convey an impartial picture without distortions.

The key message delivered to the American side was a demand for a clear Washington position rejecting any projects to divide Syria or create separate entities. Abdel Baki emphasized that U.S. policy, according to their assurances, is based on support for a united Syria. He accused the local Druze leader Hikmet al-Hijri of misleading the population with false promises of independence, promises allegedly inspired by little-known figures from Druze communities in Israel who have no weight in American circles.

The delegation stated that the U.S. administration supports President Ahmad al-Sharaa and the central government in Damascus, opposing any separatist projects and the formation of illegal armed groups. It was noted that any U.S. support to specific regions of Syria, including Es-Suwayda, does not go beyond providing humanitarian aid. The visit, organized by official invitation, is seen as a step toward strengthening the security and stability of the whole country.

The Syrian-American organization "Citizens for a Secure America" called the visit a historic event. Its representative Bakir Gubeis said the delegation held briefings in Congressional committees and met with experts from think tanks. In his view, this demonstrates a new ability of Syrian patriotic forces to influence American public opinion and policy, supporting a course toward uniting all components of society under the banner of a single state.

Experts viewed these meetings as a decisive strategic attempt to close the so-called "Es-Suwayda case," finally burying hopes for the division of Syria and facilitating the reintegration of the region. They emphasize the importance of continuing internal dialogue to resolve the problems of the province’s residents. While observers see the visit as an attempt to strengthen direct ties with American decision-makers, the U.S. State Department did not respond to a request for comment.

Comments on the news

• What is the historical and demographic role of Es-Suwayda province in Syria, and why is it often mentioned in discussions about a possible division of the country? - Es-Suwayda province in southern Syria has historically been the center of Druze residence — a compact ethno-religious community with a distinct way of life. Demographically it is predominantly Druze, which gives the region cultural and political distinctiveness. It is mentioned in discussions about dividing the country because the Druze, like the Kurds, are often seen as a group that could claim autonomy or a special status if central authority weakens, making the region a potential element in hypothetical scenarios of federalization or the breakup of Syria.

• Who are the Druze in Syria and what is the political role of their leaders, such as Hikmet al-Hijri, in the Syrian conflict and internal politics? - The Druze are a closed ethno-religious group practicing a syncretic Islamic faith, with a long history in Syria. They make up about 3% of the population and traditionally seek to preserve communal autonomy. Leaders like Hikmet al-Hijri represent a moderate wing, advocating for the protection of Druze interests, avoiding open confrontation with the Assad government while not fully supporting it. Their role is to balance pressure from authorities, the demands of the community, and external threats to ensure the survival and stability of the region.

• What is meant by the "Es-Suwayda case" that experts say they are trying to close? - The "Es-Suwayda case" generally refers to a series of protests and unrest in the province related to economic hardships, forced military service, and demands for greater autonomy. Experts believe authorities are trying to "close" this case by suppressing demonstrations, arresting activists, and offering limited concessions to prevent escalation and maintain control over a strategically important region without attracting international attention to internal conflicts.

❮ ❯

Full version: ما تفاصيل زيارة القيادي بالسويداء سليمان عبد الباقي إلى واشنطن؟

Venezuela Calls for National Political Dialogue

Acting President of Venezuela Delcy Rodríguez publicly urged the Chair of the Council for Sovereignty and Peace, Jorge Rodríguez, to immediately organize a meeting with all political forces in the country, both allied and opposition. The aim of this step is to launch a genuine internal dialogue that should lead to concrete and rapid results; Rodríguez emphasized that the process must be strictly Venezuelan, without any external influence or directives from abroad. At the same time, a call was made for national unity, reflection, and rejection of violence in order to strengthen peace, stability, and social welfare in the country.

❮ ❯

Full version: Presidenta Encargada exhortó a Jorge Rodríguez a realizar un encuentro con todos los sectores políticos del país

Transfer of Militants and Prison Handover Under Syrian Agreement

Under the ceasefire agreement in Syria, militants of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) who left al-Qatan prison in Raqqa arrived in the Ayn al-Arab (Kobani) area in the northeast of Aleppo. According to an anonymous security source, Syrian army units escorted them to the Sreen area near Kobani in line with agreed security measures. At the same time, the Syrian Ministry of Interior officially took control of al-Qatan prison, where detainees linked to the ISIS terrorist organization are held.

Damascus describes the transfer of al-Qatan prison to government forces as the first step in implementing the January 18 agreement aimed at reducing tensions in the region. A government source said that about 800 militants will leave the prison as part of an "international agreement on de-escalation and consolidation of checkpoints." It was emphasized that detainees connected to ISIS will be held in accordance with Syrian law under the supervision of special counterterrorism units.

At the international level, the United States announced plans for the temporary detention of foreign ISIS militants in Iraq with subsequent extradition to their countries for prosecution. A U.S. official said that in the coming days up to 7,000 prisoners are planned to be transferred from Syrian prisons to Iraq, with priority given to the "most dangerous" militants, including those from European countries. U.S. Central Command has already transferred 150 detainees from al-Hasakah to Iraq.

The situation remains tense due to a recent incident in which about 200 ISIS militants escaped from al-Shaddadi prison, although most of them were later detained by government forces. Damascus accuses the SDF of using the prison issue as a tool of pressure, while UN representatives note the unstable and insecure situation in the al-Hol camp in northeast Syria, which holds thousands of families suspected of links to ISIS.

Despite the signed ceasefire agreement and the integration of the SDF into state structures, Syrian authorities accuse Kurdish formations of violating the agreements and attacking civilians and military personnel. At the same time, the parties announced that they had reached agreements on military, administrative, and political integration mechanisms and began implementing the relevant provisions, although the overall situation remains fragile during this transitional period.

Comments on the News

• Who are the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in terms of their ethnic composition, political goals, and relations with the Damascus government, the U.S., and Turkey? - The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are a military alliance formed in 2015, composed mainly of the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG), as well as Arab, Assyrian, and other minority groups. Their political goal is to secure autonomy for northeastern regions of Syria within a decentralized state. The SDF has complex relations: with the Damascus government they sometimes cooperate against common enemies (in certain areas) but generally oppose central control; with the U.S. they are a key ally in the fight against ISIS, receiving military support; with Turkey they are in conflict, as Ankara views the YPG as a terrorist organization linked to the PKK and regularly conducts military operations against them.

• Why does the city of Kobani (Ayn al-Arab) have such symbolic significance in the Syrian conflict, especially for Kurdish formations? - Kobani (also known as Ayn al-Arab) became a powerful symbol of Kurdish resistance and resilience during the Syrian conflict. In 2014–2015 the city was besieged by ISIS militants, and its defense by Kurdish forces (YPG), with support from the U.S.-led international coalition, drew worldwide attention. The victory in Kobani was the first major defeat for ISIS and strengthened the position of Kurdish formations as an effective force against terrorism. For Kurds it also symbolizes their struggle for autonomy and recognition in Syria.

• What is al-Hol camp and why is it considered one of the most complex humanitarian and security challenges in northeast Syria? - Al-Hol camp is a displacement camp in northeast Syria run by Kurdish forces. It holds tens of thousands of people, mainly women and children, many of whom are family members of former ISIS fighters or otherwise linked to the group. The camp is considered a difficult humanitarian issue due to overcrowding, resource shortages, disease, and harsh living conditions. The security problem arises from the presence of ISIS supporters who can radicalize others, commit violence, or attempt escapes, posing a threat both inside the camp and to the wider region. The international community faces difficulties in repatriating residents and finding a sustainable solution.

❮ ❯

Full version: السلطات السورية تتسلّم سجن الأقطان بالرقة من قسد

Venezuela became a testing ground for new US weapons, says defense minister

Venezuela's Minister of Defense Vladimir Padrino López said that his country has been turned into a "laboratory" for testing new types of weapons by the US government. According to the senior official, on January 3, 2026, Venezuela was subjected to a systematic bombing directed from the United States using the highest-level artificial intelligence, and the US president allegedly acknowledged the use of weapons that had never before been used in combat and were not possessed by other countries. Padrino López linked this "aggression," as he called it, to the abduction of President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores, claiming that a unique military technology was used against the Venezuelan people.

❮ ❯

Full version: Padrino López:

Situation in Syria: search for ISIS escapees and expedited transfer of detainees

Syrian authorities continue a large-scale operation to find prisoners who escaped from jails where members of the banned terrorist organization ISIS were held. Syria’s Ministry of Interior reported that the Al-Hol camp zone in al-Hasakah province was brought under control after the withdrawal of forces of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) from the area. All prisons in the region have been declared restricted zones, and significant reinforcements have arrived at the camp to maintain order. Authorities are tightening security measures to prevent further escapes and breaches.

In the city of Raqqa, relatives of detainees held in the Al-Aktana prison attempted to break through barriers set up by authorities to reach the prison and express concern for the fate of their loved ones. At the same time, hundreds were forced to leave their homes in Raqqa and al-Hasakah due to military operations and sought refuge in Qamishli. According to reporters, displaced people face severe humanitarian conditions; many are housed in schools converted into shelters where basic services and heating are lacking, worsening their suffering from the cold.

Syria’s Ministry of Defense accused SDF forces of more than 35 attacks on Syrian army positions within a single day, despite an existing ceasefire. According to the ministry, these attacks resulted in the deaths of 11 servicemen and the wounding of more than 25. In addition, Syrian military said they discovered, near the al-Yarubiyah crossing, a workshop with Iranian-made drones that, they claim, the SDF were preparing for use. The SDF deny these accusations, asserting they have not conducted military activity in the area and in turn accuse the government of violating the agreement.

U.S. military officials said the process of transferring ISIS detainees from Syria to Iraq will be significantly accelerated and will take "days, not weeks." U.S. Central Command said its commander discussed by phone with Syrian President Ahmad al-Shar a coordinated handover of the detainees. Both sides confirmed their commitment to the final defeat of ISIS in Syria. U.S. command also announced the start of transferring detainees from northeastern Syria to Iraq and their placement in secure detention centers.

The number of ISIS detainees expected to be moved from Syria to Iraq is projected to reach about 7,000. Damascus welcomed the proposal. U.S. command and stakeholders stressed the importance of respecting the ceasefire agreement with the SDF during this operation to ensure a safe transfer and prevent escalation on the ground. Logistical details and the timetable are still being worked out, but statements point to an acceleration of the process in the coming days. Serious security and humanitarian problems in the region persist.

News comments

• Who are the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and what is their role and relationship with the Syrian government in the northeast? - The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are a coalition led by Kurdish formations, created in 2015 to fight ISIS. They control a significant portion of northeastern Syria and have a complex relationship with the Syrian government: formally they do not recognize Damascus’s authority, but in practice they sometimes coordinate with government forces on security and administrative matters, especially in areas where Turkish troops or remnants of ISIS are present.

• What is the Al-Hol camp in al-Hasakah province and why is control over it so important in the fight against ISIS? - The Al-Hol camp is a camp for displaced persons in al-Hasakah province, housing primarily women and children linked to ISIS fighters, including foreign nationals. Control over it is important because the camp is considered a breeding ground for ISIS’s radical ideology; frequent violent incidents occur there, and safe management is necessary to prevent the resurgence of the terrorist network and to enable reintegration or legal prosecution of its inhabitants.

• What was Raqqa’s historical status during the conflict and why does it remain a focal point for tensions related to ISIS detainees? - Raqqa served as the de facto capital of the so-called ISIS “caliphate” from 2014 to 2017, making it a symbol of their rule. After liberation by the SDF with international coalition support, the city remains a hotspot of tension due to the large number of ISIS detainees held in regional prisons and the presence of fighters’ families, creating persistent security threats and requiring coordination among various forces to prevent escapes and attacks.

❮ ❯

Full version: الأمن السوري يواصل البحث عن سجناء تنظيم الدولة الفارين

Cabello: Chavismo — the only guarantee of peace in Venezuela

The Secretary-General of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), Diosdado Cabello, stated that chavismo is the only guarantee of peace in the country, emphasizing that the party will continue to govern Venezuela. In his speech he denied rumors about internal conflicts and "betrayals" within the party, calling them lies spread by political opponents, and confirmed his support for Vice President Delcy Rodríguez, noting that unity is necessary for the country's progress and the continuation of the Bolivarian Revolution. Cabello also said that Venezuela will respond to the United States' actions of January 3 by diplomatic means and "truth," and that the government is working on the return of President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores from the United States, stressing the country's independence from external influence.

❮ ❯

Full version: Diosdado Cabello: Chavismo es la única garantía de paz del país

Syria and Kurdish forces agree on peaceful integration of Al-Hasakah province

The Syrian government has given the Kurdish self-defense forces (SDF) four days to develop a plan for integrating Al-Hasakah province into state structures. This decision was part of a ceasefire agreement reached on Tuesday with U.S. support and welcomed by the UN. The agreement followed the Syrian army’s taking control of large swathes of territory in the north and northeast of the country that were previously administered by the SDF. Syrian leadership confirmed that government troops will not enter the city centers of Al-Hasakah and Al-Qamishli, remaining on the outskirts provided the arrangements are implemented.

According to an official statement, the timetable and details of the peaceful integration of Al-Hasakah province, including the city of Al-Qamishli, will be discussed later. Under the agreement, SDF commander Mazlum Abdi must propose candidates for the posts of deputy defense minister and governor of Al-Hasakah, as well as representatives for parliament and a list of people for employment in state institutions. The document also stipulates that there will be no regular armed forces in Kurdish villages, except for local security forces drawn from residents of the region.

The agreement includes work on integrating SDF formations into the structures of the ministries of defense and interior, while discussions on the mechanism for this process continue. On their part, the Kurdish self-defense forces have declared full compliance with the ceasefire agreement with the Damascus government. An official statement from Syrian authorities noted that this is already the third agreement between the parties, reflecting ongoing efforts to settle matters and restructure military and administrative presence in the region.

U.S. Ambassador Tom Breck described the proposal as “the greatest opportunity” for the Kurds, noting that the SDF’s initial objective — which Washington supported against ISIS — has largely been achieved. He added that the U.S. does not see a long-term interest in maintaining its military presence in Syria, and that its current priorities are defeating the remnants of ISIS, strengthening national unity, and supporting reconciliation. Breck also noted that Damascus is capable of taking responsibility for security, including control over detention centers holding ISIS fighters.

Earlier, the SDF refused to implement the March 2025 agreement with the government concerning respect for the rights of the Kurdish population and the integration of civilian and military institutions in the northeast of the country under state control. That agreement envisaged reopening border crossings, airports, oil and gas fields, affirmed the unity of Syrian territory, and the withdrawal of the SDF from Aleppo to the east of the Euphrates, but it was not fully implemented. At the same time, the Syrian government is making active efforts to restore order and reassert its control over the entire territory of the country after the political changes of 2024.

Comments on the news

• What political changes occurred in Syria in 2024 and how did they affect negotiations with the Kurdish forces? - In 2024 there was an intensification of regional diplomacy involving neighboring countries, creating a new context for talks. The Syrian government stepped up dialogue with the Kurdish forces through intermediaries, but negotiations are complicated by issues of autonomy, control over resources, and the presence of international forces in the region.
• Why was the March 2025 agreement between the SDF and the Syrian government not implemented despite its detailed provisions? - The agreement was not implemented due to fundamental disagreements on key issues: the status of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) within security structures, the distribution of oil revenues in eastern regions, and the degree of autonomy in governance. The lack of enforcement mechanisms and changing regional dynamics also played a role.
• What is the current administrative structure of Al-Hasakah province and why is integration into state structures such a difficult task? - In Al-Hasakah province there is a dual system of governance: local councils linked to the Autonomous Administration of Northeast Syria (Kurdish self-administration) and remnants of state institutions loyal to Damascus. Integration is difficult due to deep mistrust, different governance systems, competing security structures, and fundamental disagreements over issues of identity, language, and resource distribution.

❮ ❯

Full version: الحكومة السورية تمهل قسد 4 أيام لوضع خطة دمج الحسكة في الدولة

Venezuela's First Oil Revenues Used to Support Economy

Venezuela has received the first $300 million from oil sales, part of an initial $500 million tranche, announced Acting President Delsi Rodriguez. These funds will be directed to support workers' incomes, protect household purchasing power from inflation, and stabilize the currency market to ensure greater economic resilience. Financial flows will be distributed through the National Bank and the Central Bank of Venezuela with the aim of strengthening foreign-exchange control mechanisms and consolidating economic balance, which is part of the recovery and growth program launched in 2018 and, according to authorities, has enabled the country to become a leader in economic growth in Latin America.

❮ ❯

Full version: Presidenta encargada anunció el ingreso de los primeros 300 millones de dólares al país producto de la venta del petróleo

Escalation in northeast Syria: army advances, talks fail, prisoners escape

The Syrian army, supported by tribal formations, continues its advance in the northeast of the country, reaching the outskirts of the city of Al-Hasakah. According to statements, the goal of the operation is to establish control and ensure security in the Al-Jazira region. One of the key successes was the complete capture of the city of Shaddadi south of Al-Hasakah, including the prison located there.

The situation sharply escalated after a mass escape of inmates from the Shaddadi prison. According to the Ministry of Interior, about 120 people affiliated with the banned terrorist organization ISIS managed to flee. Syrian authorities blamed the Kurdish "Syrian Democratic Forces" (SDF) for the incident, accusing them of deliberately releasing the prisoners. In response, a full curfew was imposed in Shaddadi and its surroundings, and the army and special units are conducting large-scale sweeps, during which dozens of escapees have already been detained.

The Syrian government stated that it intends to review the cases of all detainees who had been held in prisons previously controlled by the SDF. Assistant Minister of Interior Abdel Kader Tahan confirmed that this concerns both ISIS members and persons detained during previous campaigns. Authorities promised that each case would be examined individually and criminal cases referred to the competent court, aiming to reassure the local population and restore the functioning of law enforcement agencies.

Parallel to the military actions, important political talks in Damascus failed. A meeting between the Syrian government and an SDF delegation mediated by U.S. envoy Tom Wrack did not lead to an agreement. The Kurdish side, according to reports, withdrew from previously reached arrangements on handing over military and administrative control of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor provinces. The Syrian side rejected the request to leave Al-Hasakah under SDF administration, stating that if demands are not met the issue will be resolved by force.

On the ground the situation continues to heat up. Reports indicate that the SDF is calling on Kurdish youth inside Syria and abroad to join the "resistance." At the same time, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees warned of the risk of a new mass displacement of thousands of families due to the escalation of fighting in the east and northeast of the country. Humanitarian organizations are calling for safe access to assist the growing number of people in need.

On the diplomatic front, Syrian President Ahmad Shara reportedly held a phone call with the U.S. leader. During the conversation the parties stressed the importance of preserving Syria's territorial integrity and ensuring the rights of the Kurdish people within a united state. They also confirmed the need to continue cooperation in the fight against the remnants of ISIS, which points to the complex intertwining of conflicting interests of various parties in this conflict.

Comments on the news

• What is the historical and political status of the Al-Jazira region, and why is control over it strategically important for various parties to the conflict in Syria? - Al-Jazira is a historical region in northeastern Syria, covering parts of the Al-Hasakah, Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa provinces. Politically it has never been a separate state, but it has a distinct ethnic mix (Kurds, Arabs, Assyrians) and rich resources. Control over it is strategically important because it contains major Syrian oil and gas fields, fertile agricultural lands (wheat, cotton) and important water resources (the Euphrates and Tigris rivers). For Damascus it is an economic lifeline; for the Kurdish SDF it is the basis for autonomy; for Turkey it is a security zone against Kurdish forces; and for the United States it is a foothold for influence in the region.

• Who are the "tribal formations" supporting the Syrian army in the northeast, and what is their role and motivation in the current confrontation? - "Tribal formations" are armed groups organized along traditional tribal structures, predominantly Arab tribes of the region (for example the Shaitat, Akidat, Al-Baggara tribes). They support the Syrian army for several reasons: historical ties to the state, distrust of Kurdish dominance in the SDF, promises of economic benefits and security from Damascus, and ideological affinity with Arab nationalism. Their role includes providing local legitimacy to government forces, intelligence, and countering SDF influence in Arab areas.

• What role does U.S. envoy Tom Wrack traditionally play in Syrian negotiations, and what were previous U.S. positions regarding SDF control over northeastern regions? - Tom Wrack, as the U.S. special envoy for Syria, traditionally acts as a diplomatic mediator, especially on issues related to northeastern Syria. His role includes coordinating with the SDF, negotiating with other regional actors, and representing U.S. interests. The U.S. position has consistently supported SDF control over the northeast, viewing these forces as a key partner in the fight against ISIS and as a stabilizing factor. The U.S. provided the SDF with military, financial and political support, opposing Turkish operations in the region and seeking to maintain influence there through Kurdish allies.

❮ ❯

Full version: الجيش السوري يصل إلى أطراف الحسكة ويؤمّن سد تشرين وريف الرقة الشمالي