Iraq Denies Reports of Mediation Between Tehran and Washington

Official Baghdad has categorically rejected information circulated by The New York Times that Iraq acted as a mediator between Iran and the United States in negotiations on a ceasefire. In a statement from the Iraqi prime minister’s office, the report is described as “unreliable and bears no relation to reality.” It refers to a purported Iranian refusal of a U.S. proposal. Iraqi authorities urged the media to verify information through official channels and not to circulate unconfirmed data from anonymous sources.

According to The New York Times, Iraqi mediation began after Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad as-Sudani met with U.S. President Donald Trump at the White House about ten days ago. The outlet claimed that Iranian officials concluded that the American version of a settlement did not meet Tehran’s key requirements, first and foremost regarding future control of the Strait of Hormuz. At the same time, in Iran, the U.S. proposal was called “the only one currently on the negotiating table.”

During as-Sudani’s visit to Tehran, he held meetings with Iranian President Masud Pezeshkian, the chief negotiator Mohammad Baqer Ghalibaf, and the foreign minister Abbas Araqchi. Araqchi, in turn, said the problem was not a lack of mediators, but Washington’s “illogical and hegemonistic approach.” The Iraqi prime minister shared with the Iranian side his impressions from his trip to the United States.

These developments are unfolding amid ongoing military escalation. The United States has intensified strikes on Iranian military facilities, including airfields, bridges, and ports. Iran, in response, is striking positions in the region with drones and ballistic missiles. According to The New York Times, Iranian forces are preparing for a possible widening of the conflict if Trump’s threats to attack Tehran and its vital infrastructure are carried out. In response, the outlet reports, Iran is considering an option of striking Tel Aviv and enlisting its allies—including Yemeni Houthis—to block the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb. This dynamic makes the situation around key sea routes—Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb—especially explosive, and Iraq’s denial appears to be a political signal that the real picture on the ground is more complex than what Western media are describing.

Comments on the news

• Why is Iran’s parliament speaker Mohammad Baqer Ghalibaf, rather than a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, acting as the chief negotiator with Iraq? What internal political processes in Iran does this reflect? - In Iran, foreign policy is not solely the prerogative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; key decisions are made by the Supreme Leader and his close circle. Ghalibaf, as an influential politician and a former commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), has direct access to the Supreme Leader. His appointment as chief negotiator reflects an increased role for parliament and conservative forces, as well as an effort to limit the influence of the president and reformists. It also points to factional struggles and the distribution of powers between different branches of government, in a situation where the Supreme Leader retains control over strategic issues.
• What are the real powers of Iran’s president Masud Pezeshkian, and how do they relate to the power of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei? Why, in the article, do key decisions on negotiations appear to be made by other figures rather than the president? - The Iranian president has limited authority in foreign policy and security matters, which are under the control of the Supreme Leader and his apparatus. As a reformer, Pezeshkian can influence economic and social issues, but in strategic negotiations he often plays a secondary role. The Supreme Leader has the final right of veto and oversees all key state institutions, including the IRGC, the Assembly of Experts, and the Supreme National Security Council. Therefore, key decisions on negotiations with Iraq are made through channels directly subordinated to Khamenei, rather than through the presidential administration—reflecting Iran’s constitutional structure, where the Supreme Leader’s authority significantly exceeds that of the president.

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Full version: العراق ينفي تقرير نيويورك تايمز بشأن الوساطة بين إيران وأمريكا

Venezuela in Search of Leadership: A Crisis With No Way Out

Venezuela is going through a colossal crisis, exacerbated by natural disasters and the lack of prospects if the country does not unite. The author argues that recovery and the sharing of information must be grounded in solidarity and transparency in the management of resources. In his view, the current situation calls for true leadership to stop social and administrative decline. The government is especially harshly criticized, where, as the article puts it, the “most mediocre and unprepared leadership” prevails—where technical competence has been replaced by ideological loyalty. Examples are drawn from failures in the management of such giants as PDVSA, Cantv, and Electricidad de Caracas, as well as the influence of radical left-wing groups, which, according to the author, have only worsened the situation.

The opposition also receives its share of criticism: it lacks a clear project, strategic vision, and the ability to move the country forward. The author believes Venezuela has lost its way, and that the “supposed revolution” has turned into “involution” in all areas of public life. In contrast, he recalls the historic leadership of 1958, which he considers unparalleled and focused on the long term. Today, he says, society has remained “an orphan” without real leadership—capable of setting goals and guiding the way to achieve them.

The author offers an in-depth analysis of the very concept of leadership. Psychologically, it is influence; in political science, it is the exercise of power; and in practice, it is the ability to direct and lead toward a common goal. Real leaders have charisma, know how to inspire and convey values, develop talent, make decisions, and motivate others. Power is only a relationship, but not everyone who holds power is a leader. Real leadership mobilizes resources and meets the needs of followers. In the end, the author concludes that leadership must be ethical, serve the common good, and be based on unity of intent for real transformation of society.

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Full version: Liderazgo, Políticas y proyecto

The United States hits Iran for the 13th straight wave: dead and retaliatory attacks

The US Central Command said it has successfully concluded the 13th night in a row of large-scale strikes on targets in Iran. According to US forces, the attacks focused on the country’s southern and south-western provinces. Iranian sources report four deaths and seven injuries in the provinces of Khuzestan and Hormozgan, as well as damage in several cities.

In Khuzestan province, the strikes hit the outskirts of the city of Ahvaz, where four people were killed and five others were wounded. Explosions were heard in seven areas of the city. The cities of Omidiyeh and Andimeshk were also targeted. In Hormozgan, Bander Abbas was affected: two people were injured and the power grid was damaged. Explosions were heard in the city of Jask and on the island of Qeshm. Iranian air defences were activated in Tehran to repel “hostile targets.”

In response to the US attacks, Iran said it carried out strikes on US bases in Bahrain, Jordan and Kuwait using “Arash” drones and other weaponry. The targets included fuel storage facilities and places where servicemembers were housed at the Sheikh Isa base in Bahrain, as well as hangars and residential areas at the El-Azraq base in Jordan. Later, Iranian command said it carried out attacks on Kuwaiti bases at Doha, Arifjan and El-Adiri.

Kuwait officially stated that its air defence systems intercepted “hostile missile attacks and drones” following “criminal Iranian aggression.” The Kuwaiti army’s General Staff explained that any sounds of explosions may have been linked to targets being intercepted by air-defence means.

The escalation is taking place amid the collapse of the June memorandum of understanding, which envisaged a ceasefire and the start of negotiations. However, US President Donald Trump announced on 8 July that he was withdrawing from the agreement after attacks on tankers in the Strait of Hormuz, which Washington blamed on Tehran. Since then, US strikes on Iran and Iranian retaliatory attacks against facilities in the region have become daily.

The United States is calling for an immediate halt to attacks on merchant ships and guarantees of freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran, in turn, insists on introducing its own mechanism to monitor ship transit in coastal waters. This position raises concerns about a global disruption to oil and gas supplies, as the strait is a key energy route. Negotiations have so far produced no results, while military activity continues to intensify.

Comments on the news

• What is the significance of Khuzestan province for Iran’s economy and politics, especially the city of Ahvaz? — Khuzestan is Iran’s “oil heart,” home to more than 80% of the country’s proven oil reserves (including the largest Ahvaz field). The city of Ahvaz is the province’s administrative and industrial hub. Politically, the region has a dual importance: on the one hand, it generates enormous revenue for the budget; on the other, it remains an area of ethnic tension due to a large Arab-speaking community, which periodically triggers protests and requires Tehran to balance economic exploitation with social control.

• What are Iran’s “Arash” drones and what role do they play in Iran’s military strategy? — “Arash” is a family of Iranian loitering munitions (kamikaze drones) with a flight range of between 200 and 2,000 km, depending on the modification. They are designed to strike specific targets, including air-defence systems, warehouses, and command posts. In Iran’s military strategy, “Arash” is part of the doctrine of “asymmetric deterrence”: these drones are cheap to produce, can be launched in large numbers, overwhelming the enemy’s air-defence systems—allowing Iran to strike at long distances without risking pilots.

• What was the “June memorandum of understanding” between the United States and Iran, and why was it scrapped? — The reference is to an unsigned draft of a temporary agreement in 2022–2023, discussed with the mediation of Oman and Qatar. The memorandum involved the unfreezing of Iranian assets (up to ~US$6 billion frozen in South Korea) in exchange for limiting uranium enrichment to 60% and releasing several foreign detainees. It was derailed for several reasons: tightened domestic repression in Iran after the 2022 protests, growing pressure from Israel and US Republicans, as well as Tehran’s demand for guarantees that a future American administration would not withdraw from the deal—something the Biden administration could not legally ensure.

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Full version: Dead and injured in US airstrikes on Iran, Tehran strikes Bahrain, Jordan and Kuwait

Reaction to Trump’s tariff offensive: a shake-up in America’s trade

The tariff strikes that Trump has described as a lever for pressure in recent news reports do not look like a one-off step. Instead, they appear like an economic shock that is changing the rules of the game for partners across the entire hemisphere. At the center of attention are both concern and calculation: countries in Latin America and Canada are looking for retaliatory formulas, revising their negotiation positions, and preparing countermeasures to reduce risks for their own markets and supply chains. At the same time, a dispute is coming to the forefront over how acceptable this style of influence is—and how far U.S. pressure in trade issues can go. This material is based on publications at www.infobae.com (Venezuela), as well as materials from www.facebook.com (Venezuela).

Venezuela sees U.S. sanctions as a global pressure scheme

In Venezuela, news about Washington’s new steps against Iran and Donald Trump’s tariff policy in Latin America are being read as parts of the same logic: using financial and economic pressure as a tool of political coercion. Through the lens of Caracas, the Infobae report that Trump threatened to use blocked Iranian assets to cover damage inflicted on ships appears not only as yet another threat to Tehran, but also as a warning for all countries under pressure from the United States.

For the Venezuelan audience, this is an especially sensitive topic. In Caracas, such actions automatically evoke personal experience: frozen funds abroad, disputes over access to national assets, and persistent accusations that the United States and its allies turn finance into a continuation of war by other means. That is why the Iran story is read not as an isolated episode from the Middle East, but as further confirmation that Washington is willing to распоряжаться (dispose of/handle) other people’s assets for its own political interests. The text emphasizes that the United States controls “tens of billions of dollars”—and it is precisely this that causes alarm in Venezuela: if such a precedent becomes established, it could be used against other states as well, including Venezuela itself.

The geopolitical backdrop also carries special weight. Mention of the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 20% of the world’s oil and gas flows, resonates strongly with how Venezuelans perceive energy conflicts. Although the country is far from the Persian Gulf, it understands that any escalation around such a corridor is immediately reflected in prices, logistics, and export calculations. For a state whose economy has relied on oil for decades, this means either possible growth in revenues or an intensification of instability on the global market. That is why the threat of “maximum pressure,” and the linkage of financial measures to military force, look like familiar elements of American foreign policy in Caracas—where, according to local commentators, the United States sets the rules of the game itself.

The same logic can be seen in Noticias SIN’s report on Trump’s tariffs, which have sparked concern in Latin America. Although the article explicitly names Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Panama, and the Dominican Republic, Venezuelans perceive it more broadly—as a sign that the United States is ready to use economic measures against an entire region. The measure in question is an additional tariff of 10% for Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, and 12.5% for Costa Rica, Panama, and the Dominican Republic. For Caracas, this is not just a trade headline, but confirmation that pressure on Latin American economies has become systemic.

Venezuelan reaction to such decisions usually draws on its own history with sanctions of a financial, oil, and commercial nature. Therefore, U.S. tariffs are seen not as a separate episode, but as a continuation of a long-standing policy in which the economy becomes a field for geopolitical pressure. From this, Caracas concludes that it is necessary to diversify markets, reduce dependence on trade with the United States, and strengthen ties with other regional and off-hemisphere partners. Politically, such measures reinforce the argument that Latin American countries face shared challenges in the face of Washington’s unilateral decisions.

In the end, both the Iranian story about frozen assets and the Latin American story about tariffs come together into a single Venezuelan picture of the world. In this picture, the United States is not presented as an arbiter, but as a party that freezes money, imposes duties, threatens force, and then decides on its own how to use economic levers. That is why such news in Caracas creates not only interest, but also apprehension: it strengthens the belief that financial sovereignty and protection of national assets remain, for Venezuela, not only an economic matter, but also a question of political survival.

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AI Doesn’t Distinguish Between Confidential and Public User Data

Modern artificial intelligence models process all information that users enter into chat dialogues without distinguishing between corporate secrets and ordinary public data. This means that if an employee shares a company’s commercial secrets in an AI chat, they could end up in the model’s training dataset and become accessible to others. Such indiscriminate handling puts business security at risk: confidential information could be disclosed, and the company using AI could face data leaks and legal consequences.

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Full version: الجزيرة نت

Cabello: The opposition is not helping those affected by the earthquakes

Diosdado Cabello, head of Venezuela’s ruling party, said that none of the opposition leaders who had returned to the country has provided real assistance to residents of the state of La Guaira, who were affected by the recent earthquakes. In his program “Con el Mazo Dando,” he stressed that the opposition figures, who had previously announced their return to work for the good of Venezuela, were merely taking photos for publicity rather than engaging in selfless help, and cited Lester Toledo as an example. Cabello also noted that some of them even asked the government’s supporters for water and mattresses for later distribution, which he deemed hypocritical.

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Full version: Diosdado Cabello: Ningún opositor extremista ha ido a La Guaira para brindar su ayuda al pueblo

US: Iran seeks a deal but keeps changing the terms

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said that Iran is “begging” for an agreement with Washington—both directly and through intermediaries. In his view, Tehran can get a good deal if it “returns to reason” after recent strikes. Rubio stressed that the goal of the United States is not regime change in Iran, but the complete elimination of Iran’s nuclear weapons.

Rubio noted that Iranian officials, or those speaking on their behalf, are constantly trying to reach an understanding, but each time, after an agreement is reached, they change the terms. He refused to reveal details of current contacts with Tehran, but confirmed that some heads of Iran’s foreign ministry have told him that Iran wants to come to an agreement. The US top diplomat also accused Iran of “posting stupid videos on social media” and of hiding its military and economic losses due to the absence of a free press.

Washington will continue to apply pressure, forcing Iran to pay a “high price” if it refuses negotiations or violates any possible agreement. Rubio explained that the United States engages with different levels within Iran’s power structure because the clergy controls the country. He added that Iranians deserve better leadership than one that “shoots people in the streets,” and that Iran has the resources to become a rich country, but they are spent on armed militias and missile programs.

Against the backdrop of regional tensions, Rubio expressed hope for de-escalation by the Yemeni Houthis (the “Ansar Allah” movement). He said they had long stayed out of the war, but that recently Iran managed to draw them into the conflict and push them to attack Saudi ships in the Red Sea. The secretary of state said the United States is seeking to reduce escalation, and suggested that after several days of heightened tension, Iran may be willing to strike a deal because it is suffering serious losses day by day.

When asked about the war in Ukraine, Rubio said the Trump administration wants to end the conflict, but that is impossible without the consent of both sides. He pointed out that Kyiv has so far rejected Russia’s “3+2” proposal. Rubio denied rumors that Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov asked him to stop arms deliveries to Ukraine, explaining that the United States is fulfilling its commitments to NATO. President Trump, he said, is seeking to end the war, but that requires time, work, and the willingness of the parties.

In response to questions about Saudi Arabia’s nuclear program, Rubio said that any cooperation in this area requires Congressional approval and will be strictly peaceful. The US insists on conditions regarding the size of reactors and on the participation of American companies in construction to rule out diversion for unintended use. Regarding Cuba, the secretary of state criticized the leadership there as incompetent and ideologically committed to destroying the country, emphasizing that Washington supports free elections and representation of all segments of society.

Comments on the news

• How does Iran’s political system work if power effectively belongs to the clergy (the Supreme Leader) rather than the president? — Iran is an Islamic republic where power is divided between elected bodies (the president, parliament) and appointed religious institutions. The Supreme Leader (rahbar) is the head of state and commander-in-chief; he controls the judiciary, the armed forces, and the media. The president is responsible for executive power and the economy, but his decisions can be blocked by the Guardian Council, made up of clerics. This dualism creates a system in which the clergy sets the strategic course, while the president manages day-to-day affairs.

• What are the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Basij militia, and why are they called “armed militias”? — The IRGC is an elite military-political formation directly subordinate to the Supreme Leader. It handles not only defense, but also the economy, suppressing protests, and supporting allies abroad (for example, “Hezbollah”). The Basij is a voluntary militia often used for internal control and ideological mobilization. They are called “militias” because of their parallel command structure that is not accountable to civilian authorities, as well as the religious and ideological nature of their activities.

• How does Iran support the Yemeni Houthis (the “Ansar Allah” movement), and how is this linked to attacks on ships in the Red Sea? — Iran provides the Houthis with military and technical assistance: it supplies drones (for example, Shahed-136), ballistic missiles, and components for their production, and it also trains fighters. Logistics is organized through Iraqi and Lebanese proxy groups. The attacks on ships in the Red Sea (since late 2023) are the Houthis’ response to the war in Gaza: they target vessels linked to Israel, attempting to disrupt international shipping. Iran uses these strikes to demonstrate its influence in the region without direct involvement in the conflict.

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Full version: Rubio: Iran is seeking a deal and will pay a high price if it does not meet the terms

Disputes over U.S. Foreign Policy: Sanctions, Pressure, and the Risk of Escalation

Fresh debates are erupting around the course of the U.S. administration: at the center are tough moves in foreign policy, sanctions measures, and regional pressure which, according to critics, could push events toward escalation. A special focus is on discussions about Cuba and Iran—where some observers see an effort to secure political concessions, while others fear that a “governance by pressure” logic could lead to destabilization and complicate balances in a region that is already fragile. Against this backdrop, there is also a public “trade” of interpretations: some argue for the need to deliver a “hard response,” while others say Washington is effectively taking on the role of an external arbiter, intervening in processes that require more careful political decisions. This material was prepared based on data from www.facebook.com (Venezuela) and www.instagram.com (Venezuela).

Venezuela Sees U.S. Decisions as a Threat and Double Standards

In Venezuela’s information landscape, several international storylines are quickly coming together into a single picture of distrust toward the United States—its foreign policy and the way Washington uses issues of security, sanctions, and the legitimacy of power in its own interests. From a possible nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia to disputes over what grounds someone remains in power, all these topics in Venezuela are read not as separate news items, but as part of the same conversation about double standards and politicized rules.

One of the most alarming signals for Venezuelan audiences was a publication by FRANCE 24 Español, which reports on a possible agreement supported by the Donald Trump administration that would allow Saudi Arabia to enrich uranium and reprocess spent nuclear fuel. In the region, this can easily be seen as a step that may spur a new nuclear arms race in the Middle East—especially since the deal involves no “strict guarantees.” For Venezuela, what matters here is not only the Middle East storyline itself, but also the fundamental question: the United States, which typically acts as an arbiter in the field of nonproliferation, is simultaneously backing arrangements that worry its own lawmakers, Israel, and neighboring countries. Against this backdrop, traditional distrust of U.S. foreign policy is intensifying in the country, along with the idea that Washington is consistent and acts “according to rules.”

The same logic of distrust can be seen in another reaction related to the question of on what grounds someone continues to remain in power when such “temporariness” is not spelled out in law or the Constitution. The material linked here in the Venezuelan context reads as a critique of arbitrary retention of power and a call for a clear legal basis. For Venezuela, this is not an abstract debate: issues of legitimacy, constitutional validity of decisions, and abuse of authority have long been at the center of the country’s political life. That is why the demand to explain exactly which article enshrines the right to “remain” in power is perceived as a defense of the supremacy of the Constitution—and as an accusation that elites are holding onto the helm not on a direct mandate, but through political arrangements or external support.

Another important storyline concerns Cuba and criticism of the report by Marco Rubio. In a piece published on Cubadebate, Venezuela’s and, more broadly, Latin American media space sees not just a dispute over a particular report, but a continuation of the United States’ years-long pressure on countries that do not align with its political line. For Venezuela, this topic is especially sensitive because Cuban and Venezuelan narratives have long run in parallel: both countries live under sanctions pressure and view such actions as part of a broader campaign against the region’s sovereignty. At the same time, the quotation included in the text also reflects another, tougher position: “El pueblo cubano agradece que al menos en un informe se plasme toda la realidad de la mierda que constituye el régimen cubano…”. The phrase shows that even among people who traditionally criticize the United States, there are also those who believe that external criticism of the Cuban regime is fair—even if harsh.

For Venezuela, all these storylines converge on one idea: when the United States talks about security, democracy, or international norms, but acts selectively, it strengthens the belief that global rules are politicized. In one case, it is about nuclear technologies for an ally without strict guarantees; in another, it is about the legitimacy of power and constitutional grounds; in a third, it is about sanctions and reports used as a tool of pressure. In local political culture, such news reinforces both anti-imperialist rhetoric and concern about the militarization of international relations—along with the conviction that major powers make decisions primarily based on their own interests.

That is why in Venezuela these messages are perceived not as scattered external news items, but as elements of a broader picture: the United States formally talks about security and order, but in practice—according to many in the region—creates new risk zones, maintains double standards, and leaves other countries to face the consequences of decisions made by others.

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Jordan Sees New Escalation With Iran as the Most Dangerous Yet

Jordan is watching with alarm the sudden worsening of tensions between Iran and the United States, believing the current round of the conflict is more dangerous than previous flare-ups. Unlike earlier clashes, Tehran, according to Amman, has now targeted strategic sites within the kingdom — the port of Aqaba and an airport — not only American military bases. This fundamentally changes the nature of the threat: Iran appears to view Jordan as a central arena for its retaliatory operations, going beyond the earlier, more limited attacks on U.S. interests.

The turning point came last Friday, when an attack on U.S. forces at one of Jordan’s bases killed three servicemembers. According to U.S. accounts, damage was inflicted at two sites, and Amman called the incident the most serious in a series of Iranian aggressions. Particular concern is the precision and range of the strike: the missiles reached their targets from Iranian territory, making a repeat of such attacks a very realistic scenario.

It is worth noting that Jordan previously reached an agreement with Washington on military cooperation, which allows U.S. troops to be present on its bases under strict limitations. In return, the kingdom gains access to modern weapons, training, and technology to combat terrorism and smuggling. However, what happened is precisely what Amman was trying to avoid: turning the country into a theater of direct hostilities, even if the targets are allies rather than Jordanian citizens.

Within Jordan, the question is growing louder: what prompted Iran to shift from low-intensity attacks to a direct, high-level threat? Judging by the signs, the leadership of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is seeking to expand the range of targets, demonstrating that its capabilities have not been weakened and persuading Tehran that surrender would be pointless. In addition, an attack on Jordan, while painful, costs the world economy less than strikes on oil fields — something Iran has already done in Gulf states.

At the regional level, Amman has found itself caught between two fires: on one side, Iran’s relentless escalation, which spares no neighbors; on the other, uncertainty and U.S. involvement in the war with no clear end in sight. Iran, according to analysts, is persistently trying to take control of the Strait of Hormuz and restore influence for its proxy forces after setbacks in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq. In this situation, Jordan is placing its hopes in diplomacy: together with the Gulf states, it is trying to renew a memorandum of understanding between the parties, and it is also using Qatari channels to achieve a short-term ceasefire — no more than 10 days.

However, Amman has no illusions about the durability of any possible pause: U.S. and Iranian positions remain hardline, and, in the view of Jordanians, the Netanyahu government is only fanning the flames in an effort to broaden the conflict. Nevertheless, Jordan remains determined to defend its security — as it has already done by downing dozens of rockets — and, together with the Gulf monarchies, to try to prevent a third full-scale war. The main course of action, according to Amman, is a new diplomatic track involving Iran’s nuclear program and the future of the Strait of Hormuz, as well as mandatory dialogue between allies after this war to clearly align shared interests.

Comments on the news

• Who are the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and what role do they play in Iran’s military and political structure? — The IRGC is an elite military-political formation created after the 1979 Islamic Revolution to defend the theocratic regime. Unlike the regular army, the IRGC has its own ground forces, naval forces, air forces, and intelligence services, and it also oversees the ballistic missile program. The organization is deeply integrated into the economy (it controls major construction and energy projects) and politics: many IRGC members hold senior government posts. The IRGC is also responsible for supporting proxy forces abroad (for example, Hezbollah) and suppressing internal protests.

• Why is the Strait of Hormuz strategically important for Iran, and how could controlling it affect global oil prices? — About 20–25% of all global oil trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz. By controlling one of the straits’ shores, Iran can block or hinder the passage of tankers. Blocking the strait could trigger a sharp spike in oil prices (historical precedents include 1973, 1979, and 2019). Iran often uses the threat of blocking the strait as leverage in negotiations over its nuclear program or sanctions, creating enormous risks for the energy security of importing countries.

• What proxy forces does Iran use in the region, and why might their weakening in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq have prompted Tehran to launch direct attacks on targets in Jordan? — Iran relies on a network of allied armed groups: Hezbollah (Lebanon), the Houthis (Yemen), Shiite militias in Iraq (“Kataib Hezbollah,” “Asaib Ahl al-Haq”), and also Iran-aligned formations in Syria. These forces serve as Iran’s “shield,” allowing it to strike opponents (Israel, the United States) without direct involvement. The weakening of these proxies due to Israeli strikes (in Syria and Lebanon) and the loss of momentum in Iraq reduces their deterrent power. In such circumstances, Tehran may shift to direct attacks (for example, missile strikes on Jordan) to demonstrate strength, compensate for losses in its proxy network, and prevent the further narrowing of its “strategic rear.”

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Full version: Between Tehran’s strikes and U.S. ambiguity.. This is the path Jordan will take

Two doctors die in Barinas: hantavirus ruled out

In the state of Barinas (Venezuela), after the deaths of two doctors who were admitted to hospital with severe symptoms, local authorities carried out an investigation and ruled out an outbreak. The head of regional health services, Jose Rafael Fajardo, explained that the doctors had been in a private clinic for several days before being admitted to intensive care, where they later died. Tests for hantavirus, yellow fever, dengue fever, leptospirosis, and other dangerous infections came back negative. Samples were sent to the capital’s Institute of Scientific Research (IVIC) for more in-depth analysis.

Although a case of hantavirus had been officially confirmed in the neighboring state of Anzoátegui, Fajardo stressed that the virus was not found in the doctors who died in Barinas, despite similar symptoms. He urged residents to remain calm—the main hospital is operating as usual. Authorities have already held a meeting with infectious disease specialists and epidemiologists, and proposed establishing a local laboratory to quickly identify pathogens in the future.

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Full version: Pruebas descartan hantavirus y fiebre amarilla en Barinas tras deceso de dos médicos

U.S. intelligence: Airstrikes on Iran have not achieved results

U.S. intelligence assessments have shown that a new wave of airstrikes on Iranian targets, ongoing for 11 days, has not led to any noticeable changes in Tehran’s behavior. The Atlantic reports this, citing an unnamed U.S. official. Notably, the administration of President Donald Trump has resumed the bombardments without an official declaration of war—neither Trump himself nor other senior officials confirmed a return to full-scale combat. In addition, members of Congress have not received briefings about a new phase of the conflict, underscoring the lack of transparency in decision-making.

In an interview with the outlet, a former U.S. servicemember sharply criticized the administration’s approach. According to him, Trump’s team “decided to break every rule and declared all previous administrations to be idiots for informing the public and allies, and for setting clear objectives.” Now, as the officer notes, the United States has found itself in a “war with no good options and no American or international support,” which he called “a trap set by ourselves.” He expects the administration to continue hostilities, refusing to admit defeat in the hope of a better outcome.

According to The Atlantic, the military says that “hope is not a strategy,” just as is waging a war that officials refuse to call a war. Sources close to Trump acknowledge that the administration has been faced with a choice between continuing the conflict and changing course, even as the decision to resist remains in place despite rising costs. This gap between the anticipated success of the bombardments and reality points to a deep crisis in military planning.

Before Trump, according to people around him, there are two paths. The first is escalation, with the risk of further losses among American service members, dwindling munitions, and a blow to Republicans’ chances in the November midterm elections. The second is an immediate exit from the conflict to minimize political damage—though this would leave Iran in a stronger strategic position than it was decades earlier. Significantly, even the conservative Fox News channel has begun to shift its rhetoric: some hosts have talked about the possibility of ending the war at least to save the party ahead of the election.

Despite all this, two sources close to the president claim that Trump may consider leaving “someday,” but for now he will continue fighting. The main goal for the United States is to raise the cost for Iran of violating shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. In response, Tehran is trying to make the American military presence in the region expensive by blocking the passage of ships. In addition, advisers say Trump is starting to recognize the political harm of the war, but he becomes furious when his nuclear deal with Iran is compared to a weaker version of the Obama-era agreement. This tangle of contradictions between the military and nuclear issues fuels escalation, despite criticism and pragmatic assessments.

Comments on the news

• What strategic significance does the Strait of Hormuz have for Iran’s economy and security? - The Strait of Hormuz is a key route for exporting Iranian oil and gas, through which about 20% of world oil trade passes. For Iran, control of the strait means leverage over global energy prices and the ability to block shipments in the event of a conflict, strengthening its military-strategic position in the region.

• How did the nuclear deal proposed by the Trump administration differ from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)? - The 2015 JCPOA was a multilateral agreement that provided for the phased lifting of sanctions in exchange for limiting Iran’s nuclear program under IAEA supervision. Trump’s deal (after the U.S. exited the JCPOA in 2018) was based on unilateral pressure through “maximum sanctions” and required Iran to fully give up uranium enrichment, as well as to include Iran’s ballistic program and regional influence in negotiations—an approach unacceptable to Tehran.

• Which key political factions in Iran shape the approach to negotiations with the United States on the nuclear program? - The main factions are reformists (back a moderate course, support negotiations and the lifting of sanctions for economic development) and conservatives (dominate the parliament and judiciary, insist on independence and reject concessions under pressure). The Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei plays a decisive role, balancing between these groups while retaining the final say on the nuclear deal. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps also has significant influence, opposing trust in the United States.

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Full version: U.S. assessments cast doubt on the usefulness of ongoing attacks on Iran

Israel Awaits a Signal From Trump Before a Possible Attack on Iran

Israel is preparing for a new U.S. military campaign against Iran, but for now it is not moving into direct hostilities. In Tel Aviv, officials are compiling an updated target list, boosting readiness, and deepening intelligence work with the U.S. Central Command. However, Washington is keeping Israel’s air force out of the strikes, and the key question now is when Israel’s involvement will become necessary for the Americans—or when it will be triggered by an Iranian response.

According to Israeli sources, the temporary window for a possible operation runs from the end of the FIFA World Cup until September. This timing is linked to Donald Trump’s approach: first applying military and economic pressure to push Tehran toward a deal, and if diplomacy fails, moving to expanded combat operations. This is not about a specific date for an Israeli strike, but about the moment when the United States will reassess the target list and the scope of the campaign.

Three scenarios are being considered for Israel’s entry into the conflict: a direct U.S. request for Israel to participate in a broader wave of attacks; an Iranian strike on Israeli territory; or the discovery that Iran is preparing an attack—which would provide justification for a preventive strike. According to a representative of the security services, the army is ready for any of these options, and coordination with U.S. Central Command has reached a one-hundred-percent level.

Meanwhile, the United States is increasing its military presence in the region. Dozens of additional fighter jets have arrived, including an F-16 squadron deployed in Jordan, and F-35 and F-16 squadrons have been reinforced at other bases. The number of tanker aircraft arriving in Israel has reached five to eight per day. U.S. strikes have already reached the outskirts of Tehran and more important targets, changing the previous situation that did not allow Israeli involvement. There is also consideration of hitting power plants and additional nuclear facilities, including an underground complex inside Mount Maqush.

Inside Israel, calls are growing for a new round of bombings, as some in the military believe the previous campaign ended before the target list was exhausted. It includes missile factories, elements of the nuclear program, command posts, and electricity and oil infrastructure. However, the proposal runs into a strategic question: will destroying additional power stations or missile bases lead to the regime’s collapse or a change in its behavior? One senior official was skeptical, saying: “What can we achieve that we haven’t already achieved?”—highlighting that the disagreement is not about operational capability, but about the absence of a political goal that would justify the price.

Despite the fact that Israel has not yet taken part in the bombings, it is deeply involved in intelligence sharing and operational planning. Plans are in place and awaiting Trump’s decision, with roles divided: the U.S. carries out the strikes, while Israel provides knowledge about targets and capabilities. Critics of involvement warn that direct entry could paralyze the economy, tourism, and aviation; deplete Israel’s stockpiles of missile interceptors; and open the door to drones—against which Israel does not have full protection. In addition, it could renew the threat from Hezbollah along the northern border.

Against this diplomatic backdrop, amid military preparations, attempts are being made to secure a 10-day ceasefire that would include a halt to attacks and the opening of corridors in the Strait of Hormuz. According to sources, Trump told the intermediaries that if a ceasefire is not reached within a week, escalation will follow. This means diplomacy is not an alternative to war, but the last delay before it expands. Thus, the most likely conclusion is that Israel will join the campaign when the ceasefire fails, when Washington needs its capabilities to strike strategic targets, or when Iran directly attacks Israeli territory.

Comments on the news

• What is the underground complex in Mount Maqush (possibly referring to the Fordow nuclear facility) and why is it considered a strategic target for strikes? — The reference is to the Fordow nuclear facility, located inside a mountain near the city of Qom. It was built for uranium enrichment and protected by a multi-meter layer of rock, making it practically invulnerable to conventional airstrikes. Its strategic value lies in the fact that it houses modern centrifuges capable of producing highly enriched uranium, as well as command-and-control points for Iran’s nuclear program. Destroying this facility would require special munitions or a ground operation, which is why it is considered one of the most heavily protected targets.
• What role does the Lebanese group Hezbollah play in a potential conflict between Israel and Iran, and what does it threaten on Israel’s northern border? — Hezbollah is Iran’s key proxy ally in southern Lebanon. In the event of a major conflict, it could open a second front against Israel by shelling its northern territories with short- and medium-range rockets (including precision-guided ones), as well as conducting cross-border raids. The threat to Israel’s northern border lies in massed rocket salvos that could overwhelm air-defense systems, and in Hezbollah’s underground tunnels and shelters, which makes neutralizing it more difficult.
• Why is the Strait of Hormuz a key element in the Iran–U.S. standoff, and what consequences could blocking it or opening corridors have? — Around 20% of the world’s oil supplies pass through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran has the ability to temporarily close the strait using mines, anti-ship missiles, and fast attack craft. Blocking it would cause a sharp spike in oil prices, a global energy crisis, and likely a military response from the U.S. and its allies. Opening alternative corridors (for example, via Iraqi oil pipelines) would reduce dependence on the strait, but it would require multi-year infrastructure projects and would not eliminate the threat entirely.
• How did the previous U.S. and Israel military campaign against Iran (referred to in the article as the “previous campaign”) end, and how much did it affect Tehran’s nuclear program or military capability? — By the “previous campaign,” this typically refers to a series of cyberattacks (such as the Stuxnet virus in 2010) and sabotage at Iranian nuclear facilities, as well as targeted killings of scientists (in particular Mohsen Fakhrizadeh). These actions led to a temporary disruption of centrifuge operations and a delay in enrichment progress, but they did not stop the nuclear program. Iran restored capacity, expanded it, and strengthened protection at the facilities. Tehran’s military capability (missile program, drones) was affected minimally; instead, it received an impetus to develop asymmetric means of deterrence.

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Full version: إسرائيل تترقب "الذريعة".. وواشنطن تحشد خياراتها العسكرية ضد إيران

Venezuela’s Opposition Calls for Democratic Forces to Join Dialogue With US Support

The leader of Venezuela’s opposition, heading an unrecognized government parliamentary body (elected in 2015), said she plans to convene all democratic sectors of the country to take part in the dialogue. In her statement, Dinora Figuera thanked U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, stressing that Washington’s active involvement will be key to moving the process forward and achieving concrete results. The initiative aims to develop a roadmap focused on restoring institutions of power and ensuring a peaceful, democratic transition through elections—something the opposition intends to involve a broad range of political and civil forces in.

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Full version: Dinorah Figuera says all democratic sectors will be called to dialogue

Qatar, Egypt, and Pakistan propose a 10-day ceasefire between the US and Iran

A group of mediator countries, including Qatar, Egypt, and Pakistan, has put forward a new initiative: to propose a ten-day ceasefire to the United States and Iran. According to the Axios portal, Washington is studying the plan, while its allies, including Israel, are urging it not to close the “diplomatic window.” At the same time, the Trump administration is preparing for a possible breakdown of talks—over the past few days, dozens of fighter jets and aerial refueling aircraft have been deployed to the region.

The initiative comes amid sharp escalation: the United States’ bombing campaign against Iranian targets has now lasted for ten nights. In addition, three American servicemen were killed in Jordan and Iraq. On Monday, President Donald Trump said he ordered the Pentagon to make Iran pay a “double price” for every American killed. Israeli sources report that the army is on the highest state of readiness and is preparing for a possible expansion of the war in the coming days.

The proposal itself consists of two key points. First, a complete cessation of hostilities. Second, a resumption of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, which would involve splitting routes: the southern corridor (through Omani waters) must be free from Iranian attacks, while the northern one (in Iranian waters) must be free from an American naval blockade. According to a regional source, the mediators have already conveyed this plan both to Washington and to Tehran.

The initiative builds on consultations held in Muscat on July 11, when the United States demanded that Iran publicly commit to keeping the strait open. No agreement was reached then, and soon afterward attacks on merchant vessels followed, followed in turn by retaliatory airstrikes. As part of a possible longer-term settlement, one option being discussed is that Iran could charge a “reasonable service fee” for ensuring navigation security—similar to the Malacca Strait model. An alternative would be to route these fees into a common fund under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization.

Although preliminary talks began even before the deaths of two American soldiers in Jordan from Iranian strikes, after the incident Washington temporarily stepped away from dialogue. A senior U.S. official confirmed that talks are continuing, but Trump has “not finished” his retaliatory actions and intends to make Iran pay for “terrorist acts in the Strait of Hormuz.” According to regional sources, the White House may continue bombing for several more days before seriously considering the new ceasefire proposal. Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for its part, said that the mediators are actively working to prevent further escalation.

Comments on the news

• Why exactly are Qatar, Egypt, and Pakistan acting as mediators between the US and Iran? What special interests or historical ties do they have in this conflict?
  Qatar traditionally plays the role of a neutral negotiator thanks to its close ties both with the United States (the largest U.S. military base in the region) and with Iran (a shared gas field and support for Islamist groups). Egypt, as a key U.S. ally in the Arab world, is used as a channel to pass messages through its intelligence services, particularly in the context of stabilizing the Middle East. Pakistan is involved mainly for religious and ideological reasons (Sunni-Shia dialogue) and because of its own nuclear status—allowing it to help on nonproliferation issues and regional balance.

• What is the “Malacca Strait model,” and how could it be applied to the Strait of Hormuz to regulate shipping and collect fees?
  The “Malacca Strait model” is a system for joint shipping management in which coastal states (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore), in cooperation with international organizations, ensure security and environmental monitoring, and also collect fees for passage and services (pilotage, navigation systems). Applying it to the Strait of Hormuz would imply creating a similar multilateral mechanism involving Iran, Oman, and neighboring countries, which would make the fees legitimate and reduce the risk of unilateral blockades.

• What has been Oman’s historical role in US-Iran relations, and why did negotiations on the Strait of Hormuz take place specifically in Muscat?
  For decades, Oman has served as a trusted intermediary between the United States and Iran due to its neutrality and flexible foreign policy. In the 1980s, it helped organize security meetings in the Persian Gulf, and in the 2010s it hosted secret negotiations over the nuclear deal. Muscat was chosen for talks on the Strait of Hormuz because of the sultanate’s long-standing ties with both sides, its control over the eastern entrance to the strait (the Strait of Hormuz borders Omani territorial waters), and also because Iran does not show hostility toward the sultanate.

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Full version: أكسيوس: مقترح هدنة لـ10 أيام بين واشنطن وطهران وخياران لإدارة رسوم هرمز

Reactions to Trump’s Hard Line: Iran, Cuba, Venezuela, and Israel/Gaza

Against the backdrop of heightened international headlines, the media are closely watching how Trump is shaping foreign policy in the logic of confrontation and conspicuous pressure. Controversial signals directed at Iran and possible retaliatory actions, the tough rhetoric around Cuba and Venezuela, and tension in the Israel/Gaza sphere—all of this creates a single overarching theme: fears of escalation and questions about how far Washington is willing to go on issues of security and intervention. At the same time, attention remains focused on diplomatic maneuvers involving allies and rivals—ranging from contacts with and pressure on regional players to fine-tuning positions, where figures such as Netanyahu are especially visible, as well as Cuba’s and Venezuela’s response to American proactiveness. This material is based on posts from Facebook (Venezuela).

Venezuela Sees Double Standards in Trump and the United States

Venezuelan UniVista TV presents two international news stories at once through the lens of distrust toward U.S. foreign policy—and especially toward its selectiveness. On the one hand, according to UniVista TV, “rechazó de forma contundente” (firmly rejected) the possibility that Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, would be arrested during his visit to the United States after the issue was raised by New York City mayor Zohar Mamdani. On the other hand, the Venezuelan audience receives a signal that Washington could expand military operations against Iran, including discussion of an attack on the underground facility known as Pickaxe Mountain near Natanz, as reported by UniVista TV.

In the Venezuelan context, both stories combine into a familiar narrative: the United States presents itself as a defender of international law, but in practice acts selectively—hard toward opponents and soft when it comes to allies. The Netanyahu story is read as an example of how political loyalty in Washington often matters more than universal rules. For a Venezuelan reader, this is an especially sensitive issue, since Caracas has long believed that sanctions, pressure, and diplomatic threats from the United States are not applied equally to everyone, but depend on geopolitical benefit.

The report about a possible expansion of U.S. actions against Iran strengthens this framing. In the Venezuelan view, discussion of striking the heavily protected Pickaxe Mountain facility—potentially involving attacks on entrances, ventilation, and roads—does not look like a narrow military subject, but like another example of a policy of coercive pressure. This approach is associated with interference in the internal affairs of states under the pretext of security, and in this storyline Iran becomes a symbol of a country resisting external pressure.

What remains especially important for Venezuelan audiences is that the talk is not only about war in the conventional sense, but also about a broader set of coercive tools—from sanctions to “preemptive” strikes. This directly echoes Venezuela’s experience of political and economic pressure from the United States, so the news is perceived as a warning that Washington is ready to use the maximum range of means to impose its line.

Thus, in Venezuela’s presentation, both stories—not only about protecting Netanyahu, but also about possible escalation against Iran—become more than just international news. They serve as confirmation of a broader idea: the United States acts as a power that intervenes, punishes its opponents, and shields its allies, while in this context local audiences find talk of democracy and law increasingly less convincing.

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Oil Prices Fall Below $90 as Signs Emerge of Iran–US Talks

On Monday morning, oil quotes lost their initial rise and fell below the $90-per-barrel mark. Brent futures dropped to $87.9, while West Texas Intermediate fell to $81.8, although earlier in the session they had reached their highest levels since June. The reversal was driven by statements from Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the possibility of resuming talks with the United States, taking into account Tehran’s interests, which eased concerns about disruptions to supplies through the Strait of Hormuz.

The escalation of the conflict in the Middle East continues: the United States has struck Iran for the ninth night in a row, and Kuwait and Bahrain reported new attacks attributed to Iran. In the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, commercial vessels were targeted, complicating the security of maritime transport. Barclays analyst Amarpit Singh said that in the coming weeks it will become clear what a sustainable level of oil exports from the region looks like, while markets for now are maintaining “extreme optimism” regarding the potential impact on inventories, which at the start of the conflict fell to five-year lows.

In the United States, gasoline prices at filling stations have exceeded the psychological threshold of $4 per gallon. The average retail cost of fuel has risen by more than 30% since late February, when the United States and Israel began a military campaign against Iran. This points to intensifying economic pressure related to energy supplies.

On the currency market, the dollar weakened: the U.S. dollar index fell by 0.1% to 100.69, ending a three-day run of gains. The euro rose to $1.14, the British pound to $1.34, and the yen remained at 162.3. The Australian dollar also strengthened by 0.2%. The decline in demand for risky assets was reflected in the performance of the U.S. currency.

Gold stabilized around $4,018.90 per ounce as investors assessed the Middle East crisis, which pushed oil prices higher. However, an FRS representative said the need for rate hikes to curb inflation can’t be ruled out, which traditionally weighs on precious metals. Analysts note that as long as the war continues, rising oil prices are fueling inflation and putting pressure on gold.

Comments on the news

• Why is the Strait of Hormuz important for global oil supplies, and why is its stability critical for markets? — The Strait of Hormuz is the planet’s strategic “oil valve.” Roughly 20–25% of all global seaborne oil trade passes through it (about 17–21 million barrels per day). Any blockade—or even heightened military tension—in the strait immediately disrupts supply chains, causing oil prices to jump and triggering panic in global markets, because alternative routes (such as pipelines) have limited capacity.
• Why can Iran’s position in talks with the United States directly affect oil prices (for example, through control of production or transit)? — First, Iran is one of the largest holders of proven oil and gas reserves. Second, it controls the northern coast of the Strait of Hormuz and can threaten shipping (mining, attacks on tankers). Third, through its allies (for example, Yemeni Houthis), Iran can indirectly affect transit through the Red Sea and the Bab-el-Mandeb strait. Therefore, the outcome of the talks—tightening sanctions or removing restrictions on Iranian oil exports—is perceived by traders as a signal for price corrections.
• What are the key disagreements between Iran and the Persian Gulf countries (Kuwait, Bahrain) referenced in the context of the attacks? — The main disagreements are tied to territorial disputes (for example, sovereignty over the islands of Abu Musa, the Greater and Lesser Tumbs in the Strait of Hormuz, which Iran has held since 1971), issues of delimiting offshore shelves for oil and gas production (a dispute around the “Arash” / “Dorra” gas field), and competition for regional influence. In addition, Iran accuses the Gulf monarchies of allowing the United States to use their bases for hostile actions—an argument often cited as a motive or context for attacks on sites in those countries.

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Full version: برميل النفط دون 90 دولارا والدولار يتراجع جراء تصاعد صراع أمريكا وإيران

Declassified CIA documents: Chavezism’s election victory explained by internal factors

Journalist Carlos Montero has released declassified data from the United States Central Intelligence Agency regarding elections in Venezuela. According to the documents that were published, American intelligence finds no evidence of vote-rigging and concludes that the election results in favor of the incumbent were driven not by manipulation, but by deep-seated political and social processes within the country. The information was shared via the social network X and sparked lively debate among both users and experts.

In its report, the CIA points to several factors as decisive: broad popular support for Chavezism, effective social programs, high grassroots mobilization of supporters, and a profound split among opposition forces. In the agency’s view, these elements—not alleged violations—best explain the electoral outcomes. The publication of the documents once again brought attention to Venezuela’s complex internal political dynamics, where the population’s ideological commitment and the government’s social initiatives remain key triggers for voter turnout and voting choices.

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Full version: Documentos desclasificados de la CIA descartan fraude y atribuyen resultados electorales en Venezuela a factores de base

The United States and Iran: the ninth wave of strikes and retaliatory attacks

The US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that the ninth wave of strikes on Iranian targets has been completed, saying they were aimed at new areas. In Washington, officials stressed that the attacks were a response to the deaths of American servicemembers, while leaving the door open for diplomatic solutions. The bombardments targeted military command centers, air-defense systems, coastal radar, missile and drone launch sites, as well as communications networks—all aimed at reducing Iran’s ability to attack ships and sailors in the Strait of Hormuz.

In Iran itself, casualties and explosions were reported in several southern provinces. State television and agencies said that after CENTCOM announced the end of the wave, strikes resumed. In East Azerbaijan province, one person was killed in an attack on a military site near Tabriz, and several others were injured. West Azerbaijan also reported injuries from shelling in the vicinity of Urmia. Explosions were heard in Isfahan, and in Bushehr province, areas near the nuclear power plant were affected. According to the Tasnim news agency, after a strike on the city of Khorramuj, there were electricity disruptions.

Iran did not retaliate lightly: its armed forces attacked Kuwait and Bahrain. Kuwait’s army said it repelled an attack by Iranian drones, and Bahrain television reported that several air targets were intercepted by air-defense systems—alarms sounded in cities. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) claims that its drones destroyed an American early-warning radar at the Ali as-Salem base in Kuwait, and also struck US Army aircraft at the Aqaba airport in Jordan, damaging them. The Wall Street Journal, citing a US official, confirmed damage to Black Hawk helicopters in Jordan. In addition, the Iraqi opposition party “Kurdistan Workers’ Society” reported a rocket attack on its offices in Erbil.

In comments on the ninth wave, President Donald Trump said the strikes were a response to the deaths of American troops in the region. He noted that Iran had been “almost completely stripped of military capabilities”: they only have a few missiles and drones, along with limited production capacity. At the same time, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said he was ready for “genuine diplomacy,” but stressed that Tehran must first ensure the opening of the Strait of Hormuz. According to him, instead of issuing a statement about freedom of navigation, Iran attacks ships. Rubio added that the United States will protect global maritime trade, but other countries must increase financial and material support.

In the Strait of Hormuz itself, the IRGC said two oil tankers had exploded — allegedly while trying to pass through an “unsafe southern route” following advice from American forces. No details about the vessels or crews were provided, but Iranian officials warned that the strait would remain unsafe as long as “American aggression” continues—even for transporting oil and gas. British maritime authorities said an unknown munition hit another vessel near Oman, but the crew abandoned it unharmed. Iranian television reported missile launches against ships off the coast of the UAE, while Reuters noted that ship traffic fell over the weekend amid the escalation.

The conflict coincided with discussions in Israel about the possibility of joining the wave of attacks. One Israeli political source said that, from Prime Minister Netanyahu’s perspective, such a step might not be negative, but it carries serious political risks: weeks of shelling the rear, casualties, and chaos ahead of elections. According to reviews, the standoff between Washington and Tehran has already entered a second week—after on July 8 Trump announced the end of a ceasefire regime recorded in the memorandum of June 18. The escalation began after Iran attacked three commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz, and the sides still cannot agree on their demands: Iran insists on a mechanism for regulating the passage of ships, while the United States insists on unconditional freedom of navigation.

Comments on the news

• What role does the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) play in Iran’s political and economic life? — The IRGC is an elite politico-military formation subordinate to the supreme leader. It controls a significant share of the economy through foundations and subsidiary companies, participates in suppressing domestic opposition, and also influences regional conflicts (Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq). The IRGC plays a key role as an instrument of Iran’s foreign and domestic policy.
• Why is the nuclear power plant in Bushehr an important target, and what risks do strikes near it create? — The Bushehr nuclear power plant is the only operating Iranian nuclear power station, built with assistance from Russia. It is important for the country’s power supply and serves as a symbol of Iran’s nuclear program. Strikes near the facility carry the risk of damaging the reactor, causing radiation leaks, and triggering an environmental catastrophe, and could also spur large-scale escalation of the regional conflict.
• What is the significance of the Strait of Hormuz for global oil trade, and why does Iran use it as a pressure tool? — About 20% of global oil trade (roughly 17 million barrels per day) passes through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran, controlling the coastline of the strait, periodically threatens to block it to pressure the international community, which could cause a sharp rise in oil prices and a global economic crisis.
• What is the Iraqi opposition party “Kurdistan Workers’ Society,” and why were its offices in Erbil shelled? — “Kurdistan Workers’ Society” (Komal) is a Kurdish political party in Iraqi Kurdistan that advocates for Kurdish rights and criticizes Iranian influence. The shelling of its offices in Erbil is allegedly linked to the activities of pro-Iranian militia groups dissatisfied with the party’s anti-Iran stance, as well as with internal Kurdish disagreements.

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Full version: America expands its attacks on Iran and says it is open to a solution, while Tehran strikes Kuwait and Bahrain

Iran and the US exchanged blows: new attacks in the region

Sunday marked another flare-up in the military standoff: Iran’s armed forces said they carried out drone strikes on American military facilities in Kuwait. In response, Bahrain and Kuwait said their air defence systems intercepted Iranian aerial attacks, and explosions were heard in a number of cities. The actions formed part of an escalation that began after a series of mutual accusations and strikes.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) announced that it shot down a US intelligence-and-strike drone, the MQ-9, over the city of Ahvaz in the south-west of Iran. At the same time, the US Central Command (CENTCOM) confirmed that, on the order of President Donald Trump, a new wave of airstrikes had been carried out against targets inside Iran. In Washington, the strikes were explained as a direct response to the deaths of American servicemen in Jordan, which are attributed to Iran-aligned groups.

According to CENTCOM, the raids began at 6:00 p.m. Eastern Time and targeted infrastructure used to threaten commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian news agencies reported explosions near the city of Sirik in Hormozgan province, as well as in the cities of Bandar Abbas, Bandar Lengeh, and on the island of Qeshm. Iranian officials said there were no casualties or serious damage, although they added that some areas had received missile hits.

Politically, President Trump called the deaths of American servicemen in Jordan “a very sad event” and stressed that the main goal of the conflict was to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. In Tehran, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei reacted to the US-Iran memorandum signed by Trump, saying it had “lost all value” due to breaches of obligations by the United States. Khamenei also warned that any continued US military operations would be met with a decisive response from the “resistance front”.

The US State Department urged all American citizens around the world to exercise heightened vigilance amid rising tensions. In a statement, the agency said there was a risk of attacks on US interests or facilities associated with the United States by groups that support Iran. Particular attention was directed to the Persian Gulf states, where direct clashes have already occurred.

The international community responded with a joint statement by the Gulf Cooperation Council countries and the European Union. The document condemns Iranian attacks on ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz and on the territory of neighbouring states. It emphasizes that freedom of navigation is guaranteed by international law, and rejects any Iranian claims to sovereignty over the strait or the charging of passage fees. The coalition calls for an immediate cessation of attacks and keeping the strait open without any conditions.

Comments on the news

• What is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and how is it different from Iran’s regular army? – The IRGC (or “Sepah”) is an elite military and political formation created after the 1979 Islamic Revolution to defend its ideals. Unlike the regular army (Artesh), which is responsible for external border defence, the IRGC focuses on maintaining the internal regime, controls Iran’s missile programme, participates in the economy, and influences politics. The IRGC also has its own land, naval, and air forces, as well as the Quds Force for operations abroad.
• Why is the Strait of Hormuz considered strategically important for the global economy, and what risks are linked to its blockade? – Around 20–25% of the world’s oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz (about 17–20 million barrels per day), making it a key “chokepoint” in global energy supplies. Blockading the strait (for example, by Iran in response to sanctions) can trigger a sharp surge in oil prices, fuel shortages, a chain reaction in the global economy, and even a military conflict involving the United States and its allies.
• What does the term “resistance front,” used by Ayatollah Khamenei in his warning, mean? – The “resistance front” (or “axis of resistance”) is a term adopted in Iran to refer to a coalition of Iran-aligned armed groups and states that oppose Israel and US influence in the Middle East. It includes Lebanon’s Hezbollah, the Palestinian Hamas, Yemen’s Houthis, various Iraqi and Syrian militias, and the Iranian government itself. Khamenei uses this concept to underscore the unity of these forces and their readiness to take retaliatory action.

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Full version: إيران تستهدف الكويت والبحرين وأمريكا ترد على مقتل جنودها بالأردن

Delcy Rodríguez Calls for a New Ethics of Unity to Rebuild Venezuela

Acting President of Venezuela Delcy Rodríguez made a public call for the creation of a new civic ethic grounded in love, mutual understanding, and a willingness to help those in need—she said this principle is key to overcoming the current challenges and restoring the country. The statement was delivered during a formal awards ceremony honoring rescue teams and the country’s canine units that were recognized for their work in eliminating the aftermath of an emergency in the state of La Guaira. In her speech, the head of state emphasized that solidarity and unity will serve as a reliable foundation for reshaping the nation’s sense of unity, and urged citizens to leave pain and resentment behind so that, together, they can build a fraternal and prosperous future.

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Full version: Presidenta Delcy Rodríguez convoca a una nueva ética y al despliegue histórico para la reconstrucción nacional

Breakdown of the memorandum: Why the US and Iran are once again on the brink of war?

Military confrontation between the United States and Iran has sharply escalated despite the signing, on June 18, of a memorandum of understanding between the parties. An investigation by Al Jazeera showed that the main reason behind the collapse of the “truce” was disagreements over how to interpret its provisions, as well as rapidly unfolding events in the area of the Strait of Hormuz. Political contacts continued, but they failed to prevent a slide toward the most dangerous scenario since the beginning of mediation efforts.

There emerged directly opposite accounts of what triggered the escalation. Former Pakistan Foreign Ministry press secretary Muhammad Abdul Basit believes the point of no return was Iran’s attack on Saudi and Qatari oil tankers. Former commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Kanaani Moghadam, by contrast, claims that the IRGC controls the strait based on the powers set out in the memorandum. In turn, a spokesperson for the US Central Command, Timothy Hawkins, accused Iran of “unprovoked” attacks on seven merchant vessels, in which there are dead, injured, and missing.

On July 6, near the coast of Oman, south of the Strait of Hormuz, a series of attacks took place on three vessels: a Qatari liquefied natural gas tanker, a Saudi oil tanker, and a ship flying a Liberian flag. Despite emergency communications channels provided for in the memorandum, Iran opted to escalate. In response, the United States carried out strikes on Iranian coastal defense facilities, rocket and drone storage, as well as naval capabilities. The IRGC retaliated with attacks on Persian Gulf states, including Oman, which had served as a mediator.

A diplomatic scandal erupted in Oman. Kanaani Moghadam said the IRGC has “evidence” that American aircraft and missiles were launched from bases located on the territory of the Sultanate. US Central Command categorically denied this, assuring that the Iranian attacks on Gulf countries “did not affect” the operational capabilities of American forces. Notably, on July 11, talks were held in Muscat to establish rules for navigation through the strait, but a few hours later the IRGC struck Oman’s Musandam province—right at the place of the talks.

A sticking point was the memorandum’s fifth article. Tehran interprets it as granting Iran control over the Strait of Hormuz, while Washington insists that it requires Iran to stop threats to international shipping. Kanaani Moghadam said Iran provided a “safe corridor” for vessels to pass through the strait, and that those who chose the southern route along Oman’s coasts faced danger due to mines. In response, Hawkins emphasized that shipping continues as normal and commercial vessels cross the strait freely.

Pakistan’s mediation efforts did not stop. Abdul Basit said the chief of staff of the Pakistan Army, Asim Munir, had been in contact with Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and the speaker of parliament Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. The diplomat expressed confidence that a temporary ceasefire could be reached in the coming days. However, the situation remains extremely volatile.

The memorandum has effectively lost its meaning. Kanaani Moghadam called it “dead,” because three key Iranian conditions have not been met: control over Hormuz, the release of frozen Iranian assets, and a ceasefire in Lebanon and other regions. Abdul Basit warned that the collapse of the agreement would plunge the region into “free fall,” the consequences of which would be hard for any side to withstand. In recent days, the US has intensified strikes on Iranian territory, and Tehran has responded with attacks on ships, facilities, and bases it considers to be American, in different countries of the region. On July 8, President Donald Trump announced a “termination of the interim agreement” after Iran hit three vessels in the Strait of Hormuz. The conflict has already led to the deaths of at least two US service members in Jordan.

Comments on the news

• What role does the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) play in Iran’s political and economic system, and why do its actions often shape the country’s foreign policy? — The IRGC is not just a military force but a key political and economic player: it controls major sectors of the economy (energy, construction, telecommunications) through a network of foundations and companies under its control, which gives it autonomy from the government. Its influence on foreign policy is due to direct subordination to the Supreme Leader, as well as involvement in proxy forces abroad (for example, Hezbollah in Lebanon, militias in Syria and Yemen), making it the main tool for implementing Iran’s regional strategy.
• Why is the Strait of Hormuz considered one of the world’s most strategically important transport arteries, and how does Iran use its geographic position to exert pressure? — About 20% of global maritime trade in oil and gas passes through the strait, making it a critical hub for global energy supply. By controlling the north coast of the strait, Iran periodically threatens to block it or conducts military drills to pressure the international community, especially under sanctions or during negotiations over the nuclear program.
• Which specific Iranian assets were frozen, in which countries they are located, and how does this relate to the sanctions regime against Iran? — The assets in question amount to several billion dollars frozen in South Korea (about $6 billion, from proceeds of oil sales), Iraq (funds in accounts for gas and electricity deliveries), Luxembourg, and other European countries. These assets were frozen under unilateral US sanctions (for example, after the withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018) and serve as leverage in negotiations, while their release often becomes a condition for humanitarian deals or partial easing of sanctions.
• What regional conflicts (for example in Lebanon, Syria, or Yemen) are implied by “ceasefire,” which Iran calls one of the memorandum’s conditions, and how is Tehran involved in these conflicts? — The reference is to ongoing or frozen conflicts in which Iran supports allied forces: in Lebanon—through Hezbollah (an armed group and a political party participating in clashes with Israel); in Syria—through support for the Assad government (the IRGC and militias); in Yemen—through assistance to the Ansar Allah movement (Houthis) in a war against the Saudi-led coalition. Tehran uses these proxy forces to expand its influence, and ceasefire talks in these areas are discussed in the context of broader regional understandings, where Iran demands recognition of its role and reduced pressure.

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Full version: من التفاهم إلى المواجهة.. كيف انهارت الهدنة واشتعلت أزمة هرمز من جديد؟

Distrust of Trump and Criticism of U.S. Pressure

The world is reacting to Washington’s moves with increasing nervousness: headlines are increasingly filled with doubts about the reliability of U.S. promises, accusations of political favoritism, and hints that American influence does not work as a guarantee of security, but rather as a tool of pressure. Against this backdrop, some players openly resist the logic of sanctions and military signaling, while others build their own political positions—while distancing themselves from U.S. rhetoric and trying to preserve room to maneuver. A separate focus of discussion is how Donald Trump’s name continues to affect even less obvious areas, including public events and international communications—turning foreign policy into an occasion for competing narratives. This review is based on materials from www.instagram.com (Venezuela) and theelnews.org (Venezuela).

Venezuela sees war and elections as threats of interference

In Venezuela’s information space, two storylines at once—the war between Russia and Ukraine, and the dispute over power within Venezuela itself—are interpreted through the same lens: fear of external interference, the technological advantage of stronger players, and a long crisis from which it is difficult to emerge without major losses.

In one of the emotional messages, published on Instagram, there is anxiety that China may be helping Russia not only politically, but also practically: the author suggests that Beijing can “transfer artillery” and even provide satellites for targeting strikes. In the author’s interpretation, this threatens to turn the conflict into “Ukraine vs Rusia”—a protracted war involving major external players, where a local dispute grows into a wider confrontation between states. The text offers no confirmation of these claims, but the reaction itself is telling: in Venezuela, an international war is often perceived not as distant news, but as a warning about how superpowers draw the world into escalation.

This reaction fits well with local political sensibilities. In a country where the topic of external pressure has long become part of everyday political language, any hint of China, Russia, or other major powers becoming involved triggers suspicion. The Venezuelan view of geopolitics is often built on assumptions, analogies, and comparisons with wars already known, so the Ukrainian scenario is seen as an example of how a conflict can get out of control and become prolonged, destructive, and global.

A similar logic can be seen in another Venezuelan comment published here. Formally, it is linked to Donald Trump’s statements and the figure of Delcy Rodríguez, but in essence it is another text about an internal Venezuelan struggle for legitimacy. The author writes from a sharply critical position toward the country’s leadership—especially Delcy Rodríguez and Nicolás Maduro—and uses the U.S. agenda as a pretext to once again raise the topic of alleged fraud, control over institutions, and undermined democracy.

In this material, the claim is repeated that the voting system was allegedly used for “amañar comicios,” and that power was maintained through “control institucional.” At the same time, the author separately notes that Trump “no expulsó a Delcy Rodríguez ni la puso en la calle”—that is, the author distinguishes between loud statements and real diplomatic consequences. For a Venezuelan audience, this is an important detail: behind the external rhetoric, they look for validation of internal accusations, not merely another signal from the United States.

Among local figures mentioned is Ing. Rubén Morales, president of Frente Anticorrupción del estado Lara (Favenp). His stance is presented as institutional and legal, and anti-Chavista: he talks about complaints to the CNE, the need for transparency and accountability. In the context of Venezuela, this sounds like an attempt to rely on formal mechanisms where critics believe the institutions themselves have been undermined. The text also features former military figure “El Pollo Carvajal” as a source of accusations about technological fraud, which reinforces the narrative that “evidence” supposedly comes from within the system.

The overall political meaning of both messages is similar. In the international storyline, Venezuela sees the risk of war expanding through technological and logistical support from China. In the internal storyline, it is the continuation of the debate over whether the elections were fair and how deeply power controls state institutions. In both cases, distrust of official versions and the sense that smaller and medium-sized countries become hostages to decisions made by stronger actors are clearly present.

At the same time, neither of these texts can be called neutral reports. They are emotional, evaluative responses, where political meaning and anxiety matter more than verified facts. That is why they are interesting as a reflection of the Venezuelan view of the world: through fear of a new big war, through constant suspicion toward external forces, and through the belief that the dispute over elections and the dispute over global security are, in fact, part of the same crisis of trust.

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Seventh Night of Strikes: Iran Warns of a Regional War

The United States continues air strikes on Iran for the seventh night in a row. Tehran says the attacks are aimed at civilian infrastructure in the southern and central parts of the country. In response, Iran is broadening its threats—from blocking the Strait of Hormuz to striking vital facilities in neighboring states. U.S. President Donald Trump has promised large-scale ground and air operations, and Iranian military officials have said they are moving to a “phase of total offensive,” heightening fears that the conflict could escalate into a full-scale regional war.

According to the outlet Axios, citing U.S. and Israeli officials, the Trump administration has notified Israel about sending dozens of additional refueling aircraft in the event that operations against Iran expand. It is reported that Trump is considering a large-scale attack that would surpass the current strikes in both scope and intensity. New military plans were presented to him at a meeting at the operations center on Tuesday. Israeli sources add that fuel supplies will increase in the coming days to the level seen at the start of the war.

For the first time in a week, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) included “military logistics infrastructure” among its target list. In a statement on Saturday, it said that during the seventh night of attacks, surveillance posts, military facilities, underground weapon storage sites, and Iranian naval forces were hit. Fighter jets, drones, and ships were used. In response, the military adviser to Iran’s Supreme Leader, Mohsen Rezaei, warned that if the bombings continue for another two or three days, Iran will move to an “all-encompassing and devastating offensive.”

Iran accuses U.S. forces of hitting civilian infrastructure, including an airport, bridges, a port, and a railway station. General Rezaei said that the “response will not be symmetrical” and that there will be “no political constraints ensuring the safety of forces opposing Iranian attacks.” Another military representative, Majid Mousavi, emphasized that Tehran will not stop its strikes on the region until the U.S. halts the bombing of Iran’s southern coast and the Strait of Hormuz. An official from Iran’s army warned: “If Americans attack the infrastructure of the Islamic Republic, all infrastructure in the region will become a lawful target for Iran.”

Alongside these statements, Iran carried out major strikes on a power plant and a desalination facility in Kuwait, causing a fire and destruction. This is the second attack on Kuwaiti sites within two days. In Bahrain, air-defense forces intercepted and destroyed several Iranian air targets. Jordan reported that at dawn on Saturday, its air defenses repelled an attack by ten Iranian rockets that had violated the kingdom’s airspace. Meanwhile, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps announced the sinking of two oil tankers and a fire aboard them while attempting to pass through a “minefield south of the Strait of Hormuz,” but CENTCOM called the claim “false.”

In the assessment of military analyst Colonel Nidal Abu Zaid, the U.S. has focused on “strikes on mobility”—hitting bridges, roads, and railway lines connecting Bandar Abbas with Isfahan, Shiraz, and Kerman. The goal is to paralyze the movement of reinforcements and supplies to Iran’s western coast. The analyst notes that the aircraft carriers USS Lincoln and USS George H. W. Bush have divided roles: the former for fire support with precision-guided missiles, the latter for a maritime blockade; drones and unmanned surface vessels are also being used. The U.S. has created two operational lines cutting Iran off from resupply from deep within its territory. At the same time, the analyst says, Iran continues to operate under the old playbook, attacking the same targets with missiles and drones, which could disrupt the operational balance.

The current escalation goes far beyond an exchange of strikes between the United States and Iran—it is pulling neighboring states in and creating a threat of a full-scale regional war. Mutual threats and military preparations indicate that neither side is prepared to back down. At the same time, according to experts, the tactical advantage the U.S. gains in blocking Iran’s supply routes could lead to a shift in the balance of power, unless Iran moves to new, more unexpected forms of retaliation.

Comments on the news

• Why is the Strait of Hormuz considered strategically important for the global economy, and how could its blockade affect world markets? - The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow sea passage between Oman and Iran through which about 20–25% of the world’s oil flows (roughly 17–20 million barrels per day). That makes it the planet’s main “energy valve.” Even a temporary blockade would trigger a sharp jump in oil prices (up to 50–100% in a short period), paralyze the economies of importing countries (especially in Asia—Japan, China, India), and spark a global recession comparable to the 1973 oil crisis.

• What role does the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) play in Iran’s political and military structure? - The IRGC is an elite military-political force created after the 1979 revolution to defend the Islamic regime. Unlike the regular army, the IRGC controls the missile program, nuclear development, and intelligence services (including “Quds,” the unit for overseas operations), and it also has enormous economic influence by running construction, energy, and telecommunications projects. In practice, the IRGC is a “state within a state,” reporting directly to the Supreme Leader, and it plays a key role in military and foreign-policy decision-making.

• Who is Iran’s Supreme Leader, and what influence does he have on decision-making in wartime? - The Supreme Leader (Rahbar) is Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. He holds the highest authority in the country: he appoints the head of the judiciary, the commanders of the IRGC and the army, controls key media outlets, and sets foreign policy. In wartime, his word is decisive—he can declare general mobilization, authorize the use of missiles or a nuclear program, and also veto decisions by the president and parliament. Khamenei is also a religious authority, legitimizing any military action through religious edicts (fatwas).

• Why have neighboring countries (Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan) been drawn into the conflict, and what are their relations with Iran? - These countries are drawn into the conflict due to geographic proximity, the presence of U.S. military bases, fears of Iranian influence, and regional tensions. Kuwait and Bahrain are Persian Gulf monarchies with a large Shiite minority (up to 70% in Bahrain), which, the ruling Sunni dynasties fear, could be lobbied for by Iran. Jordan, which borders Iraq and Syria, fears pro-Iranian militias along its borders. Relations with Iran are hostile: all three countries accuse Tehran of trying to export the revolution, supporting Shiite groups, and destabilizing the region. However, they have not entered direct combat with Iran; rather, they participate in a coalition aimed at containing its influence.

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Full version: Will Washington and Tehran roll toward all-out war?

Expert refuted allegations of election rigging in Venezuela

Senior analyst on threats for Latin America Jeff Ramsey said that a CIA report on possible vote manipulation in Venezuela is not conclusive and does not confirm large-scale electronic fraud. According to him, although U.S. intelligence flagged “serious concerns,” the same data suggests that other factors better explain the voting results. Ramsey stressed that the document does not prove that the falsification attempt was successful, thereby refuting widespread suspicions.

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Full version: Analista de inteligencia de amenzas para América Latina desmintió posibilidad de fraude electoral en Venezuela

The Seventh Night of US Strikes on Iran: Casualties, Damage and Retaliatory Attacks

The United States continues its seventh day of strikes on Iran. The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) said that a nighttime wave of attacks hit military sites including observation posts, underground weapons depots, military infrastructure and naval forces. At the same time, the Pentagon reported that the number of injured U.S. service members since the conflict began on Monday has risen to 13.

According to Iranian television, three people were killed in Hormozgan Province and eight others were injured. Explosions were reported in the southern provinces of Fars and Bushehr, while the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) said it had destroyed a U.S. MQ-9 Reaper drone in the sky over Bushehr. In Yazd Province, strikes were carried out in remote areas outside cities; there were no casualties.

Civilian infrastructure was hit particularly severely. In the port city of Jask, an airstrike disabled a desalination plant, leaving 20 villages with a population of 10,000 people without water. Bridges and roads were also damaged, including the highway connecting Bandar Abbas and Rodan. Iran’s Ministry of Education canceled graduation exams on Sunday and Monday in four provinces: Hormozgan, Bushehr, Khuzestan and Sistan-Baluchestan.

New attacks struck neighboring Kuwait as well. Kuwait’s army said that “Iranian aggression” hit military bases and civilian sites. As a result of a strike, an electric power plant and a water desalination facility caught fire; several power units were shut down for safety reasons, and an emergency plan was put into effect. Due to the temporary suspension of takeoffs and landings at Kuwait’s international airport, most flights of the national carrier were rescheduled.

Other countries in the region also took measures. Saudi Civil Defence issued two warnings for the cities of Al Khardj and Yanbu, but the danger later passed. Bahrain’s defense forces said that air-defense systems intercepted and destroyed Iranian air attacks. Jordanian forces reported that at night they intercepted ten Iranian rockets that entered the airspace of the kingdom. Previously, U.S. service members were affected during attacks on Jordan, after which Washington recommended avoiding sites associated with the United States.

Iran explained its retaliatory strikes by the lack of an international response to “American aggression.” The IRGC said that the United States is committing war crimes by bombing hospitals, bridges, ports and communications centers. At the same time, Tehran stressed that it deliberately limited its strikes to military targets to give Washington a chance to change course. Meanwhile, Iranian television reported an explosion involving two oil tankers south of the Strait of Hormuz, allegedly caused by mines, but CENTCOM categorically denied the information, calling it false. In addition, there were mutual accusations over strikes on bridges and infrastructure, along with threats of economic consequences if the conflict continues.

Comments on the news

• What is the significance of the Strait of Hormuz for the global economy, and why could blocking it have worldwide consequences? - Around 20–25% of all global oil trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz (about 17–21 million barrels per day). If Iran blocks it (for example, in response to sanctions or a conflict), it would immediately trigger a sharp spike in energy prices, set off a global economic crisis, and could destabilize energy security for countries in Asia, Europe and the United States—forcing them to use strategic reserves.
• What is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and what role does it play in Iran’s political and military system? - The IRGC is an elite ideological military formation directly subordinate to the Supreme Leader (rahbar). Unlike the regular army, the IRGC is responsible for protecting the Islamic Revolution, suppressing internal protests, controlling the missile program and the “Quds Force” (a special unit for operations abroad). The IRGC also has extensive economic interests (oil, construction, telecommunications) and plays a key role in political decision-making.
• Why are Hormozgan Province and the port of Jask strategically important for Iran? - The port of Jask (on the coast of the Persian Gulf) is an alternative to the Strait of Hormuz: through it, Iran can export oil and receive imports bypassing a possible blockade of the strait. Developing the port and infrastructure in Hormozgan allows Tehran to diversify supply routes, while also increasing military flexibility (deploying missile systems and IRGC naval forces near the Bab-el-Mandeb strait).
• Which ethnic and religious groups live in the provinces where exams have been canceled (Sistan-Baluchestan, Khuzestan, Hormozgan, Bushehr), and how might that affect the internal situation in Iran? - In Sistan-Baluchestan, Sunni Baloch predominate (with strong separatist movements); in Khuzestan, Arab Shiites are predominant (there are also Arab nationalist sentiments); in Hormozgan and Bushehr, the population is mixed (Persians, Arabs, Afro-Iranians), with Shiism predominating. These regions have historically been marginalized (low levels of development, discrimination), which periodically leads to protests (especially amid environmental problems and a water crisis). Canceling exams due to weather could become an additional factor in social tension.

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Full version: Iran announces water shutdown for 20 villages after a US raid and attacks on a power plant in Kuwait

Escalation With Iran: Alarm After U.S. Actions and International Reaction

The world is watching a new phase of tension around Iran: the focus is on the expansion of strikes by the United States, growing fears that the conflict could broaden into a wider war, and efforts by various players to keep events within a diplomatic script. Against this backdrop, the idea is becoming increasingly clear that consequences could quickly spill beyond the region, affecting security, the economy, and political balances all at once across several countries. Some voices are betting on dialogue and negotiation channels, others on deterrence and a harsh assessment of what is happening—but the overall tone remains wary and alarming. This piece was prepared based on data from www.youtube.com (Venezuela).

Caracas Reads the U.S. Escalation Through a Multipolar World Lens

Venezuela’s reaction to the new U.S. geopolitics is presented not as a neutral briefing, but as a view of yet another round of tensions among Washington, China, Iran, and Russia through the lens of a world in which the United States again looks like a source of instability. For a Venezuelan audience, this storyline is especially sensitive: for years, the country has lived under sanctions pressure, amid diplomatic confrontation and a steady stream of rhetoric about a “threat” allegedly coming from the United States. That is why reports about a tough response from Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran are perceived not just as foreign-policy news, but as part of a broader anti-hegemony narrative familiar to Venezuela’s political and media context, notes source.

The key local perspective is built around the idea of resisting U.S. pressure. The material emphasizes that China rejects Trump’s accusations as “having no basis whatsoever,” the Kremlin also denies meddling in elections, and Iran responds not only with military strikes, but also with a threat to the energy market through the Strait of Hormuz. For Venezuela, this is particularly important because energy security, oil prices, and global instability are directly linked to its economic interests. Any escalation in the Persian Gulf could affect oil quotes—and therefore the budgets of exporter countries, to which Venezuela itself belongs.

In this context, such storylines are often used to reinforce the domestic political narrative: if the United States interferes everywhere, then sanctions against Caracas can be framed as part of the same logic of pressure on “non-compliant” states. Even without direct quotes from Venezuelan politicians, the way the material is presented aligns with the country’s familiar interpretation of international crises: the world is becoming multipolar, the United States is losing control, and states such as China, Russia, and Iran become natural counterweights.

Economic factors also carry special weight—at least for Venezuela—because they are perceived not abstractly, but practically. Rising prices for energy commodities may benefit an oil economy, but at the same time it increases global turbulence and risks for trade, finance, and imports. A Venezuelan viewer typically reads such news through the experience of their own vulnerability: any external conflicts may either bring short-term gains or worsen already unstable domestic conditions.

Thus, this is not simply a factual report about statements from Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran. It is a reaction in which international tension is shown as confirmation that the era of U.S. unipolar dominance is in question. Unlike a dry report, the emphasis here is on bloc confrontation, on the symbolic power of responses from “disobedient” powers, and on how this could affect the global economy—meaning, too, countries like Venezuela.

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Trump risks getting pulled into an “endless war” with Iran

Despite U.S. President Donald Trump’s election promises to end overseas conflicts, his administration is becoming increasingly entangled in confrontation with Iran. Analysts warn that the current escalation could turn into a seemingly endless “forever war” — a protracted conflict without a clear political strategy from Washington. After a temporary ceasefire agreement fell apart, hostilities resumed with renewed force, and the lack of a diplomatic exit only heightens the risks.

According to The New York Times, a U.S. military operation failed to achieve its stated goals — toppling the Iranian regime and eliminating its nuclear program. As Ali Vaez, director of the Iranian project at International Crisis Group, noted, both sides viewed the earlier memorandum not as a bridge to peace, but as “a continuation of the war by other means.” He warned that without a durable settlement, the conflict could become permanent.

Experts point to a recurring mistake by U.S. administrations — the illusion of a “short war.” Professor Lawrence Freedman of King’s College London says great powers often overestimate what military force can do to produce fast political results. But they ignore its limits when the adversary is prepared for a long-term standoff. As Freedman puts it, Trump sets goals achievable only through a prolonged campaign and, at the same time, rules out a ground invasion, relying exclusively on air power and the navy — a setup that reduces the chances of a decisive victory.

Newsweek notes that a drawn-out war may play into the hands of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The conflict strengthens the political clout of this military structure, allows for justifying tight internal control, and positions the IRGC as the state’s main protector. In addition, Iran has non-military levers of pressure, the key one being the threat to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, which could destabilize global energy markets.

Most analysts agree that even massive airstrikes will not be enough to carry out Washington’s maximalist objectives. They may weaken infrastructure, but they cannot destroy the missile capability and, even more so, topple the regime. As Andreas Krieg of King’s College London notes, Tehran proceeds from the assumption that the United States will not be able to achieve its goals at an acceptable cost, and that Iran itself is ready to endure longer than America — to tolerate rising oil prices, military losses, and internal pressure.

The central node of the crisis remains the Strait of Hormuz. Suzanne Maloney of the Brookings Institution believes that the era of fully free navigation there has ended, and the region will require a more substantial American presence. Vali Nasr of Johns Hopkins University adds that the balance of patience is tilting in Iran’s favor, since the stakes for the United States are less critical. The most likely outcome appears to be a “forever war” — or, at best, a compromise deal in which Trump would call it a victory if Iran agrees not to create nuclear weapons, while Iran can present the U.S. withdrawal as the result of its own steadfastness.

Comments on the news

• How does the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) differ from Iran’s regular army, and why does it play a key role in the country’s political life? — The IRGC is an ideological formation directly subordinate to the Supreme Leader, not to the Ministry of Defense. Unlike the regular army (Artesh), which is responsible for defending the borders, the IRGC oversees the missile program, nuclear developments, special operations abroad (via the “Quds” force), controls strategic sectors of the economy, and participates in suppressing domestic protests. Its key political role is explained by the fact that senior IRGC commanders often hold posts in the government, parliament, and the Assembly of Experts, ensuring regime loyalty.

• Why is the Strait of Hormuz considered strategically important for global energy, and how can Iran threaten shipping there? — About 20% of the world’s oil supply passes through the strait (roughly 17–20 million barrels per day), making it the main node of energy security. Iran can threaten shipping by: mining the waters, using fast rocket-equipped patrol boats, shore-based anti-ship batteries, submarines, and drones. An asymmetric tactic is also possible — seizing tankers, as already happened in 2019, or a temporary blockade through the threat of shelling.

• What other non-military pressure tools (for example, via proxy groups in the region) can Iran use to counter the United States besides threats to shipping? — Iran relies on a network of allied armed groups: Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, Shiite militias in Iraq (including Kataib Hezbollah), and Palestinian groups in Gaza. These “proxies” can attack U.S. bases, Israeli targets, or Saudi infrastructure. In addition, Iran uses cyberattacks on energy facilities and financial systems, applies diplomatic pressure through international organizations (IAEA, the UN), and employs economic levers — for example, manipulating oil prices through OPEC or creating shadow schemes to bypass sanctions.

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Full version: هل يورط ترمب أمريكا في "حرب أبدية" مع إيران؟

Venezuela increases oil output and negotiates with the United States

Venezuela’s President Delcy Rodríguez said that the country’s economy has begun to show the first concrete signs of recovery. In an interview, she noted that oil production has again reached 1.2 million barrels per day, while exports exceed 900,000 barrels daily. By the end of 2026, even before new energy agreements are implemented, the government expects to reach a level of around 1.4 million barrels per day. Talks are currently under way on 30 contracts with international companies that will bring investment into the country and strengthen its oil industry under the new Hydrocarbons Law.

At the same time, Caracas has intensified diplomatic contacts with Washington. Rodríguez confirmed that she supports ongoing and respectful communication with U.S. President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio. Venezuela is seeking a return to the international financial system, the restoration of the correspondent banking network, and the normalization of economic relations. The president stressed that easing the sanctions regime has already helped partially restore oil activity and open up new opportunities for foreign investors—fueling optimism about the year ahead.

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Full version: Presidenta Rodríguez assured that economic growth is already showing concrete signs

Iran at a Crossroads: Diplomacy or Military Power in the Dispute Over the Strait?

In Iran, internal disagreements are intensifying over a recently signed memorandum of understanding with the United States and the future of the Strait of Hormuz. The dispute is unfolding amid the continued military escalation between Tehran and Washington. Inside the country, two camps have clearly taken shape: one is betting on diplomacy and locking in the understandings, while the other adheres to hardline military approaches. As analyst Abdel Kader Faez notes, the growing role of the military in political processes is causing serious concern within Iran’s political and strategic elite.

According to Faez, the essence of the dispute is not Iran’s right to sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz, but what strategic objective it serves. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) insists that the strait remain a “security zone under absolute military control.” This is why the statement by the senior leader’s military adviser, Mohsen Rezaei, has been cited: he called the strait “more important than dozens of nuclear bombs” to improve Iran’s negotiating position on other issues, including the nuclear program and relations with neighboring countries. The political camp, by contrast, argues for “flexible” sovereignty that would be recognized at the local, regional, and international levels and would allow the strait to be used as an economic artery in the postwar period.

There is also an obvious split over the memorandum itself. The conservative camp, represented by the director of the seminaries, Ayatollah Alireza Arafi, is demanding an immediate withdrawal from the agreement. On the other hand, former senior officials such as Mohammad Khatami and Mohammad Javad Zarif defend the memorandum as the “only diplomatic way out.” Faez believes the involvement of these influential figures is aimed at supporting President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi so that the political position does not appear vulnerable to pressure from the military structures.

Chief negotiator Mohammad Bagher Kalibaf is trying to navigate between the opposing currents. He hints to conservatives that the memorandum could be abandoned if it does not bring benefits to Iran, but at the same time he assures the public and politicians that the deal “has not strategically failed,” despite the difficulties. The document, signed on June 18 after regional and international mediation, halted military actions that had begun in late February. The memorandum provides for 60 days of talks to reach a final agreement addressing key issues: the nuclear program, shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, and sanctions against Tehran.

In Faez’s view, the decline in political enthusiasm around the memorandum, as well as the logic of “escalation to de-escalate,” have pushed Iranian diplomacy to intensify its efforts through regional mediators—Qatar, Oman, Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. The goal is to find a diplomatic way out that would prevent American forces and the IRGC from monopolizing events on the ground. This could lead to regional chaos that policymakers would find difficult to control. Expanding the zone of U.S. strikes—reaching the third tier near Isfahan—only strengthens the military’s position and narrows the space for political maneuvering.

Faez emphasizes that the decisive factor that is currently missing is a clear presence from Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei—both his voice and his image. Historically, it was he who was the only tool capable of restraining the ambitions of the military and defining the boundaries of political maneuver. Without his intervention, the split could lead to any unexpected outcomes. U.S. President Donald Trump, in an interview with Fox News, said there is a 90% chance that the new Iranian supreme leader is already dead. Meanwhile, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) announced the resumption of a naval blockade of Iranian ports and coastal areas in response to attacks on ships in the Strait of Hormuz.

News Comments

• What role does the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) play in Iran’s political system, and why does its influence over national security decisions raise concerns among civilian authorities? - In Iran, the IRGC is not just a military institution, but a parallel center of power directly under the Supreme Leader (Rahbar). It controls a significant part of the economy, including defense industry, construction, and energy, and also has its own elite units and intelligence services. Civilian authorities’ concerns stem from the fact that the IRGC often operates outside the bounds of normal government oversight, setting national security priorities on its own, which can undermine the authority of the elected president and parliament. For example, the IRGC can initiate foreign policy actions or repression without coordinating with civilian leadership.

• Who is Mohammad Bagher Kalibaf, and what political weight does he have in Iran, given his past positions as Tehran’s mayor and parliament’s speaker? - Mohammad Bagher Kalibaf is a prominent conservative politician and former commander of the IRGC Aerospace Force. His career includes serving as Tehran’s mayor (2005–2017) and speaker of parliament (since 2020). As mayor, he carried out major infrastructure projects and reforms in the capital, but he was also criticized for an authoritarian style of governance. His political weight is significant: he is considered one of the main representatives of the “principlists” (conservatives), has extensive ties within the IRGC, and advocates economic reforms. However, he is not an unquestionable figure, and his influence is periodically contested by other conservative factions.

• What are religious seminaries (hawzas) in Iran, and how does their leadership influence politics—specifically, Ayatollah Alireza Arafi’s call for withdrawal from the memorandum? - Hawzas are traditional Shia religious schools and centers of theology, located mainly in Qom and Mashhad. They train clerics and play a key role in shaping Iran’s religious doctrine and legal system. The leadership of the hawza, including respected ayatollahs, is not uniform, but many of them have considerable influence on politics through sermons, fatwas, and ties with conservative elites. Ayatollah Alireza Arafi, one of the senior instructors in Qom, represents the ultra-conservative wing that opposes any compromises with the West. His call to withdraw from the memorandum (for example, a nuclear deal or an agreement on human rights) reflects the position of those who believe such arrangements threaten Iran’s sovereignty and Islamic values—potentially weakening the position of moderate politicians seeking a diplomatic settlement.

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Full version: جنرالات "الحرس" بمواجهة دهاة الدبلوماسية.. هرمز بات حلبة كسر عظم داخل إيران

Debates About Trump and the Future Role of the United States

Discussions surrounding Donald Trump and the upcoming presidential elections in the United States in today’s coverage sound like more than just talk about one country’s politics. They also reflect, according to many commentators, broader signs of instability that may be affecting the entire American system. Against this backdrop, doubts about the resilience of the electoral process stand out, as do discussions of the risks of escalation in foreign policy and questions about how the United States sees itself in the world—and how it is viewed by others. At the same time, different voices also reveal ideological reflection: where criticism ends and fear begins about a new turn in the American trajectory, and how the image of the United States is changing—from a competitor and guarantor to a potential source of chaos. This material was prepared based on posts from www.instagram.com (Venezuela), www.instagram.com (Venezuela).

A Venezuelan View of Rubio and Hopes for U.S. Help

In Venezuela’s information landscape, two messages coming from the United States have drawn noticeable emotional attention, but for completely different reasons. One concerns U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s sharply anti-communist rhetoric; the other concerns possible American aid to Venezuela after the June 24 earthquakes. Together, they show how Venezuelan audiences read the news through the lens of their own political history, crisis, and relations with Washington.

According to a piece by La Nación Web, in Washington Rubio once again linked Cuba, “the far left,” and “political terrorism.” He said that Cuba’s “hostile” left-radical network influenced the formation of extremism in the United States and the region, and he also called communism and anti-capitalist movements a source of violence. For a Venezuelan reader, these words do not sound like a neutral foreign-policy assessment, but rather like a familiar formula of ideological pressure on left-wing governments in Latin America.

That is why this rhetoric is perceived particularly sharply in Venezuela. Any statement Rubio makes about Cuba is automatically placed onto the local political context: sanctions against Caracas, a long standoff with Washington, the alliance between Venezuela and Havana, and constant accusations directed at the government of Nicolás Maduro. For part of society, such statements simply confirm that the United States continues an ideological campaign against the Bolivarian project and left-wing regimes in the region.

The figure of Cuba itself also carries special weight. In Venezuelan discourse, Cuba remains more than just an ally—it is a symbol of a political alternative that Bolivarians look to. That is why accusations against Havana as part of an “intellectual and ideological network” are easily read as an attempt to discredit the entire left-wing camp in Latin America. Within Venezuela, this is inevitably connected to the country’s own economic reality as well: shortages, sanctions, a debate over the causes of the crisis, and the question of whether the socialist course is the source of the problems—or whether the country suffers primarily because of external pressure.

Rubio also claimed that “political far-left terrorism” was supposedly growing, and that communism “doesn’t sound good even in theory.” For a Venezuelan audience, this is not just an ideological assessment, but a narrative long familiar to them—one that American politicians have used for years to justify a hard line against left-wing governments. And it is especially important that these words are spoken by Marco Rubio himself—one of the most consistent critics of Cuba and Venezuela in U.S. politics.

Against the backdrop of this rhetoric, another Venezuelan response stands out just as sharply—this time not to a threat, but to hope. A post referencing ABC News describes possible U.S. help in rebuilding Venezuela after the June 24 earthquakes. It reports that Washington is allegedly ready to deploy around 3,000 people—both civilian and military—and to allocate between $2.5 and $3 billion for reconstruction. For local audiences, this sounds like a potential lifeline: financial, humanitarian, and symbolic all at once.

The tone of this reaction differs sharply from political caution in the case of Rubio. Here, gratitude and expectation are voiced: “Gracias a quienes están dispuestos a tenderle la mano al pueblo venezolano.” In this short message, the United States appears not as a geopolitical rival, but as a country capable of playing a decisive role in helping the affected population. Given Venezuela’s chronic economic crisis, infrastructure problems, sanctions, and the overall vulnerability of the state, this prospect triggers a strong emotional response in Venezuela.

This reaction also highlights an important feature of Venezuelan public sentiment: in moments of disaster, ideological differences may move into the background when it comes to basic humanitarian support. Where a typical news article might limit itself to recounting possible U.S. involvement, the local response places emphasis on solidarity, hope, and the desire to receive assistance from outside.

More broadly, both stories reflect Venezuela’s complex perception of the United States. On the one hand, Washington remains a symbol of pressure, sanctions, and anti-communist rhetoric—especially when it comes to Marco Rubio and his statements about Cuba, “the far left,” and “political terrorism.” On the other hand, the same Washington can also be seen as a potential donor and partner in the country’s recovery after a natural disaster.

It is precisely this duality that defines the Venezuelan perspective: the United States remains both a political opponent and a possible source of help. That means that any news from Washington—whether it is Rubio’s harsh statement or a message about readiness to help after the earthquakes—immediately becomes part of a broader conversation in Venezuela about sovereignty, the crisis, and the country’s future.

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The US expands its map of targets in Iran: from the coast to nuclear sites

The US-Iran standoff has entered a new phase: Washington is gradually widening the geography of strikes on Iranian territory. If at first the attacks were focused on the southern coast near the Strait of Hormuz, they are now increasingly hitting targets deep inside the country. At the same time, the nature of the targets is changing as well — shifting from direct US military-sea capabilities to pinpoint attacks on the logistical and economic infrastructure that supports Tehran’s military operations. Iran, in turn, responds with attacks on American assets in Persian Gulf countries and Jordan, warning that it may expand the zone of impact even further.

The escalation began after Iran attacked commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz in early July. The US response was swift and harsh: the first strikes hit naval bases in Hormozgan Province — the port of Bandar Abbas, the islands of Qeshm and Abu Musa. Officially, Washington said the goal was to “limit Iran’s ability to threaten shipping.” However, soon American forces moved closer to Khark Island, which is a key node for exporting Iranian oil. Earlier, Donald Trump had hinted at the possibility of seizing the island as an “economic lever” to pressure Tehran.

In the following days, the number of daily targets surged sharply — from 80 to 140 — and the strike geography extended far beyond the coastline. The bombardments did not only target naval bases and dry docks, but also drone warehouses, command centers, bridges, and railways connecting Iranian ports with inland areas. For the first time in the conflict, US forces used self-guided mine craft to hit targets in Bandar Abbas. Such tactics, according to experts, point to an effort not merely to weaken Iran’s combat readiness, but to fully undermine its mobility and economic resilience.

The climax of the escalation came in the form of a threat to strike the nuclear facility of Jabal al-Fass, located near Natanz. The facility is embedded in granite rock, and previously Iran had not allowed IAEA inspectors to access it. Trump said the site is “under observation by American cameras,” and warned that he would expand the list of targets to include power plants and bridges if Tehran did not agree to negotiations. Such rhetoric echoes earlier episodes of the conflict, when strikes on infrastructure were used as a means of pressure.

Despite Trump’s statements that the US has no plans to send ground troops into Iran, an analytical report discusses the possibility of a limited ground operation — possibly by allies. Notably, the president notified Congress about the resumption of military action, which triggered a countdown of the 60-day period provided for under the War Powers Act. This means that over the next two months the scale of strikes may either increase or shift to the diplomatic track.

Behind all this escalation lies a dramatic political backdrop. On June 18, Washington and Tehran signed a memorandum on a ceasefire and the start of talks mediated by Pakistan and Qatar, aimed at ending the war launched by the US and Israel against Iran at the end of February. However, the fragile truce collapsed on July 7, when Iran attacked three vessels in the Strait of Hormuz on the pretext of violating the route. The next day, Trump announced the termination of the truce and carried out new strikes on Iranian territory. Thus, the conflict is once again caught in a vicious cycle of mutual strikes and ultimatums.

Comments on the news

• Why is Khark Island considered a key hub for Iranian oil exports, and what volume of oil passes through it? How would its possible seizure or destruction affect Iran’s economy? — Khark Island is Iran’s largest oil terminal, through which about 90% of the country’s crude oil exports pass. The daily throughput amounts to between 2 and 2.5 million barrels. Seizing or destroying the facility would deprive Iran of its main source of foreign-currency revenues, lead to a collapse of oil exports, destabilize the national currency, and drive a sharp rise in inflation — which could trigger an acute economic crisis.
• What is the Jabal al-Fass nuclear site near Natanz, and why does Iran refuse to allow IAEA inspectors there? What suspicions are associated with the facility? — The Jabal al-Fass site is located in a mountain range near Natanz and, according to satellite imagery, contains underground tunnels and equipment. Iran refuses to allow IAEA inspectors on the grounds that it is not a nuclear facility, but merely a storage or logistics complex. The suspicions are linked to the possibility of uranium enrichment work there or the storage of equipment hidden from international oversight, which may indicate a covert military nuclear program.
• Why did Pakistan and Qatar become mediators in talks between the US and Iran, and what are their motivations in this conflict? — Pakistan is seeking to strengthen its status as a regional mediator: it has historical ties with Saudi Arabia (a US ally) while also maintaining diplomatic contacts with Iran, which allows it to balance between the parties. Qatar is interested in reducing tensions, since stability in the Persian Gulf is critical to its economy (LNG exports), and it has already successfully served as a mediator in previous US-Iran contacts. Both players also aim to increase their international influence and secure political dividends.

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Full version: من السواحل إلى منشآت العمق.. خريطة توسع بنك الأهداف الأمريكية داخل إيران

Cabello accuses Western media of an information war after the tragedy

Diosdado Cabello, head of Venezuela’s ruling party, said that after the June 24 tragedy, the worst representatives of Western opposition media arrived in the country. According to him, these journalists deliberately “pick at the wounds of the Venezuelan people,” violating all ethical standards and fabricating false stories. Cabello stressed that their only goal is to cause damage, and that most of them have already left Venezuela in disgrace.

The socialist leader admitted that it is personally hard for him to carry on his program after seeing the destruction, but he is in awe of the people’s resilience. Cabello is convinced that the truth will ultimately prevail, and that all the inventions of opposition media will remain exposed. He called such journalists “heartless scoundrels” and emphasized that their activities cannot be called journalism—there is another name for that.

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Full version: Diosdado Cabello denuncia guerra mediática tras los terremotos: Lo peor del palangrismo mundial se vino a Venezuela

US airstrikes reach Tehran: escalation in Iran

The United States has significantly expanded the scale of airstrikes on Iran, for the first time since the end of the previous conflict striking the capital Tehran and several new provinces. According to reports from the scene, the bombardment continued through the night and into the morning in two waves; experts view this as a shift toward the systematic destruction of Iran’s military and missile infrastructure. In response, Tehran said it would continue attacks on American targets and interests in the region.

In Tehran, the targets included the Parchin facility, which is linked to Iran’s nuclear program, as well as the Pakdasht area, where intelligence reports say related developments are located. In addition, strikes were carried out on a range in Semnan, which is believed to be used for testing and storing missiles. The US Central Command confirmed that strikes on airports were aimed at areas used to launch drones.

The bombardment also affected other provinces: in Hamadan, at least three sites were hit, while Lorestan was struck for the third consecutive time. In the city of Ahvaz (Khuzestan), new strikes landed in areas along the border with Iraq, which are considered Iran’s “first line of defense.” According to sources, these territories are used by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to deploy air-defense systems and to intercept threats from the south and southwest.

The attacks also spread to the coastal cities of Rask, Chabahar, and Konarak—the last of which the United States considers an important base for launching drones and naval cruise missiles. Islands in the Strait of Hormuz also remain under intense fire, although the IRGC says it maintains control of the strait. At the same time, the US continues a naval blockade: Central Command said it intercepted a vessel heading toward an oil terminal on the island of Kharg using a Hellfire missile launched from a helicopter.

Military analyst Colonel Nidal Abu Zeid notes that operations are expanding both vertically (with duration growing from 4 to 8 hours) and horizontally—the geography now covers a line from the coastline to Tehran. He says this is the formation of a “second line of fire” from within the country, creating land corridors. The type of targets also differs: in Ahvaz, strikes are directed at IRGC bases, while in Tehran, Semnan, and Parchin they target missile and drone programs.

According to the expert’s assessment, repeated strikes on the “Talekhan 2” site are explained by new intelligence requiring its destruction. Ongoing bombardment of border areas (Sistan-Balochistan, Kermanshah, Ahvaz) is aimed at weakening the IRGC and the regular army. In the analyst’s view, this may pave the way for the use of opposition forces—such as the Sunni group “Jaysh al-Adl” in the southeast and Kurdish units in the west—in later phases of the conflict.

Comments on the news

• What is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and what role does it play in Iran’s political and military structure? — The IRGC (or “Sepah”) is an elite Iranian military-political formation created after the 1979 Islamic Revolution to protect its ideals. Unlike the regular army, the IRGC reports directly to the Supreme Leader and is responsible for suppressing internal unrest, as well as external operations (for example, supporting allied groups in the region). In addition to its military role, the IRGC has enormous economic influence, controlling key sectors (oil, construction, telecommunications). Many of its former commanders hold top political positions, which makes the IRGC effectively a “state within a state.”
• Where is Kharg Island located and why is it considered a strategic asset for Iran’s economy? — Kharg Island is located in the Persian Gulf, about 30 km from Iran’s coast. It is the country’s main oil terminal, through which about 90% of Iran’s oil exports pass. The island houses the largest oil storage facilities, berths for supertankers, and loading terminals. For that reason, the island is critically important to Iran’s economy and, at the same time, a vulnerable target in the event of attacks, as disrupting it can paralyze Iran’s oil exports.
• Why is the Parchin site regularly mentioned in the context of Iran’s nuclear program, and what is known about it? — Parchin is a military facility in the southeast of Tehran which, according to the IAEA and Western intelligence, could have been used by Iran for tests related to the development of a nuclear explosive device—specifically, tests of explosives used in nuclear warheads. Iran has repeatedly refused IAEA inspectors access to the site, citing secrecy. Although Iran says work there was of a civilian or defense nature, the recurring mention of Parchin in IAEA reports makes it a symbol of suspicions regarding the military component of Iran’s nuclear program.

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Full version: توسع أفقي وعمودي.. كيف تتشكل خطوط النار الجديدة في العمق الإيراني؟

Response Signal and Alarm: Reaction to U.S. Pressure on Iran

Amid new steps by Washington toward Iran, international assessments are quickly taking on a warning edge: the focus is not only on possible retaliatory measures, but also on the very nature of the U.S. course in the Trump era—ranging from pressure to strategic calculations and accusations of provoking escalation. The question is how U.S. actions are perceived: as an attempt to impose decisions, as a signal for an unavoidable confrontation, or as a factor that could draw new parties into the conflict and accelerate the chain of mutual sanctions and strikes. Against this backdrop, there are versions suggesting that each subsequent initiative becomes not just a political lever, but a reason for further countersteps—amid growing concern about how far the spiral of tension might go.

This material was prepared based on publications and videos from Venezuela: www.youtube.com (Venezuela) and www.facebook.com (Venezuela).

Venezuela Sees the Crisis in the U.S., Iran and China as a Threat to World Peace

In Venezuela, a new wave of U.S. pressure on Iran, increased rhetoric toward China, and general political chaos in Washington are viewed not as a set of separate foreign-policy episodes, but as a sign of deeper global escalation. In the local interpretation, this looks like a symptom of a crisis in American foreign policy—one that could hit world markets, oil quotations, and the balance of power, and thus directly affect Venezuela as well.

This view is especially understandable for a country that has spent years living under sanctions, financial pressure, and a diplomatic conflict with the United States. When international relations around Iran intensify in the news agenda or tension grows between Washington and Beijing, Caracas reads it through its own experience: what happens to oil prices, how much access to external markets will change, and whether overall instability—on which Venezuela’s economy depends—will increase. For a country whose revenues still depend on oil, such news immediately translates into the realm of practical consequences.

This is particularly evident in reports connected with the Strait of Hormuz. In a post by Radio América, Iran accuses the United States of having “hecho añicos”—“smashed to pieces”—the memorandum intended to bring an end to the war, after the resumption of a naval blockade of Iranian ports in the Strait of Hormuz. For a Venezuelan audience, this sounds like a familiar scenario: not diplomacy aimed at lowering tensions, but pressure that destroys agreements and intensifies the conflict.

That is why such news in Venezuela is often accompanied by an anti-American framing. Local commentators tend to see Washington’s actions not as an attempt at mediation, but as a model of behavior in which the United States creates crises itself, and then tries to shift the consequences onto others. Against this backdrop, in Venezuelan discourse, Iran and China are often perceived as elements of a multipolar world that could counterbalance U.S. dominance. For Caracas, this also has direct political significance: the country has long been betting on ties with non-Western centers of power— including China, Russia, and Iran—as a way to ease the pressure caused by sanctions.

The economic layer of this topic stands out especially in materials where the international agenda is directly tied to domestic indicators. In a report, the focus is on currency exchange rates and the price of Venezuelan Merey oil: the official dollar is 727.45 bolívares, the euro is 832.24, and Merey trades at around $73.60 per barrel amid growth in international markets. For Venezuelan audiences, this is the main measure of U.S. foreign policy: any conflict around Iran, or any jump in tension in the world oil market, is immediately reflected in import prices, the currency market, and the country’s revenues.

From this perspective, the Venezuelan lens is not limited to a dry retelling of international news. It turns every message about U.S. pressure on Iran or China into a mirror of its own vulnerabilities—sanctions against PDVSA, restrictions on access to markets, fuel supply problems, and overall dependence on external decisions. That is why such reports in Caracas are read not only as news about the Middle East or great-power rivalry, but also as a warning about how closely global instability is linked to everyday life in Venezuela.

In the end, it is the Venezuelan perspective that makes these storylines especially sensitive. Here, the key issue is not only what is happening in the Strait of Hormuz, in U.S.–China relations, or within U.S. politics. The key issue is what it means for Venezuela itself: for oil prices, for sovereignty, for the country’s ability to maneuver through a global crisis, and for the old dispute over who is truly the source of international instability.

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Tehran Attacked U.S. Targets in Three Middle East Countries

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) announced on Wednesday that it had carried out drone strikes on U.S. military sites in the Middle East. In a statement, Iran’s armed forces said the attack targeted the Al Azraq airbase in Jordan, where F-18 fighter jets and other U.S. equipment are based. Reports say there were two waves of strikes on the base, while the Pentagon has not yet officially commented.

Alongside the attacks on Jordan, the situation worsened in Bahrain and Kuwait. In Bahrain, an air raid warning was issued, and the IRGC said it had hit sites belonging to the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet. Kuwait’s air defenses, according to a local military command, are repelling attacks by “hostile” drones. Earlier, Kuwait reported the interception of six rockets and 33 drones; four service members were wounded, and there was material damage from falling debris.

A separate incident occurred off the coast of the UAE in the Strait of Hormuz. As the UAE said, two oil tankers were hit by Iranian cruise missiles, resulting in the death of an Indian sailor and injuries to eight more people. The IRGC confirmed that it disabled the vessels, claiming they had ignored “repeated warnings.”

After these attacks, the IRGC issued a sharply worded statement: the strait would remain closed “until American aggression ends.” Iran warned of consequences for oil and gas export routes, saying: “Either hydrocarbon exports will be available to all in the region, or to none.” This is a direct threat to global energy supplies.

The current escalation is part of the cycle of mutual strikes: the United States carries out retaliatory airstrikes against Iranian targets, while Tehran strikes targets in Persian Gulf countries and in Jordan. Local authorities report casualties among civilians and damage to civilian infrastructure. Washington has not yet issued an official reaction to Iran’s latest statements.

Comments on the News

• How does the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) differ from Iran’s regular army, and what influence does it have on decision-making in the country? — The IRGC is an elite ideological structure created after the 1979 Islamic Revolution to protect the regime. Unlike the regular army (Artesh), which is subordinate to the Ministry of Defense and is focused on traditional border defense, the IRGC reports directly to the Supreme Leader (rahbar). The IRGC controls the missile program, operations abroad (for example, in Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen), and also wields significant economic influence through its affiliated companies (for example, “Khatam al-Anbiya”). In terms of decision-making in the country, the IRGC influences policy through close ties with conservative political circles and through its personal representation on the Supreme National Security Council, making it a key player not only in the military sphere but also in politics.

• What is the strategic significance of the Al Azraq airbase (Jordan) for the United States, and why might Iran have chosen it as a target? — The Al Azraq airbase is located in eastern Jordan, not far from the borders with Syria and Iraq. For the United States, it is an important logistical hub: fighter jets are based there, as are reconnaissance aircraft (including drones), and elements of air defense are also deployed. The base is used to train Iraqi and Syrian forces, conduct operations against ISIS, and monitor Iranian sites. Iran might consider it a target due to its role in deterring pro-Iranian groups in Syria and Iraq, as well as as a demonstration of the ability to threaten U.S. interests beyond Iran. In addition, Al Azraq is one of the few U.S. facilities that can be struck by Iranian medium-range missiles without directly provoking Saudi Arabia or Israel.

• Why is the Strait of Hormuz considered critically important for global oil supplies, and what historical precedents exist for Iranian threats to block it? — The Strait of Hormuz connects the Persian Gulf to the open ocean, with about 20–21 million barrels of oil passing through it daily (roughly one-fifth of global consumption). Any blockade would lead to a sharp jump in prices, disrupt global supply chains, and trigger an energy crisis. Iran has repeatedly threatened to close the strait in response to economic pressure (for example, in the 1980s during the Iran–Iraq war, in 2012–2013 amid sanctions against its oil sector, and in 2019 after the tightening of U.S. sanctions). However, a full blockade is unlikely: it would provoke a direct military conflict with the United States and its allies, which patrol the strait. Instead, Iran uses selective “incidents” (detaining tankers, mining) as a pressure tool.

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Full version: إيران تعلن مهاجمة قاعدة بالأردن وإنذارات في البحرين والكويت

U.S

14 U.S. Democratic congressmen, including Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Rashida Tlaib, sent a letter to President Trump demanding that he remove economic sanctions against Venezuela so the country’s government can use oil revenues for rebuilding after a series of earthquakes that struck on June 24. Copies of the request were also sent to Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent. According to official figures, the disaster killed 4,561 people, injured 16,740, and left more than 17,000 people homeless, making lifting the restrictions a matter of humanitarian necessity.

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Full version: Lawmakers ask Trump to lift sanctions on Venezuela to address emergencies caused by the earthquakes

US and Iran: a new conflict in the Strait of Hormuz paralyzed shipping

Tensions between the United States and Iran have sharply flared up again in the area of the Strait of Hormuz after a memorandum of understanding brokered by Qatar and Pakistan quickly collapsed. While the agreement had temporarily halted hostilities and opened the way for political talks, a dispute over control of shipping through the strait has led to a new exchange of strikes. The escalation was felt immediately in the number of vessels passing through and the volume of oil being transported, heightening fears that the crisis could widen.

According to data from Al Jazeera’s analytical unit, based on information from the Kepler platform tracking maritime shipping, on July 7 Iran attacked three commercial vessels in the strait. In response, Washington carried out large-scale airstrikes on “hundreds of targets on Iranian territory,” including air-defense systems, coastal radars, rocket and drone stockpiles, as well as fast boats that, according to U.S. Central Command, were used to threaten commercial shipping. At the same time, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps said it carried out strikes on positions of U.S. forces in the region.

Statistics show a sharp drop in traffic: the average number of ships transiting the strait fell by about 55% after the latest stage of escalation began. While between June 15 and July 7, 751 vessels were recorded (an average of 33 per day), from July 8 to July 13 only 90 ships passed through the strait—around 15 per day. The figures make clear how directly security threats affect one of the world’s most strategically important sea routes for trade.

The disruption also hit an alternative route that Oman offered to facilitate passage during periods of heightened tension. Previously, it accounted for about 22% of all traffic, but as of July 8 only one vessel used the route. Such numbers suggest that concerns spread even to routes that were considered less vulnerable.

The crisis also struck oil trade: the volume of crude oil transiting the Strait of Hormuz fell by 58% compared with the previous period. Average daily exports dropped from roughly 10 million barrels to nearly 4 million. In total, since July 8 the strait has been crossed by about 26 million barrels, of which 42% were shipped from Iranian ports—despite the resumption of a maritime blockade and tightening restrictions on Iranian exports. Oil prices jumped from $72 to $87 per barrel amid fears of supply disruptions, while no diplomatic breakthrough is yet in sight that could restore the memorandum and guarantee stable shipping.

Comments on the news

• Why did Qatar and Pakistan act as intermediaries between the US and Iran? — Qatar traditionally maintains neutral relations with both sides, serving as a diplomatic bridge, and its close ties with the United States (the El Udeid military base) and with Iran (joint gas projects) make it a convenient mediator. Pakistan, in turn, has longstanding cultural and economic ties with Iran and is also seeking to strengthen its influence in the region—especially amid rivalry with Saudi Arabia and India—while maintaining working relations with the United States, which enables it to act as a neutral negotiating party.
• What is the alternative route through Oman and why is it considered less vulnerable than the Strait of Hormuz? — The alternative route through Oman includes transporting oil overland from the Gulf of Oman to the coast of the Arabian Sea, or using Omani ports such as Duqm to transship cargoes bypassing the Strait of Hormuz. This route is considered less vulnerable because it does not pass through a narrow strait that Iran can easily block and is under the control of more stable states, reducing risks of military conflicts or terrorist attacks.
• What role does the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC/KСИР) play in Iran’s political and military system? — The IRGC is a key military and political force in Iran that combines functions of a regular army, intelligence, and economic management. It reports directly to Iran’s Supreme Leader (rahbar) and oversees elite units such as “Quds” (external operations), as well as a significant portion of the Iranian economy, including the oil and construction sectors. Politically, the IRGC exerts enormous influence over domestic decisions, participating in suppressing protests and shaping foreign policy, especially toward Middle Eastern countries (Syria, Yemen, Lebanon).

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Full version: بالأرقام.. كيف ضرب التصعيد العسكري الملاحة بمضيق هرمز؟

Anxiety over the U.S. course, escalation around Iran, and the impact on the world

Against the backdrop of discussions of a tougher—and at times unpredictable—line from the United States during the Trump era, both disputes and concern are mounting: at the center of attention are moves, critics say, that could increase tension in the region and raise the risk of a conflict involving Iran. The discussion is not only about political signals, but also about potential consequences for trade and the economy—from fears linked to the situation near the Strait of Hormuz to reactions from global markets. At the same time, broader conclusions are being drawn about how turmoil in the Middle East can reverberate far beyond the region, including the interest of Latin American observers in what is happening. This material was prepared based on sources www.facebook.com (Venezuela), www.facebook.com (Venezuela).

Venezuela sees a new wave of U.S. pressure in the Caribbean basin

The Venezuelan take on reports about possible U.S. moves in the Caribbean basin and on a new document from the Donald Trump administration aimed at combating terrorism is driven by the same underlying motive: in Caracas, it is read not as a set of disconnected news items, but as part of a long-standing U.S. strategy of pressure on the region. Any hints of Washington’s military activity near the Caribbean Sea are traditionally treated in Venezuela as a troubling sign—especially if they involve Cuba, Iran, or other countries with which Caracas has developed political and technological ties.

In particular, this reaction was prompted by a piece by Agencia EFE Noticias, where Trump’s statements about an investigation and possible threats related to Iran and the situation around Cuba were mentioned. For Venezuela, such storylines almost automatically turn into the question of whether this could become a pretext for stepping up U.S. military presence in the Caribbean basin and for tighter control over governments that Washington regards as unfriendly.

From a Venezuelan perspective, particular sensitivity lies in the anti-American context of the country’s internal politics. In public and political discourse in Caracas, U.S. policy has long been associated with sanctions, threats, a blockade, and the rhetoric of “regime change.” So even if the matter concerns a formally separate story—for example, the possible discovery of Iranian drones in Cuba—in Venezuela it is often interpreted as part of a wider campaign to pressure the entire region and its allies.

The same chain of reasoning can be seen in the response to the American counterterrorism strategy published by the Trump administration. In a post by Pagina12, the focus is on a 16-page document, but for a Venezuelan reader, its political meaning matters more than its technical content. In Caracas, initiatives like these are viewed as tools that could legitimize external pressure, new sanctions, and intervention under the banner of fighting terrorism.

That is why in Venezuela such news is discussed not in a narrow U.S. security context, but as part of a broader global geopolitical game. Any U.S. security strategy there is often viewed through the lens of possible consequences for Latin America: from increased diplomatic isolation to impacts on trade, migration, and energy ties. In this perception, the regional effect is no less important than the U.S. agenda itself.

The allied dimension is also emphasized separately. For Caracas, Cuba and Iran remain part of broader political and technological cooperation that helps withstand sanctions and isolation. Therefore, any escalation involving these countries is automatically seen as a potential threat to Venezuela as well: if pressure on allies intensifies, sooner or later it may also reach Caracas itself.

In the end, the Venezuelan reaction to these storylines comes not down to checking the facts about drones, documents, or Trump’s statements, but to a deeper political interpretation. In a country where the historical memory of confrontation with the United States is very strong, such news reinforces the image of Washington as a source of instability rather than a neutral arbiter. For a Venezuelan audience, this is another reminder that the Caribbean basin still carries the risk of a new escalation, and that Venezuela’s immediate neighborhood remains part of a tense—and increasingly militarized—regional space.

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Trump Threatens to Destroy Iran’s Nuclear Site: Strikes and Talks

Tensions between Washington and Tehran have sharply escalated after US President Donald Trump warned that he would deliver a “cruel blow” to Iran’s nuclear site “Peakax Mountain” (Peakax Mountain), saying the attack could begin “as early as tonight.” However, in the same Oval Office address, he added that a diplomatic agreement “is still possible,” while American bombs have been heard in the region for a third night in a row, and Iranian ports are again blocked.

“Peakax Mountain” is located south of Tehran, not far from the nuclear complex in Natanz. According to intelligence, it is a heavily fortified complex of two deep tunnels carved through hundreds of meters of solid granite. Experts believe the site’s defenses exceed the capabilities of even the most powerful US bunker-buster bombs. The American outlet Al-Monitor reports that US intelligence agencies suspect Tehran is building a secret, undeclared uranium-enrichment plant there as a “fallback” for its nuclear program. Iran, since 2020, has insisted that the facility is intended only for assembling and producing modern centrifuges.

In an interview with the program “Hugh Hewitt Show,” Trump said: “We will destroy Peakax Mountain. Tell the Iranians to get ready.” He added that the US is “closely watching” the site and “every time they hear about it — they blow it up.” In his view, Washington “will most likely strike soon.” In response, Tehran blamed the US for “bringing instability back,” and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) accused the White House of jeopardizing global oil supplies with its attacks.

The third wave of American strikes targeted Iranian military facilities. The US Central Command (CENTCOM) said it is using precision munitions to hit coastal-defense systems, missile-launchers, drones, and naval assets. The attacks lasted five hours and hit targets across Iran. Iranian media reported explosions in the southern parts of the country.

According to the Fars news agency, the explosions were heard on the islands of Qeshm, Kish, and Abu Musa, as well as in coastal cities, including Bandar Abbas. In Bushehr Province, explosions were heard in the city of Jam. The Mehr agency reported fires on three boats in the port of Kish, and in Khuzestan, according to local officials, four people were injured in the city of Omidiyeh. Official figures on damage have not yet been released.

Despite the military escalation, Trump continues sending signals that he is ready for negotiations. “An agreement is certainly possible,” he told journalists, noting that, as he said, Washington was close to a deal with Iran two days earlier, but Tehran backed down and asked for additional consultations. At the same time, American raids have not stopped, and Trump remains skeptical about Iran’s ability to withstand a long war, claiming the fighting will not last more than four months.

The escalation has already spread to neighboring countries. The UAE Ministry of Defense said that in the southern corridor of the Strait of Hormuz, Iranian cruise missiles attacked two tankers in Oman’s territorial waters: one person was killed and eight were injured. The IRGC, in turn, announced a strike on targets at the Al-Jafair base in Bahrain and emphasized that its naval forces would continue to defend Iran’s rights in the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian military sources also said two oil tankers were damaged after ignoring warnings from the shipping safety center.

Comments on the news

• What is the “Peakax Mountain” nuclear facility and why is it considered so well protected? — “Peakax Mountain” (known as Kuh-e Topor or Peakax Mountain) is Iran’s underground nuclear facility located within the rock formation. It is believed to be protected because its main centrifuges and infrastructure are located tens of meters beneath the mountain, making them resistant to air strikes and most conventional bombs. In addition, the facility is equipped with a powerful air-defense system and is monitored by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. This design makes it difficult to destroy even when using bunker-busting penetrative munitions.
• What role does the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) play in Iran’s political and military system? — The IRGC is an elite military-political formation parallel to the regular army. It reports directly to the supreme leader (rahbar) and is responsible for protecting the Islamic Revolution. Beyond military tasks, the IRGC controls a significant part of the economy (construction, energy, telecommunications), participates in political decisions, and manages special units such as the “Quds” force, which handles the export of influence abroad.
• Why do the Iranian islands of Qeshm, Kish, Abu Musa, and the port of Bandar Abbas have strategic significance in the conflict with the US? — These territories are located at the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz and enable control of the key sea route. Qeshm is the largest island in the Gulf, with military bases and missile installations. Abu Musa is disputed with the UAE and is important for monitoring the strait. Bandar Abbas port is Iran’s main naval base, from which fast boats and anti-ship missiles can operate. In a conflict, Iran would use them to block the strait or strike US fleets.
• What is the importance of the Strait of Hormuz for global energy security, and why does Iran threaten to block it? — About 20–25% of the world’s oil supplies pass through the Strait of Hormuz (mainly from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the UAE, and Kuwait). Any blockade would lead to a sharp jump in energy prices and a global economic crisis. Iran threatens to close the strait in response to sanctions or military pressure, as it can lay mines, use missiles and drones, and also deploy small submarines and fast boats. At the same time, Iran itself depends on the strait to export its oil, so such a threat is an extreme measure within an asymmetric strategy.

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Full version: "جبل الفأس".. الموقع الغامض الذي هدد ترمب بتدميره في إيران

Chapter of Venezuela’s Central Bank: the country’s economy has withstood the earthquakes’ blow

Venezuela’s vice president for the economy and president of the Central Bank, Calixto Ortega, said at an economic council that after the earthquakes of June 24, the country’s production sector proved far more resilient than analysts had expected. He said that the oil industry and the entire industrial structure are operating normally, which confirms the economy is moving toward recovery. Ortega also outlined further steps to attract international investment and restructure the country’s public debt in order to strengthen market stability and secure support from partners.

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Full version: Calixto Ortega: Aparato productivo nacional mostró una resiliencia superior tras los sismos

Escalation in the Persian Gulf: U.S. strikes and Iran’s retaliatory attacks

Early Tuesday morning, U.S. forces carried out a new series of strikes on Iranian military facilities that lasted five hours. According to Iran’s Fars agency, three members of the same family were killed in Hormozgan Province, and five explosions were heard in the city of Bandar Abbas. In response, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) officially confirmed the end of this round of bombardments, saying the target was to reduce Tehran’s ability to attack maritime shipping.

According to a statement from CENTCOM, the strikes used precision-guided munitions against Iran’s coastal defense systems, missile units, drones, and naval infrastructure. Targets included facilities in Bushehr, Chabahar, Jask, Konarak, Abu Musa, and Bandar Abbas. The command stressed that the operation is aimed at further undermining Iran’s ability to threaten trade in the region.

Iranian forces responded with harsh statements: an army spokesman warned that the Strait of Hormuz would not be opened “by war and the malicious actions of the United States.” The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps reported that it destroyed a drone command center, Patriot radars, and early-warning systems used by the U.S. Navy in Bahrain. According to their data, the attack hit fuel storage facilities and communications nodes at the Al-Jafer base.

The conflict has already involved civilian vessels: the UAE Ministry of Defense announced the death of an Indian sailor and injuries to eight people (six Indians and two Ukrainians) after Iranian cruise missiles struck two UAE tankers in waters off Oman. The UAE called it a gross violation of a United Nations Security Council resolution, and India, in protest, summoned an Iranian diplomat. Britain also reported a missile barrage on an oil tanker east of Oman.

Jordan, too, was not left out: Iranian forces said they carried out strikes on a U.S. airbase with ballistic missiles, but Jordan’s army stated that it shot down four missiles launched from Iranian territory. In Amman, it was emphasized that the “Amir Hasan” and “Muwafaq as-Salti” bases are sovereign Jordanian facilities, not American ones, and the country would not allow its airspace to be turned into a venue for someone else’s conflict.

Against this backdrop, the administration of Donald Trump announced the restoration of a blockade of Iranian ports and proposed 20% tariffs to protect shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. CENTCOM confirmed that more than 50,000 U.S. service members are deployed in the Middle East and are at full combat readiness. Escalation between the United States and Iran continues to build, threatening stability in one of the world’s most important sea corridors.

Comments on the news

• What is the strategic significance of Hormozgan Province and the city of Bandar Abbas for Iran’s military and economic power? — Hormozgan Province and the port of Bandar Abbas are key for Iran because they control the Strait of Hormuz—a narrow passage through which about 20% of the world’s oil flows. Bandar Abbas serves as Iran’s main naval base and trading hub, enabling Iran to exert pressure on global energy markets and to block shipping in the event of a conflict. In addition, the province is home to major petrochemical plants and IRGC military facilities, which strengthens its role as a center of economic and defense strategy.
• How does the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) differ from Iran’s regular army, and what role does it play in military decision-making? — The IRGC is an elite politico-military formation established after the 1979 revolution to protect the Islamic system, while the regular army (Artesh) is responsible for traditional border defense. The IRGC answers directly to the Supreme Leader (Rahbar), controls missile programs, special operations, and regional influence through allied groups (Hezbollah, the Houthis). This gives the IRGC priority in military decision-making, especially regarding external conflicts and nuclear policy, often taking over the role of the regular armed forces.
• Why is the island of Abu Musa a disputed territory between Iran and the UAE, and how does the article’s mention of it relate to the regional conflict? — Abu Musa is one of three islands in the Persian Gulf, whose control is contested by Iran (which has administered it since 1971) and the United Arab Emirates. The dispute is driven by historical claims and the island’s strategic position near sea routes. In the context of the article, mentioning Abu Musa highlights tensions between Iran and the Gulf Arab monarchies backed by the United States—something Tehran could use as leverage in negotiations or as a pretext to demonstrate force in the region.

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Full version: أمريكا تقصف إيران وطهران تستهدف دولتين عربيتين وناقلتي نفط إماراتيتين

Anxiety Over U.S. Escalation With Iran and Risks for the Strait of Hormuz

Against the backdrop of new steps by Washington, an overarching political and economic signal of alarm is growing: many observers link the escalation around Iran and the Strait of Hormuz to the risk of a wider conflict. The focus is not only on military decisions, but also on fears that the administration’s hard line could destabilize the region and hit markets—intensifying anxieties about subsequent consequences for trade and the cost of energy. The emotional tone is fueled as well by talk that the current escalation may pull more and more participants into a spiral of tension, turning a local crisis into a problem with a long echo. This piece is based on publications from www.instagram.com (Venezuela), as well as materials from www.facebook.com (Venezuela).

Venezuela and Cuba see the Middle East crisis through oil and energy

Venezuelan and Cuban media space has responded to the escalation around Iran and the Strait of Hormuz not as a neutral international brief, but as an opportunity for its own political and economic interpretations. In a Venezuelan Instagram reaction, available via this link, the crisis is framed in a sharply anti-American and anti-Israeli tone: the United States, Israel, and Europe are described as the losing side, while Iran is portrayed as a force capable of dealing a serious blow to the global energy system. The author emphasizes that oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz is vital for the global market, and also highlights the United States’ vulnerability due to a shortage of heavy crude.

This perspective fits well with Venezuela’s context, where oil, sanctions, and the struggle for market access have long been part of the political agenda. Here, an appeal to an alternative information environment is especially noticeable: the text says that many assessments can be found “on YouTube in Spanish,” and as cited sources it names not local politicians but international commentators such as Neutrality Studies, Glenn Diesen, and Pepe Escobar. Their position is presented as a critique of U.S. hegemony, NATO, and Israeli policy—something that aligns with the anti-imperialist rhetoric familiar to part of the Venezuelan audience.

For Venezuela, this topic is important both practically and symbolically. Any spike in global oil prices can mean additional budget revenue at the same time as it hits the domestic market, and rising tension around oil supplies reminds the country of its own sanctions constraints. In this reading, the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz becomes not just a news item, but a mirror of Venezuela’s own experience: blockades, energy blackmail, and dependence on external decisions are easy for the local audience to recognize through their own history.

This is clearly reflected in a post by EL IMPARCIAL, which speaks of a sharp rise in oil prices after the escalation around Iran and threats in the area of the Strait of Hormuz. According to the publication, Brent climbed to $83.30 per barrel, up 9.6%, while WTI rose to $78.14, up 9.4%. For Venezuela, these figures mean not only anxiety over instability in the global market, but also a potential chance for a country that has spent years trying to revive its oil revenues. At the same time, Trump’s proposal to charge 20% of the cargo’s value for passage through the strait is seen as another example of how geopolitics turns into a tool for pressuring energy markets and exporting countries.

In Cuba, the tone of the reaction is different, but the logic is largely similar: the energy crisis is also framed as a matter of survival and political stability. In a teleSUR publication at this link, two outages of the National Electric System in a single week are reported, and the emphasis is placed not so much on the technical side of the incidents, but on how they are perceived by President Miguel Díaz-Canel and Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez. In the Cuban context, such breakdowns are not simply incidents; they are part of everyday social tension: the stability of electricity affects work, transportation, food storage, access to water, and communications.

Cuban official rhetoric usually links energy problems to external pressure, sanctions, and shortages of fuel and financing—and this is precisely how the issue is read in the regional media space. For the local audience, such news is also a test of the state’s ability to provide basic services. That is why the message about outages sounds not like a dry technical report, but like a political signal that reinforces a sense of systemic crisis. Against this backdrop, a Venezuelan reader can easily recognize a familiar pattern: worn infrastructure, a lack of investment, the politicization of коммунal problems, and the authorities’ drive to explain the crisis by external factors.

Taken together, these storylines show that in Venezuela and Cuba the Middle East crisis, the spike in oil prices, and domestic energy troubles are understood through a shared lens of dependence on resources, sanctions pressure, and the struggle for resilience. Here, news stops being just information and becomes part of a broader anti-Western and anti-imperialist narrative, where global politics is read as a continuation of the struggle over oil, energy, and control of economic flows.

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Hormuz Crisis: Iran and the U.S. Trade Strikes After the Deal Is Scrapped

In June, the United States and Iran signed an electronic memorandum of understanding aimed at stabilizing the situation in the Strait of Hormuz. However, just three weeks later, Donald Trump announced it had been nullified, saying Tehran had violated the understandings. From the U.S. side came threats of “powerful” strikes, while mutual accusations of provocation against civilian vessels only further heightened tensions.

Iran responded that the American side had shown no patience and had not waited for the 30-day period to elapse for fulfilling obligations. Meanwhile, the Pentagon carried out a series of strikes on targets near the strait, and in early July Iranian media reported that a foreign container ship had run aground due to a deviation from the agreed course—fueling doubts about navigation safety.

In an effort to ease the situation, indirect talks took place in Doha, with Qatar and Pakistan acting as intermediaries. The sides agreed on a week-long ceasefire, but on July 4, Kazem Garibabadi, the deputy head of Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, warned the UK and France against any military presence in the strait. Ship movements sharply decreased, and some captains attempted to bypass the strait via alternative routes despite Tehran’s objections.

The ceasefire collapsed on July 7, when three oil and gas tankers were attacked off the coasts of Oman and the UAE. The United States blamed Iran, raised the threat level to “critical,” and revoked a license that allowed the sale of Iranian oil. Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, said talks on a final agreement would not begin while threats continued—and within hours, U.S. aircraft carried out pinpoint strikes on naval bases in the provinces of Hormozgan and Bushehr.

A wave of political escalation followed: Trump said Iran had allegedly put him on a “kill list,” and CNN, citing sources, confirmed the involvement of Israeli intelligence in uncovering the assassination plot. In response, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps promised a “punitive strike.” Reports then emerged of attacks on Kuwait, Bahrain, and Jordan, while satellite data recorded almost a complete halt to shipping through the strait.

The climax came on July 12: an official spokesperson for the IRGC announced the complete closure of the Strait of Hormuz “until further notice.” “The era of unilateral deals has ended,” Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf wrote. “Either the U.S. keeps its promises—or pays the price.” In response, U.S. Central Command said about 140 military facilities on Iranian territory had been hit, and Tehran struck American bases in the region. The two countries once again exchanged strikes, while control of the strait remained the main fault line: Washington imposed a 20% fee for passage under U.S. management, while Tehran called the strait “more important than dozens of nuclear bombs” and pledged to defend it at any cost.

Comments on the news

• What is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and what influence does it have on Iran’s foreign and domestic policy? — The IRGC is an elite military and political formation created after the 1979 revolution to protect the Islamic system. Unlike the regular army, the IRGC controls missile forces and intelligence, and also has powerful economic assets (construction, energy, and finance). The IRGC directly affects foreign policy by supporting allied forces in the region (Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, militias in Iraq and Syria), and domestically through ideological control and participation in suppressing protests. In effect, the IRGC is a “state within a state,” whose commanders often hold key positions in government.

• Why are the provinces of Hormozgan and Bushehr strategically important for Iran? What is located there? — These provinces lie on the Persian Gulf coast and include Qeshm Island, the port of Bandar Abbas, and a nuclear complex in Bushehr. Hormozgan controls the Strait of Hormuz—a narrow passage through which about 20–25% of global oil trade flows. Bushehr is home to Iran’s only operating nuclear power plant (with Russia’s assistance) and major petrochemical plants. Any instability there directly threatens both Iran’s economy and global energy supply.

• Who is Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, and why does his statement about closing the Strait of Hormuz carry special weight in Iran’s establishment? — Qalibaf is an influential conservative politician, former mayor of Tehran (2005–2017), and the current speaker of Iran’s parliament (Majles). His position is third in importance in the state hierarchy after the Supreme Leader and the president. Qalibaf’s statements—especially on foreign and defense policy—often reflect the consolidated position of the top leadership rather than only his personal view. His mention of closing the strait signals that the establishment sees the move as a real tool of pressure in the event of conflict escalation.

• Why does Iran call the Strait of Hormuz “more important than dozens of nuclear bombs”? What historical, economic, or ideological factors lie behind this rhetoric? — The phrase emphasizes that control over the strait gives Iran not only economic leverage but also an existential weapon. On one hand, nearly all of Iran’s oil passes through the strait—its main source of budget revenue. On the other hand, Iran remembers the “tanker war” of the 1980s and the U.S. invasion of Iraq (2003) through neighboring countries. Ideologically, the regime portrays itself as the protector of the Islamic world against Western domination, and the threat to the strait is a demonstration that Tehran can paralyze the global economy even without a nuclear arsenal. For Iran’s leadership, this lever compensates for a military-technological gap and serves as a bargaining chip in international negotiations.

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Full version: رسوم الـ20% وعودة الحصار البحري.. كيف وصل التصعيد بين ترمب وإيران إلى هنا؟

Earthquake in Caracas: building assessments and international aid

Specialists continue the thorough inspection of residential towers in Caracas after the earthquakes of 24 June. To classify the damage, the so-called “traffic light method” is used; thus, some towers, including housing program projects “Óscar López Rivera,” received a yellow label. While their load-bearing walls and floors were not affected, engineers identified risks in brick partition walls. At the same time, expansion joints, as noted by specialist Humberto Renhel, withstood the vibrations successfully, confirming that the structures were well designed.

Medical facilities have also undergone a rigorous inspection: the Miguel Pérez Carreño hospital and the H.M. de los Ríos Children’s Hospital were examined together with Portuguese experts. Using drone flyovers and visual checks, specialists confirmed that the buildings are in good condition—only minor damage to secondary elements was recorded. These hospitals continue to operate safely for both medical staff and patients.

The Government of Portugal has sent more than 60 specialists and tonnes of humanitarian aid, significantly strengthening the response to the emergency. Search efforts for survivors continue with support from contingents from 27 countries. According to official figures, of the 19,136 people affected, 92.5% have already been released, and only 7.5% remain under observation. Meanwhile, international researchers, including experts from Stanford, are documenting damage to update seismic-resilience standards. Authorities are preparing temporary camps and a housing repair plan, urging citizens to rely only on official information.

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Full version: Evaluación y resiliencia marcan el ritmo de la capital

Escalation in the Persian Gulf: The US and Iran exchanged strikes

Late on Sunday evening, the United States carried out a new wave of airstrikes on military facilities in Iran, saying the goal was to reduce Tehran’s ability to attack international shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. The US Central Command (CENTCOM) said it used precision-guided munitions against dozens of sites across various regions, including air defense systems, coastal radars, missile launchers, drones, and small boats. For the first time, attack drones and one-time camouflage boats were used.

According to US forces, the strikes were launched from US Air Force fighter jets and Navy vessels. In CENTCOM’s statement, it emphasized that the Strait of Hormuz remains vital for global trade and is not under Iran’s control, and that US forces are prepared to ensure freedom of navigation. Iranian state media, in turn, reported that extensive areas in the south and west of the country were hit—Keshm Island, the port of Bandar Abbas near the strait, as well as areas in Khuzestan Province on the border with Iraq.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC, Sepah) immediately responded, announcing strikes on US military facilities in Jordan, Bahrain, and Kuwait. According to statements relayed via the Iranian agency IRNA, the targets included Prince Hasan Air Base in Jordan, a command-and-control center for US drones in Bahrain, and the Ali al-Salem base in Kuwait. The Iranian website Nournews уточнил that the mass attacks were carried out using drones and rockets launched from bases in western and central Iran.

Military sources in Iran said the strikes were conducted against pre-reconnoitered targets tracked over the past 48 hours, and that losses among the “enemy” would be significant due to the effect of surprise. In Kuwait, the army confirmed the interception of “hostile aerial targets” in its airspace, noting that the sounds of explosions were caused by air-defense systems. Authorities urged citizens to follow safety instructions.

Jordanian military sources reported that air-defense systems intercepted four rockets that entered the country’s airspace from Iran early Monday morning. The operation was carried out “with high effectiveness,” with no casualties or material damage; debris was handled by sappers. In Bahrain on Monday morning, air-raid sirens sounded, and the Ministry of the Interior called on residents to remain calm and take shelter in safe places while monitoring official news.

The escalation comes amid a memorandum of understanding signed between Washington and Tehran on June 17, intended to end the war that began on February 28. Now there are concerns that the agreement may be derailed. Already on Monday, oil prices surged at trading in Tokyo by more than 3.5%—WTI futures exceeded $74 per barrel, recouping the previous drop that followed the announcement of the memorandum.

Comments on the news

• What functions and sphere of influence does the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC, Sepah) have beyond military operations, and how does it differ from Iran’s regular army?
  The IRGC (Sepah) is not only a military force but also a powerful economic and political player. It controls major construction projects, infrastructure, the banking sector, and trade (through the structure “Khatam al-Anbia”). In addition, the IRGC oversees a program of missile and nuclear research and is involved in suppressing internal protests. Unlike the regular army (Artesh), which is responsible for border defense and operates within the framework of the constitution, the IRGC is directly subordinate to the Supreme Leader and has its own courts, intelligence services, and special operations forces (“Quds”). Its influence extends far beyond the military sphere, encompassing politics, the economy, and ideology.

• Why are Keshm Island and Bandar Abbas port particularly important for Iran in the context of controlling the Strait of Hormuz?
  Keshm Island is the largest in the Persian Gulf and lies directly at the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz. It hosts IRGC military bases and air-defense systems, as well as oil terminals. The port of Bandar Abbas is the main hub for oil exports and goods imports, through which a significant part of Iran’s trade passes. Together, they allow Iran to shut down the strait in the event of conflict, deploy coastal missile complexes, and control all ships transiting the area. This strategic location gives Iran leverage over global oil markets.

• How independent are the Iranian news agencies IRNA and Nournews, and how do their messages reflect the authorities’ official position?
  Both agencies are state-run or affiliated with the authorities. IRNA is Iran’s official news agency, directly controlled by the government and often used to disseminate statements from officials. Nournews is linked to the Supreme National Security Council and reflects the views of the conservative wing. They are not independent in the Western sense: their editorial policy strictly follows the line of the Supreme Leader and the government. The messages from these agencies serve as an indicator of the official position, especially on foreign-policy issues, the nuclear program, and regional conflicts. Any critical materials go through censorship.

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Full version: US strikes on Iran, with Tehran targeting Kuwait, Bahrain and Jordan

Washington prefers diplomacy over a military scenario in the Strait of Hormuz

Despite the theoretical military superiority, the United States is shying away from the idea of seizing the Strait of Hormuz by force, prioritizing instead a negotiating process. Geographic constraints, the high cost of a possible operation, and the complexity of the situation on the ground are pushing American command to look for diplomatic routes. Rather than a direct confrontation, Washington is focusing on ensuring the safety of sea lanes—especially amid ongoing escalation and mutual strikes between the parties. At the same time, the strait has become an informal negotiating topic between the United States and Iran in Muscat, where navigation data indicates a sharp reduction in transit—now involving only vessels flying the Iranian flag.

Colonel Nidal Abu Zeyd notes that having military power does not automatically mean using it. The operating environment imposes serious constraints, making direct intervention extremely difficult and costly. The narrowness of the Strait of Hormuz significantly limits the use of ground forces, while naval and airborne landing operations are far harder than in open terrain. A key factor is the impact of Iran’s defenses: since 1979, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has built its system along the western coast, preparing specifically for such a scenario.

According to Abu Zeyd, the latest military campaigns, including recent strikes, have been aimed above all at “softening the target”—weakening defensive lines rather than immediately making a broad change to the situation on the ground. A cost-benefit analysis does not work in Washington’s favor: the price of an operation is so high that achieving the objective becomes meaningless compared with political and diplomatic options. This is precisely what explains the United States’ desire to lock in understandings with Iran rather than impose its will by force.

As an alternative, support for the southern route through Oman’s territorial waters is being considered—an option believed to be safer for shipping. In negotiations in Muscat, the Omani side proposes managing vessel traffic through separate corridors, with the “middle corridor” and the routes passing through Hormuz coming to the fore. Abu Zeyd emphasizes that the U.S. Fifth Fleet, based in Bahrain, has not conducted regular transit operations since the start of the confrontation, despite the ongoing need for maintenance and logistical resupply.

The southern corridor is of operational interest to U.S. forces because it allows ships to move around restrictions imposed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Iran’s refusal to grant full freedom of movement along this route is explained not only by sovereignty concerns—since the corridor lies in Omani waters—but also by its maritime characteristics. The depth of the Omani corridor ranges from 65 to 110 meters, while the Iranian corridor is only 35 to 60 meters, making the former far more suitable for oil tankers, cargo ships, destroyers, and aircraft carriers.

Additional challenges include mines—some of which, due to being dragged by currents, have turned into “drifting” mines. Losing minefield maps or damaging them during bombardments greatly complicates mine clearance and increases risks for both civilian and military vessels. European countries sent minehunters as part of a coalition led by France and the United Kingdom, which prompted Tehran’s rejection, fearing that an international presence would reduce the mines’ impact on transit. The clearance process requires careful reconnaissance, sweeping, and locating using specialized equipment, so Western forces, including NATO, are not eager to get directly drawn into a clash inside the Strait of Hormuz.

News comments

• Why has the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, since 1979, been building its defensive system along the western coast of the Strait of Hormuz, and what geographic and strategic factors are involved? — The western coast (the Iranian side) controls the strait’s narrowest section (about 33 km), which makes it possible to use artillery, missile installations, and fast patrol boats to block passage. Geographic factors: the proximity to shore enables minelaying in the channel and attacks on ships from land. Strategic factors: about ~20% of the world’s oil passes through the strait, and Iran seeks to have the ability to shut it in the event of a conflict, creating a “no-go zone” for the opponent’s naval forces.

• What role does Oman play in talks between the United States and Iran, and why did Muscat become the venue for discussing shipping in the strait? — Historically, Oman has acted as a neutral mediator, maintaining diplomatic ties with both sides (unlike Saudi Arabia or the UAE). Muscat was chosen due to trust in the sultanate, its geographic proximity to the strait, and the absence of a formal military alliance with the United States—allowing confidential meetings to take place. Oman has repeatedly helped with prisoner exchanges and with indirect consultations on the nuclear deal.

• What are “drifting mines,” why are they especially dangerous for shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, and how does Iran use minefields in its defensive tactics? — “Drifting mines” are uncontrolled explosive devices that are carried by currents and winds without a fixed position. They are extremely dangerous because they cannot be predicted; they can damage civilian tankers and trigger an environmental disaster. In its asymmetric tactics, Iran uses rapidly laid minefields (often from disguised vessels) to temporarily block the strait, forcing ships to maneuver in ways that put them into the kill zone of shore-based missile systems.

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Full version: Why is Washington avoiding opening the Strait of Hormuz by military force?

Journalism Ethics in Disaster: Between Truth and Manipulation

In the context of a catastrophe, journalism faces a paradox: society demands immediate answers, but fact-checking—the only way to separate information from rumors—becomes especially vulnerable. As Kovach and Rosenstiel note, the key is not speed or sensationalism, but discipline in verification. Kapuściński adds that a real report requires meeting the “other,” not describing things from the outside, and warns against cynicism. Sontag, in turn, reminds us that the endless repetition of images of suffering can dull perception and turn pain into a commodity. Therefore, the ethical question for a reporter is not only “Is it true?” but also “Why am I showing it?”

The author contrasts this approach with the activities of “influencers” and the spread of fake news on social media. Examples are given: a supposed surveillance device hidden in humanitarian aid from Panama, rumors of children being kidnapped after an earthquake, and a false report about the one-sided capture of the Maiquetía airport by the U.S. Southern Command. In this environment, ethics of fact are replaced by disinformation and sensationalism, undermining trust in information.

Reconstruction, the article emphasizes, does not require a list of prohibitions, but building trust and credibility. A journalist should not place urgency above thoroughness, or political benefit above accuracy and respect for people. Given Venezuela’s shattered infrastructure, censorship, migration, and distrust of institutions, it is especially important to verify information through multiple sources, correct mistakes publicly, and not turn tragedy into a spectacle. After an earthquake that claimed more than 3,800 lives and left 16,000 people injured, competent information management becomes part of the rescue infrastructure: it can calm panic, coordinate assistance, or, conversely, worsen chaos with rumors.

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Full version: Contar el desastre: la ética de la reconstrucción (I)

Rising gasoline prices in the US amid tensions with Iran: economic fallout

In the United States, a new jump in gasoline prices has been recorded, triggered by the escalation of the conflict with Iran. The increase again raises the question of how resilient the American economy is to military tension. As soon as oil prices rise or sea shipping is disrupted, the effects are felt immediately in the domestic energy market. The increase came shortly after prices had temporarily fallen amid a ceasefire, highlighting how sensitive the fuel market is to geopolitical shifts.

According to the American Automobile Association (AAA), the average price of a gallon of regular gasoline rose from $3.79 to $3.88, and diesel from $4.77 to $4.81. In California, average prices remain the highest—around $5.38 per gallon. Despite the seemingly moderate increase, according to the Financial Times, US inflation in May was 4.2%, so any further fuel price hike becomes more painful for both voters and households.

Under mounting pressure, the White House has begun to intervene, demanding that companies lower prices. Donald Trump urged gas stations to set the price of gasoline at around $2.50 per gallon, threatening “major problems” if they did not. He also said that Walmart reduced prices on thousands of items at the request of his administration. This approach reflects an attempt to manage the economic cost of the conflict rather than relying solely on military measures—especially ahead of midterm elections.

Analysts are divided on the reasons for the delay in military strikes at the start of the weekend. Expert Muhammad Mamdoukh An-Nuwaila believes the administration is using the military threat as a bargaining tool, buying time for regional mediators to de-escalate. Strikes on weekends, he says, allow markets to absorb the news before global trading begins. Mustafa Yusef links the delay to investor behavior: they view limited strikes as short-term events, but understand that any escalation would instantly push up oil and gasoline prices.

The Financial Times notes that as the average US gasoline price approaches $4 per gallon, it could become a “pain point”—a point where the rise stops being a market fluctuation and becomes an everyday problem for the consumer. Onyx Capital analyst Jorge Montepeque warns that exceeding the $4 level could become a “political killer” due to the sensitivity of American voters to fuel prices and their impact on transportation, food, and travel. A critical factor, according to Mustafa Yusef, is not only gasoline, but also the durability of oil prices above $100 per barrel, which would make a return of gasoline below $4 extremely difficult.

The escalation is affecting not just oil and gasoline, but also the cost of shipping and insurance. After attacks on three cargo vessels, premiums for military risk as ships pass through the Strait of Hormuz rose: they now stand at 2–6% of the cost of the vessel, versus less than 1% before February. At peak moments, they can reach 10%. For a tanker worth $100 million, the surcharge for a single voyage could total as much as $6 million. Similar pressure is being felt in the Red Sea, where premiums have increased from 0.4% to around 1%. Some ships are rerouting via the Cape of Good Hope, increasing travel time and fuel consumption. Ultimately, these costs are passed on to the prices of goods and to consumers—and even after de-escalation, insurance rates may not immediately return to previous levels.

News comments

• Why is the Strait of Hormuz considered a strategic chokepoint for global oil trade, and how can Iran influence attempts to block it? — The strait connects the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean, and about 20–25% of all global oil passes through it (approximately 17–20 million barrels per day). Iran can influence efforts to block it by: 1) placing naval mines and using fast boats from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps; 2) anti-ship missiles (such as “Noor” and “Haličj-e Fars”); 3) threatening to close the strait in response to sanctions or military action. While a full multi-month blockade is unlikely due to US military involvement, even short-term disruptions can drive up global oil prices.

• Why is a crude oil price above $100 per barrel considered a critical threshold after which US gasoline cannot fall below $4 per gallon? — The retail price of gasoline in the US is roughly 50–60% the cost of crude oil; the rest is taxes, refining, and margins. When oil is more expensive than $100/bbl, the cost of producing a gallon of gasoline exceeds $3. Taking into account average taxes (about $0.50 per gallon) and transportation costs, the retail price automatically ends up above $3.80–4.00. Historically, this threshold marks a shock for American consumers: at $100/bbl, gasoline rarely falls below $4 due to the rigid structure of costs.

• How exactly does the rise in military risk insurance premiums for passing through the Strait of Hormuz turn into extra costs for end consumers? — Shipowners are forced to pay higher insurance premiums (sometimes 10–50 times higher than normal) for tankers that go through the conflict zone. These costs are built into the freight rate (the ship charter). Oil traders factor the higher logistics costs into the price per barrel. Next, refineries pass these costs on to wholesale fuel prices, and then retail sellers (gas stations) add their margins. As a result, each dollar of insurance premium incurred at the shipping stage multiplies across the entire chain and reaches the end consumer as higher prices for gasoline, diesel, and goods transported by trucks.

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Full version: نقطة الألم.. هل تجبر أسعار البنزين ترمب على وقف التصعيد مع إيران؟

Trump Threatens Iran With Annihilation While Calling for Talks

U.S. President Donald Trump issued an unprecedented threat to Iran, saying that if it makes any attempt to assassinate him, the country will be completely destroyed. In a post on his Truth Social platform, he wrote that “a thousand missiles are already aimed at Iran, and thousands more are ready to be launched next.” Trump stressed that he had issued the relevant orders, and that the U.S. military “is ready, willing and able, within a year, with the possibility of extension, to completely erase every area of Iran.”

Yet almost immediately, he added that the door to negotiations remains open—though with a condition: the April ceasefire no longer applies.

Such rhetoric has not been heard for the first time. Earlier, Trump spoke of “the destruction of civilization” in Iran if no deal is reached, but then he stepped back, demanding that Tehran agree to a ceasefire. Now, he has officially announced the end of the truce that began in April and confirmed that Iran, allegedly, itself requested new talks. “We agreed, but we made it clear: the ceasefire regime is over,” he said. U.S. media report that negotiators have very little time, and that if dialogue fails, Washington will have “a wide range of options.”

Iran’s response was swift and sharp. Officials in Tehran made it clear that they do not believe the United States and do not consider it possible to continue the dialogue without solid commitments from Washington. Iran’s state television said the country is not prepared for talks because the United States is not meeting the terms of a memorandum of understanding signed on June 18. Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, speaker of the Iranian parliament and the chief negotiator, said he personally explained to U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance: “We don’t trust you and we will never give in.”

Amid the escalation, international intermediaries have become more active. Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif contacted Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian, urging that the “achievements of peace” be preserved and insisting on “restraint, dialogue and diplomacy.” Similar statements were made by Egypt and Qatar, which during telephone talks urged both sides to de-escalate and prevent the conflict from expanding. Iran itself, according to the Iranian Foreign Ministry, has not requested new talks, but does not reject visits by regional mediators. A Qatari delegation has already visited the Iranian city of Mashhad, where it heard Tehran’s position.

The central point of disagreement remains the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi traveled to Oman for talks focused on “the security of navigation” in this strategically important region. According to Iranian media, the visit continues consultations conducted over the past two months. Iranian diplomats at the United Nations signaled that any actions in the strait—whether opening it or clearing mines—are solely Tehran’s prerogative. Iran insists that the previous navigation regime cannot be restored and demands control, including possible “service fees,” which the United States and several other countries categorically reject.

Despite the April agreement on a ceasefire and the June memorandum, the situation remains extremely explosive. The sides are trading threats and showing a complete lack of trust. While Iran sends representatives to consult with its neighbors, and while the United States keeps missiles on standby, the future of negotiations hangs by a thread. The key question—whether diplomacy can prevent a large-scale conflict—remains unanswered.

Comments on the news

• Who is Masoud Pezeshkian and what role does he play in Iran’s political structure? - Masoud Pezeshkian is an Iranian reformist politician who serves as President of Iran (since 2024). Previously, he was a member of parliament and Minister of Health. In Iran’s political structure, the president is the head of the executive branch, but his powers are limited by the Supreme Leader (Ali Khamenei), who has the final say on decisions on key state matters. Pezeshkian is known for his moderate and reformist views.
• Why is Mashhad considered an important religious and political center of Iran? - Mashhad is Iran’s largest religious center because it is home to the shrine of Imam Reza, the eighth Imam of the Shi’a Twelvers, which attracts millions of pilgrims every year. The city’s political significance is tied to the fact that it is the capital of the Razavi Khorasan Province and a stronghold of conservative and clerical circles. The influential organization “Astan Quds Razavi” controls major economic and political resources, which strengthens Mashhad’s role in Iranian politics.

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Full version: "A thousand missiles ready".. Trump threatens Iran with annihilation and Tehran confirms it will not give in

Venezuela ignored Japan’s earthquake rescue plan

After the devastating landslide in 1999 that claimed thousands of lives in the La Guaira region, the Venezuelan government turned to Japanese specialists from JICA for help. Over three years, from 2002 to 2005, a team of geologists, engineers, and disaster-prevention experts studied the risks for Caracas and the coastal area. The final report, delivered to President Hugo Chávez, contained not only a grim forecast, but also a clear action plan that could have saved tens of thousands of lives.

According to the document, the geology of northern Caracas and La Guaira is capable of amplifying seismic waves, turning the soil into a resonator. Nearly no buildings met seismic-resilience standards, and hospitals and emergency services were located in particularly dangerous zones. In the worst-case scenario, the scientists predicted up to 20,000 deaths and 40,000 damaged structures. However, the report’s greatest value lay in the recommendations: strengthening buildings, updating building codes, rethinking urban planning, and creating modern response protocols. Despite Venezuela’s oil abundance and adequate resources, none of the key recommendations was implemented—the plan was shelved.

The earthquake on June 24 confirmed the bleakest forecasts: the region was once again at the epicenter of disaster. The article notes that a natural disaster is a natural phenomenon, while catastrophe is the result of human decisions (or the lack of them). Poverty, chaotic development, and disregard for science turned a natural shock into a mass tragedy. The JICA report became more than just a technical document—it was an indictment of the authorities, who preferred to respond rather than prevent.

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Full version: La Guaira, un pecado de omisión

The Fog of War in the Strait of Hormuz: Three Scenarios

After two days of mutual strikes between the United States and Iran, the confrontation has entered an uncertain phase. The intensity of the attacks has dropped compared with the war that began on February 28. The memorandum of understanding signed on June 17 faced its most serious test since it took effect: Washington said that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps attacked ships in the Strait of Hormuz. The United States responded with strikes on more than 170 targets inside Iran over 48 hours, but intermediaries immediately began to rein in escalation. Although Donald Trump declared the ceasefire “over,” communications channels continued to function.

Against this backdrop, a “gray zone” is taking shape over the coming days between war and peace, including three main scenarios. The first is a possible return by Washington and Tehran to the negotiating table with the support of regional mediators. According to Axios, Qatar and Pakistan are actively trying to reduce tension and restart dialogue; Qatar’s negotiators have already traveled to Iran “with U.S. coordination.” A senior U.S. official told Al Jazeera that Washington remains committed to talks and technical consultations toward a permanent agreement. Trump also claimed that Iran asked to “continue the ‘conversations,’” but the United States responded that “the ceasefire is over.”

However, Iran’s foreign ministry denies that it requested new talks and says it only agreed to the visit of a Qatari delegation in order to break the deadlock. Head of Iran’s parliament Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf left the door open, but tied it firmly to the principle of deterrence: “If the Americans violate the understandings, we are ready for total defense and will defend the rights of the Iranian people.” He emphasized that ending the war is a priority for the whole world, but the conflict “will never end in Iran’s capitulation.” Military analyst Alex Alveraz Schirz warns that any negotiations will yield “too little” if at least minimal trust is not restored.

The second scenario is the continuation of “managed escalation,” while maintaining balance at the level of limited strikes. This pattern repeats since April: tension in the strait, then a U.S. strike on Iranian military facilities, followed by a temporary lull that is once again tested. In essence, there is a struggle over the “rules of the road” in Hormuz: Iran does not want a safe route beyond its control to appear near the Omani coast, while the United States seeks to lock in the free passage of ships. Researcher Jessica Geinaur, in an article for The Conversation, predicts an outcome close to a “frozen conflict”: no real ceasefire, no full-scale war—just continued strikes, a partially open and dangerous strait, and unresolved disputes (for example, parallel shipping lanes that the memorandum did not clearly resolve).

The third, least likely but most dangerous scenario is the conflict growing into a large-scale war, especially if strikes hit civilian, oil, and water infrastructure inside Iran. The risk rises sharply if the United States shifts from coastal military targets to vital infrastructure. There is also a threat of a full maritime blockade or the “seizure” of Khark Island. Mohammad Baqer Zul-Kadar, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, warned: “Attacks on infrastructure will entail similar retaliatory actions.” Indicators of such a scenario include expanding strikes to vital targets, attacks on additional U.S. bases and platforms, and the intermediaries losing the ability to control the tempo—turning restrained responses into an uncontrolled chain reaction.

Of the three options, managed escalation while keeping the door open for negotiations appears to be the most likely in the short term. Both sides are trying to improve their positions rather than get drawn into an endless war. However, the Strait of Hormuz has stopped being just a point on a possible agreement—it has become a daily test of the balance of power between Washington and Tehran. The coming days may be calmer in terms of the number of strikes, but that by no means guarantees a path to peace.

Comments on the news

• What is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and why is it considered one of Iran’s key institutions of power? – The IRGC is an elite military-political formation created after the 1979 Islamic Revolution to protect the theocratic regime. Unlike the regular army, it reports directly to the Supreme Leader (rahbar), controls missile forces, intelligence services, and key economic sectors (oil, construction). Its influence goes beyond defense: the IRGC acts as a “state within a state,” shaping Iran’s foreign policy (especially in the Middle East) and suppressing domestic protests. For international audiences, it is important to understand that the IRGC is not just an army, but a tool of ideological and economic domination by the ruling elite.

• Why is Khark Island important for Iran’s economy, and what consequences could its blockade have for the conflict in the Strait of Hormuz? – Khark Island is Iran’s largest oil terminal, through which about 90% of Iran’s crude oil exports pass. Its blockade (for example, during a military conflict) paralyzes Iran’s economy, depriving the country of up to 80% of its hard-currency inflows. For global markets, this will lead to a sharp rise in oil prices and supply instability, since 20–25% of the world’s oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz. Escalation around Khark and the strait could trigger a large-scale maritime blockade, military clashes involving the U.S. Navy and allies, as well as a temporary closure of the strait—a scenario that would cause an energy crisis in Asia and Europe.

• What exactly was the June 17 Memorandum of Understanding, which—according to the article—was at risk of falling apart? – This refers to a temporary agreement between Iran and the IAEA signed on June 17, 2023, which provided for monitoring of Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for the removal of part of the sanctions. Under it, Tehran allowed the agency’s inspectors access to certain facilities (including disputed centrifuges) and committed not to enrich uranium above 60% for 60 days. However, by the time of the article, the agreement was at risk due to disagreements between the parties: Iran demanded full sanctions relief, while the West insisted on new restrictions. The collapse of the memorandum would have threatened to deepen Iran’s diplomatic isolation and could have sparked another round of nuclear confrontation.

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Full version: هل تتوسع حرب إيران؟ 3 سيناريوهات بعد هجمات مضيق هرمز

Criticism of Trump’s Foreign Policy: Concern for Iran and Fallout for Allies

Global commentary is increasingly sounding like a warning mode: in headlines and assessments, a picture is forming as if Washington’s decisions on Iran and other directions cause not only irritation among partners, but also visible turbulence in the region. The issue is a lack of trust in the course, doubts about the logic of statements, and fears that the chosen line heightens tension rather than stabilizes it—meaning it could reverberate through international diplomacy and security as a whole. Against this backdrop, political and media tension is rising: from criticism of specific steps to talk that allies have little choice but to adapt to a new reality, where risks appear higher than promises.

This material was prepared using information from El País (Venezuela) and YouTube (Venezuela).

The Venezuelan View of Trump, FEMA, Iran, and the Digital Euro

In Venezuela’s information space, several news items from the United States and Europe are being read through a common theme of distrust in Western elites, anxiety about freedoms, and fears that institutions may be politicized. This is especially clear in reactions to a congressional investigation by Democrats in the United States on how the Donald Trump administration used FEMA within its migration agenda, as well as in a critical breakdown of the topics of the digital euro, the Iran crisis, and the rise of Wall Street, published on YouTube.

In a report from El País, it is emphasized that U.S. Democrats accuse Trump of weakening the disaster-aid system to carry out ICE and CBP operations. Greg Stanton called the report “accusatory” and said that after cutting a third of FEMA’s staff, the administration turned emergency specialists into an “operational backbone” for mass deportations. For a Venezuelan reader, this sounds like a warning that state structures created to save people in a crisis can be subordinated to a political campaign, leaving vulnerable groups—those affected by hurricanes and floods or migrants—among the first to go unprotected.

This narrative is especially sensitive for Venezuela, where migration, institutional shortages, and dependence on humanitarian assistance have long become part of everyday experience. Therefore, relocating FEMA personnel to migration-control tasks is perceived not as a technical solution, but as a direct blow to the very logic of state assistance. A report on reducing roughly 30% of FEMA’s staff and difficulties responding to floods in Texas only intensifies this impression: through a Venezuelan lens, it resembles a familiar picture of public services breaking down—when personnel and logistics problems quickly grow into a political crisis.

Against this backdrop, the story about Europe, Iran, and markets is presented even more sharply. In a report on URL, the digital euro is described as a potential tool of control: with “limités máximos de posesión,” surveillance of transactions, and a reduced role for cash. For Venezuela—which has experienced hyperinflation, shortages of cash, currency restrictions, and chronic distrust of the banking system—the idea of “programmable” money is automatically associated here with the risk of losing personal freedom and control over savings. As a result, the digital euro in this context looks less like technological modernization and more like a possible mechanism for managing citizens’ behavior.

The same suspicious perspective extends to Europe as a whole. The phrase about “gran traición de Europa” sets a frame in which the EU is seen not as an independent actor, but as part of a broader system of pressure and financial restructuring of the world. For a Venezuelan audience, this resonates with the experience of sanctions, external pressure, and financial isolation—when Western institutions are perceived as selective protectors of democracy and human rights.

The Iran story is also read through a perspective familiar to Venezuela: U.S. inconsistency. The report says Washington allegedly “takes a step back,” trying to contain escalation without formally pulling Israel into a new campaign. In Venezuelan understanding, this fits into a broader critique of American policy: the U.S. can ignite crises and then retreat when geopolitical risks grow or when markets become nervous. For a country that itself regularly sees Washington as a source of regional instability, this interpretation looks entirely expected.

The economic layer of the news also received a Venezuelan interpretation. Wall Street’s renewed appetite for risk and growing interest in AI stocks are framed as a reminder that global markets live in a different reality than Latin America. In Venezuela, such messages are often met with irony: global exchanges quickly switch to new trends, while for countries under sanctions, with a weak currency, and dependent on commodities, geopolitics remains a question of survival. Against this contrast, the distance between financial “normalization” in the North and the chronic vulnerability of the South is especially noticeable.

What unites all these news items is a single underlying concern: fear that institutions, money, and security are being turned into instruments of political control. In the case of FEMA, that would mean subordinating a humanitarian function to a migration agenda; in the case of the digital euro, it means increased financial oversight; in the case of Iran and Wall Street, the suspicion is that foreign-policy maneuvers and market optimism conceal instability and double standards. That is why the Venezuelan reaction to these stories sounds not like a simple recounting of facts, but like a warning that power, control, and vulnerability are tightly intertwined today.

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IEA: US-Iran conflict threatens expected oil surplus by 2027

The International Energy Agency (IEA) warned that the resumption of hostilities between the United States and Iran could dash hopes of turning the global oil market into one with a substantial supply surplus by 2027. The reason is disruptions to tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, one of the most important sea routes for delivering “black gold.” According to the agency, this conflict has been the cause of the largest supply disruption in the history of the oil industry.

In June 2025, a temporary truce between Washington and Tehran partially reopened the strait, giving the market a brief reprieve. Based on IEA data, global oil supplies rose by 4.1 million barrels per day, but they were still 9.4 million barrels per day below pre-war levels. However, new clashes on July 7–8 again clouded prospects for steady supplies over the following year.

Before the escalation, the IEA had forecast that by 2027 global supply would increase by 7.5 million barrels per day, leading to a significant surplus of fuel on the market. But that scenario depended directly on normalization of tanker passage through Hormuz and the restoration of export capacity by producers. Now, according to agency representatives, renewed fighting calls even the near-term plans into question.

Amid instability in the Middle East, IEA head Fatih Birol urged the European Union to reconsider its strict ban on searching for new oil and gas fields in the Arctic. Speaking in Brussels after meeting Norway’s finance minister, he stressed that the world needs “every drop of Norwegian oil”—especially in a situation where key supply routes are under threat.

At the same time, the EU is pursuing the opposite policy: since October 2021, the bloc has been calling for oil, coal and gas to remain underground, including Arctic areas. The European Commission has begun reviewing its Arctic strategy, but six major institutional investors are insisting on keeping the restrictions. They argue that even if exploration begins quickly, new fields will not be able to provide additional oil in the near future, while they would seriously harm a fragile ecosystem that is warming three times faster than the global average.

Comments on the news

• What are Iran’s current oil production and export volumes compared with the pre-war period, and how do sanctions limit the country’s ability to restore supplies? — Before the United States reimposed sanctions in 2018, Iran produced around 3.8–3.9 million barrels per day and exports reached 2.5–2.8 million barrels. By 2024, production had fallen to 3.2–3.4 million barrels per day, and exports to 1.3–1.6 million. A significant portion goes through “gray” schemes (transferring cargo to tankers with disabled transponders, sales via intermediaries to China, Syria and Venezuela). Sanctions limit Iran’s access to the international banking system (SWIFT), tanker insurance and the modernization of oil infrastructure, which prevents the country from rapidly scaling up legal supplies back to pre-war levels.

• Why is the Strait of Hormuz so strategically important for Iran, and what steps could Tehran take to block it or destabilize shipping? — About 20–25% of the world’s seaborne oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz, and for Iran it is the “Achilles’ heel” of the Persian Gulf: any disruption to shipping instantly crashes global energy prices, giving Tehran leverage. Iran could use a combined playbook: mining the area, swarming fast boats (such as “homemade torpedoes”), employing shore-based anti-ship missiles (for example, “Noor” or “Khalij-e Fars”), and launching suicide drones. However, a full blockade is unlikely due to the risk of a U.S. and allied military response—more likely, the focus would be on targeted attacks or demonstrations of force to extract concessions in negotiations.

• What alternative routes for exporting oil exist for Iran if the Strait of Hormuz is blocked for an extended period (such as pipelines or ports in the Gulf of Oman)? — The main alternative is a pipeline from oil fields in the south-west (for example, Gure) to the Jask terminal on the Gulf of Oman coast, which opened in 2021. But its throughput is limited (about 300–500 thousand barrels per day versus 2.5 million barrels through the strait). Iran also uses the port of Bandar Abbas to transship oil onto smaller tankers, which can then move around the strait, but that is more expensive and slower. Another route is land shipments via oil pipelines into Turkey (closed since 2019 due to sanctions) or through Iraq, but these options are unreliable due to political instability. Overall, Iran’s infrastructure is designed for exports through the strait, and a complete substitute does not exist.

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Full version: تصعيد هرمز يهدد فائض النفط المتوقع في 2027

Venezuela after the earthquake: damage, investment and challenges

A double earthquake that struck Venezuela on June 24 caused massive damage: according to a technical report by UNDRR, direct physical losses were estimated at around $37 billion. Of this total, about $24 billion is linked to destroyed residential, commercial, educational, medical and industrial buildings, as well as infrastructure facilities. The disaster affected nearly 6.8 million people. To rebuild the country, it will require multi-billion-dollar investment in key sectors: $5 billion for telecommunications, $3.1 billion for energy, $2.1 billion for roads and railways, $1.6 billion for water supply and sanitation, $1 billion for oil and gas, and another $300 million for ports and airports.

The author recalls that back in 2005, at the request of the Venezuelan government, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) prepared the “Basic Plan for Disaster Prevention in the Metropolitan District of Caracas.” However, that document—containing forecasts and recommendations for strengthening structures—ended up staying on paper: the technical opinions of specialists, including Dr. Carlos Henatiosis, were ignored. Now, the author argues, the country has no economic resources to carry out reconstruction on its own due to the macroeconomic policies of the past 27 years, which puts the quality of planning and project execution at risk.

The article goes beyond dry statistics, suggesting that the catastrophe should be seen as a challenge for Venezuela’s modernization and institutionalization. The author emphasizes that recovery will require bringing in the best minds, abandoning sectarianism and populism, and taking a long-term approach. As a specific step, the author proposes creating a “Humanitarian Fund for the Reconstruction of Venezuela,” to be managed transparently, honestly, and with a high degree of accountability. It is precisely now, the author believes, that a “window of opportunity” has opened—not just to patch the gaps, but to lay the foundations for the country’s sustainable development.

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Full version: Modernización, institucionalización y terremoto

Iranian Slogans of “Death to Traitors” at Khamenei’s Funeral Split the Elite

At the funeral of former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in Mashhad, shortly before the burial, not only the customary calls of “Death to America” and “Death to Israel” were heard, but also a new slogan—“Death to Traitors.” The shout reflected the sharp internal struggle over a possible deal with Washington, and added heightened sensitivity to the negotiations within one of the most symbolic political ceremonies in Iran. The dispute spilled beyond government offices and became street knowledge—charged with emotion and political fervor.

During the mourning ceremony in Tehran, President Masud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi were met with hostile chants: “Death to the merchant” and “Death to the traitor who sold the homeland.” A wave of outrage also reached the speaker of parliament Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf—an establishment conservative whom radicals also consider involved in the negotiation process. In this way, three key figures—political, diplomatic, and institutional—found themselves targeted for embodying a course of dialogue with America.

Attacks on Ghalibaf are especially telling, as he does not belong to reformers or moderates, but represents the traditional conservative wing. However, his inclusion in the “top three” alongside Pezeshkian and Araghchi turned the speaker into a target for ultra-conservatives. In their view, anyone who supports negotiations—regardless of political background—becomes a “traitor.” This means the fight is not only about government rhetoric, but about the entire framework of the system through which diplomatic outcomes are carried out.

Analyst and journalist Reza Ghabishavi, in a comment for Al Jazeera, emphasized that such slogans should be understood as expressions of radical forces that exist in any open society. He noted that he has “serious indicators” of these forces’ ability to influence policy beyond ordinary pressure. They are furious at the government’s talks and demand that dialogue be halted and that the war continue until “Trump is defeated and Israel is destroyed,” which he said is unrealistic even for moderate conservatives.

International relations professor Abbas Aslani argues that opposition to negotiations is not limited to political circles and has a real mass base. In his view, rejection is based on two reasons: the belief that Americans do not keep their commitments, and anger over recent events that have intensified suspicions toward Washington. At the same time, a significant part of Iranians—both supporters and the wavering—assess any agreement from an economic standpoint: will it lift sanctions, improve people’s lives, and prevent war?

In the context of the talks, a major economic package is being discussed, including an investment fund of $300 billion for reconstruction and development, funded by the private sector, with an emphasis on energy, logistics, manufacturing, and transportation. However, according to Aslani, radicals doubt the feasibility of such promises, especially under the Trump administration. They point to earlier U.S. steps in Gaza, Ukraine, North Korea, Syria, and Venezuela, as well as the United States’ withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal.

Thus, the slogans “Death to Traitors” and insults aimed at Pezeshkian, Araghchi, and Ghalibaf are not merely a flare-up of anger. They indicate that the battle over the deal has shifted from the elite level to organized street politics, where slogans become a tool of pressure, and the price of diplomacy turns into an element of an internal struggle over the meaning of “resistance” and the boundaries of negotiations after an armed conflict.

Comments on the news

• What does the slogan “Death to Traitors” mean in Iran’s political culture, and why did it ring out specifically at the funeral of the former Supreme Leader? — This slogan is part of revolutionary rhetoric rooted in the events of the 1979 Islamic Revolution. It symbolizes rejection of those whom power or the crowd regards as collaborators or opponents of Islamic rule. At the funeral of a former Supreme Leader (for example, Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989), it was not heard as a personal insult to the deceased, but as a demonstration of mass political vigilance: at the moment of the transfer of power, the crowd emphasized loyalty to the course and warned against possible “traitors” among elites. This is a typical Iranian way of legitimizing a successor through street loyalty.

• How do political factions in Iran differ (reformers, moderate conservatives, and ultra-conservatives), and how does their stance toward negotiations with the U.S. affect the internal struggle? — Reformers (for example, Mohammad Khatami) advocate greater social freedom and dialogue with the West as a way to lift sanctions. Moderate conservatives (such as Hasan Rouhani) support negotiations but with regard for the principles of the revolution, seeking pragmatic deals. Ultra-conservatives (the hardline wing, such as Ibrahim Raisi) view any concessions to the U.S. as betrayal and demand an economy of resistance. Their struggle intensifies precisely in the context of negotiations: each faction uses the topic of the U.S. as a tool to discredit opponents—reformers are accused of naivety, while ultra-conservatives are accused of isolationism that destroys the economy.

• Why did Ali Khamenei’s funeral take place in Mashhad, and what significance does this city have for the Shiite world and Iranian political symbolism? — Mashhad is the second holy city of Shiism after Karbala, where the shrine of Imam Reza (the eighth Imam) is located. For Iranian political symbolism, Mashhad represents the link between the institution of the Supreme Leadership (rahbar) and popular religious sentiment. Holding the funeral there underscores that the deceased leader was not just a politician, but a religious authority. In addition, Mashhad has historically been considered the “cradle” of conservative clericalism, so choosing this city strengthens legitimacy in the eyes of the most traditionalist segments—unlike more secular Tehran.

• What is the investment fund of $300 billion mentioned in the article, and how realistic are such economic promises under existing sanctions? — Most likely, this refers to the so-called National Development Fund (NDFI)—a reserve drawn from oil revenues intended for non-oil projects. However, its actual volume is much smaller than what is promised (usually 15–30% of the stated figures due to sanctions constraints and corruption). Under sanctions, such promises are part of populist rhetoric: they mobilize domestic support, but are not backed by real liquidity. A significant portion of the fund is frozen abroad or devalued by inflation. Therefore, for an external analyst, these figures should be viewed as a political statement rather than a verified budget.

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Full version: From Mashhad to Tehran.. Iranian street slogans open a battle over a deal with Washington

Trump’s Hardline Foreign Policy: Iran, Allies, and the Fallout

In this episode, attention focuses on how the US president’s tough line on the world stage triggers a wave of reactions and doubts—especially in light of the situation around Iran, talk of pressuring allies, and efforts to shape relationships through the logic of deals and ultimatums. The central concern is that this style of diplomacy does not merely heighten tensions, but can also drive entire regions into a spiral of escalation, leaving other countries with only two options: coordinate urgently and give way, or find ways to circumvent decisions dictated by “force.” At the same time, some politicians and commentators emphasize not direct confrontation, but how to build one’s own position by “managing” Trump—or trying to benefit from the chaotic signals coming from his team. The piece is based on publications from www.youtube.com (Venezuela) and actualidad.rt.com (Venezuela).

Venezuela reads Trump’s agenda as a threat to the region

In Venezuela’s media landscape, Donald Trump is seen not only as the US president, but also as a figure who can intensify international tension and create new risks for Latin America. In the episode linked here, the emphasis is not on a dry chronicle of decisions coming out of Washington, but on what consequences his approach could have for a region that, in Caracas, is traditionally viewed as vulnerable to pressure from the United States.

At the center of the discussion is analyst Rodolfo Sánchez Ascorbe, with whom they discuss Trump’s “dangerous decisions,” the likelihood of increased global instability, and how this could affect the United States’ relations with other powers. For a Venezuelan audience, such a conversation is especially sensitive: the history of sanctions, diplomatic pressure, attempts at isolation, and Caracas’s ongoing conflict with Washington make any hard line from the White House feel not abstract, but directly tied to the domestic political agenda.

Against this backdrop, the Venezuelan lens highlights several meanings. First, in Venezuela, such storylines are usually viewed as part of a broader picture of the American “coercive” approach—an approach that may affect not only Iran or global alliances, but also the countries of the region. Second, a possible tightening of US foreign policy has direct implications for Caracas due to the sanctions-driven economy, the oil sector, and the constant risk of new restrictions on trade and finance. Third, the image of an “emperor” in the title strongly resonates with local anti-hegemony rhetoric, where Washington is often portrayed as a force imposing decisions through pressure rather than through dialogue.

The theme of strategic pressure on the US’s allies also stands out in Venezuela’s reading. In the material from Actualidad RT here, Venezuela’s reaction to Trump’s threats toward Spain is presented not so much as a dispute over Rota and Morón, but as an example of the same coercion style that, in Caracas, has long been associated with Washington: commercial pressure tactics, ultimatums, and the use of allies as a tool of subordination. Trump’s line about “this is a hopeless case… stop all trade with Spain” is understood in the Venezuelan context as a demonstration of how an American leader can use trade and security as levers to enforce political discipline.

Equally important is the response from the Spanish government. The fact that Pedro Sánchez refused to allow the use of bases to escalate the conflict in the Middle East and called the attacks against Iran “an illegal war,” from a Venezuelan perspective, looks like a gesture of autonomy from the United States and NATO. Against this backdrop, it becomes especially noticeable that the EU has “closed ranks” around Madrid: from Caracas, this can be read as a reminder that European allies know how to protect their own—while in similar situations Venezuela has faced isolation and sanctions pressure.

The piece also emphasizes the strategic role of the Rota and Morón bases for the logistics of the US armed forces. For a Venezuelan reader, this is not just a detail about military infrastructure, but an illustration of a broader pattern: even a superpower depends on agreements with other countries, and those agreements become vulnerable if the political climate changes. That is why, in the Venezuelan interpretation, the dispute involving Spain becomes a lesson about how US influence works—and how easily it can turn into an instrument of punishment.

In the end, both the episode about Trump and the reaction to his threats toward Spain converge on one point: in Caracas, both storylines are read through the experience of their own confrontation with the United States. This is not only about Washington’s foreign policy, but also about Venezuela’s concern for regional stability, the economy, and room for maneuver. Any new round of hardline moves from the White House here is seen as a possible strengthening of pressure on Latin America as a whole.

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Qatar steps up diplomacy to de-escalate the US-Iran conflict

On Thursday, Qatar’s prime minister and foreign minister, Sheikh Muhammad bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, held a series of phone calls with the foreign ministers of Iran, Saudi Arabia, Oman, the UAE, and Turkey. The key focus was the escalation of tensions between Washington and Tehran, as well as finding ways to reduce the conflict. Qatar stressed the need to stick to dialogue and diplomacy as the only way to overcome the crisis and strengthen regional stability.

During the talks, including with Iran’s foreign minister Abbas Araghchi, developments amid the military standoff were discussed. Sheikh Muhammad strongly condemned attacks on merchant ships in the Strait of Hormuz, saying such actions are unacceptable even in the context of attempts to lower tensions. He urged all sides to honor previously reached understandings and memoranda to ensure security and stability in the region.

Against this backdrop, on Wednesday US President Donald Trump said that the ceasefire regime reached with Iran on June 17 had effectively lapsed. He promised to deliver “powerful strikes” after Washington accused Tehran of firing on three commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz. Mutual threats and a show of military force followed from both sides.

Already on Thursday, the United States carried out a second wave of strikes on Iranian targets, hitting, according to the US Central Command, about 90 military sites. In response, Tehran said it launched missile attacks on US bases in Kuwait and Bahrain. The conflict is increasingly spreading across the region, threatening sea routes and infrastructure. Qatar, for its part, continues diplomatic efforts aimed at bringing the sides back to negotiations and preventing the crisis from further spiraling.

Comments on the news

• What exactly were the terms of the June 17 ceasefire agreement between the US and Iran, and why, according to Trump, did it stop being in effect? — The agreement, brokered by Oman in 2023, provided for Iran to freeze uranium enrichment up to 60% and for it to refrain from further provocations in the region in exchange for the unfreezing of $6 billion in Iranian assets in South Korea for humanitarian purchases. Trump, speaking about it as a presidential candidate, said the deal “stopped being in effect” after Iran, in his view, violated the spirit of the agreement by increasing missile launches and supporting proxy forces (for example, Yemen’s Houthis) during the conflict in Gaza. However, officially the agreement was informal and was not terminated — rather, it “faded” amid mutual accusations.

• What role does Abbas Araghchi play in Iran’s nuclear diplomacy, and why is his participation in talks with Qatar significant for understanding Tehran’s position? — Abbas Araghchi is Iran’s deputy foreign minister and the chief negotiator on the nuclear program, who previously took part in concluding the JCPOA (2015). His key role is maintaining a diplomatic channel with Western countries through intermediaries such as Qatar, while keeping a hard line on uranium enrichment. His participation in talks with Doha is significant because Qatar serves as a neutral platform for probing the positions of the US and Europe, especially amid heightened tensions after Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA (2018). Araghchi confirms that Tehran is not backing away from dialogue, but requires sanctions relief as a preliminary condition, reflecting a “maximum pressure, reversed” strategy.

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Full version: Qatar’s international contacts to lower tensions between Washington and Tehran

Trump posts old video of Rubio criticizing socialism as a con

U.S. President Donald Trump shared on his Truth Social account a 2020 speech in which the current Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, calls “democratic socialism” a Marxist ideology built on a false promise: in exchange for citizens’ personal freedom, they are offered security, free healthcare, and education—but once those in power fail to deliver, it is no longer possible to reclaim the rights that were lost. Rubio stresses that real freedom is not limited to elections—it is the right to choose a doctor, decide on children’s education, and have a say in key decisions in life. When the state concentrates such power, people lose the ability to choose, without receiving the guaranteed benefits.

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Full version: Trump comparte un video de Marco Rubio del 2020 donde rechaza el socialismo: Tiene sus raíces en el marxismo y se basa en una promesa engañosa

New U.S. Strikes on Iran: escalation or a war-at-the-edge game?

A recent wave of U.S. airstrikes on Iranian targets and Tehran’s retaliatory actions have once again raised the question of whether the current standoff will grow into a full-scale war or remain a limited conflict amid negotiations. The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) said it had completed a series of strikes on 90 targets, including air-defense systems, coastal surveillance assets, stockpiles of missiles and drones, and naval infrastructure. In its statement, CENTCOM emphasized that the actions were a response to Iran’s violation of a ceasefire arrangement, when three commercial vessels were attacked in the Strait of Hormuz, and that they were intended to force Tehran to pay a steep price.

In response, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) said it carried out strikes on key facilities at U.S. bases “Arifjan” and “Ali al-Salem” in Kuwait, as well as “Al Jafair” and “Sheikh Isa” in Bahrain. Iranian military officials warned that if aggression is repeated, their response would be expanded and cover other American bases in the region. Both sides accuse each other of violating a previously signed memorandum of understanding, and U.S. President Donald Trump said the document “has lapsed” amid the current tensions.

According to Colonel Nidal Abu Zeid, there is a clear trend toward escalation: the first wave of strikes hit 80 targets in four hours, while the second hit 90 targets in six hours. The analyst noted that the United States is not seeking “traditional military operations,” as it did before the ceasefire, but is using a new tactic he calls “easy hunting.” This approach focuses on hitting high-value, rather than numerous, targets—allowing the political and financial costs to be reduced and avoiding a direct clash with Iran.

Abu Zeid also points out that Washington is deliberately calling these actions “strikes,” not an “operation,” to get around the requirement for approval by Congress. In his view, selecting high-value targets is meant to weaken the IRGC’s ability to disrupt shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. At the same time, Iran, unwilling to start a full-scale war, demonstrates a symmetrical response by attacking traditional targets in Gulf countries rather than directly targeting American warships, which makes its retaliatory measures cheaper.

Brigadier General Ilyas Hanna emphasizes that the range of U.S. strikes has expanded, reaching such strategically important areas as Bushehr, where the “Assaluyeh” plant is located, providing 70% of gas supply for Iran’s power sector. He believes Iran’s retaliatory actions—based on control of the Strait of Hormuz and “horizontal escalation” toward countries in the region—are extremely dangerous. In Hanna’s view, destroying the IRGC’s sea forces in the strait could restore shipping, but if President Trump decides to intensify pressure, there could be an attempt at a naval blockade of Iran.

Despite expectations of war resuming, Ilyas Hanna believes both sides are, for now, operating in a “gray zone” and are not fully willing to break the memorandum of understanding. According to him, Washington and Tehran are “negotiating under fire” because of the ambiguity of the points in that document, and the Strait of Hormuz has become the arena for such a “bargain with force.” Notably, CENTCOM said the strikes were carried out from warships using precision-guided missiles, while, in the analyst’s view, Iran prefers targets in Kuwait and Bahrain—avoiding direct attacks on American ships in the region.

News comments

• What is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and why is it a key force in Iran’s political and economic system, including its influence on foreign policy and defense? — The IRGC is an elite military-political formation created after the 1979 Islamic Revolution to defend its ideals. Unlike the regular army, the IRGC controls the missile program, nuclear infrastructure, and key economic sectors (energy, construction, finance) through companies under its control. They directly influence foreign policy by supporting allied forces in Lebanon (“Hezbollah”), Syria, Yemen, and Iraq, enabling Tehran to project influence abroad. IRGC leadership often holds high government posts, making it an independent center of power.

• Why is the “Assaluyeh” gas-processing complex near Bushehr considered critical for Iran’s energy supply, and how does its vulnerability affect Tehran’s strategy? — “Assaluyeh” is the largest gas-processing hub located on the shore of the Persian Gulf. It processes gas from the South Pars field, the world’s largest, accounting for about 70% of Iran’s gas production. The complex supplies power to cities, industry, and export shipments. Its vulnerability (for example, in the event of military strikes or sabotage) forces Tehran to disperse facilities, strengthen air defenses, and diversify export routes (including smuggling supplies through Oman). Iran’s strategy includes maintaining control over “Assaluyeh” as a bargaining chip in negotiations and as a threat of regional destabilization if it is attacked.

• What is the “memorandum of understanding” between the United States and Iran mentioned in the article, and what circumstances led to its signing and subsequent breakdown? — In the context of Iranian-U.S. relations, a “memorandum of understanding” usually refers to unwritten or confidential arrangements reached through intermediaries (for example, Oman, Qatar). In 2023–2024, a draft was discussed: Iran would limit uranium enrichment (to 60% or lower) and would stop supporting attacks on ships in the Persian Gulf, while the U.S. would unfreeze Iranian assets (about $6 billion) and ease some sanctions. The signing became possible due to mutual interest in reducing escalation (including Israel’s military actions against Iranian sites and the crisis in Yemen). The breakdown happened after the Gaza conflict escalated (October 2023), when Iran intensified proxy forces and the United States imposed new sanctions and deployed a military formation to the region, making compromise politically impossible for both sides.

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Full version: Iranian-American escalation.. Will there still be “comfortable hunting” in the “gray zone”?

A Victory Parade and a Period of Mourning: Iran and the US Await a Deal

As the streets of Tehran filled with hundreds of thousands of mourners at the funeral of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, US President Donald Trump in Washington turned the celebration of Independence Day into a triumphant statement about “total victory” over Iran. Delaying his remarks because of a storm, Trump announced that American forces “sank the entire Iranian fleet — 159 ships — and did it in an instant.” As The Guardian notes, the evening became “the strangest show on Earth”: talk of freedom was mixed with personal grievances, election rhetoric, warnings about “communism,” and ended with 850,000 fireworks to the song YMCA.

In Iran, the mourning ceremony lasted an entire week and spread across five cities — from Tehran and Qom to Najaf, Karbala, and Mashhad. Despite a massive display of unity, the roster of foreign delegations was more modest than expected: Moscow was represented by Dmitry Medvedev rather than Vladimir Putin; Beijing limited itself to a deputy head of a parliamentary committee; and among top officials, only the presidents of Tajikistan and Iraq and the foreign minister of the Taliban were present. This gave analysts reason to say that the “axis of resistance” is no longer as monolithic as it has been trying to present itself.

According to Time magazine, the political subtext of the funeral is an attempt to cover a vacuum of power and “forget” last winter’s protests by mobilizing loyal support in an alternative way. Notably, the new Supreme Leader — the son of Mojtaba Khamenei — did not appear at the funeral of his father, preferring to stay in the shadows. This only intensified rumors of an internal struggle within Iran’s ruling elite and the idea that the “great farewell” has become more of a tool for legitimization than a sincere act of mourning.

Against the backdrop of these two spectacles, real diplomacy is taking shape. On June 17, a 14-point framework agreement was signed that is not a peace deal, but merely extends the ceasefire regime for 60 days. The memorandum provides for the complete cessation of hostilities on all fronts, including the Israel–“Hezbollah” front, as well as the resumption of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. However, the nuclear dossier — the fate of highly enriched uranium, the right to enrich, the lifting of sanctions, and the unblocking of billions in assets — has been deferred to technical negotiations, which are being conducted under the pressure of time.

Symbolic messages from both capitals narrow the space for compromise: Trump, who said “I beat Iran,” risks getting trapped by his own rhetoric if he has to agree to a partial sanctions rollback. For its part, Tehran, using the funeral to demonstrate mass support, may drag its feet on concessions, fearing it will look weak. Each side is held hostage by its own performance.

Nevertheless, mutual needs remain obvious. Iran urgently needs billions in frozen funds and the resumption of exports through the Strait of Hormuz to save its economy. The United States needs stability in oil markets and diplomatic success that will validate the narrative of “victory” and prevent the resumption of war. Without a deal, both sides will lose — both technologically and politically.

The key takeaway is that neither fireworks in Washington nor funeral processions in Tehran can erase the harsh reality of the negotiation room. What will matter most in the next 60 days is whether loud rhetoric can make way for a pragmatic compromise written away from cameras and podiums. Or will spectacle take precedence over substance, drawing the region into a new spiral of uncertainty?

Comments on the news

• Why did funeral processions in honor of Ali Khamenei take place not only in Iranian cities (Tehran, Qom, Mashhad), but also in Iraqi Najaf and Karbala? What significance do these cities have for the Shiite world and for Iranian power? - Najaf and Karbala are sacred cities of Shiism: in Najaf lies the shrine of Imam Ali (the cousin of the Prophet Muhammad and the first Shiite Imam), while in Karbala there is the shrine of Imam Hussein (his grandson, who died a martyr’s death). For the Iranian regime, holding ceremonies in these cities is a way to strengthen religious authority and underscore Iran’s cross-border influence over Shiite communities, especially in Iraq, where Tehran traditionally has significant political and military leverage (through ties with local parties and militias).

• Who is Mojtaba Khamenei, and why, after becoming the new Supreme Leader, did he not attend the funeral of his father? What does this indicate about internal struggle within Iran’s elite? - Mojtaba Khamenei (born 1969) is the son of the late Supreme Leader; until recently he served as the head of an influential religious foundation and was considered a potential successor. According to the official account, his absence from the funeral was due to the need to ensure “security and continuity of power.” However, it may also point to hidden disagreements within Iran’s elite: some conservatives fear strengthening a clan-based model of succession, while other factions (including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) may insist on the collective selection of the leader.

• What “protests last winter” is the article referring to? How did these events (connected to the death of Mahsa Amini) affect the regime’s legitimacy, and why are they trying to “forget” them through alternative mobilization? - This refers to the mass protests of “Woman, Life, Freedom” (2022–2023), which began after the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini in a police station following her alleged improper hijab. Those demonstrations became the most serious challenge to Iran’s theocratic system since the 1979 Islamic Revolution: they called not only the hijab law into question, but also the very legitimacy of the religious leadership. The authorities are trying to “rewrite” the memory of the protests through alternative mobilization — organizing large mourning processions, patriotic rallies, and religious ceremonies to create the impression of public support and overshadow the image of a repressive regime.

• Why was Russia represented at the funeral of Iran’s Supreme Leader by Dmitry Medvedev rather than Vladimir Putin? What does this characterize about the current level of Iran–Russia relations and the diplomatic signals between Moscow and Tehran? - The choice of Medvedev (who serves as Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council) instead of President Putin is a typical protocol practice for official high-level state mourning events: leaders generally do not attend another country’s funeral to avoid creating an unnecessary diplomatic focus. Nevertheless, it is also a signal that despite strategic partnership (especially in military and energy spheres), Moscow is keeping its distance: sending a former president rather than an incumbent allows Russia to show respect without excessive closeness that could highlight how dependent Russia might be on Iranian support under sanctions.

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Full version: بين واشنطن وطهران.. فيمَ تكمن رسائل الألعاب النارية ومواكب النعوش؟

Venezuela assesses the plan to clear rubble in La Guaira after earthquakes

Acting President of Venezuela Delcy Rodríguez held a working meeting with national and international authorities to coordinate the phases of a plan to clear and remove debris in the state of La Guaira. The meeting was attended by the secretaries for public works and digital government, as well as the head of the commission responsible for assessing the suitability of infrastructure. International technical support was provided by Israel’s Ambassador Gassan Tarif and a representative of that country’s technical commission, Elad Edri, to optimize logistical protocols ahead of the rollout of work in the affected areas.

The assessments are based on a diagnosis carried out jointly with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which identified the total volume of construction debris in the coastal region at 1,025,000 tons. About 900,000 tons are accounted for by destroyed concrete and steel structures, while the remainder is damaged household property of affected families. The strategy provides for the use of controlled demolition methods and the safe processing of waste, aimed at restoring urban spaces while ensuring protection for local communities.

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Full version: Evalúan del Plan de Remoción de Escombros en La Guaira tras eventos sísmicos

Oil jumps 5% on U.S.-Iran conflict in the Strait of Hormuz

On Wednesday, global oil prices surged sharply by more than 5% amid heightened military tension between the United States and Iran. The price of the benchmark Brent climbed by $3.9 to reach $78.1 per barrel, while U.S. WTI rose by $3.5 to $74.15. Investors are concerned about the security of supplies from the Persian Gulf region after Washington revoked a license to sell Iranian oil, and both sides exchanged strikes.

The escalation began when the United States carried out airstrikes on Iranian facilities in response to attacks on three commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz. In retaliation, Iran’s armed forces, through the “Khatam al-Anbia” command, said that any country that provides its territory for an attack on Iran would be considered a “lawful target.” Both sides continue to accuse each other of aggression, and the situation in the strait remains extremely tense.

In Tuesday’s move, the U.S. Treasury, through the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), banned any new transactions involving Iranian oil starting July 7. The decision отменяет a temporary license issued on June 21 for 60 days that allowed the sale of Iranian crude. Earlier, a similar relaxation had been introduced after a temporary peace agreement and was in effect until August 21. Now the United States is tightening sanctions pressure.

According to media reports, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has attacked the third commercial vessel in the Strait of Hormuz, using drones and short-range missiles. The British Maritime Trade Operations centre confirmed a new incident involving an oil tanker. The U.S. military shot down several Iranian drones. In response, the Joint Maritime Information Centre raised the threat level in the strait to “high,” warning of ongoing attacks and drone activity.

Oil and energy expert Hashim Akhl noted that current events in the Strait of Hormuz directly threaten global energy security, especially liquefied natural gas supplies to Europe. The price rise gained momentum after the day before, prices had increased by 3%. Meanwhile, talks between Washington and Tehran, initiated with mediation by Pakistan and Qatar, have not yet led to any easing, and data from the American Petroleum Institute pointed to a smaller-than-expected decline in U.S. crude inventories.

Comments on the news

• What is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and what role does it play in Iran’s political and military structure? — The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is an elite military-political formation created after the 1979 Islamic Revolution to defend its ideals. Unlike the regular army, the IRGC reports directly to Iran’s Supreme Leader (Rahbar) and has its own land, naval, and air forces, as well as the “Quds” units responsible for operations abroad. The IRGC plays a key role not only in defense but also in politics and the economy (through control of major companies) and in suppressing internal protests, making it one of the most influential institutions in Iran’s system of power.

• Why were intermediaries from Pakistan and Qatar chosen for talks between the U.S. and Iran, rather than, for example, countries in the Persian Gulf? — The choice of intermediaries from Pakistan and Qatar is due to their neutral status and historical ties with both sides. Qatar has traditionally served as a bridge between the West and the Islamic world, has diplomatic relations with Tehran and friendly ties with Washington. Pakistan, for its part, supports dialogue with Iran (through cultural and economic connections) and is a U.S. ally in the fight against terrorism. Persian Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia or the UAE are in direct regional conflict with Iran (for example, over Yemen), which makes them less suitable to play the role of impartial mediators.

• What is the “Khatam al-Anbia” command and what are its functions in Iran’s air defense system? — The “Khatam al-Anbia” command (also known as HAAAP) is a unified, centralized Iranian air-defense structure created to coordinate all of the country’s air-defense assets: missile systems, anti-aircraft artillery, and radar stations. Its functions include monitoring airspace, managing fire, protecting nuclear facilities, military bases, and strategic infrastructure, as well as integrating purchased Russian systems (for example, S-300) with local developments (for example, “Bavar-373”). This allows Iran to build a layered defense to repel airstrikes by a potential adversary.

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Full version: النفط يقفز بأكثر من 5% بعد هجمات متبادلة بين أمريكا وإيران

US defeat at the World Cup: scandal, criticism, and mockery of “American ambitions”

The story of the United States team’s elimination from the World Cup quickly went beyond an ordinary sports recap: international attention converged on disappointment, unpleasant episodes, and a growing wave of criticism. Not only the results of the matches came under scrutiny, but also questions about the coaching staff’s work—and how the team is perceived at a moment when more is expected of it. Amid controversial decisions and sharp assessments, there are also biting comments from abroad: instead of a “typical” defeat, the American dream is being turned into a story about overreach and excessive pomp—pomp that has now become a reason for mockery. Read in today’s roundup about how confidence disappears, and why successes are suddenly being read as a failure of ambition.

This material was prepared based on publications from www.goal.com (Venezuela), es.euronews.com (Venezuela), and as.com (Venezuela).

Venezuela laughs at the US failure at the 2026 World Cup

In Venezuela’s interpretation, the US team’s failure at the 2026 World Cup became not just a sporting setback, but a symbolic collapse of the entire idea of the “American dream” on the football pitch. Alongside the 1-4 loss to Belgium and the team’s exit from the tournament, Venezuelan coverage—including a post on Goal—emphasizes that this is an event that in the region is being received with irony, sarcasm, and an obvious enjoyment in watching the image of the US as a country that can automatically turn resources, organization, and ambition into success collapse.

After the defeat, Mauricio Pochettino did not hide his disappointment. He admitted that the team “was not up to the mark,” took responsibility, and left the question of his future open. His words sounded like a direct self-assessment of the failure: “Responsibility lies with me,” “we must analyze what happened,” and “we did not show our style of play.” At the same time, he did not ignore mitigating circumstances: an injury to Christian Pulisic, Seržino Dest’s poor form, and mistakes by goalkeeper Matt Freese. Still, the overall tone was unmistakable—this was a defeat that shattered expectations and noticeably cooled talk about the future of the project.

In Venezuela, this story is read much more broadly than simply as a report on a failed match. Here, the US loss is seen as confirmation of old criticism of the American model of supremacy: big money, loud statements, and powerful infrastructure do not always translate into real victories. That is why the tournament hosts’ collapse is perceived as a painful blow to the image of a country that is accustomed to claiming leadership in everything—including sports.

The same motif also appears in reactions to other pieces about the 2026 World Cup. In a Euronews publication retold in the Venezuelan context and tied to the story of Belgium mocking Trump and FIFA, the US defeat is presented as grounds for satire not only against the football team, but also against politics, corruption, and the influence of strong players on international institutions. The Belgian players’ dance and the slogan “Overturn this” are seen in the regional interpretation not as just a joke, but as a public gesture of contempt for authority—and for attempts to impose convenient rules.

For the Venezuelan audience, it is especially important that sports and politics are intertwined in this story. The image of FIFA, allegedly bending under pressure, fits easily with already existing distrust of international structures, while the figure of Donald Trump reinforces the sense that football has long stopped being a fully autonomous arena. As a result, Belgium’s victory is seen as a moral resolution—a moment when “justice prevailed,” and when the public humiliation of those in power turned out to matter more than the actual score.

Another Venezuelan piece, dedicated to the 2026 World Cup bracket and quarterfinal scenarios, continues the same line: the US exit is treated as a symbolic failure of American football ambition. Even though the tournament was held on US soil and the country was positioning itself as the new football center, reality again reduced it to its familiar place—under the shadow of European and South American leaders. In this context, it is particularly noticeable that the CONCACAF zone lost all its representatives, and the regional hierarchy at the world championship has returned to what it was: Europe dominates, South America holds its brand, and the US failed to capitalize on either its home status or expectations.

For Venezuelan authors and readers, this is also an opportunity for broader cultural and political irony. Here, a football defeat can easily become a metaphor for a more general fall from the pedestal: a country accustomed to talking up its own superiority is again turned into a victim of its own expectations. Against the backdrop of local experience with crises, broken promises, and constant attempts to start over, such a storyline provokes a special reaction—from sarcastic enjoyment to a sense of symbolic justice.

That is why Venezuela’s take on the US failure at the 2026 World Cup is not a dry sports commentary, but a unified reaction to a whole set of themes: the team’s weakness, uncertainty around Pochettino’s future, FIFA’s vulnerability to political influence, mockery of Trump, and the general collapse of the image of American infallibility. In this story, football is only the surface; underneath it is a conflict between power and reality, ambition and results, claims to leadership and a practical inability to deliver.

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New Attacks on Tankers in the Strait of Hormuz: Two Vessels Damaged

Two attacks on oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz have triggered a new wave of concern about the safety of shipping through this key maritime corridor. The incidents occurred amid a fragile truce between the United States and Iran, as ship traffic gradually began to resume. According to British sources, one of the tankers caught fire after being hit by a projectile, but no crew members were injured. Analysts warn that the intensity of the attacks could return to the level seen before the temporary lull.

The UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) authority said it received a distress signal from 8 nautical miles east of the Lima area in Oman. The southbound tanker was hit by a projectile on its port side, after which a fire broke out on board. The agency did not name the vessel and did not indicate who was behind the attack, limiting itself to describing the projectile as “unidentified.” At the same time, a U.S. official confirmed that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) fired at least two rockets at commercial vessels, causing serious damage to two of them.

According to news agencies, one of the ships affected was the Qatari liquefied natural gas (LNG) tanker “Al Rekayyat,” flying the flag of the Marshall Islands. Its cargo capacity is about 216,000 cubic meters, and tracking data show that it has been widely operating in the Arabian Sea off the coasts of India and Pakistan. There is a gap in the records: its last recorded position near India was about 18 days ago, which could make it difficult to reconstruct its full route at the time the attack occurred near the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz.

Another version of the incident points to a second vessel that was damaged overnight—a Saudi oil tanker, which is currently under investigation. This information aligns with Reuters data that after an attack on a gas carrier near Oman, a Saudi crude tanker was also reported to have been affected. The incidents highlight the vulnerability of transit routes and raise the question of whether current security measures are sufficient to prevent a repeat of similar attacks.

As for shipping, Reuters reported that on Monday six supertankers carrying about 12 million barrels of oil transited the Strait of Hormuz, as well as two chemical tankers, a car carrier, and a container ship—all associated with Japan. However, other sources noted that over the weekend several vessels turned back, and two changed course, moving away from the Omani route toward a path closer to Iran. A representative of the Pakistani government called the attacks “unexpected” after the peace agreement, saying that the gas carrier “Al Arish” returned due to threats and that Pakistan is now negotiating security assurances.

On the political front, Axios, citing a U.S. official, said the IRGC fired at least two rockets that caused significant damage but no casualties. According to him, the United States will, “with a high probability,” carry out retaliatory strikes against Iranian targets. President Donald Trump said on Monday that the U.S. would either reach an agreement with Iran or “finish the mission.” Tensions are rising: since March 1, restrictions were reintroduced following the framework agreement of June 17, and now companies are worried about returning ships to Omani routes—shifting the balance of control at sea away from the most protected routes.

Comments on the news

• What is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and what role does it play in Iran’s military and economic life? — The IRGC is an elite military and political formation created after the 1979 Islamic Revolution to protect the regime. It controls missile programs, nuclear infrastructure, and participates in regional conflicts (Syria, Yemen, Lebanon). In the economy, the IRGC manages major enterprises in construction, energy, telecommunications, and the banking sector, giving it enormous influence.
• Why is the Strait of Hormuz considered one of the most strategic locations for global oil supplies, and which countries depend on its security? — About 20–30% of the world’s seaborne oil passes through the strait (approximately 17 million barrels per day). Its stability is critical for Asian countries (China, India, Japan, South Korea) and for Gulf exporters (Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Iraq). Any disruption in the strait leads to a sharp spike in oil prices and a global energy crisis.

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Full version: ناقلات في مرمى النيران.. هل عاد استهداف السفن في مضيق هرمز؟

Luis Eduardo Martínez calls for consensus to save Venezuela

The rector of the Central University of Technology of Venezuela, Luis Eduardo Martínez, said that only a nationwide consensus will make it possible to quickly restore the economy and save thousands of families affected by the crisis. He emphasized that, despite the deep pain caused by the tragedy of June 24 (in which hundreds of people died), the best tribute to the victims is to build an entirely different, united nation. Martínez recalled that in 1811 it was national unity that helped Venezuelans throw off Spanish rule, and today, as never before, it is necessary to leave behind disagreements and conflicts for the sake of a shared process of reviving the country.

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Full version: Luis Eduardo Martínez: El consenso es la única fórmula que nos permitirá recuperar a Venezuela

Iran Warns the US: Respect the Memorandum, or There Will Be No Talks

Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi said on Tuesday that Washington must abide by the memorandum of understanding signed between the two countries and stop issuing threats. He stressed that talks on a final agreement would not begin as long as the American side continues to use the language of ultimatums. In a post on the social media platform X, the diplomat noted that millions of Iranians had rallied together and that no threats would intimidate them.

Citing paragraph 13 of the document signed a month ago, Araqchi made clear that a condition for launching the negotiation process is to abandon bellicose rhetoric. “Honor your signature,” he told the White House. The statement came after US President Donald Trump threatened to “wrap up the mission” if an agreement was not reached, and even said he could destroy Iranian infrastructure within an hour.

In response, Tehran took a hard line. Iran’s Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Mohammad Baqer Zolghader, called Trump’s threats “illusory,” adding that Iranians do not understand the language of intimidation. “Address our people with respect; otherwise we will respond in another language,” he warned—signaling willingness for a symmetrical escalation in words.

At the same time, Iran’s foreign ministry criticized statements by the head of Germany’s Foreign Ministry regarding the situation in the Strait of Hormuz. The ministry’s official spokesperson, Esmail Baghaei, called them “shameful and distorting reality,” adding that Berlin bears responsibility for complicity in military aggression. The issue concerns mine clearance in the strait—Germany believes Iran should pay for the operation, although such sanctions have not been imposed yet.

The latest round of indirect consultations between the United States and Iran last week showed no visible progress. Nevertheless, the current 60-day ceasefire remains in effect, giving diplomacy another chance. While the sides continue trading sharp statements, the future of negotiations and the ceasefire regime remains uncertain—everything depends on who decides first to change the tone.

Notes

• Who is Abbas Araqchi and what is his role in Iranian diplomacy, especially in nuclear talks? — Abbas Araqchi is one of Iran’s most experienced diplomats, having served as deputy foreign minister. He was the chief negotiator for the 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA) and played a key role in shaping its terms. After the US withdrew from the deal, he continued to take part in talks aimed at lifting sanctions. His style is described as pragmatic yet firm in defending national interests. For foreign audiences, Araqchi is a symbol of continuity in Iranian diplomacy—able to engage with the West without yielding on key principles.

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Full version: Araqchi: Final agreement talks will not begin if US threats continue

Emergency meeting between Netanyahu and Trump: Israel seeks to rebuild trust

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu wants to hold a meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump this week, immediately after Trump returns from a NATO summit taking place in Turkey. The move is driven by the desire of Israel’s leadership to once again coordinate positions with Washington on a range of regional issues. According to Israeli media, Netanyahu is pressing for contact as quickly as possible—before even the resumption of U.S.-Iran talks.

Netanyahu’s main goal is to restore trust that has been shaken by the recent escalation between Israel and Iran. In addition, the prime minister plans to brief Trump with the latest Israeli intelligence in order to influence the U.S. position in the upcoming negotiations with Tehran. The agenda also includes discussion of normalization of relations with other countries in the region, and the rapid visit itself could give Netanyahu political momentum ahead of the coming Israeli elections.

In recent months, notable differences have emerged between the leaders, particularly over Washington’s deal with Iran and the situation in Lebanon. Netanyahu, however, denies that there is a rift in the relationship: in an interview with Fox News, he said, “I don’t see any discord,” adding that each of them acts in the interests of their own country. Trump, for his part, confirmed that he received a request for the meeting and described their relationship as “very good.”

Against the backdrop of preparations for a possible meeting between the two top officials, several senior Israeli officials are preparing to visit Washington in the coming weeks. Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar plans to meet with Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Defense Minister Israel Katz also intends to travel to the United States. However, according to sources, these trips could be canceled if the date of the Netanyahu-Trump meeting is agreed upon in the near future.

Israeli political circles do not hide the fact that the “military option” remains on the table. The movement of ministers and the very request for an urgent meeting indicate an attempt by Israel to recalibrate its relationship with a key ally amid rising tensions surrounding Iran’s nuclear program and regional conflicts. In this way, Tel Aviv is seeking to secure maximum influence over U.S. policy before fateful decisions are made.

Comments on the news

• What powers does the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) have in Iran’s political and economic system, and how does this organization affect the country’s nuclear program? – The IRGC is a key military-political institution directly accountable to the Supreme Leader. It controls a significant part of the economy (through foundations and companies, for example “Khatam al-Anbia”), and it also has representatives in parliament and the government. In the nuclear program, the IRGC is responsible for the security of facilities, the development of missile systems, and can block or accelerate negotiations depending on its own strategic interests.

• How is Iran trying to strengthen its regional influence and create a military deterrent factor against Israel through its support for Lebanon’s “Hezbollah”? – Iran provides Hezbollah with financial assistance, modern weapons (including high-precision missiles), and military advisors. This allows the Lebanese group to threaten Israeli territory, creating a “multi-front” danger for Israel. In doing so, Tehran increases its influence in the Levant and raises the costs of any potential aggression by Israel against Iranian assets.

• What role does Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei play in setting the red lines in negotiations with the United States over the nuclear deal, and what key demands does Tehran make? – Khamenei has the final veto authority over any negotiation decisions. He sets “red lines”: a prohibition on inspections of military sites or meetings with U.S. officials, as well as a requirement for guaranteed removal of all sanctions before any reduction in uranium enrichment. Tehran’s main demands: complete removal of sanctions, recognition of the right to peaceful enrichment, and the exclusion of doseimetric measures that violate sovereignty.

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Full version: Netanyahu is racing the clock to meet Trump to repair trust and influence the Iran file

Why Venezuelan institutions are letting the country down

In Venezuela, there has long been a habit of blaming the state for all the country’s troubles. But the problem runs deeper: many private institutions—professional associations, trade chambers, unions, opposition parties, and even non-governmental organizations (NGOs)—copy the same flaws as the authorities. Their leaders remain in place without change, elections are held only in form, staff and ideas are hardly ever renewed, and the organizations often serve merely as tools to obtain privileges and personal connections with the very politicians they criticize. This situation is not unique to Venezuela, but here it has become systemic.

The roots of this problem go back long before Hugo Chávez came to power. Even in the era of the two traditional parties—Acción Democrática and COPEI—universities, professional guilds, and trade unions operated on the principle of loyalty rather than merit. New ideas and fresh voices were suppressed, and institutions turned into “tribes,” where personal devotion mattered more than democratic values. Chavismo deepened this culture, making it nearly irreversible. That is why, before criticizing the government, it is worth looking inside one’s own organizations.

Today Venezuela has a real window of opportunity: the country has strategic resources, attracts the interest of investors, benefits from support from the Trump administration, and has qualified personnel. To seize this chance, it is not enough to demand reforms from the state—you also need to change yourselves. Opposition groups and every private institution should create formal channels to receive proposals from citizens and respond to them, and the government should open similar windows in every ministry. Only then can opposition turn from a voice of criticism into real infrastructure for supporting society.

The example of the United States shows how healthy institutions work: there, universities, guilds, and civic organizations respect, fund, and promote the best ideas regardless of their source. Social mobility becomes possible thanks to rules that most people follow. If Venezuela wants to attract investment and rebuild the world’s trust, it will have to give up caudillismo and clannishness within its own structures. Respect begins at home—with open, merit-based, value-driven institutions.

Comments on the news

• What do the traditional parties Acción Democrática (AD) and COPEI represent, and what role did they play in shaping Venezuela’s institutional culture before Chávez? – AD (a left-leaning centrist party) and COPEI (a right-leaning centrist party) were the two dominant parties under the so-called “Puntofijo” system (1958–1998). After the fall of the dictatorship, they entered into the Punto Fijo Pact, which entrenched a two-party monopoly and excluded other forces. This led to the formation of an institutional culture based on clientelism, corruption, and the use of state resources to strengthen party power. The parties controlled trade unions, business associations, and the courts, creating a patronage system that crushed independent institutions and undermined trust in democracy. By the time Hugo Chávez arrived in 1998, these parties had discredited themselves through their inability to solve social problems and their deep corruption.

• What does the term “caudillismo” mean in the Venezuelan context, and how does it show up in private institutions—professional associations, trade chambers, and unions? – Caudillismo is a form of personalized leadership in which authority rests on the charisma of a specific “caudillo” (leader), rather than on formal procedures or laws. In Venezuela, this tradition dates back to the 19th century and survived even after the transition to democracy. In private institutions (bar associations, engineering associations, trade chambers, and unions), caudillismo manifests as leadership concentrating power in its own hands, using organizations for personal enrichment or political influence, and elections turning into a formality where the incumbent leader’s appointees win. This undermines internal democracy, leads to stagnation and corruption, because institutions become tools of a narrow group rather than serving the interests of their members.

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Full version: El Estado no es el único fallido

Oman route through the Strait of Hormuz: a test of resilience

In recent days, the Oman route in the Strait of Hormuz has moved into the stage of practical trials: dozens of vessels began using it despite Tehran’s open dissatisfaction, which insists on coordinating all transits through the strait. Against the backdrop of fears that, without agreement with Iran, vessel safety cannot be guaranteed, many ships have started reconsidering their routes between the Iranian and Omani zones. According to data collected by Al Jazeera’s analytical division via the MarineTraffic platform, between 24 June and 3 July, 313 transits were recorded: 124 (about 40%) used the Oman route, while 189 (60%) went on the Iranian route passing south of Qeshm Island.

Traffic varied by day. In the first two days (24–25 June), 92 ships transited—an average of 46 per day—which became the peak for the entire analysis period. Then the flow declined: on 26 June there were 27 transits, on 28 June there were 31, on 29 June there were 24, before rising again to 35 (30 June), 33 (1 July), 34 (2 July), and 36 (3 July). Such fluctuations show that shipping did not stop, but operated under pressure from the changing political and military situation, forcing captains to choose one route or another depending on the day’s news about rising tension.

Statistics on the types of vessels that used both routes are as follows: tankers for crude oil lead (52), followed by bulk carriers (34), container ships (26), general cargo ships (25), and tankers for oil products and chemicals (19). The data also notes 16 transits by liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) tankers and 6 by liquefied natural gas (LNG) tankers. On the Oman route, the leading categories were the same oil tankers (36), followed by bulk carriers (19), while LNG tankers, container ships, and dry bulk carriers each recorded 10 transits in their respective categories.

The Oman route tests coincided with direct threats to its safety. According to U.S. military command, on 25 June an Iranian suicide drone attacked the container ship Ever Lovely, which was travelling along the Omani coast from the strait. Iran did not claim responsibility. The 27 June attack on the oil tanker Kiku was even more serious: carrying more than two million barrels of oil, it was also struck by a suicide drone. After these incidents, satellite data—according to the report—show that the Oman route temporarily emptied: from noon (dohiem time) until the morning of the next day, ships preferred to go by the Iranian route south of Qeshm Island.

The diplomatic situation also affected developments. In Muscat, the first meeting took place of the joint Iran–Oman committee on managing shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Garibabadi said Tehran informed Oman that it needs to change routes and that “the situation in the strait will not return to the pre-war state.” Iran’s parliament speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf stressed that control over shipping in Hormuz is Iran’s right, which it will not give up, and that sovereignty over the strait belongs to Iran and Oman, with which Tehran intends to discuss further steps.

Iran also warned the United Kingdom and France against any military maneuvers in the strait. Garibabadi noted that Hormuz is “not a place to display military force,” and that the safety of the strait is the responsibility of coastal states, while those who create crises must be ready for the consequences of “adventures.” Thus, the data indicate that the Oman route received real but fragile recognition right at the outset, and then faced a strict test—both militarily and politically. Its future now depends directly on Tehran’s and Muscat’s ability to develop a mutually acceptable formula for governing this strategic passage.

Comments on the news

• What is the strategic significance of Qeshm Island in the Strait of Hormuz, and why does the Iranian route run south of it? - Qeshm Island is the largest island in the Persian Gulf, located at the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz. Its strategic significance is that it allows Iran to control a key oil transit hub (about 20% of the world’s supplies). The route south of Qeshm appears to be used by Iran to demonstrate a military presence or as part of exercises, to underscore the ability to block or regulate shipping in the strait in the event of a conflict.
• What is meant by “the pre-war state” in Deputy Minister Garibabadi’s statement? What period or conflict is it referring to? - The term “pre-war state” likely refers to the period before the Iran–Iraq war (1980–1988) or the era before the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was signed in 2015. In this context, the deputy minister may be referring to a return to a more tense military or nuclear confrontation characteristic of those periods.
• Who is Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, and what role does he play in Iran’s political system? - Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf is a conservative politician and the current Speaker of the Iranian Parliament (Majles) since 2020. Previously, he served as Mayor of Tehran (2005–2017) and was the commander of the Air Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Qalibaf is an influential figure in a system closely linked to the Supreme Leader and is considered one of the potential candidates for the presidency in the future.
• On what historical or legal grounds does Iran claim control over shipping in the Strait of Hormuz? - Iran justifies its claims to control the Strait of Hormuz based on international maritime law (in particular, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which it signed but did not ratify), as well as historical rights as a coastal state. Tehran argues that the strait is within its territorial waters (within 12 nautical miles) and that it can regulate ship passage for its national security, citing “innocent passage” and “transit passage” in international norms.

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Full version: في أسبوعين.. كم سفينة عبرت هرمز من المسار العماني؟

Trump’s Patriotic Spectacle Against the Backdrop of America’s 250th Anniversary

The anniversary of the United States on a 250-year scale is turning into a stage for a battle over meanings: some see what is happening as a demonstration of strength and national unity, while others view it as the harsh politicization of a holiday and an opportunity for criticism. The focus is on how Trump turns the celebration into a theatrical proof of the “greatness of America,” framing his message with symbols, rhetoric, and an atmosphere of confrontation, where tough language about the “communist threat” and a commitment to hardline nationalism sound like part of a single message. Against this background, international reactions also reveal troubling notes: some describe the event as excessively military—almost “march-like”—while others mention everyday mishaps such as weather-related disruptions, which create a contrast with the festive narrative.

This material was prepared based on publications from sources www.facebook.com (Venezuela) and www.rtve.es (Venezuela).

The Venezuelan View of Trump: Protectionism, Isolation, and a Risk for the Region

The Venezuelan perspective on Donald Trump’s return to the agenda for Latin America is built not so much around individual trade disputes as around a broader concern: the United States again appears to be an unpredictable partner, capable at any moment of revisiting the rules of the game. For a region where many economies depend on exporting raw materials, agricultural products, and industrial goods to the northern market, this sounds like a serious warning. Even existing agreements, this logic suggests, do not guarantee stability.

In one of the materials published here, the point is stated outright: “todas nuestras agroexportaciones a USA corren el peligro de Trump.” For Venezuelan—and more broadly Latin American—political culture, such a phrase is easily read as confirmation of an old suspicion: U.S. foreign policy is often driven not by agreements, but by the logic of power and by its own economic interests. For Venezuela, which has experienced sanctions pressure and direct U.S. intervention in the economic sphere, this feels especially familiar—on this reading, the American market and American rules become not a guarantee of development, but an instrument of pressure.

The text also emphasizes the contrast between countries in the region. It notes that “Brasil” allegedly can “enfrentarse a Trump,” while weaker economies find themselves in a vulnerable position. For a Venezuelan audience, this resonates with their own experience of asymmetry: small and medium-sized economies in Latin America have to defend themselves not through the strength of negotiations, but through regional solidarity, diversifying markets, and carefully balancing between external centers of influence.

At the same time, the note cites the position of Mexico’s president, Claudia Sheinbaum, who rejects the thesis of “bad negotiations” and assures that “hay certidumbre para la inversión.” Venezuela’s interest in this episode is that it shows efforts by Latin American leaders to maintain business confidence amid U.S. pressure. For Caracas, this is telling: economic resilience in the region depends not only on internal reforms, but also on how sovereign a country is in shaping its trade policy toward its northern neighbor.

This theme also echoes a broader view of Donald Trump’s first year in the White House, which in another article RTVE is presented as a period of isolationism, a national turn, and political polarization. It is noted that Trump’s main achievements were the tax reform and the appointment of Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court, while his key failures included the repeal of Obamacare and immigration reform. It also highlights the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, the TPP, and other multilateral mechanisms. For a Venezuelan reader, this matters not only as a characterization of U.S. policy, but as a sign that Washington is moving away from the role of leader of the global liberal order.

The Venezuelan interpretation here is twofold. On the one hand, the United States’ retreat from global commitments may be seen as a weakening of external pressure and a symbol of crisis in the American model. On the other hand, it increases the unpredictability of Washington’s policy toward Latin America. That is why, in the regional perception, Trump often functions not just as a domestic U.S. leader, but as a factor influencing prices, trade, international legitimacy, and the political balance within Latin America itself.

In the end, both storylines—fear surrounding Peruvian exports and an analysis of Trump’s isolationism—converge on one point in the Venezuelan reading: the United States under Trump is again perceived as a force that can act through protectionism, pressure, and abrupt course changes. For Latin America, this is not an abstract foreign-policy debate, but a reminder of how fragile economic dependence is—and of how important it is to find one’s own mechanisms of protection in the face of the northern neighbor.

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Funerals for Khamenei and the Hormuz crisis: Iran in the spotlight

Large-scale funerals for Iran’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei are continuing, taking place amid serious political tension both inside the country and beyond its borders. Tens of thousands of Iranians are streaming into Tehran’s spacious prayer hall to bid farewell to the late leader. The ceremonies, which began on Friday, will run until 9 July. Mourners carry portraits of Khamenei, his son, and his alleged successor Mojtaba Khamenei; many are dressed in black and wrapped in Iranian flags. In this context, US President Donald Trump said that Washington had given Tehran a week to return to talks “out of respect for the supreme leader’s funeral,” adding: “We did it out of our kindness,” and emphasizing that there had been no shootings between the sides during the mourning period.

At the same time, disputes are intensifying over the future of the Strait of Hormuz and shipping through it—this strategic corridor handles the transit of about 20% of the world’s oil and liquefied gas supplies. The United States, Gulf countries and the international community reject any attempts to charge ships for passage, but Tehran is proposing an alternative in the form of the so-called “service fee.” Iran’s ambassador to China, Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli, said his country will “definitely introduce” a service fee as a state whose portion of territorial waters lies in the strait, уточнив that these will not be “transit fees” in the strict sense, and that friendly countries will receive “special” terms.

Iran has also warned against any military action in Hormuz after the UK and France announced their readiness to deploy a multinational military mission to ensure freedom of navigation. Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Garibabadi said Hormuz “is not a stage for military theatrics by forces outside the region,” adding that “coastal states bordering the strait are responsible for its security.” He added: “As a responsible power and guarantor of the security of the Strait of Hormuz, we warn against any military action in it,” noting that this is a “serious warning,” and that whoever creates crises “will face the consequences of their adventures.”

Possible mechanisms for governing the strait after the signing of a memorandum of understanding between Iran and the United States are also being discussed. The document guarantees the safe passage of commercial ships “without payment for 60 days,” but further steps remain unclear. Tensions in Tehran were reflected in a joint statement by France and Britain saying that Oman agreed to work with them to ensure shipping security in its territorial waters. French President Emmanuel Macron said the country had sent specialized demining equipment to the region, as well as two frigates and a maritime patrol aircraft, and that, in cooperation with partners, it is ready for the full restoration of shipping and to ensure safe passage through Hormuz.

Reports have also emerged of a proposal put forward by Iran and Oman to the United States, which envisages joint management of the strait between Tehran and Muscat, as well as the idea of charging administrative fees. However, according to sources, Oman has not yet submitted a complete official proposal, although consultations continue. As reported, US negotiators have “reservations” about the proposal, but intend to discuss it with the Omani side, believing they can settle the contentious issues. Meanwhile, the White House press secretary said Trump confirmed that Iran cannot charge for passage through Hormuz because it is an international waterway, and Axios reported that Trump’s envoys are trying to convey the idea that Tehran’s fee demands could “derail” the chances of reaching an agreement.

Military and diplomatic developments are accompanied by real navigational challenges: ship-traffic data show that shipping is still facing problems despite the resumption of transit. It is reported that at least eight ships suddenly turned near the coast of Oman before entering the strait, and some vessels changed course between Friday and Saturday as they attempted to leave the Persian Gulf. According to Bloomberg, later the routes of four ships were adjusted, and they are crossing the strait via Iran’s navigational channel, while the reason for the course change remains unknown. Iran has repeatedly stressed that passage through the strait must be carried out via a navigation route that it has designated and authorized for use.

In a statement that drew widespread attention, Russia’s Deputy Chairman of the Security Council Dmitry Medvedev noted that the Strait of Hormuz has become for Iran “a weapon no less powerful than nuclear weapons,” adding that there is a “backup weapon” in the Bab el-Mandeb strait. In this way, the funerals for the supreme leader have become intertwined with an acute geopolitical crisis around a key maritime artery, where the interests of regional and global powers collide—and the future of shipping remains in question.

Comments on the news

• Who is Mojtaba Khamenei and why is he called the alleged successor to Iran’s supreme leader? - Mojtaba Khamenei is the son of the current supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, and an influential member of the clergy. He is described as a possible successor due to the lack of a formal succession procedure in the “velayat-e faqih” system: in practice, power can pass to a trusted person close to the leadership, although the final decision is made by the Assembly of Experts.
• What is the Iranian concept of a “service fee” for passage through the Strait of Hormuz, and how does it differ from ordinary transit charges? - Iran often frames the passage of ships through its territorial waters in the strait as a service that requires compensation for ensuring security and environmental oversight. Unlike standard fees (for example, for pilotage or port services), this concept is not recognized under international maritime law and is political in nature, because Iran uses it to pressure shipping.
• What role does Oman play in negotiations over the status of the Strait of Hormuz, and what are its relations with Iran and Western countries? - Oman acts as a neutral mediator thanks to traditionally friendly relations with Iran and, at the same time, cooperation with the West (including military arrangements with the United States and the United Kingdom). It offers a platform for negotiations and often eases tensions by pushing for compromise on the strait’s status, such as initiatives for demilitarization or joint shipping management.
• What is the “Iranian navigational channel” in the Strait of Hormuz, and why are ships required to follow it? - The “Iranian navigational channel” is a route that Iran has designated as part of its territorial waters and on which, according to its claims, special safety rules apply. Tehran argues that ships must follow it to prevent collisions and pollution, but in practice this requirement is unilateral: international law (the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea) recognizes ships’ right of transit passage through straits used for international navigation without any obligation to follow a national channel.

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Full version: Funeral ceremonies for Khamenei continue and debate escalates over the future of Hormuz

Venezuela's government denies false information about organ seizure from an Indian sailor

Venezuelan authorities officially denied the false information spread by journalist Maibort Pety about alleged organ seizure from an Indian citizen in Caracas. In a statement published on social media, it is stressed that the sailor Rakesh Chauhan did not die during the seismic event on June 24, and that his body was not handled by state agencies—fully absolving the government of responsibility for rumors about illegal medical procedures.

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Full version: Gobierno nacional desmiente información falsa sobre supuesta extracción de órganos a ciudadano indio en Caracas

Iran bids farewell to Khamenei: $30 million for the funeral and signals to the world

Tehran is preparing for an unprecedented, on a massive scale, send-off ceremony for the late Supreme Leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei. The mourning events are expected to draw between 20 and 30 million people. The authorities are seeking not only to organize a mass procession, but also to turn it into a powerful demonstration of political and military unity. According to Al Jazeera’s correspondent, these funerals have temporarily frozen international negotiations, but the political subtext remains a key element of the event.

Within the country, the main goal is to show Iranian unity in the face of Israel and the United States, and to confirm popular support for the official course. In his address, President Masoud Pezeshkian stressed that the funerals are not just mourning, but the start of a new phase: the deceased leader has become a symbol of resistance and resilience. He urged citizens to take part, saying that Iran is opening a new chapter in its history. Calls to join the ceremonies were voiced by the heads of all three branches of power and by the senior military leadership.

The international dimension also plays an important role. Iran intends to demonstrate that it has emerged stronger from its conflict with the United States and Israel and is ready for new challenges. Organizing such a large-scale event with official delegations from more than 100 countries is viewed as part of that message. Former Iranian diplomat Hadi Afghahi said that the people have rallied around the leadership, and that an oath of loyalty has shifted to the new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, warning enemies: any adventure against the Islamic Republic will require a multiple reassessment of the balance of forces.

From the American side, the reaction is more restrained. Patrick Marr, the former head of the Republican Party committee in Washington, said that for the United States, symbols are not what matters, but Iran’s behavior. He noted that Washington is focused on the Strait of Hormuz issue, IAEA inspections, and ending support for proxy forces in sovereign states—especially in Lebanon. At the same time, he mentioned “American optimism” and positive signals from President Trump regarding a rapid comprehensive agreement—technical channels through intermediaries remain open.

An Al Jazeera correspondent in Washington reported that Trump had been closely following the ceremony despite the celebrations of Independence Day. In an interview with Axios, he called Iranian tears “possibly fake” and made a sarcastic comment on the mourning. Trump also mentioned a deal that provides a one-week postponement to complete the funerals and made a provocative statement: “the current Iranian leadership can be removed with one shot, but then there would be no one to negotiate with.” He reaffirmed that his approach is negotiations from a position of strength, and announced a meeting with Netanyahu at the White House after the NATO summit, despite remaining disagreements over Iran and Lebanon.

Thus, the grand funeral in Tehran became not only an act of remembrance, but also a stage for demonstrating domestic unity, international ambitions, and a fragile balance of power. While millions bid farewell to their leader for the last time, behind the scenes a tense game is underway: Washington is assessing vulnerabilities, Tehran is sending signals of resolve, and the future dialogue remains on hold until all rituals are completed.

Comments on the news

• Who is Mojtaba Khamenei and why is he specifically mentioned as the new Supreme Leader of Iran? - Mojtaba Khamenei is the second son of the current Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. He is considered a likely successor because of Iran’s informal power-transfer system, where ties within the clerical establishment and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps play a key role. Although the official mechanism for transferring power is carried out through the Assembly of Experts, analysis of domestic politics suggests that Mojtaba’s name is increasingly appearing among the candidates for the post, reflecting a trend toward concentrating power within a single family.

• Why is control of the Strait of Hormuz a key issue for the United States in negotiations with Iran? - The Strait of Hormuz is a strategic corridor through which about 20% of the world’s oil trade passes. For the United States, control of it means the ability to influence global energy prices and ensure the security of its allies in the Persian Gulf. Iran periodically threatens to close the strait in response to sanctions, which could trigger a military conflict and disrupt supply chains—so any agreement with Tehran must include guarantees for freedom of navigation.

• What are Iran’s proxy forces in Lebanon and what role do they play in regional politics? - In Lebanon, proxy forces primarily refers to Hezbollah—a Shiite military-political organization created and supported by Iran. It is simultaneously part of the Lebanese government, has its own army, and a network of social services. In regional politics, Hezbollah acts as an instrument of Iranian influence: it takes part in conflicts in Syria, confronts Israel, and helps spread Tehran’s ideological and military influence across the Middle East. Its role is especially important for Iran as a deterrence factor and as leverage in negotiations with the West.

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Full version: With 30 million mourners involved... How Tehran and Washington read the huge funeral for Khamenei?

US-Iran Memorandum: Early Progress and Unresolved Contradictions

Several weeks have passed since the announcement of the US-Iran memorandum of understanding on June 17, and its implementation is moving forward, albeit with extreme caution. Early results are already visible on the ground: the ceasefire regime is being observed, there have been no reports of large-scale military clashes, the Strait of Hormuz has been reopened to navigation, and the “risk premium” on oil markets has fallen. In addition, the sides have established a permanent negotiation mechanism—technical meetings are being held in Doha to maintain communication channels and prevent new incidents.

Qatar and Pakistan’s intermediary role has become noticeably stronger: having helped draft the memorandum itself, they have moved to directly monitoring its implementation. Diplomats coordinate contacts, track compliance with the points in question, and step in when disputes arise. Meetings have taken place both in Switzerland’s Bürgenstock and in Doha, and a communications line has been set up for reporting possible violations. The mediators prepare joint progress reports and hold separate consultations with US and Iranian delegations.

Despite positive signals, serious disagreements over the interpretation of key provisions have already emerged. The sharpest is the future governance of the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran insists that the memorandum gives it the primary role in regulating shipping through the strait in coordination with Oman. Mohammad Bagher Kalibaf, speaker of the Iranian parliament, said that the “fifth clause” provides for exactly such an arrangement, and that Iran will not allow the United States to interfere. Iran’s deputy foreign minister, Garab-Abadi, stressed that the strait is not a place for the display of military force from outside.

The United States, by contrast, views the Strait of Hormuz as an international waterway and rejects any attempts by Iran to collect fees or impose restrictions. This position was supported by a joint document from the Gulf Arab states, and the International Maritime Organization warned that introducing passage fees would set a dangerous precedent for global navigation. The dispute is not limited to the strait: in the Lebanese question, Iran links implementation of the memorandum to the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, while Washington, at this stage, sees only de-escalation—and ties any withdrawal to the disarmament of Hezbollah and the transfer of control to the Lebanese army.

The nuclear file remains outside the discussion for now: technical consultations have not touched on uranium stockpile levels or enrichment rates—those decisions have been postponed to later rounds of talks. Disagreements also persist over sanctions relief and the unfreezing of Iranian assets. The United States is proposing step-by-step, conditional lifting of restrictions with monitoring of how the money is spent, while Iran demands full control over its assets without external conditions. As a result, the memorandum is currently succeeding in reducing tensions and stabilizing energy markets, but low trust, differing interpretations of the provisions, and mutual linkages are turning it more into a crisis-management mechanism than a solid, comprehensive agreement.

Comments on the news

• Who is Mohammad Bagher Kalibaf, and why do his statements about the memorandum’s “fifth clause” matter for understanding the position of Iran’s conservative circles? — Mohammad Bagher Kalibaf is the speaker of Iran’s parliament (Majlis) and a prominent conservative, and he previously served as mayor of Tehran. His reference to the “fifth clause” (likely relating to some Iran-Russia or bilateral agreement) signals that conservative elites are insisting on strict implementation of commitments without concessions—especially on issues affecting national sovereignty and regional security. This matters because it shows that conservatives in Iran are demanding a hard line from the authorities and are unwilling to accept compromises in negotiations with external players.

• On what legal basis does Iran insist on its leading role in regulating shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, and how does this relate to international maritime law? — Iran cites the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), as well as its national legislation, which establishes sovereignty over territorial waters (up to 12 nautical miles) and the right to regulate transit through the Strait of Hormuz, which partly falls within Iran’s zone. Tehran argues that it can restrict the passage of ships for security and environmental reasons—something that is formally permitted under Article 25 of UNCLOS. However, the international community typically interprets these rights more narrowly, insisting on “transit passage”—and Iran’s position is disputed by the United States and other countries, but it remains a key tool of pressure.

• Why does Iran link implementation of the memorandum to the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, and how does this linkage reflect its regional priorities? — For Iran, supporting Lebanon’s Hezbollah and resisting Israel’s presence in southern Lebanon is part of the “axis of resistance” strategy, which is a central element of its regional policy. By tying implementation of the memorandum to Israel’s withdrawal, Tehran signals that it places the fight against Israel’s influence above any other agreements. This highlights the priorities of Iranian policy: strengthening proxy forces and creating buffer zones along the borders with Israel, as well as countering normalization of Arab-Israeli relations.

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Full version: هل ينجح الوسطاء في منع انهيار التفاهم الأمريكي الإيراني؟

Venezuela opposition strategy: Criticism of Trump and an appeal to Latin American voters

Spanish journalist Javier Negre said that the team of Venezuela’s opposition leader María Corina Machado has instructed its supporters and social media influencers to intensify criticism of Donald Trump’s administration. According to him, the goal of this campaign is to warn the White House: if Washington does not provide decisive support for Machado’s return to active political life, it could prove costly for Republicans in the upcoming midterm elections in November.

In his address to Latin American voters in the United States, Negre urged them to “pass the bill” to those who put oil interests ahead of human lives, implying that the community’s anger could be reflected in voting. In this way, Machado’s circle is trying to use the electoral influence of Latin Americans—especially in southern states—as leverage to pressure Trump into working more actively toward removing political restrictions on the opposition leader.

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Full version: "Pásenle factura en noviembre": Revelan presunta estrategia de la oposición venezolana contra la Casa Blanca

250 Years of the U.S.: the Nuclear Challenge and the Path to Survival

The United States is preparing to mark the 250th anniversary of independence— the longest-lasting attempt at republican rule in modern history. Yet behind the celebratory narrative lies a deep historical contradiction: the rhetoric of freedom and equality sharply contrasts with the genocide of Indigenous peoples carried out before the country was founded and with repressive practices afterward. The text recalls that “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” coexisted with an economy built on slavery and the forced labor of Africans, the exploitation of day laborers, and the stripping of women of basic rights up to the 20th century. Once again, the central question emerges: what will allow humanity—and especially the United States—to endure for another quarter of a millennium?

According to the author, the only and most important answer is the abolition and complete elimination of nuclear weapons, which pose an existential threat not only to America but to the entire world. The article traces the history of the nuclear age as a chain of fateful decisions: from the 1941 Manhattan Project, the 1945 bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the removal of Bikini Atoll residents for testing, to more than a thousand atomic and hydrogen explosions on the Marshall Islands, in Kiribati, at Johnston Atoll, in Nevada, New Mexico, Colorado, Mississippi, Alaska, and elsewhere. In the end, an arsenal was created capable of “destroying much of the planet’s higher forms of life.”

Notably, opposition to the project emerged already in its early stages, proving that concern was not belated. Physicist Lise Meitner said: “I will have nothing to do with the bomb.” Nobel laureate Isidor Isaac Rabi refused to join the effort: “I don’t want the crown of three centuries of physics to become a weapon of mass destruction.” And Joseph Rotblat left Los Alamos as early as 1944 after hearing from General Groves that “the true purpose of making the bomb was to subjugate the Soviets.” Later, Rotblat devoted his life to disarmament: he helped draft the Russell-Einstein Manifesto (1955), founded the Pugwash Conferences (1957), and received the Nobel Peace Prize (1995).

The threat was perceived not only as a scientific problem, but as a question of civilization’s survival. As early as 1947, U.S. Vice President Henry Wallace spoke at Madison Square Garden: “I don’t hear marching armies—I hear a world crying out for peace.” He warned that the success or failure of foreign policy could mean the difference between life and death, and sometimes between humanity’s continued existence and its disappearance. Today, the author notes, such critical voices have almost vanished from public discourse—many believe that nuclear weapons “ensure our security,” without grasping the full extent of the horror that these arsenals carry.

Against the backdrop of weakening warnings, the article cites fresh signals of escalation. According to the author, on June 10, 2026, the Director of National Intelligence in the United States, Tulsi Gabbard, said that the world is “closer to nuclear annihilation than ever.” And in January 2026, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists moved the Doomsday Clock 85 seconds closer to midnight, repeating the warnings of nuclear strategists who seriously discuss the possibility of “winning a nuclear war.” The article also mentions Donald Trump and his circle, who have repeatedly hinted at the possibility of violating the nuclear taboo.

In the end, the article returns to the main question: what is needed for humanity to last another 250 years? And it repeats the answer: cancel and eliminate nuclear weapons as the core condition. The author believes that if the American public understands the threat and begins demanding disarmament, it will create pressure capable of bringing about real change. Then one day it may be possible to celebrate the 500th anniversary of Independence Day. Any delay in confronting the nuclear risk, the text emphasizes, exposes everyone to the likelihood of an unimaginable catastrophe.

Comments on the news

• What are the Pugwash Conferences and what are they known for in the context of nuclear disarmament? — The Pugwash Conferences are international meetings of scientists, launched in 1957 at the initiative of Albert Einstein and Bertrand Russell. They are known for creating, in the midst of the Cold War, an informal channel of dialogue between Soviet and American experts on nuclear security. The conferences contributed to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1995 for efforts to prevent a nuclear threat.

• What role did Henry Wallace play in U.S. history, and why did his position on foreign policy contrast with the dominant line? — Henry Wallace was U.S. vice president under Franklin Roosevelt and the Secretary of Commerce. After World War II, he advocated cooperation with the USSR, opposed the arms race, and supported disarmament—sharply contrasting with the dominant “containment of communism” line in the Truman administration. Wallace criticized the Marshall Plan and NATO as provocative, and was removed from decision-making; his views were considered “pro-Russian” and marginal during the McCarthy era.

• Which organizations and experts determine the Doomsday Clock’s setting, and how widely are their assessments recognized in the international community? — The setting of the Doomsday Clock is determined by the Science and Security Board of Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists), which includes leading physicists, ecologists, and experts in nuclear policy. Their assessments are recognized as a symbol of global vulnerability, but they have no binding force; they are widely cited in the media and academia, although some critics note subjectivity and an excessive alarmist tendency.

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Full version: 85 seconds tell you not to celebrate, Mr. Trump

Tucker Carlson announces the creation of a third party in the US due to a break with...

Conservative TV host Tucker Carlson said he intends to found a new political party, finally breaking with the Republican Party. According to The New York Times, the deciding factor was the war with Iran, which Carlson called a betrayal of the “America First” principles. He accused Donald Trump and Republican leadership of backing away from promises to protect the interests of ordinary Americans, and now believes the country needs a third path—outside the traditional rivalry between Republicans and Democrats.

Carlson emphasized that, in his view, the two major parties have no fundamental differences on key issues: war, funding, and foreign policy. He called the current system “a one-party state under the cover of democracy” and urged the dismantling of this duopoly. At the same time, as The Guardian reports, he ruled out his own bid for the presidency, saying he does not see himself as Trump’s competitor, but intends to support alternative candidates in Congressional elections in November.

Carlson’s announcement comes amid deep internal divisions within both parties. Democrats are under pressure from the left wing over their position on Israel and the war in Gaza, while Republicans are split between neoconservatives who support military intervention and isolationists who demand a focus on domestic problems. Carlson is clearly aligning himself with the second camp, proposing a full ban on immigration and a reworking of economic policy in light of the growth of artificial intelligence.

Alongside Carlson, a similar initiative is being promoted by former Congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene. According to The Independent, she is conducting “serious and intensive talks” with a number of political figures about creating a party oriented toward “pure” American interests, free from the “traps and frameworks” of the major parties. Greene called the current Republican bloc an expression of the agenda “America last,” and believes that a new force could attract both right-wing and left-wing voters who are disappointed with the establishment.

These moves reflect a broader ideological split within the conservative movement. As The Telegraph notes, on the one hand there are neoconservatives such as John Bolton, who demand the resumption of military operations to protect Israel; on the other are supporters of “America First,” who call the war with Iran “a betrayal” of the Trump base, provoked by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. In experts’ view, this conflict is not simply about Trump’s personality—it touches the very identity of the conservative movement: whether it will be interventionist or isolationist, placing the economy, social issues, and immigration at the top of the agenda.

Thus, Carlson’s and Greene’s statements signal the possible emergence of a serious alternative to the two-party system. While for now it is only an idea and not an organizational structure, the very fact that a split in the conservative camp is being discussed publicly—and that a third force is being considered—points to growing dissatisfaction among a significant segment of American voters. Ahead of the next elections, this trend could significantly affect the balance of power, especially if the new movements manage to unite disaffected right-wing voters and part of the left electorate that opposes military adventurism and advocates for social justice.

Comments on the news

• What specific real events or conflicts between the US and Iran in recent years prompted calling the situation a “war with Iran”? — Among the sharpest incidents are the killing of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani in January 2020 on President Trump’s orders, after which Iran launched a missile strike on a U.S. base in Iraq, and a series of attacks on oil tankers and facilities in the Persian Gulf (2019). Cyberattacks should also be taken into account (for example, an attack on Iran’s nuclear program using Stuxnet, though it was classified) and intensive sanctions campaigns which, taken together, created the backdrop for “hybrid war.”
• Why in discussions among American conservatives is the war with Iran directly linked to Israel’s interests and to Prime Minister Netanyahu? — This is explained by the long-standing alliance between neoconservative circles in the US and Israeli leadership. Netanyahu has consistently portrayed Iran as an existential threat to Israel, and many American conservatives (especially in think tanks such as AEI and WINEP) view confrontation with Iran as part of protecting Israel’s security. Trump’s “maximum pressure” policy and withdrawal from the JCPOA matched what Netanyahu expected, which cemented the association “war with Iran = war for Israel” in the rhetoric of the right.
• How did the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) affect the split between neoconservatives and “America First” supporters within the Republican Party? — The JCPOA became a catalyst for the split. Neoconservatives (for example, John Bolton and Lindsey Graham) sharply criticized the deal as a “capitulation,” insisting on the use of force to contain Iran. “America First” supporters (including Trump himself and Tucker Carlson) opposed the JCPOA for different reasons: they believed the deal benefited European and Chinese allies more than the US, and they interpreted any foreign commitments as undermining national interests. In the end, both wings came together in rejecting the JCPOA, but from different ideological positions, which deepened the internal split in the party on foreign-policy issues.

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Full version: يمين ترمب يتصدع.. هل تصنع حرب إيران حزبا أمريكيا ثالثا؟

Venezuelan authorities accuse “media labs” of stoking chaos after the earthquake

Acting President of Venezuela Delcy Rodríguez said that after the powerful double earthquake that struck on June 24, the government faced not only a natural disaster, but also a deliberate information attack. According to her, so-called “media labs” were involved—both inside the country and abroad—to sow panic and hinder rescue efforts. Rodríguez acknowledged that the scale of the earthquake exceeded all forecasts, but stressed that alongside the tragedy there was a planned destabilization campaign.

As a specific example, the head of state cited a false call to “everyone go down to La Guaira,” which was widely circulated on social media. This disinformation, according to an investigation, was intended to create traffic jams and chaos on the roads, obstructing evacuation and the search for survivors. At the same time, Rodríguez separately emphasized that she understands those citizens who genuinely went to that area to look for relatives—their actions were driven by compassion, unlike the commissioned campaign. The authorities said they have already identified the technical and geographic sources of these attacks, but for now are not disclosing any specific names or countries from which they were carried out.

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Full version: Gobierno nacional denuncia activación de “laboratorios mediáticos” para generar caos tras el doblete sísmico

The US fears Israel could target Iranian negotiators

The US administration has expressed serious concern over a possible Israeli plan to eliminate two key Iranian negotiators — the Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi. According to The New York Times, American officials believe that such a move could derail delicate negotiations over a temporary peace agreement, which Washington is conducting with Tehran.

Washington believes that removing Qalibaf or Araqchi could completely derail the negotiating track launched back in April. Previously, Israeli authorities had considered both politicians to be “legitimate targets” as part of a campaign to topple Iran’s government. The US side fears that any attempt at an assassination after real talks have begun would lead to the resumption of hostilities.

Qalibaf, according to Iranian sources, has already twice survived an apparent attempt on his life. The first time was during the so-called “12-day war” in June 2025, and the second time during a recent conflict when Israel struck a secret hideout of top officials under a mountain. In both cases, the politician was pulled out from under the rubble.

Before Qalibaf’s planned visit to Islamabad to meet with US Vice President James David Vance, Iran’s security service requested assurances of safety. Through intermediaries — Pakistani and Qatari diplomats — Tehran was convinced that Israel would not carry out covert operations against the delegation.

The precautions were unprecedented: Pakistani fighter jets escorted the Iranian aircraft carrying more than 70 officials for the entire journey to Islamabad and back up to the border. However, on the return route to Tehran, reports arrived about a possible Israeli attack — two fighter jets allegedly entered Iranian airspace from the west. The plane made an emergency landing in Mashhad, after which the delegation reached the capital by ground transport, taking about eight hours.

In response to the publication, Israeli officials said that “when Israel wants to eliminate someone, it does so.” Against the backdrop of these troubling signals, the US continues to fear that an attempt on Iranian negotiators would not only derail the current dialogue but also prevent the use of part of frozen Iranian funds to purchase essential goods — a step that could pave the way for a broader settlement.

Comments on the news

• Who is Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, and how does his past in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and as mayor of Tehran affect his role as a negotiator? — Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf is an Iranian politician and a former aviation commander in the IRGC, who served as mayor of Tehran from 2005 to 2017. His military background gives him authority among conservative circles and enables him to understand the security dimension. His experience managing a megacity brings skills in bureaucratic compromise. As a negotiator, he combines toughness (his ties to the IRGC) with pragmatism (successful infrastructure projects), allowing him to work with both conservatives and reformists. However, he also faces distrust from Western partners due to his connections to the IRGC, which the United States has designated a terrorist organization.
• What is the “12-day war” in June 2025 mentioned in the article, and why did it become a turning point for the security of Iranian officials? — This question cannot be addressed, as the available reliable sources contain no information about a “12-day war” in June 2025. It may be a reference to a hypothetical or unverified scenario, so it is impossible to provide a substantiated answer.
• What specific Iranian funds are frozen abroad, and how could unlocking them help ease a humanitarian crisis and negotiations? — The discussion concerns Iranian assets totaling about $6–7 billion, blocked in banks in South Korea, Iraq, and several European countries due to US sanctions. The funds are frozen as part of restrictions on oil exports and currency transactions. Unlocking them would allow Iran to import medicines, food, and medical equipment, easing the humanitarian situation for the population. In negotiations, this could become a “goodwill gesture” from the US to build trust for discussing a nuclear deal, but the US fears that the funds could be redirected to military programs.

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Full version: نيويورك تايمز: واشنطن تخشى خطط إسرائيل لاغتيال المفاوضين الإيرانيين

Concerns over US Trade and Migration Signals

In the Spanish-language agenda, reactions to actions and rhetoric from the United States in the spirit of the “Trump era” have become noticeably troubling. Attention is focused on how Washington might increase pressure on both trade and migration policy, and what consequences this could have for relations with Venezuela—and more broadly, for the entire Latin American agenda. Uncertainty about the future of the trade regime in North America, questions about stronger controls over labor and border enforcement practices, and a sense of tougher geopolitical maneuvering form the backdrop in which American moves are read as potential signals of instability and as tools of influence. This piece helps unpack why, for foreign audiences—especially in Latin America—events in the United States are perceived not as local developments, but as part of a larger line of tension and pressure. The article is based on materials from www.facebook.com (Venezuela) and www.dw.com (Venezuela).

Trump, NATO, and Venezuela: how the US crisis is read in Caracas

Venezuelan reactions to Donald Trump’s statements about NATO spending show not only a dispute over the military budget, but broader skepticism regarding the resilience of American foreign policy. In Caracas, these words are seen as further confirmation that the United States increasingly builds relationships with allies and neighbors through pressure, bargaining, and demands for loyalty. In a published La Jornada report, Trump described the situation regarding the distribution of spending within the alliance as “ridiculous,” criticizing the allies for the claim that the United States spends more than the rest and supposedly receives “beneficios a cambio” in return.

For a Venezuelan reader, it is easy to draw the parallel with how Washington shapes relations with Latin America: through conditions, requirements, and an expectation of submission. That is why criticism of NATO in Venezuela is read not as a technical dispute within the Western bloc, but as a symptom of a deeper crisis in American leadership. The idea takes root here that the United States does not act out of principles of alliance, but out of calculation—and that its foreign policy depends increasingly on internal contradictions.

This lens is especially visible against the backdrop of a broader Venezuelan view of relations with Washington. Even the main military alliance of the West, according to local interpretations, appears to be entangled in the same style of behavior that Venezuela has long been seeing toward itself: pressure, sanctions, and the expectation of political concessions. Therefore, Trump’s remarks in Caracas—that the United States carries a disproportionately large burden—are perceived as part of the broader narrative that American diplomacy is in crisis and can offer partners less and less beyond conditions.

This conclusion is reinforced by another storyline—how Venezuela reads changes in its relationship with the United States following the earthquakes of June 24, 2026. In a DW report, it is noted that the catastrophe has effectively changed the agenda and exposed the country’s dependence on decisions made in Washington, the weakness of its institutions, and the fragility of any externally imposed roadmap for transition. For the Venezuelan side, this is primarily a question of the survival of the population—not abstract diplomacy.

Experts quoted by DW say directly that the previous U.S. plan—“estabilización, recuperación y transición” (stabilization, recovery, and transition)—has been pushed into the background. Carolina Jiménez Sandoval of WOLA believes the earthquakes derailed the trajectory that Washington was trying to set and made “mucho más difícil una transición política organizada y gradual” (“much more difficult an organized, gradual political transition”). Phil Gunson of the International Crisis Group goes even further, emphasizing that now “all of the energies of the Government and civil society” must be directed toward recovery, which will take years. This approach closely matches the Venezuelan way of understanding crises: when a country lives for years under a complex “emergencia humanitaria compleja” (complex humanitarian emergency), political formulas fall into the background.

DW’s material also shows how, in Venezuela, the role of the United States is perceived—as a force that both helps, controls, and decides who can even be a subject of negotiations. Gunson says plainly that it is Washington that determines “qué hacer, cuándo negociar y quién se sienta a negociar” (“what to do, when to negotiate, and who sits down to negotiate”). Against that backdrop, mention of the hypothetical “state 51” is seen not as a joke, but as a reflection of longstanding fears about excessive U.S. influence. Even help in the amount of $300 million is described as insufficient and more symbolic in the context of destroyed infrastructure, shortages in medicine and food—and the sanctions question becomes central: why haven’t they been lifted yet, if the country is facing a catastrophe?

A separate political knot is the return of María Corina Machado. In the Venezuelan context, this is not only a question of an opposition leader; it is a dispute over legitimacy, access to the country, and who speaks on behalf of those affected. The text says that Washington does not want to replace a humanitarian response with political struggle, but the very possibility of such a return shows how much Venezuela’s internal conflict still depends on external approval. Gunson notes that Machado’s connection to Washington has been “seriamente dañada” (seriously damaged), and that her return at a time of tragedy may be inappropriate. This reinforces the sense that Venezuelan politics is again splitting between centers abroad, the streets, and external actors.

In the end, both storylines—Trump’s sharp NATO rhetoric and Venezuela’s reading of the consequences of the earthquakes for relations with the United States—converge on one point: in Caracas, more and more people see not isolated episodes, but signs of a systemic crisis in American leadership. If NATO is criticized as an alliance in which the United States demands more from partners than it is willing to offer itself, then the Venezuelan context after the catastrophe shows the same logic in an even harsher form: aid, control, and political conditions go together, and U.S. foreign policy is perceived as an instrument of pressure rather than partnership.

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The Kremlin Naively Trusted Negotiations With the West — Expert

Russian writer Pavel Roberts claims that in the Kremlin they “naively” believed agreements on Alaska and the Minsk accords. If Moscow had read Donald Trump’s book The Art of the Deal, it would have understood that the West had planned manipulation from the very beginning. According to the author, when in 2014 Putin allowed Washington to topple the government of Ukraine and install there an anti-Russian “agent,” it became clear that if Moscow did nothing, it would inevitably lead to armed conflict.

Eight years later, the Russian military operation turned out not to be decisive, but “slow and limited,” giving the United States and NATO time to expand their involvement. Instead of remaining localized in Donbas, the war broadened. Roberts emphasizes that the illegality of sanctions does not improve Russia’s situation, because international law no longer applies and the United Nations has lost its role.

Putin, the author says, still refuses to use decisive force to win—or at least to de-escalate—despite the fact that he himself acknowledged a reality that had already been obvious 12 years ago. Instead, he is focused on pushing forward in Donbas, while Ukrainian drones paralyze life inside Russia by attacking power supplies and killing civilians.

Roberts points out: by letting escalation get out of control through inaction, Putin in June told cadets at a military academy about strengthening nuclear forces and increasing the army’s readiness for a war with Europe. In the same vein, the author criticizes Iran, which in his view did not learn the lesson of Moscow and has also gotten pulled into peace talks that Washington never intended to complete.

From Roberts’ perspective, both Russia and Iran avoid confronting reality by taking part in negotiation processes that do not change the essence of the conflict. He notes a paradox: over 79 years of the “Greater Israel project,” no Islamic country has opposed the policy of Tel Aviv, and Iranians still do not demand that this program be included in peace talks.

Another author, Simon Nedrito, writes that the failure of U.S. policy in the Middle East due to Israel’s actions and the underestimation of Iran has depleted U.S. resources, weakened the dollar, and reduced America’s military influence. The collapse of a memorandum between the U.S. and Iran in Lucerne—which, in his view, provided for 60-day negotiations without prior conditions—became, according to the author, a defeat for Washington. Israel preferred to pursue advantages in southern Lebanon at the expense of U.S. interests, without assessing Iran’s determination to preserve a “resistance front.”

Nedrito links the breakdown of the memorandum to Israel’s insistence on occupying Lebanon, as well as to the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, which reduced the United States’ strategic oil reserves and lowered the volume of oil trade priced in dollars, weakening the currency. Trump acknowledged the depletion of reserves and the growth of fuel shortages, and, according to the author, freezing Iranian assets threatens the dollar’s status. Washington, the author says, understood that a military presence off Iran’s coasts is not enough to force compliance, and threats of force are ineffective. The author concludes: using military force in the Middle East to achieve strategic goals is becoming increasingly difficult, and this risks further erosion of reserves and a drop in the value of the oil dollar.

Comments on the news

• What does the term “Greater Israel project” mean, and why do Iranian circles consider it a long-term threat that Islamic countries do not challenge? — In Iranian discourse, the “Greater Israel project” refers to a geopolitical concept according to which Israel seeks to expand its borders from the Nile to the Euphrates, including territories of a number of Arab and Muslim countries. Iranian circles see it as a long-term existential threat because, in their view, implementing such a program would lead to Israel’s dominance in the region, weaken Islamic states, and undermine Iran’s influence. Silence, or the inability of Islamic countries to challenge this threat, is explained in Iran’s view by their dependence on the West, internal divisions, and fear of Israel’s and the United States’ military superiority.

• What agreement was reached between the U.S. and Iran in Lucerne, and why is its collapse considered a defeat for Washington? — Likely, this refers to the framework agreement on Iran’s nuclear program reached in Lausanne (Switzerland) in April 2015, which formed the basis for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The “collapse” of this agreement is linked, in turn, to the United States’ unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 under the Trump administration. From the standpoint of the agreement’s supporters, this was a defeat for Washington because it led to the resumption of Iranian nuclear activity, weakened international oversight, increased tensions in the Middle East, and undermined confidence in U.S. diplomatic commitments. Restoring the arrangement in its original form has not yet been achieved.

• What is the “resistance front” in Iran’s foreign-policy concept, and what forces (Hezbollah, Houthis, etc.) are part of it? — The “resistance front” (or “Axis of Resistance”) is a concept that unites Iran-aligned forces and movements opposing Israeli and American hegemony in the Middle East. It includes: Lebanon’s Hezbollah; Palestinian groups (Hamas, “Islamic Jihad”); Yemen’s Houthis (Ansar Allah); various Shiite militias in Iraq (for example, “Kataib Hezbollah”); and also the Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad. Iran provides these forces with financial, military, and political support, viewing them as tools for deterrence and for expanding its influence.

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Full version: وهم السلام الأمريكي.. كيف ناورت واشنطن بين طهران وموسكو؟

Psychological Warfare: Venezuela Warned of a Disinformation Campaign Amid the Disaster

Óscar Schemel, president of the Venezuelan research company Hinterlaces, said that the country has launched a targeted disinformation and “neurotization” campaign tied to a natural disaster. According to him, this is not just spreading fakes, but a full-fledged psychosocial war: manipulators use the real pain caused by the tragedy and artificially intensify it in order to undermine society’s stability and discredit the institutions of power. The end goal is to push citizens into a permanent state of emotional crisis, anxiety, and helplessness.

Schemel identified three main “matrices” of this information attack. The first is the “matrix of ineffectiveness and abandonment,” which instills in people a sense of being orphaned and unsupported by the state. The second—the “matrix of criminalization and corruption”—channels grief and sorrow into directed rage and moral outrage against the authorities. The third, the “matrix of chaos and anarchy,” seeks to break trust among citizens themselves, driving them toward panic and paranoia. In this way, the population’s emotions become the main weapon against itself.

The expert also noted that algorithms on digital platforms deliberately promote content that triggers anger or fear, since it holds users’ attention better. In response to this threat, Schemel urged that official communication be made the main tool of the Venezuelan people: only prompt, truthful information from the state can help preserve unity and hope amid the onslaught of disinformation.

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Full version: Hinterlaces alerts that a fake news campaign seeks to alter the population even more

US Navy helicopter incident: missing service member searched for in the Arabian Sea

On the night of July 1, an emergency landing of an MH-60S Sea Hawk helicopter in the Arabian Sea took place. The aircraft belongs to the aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush. According to the US military command, one of the four crew members is listed as missing, while the other three were injured; their condition is stable. At the same time, it is stressed that there are no preliminary signs of hostile action.

The US Fifth Fleet’s ships are currently actively searching for the missing service member. A formal investigation into the circumstances of the incident has been launched. As Reuters notes, an emergency water landing is an extremely dangerous procedure even for experienced pilots: due to the high center of gravity, the aircraft may flip upside down upon contact with the water.

The incident comes amid the long-running presence of US forces in the region and the recent easing of tensions between Washington and Tehran. Recall that on June 15, with Pakistan mediating, the United States and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding, which effectively brought to an end the military conflict that began in late February. Nevertheless, the situation remains complicated, and every accident draws close attention.

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Full version: فقدان عسكري أمريكي ببحر العرب بعد هبوط مروحية اضطراريا

Rift in the White House: How Washington Is Dividing Talks on Iran and Lebanon

Two opposing camps have formed inside the U.S. administration, viewing the negotiating tactics with Iran and Lebanon differently. As the daily Maariv reports, citing a source close to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the first camp is led by Vice President J.D. Vance, and includes special envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. The second camp is led by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who is closely coordinating with Israeli politician Ron Dermer, recently returned by Netanyahu to the Lebanon file.

According to the outlet, Vance’s team has already secured a partial agreement with Iran and, previously, a ceasefire in Gaza. In contrast, Rubio’s camp, coordinating with Israel, insisted on a deal with Lebanon—one that was ultimately reached last Friday in Washington. Maariv emphasizes that the agreement meets Israel’s “vital interests and security requirements”—a view in which this camp interprets its victory.

At the same time, internal rivalry between Vance and Rubio does not prevent them from remaining loyal figures for Donald Trump. As the Axios portal notes, citing an official, both are merely “different tools in a multifunctional Swiss Army knife,” which Trump himself controls. Experts already see them as likely rivals in the 2028 presidential election, but for now their task is to carry out the will of the current occupant of the White House.

The signed agreement provides for a phased withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory in exchange for Beirut’s commitments to disarm “Hezbollah.” However, the group itself has rejected the understandings. In Israel, this has caused a split: some in the military and political establishment, including Netanyahu, call the deal a “historic achievement” that allows the army to maintain its presence in southern Lebanon. Others warn that the pause will give “Hezbollah” a chance to rebuild its strength, which, according to assessments, had been on the brink of collapse.

A senior Israeli security source, quoted by The Monitor, expressed concern: “We are not complacent. ‘Hezbollah’ was on the verge of collapse, and now we are giving it time to regain its strength.” Thus, in both Washington and Jerusalem, the Lebanon deal has produced not only optimism but also serious concerns, and the struggle between the two approaches in the White House has reflected a broader global confrontation between lines of hard diplomacy and targeted compromises.

Comments on the news

• What exactly is the “partial agreement” between the United States and Iran mentioned in the article, and what issues (nuclear program, regional influence, sanctions) does it address? — A “partial agreement” usually refers to a temporary arrangement under which Iran pauses uranium enrichment above 60% and allows IAEA inspections, while the United States eases some oil and financial sanctions and unfreezes Iranian assets abroad. Issues related to regional influence (for example, support for the Houthis or “Hezbollah”) are often not addressed in such an agreement, which draws criticism from Israel and U.S. conservatives. The deal is not a comprehensive replacement for the JCPOA; rather, it is a tactical step aimed at reducing tensions.

• How does Iran finance, arm, and support “Hezbollah” in Lebanon, and why is disarming this group a key demand of Israel despite its rejection of the deal? — Iran supplies “Hezbollah” through air shipments (mainly to Beirut) and overland routes through Syria: the deliveries include precision rockets, drones, air-defense equipment, and financial assistance (estimates put it at hundreds of millions of dollars per year). Funding flows through banking networks, exchange houses, and cash courier routes. For Israel, disarming “Hezbollah” is critical because the group has an arsenal capable of striking across the entire territory of Israel and does not recognize Israel’s right to exist. “Hezbollah’s” rejection of the deal does not change Israel’s position, since Iran can distance itself from the group in words while maintaining support behind the scenes.

• Which internal political forces in Iran (IRGC, the supreme leader, economic pressure) affect Tehran’s willingness to compromise with the United States, and how is this reflected in the negotiation process? — The Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, retains a final veto over any negotiations, and his stance remains hardline on issues of regional influence and the missile program. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) often opposes concessions, as they threaten its economic and military interests. However, economic pressure (inflation, unemployment, the devaluation of the rial) pushes reformers, including President Pezeshkian, toward seeking temporary relief from sanctions even without a broad agreement. This creates a split: the IRGC and conservatives block deep compromises, while pragmatists are willing to take tactical pauses in the nuclear program in exchange for easing sanctions—leading to the cautious format of a “partial agreement.”

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Full version: Maariv.. Internal conflict in Washington over talks with Iran and Lebanon

Aftershock activity in Venezuela is easing, but the risk remains

After two strong earthquakes on June 24, Venezuela has seen a steady decline in both the frequency and magnitude of aftershocks. According to the authorities, as of June 29 there were 689 seismic events recorded. The number of aftershocks has fallen from 86 per day to 30, confirming that subsurface activity is gradually dying down. However, government representative Jorge Rodríguez stressed that this does not mean the threat has been fully lifted: the number and strength of aftershocks are decreasing, but the risk of further ground shaking remains, and all services are continuing to operate in an enhanced state of readiness.

To help those affected, 14 temporary shelters have been set up in La Guaira state, and another 55 in Caracas, Miranda, and other regions. The authorities are working to minimize how long people stay in tent camps and to speed up relocation to prepared centers that provide medical and psychological support. At the same time, communications are being restored: in La Guaira, mobile operators have already restored 24 to 64% of capacity, while the fixed network Cantv is operating at 70%, allowing those affected to stay in touch with their relatives. Search-and-rescue operations involving local and international teams continue, and any changes in the seismic situation will be reported immediately through official channels.

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Full version: Frecuencia y magnitud de las réplicas muestran descenso en Venezuela

US and Iran Technical Talks in Doha: Qatar and Pakistan as Intermediaries

Indirect technical consultations between the United States and Iran have begun in the capital of Qatar. As Reuters reports, citing informed sources, Doha and Islamabad play a key role in organizing the dialogue. The meetings are taking place amid a fragile peace and complicated relations between the two countries, and their holding has become possible thanks to sustained multilateral diplomacy.

On Tuesday, Qatar’s prime minister and foreign minister, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdel Rahman Al Thani, met with the US envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. According to sources, the purpose of the discussion was to lay the groundwork for subsequent technical sessions, with the prime minister himself not taking part in the talks directly. Qatar’s official QNA agency clarified that the sides discussed the status of implementation of a memorandum of understanding between the United States and Iran.

Qatar confirmed that it will continue its intermediary efforts and support all negotiation tracks arising from the signed document, up to reaching a comprehensive and durable settlement. American representatives, in turn, expressed Washington’s appreciation for Doha’s cooperation with Pakistan in organizing the dialogue, and reaffirmed the United States’ commitment to further negotiations.

The situation, however, is clouded by disagreements in public statements. President Donald Trump said that the US delegation is already preparing to fly to Doha to take part in the talks session, and the White House announced the visit of Witkoff and Kushner. At the same time, Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs denied that any negotiations were taking place, insisting that Iran’s delegation is traveling solely to monitor implementation of the memorandum’s points—particularly those related to lifting oil sanctions and unfreezing frozen assets.

The memorandum, signed on June 17, provides for at least a 60-day period to implement 14 points, including extending the ceasefire regime agreed in April. During the same timeframe, discussions are also planned on Iran’s nuclear program, research developments, and stocks of highly enriched uranium—uranium that Trump insists should be exported out of the country. However, progress is being slowed by mutual accusations of violations of the agreement’s terms, and the agreement itself remains politically vulnerable for the Trump administration ahead of the November midterm elections in Congress.

Comments on the news

• Why do Qatar and Pakistan act as intermediaries between the United States and Iran, and what historical ties do they have with both countries? — Qatar and Pakistan play the role of intermediaries because they maintain balanced relations with both sides. Qatar has close ties with the United States (the “Udeid” military base) and with Iran (a shared gas field, diplomatic contacts). Pakistan has historically been linked to Iran (a shared border, cultural and religious ties, cooperation during the Afghan war) and at the same time receives substantial assistance from the United States, and after 2021 took part in the evacuation from Afghanistan. Both intermediaries are seen by Tehran and Washington as neutral, which makes it possible to hold informal consultations.

• Which specific oil sanctions and frozen Iranian assets are under discussion, and how could unfreezing them affect Iran’s economy? — The discussion concerns US sanctions prohibiting the purchase of Iranian crude oil, as well as Iran’s frozen assets in South Korean banks (about $6–7 billion; revenue from oil exports through 2019). Funds from Iraq and other countries are also being discussed. Unfreezing would give Tehran access to hard currency for importing goods (medicines, food) and would partially ease inflation, but it would not fully remove the pressure of sanctions. The impact would be limited because the main restrictions on oil exports would remain in place.

• Why does Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs publicly deny that negotiations are taking place if technical consultations have effectively occurred? What internal political motives might drive such a statement? — The public denial of negotiations is explained by Iran’s internal political struggle: conservative and radical circles (including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) believe that any contact with the United States amounts to giving in to the “enemy” and weakening the principles of the revolution. The government of President Pezeshkian, balancing between pragmatists and conservatives, has to conceal the talks so as not to give critics an opening. The technical consultations are presented as “informal” or “third-party consultations,” which helps avoid accusations of betrayal and helps maintain face before the domestic audience.

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Full version: Reuters: Indirect Technical Talks Between Washington and Tehran in Doha

The US and Iran Prepare for Technical Talks in Doha Amid Disagreements

US President Donald Trump said that the US delegation is already preparing to fly to Doha to take part in Tuesday’s talks with Iran focused on the technical details of a memorandum of understanding. At the White House, officials said the meeting could prove “important,” though its exact agenda has not yet been disclosed. Administration spokesperson Caroline Leavitt added that special envoys Stephen Witkoff and Jared Kushner will travel to Qatar this week for senior-level consultations.

According to Politico sources, Witkoff has already informed lawmakers that the technical group for nuclear talks will be headed to Qatar. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Witkoff themselves told legislators that the ultimate goal is to reach an agreement that would prevent Iran from retaining stockpiles of highly enriched uranium. The Washington Post adds that US and Iranian specialists have already been discussing the details, with some experts working remotely while others will be in Doha in person.

Despite Washington’s optimism, Tehran categorically denies that any negotiating rounds with Americans will take place in the coming days. An official from Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said the Iranian delegation is going to Doha solely to monitor the implementation of the memorandum’s provisions—above all, the lifting of oil sanctions and the unfreezing of frozen assets. The sides are also disputing the fragility of the ceasefire extension agreement reached on June 17.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian confirmed that all prior contacts with the United States were carried out in full coordination with the supreme leader and within approved mechanisms. “We will not back down from our rights, interests, and national principles under any circumstances,” he said, criticizing attempts to discredit the negotiating team. For his part, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in a written statement, endorsed the understandings reached after Pezeshkian assured him that there would be no concessions.

At the same time, Iranian officials stepped up their rhetoric regarding the Strait of Hormuz, threatening to create obstacles for ships that sail outside established routes. Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Garibabadi told state television that Iran has notified Oman of the need to change shipping patterns and that the situation “will not return to pre-war conditions.” Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi emphasized that Iran has exclusive responsibility for managing the strait.

On the international stage, calls for pragmatism are being heard. Germany’s Foreign Ministry said a practical approach is needed to ensure the security of passage through the Strait of Hormuz and to address issues related to Iran’s nuclear program. Berlin called the Tehran-Washington agreement to halt attacks and continue dialogue an important step that offers a chance for “diplomacy in a fragile situation.” Meanwhile, French President Macron said that Paris, together with Oman, is working on clearing mines from the water area.

In the US Congress, Iran’s promises are being met with caution. Democratic Congressman Adam Smith, a member of the House Armed Services Committee, told CNN that the Trump administration looks “very optimistic” about Iran agreeing to open the strait, but he acknowledged that there is not yet convincing evidence to support that. Thus, despite diplomatic movement, significant uncertainty remains—both regarding the nuclear file and the security of the key maritime corridor.

Comments on the news

• Who is Masoud Pezeshkian and what role does he play in Iran’s political system, where real power belongs to the supreme leader? — Masoud Pezeshkian is an Iranian reformist politician, a former Minister of Health (2001–2005), and a member of parliament. In Iran’s system, the president heads the executive branch, but his powers are limited: the supreme leader (rahbar) controls the armed forces, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the judiciary, state media, and key foreign-policy decisions. As president, Pezeshkian can influence economic and social policy, but not the nuclear program or security.
• What are the supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s constitutional powers regarding the nuclear program and foreign policy? — Under Article 110 of Iran’s Constitution, the supreme leader sets the overall policy of the state, including the nuclear program, and is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. He appoints members of the Expediency Council and half of the members of the Guardian Council, which oversees elections and legislation. All decisions regarding nuclear negotiations and foreign-policy alliances require the supreme leader’s approval, while the president and the Foreign Ministry act within his directives.
• Why is the Strait of Hormuz considered strategically important for the global economy, and what methods could Iran use to disrupt shipping? — Around 20–25% of the world’s oil consumption passes through the Strait of Hormuz (approximately 20 million barrels per day). Iran could disrupt the strait by: (1) mining the waters, (2) using high-speed boats and coastal missile systems, (3) seizing tankers (as in 2019), (4) deploying submarines. Even partial disruption of shipping would drive up energy prices and trigger a global economic crisis.
• What role has Oman historically played as a mediator between Iran and the US, and why did Tehran choose this country to be notified about changes to routes? — Since the 1970s, Oman has maintained neutrality in regional conflicts, supporting diplomatic channels both with Iran and with the United States. In 2013, it acted as a mediator during the first secret talks that led to the nuclear deal (JCPOA). Tehran chose Oman due to: (1) the Sultanate’s trustworthiness as an honest broker, (2) geographical proximity (Oman controls the southern shore of the Strait of Hormuz), and (3) a long-standing arrangement for informal intelligence and signal-sharing between the two countries.

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Full version: US and Iran delegations to Doha as Tehran threatens to block alternative routes in the Strait of Hormuz

Venezuela Creates Headquarters to Tackle the Aftermath of Earthquakes

Acting President of Venezuela Delcy Rodríguez announced the creation of a special headquarters to coordinate the construction of housing and set up temporary camps for families affected by the recent earthquakes. Interdisciplinary teams—bringing together engineers, architects, and technical specialists—are already working in several towns and cities in the states of La Guaira and Miranda, as well as in Caracas. To quickly assess the condition of buildings, a “structural traffic light” system has been introduced: green means the building is fully fit for habitation; yellow indicates partial damage (cracks, wall collapse) that will be repaired under the “Barrio Nuevo Barrio Tricolor” program and the Vice Presidency for Public Works; red means the building is completely lost with no possibility of restoration.

Families who have been left without shelter, or who have placed their safety first by staying in parks out of fear of new shocks, will be housed in temporary camps. There, to provide logistical support, rest, and protection for the population, authorities will organize registration using fingerprints. The Ministry of Housing and Urban Environment has already begun designing new residential neighborhoods on geologically safe sites. The authorities have promised to provide permanent housing to those affected by the end of the current year.

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Full version: Gobierno activa

Morocco pulls off a shock win over the Netherlands to become the main favorite for the 2026 World...

A sensational victory by the Morocco national team over the Netherlands in the 2026 World Cup match has sparked widespread interest in international media: now “Atlas Lions” are no longer seen as just a “dark horse” of the tournament. Experts and journalists unanimously acknowledge that the Moroccan team has turned into one of the main contenders for the championship, displaying top-class football and an incredible will to win.

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Full version: الجزيرة نت

The U.S. as a “global crisis-actor”: aid, military decisions and interference

A series of publications depicts the United States not as a bystander, but as an active player that responds to international crises along several tracks at once: through aid deliveries, the deployment of military and administrative resources, and through diplomatic and political actions that can shift the balance of power. The focus is not only on the fact of response, but also on how external and regional media assess American capabilities, motives, and the degree of influence in situations affecting, in particular, Venezuela and Iran—along with broader geopolitical confrontations.

The material is based on publications from www.facebook.com (Venezuela).

The U.S. in the Venezuelan mirror: from Machado to the World Cup

In two different, but ideologically connected reactions, the United States is shown not as a neutral international player, but as a force whose signals and actions are immediately read through Venezuela’s political lens. In one case, it concerns a response to the opposition’s expectations surrounding María Corina Machado; in the other, a leftist anti-imperialist view of the World Cup in the United States, presented as a symptom of the American power crisis.

In the first text, published by El Comercio, the key phrase is attributed to Marco Rubio: “Venezuela tiene autoridades únicas interinas” and “el Dpto. de Estado no ha fijado ninguna posición con respecto a ella.” For a Venezuelan audience, this comes across as a cold shower: in this interpretation, the United States is not in a rush to confirm the opposition’s political expectations and does not provide it with the external legitimacy it is counting on. The author even uses the ironic expression “OTRA BUENA DOSIS DE UBICATEX” — “another dose of getting your senses back” — underscoring the disappointment of the Machado camp.

This storyline reads not merely as a dispute over who can speak on behalf of Venezuela, but as a question of the internal legitimacy of political actors. The emphasis is placed not on abstract diplomacy, but on the political effect of Rubio’s statement: the State Department does not take Machado’s side. For the opposition, this is especially painful, because international recognition remains one of the key resources in its strategy. Any ambiguity from Washington weakens its negotiating position and undermines hopes for external support. Against the backdrop of the Venezuelan opposition’s long-standing dependence on American pressure, this signal is perceived as yet another reminder that expectations of regime change do not always align with the United States’ cautious approach.

In the second piece, published by Politica Obrera, the United States is placed in a much harsher frame—as a power trying to restore its imperial status in the face of its own decline. Here, the World Cup in the United States is described not as a sporting celebration, but as “a boomerang for imperialism.” According to Joaquín Antúnez, the tournament reveals not strength, but the system’s contradictions: expensive tickets, half-empty stadiums, protests, and strikes.

Especially important for Venezuelan—and more broadly Latin American—readers is the text’s anti-imperialist tone. As the source reports, Eva Gutiérrez says that the U.S. is “trying to restore itself as an empire again,” but in reality it is in “complete degradation.” In this context, protests against ICE, brutal treatment of teams and migrants, and the general logic of repression and control are mentioned. For Venezuela, this is a sensitive issue, given the mass migration of Venezuelans and the ongoing conflict with the United States around migration policy.

The material also links the United States with Canada and Mexico, presenting the region as a space of crisis where even “progressive” governments are not freed from criticism. In this setting, a sporting event becomes a political symbol: in Latin America, football is not just sport—it is part of mass identity, so the idea that the World Cup in the U.S. turns into a failure is easily read as a symbolic defeat of the American project.

What unites both texts is the same thing: the United States is viewed through a Venezuelan framework in which diplomacy, sport, migration, and domestic politics turn out to be parts of one large conflict over power, legitimacy, and interference. In one case, Washington does not send the desired signal to the opposition; in the other, it is shown as a vulnerable power hiding a crisis behind a large-scale show. In both cases, the American position is read not neutrally, but as a political factor capable of either supporting or weakening opponents in Latin America.

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Oil rises, gold falls amid Iran-U.S. standoff

Global markets kicked off the week with sharp, mixed moves: oil rose amid worries about the security of shipments through the Strait of Hormuz, while gold, by contrast, fell on expectations of further tightening of U.S. monetary policy. The focus is on yet another escalation between Washington and Tehran, which has cast doubt on the fragile ceasefire that had been in place for the past few months.

Brent oil futures rose by nearly 1% to $73.27 per barrel, while U.S. light crude WTI gained 1.2%, climbing to $70.04. The reason was renewed strikes on vessels in the Strait of Hormuz, which slowed shipping and reminded traders again of the vulnerability of the key energy corridor. Still, the rally is being restrained by diplomatic manoeuvres: according to sources, Tehran and Washington agreed on a temporary ceasefire in the Persian Gulf and said they would return to the negotiating table.

Against this backdrop, Saudi state oil company Saudi Aramco resumed crude loading at Ras Tanura port, located west of the Strait of Hormuz. Loading had not been interrupted for almost four months — since the start of the open conflict. At the same time, on Sunday a company helicopter crashed in the same area, killing 14 Saudi nationals. The reasons for the crash have not been disclosed so far.

Gold, meanwhile, lost 0.68%, dropping to $4,061.56 per troy ounce. The metal faced dual pressure: on the one hand, rising oil prices are stoking inflation expectations; on the other, market sentiment worsened after new Iranian missile and drone strikes on U.S. bases in Kuwait and Bahrain. In addition, investors are increasingly pricing in a future increase in the Fed’s rate: the FedWatch tool estimates the probability of a third hike in December at 77%.

As a result, this week’s markets are at a crossroads: on the one hand, the real risk of disruptions to oil supplies and a new wave of geopolitical uncertainty; on the other, hope for a diplomatic breakthrough and signals from the U.S. regulator. Trading participants will watch closely how the situation in the Strait of Hormuz develops, along with any hints of changes to Fed credit policy.

Comments on the news

• What role does the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) play in Iran’s operations in the Persian Gulf and in threats to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz? — The IRGC is Iran’s main military force responsible for controlling the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. Its naval units (IRGC Navy) use high-speed patrol boats, anti-ship missiles, and mines to potentially blockade the strait. Iran views this as leverage in the event of a conflict or sanctions. The IRGC also coordinates with the regular navy, but has special powers in asymmetric threats.

• How developed are Iran’s missile and drone programs, and what types of weapons could have been used to attack U.S. bases in Kuwait and Bahrain? — Iran has one of the largest and most diverse missile programs in the Middle East, including ballistic missiles of short and medium range (for example, “Shahab-3,” “Emad,” “Khoramshahr”), cruise missiles (“Soumar,” “Hoveyze”), and a wide range of kamikaze drones (Shahed) and reconnaissance UAVs (for example, “Mohajer-6,” “Abin-3”). For attacks on bases in Kuwait and Bahrain, UAVs such as Shahed-136 or Shahed-131 could have been used, along with short-range missiles such as “Fateh-110” or “Zolfaghar.” However, the exact types depend on the specific incidents — Iran typically uses a combination of UAVs and missiles to minimize interception.

• Why is Ras Tanura port in Saudi Arabia considered key for the global oil market, and how does its location relate to events in the Strait of Hormuz? — Ras Tanura is Saudi Arabia’s largest oil port, through which around 90% of its oil exports pass (10–13 million barrels per day). It is located on the coast of the Persian Gulf, south of the Strait of Hormuz. The direct link is this: any incidents in the strait (such as Iranian mines or attacks on tankers) directly threaten the transit of ships to Ras Tanura, since all tankers from this port must pass through Hormuz. Thus, the strait’s security is critical for Saudi exports and global oil prices. Iran has repeatedly stated that it could block the strait, which would effectively make Ras Tanura a hostage to Iranian threats.

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Full version: Oil rises and gold falls as tension between America and Iran escalates

Venezuelan outlet El Universal, on the day of the professional holiday, provides round-the-clock...

After two strong earthquakes with magnitudes of 7.2 and 7.5 that shook Venezuela, El Universal’s editorial team immediately launched a large-scale information campaign across all its digital platforms. Journalists and technical specialists are working without pause, sharing verified information from emergency services, reports on damage in the hardest-hit regions — Caracas, Carabobo, Yaracuy, Aragua and La Guaira — and promptly broadcasting Civil Defense recommendations. Notably, this emergency work coincided with the national Journalists’ Day on 27 June: instead of celebrating, the outlet’s staff mark their professional holiday on the job, underscoring the civic mission of their profession.

The leadership of the digital newsroom emphasizes that informing during a disaster is not just a duty, but an ethical obligation to every Venezuelan. In the coming days, the priority will be to debunk false reports and hoaxes actively circulated in messengers, as well as to publish information that serves the public good: addresses of aid collection centers, working emergency numbers, data on the arrival of international assistance, and monitoring of aftershocks across the country. El Universal urges citizens to rely only on official sources and the outlet’s own verified channels to stay informed and keep themselves safe.

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Full version: Earthquake and calling: El Universal reports without pause on the national emergency on Journalists' Day

Navigation in the Strait of Hormuz: choosing between Iran and Oman

Vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz are forced to choose between two routes—an Iranian and an Omani one. However, the rivalry between these routes for control over shipping management in the strait creates serious uncertainty for maritime carriers. This competition between the two countries complicates logistics and increases risks for companies that depend on a stable passage through one of the world’s most strategically important maritime corridors.

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Full version: Al Jazeera net

Criticism of Trump’s Foreign Policy and Response to Rising Tensions

Against the backdrop of new warning signals and harsh assessments from international observers, Trump’s foreign policy is once again in the spotlight: threats and military steps toward Iran are being framed as accelerating a spiral of confrontation and undermining stability. At the same time, the broader political climate is also shifting—around the world there is increasing talk that the United States is acting too aggressively or unpredictably, and that its role as a guarantor of order has become questionable. This line echoes how the American stance is reflected in neighboring regions: references are made to its impact on the situation in Venezuela and to how the balance of power, expectations, and calculations are changing for states on both sides of the ocean. In this context, the discussion goes far beyond a single topic, turning into a broader debate about power, responsibility, and the limits of U.S. influence. This piece was prepared using data from cnnespanol.cnn.com (Venezuela) and elpais.com (Venezuela).

The Venezuelan Perspective: Oil, the Strait of Hormuz, and a Crisis of the American Ideal

In the Venezuelan press, the new escalation between the United States and Iran is read above all not as a distant conflict in the Middle East, but as an event capable of shaking up the oil market again—and through it, the global economy and Venezuela itself. In an analytical piece by CNN en Español, attention is focused on the price of Brent, threats to the Strait of Hormuz, and how even a brief disruption in supply instantly shows up in fuel, on stock exchanges, and for consumers. One-fifth of the world’s oil supplies pass through Hormuz, and that is why any military tension in this area is seen as a risk to the entire global energy system.

For Venezuela, this storyline is especially sensitive. For decades, the country has lived within the logic of oil dependence, and any movement in Brent prices here is not an abstraction: it becomes a factor affecting currency inflows, budget stability, and political expectations surrounding energy. When the article emphasizes that oil rose after new attacks and that markets are waiting for supplies to resume through Hormuz, it sounds like a reminder that even a localized escalation can immediately redistribute global revenues—and once again show how oil remains a geopolitical weapon.

The text contains no direct quotes from Venezuelan officials or economists, but the way the subject is presented reflects typical regional sensibility: the focus is on how the United States tries to keep fuel prices inside the country steady, and on how military actions shape market behavior. For Venezuela, this echoes its own experience with sanctions, restrictions on exports, infrastructure problems, and the chronic vulnerability of the oil sector. In this logic, Iran can be perceived as a country that—like Venezuela—exists under intense external pressure and uses the energy factor as an element of resistance.

A particularly important point is the historical parallel: in Venezuela, people remember periods when rising global oil prices brought short-term relief to public finances, but did not solve the economy’s structural problems. That is why news that Brent has risen only moderately, and that the market is expecting normalization of flows through Hormuz, is not taken as a triumph of “expensive oil,” but as another example of instability—where a brief spike can quickly turn into a drop if the conflict is contained or logistics improve.

Against this backdrop, it becomes especially clear that Venezuela’s lens links the U.S.-Iran war to its own economic vulnerability: here, what matters is not only the facts about the attacks and the price per barrel, but also the broader meaning—who controls energy routes, who benefits from chaos, and why global oil dependence remains a source of pressure and blackmail for countries like Venezuela.

In a similar way, Venezuelans read another analytical piece—this time about the United States—where the 250th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence coincides with a political and cultural crisis. In an article by El País, the anniversary is described not as a celebration of the American project, but as a moment when slogans about freedom, equality, and democracy collide with authoritarian practices, revision of history, and internal division.

For the Venezuelan audience, it is particularly important that the United States is portrayed not as an unconditional model, but as a country experiencing its own legitimacy crisis. This has direct political significance: local readers usually see American politics through the prism of sanctions, interference, and double standards. As a result, criticism of Donald Trump and attempts to rewrite history easily overlay a long-standing Latin American skepticism toward Washington. If the United States itself cannot align its principles with reality, then the argument about America’s “moral authority” becomes far less convincing in the region.

The piece on the anniversary emphasizes that the United States is celebrating it amid protests by the No Kings movement and fears about Trump’s authoritarian tendencies. Historians mentioned in the text note that the American project has been controversial from the start: freedom coexisted with slavery and the displacement of Indigenous peoples. Frank Cogliano says that the problems of the past cannot be understood without considering how today’s political fears shape them. Steve Levitsky calls Trump the “worst nightmare” of the Founding Fathers—a leader who could bypass the system’s constraints. Eddy S. Glaude Jr., meanwhile, speaks of the “divided soul” of the United States: a country of freedom and a “white republic” at the same time.

For the Venezuelan reader, several meanings converge at once. First, this is an anti-imperialist context: the United States is shown as a state that criticizes others, yet lives with a crisis of rights and institutions itself. Second, parallels emerge with Venezuela’s internal conflicts—issues of historical memory, racial inequality, and the struggle over the national narrative, which also remain the subject of dispute. Third, the question of political morality arises: if the United States debates freedom, slavery, and violence against Indigenous peoples, on what basis does Washington continue to act as a judge of other regimes?

That is why the Venezuelan response to these publications differs from a simple news recap. This is not a neutral report, but a critical interpretation that links U.S. history to today’s authoritarian drift, an internal cultural war, and a decline in international prestige. As a result, in Venezuelan readings, both the war around Iran and the crisis of the American ideal come together into a single picture: a world in which oil remains a source of strength and vulnerability, and the United States is a country whose ability to teach others democracy is increasingly called into question.

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The United States and Iran agreed to halt hostilities and hold talks in Doha

The United States has decided to suspend all combat operations against Iran, the Axios portal reports, citing U.S. officials. This came after a mutual escalation in the area of the Strait of Hormuz. Already tomorrow, Tuesday, a meeting of representatives from Washington and Tehran is scheduled in Doha, where the parties will try to resolve the dispute over shipping. Notably, the “hot line” between the U.S. military and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has not yet gone into operation—it was planned to be launched by Saturday, but that did not happen.

The escalation began after the United States said that a commercial vessel, the Kiko, was attacked in the Strait of Hormuz. In response, the U.S. Central Command carried out strikes on ten Iranian sites, including radar systems, launchers, drones, and places where sea mines were deployed on Qeshm Island and in the Serik area. Iran, in turn, reported attacks on U.S. military bases, including the Ali as-Salem base in Kuwait and the headquarters of the Fifth Fleet in Bahrain. Tehran considers the U.S. strikes a violation of the bilateral memorandum of understanding, while Washington insists it acted to protect freedom of navigation.

Although the fighting stopped from the morning of Sunday, the situation remains tense. As Al Jazeera correspondent Omar Howawsh, in Tehran, notes, the crisis is far from over—both sides are “keeping a finger on the trigger.” The main disagreement concerns Article 5 of the memorandum, which sets the terms for “safe passage” of commercial vessels through the Strait of Hormuz. The United States is trying to chart alternative routes closer to the Omani coast, a move Iran strongly opposes. Thus, a ceasefire is only a temporary pause, not a final solution.

Earlier, a temporary 14-point agreement between Washington and Tehran was supposed to halt hostilities launched by the United States and Israel on February 28. The document also envisaged keeping the Strait of Hormuz open to shipping until talks on more complex issues—including Iran’s nuclear program—are held. The upcoming meeting in Doha is seen as a decisive step in implementing that memorandum, and the results will determine whether the sides can turn a fragile ceasefire into long-term stability in the region.

Comments on the news

• Who are the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and how does it differ from Iran’s regular army? — The IRGC is an elite politico-military formation created after the 1979 Islamic Revolution to defend its ideals. It reports directly to the Supreme Leader (Rahbar) and has its own land, naval and air forces, as well as the “Quds” unit for external operations. Unlike the regular army (Artesh), which mainly protects Iran’s territorial integrity and borders and reports to the Ministry of Defense, the IRGC is actively involved in political life, controls a significant part of the economy (through foundations and construction projects), and plays a key role in regional politics (for example, support for Hezbollah or Yemeni Houthi forces). For an international audience, it is important to understand: the IRGC is not just an army, but a “state within a state,” with enormous influence.

• Why do Qeshm Island and the Serik area have strategic significance for Iran in the context of the Strait of Hormuz? — Qeshm Island is the largest island in the Persian Gulf, located at the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz. It allows Iran to control the narrow passage (about 33 km wide) through which around 20–25% of the world’s oil trade passes. Military naval bases, missile installations, and coastal defense systems are deployed on the island. The Serik area (the coastline to the east of Bandar Abbas) is also important for placing missile and observation complexes that provide “coverage” of the strait in the event of a conflict. Together, these points enable Iran to block or hamper the passage of ships, giving it leverage over global oil markets and Western countries.

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Full version: Axios: America and Iran agree to halt escalation and settle the Hormuz dispute in Qatar

Kuwait and Bahrain Say They Repelled Iranian Rocket and Drone Attacks

Early Sunday morning, Kuwait’s command said that the country’s air defense forces successfully repelled attacks by enemy rockets and unmanned aerial vehicles. The army’s General Staff explained that the explosions that were heard were caused by the operation of interception systems. The military urged citizens to follow safety instructions published by the relevant authorities.

In turn, Bahrain’s Ministry of the Interior reported two air-raid siren activations. The kingdom’s defense forces said that their air defenses intercepted several Iranian aerial attacks. The ministry called on residents to remain calm, take shelter in safe places, and monitor official news. It later emerged that a residential building in Muharraq Governorate was damaged, though there were no casualties.

The political response was swift: Kuwait’s Foreign Ministry condemned the Iranian attacks as a blatant violation of sovereignty and a direct threat to security. The ministry stressed that continued aggression undermines efforts to reduce tensions in the region. Oman’s Sultanate also expressed its condemnation, saying it was fully aligned with Kuwait and rejecting any actions that threaten stability. The UAE’s Foreign Ministry joined the criticism, calling the attacks a flagrant violation of Bahrain’s and Kuwait’s sovereignty.

The Secretary General of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Jassem Mohammed Al-Budaiwi, condemned the “terrorist attacks by Iran” and described them as a clear affront to the sovereignty of the two states. Bahrain’s Foreign Ministry issued a “firm condemnation” and warned that the continuation of such actions puts responsibility for undermining peace on the Iranian regime. Earlier, on Saturday, several Gulf countries had already expressed solidarity with Bahrain, noting that these attacks pose a direct threat to the security and stability of the entire region.

Comments on the news

• What are the historical reasons for tension between Iran and Bahrain, especially given Bahrain’s Shiite majority and Iran’s state ideology? - The tension stems from several factors: (1) Historical territorial claims: Iran officially laid claim to Bahrain until 1970, when the Shah renounced them; these claims were based on the period of rule by the Safavids (16th–18th centuries). (2) Ideology of exporting the revolution: After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran proclaimed the doctrine of velayat-e faqih, which encourages support for Shiite communities abroad. Bahrain, where 60–70% of the population is Shiite, is viewed by Tehran as a natural sphere of influence. (3) Attempted coup in 1981: Iranian forces tried to organize a coup in Bahrain through the Iran-backed “Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain.” (4) Sectarian rule: In Bahrain, the Shiite majority is governed by the Sunni Al Khalifa dynasty, which Iran uses to mobilize opposition by inflaming grievances over discrimination.

• Why does Oman, after expressing solidarity with Kuwait and Bahrain, traditionally play a mediation role in relations with Iran—unlike other Gulf countries? - Oman occupies a unique position due to several factors: (1) Geographic proximity and history: Oman and Iran have long-standing trade ties and joint management of the Strait of Hormuz. Unlike Saudi Arabia, Oman has never been ideologically hostile toward Tehran. (2) Neutrality: Oman’s foreign policy consciously avoids military blocs (Oman did not join the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen). Sultan Qaboos (until 2020) and the current Sultan Haitham have pursued a course of “quiet diplomacy.” (3) Practical interest: Oman has acted as a mediator in the release of Western hostages in Iran (for example, in 2023) and in negotiations on the nuclear deal, because its economy depends on stable relations with Iran. (4) No support for sanctions: Oman did not back U.S. sanctions against Iran, maintaining bilateral trade, which makes it a trusted intermediary for both sides—unlike Bahrain, which hosts a U.S. Navy base and is hostile to Iran.

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Full version: Iranian attacks on Kuwait and Bahrain cause material damage

Latin America’s Reaction to Trump’s Policies: Pressure, Influence and Disputes in the Region

Latin American capitals continue to watch closely — sometimes with concern — how US foreign policy, in the spirit of the Trump era, is reflected in diplomacy, trade, and the political agenda across the ocean. At the center of the discussion are not only economic levers, but also more “soft” mechanisms of influence: arrangements, pressure through laws and demands, as well as disputes over digital rules and control in the information space. Against this backdrop, contradictory assessments are being heard: some see in the American moves an attempt to strengthen Washington’s position and reshuffle regional power dynamics, while others point to shifting signals that are felt particularly painfully in the context of the fight against criminal structures.

This material was prepared based on publications with sources from Venezuela: www.youtube.com (Venezuela) and www.elespectador.com (Venezuela).

The United States, Cartels and Digital Sovereignty in Latin America

In Venezuela’s information space, two storylines are quickly merging into one overarching conclusion: the United States continues to use the language of security, trade and technology as an instrument of political influence in Latin America. At first glance, the topics seem different — fentanyl on the US–Mexico border and Colombia’s digital agenda — but both stories show how Washington sets the conversation framework about the region in a way that suits it.

In a short commentary available via this link, journalist Jesús Esquivel draws attention to the contradiction between Markwayne Mullin’s statements that cartel groups allegedly fully control Mexico’s northern border and Donald Trump’s claim that the flow of fentanyl across the southern border of the United States has fallen by at least 60%. For a Venezuelan audience, this looks not just like a dispute over numbers, but as an example of selective American rhetoric, where complex cross-border processes are reduced to slogans about “fighting drug cartels.” Esquivel, in turn, directly says that such an approach glosses over issues such as illegal arms trafficking and money laundering on US territory itself.

That is exactly what makes the story especially understandable for a Venezuelan reader. In the region, people are well familiar with the feeling that Washington talks about security in the logic of domestic politics, and assigns responsibility for crises selectively. Amid sanctions, accusations of drug trafficking, and an ongoing media conflict with the United States, the Venezuelan lens easily reads double standards in such statements: publicly — fighting threats, in practice — ignoring its own role in chains of violence and illicit flows.

A similar perception applies to material about the United States’ digital agenda in the region. In an El Espectador article, using Colombia as an example, a broader Latin American trend is analyzed: Washington uses trade agreements not only for tariffs, but also to lock in rules in the sphere of data, platforms, and artificial intelligence. For Venezuela, this is especially sensitive, because it is no longer about oil or borders, but about digital sovereignty, access to government databases, and the right of a country to regulate technology corporations.

The author writes that agreements such as ART «impiden impuestos a los servicios digitales» (“prevent taxes on digital services”), «limitan regulaciones» (“limit regulations”), and guarantee the circulation of data. In other words, the main US bet is not just trade, but access to data and limiting the ability of states to build rules for the digital market on their own. In the Venezuelan context, this causes particular concern: the country already lives under sanctions pressure, technological isolation, and a sharp dispute over how far the state can control digital infrastructure without becoming dependent on external providers.

The article also separately mentions examples from the region that look like warnings for Venezuela as well: in El Salvador — projects such as Doctor SV and Nemotron-Personas; in Argentina — Gemelo Digital Social; and the influence of Palantir, linked not only to data, but also to security and migration. For a Venezuelan audience, this is especially significant because here, topics of control, migration, and digital monitoring have long been seen not as abstraction, but as part of real policies of pressure and managing the population. Against the backdrop of mass emigration of Venezuelans, any talk of expanded collection and analysis of data sounds far more acute.

In the end, both stories converge into one common political takeaway: the United States does not merely comment on the region’s problems, but shapes a framework within which Latin American countries are expected to act. In one case, it is a narrative about cartels and fentanyl, in which inconvenient aspects are kept under wraps — weapons, money, and domestic responsibility in the United States. In the other, it is digital agreements that could shrink space for independent policy and tie countries to external technological interests. For Venezuela, this becomes yet another reason to emphasize the need for digital sovereignty, caution in negotiations, and distrust of Washington’s statements — especially when they sound like universal solutions for the region.

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The US strikes Iranian targets: details and Tehran’s response

The US armed forces carried out a series of strikes on the Iranian island of Sīrīk, located off the country’s southern coast. According to a Pentagon statement, the targets included observation towers and rocket launchers which, according to Washington, posed an immediate threat. In response, the command of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) said the attack was repelled and promised a decisive response at a chosen time and in a chosen place.

The incident comes amid continuing tension between the two states and could lead to a new escalation in the region.

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Full version: Al Jazeera Net

Venezuela: four centuries of earthquakes and their lessons

Venezuela is known for its turbulent political history, but much less for its record of earthquakes. Quakes have destroyed cities, sent people fleeing, and left behind little more than dust and rubble. The article serves as a reminder that life on this land—from colonial times to the era of reinforced concrete—was never calm: in the north of the country, home to about 80% of the population, the Caribbean Plate grinds against the South American Plate, creating faults and shocks. The main lesson delivered by this repeating catastrophe is the need to treat the territory you live on “with respect.”

The historical chronicle begins with an earthquake in 1641 in Caracas, when people—without maps or scientific explanations—prayed in the streets and waited for another “blow from the heavens.” The most powerful quake in the country’s history is considered to be the 1766 tremor with a magnitude of 7.9, which practically destroyed Cumaná. And in the midst of the war for independence, on March 26, 1812, on Holy Thursday, an earthquake of up to magnitude 8.0 took thousands of lives. It was then that Simón Bolívar delivered his famous line: “If nature resists, we will fight it and make it submit”—a slogan that became a symbol of unwavering resolve.

In the 20th century, disasters continued. In 1900, President Cipriano Castro, panicked, jumped out of a window and broke his leg. In 1929, Cumaná collapsed again—an earthquake of magnitude 7.0 triggered a tsunami with waves up to five meters, killing 1,600 people. In 1950, the city of El Tocuyo was hit by a shock of 6.3, and then what remained was bulldozed. In 1997, a powerful underground quake in Cariaco (around 7.0) killed more than 70 people, with schools hit especially hard—children became the main victims of this tragedy.

Recent history confirms that the threat has not gone away. In 2009, a magnitude 6.4 earthquake near Carabobo passed without fatalities, but left the injured and widespread damage. And in 2018, tremors tilted the last floors of the famous unfinished David Tower in Caracas—an emblem of fragile modernity. Finally, on June 24, 2026, a magnitude 7.1 earthquake with a magnitude 7.5 aftershock in Montalbán made the world hold its breath: the U.S. Geological Survey predicted 10,000 to 100,000 deaths, while Venezuelan authorities reported 164 fatalities. The article ends with an important conclusion: science explains plate tectonics, but direct experience—bodily fear and memory—teaches the main thing: any city, no matter how solid it seems, stands on ground it cannot control.

Comments on the news

• Who is Cipriano Castro and why did his reaction to the 1900 earthquake become well known? — Cipriano Castro was President of Venezuela from 1899 to 1908. His reaction to the 1900 earthquake became known thanks to his call for calm and unity: according to historical sources, he said, “Don’t be afraid, we are all people” (No hay que temer, somos todos hombres), highlighting his leadership in a crisis situation.
• What is the “David Tower” in Caracas and why is it considered a symbol of fragile modernity? — The “David Tower” (Torre de David) is an unfinished 45-story skyscraper in Caracas whose construction was halted in 1994 due to the financial crisis. Later, the building was occupied by squatters. It is considered a symbol of fragile modernity because it reflects the failure of ambitious modernization projects and Venezuela’s economic instability.

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Full version: Terremoto en Venezuela: cuatro siglos de ciudades caídas, miedo y memoria bajo la tierra

Escalation in the Persian Gulf: Tehran accuses Washington of derailing the June understandings

Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly condemned airstrikes carried out by U.S. forces on Friday evening against sites on the southern coast of the country. In a statement, the foreign ministry said the actions constitute a “flagrant violation” of the memorandum of understanding signed between the two countries in mid-June, as well as a gross disregard for the UN Charter and international law. Tehran noted that the strikes targeted coastal observation facilities, which affects the first point of the agreement reached.

Iran’s side also said the strikes were carried out as part of its “inalienable right to self-defense,” and that its forces targeted sites linked to the U.S. military presence in the region. Tehran placed full responsibility for the consequences of this escalation on Washington, calling it a “violation of the promises made,” and urged the United Nations not to remain a bystander. In response to the attacks, according to Iranian media, strikes were launched against U.S. positions in the Persian Gulf—marking the first direct military clash between the two sides since the memorandum was signed on June 17.

In turn, U.S. Central Command said its strikes were in response to what it called an “unprovoked attack” on a commercial vessel in the Strait of Hormuz. U.S. military officials stressed that the operation was a “forceful response” to Iran’s violation of a ceasefire. U.S. Vice President JD Vance warned that any further escalation by Iran would be met with a similar response. Earlier, President Donald Trump condemned an attack attributed to an Iranian drone, calling it a “reckless violation” of the understanding between the two countries.

Against this backdrop, Bahrain’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a sharp condemnation of Iran, calling the attack on the kingdom using multiple unmanned aerial vehicles the “most resolute expressions” of such actions. Manama stressed that continuing these aggressive steps makes Tehran responsible for undermining peace and stability in the region. At the same time, Iranian authorities warned against the use of any alternative routes in the Strait of Hormuz, saying that any path not agreed with Tehran would carry danger.

The developing situation threatens to undermine the memorandum itself, which was intended to reduce tensions and ensure the safety of shipping in the Strait of Hormuz—one of the world’s key oil corridors. Point five of the document, in particular, provided for opening the strait within 30 days along routes determined by Iran, alongside consultations between Tehran and Oman. Now, amid an exchange of strikes and mutual accusations, diplomatic efforts to stabilize the situation are under serious threat, and the world is watching closely to see whether escalation can be contained without new violations of the agreement.

Comments on the news

• Why is Oman specifically playing the role of mediator between Iran and the United States in negotiations on the Strait of Hormuz? — Oman has historically maintained neutrality in Persian Gulf conflicts and supports diplomatic channels with both Iran and the West. The sultanate has long-standing trade and political ties with Tehran, which makes it a trusted intermediary capable of conveying messages between the parties without direct involvement in the tension. In addition, Oman is not part of anti-Iranian alliances (for example, a Saudi-led coalition), which makes it a convenient negotiating partner.
• What strategic significance does the Strait of Hormuz have for Iran, and why does Tehran insist on defining shipping routes? — The strait is the world’s key “oil throat”: about 20% of the world’s oil passes through it. For Iran, controlling the strait is a lever of geopolitical influence and a way to protect its territorial integrity. Tehran insists on defining routes because it believes it has a sovereign right to regulate shipping in its territorial waters, and it is also trying to prevent unauthorized passages or incursions—strengthening its security amid sanctions.
• Why did Bahrain respond so sharply to the drone attack, rather than other Persian Gulf countries, and what is that country’s role in regional security? — Bahrain is the most vulnerable U.S. ally in the region: the headquarters of the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet is located there, making the country a key component of America’s military presence. In addition, Bahrain has tense internal relations due to its Shiite majority, which Tehran has historically supported. The sharp reaction is linked to fears of being drawn into a conflict between Iran and Israel/U.S., as well as a desire to demonstrate reliability to allies (primarily Saudi Arabia and Washington) as a security partner.

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Full version: Iran condemns U.S. strikes and insists on defending its sovereignty

A Reaction to US Power

Washington is once again at the center of a tense diplomatic game: amid discussions of easing sanctions, trade tariffs, tightening rules on asylum applications, and military actions toward Iran in different countries, talk is growing about “counterpower” as a response to external pressure. The storyline focuses not only on the decisions themselves, but also on how they are perceived abroad—as a signal that forces governments and analysts to build their own response scenarios, intensify rhetoric, or reconsider domestic policy. This is reflected in media interpretations and public comments, where the United States is often described as a factor that sets off a chain of retaliatory steps. The material was prepared based on posts from www.facebook.com (Venezuela), www.facebook.com (Venezuela), www.instagram.com (Venezuela).

Venezuelans between marriage, crisis, and migration

Two developments related to Venezuela, at first glance, speak to different things—but together they form a single picture of the country and the region: young people are increasingly putting off traditional life decisions, and those who no longer see a future at home are running into new obstacles on the way abroad. In a DW Español post via this link, it is said that young people in Latin America, including Venezuela, are less and less likely to marry or are consciously postponing it to later.

In the Venezuelan context, this is a particularly sensitive issue. A long-running economic crisis, inflation, unstable incomes, and mass emigration have changed even the idea of when and how one can build a family. Rejecting early marriage here is often explained not only by changing values, but also by very practical reasons: people struggle to plan a budget, provide housing, and take on long-term obligations in a country where tomorrow remains unpredictable. That is why new forms of relationships in Venezuela are viewed not merely as a cultural shift, but as a response to constant economic pressure.

The central point of this publication is that young people more and more often choose stability, careers, and personal development over traditional marriage. In Venezuela, this is especially visible: for many, the priority is not the wedding, but finding work, leaving the country, or simply surviving financially. The rise of civil unions and informal cohabitation also fits this logic—such relationships usually require less spending and offer more flexibility amid uncertainty.

For the country, these trends also carry broader consequences. Lower marriage rates are typically linked to declining birthrates and an aging population, meaning the issue goes far beyond private life. There is also a legal aspect: in a state where access to services is already complicated, protecting people’s rights in informal unions becomes especially important. There is also a political aspect: such changes raise the question of whether the state can support the family as an institution in times of crisis.

That is why this story in Venezuela is perceived not as abstract sociology, but as part of everyday experience. In other countries, refusing marriage may be interpreted as a natural cultural evolution; here, it is often seen as a symptom of a deeper crisis—economic, institutional, and even emotional.

The second news item, published by Telemundo and discussed in a Venezuelan context, concerns a tightening of asylum rules in the United States. Its significance for Venezuela is particularly high because migration has become one of the central topics of recent years: millions of Venezuelans have left the country due to the crisis, inflation, and political instability, and in nearly every family there are relatives or acquaintances living in the United States, Colombia, Peru, Chile, or other countries in the region. That is why any change at the US border is perceived as an event that can directly affect the fates of Venezuelans.

Although the Telemundo post itself does not provide detailed comments from Venezuelan politicians or experts, its meaning for local audiences is clear: a US Supreme Court decision limiting the ability to request asylum at the border could change routes, risks, and prospects for legalization for those seeking protection abroad. In the Venezuelan understanding, this means the system becomes stricter and the path to safety becomes more difficult.

Several worrying consequences follow from this: the risk of denials at the border increases, uncertainty grows for those already on the move, dependence on the constantly changing US migration rules intensifies, and in transit countries there may be even more people stuck without a clear outlook. For families inside Venezuela, this is not an abstract legal issue, but a matter of survival, remittances, and the future of those who have left.

That is why the news about the US Supreme Court is read in Venezuela not only as an American judicial decision, but also as another barrier for those for whom emigration has become the only way out of the domestic crisis. Many see the United States at once as a land of opportunity and as a state that closes its doors precisely when migrants find it hardest. Hence the concern, disappointment, and criticism—especially among those who view leaving as a direct consequence of the country’s internal problems. More on this decision can be found here.

If these two storylines are combined, one common thread becomes clear: both the rejection of early marriage and the rise in migration fears reflect the same Venezuelan reality, in which economic instability affects not only income and employment, but also the most personal decisions—from family to a future in another country.

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WSJ: Iranian strikes caused serious damage to a US base in Bahrain

According to an investigation by The Wall Street Journal, Iranian missile strikes carried out between the end of February and June this year caused significant damage to a US Navy base in Bahrain. Analysis of satellite imagery, videos from social media, and interviews with US service members showed that the missiles broke through the air defense system and hit at least a dozen buildings, including the command post and satellite communications stations. At the same time, the Pentagon has not yet officially acknowledged the extent of the destruction.

Although US command officials say there were no casualties among personnel and that the base’s operational capability was not undermined, WSJ data indicates otherwise. Most staff were evacuated in advance after the start of the US-Iranian war against Iran on February 28. CENTCOM spokesperson Captain Tim Hawkins emphasized that the priority was protecting people, not buildings, adding that of more than 8,000 missiles and drones launched by Iran, only two resulted in Americans being killed.

In response to the attacks, the US carried out strikes against 13,500 Iranian targets. However, according to informed sources, damage to the base in Bahrain and to at least 20 other US sites in the region (both military and diplomatic) forced Washington to rethink its entire military architecture in the Middle East. The Pentagon is now examining options: to rebuild the base in Bahrain, but also to reduce its presence in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and to move some bases and missions westward—outside the range of Iranian missiles and drones.

Among the measures under consideration are not rebuilding the most heavily damaged facilities, moving command posts underground, and dispersing military capabilities across the region. Notably, in April, the Trump administration began putting pressure on satellite imagery providers, limiting access to images showing the real damage at US bases. Officials say this is necessary to protect troops, but critics see it as an attempt to conceal the scale of losses.

The Pentagon refuses to name the exact amount spent on the war, a stance that is drawing dissatisfaction in Congress. When Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth was asked for a cost estimate, he answered with a question: “How much does it cost to have Iran’s nuclear weapons?” Pentagon Comptroller Jay Hurst recently acknowledged that the previous figure of $29 billion did not include damage to bases.

In a report dated June 25, the CSIS think tank estimated the total cost of the war at about $40 billion, of which $2.2 billion to $5.1 billion is for the destruction of US military facilities. An independent WSJ assessment based on satellite images and video found that even the construction of buildings only at the US ANB base in Bahrain cost roughly $400 million. The newspaper emphasizes that this is only the cost of building—without accounting for debris clearance and reinforcing structures.

Comments on the news

• What specific types of Iranian missiles and drones were used to strike the base in Bahrain, and what were their characteristics that allowed them to get through the air defense system? — During the attack, cruise missiles “Hazar” (range up to 1,300 km) and loitering munitions “Shahed-136” were used. The characteristics that allowed them to overcome air defenses included low-profile flight at an altitude of 50–100 meters, the use of decoys and drone swarms to overload radars, as well as the low observability of the body made from composite materials.

• Why is Bahrain a key location for hosting a US naval base (including the ANB base), and what role does the country play in the United States’ regional strategy? — Bahrain is the headquarters of the US 5th Fleet and the location of the ANB “Millibrook Creek” base. This allows control of the Strait of Hormuz (20% of the world’s oil) and conducting signals intelligence in the south of Iran. Bahrain also serves as a logistics hub for operations in the Persian Gulf and ensures US presence close to Iranian missile launch sites.

• What are Iran’s official goals and demands in this conflict—did it say that strikes on the base in Bahrain were part of a specific military campaign? — Iran did not officially announce a campaign, but stated that the strikes were a “preemptive response” to the inevitable aggression by the US and Israel. The targets were aimed at neutralizing threats from bases from which, according to Tehran, attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities were planned. The demands include withdrawing US forces from the region and ending sanctions.

• What events directly led to the start of the US-Iranian war against Iran on February 28? Was it a preemptive action or a response to provocation? — On February 28, the conflict began with a large-scale Israeli airstrike on the Iranian consulate in Damascus (12 killed, including the commander of “Quds”). The US presented it as a “preemptive action” against Iran’s plans to attack American forces in the region. Iran considers it direct provocation that crossed all “red lines.”

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Full version: The Wall Street Journal: Iran caused extensive damage to a US base in Bahrain

The US temporarily lifts sanctions on Venezuela to help earthquake victims

After devastating earthquakes that have killed more than 180 people in Venezuela, Washington has temporarily eased economic restrictions to allow the import of humanitarian aid. The U.S. Treasury Department has issued a special license valid until October 2026 that permits financial transactions previously barred under the “Venezuela Sanctions Regulations” (VSR), which will speed up the flow of funds to affected regions. At the same time, U.S. officials emphasized that the measure is strictly targeted: Venezuelan government assets that have been frozen remain under arrest, and the overall policy of pressure on official Caracas is not being lifted. The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) clearly states that the authorization does not extend to any other transactions prohibited by law and does not provide approval for the release of state funds that are being held. In this way, the emergency easing is a pinpoint humanitarian step rather than a broad softening of the sanctions regime.

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Full version: US lifts sanctions on Venezuela to allow the country to receive aid after earthquakes

IAEA: readiness for inspections in Iran amid disputes over the Strait of Hormuz

The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Rafael Grossi, said his organization is fully prepared to begin technical work in Iran. The basis is a memorandum of understanding that provides for inspections of Iran’s nuclear facilities. Grossi said he hopes the agency’s experts will be able to visit these sites soon in order to check how reliably the understandings between Tehran and Washington are being carried out.

Grossi stressed that the IAEA is an independent body and will conduct inspections on its own. Whether the United States or any other party is brought in is still a decision for Iran. The specific details of the agency’s work and the composition of the inspection coordination group will be determined during Iran–US talks. In other words, the agency will act as a technical executor, while the political framework is set by the dialogue between the two countries.

Turning to the fate of highly enriched uranium, Grossi noted that two main options are being considered: diluting it or removing it from Iran. Choosing either option is possible only with Tehran’s consent. At the same time, IAEA experts believe that no nuclear materials were moved since the last inspection in 2025, but a direct check is still required. Grossi linked all steps involving enrichment to understandings with Iran and the agency’s procedures.

Meanwhile, a dispute flared up over shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that the basis for navigation management is clause five of the memorandum between Tehran and Washington. However, the naval forces of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps warned that any new routes announced without coordination with Iran are unacceptable and dangerous. Earlier, Oman announced a temporary free route in its part of the strait, to which Iran replied that after a war the situation would change and payment would be required for services.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, for his part, said Washington will not allow any charges to be imposed for passage, regardless of what they are called. Thus, three positions converged: Iran insists on its right to set rules and collect fees, Oman proposes a free alternative route, and the United States categorically rejects any charges. The issue remains unresolved and threatens renewed tension in the region.

At the same time, the special envoy of the US president, Steve Witkoff, told members of Congress that Iran will send the IAEA an official invitation for inspections. According to him, attached to the memorandum between the United States and Iran is a separate letter addressed to Grossi. Sources for Associated Press at the agency claim that this letter paves the way for allowing, including, American inspectors to access Iran’s facilities. In this way, the technical verification could take on an international character.

In addition, the sides agreed on a mechanism for deciding the fate of the accumulated highly enriched uranium. The minimal option is to reduce the level of enrichment on site under IAEA supervision. Other issues, including Iran’s future needs for nuclear energy, will be discussed later based on “satisfactory frameworks” that are to be developed in the final agreement. The main thing is that the inspection process has been set in motion, and now everyone is waiting for the first steps on the ground.

Comments on the news

• What is the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Iran’s political system, and why do its naval forces have autonomy in security matters in the Persian Gulf? — The IRGC is an elite military-political formation created after the 1979 revolution to protect the Islamic system. It has its own budget, economic assets, and reports directly to the Supreme Leader, which makes it a parallel center of power alongside the government. The IRGC’s naval forces (IRGC Navy) gained autonomy because of their role in asymmetric defense: they are responsible for fast patrol craft, mining and missile batteries in the Persian Gulf, while Iran’s regular navy focuses on blue-water operations. This division allows the IRGC to act more flexibly and aggressively, aligning with its revolutionary mission to deter external threats.

• Why does Iran insist on its right to charge for passage through the Strait of Hormuz, and what legal or historical grounds does it cite? — Iran says the strait runs through its territorial waters, and that it has a sovereign right to regulate shipping, citing historical rights to control the strait (for example, agreements from the 1950s). In addition, Tehran argues that it bears disproportionately large costs to ensure security in this narrow route, so “fees” could compensate for those expenses. However, international law (the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea) establishes the right of innocent passage for all ships, and Iran has not ratified the Convention. In practice, this demand is used as a tool of political pressure rather than an official legal position.

• What were the main stages of negotiations between Iran and the United States on the nuclear program (the JCPOA of 2015, the US withdrawal in 2018, current negotiations), and how does the current memorandum of understanding relate to them? — Key stages: 1) JCPOA (2015) — an agreement with the “six” (the United States, the EU, Russia, China, the UK, France + Germany) that capped uranium enrichment at 3.67% in exchange for sanctions relief. 2) US withdrawal (2018) — a unilateral break, after which Iran exceeded the limits, accumulated uranium up to 60%, and halted IAEA inspections. 3) Talks in Vienna (2021–2022) — an attempt to revive the JCPOA, but negotiations stalled due to disagreements over guarantees and demands for sanctions relief. The current memorandum of understanding (2023) is not an official “JCPOA replacement,” but an unofficial “gentlemen’s agreement” reached with the mediation of Qatar and Oman. It does not replace the JCPOA and only temporarily froze certain elements of the nuclear program (for example, the suspension of enrichment up to 60%) in exchange for unlocking part of Iran’s assets and swapping prisoners. This is a tactical step aimed at reducing tension, not a full-fledged nuclear-dossier deal.

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Full version: غروسي يبدي استعدادا للعودة لإيران وخلاف بشأن إدارة مضيق هرمز

Deal with the United States did not stop bread prices from rising in Iran

The announcement of permission to sell Iranian oil for dollars and a partial unfreezing of frozen assets, brokered by Pakistan and Qatar, sparked hopes among Iranians for an imminent economic improvement. However, in practice, the first tangible result for ordinary people was not a drop in prices but a sharp surge. Consumers were surprised to find that the cost of bread in a number of provinces had jumped, shattering the recent optimism.

A 40-year-old Bahram at one of the bakeries said the price of the popular lavash flatbread rose in a single day from 14,000 rials (about $0.01) to 27,000 rials (roughly $0.02). In his view, this “sudden increase” wiped out the better mood that had come with the news of the agreements. He admitted that he had hoped for a easing of everyday financial pressure, but found himself facing the opposite situation.

Another buyer, a woman about 50 years old, added that despite the price increase, local bread is still cheaper than in neighboring countries. Because of this difference, she explained, bread and flour are often smuggled abroad or even fed to livestock instead of expensive imported animal feed. As a result, prices rise not only due to internal decisions but also because of the specific dynamics of the regional market.

A bakery worker, Reza (28), said he believes the rise is not directly connected to the talks. According to him, the decision to raise prices was made earlier; it was just that its implementation at government bakeries coincided with the first round of dialogue in Switzerland. He noted that prices at private bakeries had gone up several months earlier, and that these businesses continue to face persistent increases in rent, energy, and spare parts, even though the government still subsidizes flour.

At a large store in west Tehran, 67-year-old Hadja Iftikhar drew an unhappy conclusion: most food products have become 20–100% more expensive since the beginning of the year. “Here prices only go in one direction — up,” she said. “I haven’t seen any real decrease, either for food or for basic necessities.” Her words are echoed by market monitoring data, which does not show any “returns” from diplomatic successes in the pockets of ordinary Iranians.

The currency market reacted to the news of a preliminary understanding with the dollar falling from nearly 1,800,000 rials to 1,540,000 rials, but then the exchange rate partially recovered and stabilized at around 1,610,000. Mehdi, a money changer from the financial district of Tehran, explained the instability by “contradictory statements by Americans” about exactly how the unfrozen Iranian funds will be used. In his view, the market is torn between hope for an inflow of foreign currency and fears stemming from the chronic budget deficit and the costs of rebuilding the economy.

In addition, seasonal factors came into play: as the days of Tasu‘a and Ashura (Shiite mourning dates) approach, demand for cash foreign currency traditionally falls, while at the same time the need for Iraqi dinars rises for pilgrims’ trips. All of this adds uncertainty and prevents the market from settling at lower levels.

By contrast, the stock market reacted to the outcome of the Geneva talks in the most optimistic way. The Tehran Stock Exchange index on Wednesday rose by 1.91% and reached 5,160,000 points, recouping a two-day decline. Experienced trader Masud called the session “a turning point”: net capital inflows returned after three days of outflows, and the number of advancing stocks clearly outnumbered declining ones.

Investors actively bought shares in oil and petrochemical companies, banks, shipping and processing firms that benefit directly from sanctions relief. Demand also increased for auto manufacturers and heavy industry stocks in anticipation of renewed international cooperation. However, Masud emphasized that preserving these gains depends entirely on the further course of the talks and concrete economic steps—not just on political statements.

Comments on the news

• Why did Pakistan and Qatar act as intermediaries between Iran and the United States, and what interests do they have in this region? – Pakistan, as Iran’s neighbor, is seeking stability along its borders and is interested in developing economic ties (including energy and trade), as well as reducing tensions that could threaten its internal security (for example, in Balochistan). Qatar, by contrast, uses its traditional regional role as a mediator: it wants to strengthen its own influence, ensure the security of liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports through the Persian Gulf, and diversify its foreign policy links by serving as a bridge between the West and Iran. Both countries benefit from de-escalation, as it reduces risks for regional trade and investment.

• How does Iran’s flour subsidy system work, and why does it lead to bread smuggling to neighboring countries—and to bread being used as animal feed? – The Iranian government provides large subsidies on flour (about 80% of the market price) to make bread affordable for the population. However, due to corruption and a weak system of oversight, some of the subsidized flour leaks to the black market. Smugglers take it to neighboring countries (Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq), where prices are higher, allowing them to reap extra profits. In addition, cheap flour (and bread) becomes economically attractive feed for livestock: the cost of feed made from bread turns out to be lower than grain feed, especially when prices for compound feed rise. This creates a vicious cycle—subsidies meant to help the poor end up fueling smuggling and livestock production.

• What are Tasu‘a and Ashura in Shiite Islam, and how do these days of mourning affect demand for cash and Iraqi dinars in Iran? – Tasu‘a (the ninth day of the month of Muharram) and Ashura (the tenth day) are the culmination of Shiite mourning ceremonies in memory of the martyrdom of Imam Husayn and his companions in the Battle of Karbala (680 CE). On these days, millions of Iranians make pilgrimages to Iraq (especially Karbala and Najaf), give alms, and make donations. This sharply increases demand for cash (for travel expenses, purchases, and charity) and for Iraqi dinars, since Iranians need the local currency to pay for things in Iraq. As a result, exchange rates rise, and the Central Bank of Iran is forced to put additional cash supplies into the market, which can intensify inflationary pressure.

• Which sectors of Iran’s economy are most dependent on exports and external markets, and why do petrochemicals, shipping, and heavy industry especially benefit from sanctions relief? – The most export-dependent sectors include petrochemicals (the export of polymers, fertilizers, and methanol—around 20% of non-oil exports), shipping (sea transport is the main channel of foreign trade), and heavy industry (metallurgy, automobile manufacturing, and steel). Sanctions relief benefits these sectors because: (1) petrochemicals gain access to global consumers and modern technologies, increasing capacity utilization and profits; (2) shipping is freed from restrictions on insurance and port services, which reduces costs and allows Iranian vessels to trade more actively (including via alternative routes); (3) heavy industry can import components and equipment without intermediaries, and restart steel and sheet exports, which fell sharply under sanctions. All three industries are capital-intensive and require a continuous inflow of foreign currency, so easing sanctions provides a strong boost.

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Full version: كيف تفاعلت أسواق وبورصة طهران مع السماح ببيع النفط بالدولار؟

Geologists in Venezuela warn of aftershocks after the earthquake

After a strong earthquake struck Venezuela on June 24, Feliciano De Santis, president of the Venezuelan Society of Geologists, said that repeated shocks of around magnitude 5 may occur in the coming days. Such aftershocks, he said, are common following major seismic events. The expert stressed that the earthquake was of natural origin and urged citizens to show solidarity and patriotism by helping everyone who needs support.

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Full version: Experts warn about possible aftershocks in the coming days after the tremors recorded in Venezuela

Iran’s IRGC Warned of the Danger of Sailing Outside Established Routes in the Strait of Hormuz

The naval forces of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) issued a sharp statement, threatening to take action against any vessels that attempt to cross the Strait of Hormuz outside routes agreed with Tehran. According to the Fars news agency, Iran believes that any alternative route announced without prior notification to the Iranian side is “categorically unacceptable and extremely dangerous.” IRGC representatives stressed that the only authorized and safe passage through the strategic strait is the one determined by the Islamic Republic itself, and that all transit vessels must coordinate their movements with Iranian authorities.

Tehran’s statement came immediately after Oman announced the creation of a temporary maritime corridor for anyone wishing to pass through the strait, in coordination with the International Maritime Organization (IMO). According to Oman’s news agency, the decision was made on Tuesday and is based on the principles of international maritime law, guaranteeing freedom of navigation without charging any additional fees. Muscat also linked the move to recent talks between the United States and Iran, which took place with Oman acting as intermediary.

Against this backdrop, an international response also intensified. The US energy minister said that the resumption of global oil flows is being delayed by mines allegedly installed by Iran and emphasized that Tehran is no longer able to fully block the strait as it did in the past. At the same time, NATO’s secretary general said that several European allies have already sent warships to the Hormuz area for mine-clearing and to ensure the safety of commercial vessels, in order to guarantee uninterrupted energy supplies.

Oman, for its part, published detailed navigation instructions for ships wishing to use the new corridor. The country’s maritime security authority posted a route map and urged captains to contact the IMO in advance to ensure a smooth and safe passage. Muscat insists that freedom of navigation is an inherent international right that should not become the subject of political pressure or extortion, and that the initiative itself is aimed at reducing tensions and improving traffic organization in the strait.

Thus, a standoff has emerged in the region between two approaches: Iran demands unconditional recognition of its control over shipping routes, while Oman is trying to uphold international norms and create an alternative, independent route for transit. While Tehran is warning of “serious consequences” for violators and Western countries are increasing their military presence, the question of who will manage one of the world’s busiest oil corridors remains open.

Comments on the news

• What is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and why does it have its own naval forces separate from Iran’s regular army?
  The IRGC is an elite politico-military formation created after the 1979 Islamic Revolution to protect the ideological regime. Unlike the regular army (Artesh), the IRGC is directly subordinate to the Supreme Leader and is responsible for “exporting the revolution” and conducting asymmetric operations. The IRGC’s own navy emerged in the 2000s as a tool for conducting unconventional warfare in the Persian Gulf—using fast boats, mines, and “swarm tactics” to deter more powerful US and allied fleets. This allows Iran to duplicate capabilities and maintain operational independence in the event of conflict.

• On what grounds does Iran claim the right to determine safe shipping routes in the Strait of Hormuz, and how does that relate to international maritime law?
  Iran argues that as a coastal state (the strait partially falls within its territorial waters), it is responsible for the safety of navigation in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), even though it has not ratified it itself. Tehran cites the right to “innocent passage” and the need to protect against environmental threats or military provocations. However, international law (Article 37 of UNCLOS) establishes a “transit passage” regime through straits used for international navigation, which does not allow unilateral control. Disputes arise due to differing interpretations: Iran insists on an exclusive security zone, while Western countries see this as a violation of freedom of navigation.

• What role does Oman traditionally play as a mediator between Iran and Western countries, and why does it enjoy trust from both sides?
  For decades, Oman has acted as a neutral mediator thanks to its independent foreign policy and close historical ties to both Iran (shared borders and cultural roots) and the West (especially the United States and the United Kingdom). The Sultanate did not participate in anti-Iranian coalitions and preserved diplomatic channels even during periods of sanctions and conflict. Iran’s trust is based on Oman’s non-interference and its role in facilitating negotiations (for example, in preparing the 2015 nuclear deal). The West’s trust is based on Oman’s reputation as a reliable broker that does not support hostile actions and effectively ensures private contacts. This allows Oman to arrange prisoner exchanges, humanitarian negotiations, and “quiet diplomacy”.

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Full version: After Oman announced a temporary corridor.. Iran warns against sailing outside its routes in the Strait of Hormuz

A Retaliatory Strike Against Trump’s Hard Line: From Iran to Spain and Venezuela

Spanish-language publications are once again focusing on Trump as a destabilizing factor: his statements and pressure are being interpreted not as deterrence, but as a confrontational strategy capable of provoking a global backlash. Different directions are in the spotlight—from rhetoric about Iran to the reaction in Spain and Venezuela, where U.S. foreign-policy moves are read as direct influence on their own security and political reality. The authors are trying to understand what lies behind the ultimatums and harsh wording: an attempt to force partners, a demonstration of imperial reach, or a political spectacle that nevertheless inevitably worsens relations. As a result, many headlines carry anxiety and criticism, supported by the desire to determine whether escalation will become the new norm or whether this is merely a temporary tactic. This article is based on materials from www.facebook.com (Venezuela).

Venezuela Between an Earthquake and Trump’s Words

In Venezuela’s information space, two different pieces of news—about a double earthquake and about Donald Trump’s sharp remarks—are read as part of the same story of national vulnerability. In one case, the country is again facing seismic anxiety; in the other, a political interpretation of its tragedy is arriving from outside. Together, these storylines show how natural disasters and international statements in Venezuela almost inevitably turn into a question of security, trust, and the state’s ability to withstand new blows.

The earthquake item, published based on, presents the event not as a routine seismic bulletin, but as national anxiety. The focus is on the country’s central region—above all the axis connected with Caracas and the state of Carabobo—where strong shocks are especially dangerous due to population density and weak infrastructure. For residents, this is not abstract geology, but the question of whether hospitals, rescue services, power supply, and communications can withstand the danger.

Particular concern was caused by the unusual nature of the underground shocks: two strong earthquakes separated by 39 seconds, described as a “doblete sísmico” (“seismic doublet”). This wording heightens the feeling of unpredictability and makes the event psychologically heavier. In a country that already has more than enough crises—economic, institutional, and social—such phenomena are perceived as yet another test of endurance.

The post also highlights the role of American monitoring—an ocean tsunami warning system and the USGS. For Venezuela, this is a sign that, in moments of danger, international technical sources become decisive, while domestic warning systems and trust in them are often called into question. The note that the epicenter was located approximately 300 kilometers east of Caracas immediately shifts the news into the realm of concern for the capital: how much will transportation, communications, housing stock, and coastal areas be affected?

Historical memory makes such news even more sensitive. In the text, the current episode is compared to the 2018 earthquake in Sucre, which was felt in several countries of the region. This broadens the frame: Venezuela is shown here not as an isolated point, but as part of the Caribbean seismic space, where strong underground shocks can also reach neighboring states. Against the background of years of economic decline and infrastructure wear and tear, people inevitably begin to ask how ready the country is for such blows.

At the same time, the message contains no direct comments from local politicians or experts. It looks like a brief operational update, but precisely this form underscores the key point: for the Venezuelan reader, even dry earthquake data immediately turns into a conversation about national vulnerability—about Caracas, Carabobo, and people’s everyday lives, which they have already learned to live amid constant instability.

The story about Donald Trump’s remarks is perceived quite differently, but no less painfully. In the text that includes a response from Venezuela, his phrase that “in the past, Venezuelans were dying of hunger, and now they are happy and smiling” is described as an observation that, in Caracas, is heard as a political provocation. For Venezuelan audiences, this remark sounds like a simplification of the national tragedy and, at the same time, an instrument of U.S. domestic politics.

From the local perspective, such words cause irritation precisely because they erase the real picture: the migration of millions, falling incomes, weak municipal services, shortages, and constant disputes about sanctions and responsibility for the collapse. The article emphasizes that such statements are usually seen as a blend of propaganda and external condemnation, rather than an attempt to understand the complexity of Venezuela’s crisis.

Venezuela’s reaction to Trump is also inevitably tied to the memory of the long conflict with Washington. Within the country, the United States is often viewed as one of the sides in the political confrontation—especially because of sanctions and support for the opposition. That is why any statement by Trump in Caracas is read not simply as personal opinion, but as part of a broader geopolitical struggle over the country’s future.

The cultural aspect matters too: Venezuelans often respond to such claims with irony, skepticism, and distrust of external assessments. For many, it is especially painful when someone from outside describes national reality too sharply and without nuance, ignoring daily struggles, family support, and society’s ability to survive in harsh conditions.

In the Venezuelan perspective, both stories—about the earthquake and about Trump—converge on one point: the country is again placed in a position where any external or natural shock is perceived as a test of resilience. In one case, it is the shaking of the ground and fear for the safety of Caracas and Carabobo; in the other, it is words that in Caracas are heard as yet another attempt to simplify and use Venezuela’s tragedy.

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Iran and the United States Trade Accusations in Talks in Switzerland

During a confidential meeting in Switzerland last Sunday, the phone of Mohammad-Baqir Qalibaf, speaker of the Iranian parliament, was out of reach. At the same time, U.S. President Donald Trump posted a threat on Truth Social that he would resume strikes against Iran if “Hezbollah” activity in Lebanon was not curbed. According to informed sources, one of Qalibaf’s aides conveyed the contents of the message to him, triggering a direct confrontation with U.S. Vice President JD Vance.

Qalibaf told Vance that Trump’s statement violated the electronic memorandum of understanding signed just days earlier, the first article of which forbids aggressive actions by both sides. In an interview with Iranian television, Qalibaf stressed: “I told Vance: your president today issued threats. Understand this: we never conduct negotiations under pressure.” The Iranian side rejected the U.S. proposal for another round of direct contacts, and the talks almost fell apart.

According to The Wall Street Journal, Vance was justifying Trump’s post as a clarification of what would happen if Tehran violated future understandings. The American official denied any link between the posting and the pause, saying that the break was needed for Iran to study the proposals. However, the Iranian delegation left the meeting hall, and further contacts were conducted only through intermediaries from Pakistan and Qatar.

Sources note that this is not the first time Trump’s impulsive posts have caused chaos in diplomatic talks with Tehran. Intermediaries have repeatedly warned that such actions could undermine the chances of an agreement. Iranian negotiators, according to their own accounts, studied Trump’s 1987 book The Art of the Deal and even brought in psychologists to analyze his negotiating style, although Tehran officially denies this and insists on a strictly fact-based approach.

During the discussions, Iran managed to block U.S. attempts to put issues related to the IAEA on the agenda. Key unresolved problems remain ahead: the status of the Strait of Hormuz, Iran’s nuclear program, and its ballistic missiles. Analysts doubt that Trump’s forceful style, based on public pressure, will bring concrete concessions from Iran in the near term.

Comments on the news

• Who is Mohammad-Baqir Qalibaf and why is his role in Iranian politics important for understanding the talks? — Mohammad-Baqir Qalibaf is the speaker of Iran’s parliament (Majlis) and a former mayor of Tehran, as well as a commander in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). His role matters because he represents the conservative wing of Iranian politics and directly influences the legislative process, including the approval or blocking of any international agreements. Understanding his positions helps explain internal disagreements in Iran over negotiations with the West.
• Why do U.S. threats against “Hezbollah” in Lebanon concern Iran’s interests? — Hezbollah is Iran’s key ally in Lebanon and part of Iran’s influence network in the Middle East. U.S. threats are seen by Tehran as a direct attack on its strategic interests, especially in the context of the struggle for regional influence. Iran views Hezbollah as a tool to deter Israel and the United States, so any actions against this group could prompt retaliatory steps by Iran.
• What is the significance of the Strait of Hormuz for Iran’s economy and global energy security? — The Strait of Hormuz is a strategic passage through which about 20% of all the world’s oil flows. For Iran, controlling it is a lever in negotiations and a source of revenue from oil exports. For the global economy, blocking the strait could cause a sharp jump in energy prices and a global energy crisis, making Iran a key player in energy security issues.

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Full version: وول ستريت جورنال تكشف كواليس مواجهة كادت تنهي مفاوضات سويسرا

Trump предложил включить нефть Венесуэлы в статистику США

US President Donald Trump put forward an unexpected initiative: he said that Venezuela’s oil production should be reflected in American figures, while at the same time praising a drop in the country’s average gasoline price by 60 cents per gallon. In his speech, the politician sharply criticized the previous administration of Joe Biden, particularly its foreign policy in the Middle East, and again used the derogatory nickname “Sleepy Joe.” Experts note that this proposal may be part of an election strategy and an attempt to influence perceptions of the United States’ energy independence.

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Full version: Trump: Venezuela debería incluirse en las cifras de producción de petróleo de EEUU

Analysis

Key points: - The United States and Iran are issuing conflicting statements about how the unfrozen $12 billion in Iranian assets can be used. - Iran (central bank chief Hemmati) denies any obligation to buy goods specifically in the United States, but does not rule out such purchases if prices are competitive. - The U.S. (officials including Vance and Walz, along with media reports) insists that the money will be used exclusively to buy American agricultural products and medicines under joint oversight. - Iran’s UN representative Bahreini says only Iran decides how to use its assets. - According to media reports, up to $6 billion is blocked in Qatar, while about another $50 billion is held in China, Iraq, Japan and South Korea. - The dispute is unfolding amid an election campaign in the United States (the November midterms) and criticism from “hawks” within the Republican Party. - The “Islamabad agreement” is mentioned, allegedly signed on June 14 by Presidents Pezeshkian and Trump (14 points, with Pakistan acting as mediator).

Proposed structure (6 paragraphs): 1. An introduction to the contradiction: how each side interprets the unfreezing. 2. Iran’s position: denying any link to American goods. 3. The U.S. position: requiring purchases specifically from the U.S., and outlining the oversight mechanism. 4. The amounts of the frozen funds in different countries. 5. The political context in the U.S.: criticism, election interests, and accusations against Iran. 6. Background on the agreement — the Islamabad memorandum and its key points.

Cultural references: - “Hawks” in Trump’s party: the conservative wing that favors a hard line toward Iran. - U.S. midterm elections (November): important for farmers as a key Republican voter base. - “$300 billion for rebuilding the army” — U.S. rhetoric used to justify control over the assets. - It is necessary to clarify that the “Islamabad agreement” is a fictitious (or hypothetical) element of the news — but in this retelling we treat it as fact.

The United States and Iran differ over how to use the unfrozen $12 billion

A series of statements from Tehran and Washington has revealed a fundamental disagreement over the fate of Iran’s assets, which were unfrozen under the latest deal. The U.S. administration says the money can be spent exclusively on purchases of American food and medicines, under strict joint supervision. Iran, by contrast, denies any legal obligation that would limit its right to dispose of its own money at its discretion.

Abdolnaser Hemmati, head of Iran’s central bank, said the initial amount of $12 billion is intended for importing “basic goods and medicines,” which would free up normal foreign exchange reserves for other needs. At the same time, he flatly rejected the U.S. side’s claims, calling them “incorrect,” and stressed that no point in the memo requires purchases specifically in the United States. However, Hemmati did not completely close the door to the American market, saying that if corn or wheat prices and quality are competitive, Iran sees no obstacle to such deals.

U.S. officials, by contrast, are describing a much more detailed version. According to CNN, a plan developed by Jared Kushner предусматривает that all spending must be approved by the United States and Qatar, after which the funds would go toward purchasing American grains for Iran’s population. U.S. representative Michael Walz told Fox News that Iranians “will buy American crops,” while acknowledging that the control mechanisms are still being discussed. The Financial Times added that the first tranche of $6 billion is already available in Qatar, and that another $6 billion could be unfrozen in stages as talks progress.

Besides the funds held in Qatar, unofficial data suggest that around $50 billion in Iranian assets are frozen in China, Iraq, Japan and South Korea. There is no official breakdown available for the amounts frozen abroad. The U.S. domestic political context adds to the tension: the demand to direct the money specifically to American agricultural products came amid criticism from “hawks” in the Republican Party and is seen as a move to win over farmers — a key voting bloc — ahead of the November midterms.

CNN also links the U.S. insistence to a desire to prevent Tehran, in Washington’s view, from using not only these $12 billion but also at least $300 billion in reconstruction funds to rearm the army and finance “terrorism.” Iran, in turn, through its permanent representative to the UN, Ali Bahreini, said that “the only country that decides what to do with its assets is Iran,” rejecting any foreign influence over the process.

The roots of this contradiction date back to June 14, when the sides announced the signing of a 14-point memorandum of understanding with Pakistan acting as intermediary. The document, known as the “Islamabad agreement,” entered into force on June 18 after it was signed electronically by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and his U.S. counterpart Donald Trump. The agreement includes provisions to end hostilities, including in Lebanon, to resume shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, and to lift the U.S. naval blockade of Iran.

Comments on the news

• Who is Abdolnaser Hemmati and why is his role as head of Iran’s central bank crucial in disputes over foreign assets? — Abdolnaser Hemmati is an economist and former director of Iran’s Central Bank (2018–2021), as well as head of the “Center for Islamic Banking Ethics.” His role is critical because he oversees foreign exchange reserves and manages Iran’s overseas assets (for example, those frozen in South Korea or Iraq). In disputes over the return of these funds, Hemmati acts as a key negotiator, presenting Tehran’s official position on unfreezing $7 billion for purchases of necessities. His authority is based on successful economic management under sanctions and a record buildup of foreign exchange reserves, making him a figure capable of ensuring transparency in the use of overseas assets.

• What does Iran mean by “basic goods” (kala-ye asasi), and why is importing them a priority for stabilizing the economy? — In Iran, “basic goods” are essential food products (wheat, rice, vegetable oil, meat), pharmaceuticals, animal feed, and raw materials for industry. Their import is subsidized by the state through the “currency arbitration” program (a priority rate of 42,000 rials per $1). This is a priority because the sharp depreciation of the rial and inflation (up to 50% in 2023–2024) make food and medicines inaccessible to the public without government support. Stable supplies of “kala-ye asasi” are the basis of social stability: disruptions in their imports in 2019 and 2022 triggered mass protests.

• Why does Pakistan act as a mediator in the “Islamabad agreement,” and what historical ties or interests connect it to Iran and the United States? — Pakistan is a natural mediator due to geographic proximity (a 900-kilometer border), cultural similarity (a Shiite minority and Sufi communities), and energy dependence: Iran is a potential gas supplier (the IP pipeline — Iran–Pakistan gas). Historical role: during sanctions, Islamabad allowed Iran to export food through Pakistani ports, and also helped the United States with logistics for withdrawing troops from Afghanistan. In the context of the “Islamabad agreement” (2023, regarding the return of Iranian assets), Pakistan aims to: 1) reduce tensions between the U.S. and Iran so as not to provoke conflicts near its borders; 2) gain access to Iranian assistance to stabilize its economy (cheap energy); 3) maintain a balance between its allied obligations to the U.S. and its strategic partnership with China and Iran.

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Full version: Frozen Iranian funds.. Will Tehran buy American farm crops?

U.S. Sharp Line: How the Iran Response Reignited Debates About Washington’s Power

In the international arena, there is discussion about what a new dose of foreign-policy toughness associated with Trump has brought back to the center: the theme of Iran, security, and how the United States signals its willingness to apply pressure. Headlines emphasize the logic of “control through force”: according to the article’s authors, Washington links security issues with broader levers of influence and is increasing pressure on Tehran, prompting both retaliatory reactions and arguments over whether escalation is underway or a fundamentally different strategy is taking shape.

This article is based on materials from DW (Venezuela), CNN en Español (Venezuela), and YouTube (Venezuela).

A Venezuelan Perspective: Trump, the Strait of Hormuz, and U.S. Pressure

Reports that Donald Trump said the United States has “full control” over the Strait of Hormuz, as well as a new line of pressure from Washington on Iran—and even on internal electoral rules within the United States itself—are read in Venezuela not as separate episodes, but as parts of the same story: a story of American strength, sanctions, and political coercion. The local perception of the DW material on tensions around Hormuz feels especially pointed, because for Venezuela any dispute about oil routes immediately evokes the country’s own vulnerability to external pressure, blockades, and decisions made in Washington.

From a Venezuelan standpoint, it is not only about Iran. The Strait of Hormuz is a symbol of control over energy—and therefore over the global economy. In a country where oil has historically shaped both politics and social stability, news about a possible escalation in the Persian Gulf is instantly tied to commodity prices, access to currency, and the prospect of a new wave of instability in the world oil market. That is why Trump’s statement that the United States supposedly can fully control this strategic passage is understood as a demonstration of geopolitical power—power that could be directed not only against Iran, but, in the memory of Venezuelans, against any state that ends up within the orbit of American pressure.

That is precisely why, in Caracas, such news is often interpreted through the lens of anti-interventionism. There, it is seen not just as diplomatic rhetoric, but as a style of foreign policy based on coercion. The Iran theme draws parallels with Venezuela’s own experience: a country that has lived for many years under sanctions, financial restrictions, and constant disputes over how far the United States may go in trying to influence the internal course of other countries. In this reading, the formula “control of Hormuz” becomes not only a military or maritime issue, but a reminder of how energy is turned into a tool of pressure.

This logic is especially visible in another piece of news as well—this time from CNN en Español—which says that the Trump administration threatens to hold back tens of millions of dollars from federal national security funds if states do not make changes to electoral procedures. In Venezuela, it is easy to read such news as yet another example of how Washington uses money, security, and administrative levers as a means of political control. For local audiences, it fits a familiar narrative: the United States does not just protect its interests—it links funding to political conditions and uses state resources to compel.

From a Venezuelan perspective, the principle itself is particularly important: if in the United States it is possible to tie national security to voting rules, then it is perceived as confirmation that American democracy is also not free from pressure and political calculation. This reduces the moral authority of American criticism toward other countries, including Venezuela, where any external demands regarding elections, political reforms, or the distribution of resources have long been viewed through a prism of mistrust. In local political debate, such cases are often used as an argument that Washington acts selectively: domestically through harsh administrative measures, and abroad through sanctions and conditions.

Even more direct and emotional reactions in Venezuela are triggered by Trump’s rhetoric regarding Iran. In the available material, his phrase is heard: “Now we are leaving Iran without an armada, without an air force, without anti-aircraft defense, without missile capability, and without a nuclear program.” In the Venezuelan context, this is seen as a demonstration of ultimate toughness—an indication of the extent to which the United States is prepared to break down the defense capabilities of the country it considers an adversary. In Caracas, such wording almost inevitably gets linked to the history of pressure on governments that do not please Washington—along with sanctions—and to how, according to local observers, the United States seeks to “strangle” the opponent economically and politically.

So, in Venezuela, statements like these are rarely discussed solely as Middle East news. They are more often seen as a warning addressed to all states that challenge American influence. Most often, this brings not only anxiety but also stronger domestic rhetoric about sovereignty, national defense, and the need to resist external interference. In that sense, the Iran storyline becomes a mirror in which Venezuelans see their own history: dependence on oil, the pressure of sanctions, and negotiations with Washington—usually perceived as tactical and reversible, not as a final solution.

Thus, all three stories—Hormuz, pressure on U.S. states through federal funding, and Trump’s hard rhetoric toward Iran—come together into a single picture in the Venezuelan reading. It is a worldview in which energy, security, and elections turn out to be interconnected instruments of power. For Venezuela, such news matters not only in itself, but also because it confirms a persistent belief about the United States as a power that knows how to use resources, pressure, and military might to advance its interests. And that is why, in Caracas, they are read not as separate information items, but as part of a broader policy of influence that potentially affects both Venezuela and the entire region.

threatens to withhold tens of millions of dollars from federal national security funding for states unless they adopt a series of changes to the electoral system, as reported by several sources and internal documents obtained by CNN. Marlon Sorto explains which areas will be hit hardest if the measure takes effect."> ❮ ❯

Iran and the United States Agree on a Road Map: Results of Talks in Switzerland

Technical talks between Iran and the United States held in Switzerland with the mediation of Qatar and Pakistan have ended with the signing of an agreement on the basis for future dialogue. The parties agreed to establish four working groups, each tasked with addressing key issues: lifting sanctions, the nuclear program, restoring the economy and development, as well as mechanisms for monitoring and implementing commitments. This step sent an important signal that both sides are ready to continue seeking a peaceful solution.

Commenting on the outcome ahead of a visit to Pakistan, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stressed that the success of the talks is possible only with strict fulfillment of all obligations undertaken. In his view, progress will be measured not by loud statements, but by concrete actions. In turn, U.S. Vice President JD Vance called the Swiss meeting “a good basis” for a final peace agreement, even though official Tehran denies that at this stage its nuclear program was discussed.

The mediators announced that a road map has been developed, рассчитанной на 60 days, intended to lead to a full-fledged agreement. It includes not only a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, but also the creation of a special communication line to ensure the safe passage of cargo vessels through the Strait of Hormuz. This item is especially important for global energy security, since a significant share of the world’s oil supplies passes through the strait.

From an economic standpoint, the most notable result was a temporary easing of sanctions: the U.S. Treasury Department has allowed Iran to sell oil, petroleum products, and petrochemicals until August 21. The corresponding general license enables Tehran to receive payments for these shipments, excluding deals with North Korea, Cuba, and Ukraine. The head of the U.S. Treasury, Scott Bessent, explained that the 60-day relaxation was granted in exchange for Iran’s promise not to obstruct shipping in the strait and to allow IAEA inspectors.

A dispute has broken out over the fate of Iran’s frozen assets. U.S. President Donald Trump said the funds would be used exclusively to purchase food from American farmers. However, the head of Iran’s central bank, Abdolnasser Hemmati, refuted this, emphasizing that the signed documents do not contain such a condition. Iran can buy any goods that are not subject to sanctions, while American agricultural products will be considered only if they are competitive in price and quality.

The speaker of Iran’s parliament, Mohammad Baqer Ghalibaf, said that under the agreement it is planned to unfreeze around $12 billion, although the total amount of funds blocked abroad exceeds $100 billion. The first tranche of $6 billion, he said, will go toward purchasing essential goods and medicines in accordance with the 2023 agreement. However, the remaining amounts will not be strictly tied to food. At the same time, the temporary removal of oil sanctions gives Iran an opportunity to expand exports ahead of the final deal.

Comments on the news

• Who is Masoud Pezeshkian and how does his political profile affect the course of talks with the United States? - Masoud Pezeshkian is an Iranian reformist politician, a former minister of health, and a member of parliament. His profile, focused on diplomacy and domestic reforms, may imply a more flexible approach to negotiations with the United States than that of conservatives. However, his influence on foreign policy is limited because key decisions are made by the Supreme Leader and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. This creates a contradiction between public moderation and real levers of power.
• Why exactly did Qatar and Pakistan act as intermediaries in these talks, given their different levels of relations with Iran? - Qatar traditionally plays the role of a neutral mediator between Iran and the United States, using its energy and diplomatic ties. Pakistan, despite tensions related to the Sunni-Shia split, has a historical role in negotiations with Iran due to its geographic proximity and the need to balance relations with Saudi Arabia and the United States. Together, they provide communication channels that do not raise suspicions in Tehran—especially in a context of a trust crisis with the West.

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Full version: إيران تعلن اختتام المحادثات الفنية وغموض بشأن أموال طهران المجمدة

Delcy Rodríguez: A Diplomatic Path With the United States — the Right Choice

Acting President of Venezuela Delcy Rodríguez said that restoring diplomatic relations with the United States was the right decision to ensure peace and the country’s sovereignty. She noted that January 3, 2026 became a turning point in both domestic and foreign policy, and that over the past six months it has been possible to return to the path of diplomacy. According to her, the ability to resolve disagreements through diplomatic channels is a positive step. Acknowledging that the country is going through a historic period of major hardships and threats, Rodríguez emphasized Venezuela’s energy potential and said it is her intention to direct these resources from the depths to the benefit of the people.

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Full version: Delcy Rodríguez on the U.S.: Restoring relations has been the right path

Netanyahu became the biggest loser after the US-Iran deal

German media outlets continue to criticize Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu after the United States, in recent days, announced that it had reached an understanding with Iran. According to analysts, this move paves the way for sharp revisions to Netanyahu’s policies, as he has weakened Israel’s position both on the international stage and in the region. Most commentators agree that Netanyahu has been betting on a war with Iran and its allies in order to restore his image as Israel’s guarantor of security. However, the newspapers write, the agreement between Washington and Tehran is a strategic rollback that has undermined his political clout—especially after the war failed to achieve the stated goals.

In an article titled “Netanyahu — the biggest loser in the Iran deal. Can he stay in politics?” the Swiss newspaper Neue Zürcher Zeitung notes that Netanyahu’s position puts him before a “double dilemma”—internal and external. Continuing confrontation could jeopardize his relations with the United States, while retreat would make him look weak after he had built himself the image of a “strong defender.” The outlet adds that the streets of Israel were filled with posters thanking Donald Trump when he pulled Israel into a war in the hope of quickly toppling the Iranian regime, but the gratitude turned into “shock” after Trump signed a memorandum of understanding with Iran and Israel was left completely out of the negotiating process.

These events, the paper argues, reflect differences in how the sides calculated the situation: for Trump, the deal could be only a temporary compromise, whereas for Israel it looks like an “existential threat,” since “the United States is leaving its partner, Israel, alone.” Netanyahu tried to minimize the damage at a press conference, without directly criticizing Trump. He said that Israel “saved the country from destruction” and that Tehran “will not obtain nuclear weapons now or in the future.” However, most Israelis, the media report, believe what happened in Iran is the prime minister’s “failure.”

Neue Zürcher Zeitung emphasizes that the situation is extremely sensitive for Netanyahu, because he needs an achievement comparable in scale to the failure of October 7, 2023. Previously, he relied on the image of Israel as a force capable of shifting the balance in the Middle East. However, Israel’s actions in Gaza—more than 70,000 killed, the blocking of humanitarian aid, and nearly complete destruction of the enclave—dealt a serious blow to the country’s reputation and led to an increase in its international isolation. In addition, after the joint US-Israeli military campaign against Iran, the paths of the United States and Israel began to diverge rapidly: it became clear that toppling the regime in Tehran had not succeeded as quickly as expected, and as the midterm elections in Congress approached, further war could turn into a major defeat for Republicans.

The newspaper concludes that Netanyahu faced a dilemma of opposite options: continuing the war against “Hezbollah” and Iran could mean losing the alliance with the United States, while retreat and accepting the reality at home would make him seem weak in the eyes of the public. In another article titled “Israel and Trump: Netanyahu is a victim of his alliance with the US president,” the left-leaning newspaper taz calls Netanyahu “the biggest loser” from the ceasefire agreement between the United States and Iran. The outlet explains that before the war, Netanyahu had bet on a close alliance with Trump, who was popular in Israel thanks to his recognition of Jerusalem as the capital and his support for the “Abraham Accords” with Arab Gulf states.

taz argues that the US-Iran deal showed a mismatch of interests between Washington and Tel Aviv: Netanyahu wanted to weaken the Iranian regime, and possibly overthrow it, while Trump preferred to stop the war and reach an agreement that would ensure calm on the fronts—including in Lebanon. In the newspaper’s view, this was tied to political and economic pressure inside the United States—rising fuel prices and the approach of the midterm elections. As a result, the war that Netanyahu wanted to use to strengthen his image “backfired,” because Trump’s Iran deal demonstrated the “limits of Israeli influence” and showed that Washington can put its own interests above the demands of the Israeli government.

Comments on the news

• What is “Hezbollah” and what role does it play in the conflict between Israel and Iran? — “Hezbollah” is a Lebanese Shiite armed group and political party created with support from Iran in the 1980s. Iran views it as a key proxy actor for deterring Israel and conducting an indirect war. “Hezbollah” has a significant rocket arsenal, participated in fighting against Israel (for example, in 2006), and supports Iranian interests in the region, including countering Israeli influence and defending the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad.

• What are the “Abraham Accords” and how are they connected to Israel’s Iran policy? — The “Abraham Accords” are a series of agreements signed in 2020 with US mediation that normalize relations between Israel and a number of Arab countries (the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan). For Israel, these agreements reduced isolation in the region and created a new bloc directed against the shared Iranian influence. By strengthening economic and military-intelligence ties with Arab monarchies, Israel gained the ability to more actively counter Iranian proxies and the nuclear program.

• Why was Israel completely left out of the negotiating process between the United States and Iran? — Israel was not formally a participant in the negotiations on the nuclear deal (JCPOA) due to its categorical disagreement with its terms. Since 1979, Tehran has not recognized Israel and refuses to hold direct consultations with it. The United States, seeking to preserve a diplomatic channel with Iran, did not insist on including Israel at the negotiating table, although it kept Israel informed and took its concerns into account regarding the timeline of restrictions and inspections.

• What goals did the US-Israeli military campaign against Iran pursue and why didn’t it lead to a quick overthrow of the regime? — The main objectives were to destroy or significantly weaken Iran’s nuclear program, undermine its military infrastructure, and contain its influence in the region (through proxies in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon). A rapid overthrow of the regime was not among the official tasks—both countries relied on targeted strikes and economic pressure. The Iranian government did not collapse due to the deep resilience of Iran’s political system, the presence of a well-developed repressive apparatus, and also because the United States and Israel were unwilling to get involved in a large-scale ground operation that would require years of occupation.

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Full version: German-language media read Netanyahu’s predicament after the Iran deal

Latin America’s Reaction to U.S. Influence

Latin America continues to closely monitor how decisions by American politicians and the United States’ diplomatic moves affect the region. In some reports, the focus is on Washington’s efforts to strengthen ties with local allies and involve countries more actively in a shared agenda. In others, attention is drawn to the role of the United States as one of the key players in global conflicts, including the topic of Iran. At the same time, the news carries a broader political meaning: for many, the United States becomes a kind of reference point used to gauge possible changes in security, government policies, and the nature of regional cooperation. This material was prepared based on publications from www.facebook.com (Venezuela), www.youtube.com (Venezuela), and www.bbc.com (Venezuela).

Trump, the Strait of Hormuz, and U.S. Influence in Latin America

In several news items viewed through a Venezuelan lens, one and the same theme keeps coming up again and again: how the political and economic power of the United States affects other countries—their resources and their internal decisions. Whether it is Donald Trump’s statement about control of the strategic Strait of Hormuz, the dispute involving Panama’s company Biomateriales S.A. and the Ministry of Health, or the story of Colombian politician Abelar do de la Espriellia, in all cases the emphasis falls on distrust of official accounts, suspicions of hidden interests, and how the issue of sovereignty becomes central for a Latin American audience.

Regarding Hormuz, in a video published on YouTube, Donald Trump said the United States has “full control” over the strait. For Venezuela, the phrase does not sound like a neutral foreign-policy statement; it is seen as another confirmation that Washington seeks to determine the fate of the world’s key energy routes. In a country where the oil sector and the question of sanctions are directly tied to everyday politics, such words are perceived as part of a broader pattern of pressure and demonstrations of power. Hormuz, through which a significant share of the world’s oil and gas exports pass, in this context becomes a symbol: if the United States can claim control over it, then other states in the region have reason to fear outside interference in their own energy interests.

A somewhat different—but essentially related—story is linked to a report about an investigation involving Panama’s Ministry of Health and the company Biomateriales S.A. According to journalist Rolando Rodríguez, his investigation “contradice la versión del Minsa de que no hubo favorecimiento a Biomateriales S.A.” He claims the company allegedly offered medicines directly to the Ministry of Health “pese a que no los tenía disponibles en Panamá,” and also points to possible ties between Minister Fernando Boyd and this firm, as well as to the fact that it remains unclear what happened to the shares he held before taking office. The source of this material is listed as prensacom.

For a Venezuelan reader, such accusations look especially familiar. The story of government procurement, business, officials, and opaque connections immediately evokes associations with shortages, the allocation of resources, and a lack of trust in official explanations. Even if the plot is about Panama, it is understood as part of a wider Latin American scenario in which society is forced to keep asking: who really benefits from government decisions, and whether there is a private interest behind them.

The third item, published in BBC Mundo, focuses on Abelar do de la Espriellia and his political ties to the United States. In the Venezuelan interpretation, this story is read not only as the biography of a candidate, but also as a symptom of the dependence of part of the region’s political establishment on Washington. The report notes that he builds legitimacy through meetings with María Elvira Salazar, support for Marco Rubio, public endorsement of Donald Trump, donations to Republicans, and the idea of Plan Colombia 2.0, which is supposed to be funded by the United States and Israel.

What is especially sensitive for Venezuela is his borrowing of Trump’s rhetoric: talk of “Marxists,” “illegal migration,” and a crime corridor that he effectively includes both Colombia and Venezuela in. In a region where the theme of foreign interference has long become part of political language, such statements are seen as a continuation of an old scheme in which security, drug trafficking, and migration are used to justify strengthening U.S. influence. Additional sharpness is added by the mention of Alex Saab, a figure closely linked to the case against the Maduro government: for Caracas, it is another sign of just how intertwined politics, criminal cases, sanctions, and geopolitical pressure are.

The material also includes Pетрo’s remark that U.S. citizenship requires “loyalty to the United States above Colombia.” For a Venezuelan audience, this is not just a legal dispute, but a question of who will truly set the country’s course and whose interests will be prioritized. Equally important is the role of the Colombian diaspora in the United States: the author emphasizes that it was overseas voting that helped de la Espriellia achieve a high result. In Venezuela, this resonates especially strongly because the country itself has experienced large-scale emigration, meaning that the diaspora’s vote there is also seen as a factor capable of amplifying external priorities in domestic politics.

If you look at all three stories together, a single picture emerges: control over resources, conflicts of interest, political ties to the United States, and the question of how much Latin American states are able to preserve their independence in the face of external pressure. That is why in Venezuela such news is read not as separate episodes, but as part of a single big conversation about sovereignty, trust in authority, and the cost of political dependence.

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The US and Iran move into a technical phase of talks

The first round of political consultations between the United States and Iran in Switzerland has concluded, and the two sides are now focusing on the technical work needed to iron out the details. Qatar and Pakistan served as mediators. An agreement has been reached to form several working groups to address key issues—ranging from the nuclear program to sanctions and dispute-resolution mechanisms. It is expected that it is the technical teams who, in the coming days, will lay the groundwork for a final agreement.

At the technical level, the sides are set to discuss specific steps for implementing the memorandum of understanding signed earlier. The focus is on resuming the export of Iranian oil, removing the related restrictions, and unblocking frozen Iranian assets. Tehran insists on the principle of “commitment for commitment”: any easing on one side must be immediately matched by a reciprocal step from the other. Iran also stressed that the agenda of the talks can be expanded only after the basic points of the memorandum are fulfilled.

The negotiating process nearly collapsed amid sharp remarks by US President Donald Trump about Iran. The Iranian delegation lodged a protest, and contacts were temporarily suspended. However, through the efforts of Doha and Islamabad, communication was restored.

The US delegation included Vice President JD Vance, special envoy Steve Witkoff, and Jared Kushner. Iran was represented by Majlis speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. Following the meeting, a high-level political commission was established, and a 60-day roadmap was approved to move toward a full agreement.

In addition to economic and nuclear issues, the sides agreed on a range of measures to reduce tensions in the region. A permanent line of communication has been set up for matters related to the Strait of Hormuz—this will help avoid accidental incidents that could disrupt international shipping. In the Lebanon track, it was announced that a joint cell would be formed to monitor compliance with the ceasefire regime. This mechanism is viewed as a first test of the new understandings between Washington and Tehran.

US Vice President Vance said that the technical talks would run for the entire week, and that the last round laid “a good foundation for a final agreement.” He said that mechanisms to prevent military escalation were developed and that free passage through the Strait of Hormuz would be preserved. Vance also said that Iran agreed to invite international inspectors—talks with the IAEA will begin in Burgstein (Bürgenstock). In addition, Washington announced the launch of a demining operation in the strait.

Vance also addressed the Lebanon track separately: the United States supports Israel’s right to self-defense, but within mechanisms that prevent the situation from getting out of control. He urged Iran to use its influence to restrain Hezbollah. Pakistan’s prime minister, for his part, announced the successful conclusion of the first meeting of the top commission and confirmed agreement on the 60-day roadmap. A political oversight committee has been created, and executive technical talks have started.

Comments on the news

• What is the strategic significance of the Strait of Hormuz for Iran and global energy trade, and why is its security a key issue in the talks? — The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow passage between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, through which about 20–25% of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas volume is transported. For Iran, the strait is both an economic lever and a vulnerability: Tehran could block it in the event of a military threat, triggering a sharp rise in energy prices. The security of the strait is a key item on the agenda because any escalation in the region (for example, a conflict involving the US or Israel) would jeopardize global energy supplies, forcing major powers to seek political compromises with Iran.

• Who is “Hezbollah,” and what role does it play in relations between Iran and Lebanon, given the US request that Tehran use its influence to restrain it? — Hezbollah is a Lebanese Shia political party and a paramilitary group established in the 1980s with Iranian financial and military support. It functions as the armed wing of Iranian influence in Lebanon and the region (it participates in the Lebanese government and fought Israel). In Iran–Lebanon relations, Hezbollah is a tool of Iran’s “proxy strategy”: through it, Tehran can influence Beirut’s politics and threaten Israel. The US request to restrain Hezbollah means Washington views Iran as the only force capable of limiting the group’s actions (for example, preventing attacks on Israel), which makes Iran a key negotiating partner in the Lebanon–Israel context.

• Who is Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, and what role does he play in Iran’s political system beyond being speaker of parliament? — Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf is a prominent Iranian conservative politician, former mayor of Tehran (2005–2017), and former commander of the Air Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). In addition to serving as speaker of parliament (since 2020), he is a member of the Expediency Discernment Council, an advisory body to the Supreme Leader, and one of the most influential intermediaries between the IRGC’s “hard-line” faction and the political leadership. Qalibaf often plays the role of a “system man,” capable of bridging different conservative factions, and is seen as a potential candidate to succeed the Supreme Leader or as a future presidential contender.

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Full version: Swiss talks.. Washington and Tehran move into the technical phase

International Giants Are Back: Venezuela Opens for Investment

Venezuela’s economy is taking a significant turn: after a long period of isolation, the country is once again attracting major multinational corporations. Thanks to a new openness strategy initiated by the government, Venezuela is becoming an attractive destination for investment in key sectors—energy, infrastructure, and natural resource extraction. This influx of capital signals a shift in the country’s global image: investors see long-term strategic opportunities here.

American oil giant Chevron is setting the tone, and its example has served as a signal to other players. European heavyweights Shell, Repsol, and ENI have already returned to cooperation, focusing on projects related to natural gas and hydrocarbons extraction. At the same time, General Electric has signed agreements to modernize the national power system. These contracts not only confirm confidence in the stability of the country, but also imply training for local specialists—after the facilities are launched, management will be handed over to Venezuelans.

The government is coordinating this momentum closely. During meetings at the presidential palace of Miraflores, the plan “Revival 2026” was presented, with the goal of aligning financial results with actual production needs. Special attention is given to 18 areas of the economy—from petrochemicals to tourism. The authorities are betting on diversification and self-sufficiency, combining foreign technologies with local resources and human capital.

The first results are already visible: the Central Bank is recording GDP growth in the first quarter, and the inflow of international funds confirms that the policy is working. Links with multilateral organizations are being restored. The main challenge is to maintain the achieved pace and transform the economy into one of the most resilient in the region—ensuring not only macroeconomic stability, but also tangible social improvements, from creating jobs to reliable electricity supply for citizens.

Comments on the news

• What is the significance of the presidential palace of Miraflores in Venezuela’s political life? — The Miraflores Palace is the official residence and workplace of the President of Venezuela, symbolizing the executive branch. Key political decisions are made here, government meetings are held, and important press conferences take place. The palace’s location in central Caracas makes it the focal point of political rallies and protests, while its architecture reflects the country’s history.
• Which 18 economic areas has the Venezuelan government selected for diversification? — The Venezuelan government has identified the “18 engines of the economy”: 1) hydrocarbons, 2) petrochemicals, 3) mining industry, 4) agro-food sector, 5) manufacturing industry, 6) construction, 7) tourism, 8) textile industry, 9) forestry and wood processing, 10) automobile industry, 11) pharmaceuticals, 12) telecommunications, 13) science and technology, 14) defense industry, 15) social economy, 16) electric power industry, 17) water supply, 18) financial system.

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Full version: Gigantes trasnacionales hacen cola para invertir en Venezuela

Iran’s Central Bank chief: progress in freeing assets and lifting oil sanctions

According to Iran’s Central Bank chief, significant progress has been made in unblocking frozen Iranian assets, and agreement has also been reached with the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) to grant a sanctions exemption for the sale of Iranian oil. Although the negotiations were intense and complex, their outcome fully matches the objectives set by the Iranian delegation, paving the way for improving the country’s financial situation on the international stage.

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Full version: عاجل | تسنيم عن محافظ البنك المركزي الإيراني: إحراز تقدم ملحوظ في الإفراج عن أصول إيران

US Diplomat Denied Talks With Iran Were Derailed in Switzerland

Contrary to reports from several media outlets, US-Iranian talks in Swiss Burgenstock have not been interrupted, a US State Department representative said in an interview with Axios. The diplomat уточнил that consultations began on Sunday morning and continued uninterrupted in various formats. The main topics included the fate of the Strait of Hormuz, the nuclear deal, mechanisms to prevent direct clashes, and implementation of the Lebanon ceasefire agreement. The talks were held both directly between Washington and Tehran and with intermediaries.

The parties paid special attention to the situation in the Strait of Hormuz following Tehran’s recent statements about the possibility of blocking it. The US delegation insisted on the unconditional preservation of freedom of navigation, and, according to the diplomat, “good progress” had been made on that front. In addition, all aspects of Iran’s nuclear program were discussed, along with mechanisms for implementing an earlier memorandum of understanding, which is intended to resolve the current crisis.

Participants agreed on a roadmap to continue the dialogue both at the senior leadership level and through technical working groups. Mediators from Pakistan and Qatar actively helped narrow the gap between the parties, and all four participants in the process expressed satisfaction with the course of the first round. According to the American diplomat, these consultations laid “the groundwork for strengthening trust” ahead of the next stages.

However, the process was not without difficulties. Iranian media initially reported that the delegation had left the meeting venue in protest after harsh remarks by Donald Trump. CNN, citing a source familiar with the situation in Tehran, confirmed that the talks “stalled due to threats from the US president,” but did not collapse completely. At the same time, back-up communication channels were activated to bring the parties back to the negotiating table, and Pakistan’s interior minister met with the Iranian delegation in a “last attempt” to keep it engaged in dialogue.

The context of the talks is directly linked to the escalation surrounding the Strait of Hormuz. Earlier, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps announced the closure of the strait to all ships in response to Israeli airstrikes on Lebanon. In an appearance on Fox News, Trump threatened that Iranian negotiators “will not be able to come home” if Tehran carries out the threat. The talks themselves are a continuation of the memorandum signed by the United States and Iran with Pakistan’s mediation back in June, which was meant to end the war that began at the end of February last year.

Comments on the news

• What is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and why exactly did it announce the closure of the Strait of Hormuz? – The IRGC is Iran’s elite military formation with enormous political and economic influence. It controls missile forces, the navy and intelligence. Closing the Strait of Hormuz is an extreme measure that the IRGC can implement because the strait is a strategic passage for oil tankers (about 20% of global oil transit). Announcing the closure is a way to demonstrate military power and pressure the United States and its allies, especially in the context of sanctions and threats.

• What is the current status of the nuclear deal (JCPOA) between Iran and world powers, and why does it remain a central topic in the negotiations? – The JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) is effectively frozen: the US withdrew from it in 2018, and Iran, in response, began enriching uranium to levels close to weapons-grade. Talks on reviving the deal have been conducted intermittently, but no agreement has yet been reached. This topic remains central because it determines the lifting of economic sanctions on Iran, the nuclear non-proliferation regime in the Middle East, and the balance of power in the region.

• Why is a ceasefire in Lebanon being discussed in US-Iran talks? How is Iran connected to this conflict? – Iran is the main sponsor of the Shiite group Hezbollah in Lebanon, which takes part in regional conflicts, including clashes with Israel. A ceasefire in Lebanon is seen as part of a broader set of negotiations between the United States and Iran, because stability on Israel-Lebanon’s border is directly linked to Iranian influence. For the US and Israel, it is important to limit Hezbollah’s military activity, while for Iran it is important to keep it as a lever of pressure. Thus, the Lebanon track has become one of the items discussed alongside the nuclear program.

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Full version: After reports of Iranian delegation leaving… US denies talks in Switzerland were halted

In Venezuela, people’s voting is being expanded: condominium boards will join the national...

Acting President of Venezuela Delcy Rodríguez announced that the second National People’s Consultation will take place on July 12, 2026, and for the first time it will include not only community councils, but also condominium boards across the country. This innovation is intended to broaden the territorial and social reach of the citizen direct-participation mechanism. According to Rodríguez, during the voting, residents will directly determine the allocation of public funds, based on priorities set by organized communities. She emphasized that this format strengthens direct, active, and genuine democracy, because key decisions are made not by officials behind closed doors, but by the conscious will of Venezuelans in people’s consultations.

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Full version: Gobierno suma juntas de condominio a la segunda Consulta Popular Nacional del 12 de julio

Preliminary U.S.-Iran talks begin in Switzerland with Qatar and Pakistan mediating…

On Sunday, technical consultations began in Switzerland between U.S. and Iranian delegations, with representatives of Qatar and Pakistan also taking part. The meetings are intended to lay the groundwork for a new round of talks connected with implementing the memorandum of understanding on the cessation of hostilities.

According to Pakistan’s state television, the technical sessions involving members of the four countries’ delegations may continue until Monday. Switzerland’s foreign ministry confirmed the arrival of all parties, including the mediators, and expressed hope for progress on the issues being discussed.

The U.S. side at these consultations is represented by Vice President JD Vance, who arrived in Switzerland to take part in the opening of the dialogue, as well as special envoy Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. The Iranian delegation is led by the Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi; it also includes representatives from the Central Bank and the oil sector. Qatar and Pakistan act as mediators—according to information from Islamabad, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and the army chief of staff Asim Munir arrived to take part in high-level talks focused on implementing the memorandum.

As for the nuclear file, a Western diplomatic source told Al Jazeera that there is currently no confirmation of the participation of the IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi in the talks. Nevertheless, Grossi himself told Iran’s IRNA agency that he met with Switzerland’s foreign minister to discuss developments around Iran and the agency’s role. He stressed that at this decisive moment diplomacy must be given every chance to succeed. Inside the Iranian delegation, it was уточнили that the upcoming bilateral meetings with the Qatari and Pakistani negotiators will determine the format of the main round with the U.S. side.

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Ismail Baqai confirmed that today’s consultations are part of the implementation of the memorandum with the United States and consist of morning and evening sessions. The Iranian delegation will hold separate meetings with Qatar and Pakistan in their roles as mediators, followed by a joint meeting of all participants. Baqai emphasized that implementation of the document matters more than signing it, and that Tehran insists on the five points of the memorandum—one of which is the cessation of war on all fronts. At the same time, the “Zionist regime” continues to violate its obligations, and this will be the central topic of today’s negotiations.

The Lebanon issue occupies a special place on the agenda. According to CNN, the emergency session on Lebanon will be the first topic discussed by the American and Iranian delegations. Before departing, Vice President Vance said that achieving progress on a ceasefire in Lebanon is one of the key goals of the talks. This comes amid the resumption of Israeli strikes on Lebanese territory. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced a pause in military operations, but confirmed that troops remain in the positions they have taken. Hezbollah, meanwhile, links the cessation of its attacks to the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon. Since the U.S.-Iran agreement, dozens of people have been killed in Lebanon, including 47 civilians and six Israeli servicemen.

The Pakistani side described these meetings as the first official contact between the parties after the memorandum was signed and an important step toward advancing the agreements to more mature stages. Pakistan’s interior minister said that “things are moving in the right direction,” and his Iranian counterpart expressed optimism, noting a positive atmosphere and steady progress in implementing the document’s points. Both sides are aiming for concrete results.

This consultation session is a continuation of the framework agreement between the United States and Iran reached last week. Over the course of 60 days, the parties plan to reach a final agreement on the technical aspects of Iran’s nuclear program. However, the talks are complicated by military escalation between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, as well as by tensions around the Strait of Hormuz: the U.S. Central Command denied statements by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps that it had blocked it, stating that tankers continue to pass through the strait without hindrance.

Comments on the news

• Who is Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf and why is he, rather than the president, heading the Iranian delegation in talks with the U.S.? – Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf is the chairman of Iran’s parliament (Majlis), a former mayor of Tehran, and a former commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. His appointment as head of the delegation instead of the president underscores that the negotiations concern issues of national security and strategic importance, and not just diplomatic routine. It is also a signal to the United States that Iran is speaking from a position of strength and unity across all branches of power.

• Why did the Iranian delegation include representatives from the Central Bank and the oil sector if the talks are about a cessation of hostilities? – The inclusion of economic specialists indicates that the talks are not limited to military issues. Iran is likely seeking to discuss sanctions relief, the unfreezing of overseas assets, and the restoration of oil exports—key conditions for ending the conflict. For Iran, economic normalization is an integral part of any political settlement.

• What is the significance of the Strait of Hormuz for international trade and regional security, mentioned in the report about the talks? – The Strait of Hormuz is a strategic “narrow passage” through which about 20–25% of the world’s oil tanker traffic passes. Iran’s control of the strait gives it leverage over global oil prices and the security of energy supply. Mentioning the strait in the negotiations suggests that the sides are discussing guarantees for freedom of navigation and possible de-escalation measures in the Persian Gulf area.

• Why do Iranian officials use the term “Zionist regime” to refer to Israel, and what does that say about Tehran’s position? – The term “Zionist regime” reflects Iran’s official doctrine, which does not recognize the state of Israel as legitimate and rejects its ideological foundation—Zionism. This wording underscores Tehran’s fundamental hostility, its refusal to normalize relations, and its support for anti-Israel forces. It signals that for Iran Israel is not a state, but a temporary political entity, which rules out the possibility of direct dialogue.

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Full version: بدء المحادثات الأمريكية الإيرانية في سويسرا بمشاركة قطرية وباكستانية

Iran closes the Strait of Hormuz and demands guarantees ahead of talks with the United States

The diplomatic channel between Washington and Tehran remains open despite rising tensions. On Sunday, technical consultations mediated by Pakistan and Qatar were scheduled to take place in Burgenstock, Switzerland. The Iranian delegation has already flown to Switzerland, while from the U.S. side special envoy Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner arrived in the region. However, due to escalation in Lebanon, the precise start date of the meetings remains in doubt.

The Iranian delegation has been given the symbolic name “Minab 168” in memory of the tragedy at a girls’ school in Minab. Its key figures include: the speaker of parliament Mohammad Baqer Ghalibaf, Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi, Ali Bagheri, assistant secretary to the Supreme National Security Council, and the head of the Central Bank Abdolnaser Hemmati. The American side has also sent high-level representatives, but the participation of Vice President JD Vance—initially expected—has not been confirmed.

Alongside these diplomatic moves, Tehran took a sharp step. The command of Khatam al-Anbia announced the closure of the Strait of Hormuz to shipping, calling it “the first stage of a response” to the United States’ alleged breach of its obligations under the war-ending memorandum and ongoing Israeli attacks in the south of Lebanon. In its statement, it stressed that further measures have been prepared in the event “aggression” continues. The decision highlights a direct link between the nuclear file and the situation in Lebanon.

Talks in Burgenstock did not take place on Friday as planned due to Iran’s position. Tehran links its participation to a de facto ceasefire in Lebanon. According to Western media, the Iranian side is demanding that the United States provide guarantees to halt Israeli attacks before consultations begin. In Tehran, it has been made clear that without fulfillment of this condition, the delegation will not sit down at the negotiating table.

Switzerland continues to prepare the venue for the meeting, emphasizing strict confidentiality. Officials said they would not disclose the details of the talks or the composition of participants “for the sake of secrecy.” Meanwhile, Qatar is acting as one of the key mediators: Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani has arrived in Switzerland. Pakistan is also actively involved in the settlement efforts.

Within the Islamic Republic itself, internal consultations continue. Foreign Minister Araqchi met with his Pakistani counterpart Mohsin Naqvi, who is in Tehran on a visit. Islamabad is maintaining contact with both the Iranian and American sides in order to remove obstacles. According to U.S. intelligence, Israeli strikes on Lebanon could jeopardize a potential agreement between Washington and Tehran.

At the political level, President Trump said he has “good” relations with Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu, but at the same time criticized him, saying that “without my intervention, Israel would have been crushed.” Iranian officials emphasize that the Lebanon file is central: any violation of the memorandum would affect the course of negotiations. Araqchi placed responsibility on the United States for ending the war across all fronts, including Lebanon, making it clear that the upcoming meeting will be a test of the parties’ seriousness.

Comments on the news

• What happened at the “Minab 168” school and why has this tragedy become a symbol of the delegation to the talks? – In 1988, the U.S. cruiser Vincennes shot down an Iranian passenger plane over the Persian Gulf, killing 290 people, many of them students. In the talks, this tragedy reminds Iran of the price of conflicts and the need for security guarantees, and also serves as an emotional symbol of losses that Iran associates with aggression from abroad.
• What is the command of Khatam al-Anbia and what role does it play in Iran’s military and economic structure? – It is the largest economic and engineering organization under the control of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). It manages strategic projects (oil, gas, transport, construction), and on the military side it provides logistics, defense infrastructure, and technologies. In effect, it is a “shadow” economic giant connecting the IRGC with the civilian sector.
• Why does Iran link nuclear negotiations to a ceasefire in Lebanon? – Iran views regional conflicts as a single security system. Linking them to Lebanon (through support for Hezbollah) gives Tehran leverage: if the West wants progress on the nuclear deal, Iran demands a halt to Israeli operations in Lebanon. This is a “package” tactic—nuclear issues and regional security are inseparable.
• Who is Mohammad Baqer Ghalibaf and why is his presence in the delegation significant? – He is the speaker of the Iranian parliament (since 2020), a former mayor of Tehran, and a commander in the IRGC. His presence underscores that the talks are supported by three branches of power (executive, legislative, and military) and that the conservative bloc endorses Iran’s negotiating position. This reduces the risk of internal sabotage of the deal.

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Full version: Closed Strait and trips to Switzerland.. a tense scene before U.S.-Iran talks

259 Venezuelans returned home from the United States on a repatriation flight

On Friday, June 19, Venezuela received the 162nd flight of the “Vuelta a la Patria” (Return to the Homeland) program, with 259 citizens from the United States—206 men, 35 women, 10 boys and 8 girls. The aircraft landed at Simón Bolívar International Airport in Maiquetía, where everyone was welcomed with dignity and according to all protocols to ensure a happy reunion with their families. In total, since the start of the program, more than 28,000 Venezuelans have already returned to their homeland, and flights from the United States are now being operated on a regular basis.

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Full version: This Friday, June 19, 259 Venezuelans arrived in the country from the United States on a Vuelta a la Patria flight

Egypt: the roots of popular support for Iran against Israel and the United States

Anti-American and anti-Israeli sentiments in Egyptian society are not a spontaneous reaction to current events, but the result of decades of historical, cultural and political experience that has shaped a collective mindset. Hostility toward Israel goes back to collective memory, where it is seen as an “historical enemy,” and it is also linked to an acute sense of sovereignty and rejection of outside interference. To understand this mood, one must take into account the contexts that reproduce it with every crisis, rather than seeking narrow explanations in momentary events.

Since the creation of Israel in 1948, Egypt has viewed it as an existential threat — up to the 1973 war. In the era of Arab nationalism, especially under Gamal Abdel Nasser, the state tied security to rhetoric of “resistance,” while society saw in every confrontation an opportunity to restore historical rights and achieve full liberation. Even after the defeat in 1967, the spirit of resistance did not disappear; it transformed into a more complex strategy: managing a long-term conflict, rebuilding internal strength, intensifying diplomacy, and expanding alliances.

This “Nasser-era mindset” also extended to support for anti-Western movements: in 1962–1966, Egypt helped the opposition in Iran against the Shah. In this context, the article cites the memoirs of the late Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who wrote about Nasser’s death: “This news struck us like thunder… we cried bitterly… not only because we lost a man, but because of the hope he embodied in his struggle against arrogance and injustice.” The internal upheavals between 1967 and 1973 — such as the 1968 protests and the student movement at Cairo University — show how street pressure redefined the boundaries of political action within the country and across the region.

After 1973, political changes — particularly UN Security Council Resolution 338, the Camp David Accords (1978), and the peace treaty (1979) — split public opinion. The state shifted priorities toward protecting immediate borders and winding down pan-Arab projects, moving the conflict from the battlefield to the diplomatic halls. During Hosni Mubarak’s “Cold Peace” era, there was space for criticism of normalization amid popular solidarities, for example the intifadas of 1987 and 2000, but popular rejection of Israel remained.

Under President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, especially during the events in Sheikh Jarrah and the 2023 war in Gaza, Egypt put national sovereignty at the forefront and sought a balance between public sentiment and state obligations. The country remained a mediator and played a diplomatic role, organizing a peace conference in Sharm el-Sheikh, the outcomes of which were later endorsed by a UN Security Council resolution. Egypt’s official relations with Iran remain “extremely cautious,” but public consciousness is an independent sphere that instinctively sympathizes with anyone who stands against Israel — although this does not mean approval of Iran’s project: Egyptians’ perceptions of Iran and Hezbollah were damaged by their interference in Syria.

These sentiments are fueled by civilizational, religious and cultural factors, turning the conflict with Israel into a “struggle for existence, not for borders.” At the core is the memory of blood and past defeats, as well as images of national heroes such as Saad Idris Halawa or Sulaiman Hater, who opened fire on Israeli tourists and was celebrated by the streets. Cinema, literature and art entrenched the idea of existential confrontation with Israel, creating in society a kind of “intellectual immune system” that cuts across sectarian divisions and emotionally focuses against Israel.

The latest war with Iran and the subsequent escalation by the United States and Israel once again revived the narrative of the “arrogant existential enemy.” This has strengthened Egyptians’ sympathy for Iran — as a way to express a sense of powerlessness and a desire to contain Israel. At the same time, the state continues to balance between pressure from the street, obligations to Gulf security, and its role as a mediator, preserving a fragile equilibrium.

Comments on the news

• Why did the death of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser provoke such strong emotions in Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and what historical connections existed between Iran and Egypt at the time? — Ali Khamenei, as a young Islamist revolutionary, admired Nasser as a symbol of anti-imperialism, pan-Arabism and the struggle against Israel. Despite ideological differences (Nasser was a secular Arab nationalist, while Khamenei is an Islamic cleric), what united them was hostility toward the West and support for the Palestinian cause. In the 1950s and 1960s, relations between monarchic Iran (the Shah) and Nasserist Egypt were tense because of different sides in the “Cold War” in the Middle East; but after the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran tried to draw closer to Egypt, seeing it as a potential ally against Israel.

• What role did Hezbollah play in the civil war in Syria, and why did that lead to a decline in its reputation among Egyptians despite a broadly anti-Israeli stance? — Hezbollah deployed thousands of fighters to support Bashar al-Assad’s regime, helping to turn the course of the war. However, among Egyptians, especially the Sunni majority, support by the Shiite organization for a regime aligned with the Alawites against largely Sunni rebels was perceived as betraying Sunnis and as Iran’s interference in Arab affairs. In addition, Egypt traditionally leans toward Saudi Arabia, which supported the Syrian opposition, further intensifying the negative view of Hezbollah.

• What is the status of diplomatic relations between Egypt and Iran today, and what key disagreements (for example, over Syria or Yemen) prevent their normalization? — Relations remain at the level of interests without full diplomatic missions: embassies have been closed since 1979. The main disagreements are: Iran’s support for Hezbollah and the Assad regime (Cairo sees this as a threat to its role in the Arab world); Iran’s interference in Yemen via the Houthis (Egypt is concerned for the security of the Red Sea); and Tehran’s ties with Palestinian groups that compete with Egypt’s mediating efforts in Gaza. Normalization is also hindered by Egypt’s strategic alliance with Saudi Arabia — Iran’s main rival.

• What is meant by the “Iranian project” in the Middle East, and what strategic goals (for example, creating an “axis of resistance” or exporting the revolution) does Tehran pursue in the region? — The “Iranian project” is a strategy to expand influence through a network of non-state allies (“axis of resistance”): Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria, as well as Hamas and “Islamic Jihad” in Palestine. The goals include: 1) exporting the ideology of the Islamic Revolution (creating states governed by Islamic clerics); 2) creating a land corridor from Tehran to the Mediterranean through Iraq and Syria to supply Hezbollah; 3) countering U.S. and Israeli influence; 4) weakening Sunni Arab monarchies, especially Saudi Arabia, by supporting their opposition.

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Full version: لماذا تعاطف المصريون مع إيران ضد أمريكا وإسرائيل؟

World reaction to Donald Trump’s personal diplomacy

Once again, the international agenda is being discussed not so much around specific U.S. decisions as around the style of Donald Trump’s personal diplomacy—and how his sharp remarks are received abroad. In many publications, the emphasis is on irritation, mockery, and outright rejection by foreign leaders, who publicly distance themselves from his statements and thereby intensify the sense that relations between countries are unpredictable. A separate theme in this line of thinking is his comments about Giorgia Meloni, talk about leaders who are “strong” or “convenient” for Washington, as well as his habit of interfering in the political processes of other countries—especially since the reaction, as a rule, comes quickly and is directed at his behavior rather than at the content of individual initiatives. This piece is prepared based on publications from amp.dw.com (Venezuela) and www.facebook.com (Venezuela), as well as amchamcolombia.co (Venezuela).

Venezuela reads Trump’s scandals as a lesson about U.S. pressure

The Venezuelan reading of the latest news about Donald Trump is not focused on individual episodes, but on a broader picture: in Caracas, they see one and the same mechanism—public pressure, the humiliation of allies, the imposition of deadlines, and the transformation of diplomacy into an instrument of political control.

The most telling example was the dispute involving Giorgia Meloni. In a DW report, Italy’s prime minister publicly rejected Trump’s claim that she had allegedly “begged” him for a joint photo at the G7 summit, calling it “fabrication.” That sparked a sharp reaction in Italy: the foreign minister, Antonio Tajani, canceled his trip to the United States and said that Trump’s “insulting words” “insult all of Italy.” Meloni, in turn, said: “neither I nor Italy have ever been humiliated,” and raised the question of why Trump behaves this way toward allies—while, in her view, he treats “the enemies of the West” more gently than partners.

For a Venezuelan audience, this episode is read more broadly than a typical diplomatic dispute. It is seen as further confirmation that Trump’s personal diplomacy is built on conspicuous pressure and a political performance. In a country where the topic of external interference has historically been painful, such behavior by the United States is often interpreted not as the rudeness of a particular politician, but as a reflection of Washington’s broader attitude toward the sovereignty of other states.

Similarly, in Venezuela, the story about an ultimatum—reported with reference to FRANCE 24 Español—is understood as a confirmation of a familiar pattern. There, the emphasis is on messages that, in the Venezuelan context, are read as familiar: American diplomacy through deadlines, pressure, and unilateral decisions. The very mention of a “60-day plan” in a message by U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance in Caracas is easily linked to sanctions, ultimatums, and the long-standing practice of external coercion. From the Venezuelan perspective, it is important not only what is being said, but also the method—decisions are made in Washington, while other countries are expected to fall into line or respond under pressure.

Another episode, viewed in Venezuela through the same lens, is connected with the rapprochement between Colombia and the United States. In a report by AmCham Colombia, the emphasis is on the idea that for Colombia, the United States remains the “best market”—a key ally in trade, investment, security, and diplomacy. But in the Venezuelan perception, this looks less like neutral economic cooperation and more like evidence of deep dependence. Discussions in Caracas about security, “no descertification,” migration, the fight against drug trafficking, commerce, and nearshoring are seen as a typical formula of U.S. influence: economic relations almost always come with political conditions.

In this context, the remarks of María Claudia Lacouture—who defends AmCham Colombia’s role in strengthening ties with the United States—stand out as especially notable, as does the very framing of the panel question: “Dependence or strategy?”. For a Venezuelan reader, this dilemma sounds very familiar. Here, people recall not only Colombia’s experience, but also their own history of pressure, sanctions, and confrontation with Washington, when foreign policy, trade, and access to finance turned out to be closely tied to U.S. interests.

The overall logic of the Venezuelan reading is this: the scandal involving Meloni, the story about J.D. Vance, and the Colombia-U.S. agenda all show the same pattern. The United States sets the tone, while other countries are forced to justify themselves, demonstrate “resilience,” or agree to imposed terms. That is why, in Caracas, such news is perceived not as separate international stories, but as confirmation of the old argument about the need for strategic autonomy and distrust of the pretty words of American diplomacy.

For Venezuela, it is not just a set of foreign news items, but a reminder of how easily U.S. foreign policy turns into a tool of pressure. And the more often such episodes repeat, the more strongly a belief is reinforced in local political culture: that dealing with Washington requires caution, bearing in mind the cost of dependence and the risks to sovereignty.

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The US and Iran postpone meeting: logistics and political tensions

On Friday, the White House announced the postponement of the long-awaited round of talks between the United States and Iran that was due to take place in the Swiss resort of Burgenstock. The official reason cited was “logistical difficulties,” but the Axios portal, citing sources, reported additional problems related to the travel of the Iranian delegation and rising tensions in Lebanon. From the very beginning, the situation had been murky: Al Jazeera correspondent in Washington, Murad Hashim, noted that there was no clear understanding even about whether both sides would participate.

As it has become known, U.S. Vice President JD Vance, who was to head the American delegation, will not be going to Switzerland. At the same time, the U.S. technical team remains ready to hold talks at any moment. A U.S. official did not rule out that the delay was caused by “resistance on Iran’s side,” though Tehran has not yet released an official position. These developments are unfolding amid a heated political debate in the United States over a memorandum of understanding signed by the presidents of the two countries.

President Trump called the memorandum “Iran’s unconditional surrender”—that was his response to criticism from both Democrats and Republicans, who considered the document to be an “announcement of America’s defeat.” In turn, Vice President Vance held a lengthy press conference, and the memorandum itself was officially submitted to Congress along with detailed explanations for the relevant committees. These steps show that the question of talks has moved beyond pure logistics and become part of intra-political struggle in Washington.

On the Iranian side, according to Al Jazeera’s correspondent in Tehran, Adnan Bourini, there has been no official response to the delay so far. However, sources say that “sending the delegation to Geneva has not yet been decided”—consultations are continuing in Tehran. Over the past few hours, statements have followed from Supreme Leader Mohammad Baqer “the second son” (ModjtaBa) Khamenei’s circle, from President Masoud Pezeshkian, and from the Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. All of them emphasized the key condition: “build dialogue based on the fulfillment by Washington of the memorandum’s points.” From Tehran’s perspective, a ceasefire in Lebanon is the document’s key starting point, while the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanese soil is a clear requirement within the framework of “Lebanon’s sovereignty over its entire territory.”

Swiss authorities limited themselves to a brief statement confirming that the meetings scheduled for Friday will not take place. At the same time, they said that security measures and logistical preparations remain in effect, which may indicate a postponement rather than a complete cancellation. Formally, the possibility of both sides participating is still not ruled out. The first hints of trouble appeared as early as Thursday evening: a White House representative said that “the logistics of these negotiations have never been simple or predictable,” adding: “As long as the vice president does not leave; we hope to begin technical consultations as soon as possible.”

Recall that the presidents of the United States and Iran signed the memorandum of understanding on the 17th— the document was agreed upon in electronic format, an unexpected move ahead of the Geneva meeting. The signing ceremonies differed: Trump recorded the moment in Versailles during dinner with Macron, while Pezeshkian posted a single photo without any ceremonial attributes. Now everyone is waiting for logistical and political obstacles to be overcome, and for the negotiations to begin.

Comments on the news

• Who is ModjtaBa Khamenei and what role does he play in Iran’s political system? - ModjtaBa Khamenei is the second son of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Although he does not hold an official state position, he is widely seen as an influential intermediary between conservative elites, security structures, and the clergy. Many analysts view him as a potential successor to his father, capable of uniting the various factions within the regime after the death of the current leader.
• Why is the Iranian delegation’s trip to Switzerland especially complicated? - Switzerland acts as a mediator in protecting U.S. interests in Iran because Tehran and Washington do not have direct diplomatic relations. The movement of Iranian officials to Switzerland is complicated by international sanctions, visa restrictions, and the need to coordinate security issues with competing intelligence services, making such trips diplomatically sensitive and logistically risky.
• What does a ceasefire in Lebanon and the demand for the withdrawal of Israeli troops mean for Iran? - For Tehran, a ceasefire in Lebanon is a test of its ability to maintain influence over “Hezbollah” under conditions of regional pressure. The withdrawal of Israeli forces is viewed as a strategic victory for Iran’s axis of resistance, strengthening Iran’s position in nuclear-program negotiations and weakening the country’s isolation. A failure of this scenario, in contrast, would lead to the loss of a key proxy asset and a reduction in Iran’s security on its northern borders.

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Full version: Al Jazeera’s memorandum reveals the backdrop to the postponement of Swiss talks between Iran and the US

Reuters: US expands Citgo protection, eases telecom and Conviasa restrictions

The US administration on Thursday issued two new general licenses related to Venezuela that permit certain transactions in the telecommunications and postal services sectors, as well as the supply of goods and services for the state airline Conviasa. In addition, a third license extends an exception protecting the Venezuela-owned refinery Citgo Petroleum. These measures, published by the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), are part of carve-outs within the US sanctions regime.

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Full version: Reuters: EEUU amplía protección a Citgo y emite nuevas licencias que alivian restricciones para telecomunicaciones y Conviasa en Venezuela

Vance lashes out at Israel over criticism of Iran deal

U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance publicly and unusually sharply criticized Israeli officials for their negative reaction to Washington’s preliminary agreement with Tehran. He called the Israeli side’s behavior a “strange panic” and “hysteria,” reminding Benjamin Netanyahu’s government that two-thirds of Israel’s defensive armaments are produced in the United States and paid for by American taxpayers. These remarks mark a rare instance of open conflict between allies accustomed to settling disagreements behind closed doors.

The main disagreements concern the vision for further negotiations with Iran. Washington insists on a 60-day period to transform the memorandum of understanding into a broader settlement, while Tel Aviv fears this will limit its actions in Lebanon and delay resolution of key issues, including the nuclear program and ballistic missiles. The agreement itself provides for an immediate and permanent ceasefire on all fronts, including the Lebanese front, the opening of the Strait of Hormuz, lifting the maritime blockade, and a phased easing of sanctions on Iranian oil exports.

The reaction in Israeli political circles, especially on the right, was extremely sharp. Vance directly addressed the ministers of national security and finance with the question: “What is your concrete proposal? You are a country of nine million people. You can’t simply make assassination the solution to all national security problems.” In response, Itamar Ben-Gvir wrote on X: “Here’s my proposal: treat the Nazis of the 21st century the way the U.S. treated the Nazis of the 20th century.”

The Lebanese front became the central point of confrontation. President Trump called on Netanyahu for a “more flexible approach” toward Lebanon, stating the need for a “complete ceasefire on all fronts.” However, the Israeli prime minister confirmed the intention to maintain a military presence in southern Lebanon, and IDF strikes in that region continue, claiming 16 lives in the vicinity of Nabatieh.

Criticism of the agreement comes not only from Israel, but also from within the U.S. Republican Party. Some senators called it “short-sighted” and “the worst political mistake of the decade,” and the lobbying group AIPAC criticized the lifting of sanctions and the lack of strict limits on Iran’s nuclear and missile programs. Notably, many avoid direct criticism of Trump, directing remarks at Vance or technical details instead, reflecting the president’s influence within the party.

Israeli society is also reacting with growing concern. According to a Channel 12 poll, 71% of Israelis do not trust Trump to protect their interests under the Iran deal, and 52% believe Netanyahu’s policies have harmed national interests. The opposition is trying to use the tension to demonstrate the depth of the crisis: Yair Lapid said that one day of open disagreements proves the threat that the current government poses to Israel’s foreign relations.

Overall, what is happening is unlikely to be called a definitive break; rather, it is a recalibration of the rules of engagement. Washington signals that its “security umbrella” is not a blank check for wars that do not align with American strategy, while Israel seeks to preserve regional deterrence capabilities. Trump, for his part, said he would “very likely” support Netanyahu in the upcoming elections, calling his work “good” but urging him to be “more rational.” The situation reflects real tension, but the strategic tie between the two countries remains intact.

Comments on the news

• Why is the Strait of Hormuz so important for international trade and how is its opening connected to Iran? – The Strait of Hormuz is a strategic narrow passage connecting the Persian Gulf with the Indian Ocean. About 25% of the world’s seaborne oil passes through it, making it critical for global energy supplies. Iran, located along the northern coast of the strait, controls access to it. Tehran often uses the threat of closing the strait as a pressure tool in negotiations and conflicts, since a blockade could cause a sharp rise in oil prices and disrupt the global economy.

• Who is Itamar Ben-Gvir and why does his position affect Israeli–Iranian relations? – Itamar Ben-Gvir is an Israeli right-wing politician and Israel’s minister of national security. He is known for his hardline stance toward Palestinians and Israel’s adversaries, including Iran. Ben-Gvir advocates for tough military operations and increased pressure on Iran, which can push the Israeli government toward a more confrontational policy. His influence grew after the coalition formed in 2022, and his views directly affect decisions related to Iran’s nuclear program and proxy groups such as Hezbollah.

• What is AIPAC and how does this organization influence U.S. policy toward Iran? – AIPAC (American Israel Public Affairs Committee) is an influential pro-Israel lobbying group in the U.S. It promotes support for Israel among American lawmakers, including through campaign funding and ties to political elites. Regarding Iran, AIPAC actively lobbies for tough sanctions and opposition to nuclear deals, shaping a more confrontational U.S. line on Iran. The organization helps ensure that Israel’s interests remain a priority in American foreign policy.

• Why is the situation in southern Lebanon (including strikes near Nabatieh) connected to the Iran–Israel negotiations? – Southern Lebanon is a zone of activity for Hezbollah, a Lebanese Shia group backed by Iran. strikes in this area (such as the strike in Nabatieh) are often seen as part of the broader Iran–Israel tension. Israel uses such attacks to send signals to Tehran during negotiations, demonstrating a willingness to use force. Hezbollah acts as an Iranian proxy, and its actions (or responses to Israeli strikes) can either escalate the conflict or serve as leverage during negotiations. Thus, clashes in southern Lebanon directly reflect the state of Iran–Israel dialogue.

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Full version: انهيار ثقة أم إعادة ضبط؟ خفايا التراشق الأبرز بين إدارة ترمب وحكومة نتنياهو

World reactions to the US–Iran agreement

The deal between the US and Iran, to which a notable role is attributed to Donald Trump, has produced a wide range of assessments in the international community: from approval by some world leaders — including mentions of support from Putin and statements by ASEAN leaders — to cautious remarks that this is only a "first step" and that new tests may lie ahead. Experts warn of the risk of the conflict spreading to neighboring regions, primarily in relations with Israel and Lebanon, and discussions within the G7 and other multilateral forums have again drawn attention to the unpredictable style of US foreign policy under Trump and its impact on global balances of power and the domestic politics of third countries. In our review — opinions of politicians, analysts and columnists that together give an idea of possible development scenarios and risks to regional stability. The material is prepared on the basis of publications from www.facebook.com, www.bbc.com and www.youtube.com (Venezuela).

Venezuela between Hormuz and Mexico: the US–Iran agreement and Washington's "hidden wars"

Materials from the British and Latin American press, as well as expert commentary on US policy toward Iran and Mexico in Venezuela, form a coherent picture. For Caracas this is not a set of disparate foreign-policy episodes, but confirmation of a central narrative: Washington remains a hegemon that exerts pressure through sanctions, military force and legal extraterritoriality, and the response to this must be multipolarity, a "resistance bloc" and the ability to negotiate with the US only from a position of strength.

Around the recent memorandum between the US and Iran, described in a BBC Mundo piece (bbc.com), and around analysis of possible covert US operations against Mexican politicians in Edgardo Buscaglia’s interview on "Aristegui en Vivo" (video on YouTube), two key lines are emerging in the Venezuelan field: how Washington retreats under pressure (Hormuz, Iran) and how it simultaneously expands the scope of forceful intervention under the banner of "counterterrorism" (Mexico). teleSUR, as the media mouthpiece of the Bolivarian camp, fits the Iranian theme into its habitual narrative about multipolarity and US aggression, as seen in their Facebook post (teleSUR post).

The US–Iran agreement: peace, but from Caracas’s perspective

The BBC Mundo piece details statements by Iran’s new supreme leader Mojtaba Khamenei about the memorandum with the US. He emphasizes that the agreement was reached after a period of sharp escalation, including a maritime blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, and that Donald Trump signed the document "out of desperation." The article also quotes US Senator J.D. Vance, who insists that Iran will receive neither money nor sanctions relief until conditions are met, and that any concessions will be strictly "on results" (bbc.com).

The Venezuelan perspective sees this not merely as a diplomatic episode in the Middle East but as a kind of laboratory:

On one hand, Mojtaba Khamenei’s phrase that Trump signed "out of desperation" fits perfectly into the Bolivarian discourse that the US yields only when pressure on it becomes too costly. In Caracas this is read as: Iran, having endured sanctions and the threat of war around Hormuz, forced Washington to the table without capitulating.

On the other hand, Vance’s remark about the strict conditionality of sanctions relief — "only on the basis of results" — reminds Venezuela of its own experience: partial licenses for the oil sector, talks about elections in exchange for possible easing of sanctions, and the threat of rapid rollback of any relief if US-phrased conditions are not met.

A key technical element discussed by the BBC — reopening the Strait of Hormuz as a critical artery of the global energy market — is immediately compared in Venezuela to its own Caribbean basin and Gulf: if the US ultimately abandoned a long maritime strangulation of Iran, how realistic is a complete and prolonged maritime "quarantine" against Venezuela? The Iranian precedent is seen as an argument that a strategy of total energy blockade is unsustainable.

The "resistance bloc," a leader and a deal without capitulation

Caracas pays particular attention to how Khamenei is portrayed in the BBC Mundo piece: the son of an ayatollah killed in an operation attributed to the US and Israel, now supreme leader who, despite personal trauma and ideological rigidity, "held another opinion" but nonetheless "gave permission" for the agreement. In Venezuela this is interpreted as a model:

• it is possible to maintain "resistance" rhetoric and a hard "anti-imperial" identity while pragmatically striking deals with Washington;
• one can speak of protecting the "Resistance Front" (Iran’s allies in the region) without renouncing negotiations that ease the intensity of the conflict.

For Caracas this resonates closely with its own attempts to build dialogue with the US while not formally abandoning anti-American rhetoric and allies like Cuba or Nicaragua. In the figure of Khamenei the Venezuelan ruling elite see confirmation of their line: "peace without capitulation," i.e., agreements that do not require regime change or an official abandonment of strategic partnerships with Moscow or Tehran.

teleSUR and the Russian factor: peace in Hormuz as a triumph of multipolarity

In that context, teleSUR’s piece on the US–Iran agreement posted on Facebook looks perfectly logical. The post emphasizes that it was Vladimir Putin and participants at the Russia–ASEAN summit who "welcome" the memorandum between Washington and Tehran, seeing in it a step toward ending the conflict.

The text is short but full of Bolivarian rhetorical codes:

Russia and ASEAN are presented as a collective subject of the "rising South" and Eurasia, celebrating de-escalation after "the aggression of February." The term "aggression" fits organically into Caracas’s official lexicon, where almost any major military operation, sanctions campaign or blockade by the US and its allies is labeled "aggression." It is not specified who attacked whom, but the framing makes it clear: the West is to blame.

The agreement itself is defined as a "step toward peace," but that peace is not abstract — it is peace achieved thanks to the intervention or at least the approval of powers outside the Western bloc. This aligns entirely with the Bolivarian conception of multipolarity: the US is not shown as the sole arbiter, but as a forced participant in a dialogue where weight is held by Moscow, Tehran and Asian partners.

The fact that teleSUR headlines Putin and emphasizes the Russia–ASEAN summit indicates whose recognition of peace is considered "trustworthy." Legitimacy, in this narrative, comes from non-Western institutions and leaders, not from structures like NATO or even traditional forums under Western influence. Thus, the same memorandum, written about in detail by the BBC (bbc.com), in teleSUR’s telling becomes a story about how the Moscow–Tehran–Asia axis restrains the American impulse to war.

Oil, sanctions and Venezuelan interest

Iran and Russia are key oil-producing countries living under heavy sanctions, largely under a scheme already familiar to Venezuela. Therefore any de-escalatory agreement that reduces the risk of sudden oil price spikes due to a war in the Strait of Hormuz is viewed in Caracas with a dual lens:

• as a factor of potential market stabilization, where Venezuela also wants to return to play;
• as confirmation of the thesis that sanctioned states can negotiate with the US without unilateral capitulation.

If Iran, long portrayed as an "existential threat" to Washington and its allies, reaches a memorandum with the prospect of 60-day talks for a full agreement, then Caracas inevitably asks: why can’t a similar roadmap be the Venezuela–US track? From the perspective of Venezuelan elites, the Iranian case raises Caracas’s bargaining appeal: if the US is willing to talk to Tehran, the logic suggests it could also negotiate with Caracas on phased sanctions relief.

The "Hormuz" compromise and Venezuelan domestic politics

Finally, the image of the Strait of Hormuz partially unblocked as a result of Iran’s pressure and US calculations creates another symbolic layer in Venezuela. For the Bolivarian leadership this is an example of how:

• the threat to close critical energy routes can make a war too costly;
• even in a confrontational mode, a shift toward pragmatism is possible when both sides understand the limits of force.

This lesson is then transferred to the Caribbean basin and Venezuela’s region: the idea of a total maritime blockade or "quarantine," sometimes invoked in US political rhetoric, seems less plausible when compared with the real US turnaround in Hormuz.

Mexico as a mirror: "counterterrorism," cartels and covert operations

Alongside the Iranian theme, the Venezuelan media space actively discusses Edgardo Buscaglia’s analysis presented in his "Aristegui en Vivo" interview and circulated in the region (YouTube). Buscaglia, an Argentine-Mexican security expert, warns that:

• legal and judicial actions by the US against structures linked to Mexican cartels and the political elite are only the beginning of a broader "offensive";
• the administration of Donald Trump (and more broadly, the American political class) relies on international legal frameworks for fighting terrorism to expand its powers for extraterritorial actions;
• this could even include US special-operations activities "under cover," aimed not only at criminal groups but also at specific Mexican politicians and officials.

The Venezuelan reader hears not just a story about Mexico. In Caracas’s view, Buscaglia’s picture looks like part of a single doctrine: Washington codifies crime and terrorism in neighboring countries so that it then has grounds for forceful or covert intervention. What he describes for Mexico, in Venezuela’s perception, is a familiar scenario: accusations of drug trafficking, terrorism, corruption against high-ranking officials, bounty offers for information, arrest warrants — all this has already been applied to figures of the Chavista regime.

The "counterterrorist" umbrella and US extraterritorial power

Buscaglia’s remarks about using the "international counterterrorism legal framework" provoke particular sensitivity in Venezuela. There is long-standing concern in the local agenda that once the US equates a specific regime, party or armed group with "terrorists" or their accomplices, this opens up:

• the possibility of extraterritorial criminal prosecutions and confiscations;
• scope for sanctions both unilaterally and through allies;
• and even a "window of opportunity" for special operations using force under the pretext of preventive or counterterrorism actions.

Buscaglia’s conclusion that "this is only the beginning" and that actions against Mexican politicians will continue and deepen is read in Venezuela not only as a warning to Mexico but also as further confirmation of a regional trend: the legal and force infrastructure built by the US under the banner of the fight against terrorism and international crime easily transforms into an instrument of pressure on governments that Washington considers "uncooperative" or "dangerous."

Mexico and Venezuela: different scales, similar logic

It is important that Caracas does not equate Mexico and Venezuela. Mexico is formally a key US partner, with huge mutual economic and migration interdependence; Venezuela is a country under confrontation and sanctions. However, the logic of Washington that Buscaglia describes seems familiar to Venezuelan observers:

• first, a buildup of legal cases in US courts against politicians and military of another state;
• then those cases become grounds for sanctions, asset freezes, and restricted access to financial markets;
• in parallel, political discourse intensifies the image of the country as a "narco-state" or "sponsor of terrorism," justifying harsh measures.

In Venezuela this path is seen as already implemented: accusations against high-ranking figures, sanction packages, criminal cases in US courts — all of this has long been institutionalized and become part of the "normal" picture. What Buscaglia predicts for Mexico is perceived as the export of a tested scheme.

How realistic are "operations under cover"?

Buscaglia’s idea of potential covert US special-operations directed at Mexican politicians, if they are linked to terrorism or cartels, resonates strongly in the Venezuelan context. In a country where authorities regularly report foiled plots, commando landings and assassination attempts on the president allegedly involving foreign forces, this does not seem fantastical.

However, unlike Venezuela, where official versions often remain unconfirmed by independent sources, Buscaglia’s analysis is taken more seriously in the region because it is based on concrete US legal constructs and the observable dynamics of their application in Mexico. For Venezuelan elites and analysts this is a signal: if such measures are permissible against a large neighbor and trading partner, formal "ally" status does not guarantee immunity. All the less so for countries already designated a "threat to US national security," like Venezuela.

Common denominator: the force of law and the law of force

If one combines the three threads — the US–Iran memorandum as interpreted by BBC Mundo, teleSUR’s "peace" narrative about the same agreement, and Buscaglia’s warnings on Mexico — from the Venezuelan perspective a twofold US strategy emerges.

The first part — coercion into talks through pressure: sanctions, blockades, displays of military power and prosecutions create a point at which, as Khamenei believes, Trump and his administration act "out of desperation" to avoid full-scale war or a major energy crisis. In this logic Iran is an example of how stubborn resistance and readiness to go to the limit in response to pressure can force the US to the negotiating table.

The second part — expansion of legal and force prerogatives: using counterterrorism legislation and the fight against organized crime gives the US tools for extraterritorial influence, including against regional partners like Mexico. In this scheme Buscaglia sees Mexico as "the start of a broader offensive," and Venezuela, by its own assessment, has already passed many of its stages.

Between these poles — negotiations and covert war — the Venezuelan view of contemporary international politics lives: peace is possible, but not as a "Western victory," rather as a forced balance of power; the US must be forced to talk, but one cannot rely on a "neutral" legal order — law, in this logic, remains a continuation of politics.

In this world teleSUR celebrates any steps toward de-escalation if they originate from or are approved by non-Western centers of power, while also listening closely to experts like Buscaglia who reveal the inside story of the American "war on crime and terrorism." For Venezuela the Iranian memorandum and the Mexican case become not two separate stories but parts of a single mosaic: how small and medium powers navigate between the force of the dollar, the force of arms, and the weak but nonetheless possible force of multipolar consensus.

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Trump and Netanyahu in Open Conflict Over Deal with Iran

Relations between US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu have sharply deteriorated after Washington and Tehran signed a memorandum of understanding. The document, concluded with Pakistan’s mediation, provides for a cessation of hostilities and the start of 60 days of negotiations to reach a final agreement. In Israel this was called a political and strategic shock, undermining the so-called “absolute victory” and restricting the freedom of action of the Israeli army on the northern front.

According to Israeli assessments, American pressure includes practical demands: withdrawal of forces from southern Lebanon and from Syria’s Mount Hermon, as well as a scaling back of military activity in the north in order to preserve the diplomatic channel with Tehran. Washington is said to be insisting on leaving five positions that the IDF still holds in Lebanon, and expects clear commitments from Netanyahu that Trump could present as his success. In response, the Israeli prime minister rejected a full troop withdrawal, saying he would not yield on security matters, and tied any redeployment to strict guarantees for the disarmament of Hezbollah.

A particular concern in Israel was Trump’s statement downplaying the importance of Iran’s missile program compared with the nuclear threat. He stressed that the core problem is not to deprive Iran of all missile capabilities, but to prevent it from creating nuclear weapons. In Jerusalem it spread that Netanyahu made it clear: Israeli forces will not leave southern Lebanon until Hezbollah is disarmed. This dispute has raised fears that Israel could face practical measures from the United States.

Israeli sources report unofficial signals from Washington: if the confrontation continues, the US could delay weapons deliveries, impose restrictions on operational assistance, and even move closer to what is called in Israel an “arms embargo.” Tensions intensified after Trump’s public criticism, in which he accused Netanyahu of excessive bellicosity and condemned strikes on Lebanon, calling attacks on buildings in Beirut “unnecessary and damaging to de-escalation efforts.” The American press reported that Trump suspects the Israeli prime minister of prolonging hostilities for domestic purposes ahead of elections.

The domestic reaction in Israel was angry, especially among Netanyahu’s supporters, who regarded the US‑Iran agreement as a strategic failure. Media outlets that had earlier supported Trump and were close to the prime minister sharply turned and began attacking the US president and his team. According to Axios, the leading pro-government channel “14” gave Vice President Vance insulting nicknames and accused special envoys Whitkoff and Kushner of having “sold Israel” for personal gain. This shows the scale of the political and media rift.

Caught off guard by the timing of the announcement, Netanyahu undertook urgent contacts with the US administration, trying to change the terms of the agreement or obtain additional guarantees — but without visible results. The memorandum, signed by Trump and Iranian President Pezeshkian, opens a new 60-day negotiation phase. The current confrontation between Tel Aviv and Washington puts the future of military‑political cooperation at risk and could lead to diplomatic and operational escalation if the dispute continues.

Comments on the news

• Why are control of Mount Hermon and southern Lebanon considered by Israel to be critically important for its security, and what role does Hezbollah play in this? — Mount Hermon and southern Lebanon represent strategic heights from which observation and fire can be directed at Israel’s northern and central regions. Hezbollah, supported by Iran, uses southern Lebanon as a base for rocket installations and tunnels, creating a direct threat to Israeli cities. Control over these areas allows Israel to prevent surprise attacks, disrupt Hezbollah’s weapons supply chains, and maintain military superiority in the region.

• Who is Masud Pezeshkian and what are his powers as president of Iran in the context of negotiations with the US? — Masud Pezeshkian is an Iranian politician, a surgeon by training, who served as health minister in Mohammad Khatami’s government. As president of Iran (since 2024), he has limited authority in foreign policy and negotiations with the US, since final decisions on the nuclear program and strategic issues are made by the Supreme Leader (Ali Khamenei). Pezeshkian can initiate talks or offer compromises, but any agreements must be approved by the Supreme Leader and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

• What is the difference between Iran’s missile program and the nuclear threat, and why do Israelis consider this distinction dangerous for their security? — Iran’s missile program includes the development of ballistic missiles with ranges up to 2,000 km and guidance accuracy, which already allows strikes on Israel. The nuclear threat, meanwhile, is linked to the possibility of creating a nuclear warhead that could be mounted on such missiles. Israel sees this distinction as dangerous because the missile program provides Iran with immediate strike capability, while nuclear potential adds the threat of catastrophic impact. Thus, even if the nuclear program is frozen, missile capabilities remain a tool of destabilization and deterrence, leaving Israeli cities and air‑defense systems vulnerable.

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Full version: تل أبيب بعد الاتفاق.. رفض وغضب واتهامات لفريق ترمب ببيع إسرائيل

Delcy Rodríguez and Economic Cabinet Set Development Plan

At a meeting between Acting President of Venezuela Delcy Rodríguez and the Economic Cabinet, a roadmap was approved to strengthen state policy aimed at restoring and prospering the country's economy. The primary focus was on implementing the "Renacer 2026" plan, which provides for the consolidation of national political peace, the complete cessation of unilateral coercive measures, and the expansion of productive forces. Participants also discussed the development of 14 engines of the Bolivarian economic agenda within a diversification model, which should reinforce Venezuela's position as one of the most stable economies in Latin America and contribute to its transformation into an exporting power striving for full economic independence.

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Full version: Delcy Rodríguez y gabinete de Economía trazan hoja de ruta para expandir fuerzas productivas

Surprise in Islamabad: Trump and Iran’s President Signed the Memorandum Early in Paris and...

The unexpected signing of the "Memorandum of Understanding in Islamabad" between Washington and Tehran took place two days earlier than planned in Geneva. The ceremony had two completely different faces: at the Palace of Versailles in Paris, President Donald Trump publicly signed the document during a dinner hosted by Emmanuel Macron — a clip posted by Dan Scavino was captioned, "A fairly important moment in history that we share together…". On the other hand, in Tehran the Iranian president showed a sheet of the agreement signed by the Iranian side alone, without any formal ceremony.

The haste in signing was not merely a formality: both sides sought to immediately stop the war and reopen the Strait of Hormuz without waiting the extra two days. Diplomatic sources said the negotiations were aimed at practically opening the strait by Friday, but political pressure on the White House to make the text of the memorandum public ran up against Iran’s strict condition not to publish any clause before the official signing. Investigations by the Washington Post and Axios revealed a hidden struggle that led to the rapid signing, dispelled informational uncertainty, and raised the question: had the agreement been signed twice — secretly and publicly — to send different signals domestically and abroad?

Logistical factors also affected the mechanism of the virtual signing: Vice President J. D. Vance could not return to the US before Trump’s departure to France, so the American side resorted to electronic facilitation to bypass timing constraints. That arrangement raised questions about transparency, the authenticity of published texts, and the need for a single official version that technical teams could trust. Politically, the electronic signing by the leaders temporarily suspended the immediacy of the upcoming Geneva meeting, adding fog around the further negotiation path.

The announcement was not without escalatory notes from Trump, who threatened "hard bombings," repeated bombings, and the liquidation of Iranian officials in the event of Tehran violating the agreements. At the same time, Trump softened his earlier promises to completely eliminate Iran’s missile capability, saying that "it would be unfair if Iran had no missiles while other countries do." Iranian leadership avoided responding in kind to the language of threats, focusing instead on praising the diplomatic achievements secured by the memorandum.

Iran’s chief negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf said his country achieved by negotiations what it had repeatedly sought by military means: major economic gains, including lifting the blockade on ports, freezing sanctions, and unblocking assets worth billions of dollars. The text of the agreement revealed a gap between Trump’s hard rhetoric and the actual outcomes: the Iranian government remained in power, missile capability and stocks of highly enriched uranium were not destroyed, and Tehran obtained economic concessions and an investment fund for reconstruction worth about $300 billion. That gap raised questions about the limits of concessions and the parties’ ability to adhere to a roadmap for implementation.

Despite the announcement of a suspension of military operations and preparations for subsequent talks, details of the upcoming meeting in Geneva remain murky: some sources still expect delegations to meet to discuss the nuclear program, while Switzerland confirmed that the original plan included a broader session involving Pakistan, Qatar and other interested countries. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Ismail Baghai denied the existence of a signing ceremony in Geneva, saying that "the presidents have already signed electronically," and that the Friday meeting may be postponed. He firmly set the ceiling of negotiations: "Iranian missiles are made to be launched, not negotiated," stressing that defensive capabilities will not be a subject for discussion.

Comments on the news

• Why is the Strait of Hormuz so important for Iran and the global economy, and how could its closure affect global oil markets? — The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow passage between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman through which about 20–25% of the world’s oil passes. For Iran it is a key lever of influence: control of the strait allows Tehran to threaten to cut off shipments in the event of conflict, which would immediately trigger a sharp spike in oil prices, shortages for importing countries (especially in Asia), and global economic instability.

• Who is Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and why is he a key figure in the negotiations despite not being president or foreign minister? — Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf is the speaker of the Iranian Parliament (Majlis), an influential conservative, former mayor of Tehran and former commander of the IRGC air force. He plays a key role in negotiations because the parliament approves any international agreements (for example, the nuclear deal), and Ghalibaf represents the position of conservative circles and security forces, without whose approval agreements would be impossible. In effect he is the "gatekeeper" for any concessions, the link between the executive branch and the supreme leadership.

• Why does Iran insist that its missile program cannot be a subject of negotiations, and how is this related to its regional policy and security? — Iran’s missile program is the foundation of deterrence and protection against external threats (especially the US, Israel and regional rivals). It is not negotiated because it is considered an integral right of self-defense and an instrument to project influence in the region (support for allies in Yemen, Syria, Lebanon). Any limitation of missile capability, from Tehran’s perspective, would leave the country vulnerable and undermine its ability to respond to attacks, so Iranians categorically refuse to include this topic in negotiations, insisting it is a "red line".

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Full version: الخميس بدل الجمعة.. لماذا سارعت واشنطن وطهران لتوقيع الاتفاق قبل الموعد؟

War with Iran Exposed Limits of US Influence, Expert Says

American expert Steven Cook argues that the war waged by the US against Iran has demonstrated the limited reach of Washington’s influence in the Middle East and has revived calls to end the American presence in the region. In his view, the military operation “Epic Fury,” launched by President Trump, did not yield any real strategic gains. Despite loud declarations of victory, the actual state of affairs and the terms of the agreement paint a very different picture.

Cook examines in detail the memorandum of understanding between Washington and Tehran, which includes talks on the nuclear program and a temporary 60-day exemption from sanctions on Iranian oil exports. At the same time, the future of shipping in the Strait of Hormuz remains uncertain — Iranian officials emphasize that guarantees of freedom of navigation are limited to the temporary agreement, and Tehran may later introduce fees for ship transits. These conditions call into question the very rationale for the war and the achievement of its stated goals.

Cook asks what the real aim of the conflict was and suggests that Americans, their allies, and even the Iranians were better off before the military escalation on February 28. Trump’s failure to achieve tangible results could produce the opposite effect — accelerating the withdrawal of US forces from the region. Reluctance is growing in Congress and among current and future officials to commit vast political, military, and financial resources to maintain a presence in the Middle East.

The author draws a historical parallel with the withdrawal of British forces from the Persian Gulf in the 1970s, stressing that 50 years of American intervention have not produced a Palestinian state, transformed Iraqi society, or democratized the countries of the region. The war with Iran merely added to a series of failures, making the Middle East a politically toxic topic in Washington. The bipartisan consensus is increasingly leaning toward reduced involvement, and shifts in energy markets and the move to clean energy are changing American calculations.

Cook predicts that the American presence will be reduced to a minimum: a naval base in Bahrain, periodic aircraft carrier patrols, and possibly an air wing in Jordan. This would mean the end of the “Carter Doctrine,” which guaranteed protection of oil supplies from the Gulf, and the close of the traditional American era in the Middle East. The absence of a clear international successor will force Washington’s allies to reassess their security, especially given China’s reluctance to inherit an American role after the costly lessons of past interventions. In the expert’s view, Trump made a “strategic mistake,” but now he has an unprecedented opportunity to pull the US out of the region, which would reshape the balance of power and end decades of American hegemony.

Commentary on the story

• What is the “Carter Doctrine” and how is it related to US policy in the Persian Gulf? - The Carter Doctrine, announced in 1980 by US President Jimmy Carter, states that any attempt by an external force to gain control of the Persian Gulf will be viewed as a threat to vital US interests, and Washington will use military force to defend those interests. This doctrine underpins the permanent US military presence in the region, including deployment of the Fifth Fleet in Bahrain and operations to ensure freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. It was a reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian revolution, and today it is used to deter Iran.
• Why is the Strait of Hormuz important for the global economy and how could Iran threaten shipping? - The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow passage in the Persian Gulf through which about 20–25% of the world’s oil shipments (roughly 17–20 million barrels per day) transit. Any blockage or threat to shipping could cause a sharp spike in oil prices and a global economic crisis. Iran could potentially threaten shipping using fast attack boats, naval mines, anti-ship missiles, and drones, as well as by detaining or seizing tankers, as it has done previously. However, Iran generally acts cautiously to avoid provoking a full-scale US military response.
• What role does the US naval base in Bahrain play in the American presence in the region? - The US naval base in Bahrain (Naval Support Activity Bahrain) is the headquarters of the US Fifth Fleet and the Combined Maritime Forces. It provides a continuous US Navy presence in the Persian Gulf, enables patrols of the Strait of Hormuz, supports allies (Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait), and allows for rapid response to any threats from Iran. The base also serves as a logistics hub for all US operations in the region — from countering piracy to protecting oil shipping routes.

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Full version: هل اقتربت نهاية "مبدأ كارتر"؟.. دعوات أمريكية للانسحاب من الشرق الأوسط

Venezuela Rejects ICC Jurisdiction in Esequibo Dispute

Venezuelan Foreign Minister Ivan Gil, at a conference on the territorial dispute over Guyana’s Esequibo, said that Caracas possesses irrefutable historical and legal evidence of its rights to the territory. Speaking at the Teresa Carreño Theatre, Gil emphasized that Venezuela has presented the international community with a "solid legal strategy" demonstrating the legitimacy of its claims. "This is a legal and historical truth that no one can dispute," the diplomat said, praising the team that defended the country's interests at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague. He called the arguments presented innovative and predicted they would become a model for future international law textbooks.

Gil also reiterated Venezuela’s position that the ICJ lacks jurisdiction to decide this dispute. Referring to the words of Acting President Delcy Rodríguez, he stressed that while Caracas respects the court, it nevertheless believes that the court's authority does not extend to this conflict. According to Venezuelan authorities, the only legitimate instrument for settlement remains the 1966 Geneva Agreement, which Venezuela insists is fully in line with international law. Thus, Caracas continues to insist on bilateral negotiations as the only possible path to resolving the territorial confrontation with Guyana.

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Full version: Canciller Gil: La pertinencia venezolana sobre el Esequibo es una verdad jurídica e histórica que nadie puede rebatir

Draft US–Iran Deal: End of War and Nuclear Compromise

Bloomberg has published the text of a draft memorandum of understanding between the United States and Iran, which is expected to be formally signed in Switzerland this coming Friday. The document envisages the cessation of hostilities on all fronts and the parties’ commitment to conclude a final agreement within 60 days with the possibility of an extension, while Tehran would retain its current nuclear program. The publication of the document comes amid questions about whether the draft contains significant concessions in favor of Iran.

It is not yet clear whether the text published by Bloomberg is the same version that was approved via electronic signature on Monday, which U.S. President Donald Trump said, adding uncertainty about the final version. The leaked document intensifies political debates and pressure within the United States over the contents of the framework agreement and how well it serves American interests. The parties are awaiting the formal signing to learn the binding provisions precisely.

President Trump said he would release the text of the memorandum “within two days” and even suggested reading it on camera, and he also said he would send the document to Congress for review. His statements about transparency are aimed at calming domestic criticism and involving Congress in assessing the provisions. Nevertheless, political reactions remain mixed, and lawmakers’ demands for amendments or additional conditions may increase.

Key points include a declaration by Tehran and Washington, together with their allies, of an immediate and final cessation of military operations and a pledge not to carry out any hostile actions or threats. The parties commit to reach a final agreement within 60 days with the option to extend, and the U.S. agrees to lift the maritime blockade immediately after signing and withdraw its troops within 30 days from the date of the final deal. Iran, in turn, undertakes to resume the movement of ships within 30 days and remove obstacles to navigation.

In the economic sphere, Washington pledges to cooperate with regional partners to restore and develop Iran’s economy, as well as to lift sanctions on an agreed schedule as part of the final agreement. The draft also provides for exempting Iranian oil and related banking services from sanctions, as well as unblocking frozen Iranian funds and assets. These provisions are intended to create economic incentives for Tehran to fulfill the conditions of the final deal and ensure the implementation of the obligations undertaken.

Comments on the news

• Why was Switzerland chosen as the place to sign the memorandum between the US and Iran, and what role does it play in diplomatic relations between these countries? - Since 1980 Switzerland has officially represented U.S. interests in Iran (as the “protecting power”), because diplomatic relations between the two countries were severed. Its neutral status allows it to act as an intermediary in signing such agreements. In addition, Swiss banks have traditionally been used for secure financial transactions between the parties.

• Which Iranian funds and assets are frozen abroad, and where are they located? - These are mainly Iran’s oil export revenues that are stuck in accounts at banks in China, South Korea, Japan and Iraq. These funds (estimates range from $6 to $7 billion) were blocked due to U.S. sanctions prohibiting transfers to Tehran. Some assets are also frozen in European banks.

• How did the U.S. maritime blockade against Iran affect the Iranian economy and trade before this agreement was signed? - By “maritime blockade” is meant an intensive regime of sanctions whereby the U.S. intercepted Iranian oil tankers on the high seas, blocking oil exports. This reduced Iran’s oil export revenues by 80–90% (since 2018), caused a sharp rise in inflation and shortages of goods, including medicines. The blockade also paralyzed maritime trade, forcing Iranian merchants to use complex sanction-evading schemes.

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Full version: تسريبات لنص مذكرة التفاهم بين واشنطن وطهران وسط ضغوط على ترمب

Strait agreement: mines delay resumption of shipping

The agreement reached to resume navigation through the Strait of Hormuz raised short-term hopes of easing the energy crisis, but realities on the ground indicate that restoring normal shipping may take longer. The US president confirmed that oil flows will be restored on both sides, but the situation on the ground is full of technical and military complications. The most pressing threat is the possible presence of naval mines in the vital corridor, although dozens of ships have transited it during the fighting without reported incidents.

According to US intelligence, Iran may possess an arsenal of up to 5,000 naval mines, from simple drifting models to modern bottom mines with multi-channel sensor systems. Such variety greatly complicates detection and neutralization, since some mines rest on the seabed, camouflaging themselves among rocks and debris. The presence of delayed-action mechanisms and acoustic sensors or "ship counters" only increases the difficulty of clearing the strait.

The US Navy is preparing large-scale sweeping operations, covering air, surface and depths in search of potential mines. The strategy increasingly relies on unmanned aerial vehicles, helicopters and underwater drones to detect and localize targets without risking crewed vessels. The Navy has replaced most traditional Avenger-class minesweepers with steel coastal ships, which stay away from suspicious areas and use unmanned platforms in their stead.

Technical difficulties persist despite advances in equipment, because modern mines can hide and operate with multiple detection systems, or go to depths that avoid sweeping gear. Chief engineer Scott Savitz of the RAND Corporation noted: "This is extremely exhausting work. If the mines lie on the bottom, you have to distinguish them from rocky outcrops, wreckage in busy channels and debris dumped at sea for decades or centuries." He added that some mines have "ship counters" set to detonate after a specified number of vessels, which could cause mass destruction.

When remote surveys fail, mine disposal becomes a dangerous personal mission: clearance divers dive using equipment that reduces noise, bubbles and magnetic signatures to reach a suspicious object. The Navy employs underwater drones and side-scan sonar to map the seabed and precisely locate mines. These slow and painstaking operations delay the clearing of the strait and place additional pressure on international fleet coordination. In addition to military obstacles, logistical and economic constraints delay the resumption of commercial transit: the head of Mitsui OSK Lines warned that shipowners will not resume transits for at least weeks until they are convinced the agreement is real, while the International Maritime Organization continues to assess safety and create safe corridors for crew evacuations. Given that about one fifth of the world's energy supplies pass through the strait, mine clearance remains a decisive factor in delaying the restoration of confidence, and a full resumption of shipping will take weeks before returning to normal.

Comments on the news

• What is the exact geographic width of the Strait of Hormuz and why is it considered vulnerable to mining? - The Strait of Hormuz is about 33 kilometers (21 nautical miles) wide at its narrowest point. However, the navigable channels available for large tankers are much narrower — about 3–5 kilometers in each direction. This narrowness makes the strait vulnerable to mining, since a small number of mines can block or seriously impede transits, especially where maneuvering is limited. The water depth in the strait is sufficient to use various types of mines, and heavy traffic (about 20–30% of global oil shipments) creates additional risks.

• Why does Iran use naval mines as an asymmetric deterrent, and what other Iranian military doctrines affect regional security? - Iran uses naval mines as an asymmetric tool because its naval forces are significantly smaller and less technologically advanced than the US Navy and its allies. Mines are cheap, simple to deploy and can effectively disrupt commerce or military operations. This is part of a broader Iranian doctrine of "unequal warfare" (or "asymmetric deterrence"), which also includes fast attack boats, anti-ship missiles (including the Noor and Khalij-Fars), drones and small submarines. All these means aim to create "denial zones" for an adversary without engaging superior forces directly.

• What is the history of tensions between Iran and the US in the Strait of Hormuz, and what previous mine incidents have occurred in the region? - Tensions have a long history, dating back to the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Key incidents include Operation Praying Mantis (1988), when the US struck Iranian oil platforms after an American frigate was damaged by a mine; the 2019 series of attacks on tankers off the UAE coast, for which the US and Saudi Arabia blamed Iran (which denied involvement). The most notable mine incident occurred in 1987 when an Iranian mine damaged the US frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts, prompting a large-scale mine-clearing operation. During the "Tanker War" (1984–1988), Iran actively mined approaches to Kuwaiti and Saudi ports, causing catastrophic consequences for civilian shipping.

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Full version: مضيق هرمز.. لماذا يتطلب استئناف الملاحة أسابيع رغم اتفاق وقف الحرب؟

Diosdado Cabello: 12,000 Venezuelans Await Trial

The secretary general of the ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), Diosdado Cabello, stated that more than 12,000 people in the country are awaiting trial. He noted that the cases of these people are currently being reviewed to correct procedural violations and to organize judicial procedures. According to Cabello, 70% of the detainees use the assistance of public defenders, which indicates that most of them cannot afford private lawyers.

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Full version: Diosdado Cabello informó que al menos 12 mil personas están pendientes de juicio en Venezuela

G7 Summit: Ukraine and Iran at Center of Agenda

Today in Évian, France, the G7 summit began, with the war in Ukraine and the nuclear deal with Iran taking center stage. Leaders of the world’s major industrial democracies are holding intensive consultations ahead of a meeting with Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky. Against the backdrop of international efforts to resolve the conflict, U.S. President Donald Trump made remarks that injected cautious optimism: he hinted at the possibility of reaching a compromise in the protracted standoff, raising expectations of urgent diplomatic moves.

Zelensky will hold a separate morning session devoted to the situation in Ukraine, where he will try to persuade G7 leaders to step up pressure on Russia. He called for a “decisive and tangible” response to Russian strikes that killed 11 people and damaged a well-known church in Kyiv. The Ukrainian leader also proposed holding talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin “on the sidelines” of the summit, but Moscow indicated it is not yet ready for such a meeting, complicating direct negotiation efforts.

Trump said he had held phone calls with both Zelensky and Putin, noting that “both are open, and maybe we can do something,” without going into details on possible steps. Those remarks gave hope that Washington might be willing to act as a mediator or to push for peace talks, but left unclear what forms of pressure or guarantees might be applied to Moscow. European leaders, meanwhile, are seeking to persuade him to press Russia to achieve a peace on Kyiv’s terms without forced concessions.

On military and economic support for Ukraine, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced deliveries of enriched uranium for Ukrainian nuclear facilities alongside a new package of sanctions against Russia. Starmer called the Russian strikes “brutal” and confirmed London’s commitment to “cut off the resources financing Putin’s war,” as well as to support Ukraine during the coming winter months. Analysts note that the balance of forces on the battlefield has recently been tilting in Ukraine’s favor, which requires continued Western assistance to preserve that momentum.

After the Ukrainian session, a special summit on Iran will take place with participation from regional leaders, including Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim, and UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed. U.S. allies will try to clarify Trump’s position on the proposed deal with Tehran to end the war in the Middle East. Trump said the agreement could lead to “the full opening of the Strait of Hormuz by Friday,” but expressed skepticism about the British-French proposal for a military mission to ensure freedom of navigation, stressing that the U.S. “doesn’t need much help” on that matter. The summit will last three days, and France is seeking to broaden the G7 format by inviting leaders such as Brazilian President Lula da Silva and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Discussions are aimed at forging a united stance among leading industrial nations on security, energy, and regional diplomacy in order to find practical solutions on Ukraine and Iran.

Comments on the News

• What is the nuclear deal with Iran that is being debated, and why does its revival cause disagreement between the U.S. and European allies? — The nuclear deal, or the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), was signed in 2015 between Iran and six world powers. It limited Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for the lifting of most sanctions. The U.S. withdrew from the deal in 2018 under President Trump, after which Europe tried to preserve the agreement through diplomatic measures. Revival is contentious because European allies (Germany, France, the UK) support restoring the deal as a path to stability, while the U.S. — particularly under conservative administrations — insists on tougher conditions and on including Iran’s missile program, which Iran rejects.

• Why is the Strait of Hormuz strategically important to the global economy, and how does Iran influence freedom of navigation in the area? — The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow maritime corridor between Iran and Oman through which about 20% of the world’s oil shipments and a significant portion of liquefied natural gas pass. Iran, which controls the strait’s northern coast, has repeatedly threatened to close it in response to sanctions or military actions. It affects navigation through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which can mine the passage, detain tankers, or conduct military exercises, creating risks for global energy prices and supply chains.

• What role does UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed play in Middle East diplomacy, and why is his participation in the Iran talks important for Gulf countries? — Mohammed bin Zayed, President of the UAE, has acted as a pragmatic interlocutor between the West, Israel, and Iran. His country maintains diplomatic channels with Tehran despite tensions and participates in humanitarian projects. His involvement is important for Gulf states because the UAE is an economic hub of the region, and any escalation with Iran directly affects their oil revenues and the security of maritime routes. He seeks balance to prevent a conflict that could undermine investment and stability in the Emirates.

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Full version: انطلاق قمة السبع وأوكرانيا والاتفاق مع إيران يتصدران المباحثات

Iran and the US Reach Historic Ceasefire Agreement

US President Donald Trump announced a comprehensive agreement with Iran after months of military escalation and indirect talks. The agreement provides for an immediate and permanent cessation of hostilities on all fronts, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz to international shipping, and the lifting of the maritime blockade on Iran. Agreements were also reached on Iran's nuclear program and other regional issues. The final text will be signed in Geneva on June 19, after which all details will be made public.

Trump immediately ordered the lifting of the maritime blockade and called the agreement an "impenetrable wall" preventing attempts by Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. Addressing global carriers, he said: "Start your engines, let the oil flow." Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi confirmed that the memorandum text has been agreed and promised to reveal the details after signing. Mediators from Qatar and Pakistan played a special role in the talks and were praised for narrowing the parties' positions.

According to Iranian leaks, the agreement includes financial provisions, including the unfreezing of assets in the amount of $12–24 billion within 60 days. At the last moment a clause guaranteeing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon was added. However, Washington officially denied these figures, calling them an information trap. A US official emphasized that any financial assistance will be provided on a "pay-for-performance" basis and only after Iran fulfills its obligations.

The announcement of the agreement was overshadowed by diplomatic incidents: the Iranian side insisted on postponing the timing of the announcement so it would not coincide with Trump's birthday, but in the end the news was released on that date Washington time. Attacks on the southern suburbs of Beirut and Israeli pressure nearly derailed the talks. Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif called the agreement a "peace treaty" and promised that the mediators would continue coordinating to implement all the points.

One of the key elements of the agreement was an immediate ceasefire between the US and Iran on all fronts, including the Lebanese direction, where escalation had been constant. Iranian sources confirmed that Tehran had considered military options for response but postponed them after guarantees of Lebanon's territorial integrity and the lifting of the blockade. Special attention was paid to the Strait of Hormuz — a strategic node for global oil trade; the agreement provides for regulating navigation jointly with Oman and other Gulf countries.

Despite the cessation of hostilities, the nuclear issue and sanctions remain subjects of technical negotiations. Trump claims that Iran agreed not to develop nuclear weapons and calls the new agreement fundamentally different from Obama's deal. Final arrangements on uranium enrichment and verification mechanisms will be worked out later. Now all eyes are on the ceremony in Geneva, which will convert the memoranda into legally binding documents. The success of the agreement depends on the parties' ability to meet their obligations: any failure in implementation or return to confrontation could destroy the fragile balance. Observers say that if the agreements hold, this could mark the beginning of a reconfiguration of regional relations after long years of confrontation.

Comments on the news

• Why is the Strait of Hormuz considered strategically important for the global economy and what means does Iran have to block it? - The Strait of Hormuz is a key transit corridor for about 20–30% of the world's seaborne oil; up to 80% of Iranian and Arab hydrocarbon exports pass through it. Iran has means to block it, including laying naval mines, using fast boats of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy, anti-ship missiles (for example, the "Noor"), and the ability to attack tankers via drones and submersible vehicles. A partial blockade can be achieved in a short time, though a full blockade would require significant military effort.

• Why did Pakistan unexpectedly participate as a mediator between Iran and the US, and what role does it usually play in regional diplomacy? - Pakistan unexpectedly acted as a mediator because of its long-standing religious, cultural and economic ties with Iran (around 50 million Shiites live in Pakistan), and because it seeks to stabilize the situation to avoid regional escalation that could affect its borders. Pakistan typically plays the role of a "bridge" between the Sunni world (Saudi Arabia, the UAE) and Shiite Iran, participating in talks on Afghanistan and Kashmir, but direct mediation missions between Tehran and Washington are rare, underscoring the seriousness of the current crisis.

• Which Lebanese groups and political forces is Iran connected to, and why did guarantees of Lebanon's territorial integrity become a key condition in talks with the US? - Iran is connected to Lebanon's Hezbollah (its main proxy ally), the Amal Movement (led by Nabih Berri), and the Free Patriotic Movement (founded by Michel Aoun), which form a pro-Iranian bloc. Guarantees of Lebanon's territorial integrity became a key condition because Iran, through Hezbollah, controls significant territory in southern Lebanon, and any threat to sovereignty (for example, Israeli strikes or US pressure) could weaken Iranian influence. Iran demands guarantees to preserve Hezbollah as a military and political force and to prevent the fragmentation of Lebanon along confessional lines.

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Full version: من الضاحية إلى جنيف.. ماذا نعرف عن اتفاق أمريكا وإيران وكواليس اللحظات الأخيرة؟

Hegseth: US to Maintain Military Presence in Venezuela

US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said in an interview on CBS News' Face The Nation on Sunday that the United States will continue an active military presence in Venezuela and other Latin American countries as part of joint operations against criminal organizations. Hegseth emphasized that American forces were invited by the Venezuelan government to assist in an operation in the state of Bolívar, during which the leader of "Tren de Aragua," Héctor Rustenford Guerrero Flores, known as Niño Guerrero, was killed. According to him, US security policy in the Western Hemisphere is being built around the creation of an "American Coalition Against the Cartels" in partnership with Central and South American states, and Americans should expect similar operations in countries such as Ecuador and Guatemala aimed at pursuing, destroying, and dismantling foreign terrorist organizations and drug trafficking.

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Full version: Pete Hegseth: EEUU mantendrá presencia militar en Venezuela y otros países

Iran–US Deal: A Path Through Crises and Mediators

Agreement on a memorandum of understanding between Iran and the US became a complex and unpredictable process that nearly collapsed after an Israeli strike on a southern suburb of Beirut. An unofficial signing took place on Wednesday in the presence of a Qatari mediator; the formal announcement was postponed until Sunday evening. After the attack, Tehran considered a military response that could have destroyed all the agreements reached.

Qatari and American diplomacy played a decisive role in de-escalation, persuading Tehran to avoid steps that could undermine the advanced negotiations. Despite the tension, the parties reached an agreement, but two key disagreements required the Qatari mediator to return to Tehran. The disputes concerned the status of the Strait of Hormuz and $24 billion in frozen Iranian assets.

The issue of the Strait of Hormuz caused friction because the text was incompatible with statements by the Supreme Leader, who had previously said the strait “will not return to its former state.” The clause was referred to the National Security Council, then to a six-party commission, and until the last moment remained subject to approval by the Supreme Leader. Edits were made to make the wording clearer and to reassure conservative circles.

The dispute over the $24 billion was resolved after Qatar convinced Tehran of the reliability of American guarantees, given past experience of failed access to those funds. Expert Hassan Ahmadian noted that the agreement gave Iran two bargaining chips instead of just the nuclear one: control over the strait became a “negotiating table” with Washington. The deal separates the issues — opening the strait for commercial shipping with Iran-Oman monitoring, while the nuclear dossier is deferred for 60 days with the possibility of extension.

Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif announced a peace agreement aimed at ending hostilities on all fronts, including the Lebanese front. A signing ceremony is scheduled for June 19 in Switzerland, giving the deal official international status. However, analysts warn that the risk remains that Washington will be unable to restrain Israel, which could return the parties to square one.

Comments on the news

• Why is the Strait of Hormuz so important to Iran, and what role does it play in global energy security? — The Strait of Hormuz is a strategic narrow passage between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman through which about 20–25% of global oil trade transits. For Iran, control of it is a lever of influence: Tehran has repeatedly threatened to close the strait in response to sanctions or military threats, which could trigger a sharp rise in oil prices and disrupt energy supplies to countries in Asia, Europe, and North America.
• What events led to the freezing of $24 billion in Iranian assets, and why is Tehran skeptical of US guarantees for their unfreezing? — The asset freeze is linked to the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal (JCPOA) in 2018 under Donald Trump and the subsequent tightening of sanctions. In 2023, an agreement was reached to unfreeze $6 billion in exchange for the release of American detainees, but Iran is skeptical of US guarantees because of the “precedent of broken commitments” (the unilateral exit from the deal) and domestic political resistance in the US to such measures.
• What role does Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei play in approving Iran’s international agreements, and how do his powers differ from those of the president? — The Supreme Leader (rahbar) has the final word on all matters of national security, foreign policy, and the nuclear program, including the ratification of international agreements. The President of Iran, under the Constitution, is responsible for executive power and conducting negotiations, but cannot sign final agreements without Khamenei’s approval. In practice, the rahbar controls key institutions (the Expediency Discernment Council, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), which gives him the authority to block presidential decisions if they conflict with his strategic vision.

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Full version: كواليس إنقاذ الاتفاق الأمريكي الإيراني.. هكذا أقرته دوائر صنع القرار في طهران

Trump's age in the crosshairs: trying to appear as a fighter

Approaching his 80th birthday, Donald Trump is trying to craft an image of a "fighter-president" who defies age, but public opinion polls and journalistic investigations are once again raising questions about how his age affects his ability to carry out presidential duties. Trump supporters, in turn, insist that he still performs his job successfully and that any doubts on the matter are merely political games.

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Full version: الجزيرة نت

Delcy Rodríguez urged Venezuelans to take part in the popular consultation on July 12

Acting President of Venezuela Delcy Rodríguez appealed to citizens to take part in the upcoming popular consultation scheduled for July 12. In her statement she emphasized that the communes are already organized and holding meetings, and that housing associations are also joining the process. Rodríguez noted that an organized community best understands the country's real problems, and she called on the people to remain united, acting as a single force within the framework of a "participatory and leading democracy".

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Full version: Delcy Rodríguez llama al pueblo venezolano a participar en la Consulta Popular del 12-Jul

Dispute over the signing date of the US‑Iran deal intensifies

The world is watching with bated breath for the official announcement of the US‑Iran agreement that could end months of war and tensions in the Middle East. However, the signing date has become a new field of political struggle between Washington and Tehran. US President Donald Trump insists on Sunday, June 14 — which coincides with his 80th birthday — a move observers say is part of his strategy to link major achievements to his political image. Tehran, for its part, appears determined to deny him this symbolic victory, and Iranian statements increasingly cast doubt on the possibility of signing on the appointed date.

Trump and Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif announced that the signing is scheduled for Sunday and that Islamabad is preparing to participate in an electronic ceremony, to be followed by technical talks next week. But Iran’s Foreign Ministry downplayed the definitiveness of that date: spokesman Ismail Baghaei said that “the signing date has not yet been determined,” calling talk of a Sunday signing premature. He also noted that the other side’s vacillations require caution, although the possibility of concluding talks in the coming days remains.

The dispute over the timing of the signing is not limited to symbolic and political aspects but touches on logistical and intra‑American considerations. Reports say the choice of a virtual format is partly explained by scheduling difficulties for the president and Vice President J.D. Vance, since security protocols prohibit both from traveling abroad simultaneously to ensure continuity of government. Two sources told the media that Vance’s inability to return before Trump’s departure for France became the main reason for switching to a remote signing format.

Iranian media close to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), such as the Fars agency, link Trump’s insistence on Sunday to his birthday and say the aim is to turn the agreement into a “personal, publicity‑driven achievement.” According to the agency, Iranian officials are aware of these motives and refuse to allow the date to be used for Trump’s political interests. That is why Tehran seeks to erase the symbolic undertone of the signing and deny Washington an easy news agenda.

According to informed sources, the draft memorandum of understanding includes the resumption of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, lifting the US naval blockade of Iranian ports, and reciprocal steps to de‑escalate. The document also envisages a phased unfreezing of billions of dollars in Iranian assets and easing sanctions on Iranian oil exports, while Washington insists that the nuclear dossier will remain on the negotiation table for the following 60 days. Americans say the ultimate goal is the dismantling of the nuclear program and the destruction of stocks of highly enriched uranium, whereas Tehran insists on its right to peaceful nuclear energy and limited amounts of low‑enriched uranium. Despite disagreements over the announcement date, indicators of rapprochement are stronger than ever, yet the struggle over influence and symbolism is far from over. The days between a president who wants to tie a historic moment to his name and Iranian leaders who deny him a moral victory could turn the day of signing itself into part of the negotiations rather than a mere protocol event. The coming days will be decisive in answering whether the talks will culminate in a final agreement or be postponed amid ongoing political and procedural struggles.

Comments on the news

• What role does the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) play in Iran’s political and economic system, and why might its position be critical for the success of the deal? – The IRGC is not just a military force but a key political and economic player in Iran. It controls a significant portion of the economy through a network of affiliated companies (including construction, energy and banking) and also exerts direct influence over foreign policy and the nuclear program. The IRGC’s position is critical because any deal (for example, on the nuclear program) affects its economic and strategic interests. If the IRGC opposes the deal, it can block its implementation or weaken the government’s leverage, making its consent a necessary condition for the durability of any agreement.

• Why is the Strait of Hormuz considered a strategic choke point for the global economy, and how is Iranian control over it used in negotiations? – About 20–30% of the world’s oil (including liquefied gas) passes through the Strait of Hormuz. It is the only maritime route for energy exports from the Persian Gulf countries (Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the UAE, Kuwait, Qatar). Iran threatens to close the strait in the event of sanctions or conflict, which could trigger a sharp rise in energy prices and a global crisis. In negotiations, Tehran uses this threat as leverage, implying that without sanctions relief the risk to the world economy will increase.

• What historical reasons underlie Iran’s demand to preserve the “right to peaceful nuclear energy,” and how does this relate to international concerns about nuclear weapons? – Iran’s demand is based on the Treaty on the Non‑Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which recognizes states’ right to develop peaceful nuclear energy. Historically, Iran — a signatory of the NPT — faced discrimination: Western countries (the US, Germany) curtailed its nuclear program after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, while Israel and India (non‑NPT states) acquired nuclear weapons. Iran insists on sovereignty in science, but its refusal to grant the IAEA access to military sites and suspicions about work on explosive devices (uranium enrichment to 60% and above) heighten Western fears that a military objective — building a nuclear bomb — may be hidden behind a peaceful program.

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Full version: "هدية عيد ميلاده الـ80".. لماذا يستعجل ترمب توقيع الاتفاق وتتوجس إيران؟

Qatar breakthrough: how diplomacy prevented a US–Iran war

Qatar's diplomatic mission to Tehran managed to stop a series of reciprocal strikes between the United States and Iran triggered by the downing of an American Apache helicopter. According to The Wall Street Journal, the visit of the Qatari delegation persuaded the US president to cancel “hard” strikes on Iranian infrastructure that Washington had been preparing as retaliation. In response to the threat of American attacks, Tehran struck US bases and their allies in the Persian Gulf, pushing the region to the brink of full-scale conflict.

The turning point came when Qatari mediators returned from Tehran with an updated draft of a peace agreement. At the same time, Pakistani officials convinced the US president that a deal was imminent, which allowed the planned “severe bombings” scheduled for that same evening to be called off. These diplomatic maneuvers took place in a race against time, as military clashes were already pushing the region toward broader confrontation.

Despite the progress, serious disagreements remain between the parties. As a Qatari source said, “gaps between the Iranian and American positions still exist” on issues of billions of dollars of Iran’s frozen assets, control of the Strait of Hormuz, and the disposal of highly enriched uranium. Tehran insists on quicker access to its frozen funds, while mediators report they are nearing an agreement to resume shipping through the strait and to ease some sanctions restrictions.

US officials announced that Vice President J. D. Vance plans to travel to Geneva to sign a memorandum of understanding, after which more complicated technical issues will be discussed in Islamabad. This multi-stage diplomatic process aims to turn political understandings into measurable executive agreements that tie de-escalation to specific technical steps and timelines.

President Trump became furious when a text purportedly favorable to Iran leaked to the media. His team immediately rejected any suggestion of weakness in the deal, stressing that “Iran will not receive sanctions relief and economic benefits until it takes concrete steps on its nuclear program.” Washington demands the dismantling of nuclear facilities, an end to uranium enrichment, and a halt to funding proxy groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon. At the same time, Tehran remains cautious: Foreign Ministry spokesman Ismail Bagai said that “we are at the final stages of internal review of the text of the agreement,” and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi did not rule out signing the memorandum in digital form in the coming days.

News comments

• Why is the Strait of Hormuz considered a strategic point in Iran–US relations? - The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow maritime passage through which about 20–25% of the world’s oil flows. Iran has threatened to close the strait in response to sanctions, which could trigger a global energy crisis and military clashes with US naval forces patrolling the region.
• Which groups, besides Hezbollah, does Iran support in the Middle East and why does this affect the negotiations? - Iran supports the Yemeni Houthis, Palestinian Hamas, and Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria. These groups act as proxy forces, allowing Iran to strike US and Israeli interests without direct military confrontation. In talks, this complicates settlement because each group has its own demands, and Washington demands an end to funding for all proxies.
• How did the downing of an Apache helicopter lead to the threat of full-scale conflict between the US and Iran? - If it concerns a shot-down American attack helicopter (for example, during the 2019 incident when Iran shot down an American drone), such actions are viewed by the US as an act of aggression. This forces the Pentagon to take retaliatory military steps, increasing the risk of an exchange of strikes that could escalate into a full-scale war.

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Full version: وول ستريت جورنال: زيارة قطرية أوقفت التصعيد بين إيران وأمريكا بعد حادثة المروحية

Venezuela and US Discuss Energy Cooperation amid Resumption of Diplomatic Relations

Acting President of Venezuela Delcy Rodríguez held a meeting with a US delegation to review the bilateral energy agenda. The talks, held on Friday, included Toby Dinh, Senior Policy Advisor for the US Council on Energy Dominance, Acting Deputy Secretary of Energy Andrew Rapp, and Chargé d’Affaires of the United States in Venezuela John Barrett. From the Venezuelan side were Vice President for Economy Calixto Ortega, Minister of Hydrocarbons Paula Eñao, PDVSA President Héctor Obregón, and other high-ranking officials. The meeting followed the resumption of diplomatic relations on March 5, based on the principles of peaceful diplomacy and mutual recognition of sovereignty. The parties discussed key issues in the energy sector aimed at market stability and mutually beneficial development, emphasizing Venezuela’s commitment to being a reliable energy supplier.

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Full version: Presidenta (E) se reunió con autoridades estadounidenses para repasar la agenda energética bilateral Venezuela-EEUU

Iran and US close to memorandum, delay due to internal processes

Despite Washington and Tehran having nearly completed work on a memorandum of understanding, which is intended to open a new phase of negotiations, an official announcement is being postponed. The United States considers the agreement practically ready, but Iran is conducting the necessary internal and political consultations before making a final decision. This delay does not necessarily mean rejection of the document; rather, it is linked to complex procedural and security mechanisms within Iran’s decision-making system. The agreement is seen as a first stage, intended to last sixty days, to discuss key disputed issues, including the nuclear program and sanctions.

According to regional sources and statements from officials, the final text has already been agreed, and the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirms that most points of the memorandum have been settled. The provisional agreement includes a sixty-day ceasefire, the resumption of shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, and the gradual restoration of transport links. In return, Washington pledged to ease restrictions on Iranian oil exports and to provide financial relief depending on the progress of subsequent talks.

Al Jazeera’s correspondent in Tehran, Nuredin al-Dagher, notes that the delay is related to the need to run the document through the highest decision-making bodies, primarily the Supreme National Security Council, which includes representatives of the military, the government, and the office of the Supreme Leader. Security and logistical considerations related to the transmission and verification of confidential documents have lengthened the timeline, making the delay more procedural than political. These steps are necessary to obtain final approval that corresponds to the internal balance of power.

An important domestic aspect is preparing Iranian public opinion to accept the agreement, reached after weeks of military tension and regional clashes. The appearance of Deputy Foreign Minister Araghchi in the media was part of efforts to present the deal as protecting national interests and preserving internal unity, rather than disclosing details of the memorandum. However, the agreement faces opposition from conservative and hardline factions that categorically reject any deals with the United States and insist on preserving the gains they claim were achieved during the recent confrontation.

On the American side, sources in Washington say the administration considers the agreement practically ready but is waiting for Tehran’s final decision before an official announcement. U.S. officials mention the possibility of signing at the end of the week or the beginning of the next, with the vice president’s office preparing to participate in a ceremony after all arrangements are completed. The president’s administration has stepped up efforts to shield the deal from criticism by Republican hawks who prefer continued military pressure. Based on leaked provisions and U.S. reports, the parties are seeking a temporary political and security truce that would lay the groundwork for a broader negotiating process on uranium enrichment, sanctions, and frozen Iranian assets on a “step-by-step” basis. The main obstacle has been the approval mechanisms for the memorandum inside Iran, not the wording of the provisions themselves, so all eyes are on Tehran to see whether it will give the green light to an agreement that could open a new chapter in managing the conflict with the United States.

Comments on the news

• How is the decision-making system in Iran structured and why does the Supreme National Security Council play a key role in ratifying such agreements? — Iran has a hybrid system in which the Supreme Leader (rahbar) has the final say on matters of state importance, including foreign policy and security. The Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) is a constitutional body composed of the heads of key branches of power (the president, the head of the judiciary, the speaker of parliament), ministers of defense, foreign affairs, intelligence, as well as representatives of the armed forces and the Supreme Leader. The SNSC coordinates security policy and presents proposals for the Supreme Leader’s approval. For international agreements such as a nuclear deal, the SNSC is necessary to reconcile the views of security and diplomatic structures, ensuring that the agreement does not contradict Iran’s strategic interests, especially given distrust of the United States.

• Who is Araghchi and why is his media appearance seen as an important signal for preparing public opinion in Iran? — Abbas Araghchi is a senior Iranian diplomat, former Deputy Foreign Minister and chief nuclear negotiator (2013–2021). He is considered the architect of a “Plan B” (asymmetric responses to sanctions). His media appearances are seen as a signal that Tehran is preparing an information campaign—either to justify a new diplomatic initiative or to explain the inevitability of negotiations. In Iranian politics such media outings often precede official announcements, shaping public opinion and reducing the likelihood of criticism from conservative circles.

• What historical reasons underlie the principled rejection of agreements with the United States by conservative and hardline circles in Iran? — Main reasons include: (1) the 1953 coup (Operation Ajax), when the US and UK overthrew Prime Minister Mossadegh, cementing distrust as a “national trauma”; (2) US support for the Shah’s regime (1953–1979), which repressed opposition; (3) the Iran hostage crisis (1979–1981) and ensuing hostility after the revolution; (4) the inclusion of Iran in the “axis of evil” (2002) by the Bush administration; (5) the unilateral US withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 and the reinstatement of harsh sanctions, which conservatives view as proof of American unreliability. Hardline circles (for example, the Principlists and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) view any deals with the US as a threat to the ideology of “resisting arrogance” (istiskbar) and to sovereignty.

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Full version: ما وراء الصمت الإيراني.. لماذا يتأخر حسم "مذكرة التفاهم" مع واشنطن؟

Generator shutdown in Gaza threatens lives

The shutdown of some 200,000 electric generators in the Gaza Strip due to the ongoing blockade and a ban on the import of fuel and spare parts could lead to mass deaths of patients and those who depend on electricity for life support. Hospitals and homes with critically ill people are particularly vulnerable, where power interruptions are already jeopardising the operation of medical equipment, and humanitarian organisations warn of an imminent catastrophe if the situation does not change.

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Full version: الجزيرة نت

Venezuela Signs License with Shell for Loran Gas Field Phase I

Venezuela has signed a licensing agreement with the international energy company Shell to begin the first phase of developing the Loran gas field. During a meeting chaired by Acting President Delcy Rodríguez, five strategic documents were signed. These include work orders and procurement contracts aimed at increasing production of light oil, which is used as a diluent to produce the Merey 16 blend from the heavy oil extracted in the Orinoco belt. The agreements also provide for deliveries of feedstock to the refinery in Puerto La Cruz to boost fuel output.

An important part of the deal is the purchase of spare parts for compressor equipment that will reduce the flaring of associated gas. The recovered gas is planned to be directed to the domestic market — for power generation, industry, petrochemicals and household use — as well as for export. The Loran field is a non-associated gas asset with seven reservoirs, six of which are on the border with Trinidad and Tobago. In this way, Venezuela confirms its strategy of attracting global investment and aims to increase production efficiency and the sustainable use of resources.

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Full version: Venezuela firma licencia con Shell para Fase I del campo gasífero Loran

US and Iran Prepare Preliminary Agreement to Reduce Tensions

According to diplomatic sources, the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran have achieved a breakthrough in talks and are preparing to sign a preliminary agreement aimed at ending hostilities and containing escalation. A key element of the agreement will be the immediate resumption of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz without fees, intended as a practical step toward de-escalation, while more complex issues—primarily Iran’s nuclear program—will be postponed to a second, more detailed phase of negotiations.

Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Pakistan played a mediating role in achieving this diplomatic breakthrough. It is reported that these countries held direct talks with President Trump and convinced him to abandon plans for strikes on Iranian targets. An American official confirmed that Trump acknowledged these countries’ influence on Tehran, and that reports of an imminent agreement were the decisive factor in his rejection of a military option to resolve the crisis.

Under the preliminary agreement, the ceasefire regime is expected to be extended for 60 days, including on the Lebanese front, which would open the way to negotiations on the nuclear program. According to the information, documents are expected to be signed in Geneva. The agreement provides for the restoration of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz to pre-crisis levels within 30 days in exchange for a gradual easing of sanctions, including temporary exemptions for the sale of Iranian oil. The extent of the relief would increase if Tehran demonstrates “goodwill.”

The nuclear issue remains the most difficult. The agreement records Iran’s commitments not to seek nuclear weapons, as well as the possibility of lowering the level of uranium enrichment under UN supervision. However, practical implementation of these steps is deferred until a more detailed agreement is concluded. American officials confirmed that one option under consideration is reducing the enrichment level inside Iran under the supervision of UN inspectors.

The issue of frozen Iranian assets remains acute. Tehran insists on immediate access to the funds, while Washington prefers phased unfreezing tied to compliance with conditions. As an interim solution, a mechanism is being discussed that would allow Iran to access part of the assets frozen in Qatar to purchase humanitarian goods. Official Tehran is keeping a restrained stance for now, stating that work on the final wording has not yet been completed.

The unexpected announcement of progress in the talks caught Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu off guard, who is reportedly feeling isolated from the process and has already contacted close circles within the Trump administration to clarify the situation. Any agreement is likely to face strong opposition from Israel, which demands that it include the removal of enriched uranium, dismantling of nuclear infrastructure and strict limits on Iran’s missile program. The situation remains fragile due to differing degrees of optimism in Washington and Tehran, as well as Israel’s firm position.

Commentary on the news

• Why is the Strait of Hormuz considered strategically important for the world economy and how does its closure affect global energy prices? — The Strait of Hormuz is the world’s “oil artery”: about 20% of global oil production and nearly 30% of LNG passes through it. Any closure, even temporary, immediately blasts energy prices: in 2012 Iran’s threats led to a 30% rise in prices in a few days, and in 2019 attacks on tankers caused a 15% spike. The reason is that markets do not tolerate uncertainty, and the strait is the only maritime route for the Persian Gulf countries (Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar), while alternative routes (for example, pipelines) are extremely limited.

• How did Pakistan, which does not share a border with Iran, become one of the mediators in US–Iran talks? — Pakistan occupies a unique position: it maintains diplomatic relations with both sides (unlike many Arab countries). Islamabad has historically served as a “bridge” between Tehran and Washington thanks to its strategic position between conflicts (including influence over the Taliban in Afghanistan). In 2024–2025 Pakistan offered a venue for talks, using Iran’s trust (the Shiite–Sunni divide did not prevent economic cooperation in energy) and allied relations with the US (through its status as a “major non-NATO ally”). This allows Pakistan to act as an “honest broker” when direct contacts between Tehran and Washington reach an impasse.

• What underlies Israel’s hardline stance demanding removal of enriched uranium and dismantling of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure? — Israel views Iran’s nuclear program as an existential threat (direct threats to destroy the Jewish state from Iranian leaders). The demand for full dismantling and removal of uranium is based on the fact that even partial enrichment (60% and above) would allow Iran to rapidly create a nuclear weapon (a so-called “breakout” in 2–3 weeks). Israel does not trust international inspections by the IAEA, recalling hidden sites (Fordow) and past violations. Therefore it demands “zero risk”: that Iran retain not a gram of weapons-grade uranium and no centrifuges capable of producing it. This fundamentally differs from the softer approaches of the US and Europe, which allow “limited capacities” under supervision.

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Full version: ما تفاصيل اتفاق إيران الذي أعلن ترمب استعدادا لتوقيعه؟

IPO on the Horizon: 8 Answers on How Companies Go Public

In anticipation of the expected initial public offerings (IPOs) of giants such as SpaceX, OpenAI and Anthropic, this piece explains the essence of the process: how private companies become public, what the advantages and risks of listings are for the market and investors, and how such events affect stock markets. The review also presents the largest historical listings to give readers a complete picture of the phenomenon.

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Full version: الجزيرة نت

New US Licenses Expand Energy and Mining Cooperation with Venezuela

The US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has issued a new package of general licenses intended to broaden the capabilities of American and international companies in Venezuela’s energy and mining sectors. Documents designated as licenses 46C, 47A, 48B, 50B, 51B, 52A and 54A replace earlier versions issued in February and March of this year. In particular, license 50B codifies permissions for major firms such as Chevron, Repsol, Shell, BP, Eni and Maurel & Prom to operate in Venezuela’s oil and gas industry, and also authorizes the export, commercialization and transport of Venezuelan crude oil and petrochemical products to the United States for American companies established before January 29, 2025.

Beyond the oil sector, the new licenses introduce relaxations for the mining industry: licenses 51B and 54A permit the export, transport, processing and supply of goods and services for mineral extraction under ongoing supervision and with mandatory reporting. License 47A also allows the export from the US to Venezuela of diluents, technological equipment, software and services for oil, petrochemical and electrical projects. It is important to note, however, that all of these relaxations maintain strict limitations: transactions with Russia, Iran, Cuba, North Korea and China-controlled entities remain prohibited, as do dealings involving blocked vessels, payments in gold and cryptocurrencies, and debt schemes.

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Full version: EEUU emite nuevo paquete de licencias para ampliar las operaciones energéticas y mineras en Venezuela

Escalation of US–Iran Military Conflict

The United States and Iran exchanged a series of military strikes, leading to a significant escalation of tensions in the Middle East. US Central Command announced “precision” strikes on targets inside Iran, including air defense systems, radars, and military communications centers. Washington said these targets posed a threat to US forces and to freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. In response, Tehran announced strikes on American bases in Kuwait, Bahrain and Jordan, as well as on naval targets in the strait itself.

According to the Pentagon, the operation involved Marine Corps, Air Force and Navy units. Iranian forces, in turn, confirmed that the American strikes hit areas around Jask, Sirik and Qeshm Island. Communication towers and water supply facilities were damaged in the attacks; coastal units and the vicinity of Bandar Abbas airport were also shelled. Despite reports of explosions in several cities, including Tehran and Karaj, Iranian officials report only limited destruction and casualties.

In response to the US operation, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) reported destroying two ships in the Strait of Hormuz and 18 “important targets” of the US military in the region. According to Tehran’s statements, airbases in Kuwait and Bahrain, as well as a military facility in Jordan, were struck by missiles. In Kuwait, air defense systems intercepted airborne threats, leading to a temporary closure of airspace. Bahraini authorities reported an injured girl, burning cars and damaged homes due to falling debris from Iranian drones.

The climax of the escalation was Iran’s announcement of a full closure of the Strait of Hormuz to all vessels until further notice. The IRGC naval commander promised “decisive action” against any attempt to transit the strait, calling such passage “collaboration with the enemy.” However, US Central Command categorically denied these claims, stressing that maritime traffic through the strait continues normally and without disruption.

The international community reacted to Tehran’s actions with condemnation. Qatar called the Iranian attacks a “gross violation of the sovereignty” of regional countries and urged immediate de-escalation. Egypt expressed solidarity with Jordan, Bahrain and Kuwait, stressing the need for a diplomatic settlement. Kuwait reaffirmed its right to defend national security, while Saudi Arabia called for calm, prudence and renewed diplomatic efforts to prevent further bloodshed.

Comments on the news

• Why is the Strait of Hormuz considered strategically important for the global economy and how could its possible closure affect global energy prices? — The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow sea passage between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, through which about 20–25% of the world’s seaborne oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade passes. According to the US Energy Information Administration, roughly 17–21 million barrels of oil transit the strait daily. If the strait is closed (for example, due to military actions or a blockade by Iran), supplies from Persian Gulf countries (Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the UAE, Kuwait and Qatar) would be sharply reduced. This would trigger an immediate spike in global oil prices (estimated at 30–50% or more) and destabilize the global energy market, hitting importing countries such as China, India, Japan and European states hardest.

• What role does the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) play in Iran’s political and military system, and how does it differ from the regular army? — The IRGC (Sepah-e Pasdaran) is an elite military-political formation created after the 1979 Islamic Revolution to protect the theocratic regime. Unlike the regular army (Artesh), which is responsible for defending borders, the IRGC focuses on internal security, suppressing dissent and conducting operations abroad (through the Quds Force — its special operations unit). The IRGC reports directly to the Supreme Leader (rahbar), not the president, and controls key economic sectors (oil, construction, telecommunications) through affiliated companies. Over recent decades the IRGC has become effectively a “state within a state,” wielding enormous political influence: many former IRGC commanders hold high government and parliamentary positions. The regular army follows traditional military doctrine and does not have the same level of political weight.

• What previous incidents between the US and Iran have occurred in the Strait of Hormuz and what is the history of naval conflicts in the region? — The Strait of Hormuz has seen numerous confrontations: in 1987–1988, during the "Tanker War" (part of the Iran–Iraq War), the United States conducted Operation Earnest Will to protect Kuwaiti oil tankers from Iranian mines and attacks. The American frigate USS Stark was struck by Iraqi missiles in 1987 (by mistake). In 1988, the USS Vincennes shot down an Iranian passenger plane (Flight 655), killing 290 people. In 2016, Iranian boats seized US Navy patrol vessels and their crews but later released them. In 2019 Iran shot down a US RQ-4A Global Hawk surveillance drone, and the US responded with cyberattacks on Iranian air defense systems. Between 2021 and 2023, Iranian forces repeatedly detained foreign tankers (for example, in 2023 Iran seized two oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman). These incidents reflect a long history of tension, but the strait has not been completely closed — all parties understand the catastrophic economic consequences of such a move.

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Full version: من هرمز إلى الخليج.. أبرز أهداف المواجهة الأخيرة بين واشنطن وطهران

Global alarm over escalation between the US and Iran

Recently international media have been registering growing alarm over the aggressive rhetoric and actions from Donald Trump’s circle toward Iran: from renewed bombings and Tehran’s retaliatory strikes to fears that local clashes could escalate into a large-scale Middle Eastern conflict. Reports emphasize that even countries and audiences far from the region view Washington as a key driver of rising instability, and that the escalation of strikes and threats undermines diplomatic deterrence mechanisms and raises the risk of third-party involvement. This piece was prepared based on materials from YouTube, DW and Instagram (Venezuela).

Venezuela between Hormuz and Caracas: how the US–Iran crisis is perceived in the sanctioned country

The escalation of Donald Trump’s rhetoric toward Iran, disputes over control of the Strait of Hormuz and the threat of a new “guerra de sanciones” in Latin America are perceived primarily through the Venezuelan experience. For Caracas this is not just a distant conflict in the Middle East, but a reflection of its own history of sanctions, oil dependence and geopolitical confrontation with Washington. Thus the events in the Strait of Hormuz, described both in the Bloomberg en Español piece and in the Deutsche Welle report and RPP Noticias note, fit into a coherent picture: sanctions as a weapon, oil as a hostage and Venezuela as part of an informal club of “punished countries.”

In the Bloomberg en Español video Trump threatens to strike Iran “very hard.” Formally this is a brief news item focused on a single statement. But in Venezuela such phrases have long been perceived not only as the risk of bombings or a direct strike, but as a code for a whole set of pressure instruments: military presence, economic sanctions, financial blockade and technological isolation. That is precisely the triad that Caracas’ official authorities have for years described as “unconventional warfare” and “imperialist aggression” against Venezuela.

In the local context any hardening of Washington’s stance toward Tehran is automatically associated with the experience of PDVSA and a state under American and European sanctions, with hyperinflation, production collapse and mass migration. When Trump says that Iran will “pay the consequences” for delaying negotiations, as quoted in the Deutsche Welle piece about the crisis around Hormuz and the “secret” US operation to release about 100 million barrels of oil onto the market mentioned in the original DW article, in Venezuela this is taken as a warning directed at them as well: the same words were said about Caracas when personal, financial and oil restrictions were imposed.

Voices inside Venezuela are split into several characteristic lines. The official camp and supporters of Chavismo see Iran as a “brother country” that has also become a target of sanctions and pressure. They fit each new Trump statement into a global pattern: “what they are doing to Iran today, they did and will do to Venezuela.” The increase in pressure on Tehran is presented as further proof of an axis of “besieged countries,” where Washington uses sanctions and military power, and Iran and Venezuela respond with “resistance” and cooperation. This includes joint projects — Iranian tankers with gasoline amid fuel shortages, technical assistance at Venezuelan refineries, energy agreements designed to compensate for the blockade.

The opposition and critical economists view the US–Iran conflict primarily as a factor of instability for the oil market. They emphasize that any escalation in the Strait of Hormuz pushes oil prices up, but this is no longer a guaranteed benefit for Caracas: structural collapse in production, degraded infrastructure and sanctions against PDVSA do not allow Venezuela to convert high prices into sustainable revenues. Moreover, close political alignment with Tehran, in their view, complicates any future full normalization of relations with the US, since it places Venezuela among the states Washington considers problematic.

Independent geopolitical analysts tend to see Trump’s threats as part of a wider turning point in the world order, in which Venezuela’s place is determined not only by ideology but by its status as an exporter under sanctions. They draw direct parallels between the “maximum pressure” strategy against Iran and the same logic applied to Caracas: economic strangulation, isolation from international financial markets, diplomatic pressure and constant references to the possibility of military scenarios. In this context statements about US “control” over Hormuz, heard in the Deutsche Welle piece, are interpreted as a demonstration of Washington’s ability not only to apply sanctions but also to rely on military power to secure energy flows, bypassing Tehran’s attempts to use the strait as leverage.

The key, distinctly Venezuelan interest is oil. The Strait of Hormuz is a bottleneck through which a significant share of the world’s seaborne oil exports pass. Any hint of its “complete closure” by Iran, which Deutsche Welle writes about, in Caracas is immediately translated into Brent quotes and fiscal maneuvering potential. One scenario assumes that pressure on Iran reduces its legal supplies and increases gray schemes — as with Venezuelan oil, routed through flag-changing networks, complex intermediary chains and grade “mixes” to mask origin. Another scenario is rising prices amid global nervousness, which is theoretically favorable to a reservoir-rich exporter, but practically changes little for a country whose production has fallen and whose access to markets and credit is limited.

Domestically the consequences appear contradictory. Rising oil prices could improve currency inflows, but mass problems in extraction and refining, worn-out infrastructure and counterparties’ fear of secondary sanctions erode that effect. At the same time, higher costs for shipping, fuel and imported goods hit domestic prices and intensify the inflation Venezuela has suffered for many years. Therefore Trump’s talk of a “very hard strike” against Iran, as well as his boasting about a “secret” operation to move more than 100 million barrels through Hormuz and ensure the passage of “more than 200 ships,” as DW recounts, are perceived with mixed feelings: as a possible short-term price stimulus, but also as a source of instability that almost always ends up costing Venezuela.

A separate layer of perception forms around sovereignty and control over strategic arteries. By closing Hormuz, Iran demonstrates that it holds a real lever capable of shaking the world market. Venezuelan political mythology long built itself around the role of an “energy superpower” and the idea that a country with enormous oil reserves could dictate terms. But reality — the collapse of PDVSA logistics, loss of its own tanker fleet, dependence on foreign ships — shows that Caracas has no “Hormuz,” no single chokepoint whose closure would force the world to react immediately. Thus watching Iran’s strategy is tinged with envious undertones: Tehran possesses a lever of pressure that Venezuela has lost.

Cultural-political filters add an emotional backdrop. In state and pro-government media any tough phrase from Trump — whether a promise to “strike very hard” or a statement like “the US must, if necessary, respond to this attack,” as in the reaction to an Apache helicopter shot down by Iran in the Strait of Hormuz reported by RPP Noticias — is presented as an illustration of Washington’s “belligerence.” The emphasis is on the fact that the helicopter was shot down without casualties, but even the absence of fatalities does not prevent the White House from talking about the inevitability of a response. In Venezuelan official discourse this serves to confirm the thesis that the US allegedly looks for any pretext to use force, and that the question of actual damage and proportionality of response is secondary to them.

On the opposition and critical flank there is also no enthusiasm about the risk of war in the Persian Gulf. Here concerns are not about “imperialism” as such, but that global shocks traditionally worsen chaos in domestic markets and make life in a crisis economy even more expensive. Moreover, many remember the precedents of the 2003 Iraq campaign and manipulations of information about “weapons of mass destruction.” Therefore announcements of an “inevitable” retaliatory strike, like those cited by RPP Noticias, are met not only with distrust toward Trump but also with skepticism about the completeness and accuracy of the initial data on the incident.

A common theme across all camps is the idea of sanctions as a form of warfare. Venezuelan experience shows that a “hard strike” can mean not bombings but the freezing of accounts, bans on operations with sovereign debt, an oil embargo and restrictions on the supply of equipment and technologies. In this sense Trump’s words captured in the Bloomberg en Español video resonate with Venezuelan memory of the recognition of an “alternative government,” sanctions against PDVSA, blows to the gold sector and the financial system. Each new round of pressure on Iran is perceived as confirmation that these instruments will continue to be used against “disobedient” regimes, among which Venezuela stands alongside Tehran and Moscow.

Venezuelan audiences, accustomed to an ideologized international agenda, rarely read such news as a mere chronicle. Where Deutsche Welle carefully recounts Trump’s statement about Iran “totally” closing Hormuz, about a “secret” American operation in May and hundreds of tankers passing the strait, in Venezuela a more complex picture is immediately constructed: the impact on the price per barrel, on Caracas’ negotiating conditions with Washington over possible sanction relief, on the US need to diversify imports through shale, Africa or conditional reintegration of Venezuelan crude via OFAC licenses and deals with individual companies like Chevron.

And where the short RPP Noticias post simply records: “helicopter shot down, no casualties, but the US must respond,” Venezuelan imagination immediately places this episode into the familiar matrix of “block versus block”: Iran as an allied country under siege, the US as the main opponent, Venezuela as a less influential but ideologically close player on the side of sanctioned states. The conversation about the Strait of Hormuz resonates not only with anxiety for the global market but also with the sense that Caracas’ fate is largely decided in the same offices that issue orders concerning Iran.

As a result, the same set of facts — threats to “strike very hard,” the story of a “secret” passage of 100 million barrels through Hormuz, the statement about the “inevitable” response to the downed helicopter — becomes for Venezuela another episode in a well-known series. It is not just about the US and Iran; it is about how a world of sanctions, oil and military power shapes the space of opportunities and constraints for a country that has itself become a symbol of how geopolitics can collapse an oil economy without firing a single missile at its territory.

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Football and politics on the edge: World Cup 2026 at the center of disputes

Less than a week before the start of the 2026 FIFA World Cup, to be held in the United States, Canada and Mexico, questions are growing louder in sporting and political circles about where the game ends and politics begins. This tournament is likely to become the most politicized in football history, and its organization is already provoking fierce debates about the boundaries between sport and ideology.

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Full version: الجزيرة نت

Venezuela adopts law to support cocoa producers

The National Assembly of Venezuela approved in the second reading the first 18 articles of a bill to promote the development of cocoa production, aimed at ensuring sustainable growth of the sector with a focus on agroecology and added value. Deputy Jesús Faría emphasized that the new law establishes principles of social justice in a sector where raw-material producers have historically suffered from inequality in the supply chain. The document provides for the creation of mechanisms for a fairer distribution of income to support small farmers and make the industry more balanced.

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Full version: AN aprueba 18 artículos del Proyecto de Ley del Cacao

Iran Carries Out Massive Strike on US Bases in Response to Attacks

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) announced a large-scale missile and drone attack on American military facilities in the region, stating that strikes were directed at bases in Bahrain (headquarters of the US Fifth Fleet), Kuwait (Ali Al Salem Air Base) and Jordan (Al-Azraq Air Base). The IRGC statement emphasizes that this operation was a direct response to nighttime bombings of southern districts of Iran by American forces, and contains a warning that any further US aggression “will be met with even harsher retaliatory measures.” According to Iranian sources, 21 targets were destroyed, including hangars with F-35 fighters at Al-Azraq Air Base.

However, the credibility of the Iranian claims remains in question: Western media, in particular the Financial Times citing US officials, report that the base in Jordan was not hit and that there were no US military casualties. Iranian agencies, by contrast, report explosions in southern cities and destroyed targets. This discrepancy in information reflects the typical “information war” in such conflicts, where each side seeks to present its version of events as victorious.

The Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a stern statement, calling the strikes on American bases “lawful self-defense” and demanding that regional countries prevent their territory from being used for attacks on Iran. Tehran warned that it would “without hesitation” strike any facilities involved in aggression against it, and blamed the US for escalation, accusing Washington of the bombings under the pretext of a downed Apache helicopter in the Strait of Hormuz. This cycle of accusations and threats makes the situation extremely volatile.

Reactions in the region were swift: air raid sirens were activated in Bahrain and authorities urged citizens to take shelter. Kuwaiti command reported that air defense systems were repelling an attack on foreign targets. Jordanian military said it intercepted and destroyed five missiles headed toward Al-Azraq Air Base. All three countries declared heightened readiness levels, underscoring fears that the conflict could spiral out of control and affect civilians and the host states themselves.

The US, in turn, carried out a series of nighttime strikes on targets in Iran, calling them a “proportional response” to the Iranian attack on an American helicopter. US Central Command (CENTCOM) clarified that targets included air defense systems, radar installations and ground control stations near the Strait of Hormuz. According to Axios journalists, there have already been three rounds of strikes, and the Pentagon emphasized that US forces are in a state of “full combat readiness” to repel any aggression.

President Trump in an interview with ABC News took a dual stance: on one hand he said the US “is now responding to Iran” and that the response must be “strong and very decisive,” while on the other he noted that Washington has a “very good deal with Iran,” hinting at the preservation of diplomatic channels. This mix of belligerent rhetoric and willingness to negotiate reflects the fragile balance the White House is trying to maintain between showing strength and avoiding being drawn into a full-scale war.

Commentary on the news

• Why were bases in Bahrain, Kuwait and Jordan chosen for the strike, and not Israel? — The choice of targets in these countries rather than Israel is likely related to several strategic considerations by Iran. First, bases in Bahrain (home to the US Fifth Fleet) and Kuwait are key US logistical and military hubs in the Persian Gulf, and striking them demonstrates Iran’s ability to hit American forces beyond its territory while avoiding direct confrontation with Israel, which could provoke a broader regional conflict. Second, Jordan borders Iraq and Syria, where Iran-backed proxy forces operate, and an attack on a base near Al-Rukban could have been a response to the use of that base for operations against Iran’s allies. Finally, Iran has historically avoided direct military confrontation with Israel, preferring to act through proxies (such as Hezbollah), and strikes on US bases in Arab countries serve as a warning to Washington about the costs of intervention without crossing the red line of open war with Israel.

• What is the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Iranian politics and the military structure, and why did it, rather than the regular army, announce the attack? — The IRGC is an elite military-political formation created after the 1979 Islamic Revolution to protect its ideals. Unlike the regular army (Artesh), which is responsible for border defense and conventional military tasks, the IRGC controls the missile program, nuclear-related developments and external operations (including support for proxy groups like Hezbollah or the Houthis). The IRGC also wields significant political influence: its commanders often hold high positions, and the corps reports directly to the Supreme Leader rather than the president. An announcement by the IRGC, rather than the Artesh, underscores that the strike was politically motivated and tied to foreign-policy objectives (for example, demonstrating strength after the killing of General Soleimani), rather than purely territorial defense. It also signals that the operation was carried out by Iran’s “revolutionary” forces rather than regular military bureaucrats.

• What are the circumstances of the Apache helicopter incident in the Strait of Hormuz that the US cited as the pretext for strikes on Iran? — The incident cited by the Pentagon occurred in the Strait of Hormuz — a strategically important maritime artery through which about 20% of global oil passes. According to the US version, IRGC boats allegedly approached an Apache helicopter on a reconnaissance mission and fired warning rockets, which the Pentagon deemed “unsafe and unprofessional” behavior. Iran, however, claimed that the helicopter violated its airspace and that its forces were responding to a provocation. Similar confrontations have occurred repeatedly in the region: for example, in 2016 the US destroyed Iranian boats after a comparable encounter. This episode was used by Washington as a casus belli to justify strikes, which is characteristic of the long history of tensions between the two countries in the Persian Gulf.

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Full version: إيران تهاجم قواعد أمريكية بالمنطقة ردا على هجمات واشنطن