Trump and Netanyahu's Dilemma: a Fragile Ceasefire in the Middle East

The recent escalation between Iran and Israel has once again exposed the fragility of the ceasefire regime in the Middle East, as well as the depth of contradictions in the relationship between US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The exchange of rocket strikes in recent days has become a new test for this complex tie. Although the leaders jointly struck Iran in late February, their political and strategic interests have begun to diverge as the conflict has unfolded. The crisis demonstrates how easily a limited incident can grow into a wider war in a region trapped in a state of “neither war nor peace.”

In recent days Trump has emphasized his dominance in relations with Netanyahu, saying that he is the one making the key decisions in the Middle East. Those remarks came amid reports of a sharp rebuke the US leader delivered to the Israeli prime minister, warning him against steps that could undermine the regional stability Washington seeks to strengthen. However, subsequent events showed the limits of American influence: Netanyahu ordered an attack on a southern suburb of Beirut — a Hezbollah stronghold — which Tehran regarded as a violation of the ceasefire’s “red lines.”

The Israeli strike provoked an Iranian retaliatory rocket attack on Israel, followed by new Israeli strikes on Iranian territory. US intervention helped temporarily contain the escalation and prevent a full-scale war. Nevertheless, analysts say the region remains explosive: persistent tensions make any incident capable of triggering a new round of conflict. Experts describe the situation as highly unstable — with no durable peace and no lasting ceasefire.

The instability is fueled by divergent priorities between Trump and Netanyahu. The US administration faces global economic pressure from the potential closure of the Strait of Hormuz and rising oil prices, which could damage Trump’s pre-election standing. At the same time, Netanyahu, facing upcoming elections, is forced to demonstrate his ability to handle security issues, which sometimes pushes him toward military escalation to strengthen his domestic political position. This difference in priorities prompts the Israeli leader to seek a political breakthrough through force, while Washington fears wider consequences.

An additional source of tension has been talks between Washington and Tehran conducted without Israel’s participation. According to leaks, a potential agreement could limit Iran’s nuclear program while placing constraints on Israel’s freedom of action in Lebanon against Hezbollah. Israel regards such concessions as unacceptable. Experts believe that for Netanyahu it would be politically more advantageous for the talks to fail and for the US to return to direct confrontation with Iran. Trump, for his part, would struggle to accept a deal resembling the 2015 agreement that he once sharply criticized. Thus, the fragile ceasefire depends on the ability of Washington, Tel Aviv and Tehran to simultaneously balance their political and military calculations, while the relationship between Trump and Netanyahu remains a mix of mutual influence and diverging interests.

News commentary

• What is Hezbollah and what role does the group play in the conflict between Iran and Israel, especially in Lebanon? — Hezbollah is a Lebanese Shia political-military organization founded with Iranian support in 1982. Iran views it as a key element of the “axis of resistance” aimed at Israel and US influence in the Middle East. In the conflict with Israel, Hezbollah acts as Iran’s proxy: it has its own military arsenal, including long-range rockets, and conducts shelling of Israeli territories from southern Lebanon. For Iran, Hezbollah is a deterrent instrument that allows it to pressure Israel without direct involvement of Iranian forces. In Lebanon the group holds significant political influence and de facto control over some areas, making it a key player in regional tensions.

• Why is the Strait of Hormuz considered strategically important for the global economy and how would its possible closure affect the US position in negotiations with Iran? — The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow maritime passage linking the Persian Gulf with the Indian Ocean. About 20–25% of the world’s oil shipments (roughly 17–20 million barrels per day) pass through it, making it critical to the global energy market. A possible closure of the strait by Iran (for example, in response to sanctions or military action) would trigger a sharp spike in oil prices, disruption of supplies and an economic crisis in many importing countries (including China, Japan and EU states). The US, as the main military guarantor of freedom of navigation, must factor this risk into negotiations with Iran: the threat of blocking the strait gives Tehran leverage to seek sanctions relief and concessions, while Washington seeks to avoid a military escalation that could affect the global economy.

• What was the 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA) and why did President Trump criticize it, given its possible revival in current talks? — The JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) is an international agreement signed in 2015 between Iran and six world powers (the US, UK, France, Germany, Russia, China) and the EU. In exchange for sanctions relief, Iran agreed to limit its nuclear program (reduce its stockpile of enriched uranium, modify reactors and allow IAEA inspections) to make the development of a nuclear weapon impossible. President Trump criticized the JCPOA as a “terrible deal”: firstly, because it did not curb Iran’s ballistic missile development; secondly, because it did not address Iran’s support for proxy groups (such as Hezbollah); and thirdly, because its phased sanctions relief, in Trump’s view, provided Iran with too much funding without long-term guarantees. In 2018 Trump withdrew from the deal, leading to the re-imposition of sanctions and Iran’s resumption of uranium enrichment above permitted levels. Now, with talks resuming, the possible revival of the JCPOA (or its updated version) faces the same disagreements: Tehran demands full sanctions relief, while the US (including Trump’s supporters) insists on including Iran’s missile program and regional activities in the agreement.

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Full version: غارديان: العلاقة المعقدة بين ترمب ونتنياهو تهدد هدنة الشرق الأوسط

Venezuela's oil exports reach 1.25 million barrels per day

The U.S. Embassy in Caracas announced that oil exports from Venezuela have reached 1.25 million barrels per day — the highest level in the last seven years. This achievement, according to the American diplomatic mission, is the result of a three-stage plan developed by Secretary of State Marco Rubio and President Donald Trump. Chargé d’Affaires John Barrett noted that such progress became possible thanks to cooperation with the interim government of Delcy Rodríguez and private investors, which contributes to the economic recovery and prosperity of both the American and Venezuelan people.

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Full version: Embajada de EE. UU. afirma que exportaciones petroleras de Venezuela alcanzan los 1,25 millones de barriles diarios

Iran struck Israel in response to attack in Beirut

On the evening of 7 June 2026, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) struck positions in Israel in response to the bombing of a building in the southern suburb of Beirut that took place the same day. The IRGC called the attack a violation of the "new equation" established on 2 June after Tehran threatened to bomb the north of occupied Palestine if the Netanyahu government carried out its threat to strike civilian targets in Beirut. This escalation was part of a series of reciprocal strikes in which each side tried to impose its own conditions on the battlefield.

U.S. President Donald Trump applied significant pressure on Netanyahu by phone, demanding respect for the new equation and that he not take steps to escalate in response to Ababil drone attacks that Israel could not handle. Netanyahu’s decision to bomb the building on 7 June was perceived as an open challenge to that equation. Although there were reports that Washington had been warned of the bombing, suggesting possible approval, the American administration denied this and called for restraint in Iran’s retaliatory actions. These contradictions only deepened mistrust of Trump’s stance, caught between outright support and calls for de-escalation.

Netanyahu’s motives were not only military but also political: he felt constrained by the new equation and sought to disrupt rumors of an imminent agreement with Iran mediated by Pakistan and Qatar. Past experience with Trump showed that moves toward a deal were followed by setbacks and threats to resume military action, making the situation on the ground extremely unstable. This shifting dynamic reproduced a bargaining logic combined with a simultaneous threat of escalation, evoking the proverb about having sun and rain on the same roof.

Since Trump announced a ceasefire after the 40-day war, he has pursued a dual policy: the following 60 days included both negotiations or exchanges of messages and threats to resume the war or carry out partial strikes. Trump tried to present recent shootouts in the Strait of Hormuz and southern Iran not as violations of the arrangement but as part of a broader process of threats and signals. At the same time, Netanyahu sought a full-scale war while conducting operations in Lebanon and Gaza, which made U.S.–Israeli relations swing between support and pressure.

The constraints Trump faced made continued escalation policy extremely difficult: the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz, attempts to lift the blockade of Iranian ports, his falling approval ratings, upcoming midterm elections, a worsening economy, preparations for the World Cup, and the celebration of U.S. Independence Day. In addition, frustration grew over the unattainability of the war’s initial objective—regime change in Iran—not only because of the resilience of Iranian leadership and people but also because of Tehran’s effectiveness in managing the conflict politically and militarily. These factors forced the U.S. administration to balance between the need for an agreement to reduce tensions and the risk of sliding with Netanyahu into a large-scale war. Thus, Trump’s priority became seeking arrangements that would cover Lebanon and possibly Gaza, rather than being drawn into the war Netanyahu desires, especially after their latest phone call. With the resumption of exchanges of fire between Iran and Israel on 8 June, Trump must either force Netanyahu to follow his course or accept an escalation that the U.S. cannot politically and economically withstand. The game has turned: Trump has two choices left — compel Netanyahu to de-escalate or descend with him into the abyss of war.

News commentary

• What is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and what role does it play in Iran’s political and military system? - The IRGC is an elite politico-military formation created after the 1979 Islamic Revolution to defend the theocratic regime. Unlike the regular army, the IRGC controls the missile program, overseas special operations (including support for Hezbollah and the Houthis), and exerts huge economic influence through affiliated companies. In practice, the IRGC operates like a "state within a state" and is a key instrument of Supreme Leader Khamenei for preserving power.

• Why is the Strait of Hormuz strategically important to Tehran and how can Iran use it to pressure its opponents? — About 20% of the world’s oil trade passes through this 33-kilometer strait, making it the planet’s "oil throat." Controlling the strait’s northern shore, Iran can close it with mine-laying, anti-ship missiles, and fast attack craft. The threat of blocking the strait is Tehran’s main trump card in negotiations: it can trigger spikes in oil prices and a global energy crisis, forcing the West to take Iranian interests into account.

• Why are Pakistan and Qatar acting as mediators in possible talks between Iran and the U.S., and what motives drive these countries? — Qatar traditionally plays the role of a "neutral venue": Doha maintains good relations with Tehran (the shared South Pars gas field) while also hosting the largest American military base in the region. Pakistan has an interest in a stable Iran because of their 900-kilometer border, the risk of radicalization of Baloch separatism, and the need to import Iranian electricity. Islamabad also wants to demonstrate usefulness to Washington to ease pressure on issues such as its nuclear program and the Taliban.

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Full version: انتهت اللعبة وترمب ليس أمامه إلا إنزال نتنياهو عن الشجرة

Iran's missile strikes on Israel threaten regional escalation

American and British media warn that Iran's rocket attacks on Israel in response to Israeli bombings of southern Beirut suburbs could provoke a new outbreak of regional conflict. According to journalists, the incident has tested the fragile ceasefire that went into effect on April 8 after more than a hundred days of war. The previous phase of fighting began in late February with a U.S.-Israeli strike on Iran and temporarily subsided thanks to diplomatic efforts.

The Wall Street Journal notes that Iran struck Israel for the first time since the ceasefire, which could lead to immediate escalation. The New York Times fears a return to full-scale open confrontation, while the Washington Post emphasizes that the attacks complicate already difficult talks on a comprehensive peace agreement. Experts are unanimous: any Israeli retaliation risks drawing other regional powers into the conflict and undermining global security.

The international community is watching the U.S. administration's response with concern, especially amid reports of progress in U.S.-Iran talks. According to Axios, President Donald Trump held a phone call with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and strongly urged restraint in carrying out retaliatory strikes. The American leader indicated that diplomacy should be given more time and that negotiations with Tehran must not be derailed.

In public statements, Trump called on Iran to stop the rocket fire and return to the negotiating table. "You fired your rockets, that's enough," he said in an interview with Fox News. "Come back and make a deal." The White House seeks to balance support for Israel's right to self-defense with preventing a full-scale war that could destroy the chances for a peaceful settlement.

Later in an interview with the Financial Times, Trump stressed that he — not Netanyahu — would determine the terms for ending the conflict. The American leader also criticized recent Israeli strikes on Hezbollah positions in Lebanon as uncoordinated with Washington. At the same time he voiced support for "surgical" strikes against militants but firmly rejected the possibility of a large-scale attack on Beirut, clearly defining the boundaries of what he deems acceptable for his ally.

Comments on the news

• What is Hezbollah's role in the Iran-Israel conflict and why did Israeli strikes on its positions in Lebanon prompt Iran's rocket attack? — Hezbollah is a key Iranian ally in the region, established with Tehran's support in the 1980s. It operates as Iran's military proxy on the border with Israel, distracting Israeli forces and creating a threat on the northern front. Israeli strikes on its positions in Lebanon are perceived by Iran as a direct attack on its strategic infrastructure and sphere of influence. In response, Iran launched rocket strikes to demonstrate solidarity with its ally, protect its interests, and preserve the balance of power in the region, since Iran and Hezbollah officially declare commitment to the "axis of resistance" against Israel and the United States.

• What are the main topics of the U.S.-Iran talks mentioned in the article, and why are they important for regional stability? — The main topics include Iran's nuclear program (in particular, returning to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or modifying it), lifting economic sanctions, and regional security issues such as Iran's influence in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen. These talks are critically important for regional stability because their success could reduce the risk of full-scale war between Iran and Israel, which could involve the U.S. and other Middle Eastern countries, and could prevent a regional arms or nuclear race. Failure of the talks, conversely, would heighten tensions and could lead to direct military clashes that destabilize the entire Middle East.

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Full version: صحافة أمريكية.. سيناريو تجدد الحرب مع إيران وترمب يلجم إسرائيل ويلمح لصفقة

Venezuela rejects Guyana PM's comments on possible ICJ ruling

Venezuela has officially rejected recent remarks by the Prime Minister of Guyana, who anticipated the expected ruling of the UN International Court of Justice on the territorial dispute over the Guayana Esequiba region. Caracas, through Foreign Minister Ivan Gil, called Georgetown's position "an open and manifest breach of the 1966 Geneva Agreement and international law." Venezuelan authorities emphasized that they never consented to having this dispute considered by the International Court, and expressed bewilderment that Guyana, in their view, is preemptively deciding the content of a verdict not yet issued, demonstrating "disregard for international law."

Venezuela reiterated that it does not recognize any decision the International Court may issue regarding this territory, and confirmed its commitment solely to a political and negotiated settlement within the framework of the Geneva Agreement. Caracas insists on bilateral negotiations as the only path to ensure stability, good-neighborliness, and shared development in the region. This move underscores deep disagreements between the two countries over how to resolve the long-standing border conflict dating back to colonial times.

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Full version: Venezuela rechaza declaraciones del Primer Ministro de Guyana sobre eventual decisión de la CIJ

One Hundred Days of War with Iran: A Hit to Americans' Wallets

One hundred days after the start of the American-Israeli war against Iran, the economic consequences in the United States are becoming increasingly tangible. Americans are directly facing a higher cost of living: prices for fuel, food and housing are steadily climbing. Polls show a significant portion of the population disapproves of how the White House is handling the conflict and considers military intervention a mistaken step. The war is turning into a growing political and economic burden for President Donald Trump’s administration.

Analytical firm Moody's Analytics estimated that the average additional expense for an American household because of the war is about $750. The lion's share of that amount — roughly $447 per household — fell on higher electricity and fuel costs. These figures clearly show how extra expenses cut into everyday budgets, forcing people to reassess their usual spending.

Mark Zandi, chief economist at Moody's, called the situation a “serious economic blow,” emphasizing that the main burden falls on middle- and low-income families. They spend the bulk of their income on basic needs, whose prices are rising the fastest. Michael Klein, a professor of international economics at Tufts University, notes that these groups devote the largest share of their income to food and housing, and those sectors have become noticeably more expensive. As a result, inequality is only growing, and the social consequences are widening.

Gasoline prices have become one of the most visible indicators of the crisis. According to the American Automobile Association, the average cost per gallon of fuel jumped from less than $3 at the end of February to more than $4.20 by early June. Experts link this surge to disruptions in energy markets, reciprocal strikes and tensions in the Strait of Hormuz — a key route for global oil and gas exports. The rise in energy prices immediately affected inflation: the personal consumption expenditures index recorded a significant increase in energy costs, and the overall inflation rate rose to 3.8%. Many Americans have already changed their lifestyles, for example switching to remote work to use their cars less frequently.

Consumer confidence has plunged: the University of Michigan index fell to one of its lowest levels in recent years. Studies show that nearly two-thirds of Americans have cut their spending due to high prices and economic concerns. The aviation sector, heavily dependent on fuel, also took a hit. Budget carrier Spirit Airlines ceased operations after more than three decades, partly citing rising fuel costs. Other airlines have raised ticket prices to offset expenses. At the same time, food prices began to rise, and experts fear further increases due to higher costs for fertilizers imported from the Gulf countries. Economist Jonathan Ernst warns that American farmers face a “double hit” — simultaneous increases in fuel and fertilizer prices.

The housing market has also felt the impact: long-term mortgage rates rose due to inflationary expectations — investors demand higher yields to compensate for the loss of purchasing power. This increases borrowing costs for both households and businesses. At the government level, the war continues to drain financial resources. According to a report, the Pentagon is spending about $2 billion per day on operations against Iran, and the administration is requesting additional billions to fund them. The budget proposal foresees a sharp increase in military spending alongside cuts to civilian programs. Thus, after one hundred days the war has become one of the key factors affecting the American economy, its political balance and financial stability.

Commentary on the news

• What is the significance of the Strait of Hormuz for the global energy market and how is it connected to Iran’s economy? – The Strait of Hormuz is a strategic “oil valve” through which about 20–25% of the world’s oil trade and a significant share of liquefied natural gas (LNG) pass. For Iran it is not only a key route to export its own oil but also a leverage tool: control over the strait allows Tehran to exert pressure on world prices, which is critical for an Iranian economy heavily dependent on oil revenues.

• What levers of influence does Iran have in the Strait of Hormuz and how can they affect global oil prices? – Iran has several tools: first, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) can mine waters, use speedboats and deploy anti-ship missiles. Second, Iran can temporarily close the strait, creating market panic. The threat of even a partial blockade can raise oil prices by $10–20 per barrel, as happened in 2018–2019, because traders factor in the risk of supply disruptions.

• Why do fertilizer prices from Gulf countries depend on the conflict with Iran, and how does this affect American farmers? – Gulf countries (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE) are major fertilizer producers (especially urea and phosphates) due to cheap natural gas. The conflict with Iran increases shipping risks through the Strait of Hormuz — the main export route for these fertilizers. This leads to higher insurance premiums and logistical delays, raising global prices. American farmers importing fertilizers (for example, from Saudi Arabia) are forced to pay more, which reduces their profitability and can push up food prices in the U.S.

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Full version: كيف وصلت فاتورة الحرب على إيران إلى جيوب الأمريكيين؟

Iran Strikes Israel for First Time Since April: Sirens in North and Threats of Retaliation

Yesterday air-raid sirens sounded again in Israel after Iran launched missiles at the country for the first time since a ceasefire was declared in April. The Israel Defense Forces confirmed activation of alert systems across large areas of the north and center, including Haifa, Caesarea and Hadera, after launches were detected from Iran. All fired missiles were reported intercepted by Israeli air defenses, and two barrages were recorded in total, including up to 10 ballistic missiles.

Tehran called the strike a “warning” in response to an Israeli strike on the southern suburb of Beirut that took place on the hundredth day of the war. Israeli army spokesman Evi Deferin sharply condemned Iran’s actions, saying that “the Iranian terrorist regime made a grave mistake by once again choosing the path of terror.” Emergency measures were immediately implemented domestically: schools were closed, hospitals switched to an enhanced mode of operation, and military reservists were placed on heightened alert.

Chief of the General Staff Eyal Zamir emphasized that Tel Aviv will deliver a “severe and wide-scale” retaliatory strike as soon as it gets the “green light.” Zamir reportedly held consultations twice in the past day with Commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Brad Cooper, indicating close coordination. At the same time, Israeli officials suggested that a response could be postponed, but not canceled, demonstrating readiness for multiple military scenarios.

Iranian authorities warned that any further aggression would meet a “harsher response,” and that a new strike would be aimed at “all US-Zionist facilities in the region.” The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps said the strikes were carried out in three waves and were directed at Ramat David airbase in northern Israel. Iran’s Foreign Ministry described the attack as an act of “legitimate self-defense” and placed direct responsibility on the United States for Israel’s violations of the ceasefire.

In response to the Iranian missiles, Israel carried out an airstrike on the southern suburb of Beirut, which killed two people, further escalating the conflict with Hezbollah and Lebanon. Commander of Iran’s Khatam al-Anbiya Corps Ali Abdollah Aliabadi threatened “even more crushing strikes” if Israel continues the attacks. The social media account of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei again confirmed the Islamic Republic’s support for the “resistance.” On the diplomatic front, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi held talks with counterparts from the United Kingdom, Turkey, France, Qatar and Pakistan.

U.S. President Donald Trump held a phone call with Netanyahu, urging him not to respond to Iran’s attack. In an interview he said that the Israeli prime minister “will have no choice but to accept any deal that the United States makes with Iran,” stressing that “I (Trump) make all the decisions, not Netanyahu.” Washington cautioned Israel against missing the opportunity to reach an agreement and urged it to wait a few days. Meanwhile Iran and Syria announced a partial closure of their airspace, and operations at Damascus International Airport were suspended during the restrictions.

Comments on the news

• What is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and what role does it play in Iran’s political and military system? — The IRGC is an elite politico-military formation created after the 1979 Islamic Revolution to protect the regime and suppress internal threats. Unlike the regular army, the IRGC reports directly to the Supreme Leader, controls missile programs, nuclear-related infrastructure, key economic sectors (oil, construction) and plays a decisive role in exporting the revolution by supporting proxy forces such as Hezbollah and the Houthis.
• How is decision-making structured in Iran and what role does Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei play compared to the president? — Iran has a theocratic system with dual leadership. The Supreme Leader (since 1989 — Ayatollah Ali Khamenei) is the head of state with extensive powers: he commands the military and the IRGC, approves candidates for top positions (through the Assembly of Experts), and controls the judiciary and media. The president is elected by popular vote, but his authority is limited to domestic policy and the economy; all key decisions (especially foreign and military policy) require the Supreme Leader’s approval.
• What is the role of the Lebanese group Hezbollah in the regional conflict and how is it connected to Iran? — Hezbollah is a Shia political and armed organization founded by Iran in 1982 with IRGC support to fight the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Today it acts as a key element of Iran’s “axis of resistance”: it receives funding, weapons (including rockets) and military advisors from Tehran. Hezbollah actively engages in conflicts with Israel (for example, the 2006 war) and in the Syrian civil war on the side of the Assad regime, allowing Iran to project military power in the Middle East without entering into direct war.

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Full version: إيران تقصف إسرائيل وترمب يحدد الخيارات أمام نتنياهو

Delcy Rodríguez Discussed Investment Opportunities in Venezuela with ESSAR

Acting President of Venezuela Delcy Rodríguez held a meeting in Mumbai with the leadership of the Indian corporation ESSAR to assess opportunities for strategic investments. Arriving in India on June 3 for an official visit, she aims to strengthen bilateral relations and explore cooperation prospects that could contribute to Venezuela's economic development. The meeting with ESSAR, known for its projects in energy and industry, underscores Caracas's interest in attracting foreign capital to restore the national economy.

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Full version: Presidenta (E) Delcy Rodríguez se reunió con directivos de ESSAR de India para evaluar oportunidades de inversiones estratégicas

Escalation in the Persian Gulf: US and Iran Exchange Strikes

Activity of the US Air Force surged over the Persian and Gulf of Oman after US Central Command announced the destruction of two Iranian drones that threatened shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. FlightRadar data recorded intensive patrols by eight tanker aircraft, which flew holding patterns for more than 13 consecutive hours. In addition, sources report widespread failures of navigation systems near the strategic strait and off the coast of the United Arab Emirates.

In response to the launch of Iranian drones, US forces struck coastal radar sites in Iran, prompting an immediate reaction from Tehran. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps claimed responsibility for attacks on targets in Kuwait and Bahrain, calling them a "direct reprisal" for the damage to military facilities in southern Iran. This series of reciprocal strikes significantly raises tensions in one of the world’s most important maritime corridors, through which a substantial portion of global oil shipments passes.

The developments come against the backdrop of an extremely fragile ceasefire brokered by Pakistan on April 8, 2026, following a large-scale conflict that began on February 28. Initially, the agreement halted hostilities that had led Iran to impose strict restrictions on navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, but the current clashes threaten both that fragile truce and the security of international maritime trade in the region.

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Full version: نشاط مكثف لطائرات أمريكية بمياه الخليج عقب إسقاط مسيرات إيرانية

Latin American Alarm Over Trump's Foreign Policy

Venezuelan and regional media increasingly view Donald Trump’s foreign policy as a factor of instability and potential destabilization in Latin America. His hard line on Iran is seen not as an isolated episode but as part of a broader pattern of intervention — from legal pressure and diplomatic maneuvers to influence over elections and the internal politics of neighboring countries. Commentators warn that such approaches can simultaneously strengthen allies and undermine security in Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela, while expanding the U.S. sphere of influence through security and migration measures ahead of major events, such as the 2026 World Cup. This selection is based on materials from El Impulso (Venezuela) and YouTube (Venezuela).

Venezuela under External Tutelage: Oil, Elections, and a Weary Distrust of the U.S.

In contemporary Venezuelan political discourse, the United States, Donald Trump, and his influence on the region no longer look like abstract geopolitics. They flow into very concrete questions: will there be electricity and water tomorrow, will a teacher’s salary increase, will the opposition’s political capital devalue, and who really decides how elections are conducted not only in Caracas but also in Bogotá. Two different media pieces — an analytical column on the domestic Venezuelan situation and an examination of the conflict around U.S. statements on the Colombian elections — form a single picture of Latin American skepticism in the face of Washington’s “tutelage.”

The starting point of the first story is deeply local. In a Venezuelan column published on elimpulso.com, political scientist and university lecturer Santiago Andrés Rodríguez describes the mood in the country after the U.S. special forces’ intervention in Caracas and the signing of a “pact” between Delsi Rodríguez and Donald Trump. Since January 3, he says, “huge expectations” have arisen in society: the promised “energy pragmatism,” lifting sanctions on the oil sector, and the arrival of international companies in the industry were supposed to trigger a rapid economic upswing.

However, for most Venezuelans the measure of change is not GDP or the number of signed agreements, but electricity in the outlet, water from the tap, functioning transport, and accessible healthcare. Rodríguez emphasizes that it is precisely the collapse of basic services — daily power and water outages, problems with transport and hospitals — that sets the real backdrop against which any “transition” is evaluated. And against that backdrop, he assesses, the “promised breakthrough” has not materialized: the vast majority, especially the poorest layers, do not feel any improvement in quality of life.

At the center of his analysis is a triangle of forces. On one side, the “rodrigato” of the Rodríguez brothers, controlling the executive and legislative branches and, in his view, building tactical obedience to Washington not for the sake of reforms but to prolong their own hold on power. On the other — the U.S. led by Trump and the figure of Marco Rubio as a symbol of a hard line on Venezuela. The third vertex is María Corina Machado, whom Rodríguez calls the strongest and most legitimate opposition leader in the last three decades, but whom he sees in an extremely dangerous balance between the expectations of the “street” and the logic of protracted negotiations under external pressure. He reproaches her for being overly conciliatory toward Trump and warns of the risk of losing street legitimacy if she does not “measure political time very precisely.”

He pays special attention to the oil economy. The lifting of sanctions and the return of foreign companies were presented as the start of a quick “reactivation” of the economy and wage growth, especially in the public sector. Formally, a salary of around $240 was set, additional bonuses were introduced, including for “professionalization.” But, Rodríguez notes, the beneficiaries are distributed extremely unevenly: some healthcare workers received something, while university professors, including himself, remain without these supplements. As a result, the illusion that the new oil rent would be nationwide has collapsed; instead, it looks fragmented and unfair.

From this he draws a broader conclusion: Trump’s strategy on the oil question operates primarily in the interests of the United States itself. Venezuelan oil is being used to improve the American economy, while the exporting country’s population does not see the dividends. Here one can easily recognize the motives of the long-standing critique of “oil rentism”: oil serves external games and the strengthening of other economies rather than internal modernization. Only now the “piano behind the curtains” is no longer the faceless global market but a very concrete Washington.

At the same time Rodríguez acknowledges that, politically, the sense of hope has indeed intensified: under international tutelage a kind of managed transition seems to be playing out, which should lead to a change of leadership. But this transition, in his logic, does not look sovereign or genuinely national: key decisions are made in Washington and in backroom elite agreements, rather than through processes accountable to civil society. Hence the growing tension between “political time” — the rhythm of negotiations, election calendars, and external signals — and the “real time” of the impoverished street, which wants not another “historic turn” but predictable access to basic services.

Rodríguez does not hide his normative stance. He criticizes the “rodrigato” for playing for delay, Trump for using Venezuela as a tool of U.S. oil and domestic policy, and María Corina for the dangerous balance between external loyalty and internal expectations. At the same time he repeatedly returns to the risk of “frustración”: if after such a surge of hope quick, even partial, improvements do not arrive, society may go through a new cycle of disappointment that will hit the opposition first and foremost. In his view, Machado’s “political capital,” uniquely high for many years, could be wasted if she does not initiate a break with the logic of endless transition and return to a strategy oriented toward street legitimacy and pressure from below.

This inside-Venezuela perspective also colors the perception of another story — this time Colombian, but viewed through the same sensitive lens of U.S. intervention. A video piece titled “ESTADOS UNIDOS NO LO ESPERABA: Petro y su gobierno frenan el plan de Trump para las elecciones 2026” (link) tells of a very specific collision: statements by a high-ranking American official and the response by a Colombian minister. But for a Venezuelan viewer this is not an episodic dispute but another example of Washington’s structural “ingerenicism” in regional politics.

It concerns warnings by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau, who spoke of possible sanctions and visa cancellations for those who attempt to “manipulate” the second round of Colombia’s presidential elections. The toolkit is familiar: sanctions and visas long ago became part of the everyday political lexicon for the Venezuelan elite. Here too the familiar choice of words appears: defending democracy, combating manipulation, conditional recognition of results. Against that background, the reaction of Colombia’s interior minister Armando Benedetti — who questions Washington’s right to “import justice” into foreign territory while at the same time acknowledging that visa decisions are a sovereign matter for the United States — from a Venezuelan perspective looks like an attempt to draw a minimal outline of national dignity in an asymmetric dialogue.

The figure of Trump, put in the video title as the author of a “plan” for the 2026 elections, picks up associations already ingrained in Venezuelan memory. It was the Trump administration that most fiercely promoted regime change in Caracas, recognition of parallel power structures, and the use of financial and oil sanctions as instruments of pressure. Now, when the Colombian context speaks of a possible attempt to pre-construct a scenario for the 2026 elections, for a Venezuelan viewer this sounds like a repetition of the same scheme in a neighboring country: long-term planning of the political field from the angle of Washington’s interests.

The video announces “analysis with Mauricio Reina,” which, judging by the format of such programs, centers the question: where is the boundary between a “legitimate warning” and a crude “intervention in internal affairs”? This question almost automatically splits the audience into two camps — supporters of strong external pressure as a tool to defend democracy and defenders of absolute sovereignty, even at the cost of tolerating authoritarian practices. In Venezuela this debate has been going on for a quarter century, and an increasing number of people, burned by the economic consequences of sanctions, lean toward skepticism about “savior” sanctions and visa blacklists.

Both stories — about an oil “breakthrough” that did not reach the pockets of the average Venezuelan, and about Landau’s warnings addressed to Colombian elites — are joined by a common narrative: the U.S. plays the role of regional arbiter who allocates legitimacy, punishes, and rewards based on its own strategic priorities. Where in Washington this may be presented as a moral duty to protect democracy, in Caracas and increasingly in other Latin American capitals it is read as a continuation of the old logic of control.

The political and social dimension for Venezuela is twofold. On one hand, the spread of the practice of sanctions and visa threats to other countries, like Colombia, normalizes the same approach once applied to Venezuela. This consolidates a model in which Washington effectively reserves the right to evaluate the quality of elections and the legitimacy of governments in the region. On the other hand, the Colombian episode opens new windows of opportunity for Caracas: frictions between Gustavo Petro’s progressive government and the U.S. potentially weaken the traditional anti-Venezuelan front in Bogotá, creating space for bilateral agreements on migration, border security, and energy outside the strict framework of the American agenda.

Against this background, domestic Venezuelan fatigue heightens cultural sensitivity to the word “tutelage.” After decades of anti-imperialist rhetoric, cycles of opposition protests, and numerous “historic turning points” without noticeable improvements in services and wages, an expectation of a “quick result” after every loud gesture — military intervention, pact signing, sanction lifting — has taken root in society. When results do not come, the skepticism that grows is less ideological than pragmatic: if life does not become easier, then either external actors pursue their own interests, or local elites use the external factor as a cover to prolong the status quo.

In both the story of a U.S.-led “transition” and the story of warnings about Colombian elections, the same structural flaw is clearly visible from Caracas. The people remain a decoration, a backdrop appealed to in the name of democracy, human rights, or national dignity, but who almost never becomes a real subject of the process. In the first column the citizen appears through complaints about electricity, water, transport, and meager wages; in the second — as an extra in someone else’s game about sanctions, visas, and strategic plans for the 2026 elections.

That is why Venezuelan analysis, like the piece on elimpulso.com, differs from dry news reporting: it bets not on listing facts but on interpreting motives, juxtaposing the elites’ “political time” with the street’s “real time,” and warning of a new wave of frustration. And video pieces like “ESTADOS UNIDOS NO LO ESPERABA…” (link) add to this picture the sense that the Venezuelan experience is not an exception but a symptom of a broad regional trend in which the United States continues to play the role of stern guardian, while Latin American societies increasingly respond with weary but ever clearer skepticism.

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Israel Begins Talks with U.S. on New Military Agreement

Israel has officially begun preliminary talks with the administration of President Donald Trump on creating a fundamentally new long-term security framework to replace the existing 2016 memorandum, which expires in 2028. This is not merely about extending financial aid, but about a strategic reassessment of the relationship prompted by the recent war with Iran and scenarios of multi-domain conflict. Tel Aviv seeks to use battlefield experience to secure a more resilient and comprehensive defense infrastructure with broader commitments from Washington.

Israel's Ministry of Defense announced the start of formal consultations prompted by changes on the battlefield and in the political arena. Military operations have placed unprecedented strain on Israeli air defense systems and precision weapons. It became clear that countering Iranian ballistic missiles and drones depended significantly on integration with Pentagon radar systems and data from U.S. satellites. Tel Aviv intends to enshrine this cooperation as a permanent element of the new agreement to avoid future depletion of defense resources.

Beyond military considerations, the initiative is driven by political calculations and concerns about possible negotiations between Washington and Tehran, prompting Israel to act preemptively. Israel seeks to leverage direct U.S. military involvement to convince Congress and the White House that previous defense mechanisms are no longer suitable for the "modern missile war." The goal is to secure solid and irreversible U.S. defense commitments before any potential political arrangements with Iran.

The Obama-era 2016 agreement — $38 billion over ten years — contained painful restrictions for Israel, the main one being the requirement to gradually spend all aid on the U.S. defense market by 2028. This limitation harmed Israel's defense industry, effectively eliminating the previous privilege of spending up to 26.3% of funds domestically. As a result, a significant portion of the grant went to support American defense companies. However, under pressure from the war in Gaza and the conflict with Iran, these restrictions have effectively collapsed due to emergency aid packages provided outside the original agreement.

This time Tel Aviv is asking for more than a "blank check"; it aims to transform the relationship into "full military integration and partnership," operating as two armies within a single system. Requests include doubling the budget and extending the term to 20 years, unifying data networks and satellite intelligence, joint military production, and local development of cyber artificial intelligence technologies. Estimates suggest support could more than double the current $3.8 billion per year to cover advanced technologies and joint production for the next two decades. The Israeli approach has the tacit support of senior officials, including Netanyahu, and envisages shifting billions of dollars from State Department grants into Pentagon procurement budgets, which would reduce political and diplomatic oversight. The expected outcome is the creation of deeper and less transparent defense ties that would turn Israel from a "country dependent on aid" into an "integral technological partner" with a broad operational mandate in the region. This shift would guarantee Israel lasting qualitative superiority and absolute military freedom of action to protect its interests, even if White House calculations regarding Iran change.

Comments on the story

• What is the 2016 memorandum (or "Obama agreement") for $38 billion, and what restrictions did it impose on Israel? - The 2016 memorandum is a ten-year agreement between the U.S. and Israel to provide military aid totaling $38 billion (2019–2028). It replaced a previous $30 billion memorandum. The main restriction: Israel agreed to gradually reduce the use of part of the funds on purchases from its own defense industry, from 26.3% at the start of the term to a full shift toward spending primarily on American arms and technologies. Israel also agreed not to seek military assistance from other countries without consulting the U.S.

• Which Iranian ballistic missiles and drones posed the main threat, and how did Israel's air defense (including the Iron Dome) interact with American radars during the recent war? - The main threats were medium-range ballistic missiles (for example, Shahab-3 and Emad, capable of reaching Israel) and kamikaze drones (like the Shahed-136). During the recent attacks (2024), Israeli air defenses, including Iron Dome (for short-range rockets), David's Sling (for medium-range), and Arrow-3 (for ballistic threats), operated in coordination with U.S. Aegis radars and missile defense systems deployed in the region. This allowed for the exchange of trajectory data and improved reaction time for interceptions.

• Why was it important for Israel to be able to spend 26.3% of American aid domestically, and what role did Israel's defense industry play? - This allowed Israel to support its own defense companies (for example, Rafael, IAI, Elbit), which create jobs, drive technological innovation, and reduce dependence on imports. The ability to spend part of the aid on local developments gave Israel flexibility to adapt weapons to its needs (for example, creating Iron Dome) while maintaining strategic autonomy.

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Full version: كيف أعادت حرب إيران تشكيل التحالف العسكري الأمريكي الإسرائيلي؟

Human Rights Coalition Calls for Amnesty for Military

The director of the Human Rights Coalition, Alonso Medina Roa, called for the Amnesty Law to be applied to servicemembers detained for political reasons and demanded political will from the Supreme Court and the National Assembly for a transparent overhaul of the judicial system. He emphasized the need to speed up judicial proceedings and to extend amnesty to all citizens, stating that prisoners cannot be divided by party affiliation and that the release of all political prisoners is necessary for societal healing. He also noted the importance of education so that police officers, prosecutors, and judges act in accordance with the law and ethics.

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Full version: Coalición de Derechos Humanos insta aplicar Ley de Amnistía a militares privados de libertad

Iran and Lebanon Exchange Sharp Remarks

A spokesperson for Iran’s Foreign Ministry, Ismail Baghaei, drew the ire of Lebanese President Michel Aoun with a tweet in the Lebanese dialect that caustically mocked the leader’s loyalties. The post appeared after Aoun’s interview with CNN, in which he openly criticized Tehran. This sharp exchange between the two capitals reflects growing regional tensions that have already moved beyond routine diplomacy.

In the CNN interview, Aoun accused Iran of using Lebanon as a “bargaining chip” in its confrontation with the United States and Israel, saying that “Lebanese are tired of wars and want peace.” He addressed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps directly, stressing: “This is our country, not yours.” Aoun called on Tehran to stop its interference, which he said places a heavy burden on the Lebanese people.

The president of Lebanon also said he was ready to continue negotiations with Israel, calling this a “historic chance” to end decades of conflict. He expressed confidence that only diplomacy, not military force, can bring the long-awaited peace and security to the region. This step signaled Lebanon’s search for alternatives to escalation.

Social media reacted instantly to the exchanges, splitting into two camps. Many users were surprised by the sharpness of Baghaei’s tweet, which is rare in diplomatic communication. Others saw it as an example of rising tensions that break traditional protocols and move into open hostility. The discussions raised questions about the future of relations between the two countries.

Observers believe this verbal spat is indicative but does not necessarily lead to a full-scale diplomatic rupture. It rather exposes the fragility of the political climate between Lebanon and Iran, without guaranteeing immediate policy changes. The main victim remains the Lebanese people, whose fate depends on whether the parties retain the ability to engage in dialogue.

Comments on the news

• Why is an Iranian diplomat’s use of the Lebanese dialect of Arabic considered particularly provocative? – The use of the Lebanese dialect by an Iranian diplomat is seen as a provocation because it underscores direct and detailed Iranian interference in Lebanon’s internal affairs. The Lebanese dialect is not merely a linguistic tool but a marker of cultural and political identity. When an Iranian official uses it, it signals deep political penetration and a disregard for Lebanese sovereignty, especially against the backdrop of tense relations between Tehran and Beirut.

• What is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and what role does it play in Iran’s regional policy, including in Lebanon? – The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is an elite military and political institution of Iran, established after the 1979 Islamic Revolution to protect the regime and extend its influence. The IRGC is directly responsible for external operations, including support for allied groups in the Middle East. In Lebanon, the IRGC, through its Quds Force, provides military, financial, and logistical assistance to Hezbollah, enabling Iran to influence Lebanese politics and use it as leverage in regional conflicts, especially against Israel.

• What has been Iran’s historical role in Lebanese politics, particularly through support for Hezbollah, and why does the president of Lebanon accuse Tehran of using the country as a “bargaining chip”? – Iran began active involvement in Lebanese politics in the 1980s, using the creation and support of Hezbollah as a tool to promote its interests in the region. Hezbollah has become not only a military force but also a political party that is influential in Lebanon. The president accuses Tehran of turning the country into a “bargaining chip” because Iran’s interests are often prioritized over Lebanon’s stability and sovereignty: for example, Hezbollah’s participation in the Syrian conflict or confrontations with Israel has led to economic sanctions, political instability, and Lebanon’s international isolation, which harm Lebanon itself.

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Full version: "بيبيع اللي واقف حدّه".. المتحدث باسم الخارجية الإيرانية يرد على عون باللهجة اللبنانية

Trump: US does not need a deal with Iran to access uranium

President Donald Trump said his country "does not need a deal with Iran to obtain enriched uranium," stressing that Washington is already able to access it. He downplayed Iran's ability to stop the US, saying, "I don't think they can stop us if we want to." According to Trump, there is currently no need to do so because the uranium was "buried" after storage sites were bombed during the past forty days of the war. He also revealed that the US monitors Iranian nuclear sites from space, threatening further strikes if necessary.

Trump confirmed that the option of sending special forces to seize nuclear materials from Iran was considered, but he rejected it to avoid repeating Jimmy Carter's mistakes. The operation would have required a one- to two-week military presence in the conflict zone, so it was not carried out. The US president emphasized that the country's main goal is to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, saying: "The Iranians will never get it." He believes Washington is handling this task well, and the essence of any agreement is to prevent Tehran from obtaining an atomic bomb, adding that the US will prevail either through negotiations or "by other means."

Speaking of possible negotiations, Trump named the immediate reopening of the Strait of Hormuz as the main condition. He is not seeking a personal meeting with Iran's Supreme Leader, but did not rule one out if a deal is reached. Washington demands practical guarantees of a separation between the nuclear program and regional balance before any settlement. Trump warned that a resumption of war is possible if Iran kills American soldiers, calling that a "good reason" for military action. Thus, the US leaves itself the choice between diplomacy and force to protect its interests and freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf.

Trump also touched on the Lebanon issue, noting that it is connected to Iran, and said: "Hezbollah contacted us and asked: what do you think about a ceasefire?" He said he had spoken with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and with Hezbollah itself, expressing confidence in progress in this "long-standing conflict." Concluding, he said Lebanon deserves peace, emphasizing the US desire to reduce regional tensions. These statements reflect Washington's aim for comprehensive stabilization in the Middle East, where the Iranian issue remains central.

Comments on the news

• What is the Strait of Hormuz and why is its reopening a key condition for the US in talks with Iran? — The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow maritime corridor between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, through which about 20% of global oil trade passes. Control of the strait is critical for the US because its closure by Iran could trigger a global energy crisis and undermine allies' economies. Reopening the strait means guaranteeing unobstructed passage for American and allied vessels, which is a "red line" in negotiations. Iran, by threatening to close the strait in response to sanctions, uses it as leverage, so the US demands its reopening as a condition for any agreement on the nuclear program.

• What role does the Lebanese group Hezbollah play in the context of Iran's nuclear program and the regional balance of power in the Middle East? — Hezbollah is a key proxy ally of Iran, acting as a "frontline" against Israel. It distracts the attention and resources of Israel and the US, giving Tehran strategic depth for advancing its nuclear program. Moreover, Hezbollah's arsenal (including long-range rockets) poses a deterrent threat that restrains direct Israeli military intervention against Iranian nuclear sites. Thus, Hezbollah strengthens Iran's bargaining position: any attack on Iran risks provoking a war in northern Israel, which undermines the regional balance and raises costs for Iran's opponents.

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Full version: ترمب: لا نحتاج لاتفاق مع إيران للحصول على اليورانيوم المخصب

Acting President of Venezuela met with the U.S. Ambassador to India

Acting President of Venezuela Delcy Rodríguez held an introductory meeting in New Delhi on June 4 with the U.S. Ambassador to India, Sergio Gor. The event took place during the second day of Rodríguez’s working visit to the Asian country and was devoted to discussing progress in bilateral relations between Venezuela and the United States. This meeting marks a new phase of constructive dialogue based on mutual respect and cooperation, which is especially significant against the backdrop of a long history of tensions between the two states.

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Full version: Presidenta (E) Delcy Rodríguez sostuvo reunión de cortesía con embajador de EEUU en India, Sergio Gor

Illusion of victory: both the US and Iran incur growing losses

According to analyst Sanam Vakil, both Washington and Tehran are behaving as if they are prevailing in the ongoing confrontation, but the facts indicate the opposite: both sides are incurring increasingly palpable political, economic and strategic costs. The author emphasizes that the notion that time is working in favor of one side or the other is mistaken, since both players are effectively losing both domestically and regionally. The key conclusion is that the current situation is not a victory but a series of multilayered losses.

The ceasefire that came into effect on April 8 is accompanied by intermittent waves of escalation, including new US strikes and Iran’s retaliatory actions that have affected Kuwait and Bahrain, as well as Israeli escalation in Lebanon. Although the parties have so far managed to avoid full-scale war, maintaining this state of affairs risks turning the truce into a chronic stalemate. This stalemate carries serious regional and international consequences, keeping markets and allied regimes in a constant state of tension.

The analyst highlights four key obstacles to political progress. The first is mutual distrust: Tehran does not believe President Donald Trump can deliver a durable deal and fears that US demands will gradually expand — from the nuclear program to missiles and regional policy. The second obstacle is the absence of direct and effective channels of communication between the parties: since the meeting in Islamabad, no mechanism has been established to turn political signals into practical agreements.

The third obstacle lies in the radical divergence of goals: Iran insists on detailed guarantees, including lifting sanctions, clear implementation mechanisms and commitments not to renege on agreements, while Trump seeks a quick and simple deal that can be presented advantageously to voters. The fourth is domestic pressure: in Washington any agreement with Iran would face fierce attack from Republican hawks as well as from Democrats, while in Iran concessions after months of war and bombings could be perceived as capitulation, especially against the backdrop of rising expectations among the younger political generations.

Despite optimistic assessments from each side, the costs are real and mounting. The US faces political and economic costs: energy markets remain anxious, the country’s image as a guarantor of stability is undermined, and the security of allies in the Persian Gulf is threatened. Iran, for its part, suffers economic problems: inflation reaches 77%, the rial is losing value, and domestic protests and repression are aggravating the crisis. The author concludes that the window for de-escalation is still open — but turning the truce into a real political process requires more effective direct dialogue, a clear timetable and a readiness for mutual concessions.

Comments on the news

• Why is the meeting in Islamabad mentioned as important, and what does it say about the absence of direct channels between the US and Iran? - The meeting in Islamabad is important because it demonstrates that the US and Iran are forced to use intermediaries (in this case Pakistan) to discuss key issues such as the nuclear program or regional security. This underscores the complete absence of direct diplomatic contacts between the countries since 1980 due to decades of mutual distrust and hostility. The fact that the parties resort to mediation even for indirect talks points to a deep crisis in bilateral relations.

• What protests and repressions have taken place in Iran recently, and how are they connected to the economic crisis described in the article? - In recent years Iran has seen large-scale protests, including nationwide demonstrations after the death of Mahsa Amini in 2022 (against mandatory hijab and the political regime), as well as economic protests in 2023–2024 due to sharp rises in food and fuel prices caused by inflation and sanctions. Repression has included the arrest of thousands of people, the use of force by the IRGC and police, and internet shutdowns to suppress coordination. These protests are directly linked to the economic crisis: US sanctions have worsened inflation and unemployment, which provoked public discontent that the regime suppresses to maintain stability.

• Who are the “younger political generations” in Iran and why do their expectations affect Tehran’s reluctance to make concessions? - The “younger political generations” are Iranians born after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, who make up the majority of the population. They grew up under sanctions and restrictions and demand greater political freedoms, gender equality and improved economic conditions. Their rising expectations put pressure on the government: if Tehran makes concessions to the US (for example, by relaxing nuclear demands or loosening societal controls), this could be perceived by youth as weakness and spur new protests. Therefore the authorities fear that concessions in foreign policy would lead to loss of domestic control and prefer a hard line.

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Full version: مقال في الغارديان: واشنطن وطهران تعتقدان أنهما تنتصران لكنهما تخسران

Latin American pushback: a region growing weary of Washington's pressure

In Latin American capitals there is a growing sense that the United States is returning to a policy of intervention and sanctions personified by Donald Trump, and this is provoking an active reaction from regional leaders. Cuba and Mexico loudly condemn "interventionism" and economic restrictions, Brazil and other countries try to defend strategic autonomy on security and trade issues, and public debates reveal a split between desires for national sovereignty and the inevitable influence of the United States. Some governments bargain and seek new foreign-policy allies, others conspicuously distance themselves, strengthening regional solidarity and their own institutions. This piece was prepared based on publications from www.elperiodicoextremadura.com (Venezuela) and www.france24.com (Venezuela).

Venezuela between blockade and oil: how Caracas reads sanctions against Cuba and bets on India

In the news flow about Latin America two, at first glance separate, stories — new US sanctions against Cuba and Delcy Rodríguez's visit to India — combine into a single Venezuelan narrative about "siege" and the struggle to survive through oil. From Caracas's perspective these are not isolated episodes but parts of one regional strategy of Washington's pressure and a parallel counterstrategy of the Bolivarian project, which relies on allies and energy.

In live coverage of the crisis in Venezuela and US geopolitical moves, the piece "EEUU captura a Maduro, en directo | Crisis en Venezuela y los planes de Trump en Groenlandia, Cuba, México o Colombia" describes a chain of Washington's actions on various fronts — from Caracas to Havana. Against this backdrop, the US Treasury sanctions against Cuban president Miguel Díaz‑Canel, Raúl Castro, some of their family members and five Cuban organizations in Caracas are perceived not as an isolated step but as a stage of the same line of pressure long aimed at Venezuela as well.

That is why in Venezuela such measures are interpreted as confirmation that the US is using "financial weapons" against governments allied with Caracas. Cuba is a key partner in security, healthcare and political advising; a strike against Díaz‑Canel and Raúl Castro in official rhetoric is equated with an attack on the entire bloc of allies of the Bolivarian revolution. Constant mentions in the news about the "blockade of the Caribbean country" directly rhyme with the term "blockade" used by Nicolás Maduro's authorities to describe their own sanction-related restrictions. This forms the idea of a shared "fateful space": what is being done to Cuba today is a continuation of what has long been done to Venezuela.

Inside the country this is read through the prism of a long-established narrative of "hybrid war," where economic blockade, asset hunts and diplomatic pressure become elements of a single strategy. For government circles and pro-government analysts the sanctions from the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) are part of a "regional ring" designed to provoke regime change in Havana and Caracas, and the inclusion of family members on blacklists (the wife, son, stepson of Díaz‑Canel, Raúl Castro's son) reminds Venezuelans of a familiar pattern: the same personal and family sanctions have long been applied to senior officials in Caracas, including Maduro himself.

The Venezuelan opposition views this differently, but still through a national lens. For its representatives, sanctions against the Cuban leadership are a legitimate tool of pressure on authoritarian governments and simultaneously a signal: the cost of alliance with Caracas is rising, and Havana's and Caracas's political and economic isolation is intensifying. From this perspective, US moves against Cuba demonstrate what mechanisms the international community can continue to use to pressure Venezuelan authorities.

However divergent the assessments, public perception converges on one point: the language of "blockade" and "sanctions" is already fully normalized in Venezuela. A population that has lived for years under headlines about new restrictions immediately draws a parallel: "what they do to Cuba, they do to us." For government supporters this confirms an "imperialist siege," for opponents it is evidence that neighboring regimes are subject to the same set of external levers as Maduro.

The consequences of Cuban sanctions for Venezuela extend far beyond solidarity. There has long been interdependence between the two countries: Havana relied heavily on preferential oil from Venezuela while sending doctors, specialists and security advisers to Caracas in return. Financial and personal pressure on the Cuban elite and related structures undermines the operational capabilities of an ally involved in Venezuelan medical programs and the security apparatus. At the same time, Cuba's role as an intermediary financial-logistics platform for transactions of interest to Caracas becomes more complicated, fitting into the larger picture: from sanctions against PDVSA to restrictions on Venezuela's financial system.

This architecture of pressure closely resembles what Venezuela itself has experienced for many years. In Caracas they see direct parallels: like Díaz‑Canel and Raúl Castro, Venezuelan leaders have appeared on OFAC lists alongside relatives; sanctions are presented not only as legal measures for specific actions but as an attempt to discredit and weaken an entire political project. In the collective memory of Bolivarian supporters this continues a long-standing line of conflict with the US — from Cold War times and support for Cuba to oil sanctions against PDVSA. Any new wave of restrictions against Havana, Managua or La Paz is used within Venezuela to reinforce the thesis of an "imperialist ring," which justifies internal mobilization and prioritizes "resistance" over reforms.

Against this background it is particularly telling that in the same news cycle another story appears — Delcy Rodríguez's visit to India, covered in a France 24 piece. Formally it is an economic note about strengthening energy ties, but read from Caracas it becomes a kind of implicit editorial about the regime's priorities: by any means secure the flow of oil dollars and diversify partners in the face of geopolitical vulnerability.

The authors emphasize that India is "the world's most populous country" and "the second-largest buyer of Venezuelan oil, right after the US," especially against the backdrop of a "global supply affected by a crisis in the Middle East." For a Venezuelan audience two important messages are immediately readable here. First, despite sanctions and internal collapse, the country remains a significant energy player. Second, Global South allies, in this case India, become indispensable precisely when the oil market is shaken by conflicts dominated by Western powers.

The chosen phrasing adds a particular nuance: in the photograph Delcy Rodríguez is presented as "acting president of Venezuela," shaking hands with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. For the domestic audience this is more than a ceremonial gesture: the regime's second-in-command is portrayed as a figure at the level of head of state, which fits the trend of power concentration within Maduro's close circle and constructs an image of continuity and resilience. She thus appears not merely as a vice president on an economic mission but as a representative of the "country's leadership" building global alliances in a difficult moment.

Economically the central idea is clear: when a "crisis in the Middle East" limits global oil supply, securing India as the second buyer after the US is a lifeline for Venezuela suffering from a severe shortage of external financing. Domestically such tours are interpreted as part of a threefold strategy: to ensure a minimal level of foreign currency inflows for subsidies, critical imports and relative exchange-rate stability; to show the base that the country is not "isolated" and can circumvent sanctions through alliances with rising powers; and to send a signal to Washington and Europe that Caracas can redirect flows to alternative markets if full normalization of energy ties with the West stalls.

Historically Chávez's and Maduro's foreign policy was built around "oil diplomacy" — from strategic agreements with China and Russia to the Petrocaribe initiative. In this context Rodríguez's visit to New Delhi, described by France 24, looks like a logical continuation of the same line: internal crisis does not eliminate the possibility of external maneuver if you have oil. If the axis once formed as "Caracas–Beijing–Moscow," now a triangle "Caracas–Washington–New Delhi" is increasingly visible, with India playing the role of an insurance partner in case relations with the US again deteriorate.

Culturally this whole picture fits into a persistent Venezuelan sensitivity: "they remember us when there is a global oil crisis." Mention of a "crisis in the Middle East" activates the memory of how each world conflict that pushes oil prices up has been perceived in Caracas as a window of geopolitical and economic opportunity — even amid deep domestic decline. The fact that it is Delcy Rodríguez, not the foreign minister, who becomes the face of this diplomacy underscores that foreign policy is viewed primarily as an instrument of economic and political survival for the narrow ruling core.

Juxtaposing these two stories — sanctions against Cuba and the strengthening of energy partnership with India — reveals how a cohesive perception is formed in Venezuela. On one hand, the flow of news about sanctions, "siege" and "blockade" — concentrated in live reports like the coverage of the Venezuelan crisis and Washington's plans — feeds the narrative of a constant US attack on the Caracas–Havana allied axis. On the other, pieces about economic missions to New Delhi, such as the France 24 publication, shape the image of a government that, despite the "siege," finds new supports in the Global South and can turn global shocks into an opportunity to shore up its rear.

Thus foreign-policy news about Cuba and India, read through the Venezuelan lens, merge into one narrative: the US is tightening a sanctions noose around the Bolivarian camp, and Caracas, in response, seeks to compensate losses by expanding oil ties with major powers outside the Western bloc. It is precisely in this space — between blockade and oil — that Venezuelan politics lives today.

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Iran struck Kuwait and Bahrain

In a dangerous escalation, Iran retaliated for recent US strikes on its territory by attacking Kuwait and Bahrain. According to a military expert, this came as a surprise because it had been expected that Tehran would strike American ships and aircraft blocking its ports. This move changed the dynamics of the conflict and was called extremely risky.

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Full version: الجزيرة نت

US Joint Chiefs Chairman Visited Caracas

The Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff made an unexpected visit to Caracas to hold talks with the Venezuelan government, emphasizing the importance of the country's stability for overall security in the Western Hemisphere. During the meeting, the American general confirmed the US military's commitment to carrying out a three-phase plan promoted by Washington, although specific details of this plan remain classified. This rare high-level contact between two countries that have long been in tense relations signals a possible shift in US diplomatic strategy toward Venezuela.

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Full version: El jefe del Estado Mayor Conjunto de EEUU viajó a Caracas para reunirse con el gobierno venezolano

Trump Balances Sanctions and War with Iran

The administration of President Donald Trump is trying to maintain a "maximum pressure" policy on Tehran while avoiding a full-scale military conflict. According to media reports, Trump has told aides in private that he does not intend to start a war with Iran unless Iranian attacks lead to the deaths of American soldiers. However, recurring clashes are increasing tension in the White House and call into question the durability of the current ceasefire.

One of Trump's key demands has become the complete absence of direct payments to Iran under any new agreement. The president fears that such a step would be perceived as a "capitulation," especially in light of criticism over the release of $1.7 billion under the 2015 deal. Tehran is now seeking nearly $12 billion, but Washington is adamant — Trump wants an agreement that places the US in a much stronger position than under Obama.

In search of a way out, US officials are considering alternative financial mechanisms that would avoid direct payments while satisfying Iranian demands. One option is to have third countries unfreeze Iranian assets so that these funds would not appear as direct US payments. It is emphasized that the money could be directed exclusively to humanitarian needs — medicines, food, and agricultural machinery via vetted suppliers.

The main condition for any sanctions relief remains Iran's relinquishment of its stocks of highly enriched uranium. The White House insists that economic incentives can be provided only after concrete steps to roll back the nuclear program. This approach is intended to demonstrate toughness to the American audience and prevent a repeat of past "concessions" to Tehran.

At a cabinet meeting Trump made his position clear: "We control their money and we won't give it up until they start behaving properly." Secretary of State Marco Rubio added that "there will be no advance payments," and any sanctions relief would be possible only after Iran meets all the demands. Thus, discussion of nuclear sanctions remains only part of the negotiations, not their starting point.

Comments on the story

• Which countries could act as intermediaries for unfreezing Iranian assets and why is their involvement important to avoid direct payments? - Key intermediaries could include Qatar, Iraq, Oman, and Switzerland (through humanitarian channels). Their involvement is important because after the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal in 2018 and the imposition of secondary sanctions, direct financial transactions between the US and Iran became impossible. Intermediaries provide a "gray transfer" mechanism in which proceeds from Iranian oil (for example, held in Iraqi banks) are converted into humanitarian goods (food, medicine) without direct Iranian access to dollar accounts. Qatar has already acted as a financial "channel" in 2020–2023 to transfer $6 billion of Iranian funds in exchange for the release of hostages.

• Why does the article mention the $1.7 billion released under the 2015 deal, and what is its background in the context of Iran–US disputes? - That sum is linked to Iran’s claim against the US at the International Court of Justice over frozen assets from a 1970s military contract (before the 1979 Islamic Revolution). In 2015, as part of preparations to implement the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the US agreed to unfreeze these funds to settle the dispute. However, in 2018 the Trump administration withdrew from the JCPOA and again blocked the payment, creating a precedent of "double freezing" that is often cited in debates about trust in American commitments.

• What does the US "maximum pressure" policy on Iran include and what specific measures have been applied against Tehran in recent years? - The "maximum pressure" policy, launched by the Trump administration in 2018, includes: (1) unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA; (2) reinstatement and tightening of oil sanctions (aimed at reducing Iran's oil exports to zero); (3) imposition of secondary sanctions on foreign companies doing business with Iran (including banks, ports, shipping firms); (4) designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a foreign terrorist organization; (5) targeting financial networks that evade sanctions (for example, through Chinese or Iraqi banks). In recent years (2020–2024), measures have been added against Iran’s UAV and missile programs, as well as cyberattacks on Iranian infrastructure (for example, the Bushehr nuclear power plant).

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Full version: ضغط بلا حرب.. ما هي إستراتيجية ترمب الجديدة في مواجهة طهران؟

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Comments on the news

• What role does the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) play in Iranian politics and the economy beyond its military functions? — The IRGC is not just a military structure but a key player in Iran’s economy and politics. In the economy it controls major construction projects, telecommunications, the oil and gas sector, and banking through affiliated companies (for example, Khatam al-Anbiya). The Corps receives large state contracts without competitive bidding. In politics the IRGC directly influences elections by supporting conservative candidates, and its former commanders often occupy top state positions (for example, President Ebrahim Raisi — a former judge closely linked to the IRGC). This dual role makes it a “state within a state.”

• Which hidden consequences of international sanctions most affect the everyday life of ordinary Iranians? — Besides the obvious rise in prices and inflation, sanctions create hidden problems: shortages of medicines due to bans on their import (even for treating chronic diseases); difficulty accessing international payment systems (e.g., Visa/Mastercard), which hinders buying goods abroad or paying for education overseas. Food quality also suffers — bans on importing fertilizers and seeds reduce yields, and smuggling fills the market with outdated or expired goods. Finally, disconnecting Iranian banks from SWIFT complicates receiving remittances from relatives abroad, which for many families is the only source of income.

• Why is the city of Qom considered the spiritual center of Shia Islam, and what influence does its clergy have on Iranian politics? — Qom is home to the largest Shia seminary (hawza), founded in the 9th century, and the shrine of Fatima Masumeh, the sister of Imam Reza. Each year thousands of theology students from across the Shia world study there. Qom’s clergy, especially the grand ayatollahs (for example, Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi), shape Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) and can influence politics through fatwas that oblige believers to support or criticize the authorities. They also appoint representatives to key state bodies, such as the Guardian Council, which assesses laws for compliance with Islam and vets candidates for elections. Any major political decision in Iran, whether about the nuclear program or social reforms, often receives approval or a soft veto from Qom’s clergy.

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Full version: "مصادفة شديدة الغرابة".. إسقاط طيار أمريكي مرتين بنيران صديقة وصاروخ إيراني

Delcy Rodríguez announced new contracts to boost oil production

Acting President of Venezuela Delcy Rodríguez confirmed that new contracts providing significant investments to increase oil production will be signed this week, and said results are expected by the end of the year and in subsequent years, stressing the government's commitment to the people's welfare and presenting Venezuela as an open energy partner ready for mutually beneficial cooperation.

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Full version: Delcy Rodríguez anunció nuevos contratos para incrementar producción petrolera

Attack on Kuwait Airport: Iran Strikes, U.S. Responds

The Kuwaiti Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed one death and several injuries as a result of an attack described as Iranian on Kuwait International Airport. The Directorate General of Civil Aviation reported significant damage to the terminal building from drone and missile strikes, prompting immediate activation of the emergency plan. All flights were suspended, and some were diverted to alternate airports to ensure passenger and staff safety.

Kuwaiti diplomacy said the country "will not tolerate and will not be lenient" toward repeated aggression, and the military is coordinating with relevant bodies to take necessary measures to protect the state's security. The Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense published photos and videos of the destruction inside the airport and warned citizens not to approach debris, shrapnel, or unidentified objects left after interception.

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that it had repelled multiple waves of Iranian attacks on regional countries, and that Iranian ballistic missiles and drones did not reach their targets. In response to strikes attributed to Tehran, U.S. forces carried out precision strikes on an Iranian military ground command post on Qeshm Island. CENTCOM specified that two rockets launched toward Kuwait fell or broke up before reaching their targets, and that U.S. and Bahraini air defenses intercepted missiles aimed at Bahrain.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) said it attacked "an American base in the region" and the U.S. Fifth Fleet in Bahrain with missiles and drones in response to what it called a U.S. strike on a communications tower on Qeshm Island, which CENTCOM categorically denies. In a statement the Guards warned: "Our response will be different if we are subjected to aggression, and it must serve as a lesson for the enemy," and also threatened that "destabilizing the strait will come at a high cost to the American military." They also reported a strike on the vessel Panaya, which they described as belonging to the "Zionist‑American enemy," in response to an attack on an Iranian oil tanker.

In Kuwait and Bahrain, air defense systems were repelling missile and drone attacks, accompanied by sirens and calls for the public to "remain calm and move to the nearest safe place." Reporters described explosions caused by missile interceptions, and Kuwaiti military officials explained that all sounds were related to the operation of defense systems. In Bahrain, local media confirmed the destruction of Iranian missiles and drones in the skies over the kingdom.

This is already the third attack on Kuwait in the past week: earlier, the military repelled similar attacks on Monday and Thursday. The Kuwaiti Cabinet again condemned the strikes, demanding that Iran "immediately and unconditionally cease" and placing full responsibility on it, warning that corresponding measures would be taken to ensure security. Meanwhile, U.S. reports indicate minor injuries to several U.S. service members and civilian contractors from a rocket strike on Ali Al Salem Air Base in Kuwait, although CENTCOM emphasized that all interceptions did not result in casualties among U.S. forces during other attacks.

Comments on the News

• What is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and how does its role differ from Iran’s regular army? – The IRGC is an elite military-political formation created after the 1979 revolution to protect the Islamic system. Unlike the regular army (Artesh), which focuses on guarding the country's borders, the IRGC carries out tasks related to ideological protection of the regime, conducts overseas operations (through the Quds Force), controls a significant portion of the economy, and influences domestic politics. The Artesh is subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, while the IRGC reports directly to the Supreme Leader.
• Why does the IRGC’s mention of the "strait" raise particular concern, and which strait is meant? – In Iranian military-political discourse, "the strait" almost always refers to the Strait of Hormuz — a strategic waterway through which about 20% of the world's oil trade passes. IRGC threats to close this strait in response to external pressure are seen as a direct danger to global energy markets, which would immediately prompt oil price increases and fears of military escalation.
• What does the term "Zionist‑American enemy" mean in Iran’s rhetoric and what historical or political contexts does it reference? – This term denotes the perceived alliance of Israel and the United States as a single hostile force that, according to Iranian authorities, seeks to undermine the Islamic Republic, control the Middle East, and destroy Palestinian statehood. It stems from the anti‑imperialist rhetoric of the 1979 revolution (including the U.S. embassy seizure) and from Iran’s nonrecognition of Israel as a legitimate state, emphasizing that both countries are seen as allies pursuing common interests through sanctions, military pressure, and support for Iran’s regional adversaries.

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Full version: قتيل بهجوم إيراني يستهدف مطار الكويت وأضرار بمنشآت دبلوماسية

Trump Announces Possible Agreement with Iran Next Week

US President Donald Trump said Monday evening that a framework agreement with Iran to extend the ceasefire and reopen the Strait of Hormuz could be reached "as soon as next week." However, he clarified that unresolved issues remain and he has not yet given final approval to the deal. In his statement, Trump emphasized that a "peaceful agreement with Iran could be better than a military victory," although negotiations are difficult for both sides.

Trump also noted that talks with Tehran are continuing at an "accelerated pace," despite Iranian reports that the dialogue had been suspended because of Israeli strikes on Lebanon. According to Western media, contacts resumed after Trump called off a planned strike on a southern suburb of Beirut following a "fruitful" conversation with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. That turn of events gave new momentum to talks that have been unstable since the start of the war.

Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for its part, warned that "violating the ceasefire on any front is a violation on all fronts," stressing the "serious consequences" of such a step. That statement reflects Tehran’s concern about possible escalation and sets strict limits for any future agreement. Current regional tensions and threats of military responses make any new compromise extremely fragile.

According to Mehr agency, Iranian authorities are still studying the final text of the memorandum of understanding and have not yet sent a response. Tehran seeks tangible benefits, drawing on the bitter experience of past deals. Sources stress that "the history of US non-compliance and distrust" forces Iran to adopt an extremely tough stance. This approach balances fear of an agreement with fear of war, making negotiations complex and protracted.

Reuters reports that Tehran is seeking a temporary and limited agreement that would ease economic pressure and stabilize the domestic situation without major concessions on its nuclear program. Three Iranian sources confirmed that such a tactic matches Iran’s usual strategy of softening sanctions and maintaining dialogue without abandoning key positions. Iranian officials view a limited agreement as a way to buy time, obtain financial assistance and contain internal risks from a worsening economy. Meanwhile Pakistan is acting as an intermediary between Washington and Tehran, seeking a settlement after the conflict that began on 28 February. The temporary truce established on 8 April opened a diplomatic window for pursuing limited solutions.

Comments on the news

• Why is Pakistan acting as an intermediary between the US and Iran, and what role does it play in regional diplomacy? — Pakistan traditionally maintains close ties with Iran (shared border, cultural and religious roots) while also keeping functional relations with the US (military and economic assistance). In a situation where direct channels between Tehran and Washington are practically absent, Islamabad serves as a convenient "negotiator": it is not a direct party to the conflict but has resources to influence both sides. In addition, Pakistan is interested in stability along its borders (especially in Balochistan) and is trying to strengthen its role as a regional mediator, competing with players such as Oman or Qatar.

• What strategic importance does the Strait of Hormuz have for the global economy, and why is its blockage a key leverage point for Iran? — About 20% of the world’s oil (roughly 17–20 million barrels per day) passes through the Strait of Hormuz. It is the main maritime route for the Gulf countries — Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait and Iran itself. Blocking the strait (even partially) would instantly trigger a sharp rise in energy prices, fuel shortages and a recession in importing countries. For Iran, this is an "asymmetric trump card": even with a weak economy it can create a global crisis that would force the US and its allies to negotiate.

• What domestic economic problems in Iran (for example, the impact of sanctions and inflation) are driving Tehran to seek a temporary agreement despite distrust of the US after the withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal? — After the US withdrawal from the JCPOA (2018) the Iranian economy faced hyperinflation (officially up to 45–50%, in reality higher), a rial devaluation (more than tenfold), youth unemployment (up to 25%) and budget shortfalls due to reduced oil revenues. Domestic protests (for example, in 2022–2023) exposed the regime’s vulnerability when food and economic instability become political threats. A temporary agreement, even without full sanctions relief, could give Tehran access to some frozen assets (for example, in Iraq or South Korea) and help stabilize the market ahead of presidential elections. However, Tehran fears a repeat of the "2015 trap," when the deal did not lead to real sanctions relief, so it is seeking a short-term but legally binding option.

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Full version: ترمب: اتفاق إطاري مع إيران قد يُبرم خلال الأسبوع المقبل

Delcy Rodríguez launches 0800EXTORSION line to fight corruption in the judiciary

Acting President of Venezuela Delcy Rodríguez announced the launch of the telephone hotline 0800EXTORSION, aimed at ending payoffs and extortion in the justice system. "I want to put an end to the matraca (extortion)," she said at the start of nationwide consultations on criminal justice reform. Rodríguez emphasized that this measure is intended to protect honest police officers, prosecutors and judges who suffer because of the reputation imposed by corrupt colleagues, and she called for an end to tarnishing the dignity of institutions that have proven their devotion in the most difficult moments of political violence in the country.

Recalling her experience working as a lawyer, Rodríguez pointed to persistent problems of corruption in Venezuelan courts, admitting that while institutions are gradually being cleansed, this is not enough. She stressed the need to create a justice system that corresponds to the "historic moment" and the moral demands of Venezuela. The reform, she said, is an important step toward a peaceful Venezuela, where citizens can resolve their problems without resorting to crime. Noting in particular the work of magistrates in the field, Rodríguez added that the nationwide consultations will help to hear the people's ideas, although some diagnoses have already been made.

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Full version: Delcy Rodríguez anuncia línea 0800EXTORSIÓN para “acabar con la matraca” en el sistema de justicia

Iran Suspends Talks with U.S. Over Israeli Strikes

Iran announced the suspension of negotiations and message exchanges with the United States through intermediaries in protest against ongoing Israeli attacks on Lebanon and the Gaza Strip. According to Tasnim agency, the decision was made after Tehran accused Israel of violating the ceasefire on all fronts. Iranian officials stressed that a ceasefire in Lebanon was one of the key preconditions for any talks, and they will not resume until Iran’s and the “resistance”’s demands are met. This includes a full halt to attacks and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory.

In response to the actions of Israel and its allies, Tehran and the “resistance front” are considering the possibility of closing the Strait of Hormuz and activating other fronts, including the Bab-el-Mandeb. Iranian diplomats insist that any violation of a truce on one front is considered a violation on all fronts, and that a ceasefire in Lebanon is an integral part of any comprehensive settlement. U.S. President Donald Trump said he was not informed in advance of Iran’s decision but noted that it “doesn’t necessarily mean a return to war,” while confirming continued sanctions pressure on Tehran.

Iranian representatives clearly linked the resumption of the negotiation process to the fulfillment of their conditions, including stopping attacks and withdrawing forces, warning that retaliatory measures could be strategic and geographical in nature. Analysts see this decision as a shift in Iranian doctrine from “strategic patience” to “full offensive deterrence.” Tying the defense of allies to the security of maritime routes turns Iran’s geography into a weapon, which could become a “point of no return” in the regional balance of power.

Expert Morteza Shokri warns that the threat of crippling global trade by closing the straits is not a media stunt but reflects a real readiness for catastrophic consequences for the sake of structural survival. Halting the transit of more than 20 million barrels of oil per day could destroy supply chains and accelerate a move away from the dollar toward eastern financial systems such as the “petroyuan.” The economic blow could become structural and change the rules of the global financial system.

Diplomatically, Shokri believes the international community may be forced to adopt a new security system, since traditional diplomacy has exhausted itself. The U.S. will have to bear the costs of compensation and financial guarantees to restore stability. Any attempt to shift the costs of American policy onto the Gulf countries will reach a dead end and only deepen the crisis. Getting out of the escalation requires recognizing the changed balance of power and making concrete commitments.

Researcher Aref Dehgandar describes the situation as an “existential war” over the formation of a regional security system. In his view, the suspension of message exchanges with Washington is an attempt to create an “inevitable balance” that raises the price of continuing Israeli attacks. Iran may move to preemptive support for Hezbollah and its allies, as well as to direct strikes on Israel in case of escalation, not ruling out the activation of additional fronts such as Bab-el-Mandeb. Ultimately, the tension carries enormous risks of military and economic escalation capable of changing the rules of the game in the Middle East if an acceptable settlement for all parties is not found.

Commentary on the news

• What does the shift from “strategic patience” to “full offensive deterrence” mean in the context of Iranian military doctrine? — It is a move from a defensive posture (avoiding direct clashes, relying on deterrence through the threat of retaliatory strikes) to a more aggressive stance: Iran now declares willingness to carry out preemptive strikes and actively project power beyond its borders, especially through proxy forces, to deter enemies on their territory.
• What is Iran’s real capability to close the Strait of Hormuz and what mechanisms exist for this? — Iran has the means to temporarily disrupt navigation in the Strait of Hormuz using mining, coastal anti-ship missiles (such as the Noor and Khalij Fars), and small fast boats with torpedoes. However, a full closure of the strait is technically impossible without prompting immediate military intervention by the U.S. and its allies, which would be catastrophic for Iran itself. The realistic capability is to create a “bottleneck” and increase insurance risks.
• What is the “resistance front” and which groups belong to it besides Hezbollah? — The “resistance front” is an informal network of proxy groups and Iran-aligned forces coordinated by Tehran to confront Israel and the U.S. It includes: the Yemeni Houthis (Ansar Allah), Palestinian groups Hamas and Islamic Jihad, Iraqi militias such as Kataib Hezbollah, Asaib Ahl al-Haqq and Harakat al-Nujaba, as well as pro-Iranian forces in Syria.

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Full version: إيران تعلّق رسائلها مع واشنطن وتلوّح بهرمز وباب المندب.. ما التداعيات؟

US Strikes Iran; Tehran Responds by Hitting Airbase

The US Central Command reported that American warplanes carried out a series of precision strikes on Iranian air defense systems, a ground control station, and also destroyed two suicide drones that, according to the Pentagon, threatened international shipping. The military emphasized that the strikes were conducted on Saturday and Sunday in response to Iran’s earlier downing of an American MQ-1 drone over international waters, calling its actions "defensive."

According to a statement from Central Command, the targets included radars and drone control points in the Guruk area and on the island of Qeshm in Iran. US forces noted that no US personnel were harmed during the operations and that infrastructure and equipment were not damaged. The strikes were aimed at neutralizing threats to shipping and regional security.

In response, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) said it carried out a direct strike on the airbase from which the American aircraft had launched. According to the Fars news agency, Iranian forces "accurately hit the targets" less than an hour after the US attack. The specific location of the base was not disclosed. The IRGC warned that any repeat of aggression by Washington would receive a "completely different" response.

Against the backdrop of the escalation, Kuwait reported that its air defense systems were intercepting missile barrages and drone attacks. Authorities urged citizens and residents to follow safety instructions, warning that sounds of explosions in the country were related to interceptions. The situation indicates an expansion of the zone of tension in the region, where mutual US and Iranian strikes threaten to draw neighboring states in.

News commentary

• Why is the island of Qeshm strategically important for military operations in the Persian Gulf? - Qeshm Island is located in the Strait of Hormuz, through which about 20% of the world’s oil trade passes. Its strategic significance stems from the ability to control shipping routes, deploy anti-ship missile systems (for example, Noor or Khalij-e Fars) and drones, and use it as a base for rapid deployment of IRGC high-speed boats. In addition, its proximity to foreign military bases (for example, the UAE) makes Qeshm an important element of deterrence in the region.

• What is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and how does it differ from Iran’s regular army? - The IRGC is an elite and ideological military formation established after the 1979 Islamic Revolution to protect the Islamic Republic. It differs from the regular army (Artesh) in several respects: (1) it answers directly to the Supreme Leader (rahbar), not the Defense Ministry; (2) it has its own ground, air, and naval forces, as well as the Quds Force, responsible for operations abroad; (3) it controls key economic sectors (oil, telecommunications, construction) through the Khatam al-Anbiya structure; (4) it is actively involved in the country’s political life, unlike the regular army, which focuses on defending borders from external threats.

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Full version: ضربات أمريكية داخل إيران وطهران ترد باستهداف قاعدة جوية

Investigation launched in Venezuela against five police officers for illegal search

The Office of the Attorney General of Venezuela has officially announced the start of a criminal investigation into five officers of the National Bolivarian Police (PNB). They are suspected of conducting an illegal search and of actions contrary to public ethics at an entertainment venue in the city of Barquisimeto, Lara state. The investigation has been assigned to the 21st Prosecutor’s Office of Lara state, which will work together with the 98th National Prosecutor’s Office, specializing in the protection of human rights and gender diversity. The police themselves have already initiated internal control mechanisms and handed all five officers over to the authorities; they will soon be brought before a court on charges under the Criminal Code and the Anti-Corruption Law.

The operation carried out at the venue (previously a sauna) resulted in the detention of 28 people. According to local media, the raid was prompted by complaints from neighborhood residents about alleged prostitution, as well as the sale and use of drugs on the premises. However, the venue’s management categorically denies these accusations, asserting that they are exclusively engaged in the lawful rental of the premises for patrons’ recreation. At present, all 28 detainees and the case materials are under police control for official procedures and judicial review.

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Full version: Ministerio Público inicia investigación contra cinco funcionarios de la PNB por allanamiento a un local en Barquisimeto

Iran Accuses US and Israel of Violating Ceasefire, Threatens Response

Tehran has officially blamed Washington and Tel Aviv for the collapse of the ceasefire agreement in Lebanon and the region. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei, at a press conference in Tehran, said that "the Zionist regime and the United States are violating the ceasefire" and warned that the Islamic Republic does not intend to back down from measures to protect its security and stability in the region.

Baghaei emphasized that the actions of the United States and Israel are not simply isolated incidents, but a continuation of a full-scale war against the peoples of the Middle East. He said that Tehran "considers itself obliged to take practical steps" if violations of the ceasefire and encroachments on Iranian interests continue. According to the diplomat, all decision-making centers in Iran are already studying options for retaliatory measures, and the country is doing everything necessary to support Lebanon and the resistance forces against Israeli attacks.

These statements came against the backdrop of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's order to strike the southern suburb of Beirut, as well as after US Central Command airstrikes on Iranian air defense systems and a ground control station in the Gurok area and on Qeshm Island. Washington explained these strikes as a response to the downing of an American drone by Iranian forces over international waters. Tehran, in turn, viewed these actions as part of a large-scale escalation, which intensified rhetoric about violations of the ceasefire and threats of retaliation.

On the negotiation track, Baghaei noted that ongoing indirect contacts with the US on ending the war "depend on the other side refraining from putting forward unilateral new conditions." He repeated that "negotiations do not mean there is trust between the parties," and pointed out that contradictory positions of the American side explain the protracted nature of the process. At the same time, the Iranian diplomat stressed that at this stage there is no detailed discussion of the nuclear program, since Tehran's priority is precisely the cessation of the war.

Baghaei also reported that one of the 14 points of the draft memorandum of understanding with Washington is lifting the American maritime blockade of Iranian ports. He highly praised Qatar's role in the talks to end the war. Regarding the Strait of Hormuz, the diplomat said that Iran has the right to measures to ensure its security and interests, and noted that ships transit the strait in coordination with the Iranian armed forces. Tehran advocates the creation of a mechanism involving other littoral states for safe passage that does not affect Iran's national security. Although the US and Iran exchanged proposals via Pakistan, and President Trump repeatedly spoke of an imminent deal, disagreements on points such as the unfreezing of Iranian assets and the fate of the nuclear program remain a serious obstacle. In this deadlock, Tehran states that it is closely monitoring developments and is ready to take necessary defensive measures while continuing to support Lebanon.

Comments on the news

• Why do Qeshm Island and the Gurok area have strategic significance for Iran, and what is located there? – Qeshm Island is the largest island in the Persian Gulf, located near the Strait of Hormuz. It is strategically important because it hosts military bases, oil terminals, and a gas production center (including the South Pars field). The Gurok (Gureh) area is a port and naval base on Iran’s coast, providing control over shipping and quick access to the strait. These facilities allow Iran to control sea lanes and protect its energy resources.

• What is the significance of the Strait of Hormuz for Iran, and why is control over it contested? – The Strait of Hormuz is a key maritime route through which about 20–25% of global oil trade passes. For Iran it is a "gateway" to the Indian Ocean and a source of influence on world prices. Iran considers the strait part of its national security zone, while the US and its allies insist on freedom of navigation. Disputes arise from Iran's attempts to restrict ship movements in response to sanctions, which leads to tensions and the threat of a blockade.

• Why are Qatar and Pakistan acting as intermediaries in talks between Iran and the US? – Qatar has long-standing diplomatic and economic ties with Iran (the shared North/South Pars gas field) and simultaneously maintains trusted relations with the US (the Al Udeid airbase). Pakistan also maintains good relations with Iran (a shared border, security issues in Balochistan) and has regional influence due to its role in the Islamic world. Both countries act as neutral mediators capable of conveying the parties' positions without direct confrontation.

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Full version: Iran accuses America and Israel of violating the ceasefire and threatens a response

Iran and the US in a Fog of Talks: Distrust and Hard Terms

Indirect talks between Washington and Tehran aimed at ending the conflict have continued since February 28, but Iranian officials are skeptical of US intentions. Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf said no agreement will be signed without fully securing "the rights of the Iranian people," and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi called media reports "mere conjecture," stressing that final outcomes remain unclear. Tehran continues to exchange texts with Washington, but a source in Iran noted that any changes introduced by Trump are not binding on the Iranian side.

Harder statements come from the American side: the new version of Trump's proposal includes strict conditions on the nuclear program and the Strait of Hormuz. The US president said in an interview with Fox News that he had received guarantees from Tehran not to produce or buy nuclear weapons, but the Iranian side denies this. The Pentagon chief warned of the possibility of resuming military action if talks fail, keeping the military option as a fallback.

The main contentious issue is the nuclear program: Washington insists on long-term restrictions on uranium enrichment, while Tehran demands the de facto lifting of sanctions before any commitments. Discussions include a potential unfreezing of Iranian assets worth $12 billion, but Trump denied any cash transfers. The talks are hampered by mutual distrust: Iran does not trust US promises, while the American side insists on inspections and strict oversight.

The Strait of Hormuz has become the second key point of contention: Iran insists on sovereignty over this strategic waterway, while the US demands freedom of navigation. A representative of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) said that control of the strait is "more important than possessing nuclear weapons." Against this background, French President Emmanuel Macron has stepped up diplomacy, holding talks with leaders of the Gulf states and proposing a multinational mission to restore sea traffic in accordance with international law.

The fate of the talks remains murky: on one hand, a phased compromise that reduces tensions is possible; on the other, a complete breakdown of dialogue and a return to military escalation. Iran continues to insist on its conditions, and the US is preparing for any scenario, including a use-of-force option. Experts warn that the issue may be resolved not so much at the negotiating table as under pressure from regional and international dynamics, where the ambitions of the parties and external actors like France play a key role.

Comments on the story

• Who is Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and what role does he play in Iranian politics? — Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf has been speaker of Iran's parliament (Majlis) since 2020. Previously he was mayor of Tehran and commander of the IRGC Air Force. Ghalibaf is an influential conservative close to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. His role is to promote legislation supporting a hard line on the nuclear program and regional policy.
• Why is the Strait of Hormuz so important to Iran and how is it linked to the nuclear talks? — The Strait of Hormuz is a strategic chokepoint in the Persian Gulf through which up to 20% of the world’s oil passes. Iran uses the threat of closing the strait as leverage in nuclear talks: in the event of sanctions or a military threat, Tehran could disrupt global oil supplies to force the West into concessions.
• What is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and how does it influence Iran’s foreign policy? — The IRGC is an elite military-political formation subordinate to the Supreme Leader. It controls the missile program, supports proxy forces (for example, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen), and manages key sectors of the economy. The IRGC directly shapes Iran’s foreign policy, often acting more hardline than diplomatic institutions, especially in confrontations with the US and Israel.

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Full version: طهران تشكك وترمب يتشدد.. ما الذي أخر مستجدات مباحثات واشنطن وطهران؟

Delcy Rodríguez met with coffee producers in Venezuela

Acting President of Venezuela Delcy Rodríguez held a meeting on Saturday with coffee farmers from the states of Portuguesa, Lara and Trujillo as part of the First Assembly of the Communal Coffee Plan 2026. She reported that in the 2025–2026 period coffee production in the country reached nearly 4 million quintals (about 184,000 tonnes). Of these, 1.8 million quintals were allocated for domestic consumption and 2.1 million for export. Rodríguez emphasized that coffee is one of the most important sectors of the economy, where communal production has already fully organized the entire supply chain.

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Full version: Presidenta encargada Delcy Rodríguez encabezó asamblea con caficultores de Portuguesa, Lara y Trujillo

Iran at a Crossroads: Nuclear Doctrine in Question

Amid reports of progress in indirect talks with the United States and mounting American pressure on Iran to abandon its nuclear program, a heated debate is spreading through Iranian society. The central question worrying both elites and ordinary citizens now is whether Tehran should continue following its previous nuclear doctrine or whether it is time to change it radically. After recent military clashes it became clear that enriching uranium to high levels did not provide the expected deterrent, which has led to a split: some view the nuclear program as a symbol of national sovereignty, others see it as a losing bet that has cost the country decades of isolation and sanctions.

Ordinary Iranians interviewed by journalists on the streets of Tehran increasingly express disappointment with the economic and political price of the nuclear project. 49-year-old Hossein bitterly notes: “For decades we've been going nowhere: we enrich uranium but don't make a bomb, and we suffer from sanctions as if we already have a nuclear arsenal. It's time either to make the bomb and live with pride, or to say we don't need it and rid ourselves of this burden. This uncertainty is killing us.” 45-year-old Nakar adds that because of the sanctions a whole generation lost its youth waiting for results that never came.

Some Iranians oppose the creation of nuclear weapons both for moral and strategic reasons, fearing further isolation of the country. 32-year-old doctor Sara is convinced that a nuclear bomb will not end sanctions and will instead turn Iran into a “target” for a total blockade. In contrast, 56-year-old teacher Mohsen is proud of the achievements in the atomic field but asks a pointed question: “If a bomb deters enemies, why shouldn't we have one?” He insists the country has only two acceptable paths: either acquire the bomb and live in security, or halt enrichment and open the economy.

Among the elite, the debate takes on a deeper strategic dimension. Researcher Mostafa Najafi believes that choosing nuclear armament is no longer an abstract idea but is becoming an inevitable path to which external forces might push Iran. “Before signing a new nuclear agreement, Iran needs to give a clear answer to a fundamental question: do we continue with the old doctrine or move to a new one?” he warns. According to him, if Washington does not offer real benefits, part of the elite will be convinced that current means of deterrence are insufficient and will lean toward nuclear deterrence.

On the other hand, former senior IRGC official Hossein Kanani Mogaddam reminds that the main obstacle to making a bomb is the “religious ban.” He emphasizes that the Islamic Republic has never sought mass destruction. Kanani proposes alternatives to nuclear deterrence, such as control over the Strait of Hormuz and tactical weapons. He argues that Iran possessing uranium enriched to 60% is itself a “deterrent factor,” and that sanctions and attacks are not necessarily a direct consequence of the nuclear program but merely a pretext.

In the context of indirect talks and intensifying international pressure, Iran finds itself at a historic crossroads. Society and the elites are divided: some insist on preserving nuclear rights as a symbol of sovereignty, others call for reassessing the cost of such a policy for the economy and security. The final choice may be dictated by the actions of Washington and Tel Aviv: either pushing Iran toward full armament, or creating conditions for concessions, sanctions relief, and openness. In any case, it will be Tehran’s internal decision that determines the country’s path for decades to come.

Comments on the story

• What role does the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) play in shaping Iran’s nuclear policy and why are there different views among its members on this issue? - The IRGC acts both as the military guarantor of the nuclear program and as a lobbying group with its own economic interests. Disagreements within it are caused by tactical disputes: “hawks” (for example, former commander Mohsen Rezaei) view nuclear weapons as necessary for the regime’s survival, while “pragmatists” (some current commanders) see excessive confrontation as a risk of isolation and economic collapse. Personal competition between factions for influence over the Supreme Leader also plays a role.
• What is the strategic significance of the Strait of Hormuz for Iran and how could control over it serve as an alternative to nuclear deterrence, as some elites suggest? - For Iran the Strait of Hormuz is a “non-nuclear trump card”: its potential closure could crash global oil markets, giving Tehran a powerful lever of pressure on the West and the Arab monarchies. Some Iranian strategists (for example, from the Defense University) argue that the threat of closing the strait creates an “asymmetric deterrence” effect that does not require developing a nuclear bomb. However, this is controversial, since a full blockade could provoke a military response from the US and Saudi Arabia and also damage Iran’s own economy.
• Why is enriching uranium to 60% considered a “deterrent factor” even though creating a nuclear weapon requires enrichment to 90%? What is the difference between these levels in terms of international law and military potential? - The 60% level is a “threshold” point: technically it allows Iran to further enrich uranium to 90% (weapons grade) within days. For the international community, 60% is a “red line” under the NPT framework because this level has no civilian application (medical isotopes are produced at 20%), and therefore indicates military intent. From a military potential standpoint, 60% is not sufficient for an explosive device (90% is required), but it demonstrates technological readiness for one. The difference in international law is formal: the NPT does not prohibit enrichment to any level if a country is a party to the treaty, but UN Security Council resolutions (in particular 2231) constrain Iran. Thus 60% is a political, rather than purely technical, “deterrent factor.”

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Full version: الملف النووي في نقاش الشارع.. الإيرانيون بين "ردع القنبلة" و"ثمن العقوبات"

Hegset Threatens Iran with Resumption of Strikes

US Defense Secretary Pete Hegset, at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, said Washington is prepared to resume military action against Iran if an agreement is not reached. He emphasized that the US has "sufficient stockpiles of weapons" and is "fully capable" of continuing the war, and that the defense-industrial base is being strengthened to increase ammunition production. Hegset noted that President Donald Trump is "patient" and seeks a "big deal" that guarantees Iran will not obtain nuclear weapons, and that "the American president will not sign any deal if it is not in the interests of our country."

Tehran responded through an advisor to the Supreme Leader, Mohsen Rezaei, who accused Trump of "betraying diplomacy for the third time" because of the continued naval blockade and excessive demands in negotiations. Iranian sailors reported that ships attempted to cross the blockade line after the announcement of a relaxation, but met American warnings, up to threats to open fire. Meanwhile, the security forces stated that 20 vessels passed through the Strait of Hormuz within 24 hours in coordination with Iranian military forces, and the British trade mission assessed the level of maritime threat in the strait as "critical" because of the blockade.

President Trump announced on his Truth Social platform the lifting of the naval blockade and demanded that the Strait of Hormuz be opened immediately without passage fees. He also called on Iran to remove all naval mines, noting that US minesweepers have already neutralized several of them. Trump added that Iran must agree "never to have nuclear weapons or a bomb," and that the US will carry out nuclear inspections in coordination with Tehran and the IAEA, stressing that "no money will be transferred to Iran until further notice." These statements came amid ongoing maritime tensions and shipping concerns.

A two-hour meeting of the White House operational staff was held to discuss options regarding Iran, but no final decision was made. Officials confirmed that "President Trump will not enter into any agreement with Tehran if it is not beneficial to America and does not conform to his red lines." According to the New York Times and other sources, the administration is close to a deal, but issues such as frozen Iranian assets remain a key obstacle. It is also reported that Washington has received verbal assurances from Iran regarding nuclear materials, and a possible agreement could include a ceasefire in Lebanon.

The Iranian Foreign Ministry said it wants to verify the "authenticity of the lifting of the naval blockade" — whether this is a real step or merely media statements. The ministry emphasized that Tehran is currently focused on "ending the war," not on discussing details of the nuclear program. The foreign ministry also noted that Iran's actions are in line with its "national interests," that management of the Strait of Hormuz in the future will be joint with Oman, and that hostile vessels will not be allowed to pass, whereas commercial ones will only be allowed "in coordination with our forces." The ministry called the American blockade illegal from the outset and a violation of the ceasefire regime, and its lifting — a cessation of unlawful actions.

The war, started by the US and Israel on February 28, has led to the deaths of thousands of people, mainly in Iran and Lebanon, and has caused a global economic crisis due to rising energy prices as a result of the de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Diplomatic and military maneuvers continue, but many unresolved issues remain: maritime jurisdiction, frozen assets, and guarantees that Iran will not have nuclear weapons. The situation is still defined by the balance between US military pressure, Tehran’s statements, and the international community’s concern for the safety of shipping and energy supplies.

News Commentary

• Who is Mohsen Rezaei and what role does he play in Iran’s political system? — Mohsen Rezaei is a former commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) from 1981 to 1997, now a politician and member of the Expediency Discernment Council — an advisory body to the Supreme Leader that resolves disputes between parliament and the Guardian Council. He has run for president three times but did not win. His role is to embody the conservative wing and the IRGC’s interests within the political establishment.
• Why is the Strait of Hormuz considered one of the most strategically important sea routes in the world, and how has Iran historically used control over it as a pressure tool? — About 20% of the world’s seaborne oil (roughly 17 million barrels per day) passes through the Strait of Hormuz, making it the planet’s "oil throat." Iran has historically used the threat of blocking the strait as leverage in conflicts: for example, during the Iran-Iraq war (1980s) and in response to US sanctions (2018–2019). This forces world powers to seek a balance to avoid disruption of energy supplies.
• What are the "frozen Iranian assets" mentioned in the article, and why are they a key obstacle in negotiations with the US? — These are billions of dollars of Iranian funds frozen abroad as a result of US sanctions (for example, about $6 billion in South Korea). For Iran, their unfreezing is a condition for any dialogue because it directly affects the economy and access to international trade. For the US, they are leverage and a means of control over Iran’s nuclear program, so the assets have become a stumbling block in negotiations (for example, partial unfreezing was discussed in 2022–2023 in exchange for concessions).

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Full version: واشنطن تهدد بضربات جديدة وإيران تتهم ترمب بخيانة الدبلوماسية

Jorge Rodríguez announced fuel deliveries for Trujillo farmers

Chairman of the Venezuelan National Assembly Jorge Rodríguez announced the allocation of four tankers of diesel fuel for the agricultural sector of Trujillo state, starting May 30. This decision, made at the direction of Acting President Delcy Rodríguez, is intended to address the logistical problems of local producers. The fuel supply directly responds to requests from Governor Gerardo Márquez and workers’ associations, and will also speed up delivery of the harvest to markets across the country. In addition, Rodríguez proposed creating direct distribution channels between Trujillo and Caracas distribution centers to strengthen domestic trade and provide the population with fresh produce.

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Full version: Jorge Rodríguez anunció distribución de combustible para productores del estado Trujillo a partir de este 30M

Trump lifted the maritime blockade on Iran: a step toward a deal or a temporary concession?

President of the United States Donald Trump’s announcement that he was lifting the maritime blockade on Iran has sparked heated debate: is this the start of a political agreement or merely a temporary measure in ongoing negotiations? Washington presented the move as part of broader understandings that include reopening the Strait of Hormuz, ensuring freedom of navigation, and reaching an understanding on Tehran’s nuclear program. In response, Iran hastened to say there is no final agreement and that key issues — sanctions, frozen assets and implementation mechanisms — remain unresolved.

The maritime blockade imposed by the US was aimed at choking off Iranian exports and applying economic pressure by restricting vessel movements to and from Iranian ports. Its lifting effectively means a partial restoration of trade and maritime transport, as well as the loosening of one of America’s main pressure levers. Trump tied this step to the immediate reopening of the Strait of Hormuz for commercial shipping without transit fees, the clearing of mines from waters and the return of stranded vessels, indicating that Washington views the situation as operational security measures rather than mere political statements.

However, the announcement was not standalone: Trump linked it to other conditions, including guarantees of freedom of navigation and Iran’s commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons. Some analysts described the move as a preliminary item or a confidence-building measure within a broader negotiation process. Trump himself mentioned postponing a final decision on a settlement, which confirms that the main issues are still under negotiation. Thus, the statement can be seen as a signal that the conflict is shifting from a phase of intense military and maritime pressure to a phase of testing political intentions through limited reciprocal steps.

Current indicators do not show Iran’s full acceptance of the American formula. Tehran insists that any step must be part of a comprehensive agreement covering the lifting of sanctions, the unfreezing of assets and clear enforcement guarantees. The Tasnim agency, citing Iranian sources, reported that “Trump’s assertions and those of the American media on the nuclear dossier have no basis,” and stressed that discussion of nuclear program details is not being conducted at this stage. Moreover, Trump’s insistence on refusing to unfreeze assets raises further doubts in Tehran about Washington’s seriousness.

The evidence suggests the Trump administration is following a “step-by-step” approach: reciprocal measures such as reopening the strait, ensuring navigation and returning vessels serve as a test of Iran’s commitment before moving to a comprehensive agreement. However, lifting the blockade does not mean the conflict is over or that a final settlement has been reached. Political analysts believe the development is closer to a negotiated truce or a de-escalation that leaves the door open for talks. Ongoing contradictory statements and isolated military incidents around the Strait of Hormuz indicate the crisis has not yet reached a definitive resolution.

Commentary on the news

• Why is the Strait of Hormuz so important for Iran and how does its blockade affect the country’s economy? - The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow maritime passage through which about 20% of the world’s oil transits. For Iran it is a strategic lever of pressure: by closing the strait, Tehran can disrupt global energy supplies, which would push up oil prices. However, a complete closure would also hurt Iran itself, since almost all of Iranian oil (the main source of foreign-currency revenues) is exported through it. In response, the US and its allies could impose tough naval measures, which would worsen Iran’s economic isolation.

• What is the Tasnim agency and what role does it play in covering Iranian politics? - Tasnim is a semi-official news agency close to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). It often acts as a mouthpiece for conservative circles and the military establishment, publishing exclusive material on military exercises, IRGC command statements and the nuclear program. In Iran’s media system Tasnim competes with other agencies (for example, Fars or IRNA), presenting a harder, more nationalist line.

• Why are Iran’s frozen assets a key demand in negotiations, and which countries hold them? - Frozen assets are Iranian oil revenues that have been blocked in foreign banks after US sanctions were imposed (mainly since 2018). For Tehran, unfreezing these funds (estimated at $6–10 billion) is critical because it is the only way to obtain foreign currency for importing goods, medicines and food while avoiding secondary US sanctions. The main countries holding these assets are South Korea (about $7 billion), Iraq, Japan and several European states where Iranian oil was sold but payments were frozen due to fears of US secondary sanctions.

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Full version: بين إعلان ترمب وتشكيك طهران.. ماذا يعني رفع الحصار البحري عن إيران؟

Lessons of a Failed War: French Criticizes Trump's Iran Strategy

American writer David French sharply criticized Donald Trump's administration for waging a war with Iran, calling it "a visual lesson in how not to wage war." In his view, Washington, despite overwhelming military superiority, failed to achieve its strategic objectives. The picture that officials painted in the first weeks of the fighting proved misleading: they spoke of deafening victories and the complete humiliation of Tehran, while the reality on the ground was much more complicated.

French describes in detail how Iran showed remarkable resilience, demonstrating the ability to quickly block the Strait of Hormuz and inflict significant damage on U.S. bases and energy facilities in the Persian Gulf. He mentions the destruction of dozens of U.S. manned and unmanned aircraft. Intelligence, he says, directly contradicted official statements: Iran retained about 70% of its launchers and missile arsenal, as well as control over most military facilities related to the strait.

The author asserts that the Trump administration "did not achieve a single war objective." The Iranian regime not only stood firm but likely became even tougher due to the increased influence of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The nuclear program continues, Tehran possesses enriched uranium and a powerful missile arsenal, and it has not ceased supporting its regional allies. According to French, air strikes did not lead to the collapse of the regime or to a decisive political victory.

French places particular blame for the failure on Trump, noting that he started the war with a "naive and unrealistic" plan that assumed Iran would quickly collapse under the bombs. He criticizes the lack of a "backup plan" after the first strikes failed, when the strategy was reduced to merely "continuing the bombing." The author compares the current team to more experienced predecessors, lamenting that the knowledge of military and political figures like James Mattis was not used.

The article questions the very military doctrine based on the belief that wars can be won by air power alone, referencing historical examples — World War II, Vietnam, and Iraq. French relays a warning from retired General Stanley McChrystal about the "temptation of air power," calling it a "recurring American illusion." He also points out that exceeding authorities granted by Congress undermined public support, and that the U.S. Constitution does not allow the president to wage a prolonged war without lawmakers' approval. The conclusion is grim: the military accomplished its battlefield tasks, but the problem lay in "poor political leadership and lack of strategic planning."

Comments on the news

• What is the Strait of Hormuz and why is it so important to Iran and the global economy? - The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow waterway in the Persian Gulf through which about 20–25% of the world's oil and a significant share of liquefied natural gas transit. Control of the strait is a key geopolitical lever for Iran: Tehran has repeatedly threatened to close it in response to sanctions, which could trigger a sharp rise in energy prices and a global economic crisis.
• Who are the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and what role do they play in Iran's political and military system? - The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is an elite military-political formation created after the 1979 revolution to protect the regime. They command missile forces, special operations, and control key sectors of the economy. Unlike the regular army, the IRGC reports directly to the Supreme Leader and is actively involved in suppressing internal protests as well as supporting proxy groups abroad.
• Which regional allies does Iran support and how does that affect the conflict? - Iran supports Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria, and Palestinian groups (for example, HAMAS). These allies receive funding, weapons (including missiles and drones), and military advisors. They create a "rim of instability" around Israel and Saudi Arabia, allowing Iran to wage proxy war without direct military intervention, which expands the regional conflict and undermines stability in the Middle East.

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Full version: ترمب وإغواء القوة الجوية.. كيف تحولت حرب إيران إلى مأزق إستراتيجي؟

Rodríguez: economic diversification ensured Venezuela's steady growth

Acting President of Venezuela Delcy Rodríguez said on Thursday during the "Against Sanctions and For Peace" pilgrimage in the state of Anzoátegui that economic diversification has been the "wonderful secret" that has allowed the country, despite sanctions, to demonstrate steady growth over the past five years. She emphasized that this path became possible thanks to the development not only of the oil sector but also of other industries.

Rodríguez noted the strategic potential of the eastern state, calling it not only an oil and gas power but also a strong agricultural, livestock, and tourist center. Accompanied by the minister of tourism and the governor, she announced funds would be allocated to restore local commercial and tourist infrastructure, in particular the traditional "Paseo de las empanadas" — a popular promenade. "What I see in Anzoátegui during this pilgrimage is an economic explosion," Rodríguez said, highlighting the region's advantages and its natural beauties, such as Mochima National Park, which, she said, serve as drivers of the non-oil economy.

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Full version: Delcy Rodríguez: Diversificación económica ha permitido el crecimiento sostenido de Venezuela

Fragile Truce with Iran: Expert Predicts New Clashes

Russian Middle East researcher Alexander Svarants believes that the ceasefire agreement with Iran, concluded in early April, was forced and did not ensure a smooth transition to lasting peace. According to him, the absence of durable compromises between the parties leaves the region in an unstable state and threatens a resumption of hostilities. The expert emphasized that this outcome reflects the failure of international mediation efforts, which were unable to create a sustainable basis for ending the enmity.

The author notes that Iran perceived US actions not as a pursuit of compromise but as an attempt to deceive the international community, lull the vigilance of Iranians and then strike. Tehran, he says, uncovered Washington’s true intentions, viewing the negotiations as an instrument of pressure rather than a path to a final settlement. As a result, Iran firmly stuck to its conditions and did not make substantial concessions, which only exacerbated tensions.

Svarants draws attention to growing discontent in the US with what he calls the Trump administration’s “Iranian adventure,” whose popularity is rapidly declining. Washington’s NATO allies refrain from direct intervention or jointly reopening the Strait of Hormuz. Moreover, the expert disputes US claims that Iran has lost its naval, missile and drone capabilities — despite severe airstrikes, Tehran still has enough missiles, drones, small boats and rocket launchers to continue resisting.

It was expected that a meeting between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping would clarify positions on Iran, since China, as a trading partner, is interested in the swift reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and Iranian ports because of its need for oil. Svarants points out that China-Iran relations and Beijing’s influence on the crisis could have been key to reducing tensions or reshaping alliances. However, the visit did not lead to clear decisions or significant concessions by the US that would have changed the conflict’s dynamics.

Tehran put forward clear and tough peace terms, including guarantees of a complete halt to hostilities, payment of compensation for damages, the abandonment of a military nuclear program and the transfer of enriched uranium to third parties — in exchange for recognition of Iran’s right to a peaceful nuclear program under IAEA supervision. Iran also demands the lifting of economic sanctions, the unblocking of its assets and a return to the international financial system. Svarants concludes that the US faces a difficult choice between war and peace, and Trump’s threats of a “crushing strike in two to three days” only increase uncertainty, leaving the conflict open until real compromises meeting Tehran’s demands are offered.

Comments on the news

• What strategic significance does the Strait of Hormuz have for Iran and the global economy, and why is its control so important in this conflict? - The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow maritime corridor through which about 20–25% of global oil shipments pass. For Iran, control of the strait is a key lever of pressure: Tehran can block the strait, causing a sharp spike in energy prices and an economic crisis, while risking the loss of export income itself. In the conflict this is Iran’s “nuclear option,” which makes it an indispensable player in global energy security.

• What is China’s current role in trade relations with Iran, and can Beijing influence Tehran’s position in nuclear talks? - China is Iran’s largest trading partner, buying the lion’s share of its oil (often circumventing sanctions) and providing infrastructure investments. Beijing plays the role of a pragmatic mediator: it is interested in stable energy supplies and does not want nuclear escalation, but it avoids direct pressure on Tehran to avoid losing economic influence. China can soften Iran’s position indirectly — through trade incentives or the threat of their reduction — but it will not openly support harsh US sanctions.

• What does the term “Iranian adventure” of the Trump administration mean in the context of US policy in the Middle East? - The “Iranian adventure” referred to the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” policy — withdrawing from the nuclear deal (JCPOA), imposing strict sanctions and making military threats aimed at undermining Iran’s economy and provoking a regime change. It was a risky strategy that, in intention, should have strengthened US positions but in practice led to increased regional tensions, accelerated Iran’s uranium enrichment program and weakened trust in diplomacy.

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Full version: كاتب روسي.. طهران قرأت تراجع واشنطن وتمسكت بشروطها

US strikes Iran, accusing Tehran of breaching ceasefire

At dawn on Thursday, the United States launched new air strikes on southern areas of Iran, hitting, according to an American official, a military facility that posed a threat to U.S. forces and shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Washington said the actions were "deliberate and purely defensive" and intended to preserve the ceasefire regime. U.S. forces reportedly shot down Iranian drones and struck a ground-based launcher.

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) accused Iran of violating the ceasefire, saying Tehran fired a ballistic missile toward Kuwait and launched five drones into the Strait of Hormuz. American officials said they intercepted all five drones and prevented a sixth being launched from Bandar Abbas. Iran, in turn, condemned the attack: Foreign Ministry spokesman Ismail Baghaei called the strikes "barbaric" and expressed solidarity with Oman.

Iranian media reported explosions in Bandar Abbas and activation of air defense systems. According to Tasnim agency, the target was a military facility near the city's airport, from which, Tehran claims, the American attack was launched. Kuwait also said its air defenses repelled the missile strikes and drone attacks, and that the sounds of explosions were linked to defensive systems at work.

Tehran confirmed it will not back down from its "red lines" despite threats from U.S. President Donald Trump. These include the right to uranium enrichment, control over the Strait of Hormuz, and the lifting of sanctions. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi called on regional countries for solidarity, and a spokesman for the Navy of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps said the likelihood of war is low, but the armed forces are prepared for any scenario.

U.S. President Donald Trump threatened that he might "settle the matter" with Iran if a more favorable deal is not reached. He stressed that the Strait of Hormuz will remain open to all and denied rumors that Iran and Oman might take over shipping management as part of a deal. Trump also acknowledged he is not ready to accept proposals that do not suit Washington.

Amid the escalation, leaks emerged about a draft understanding brokered by Pakistan. Iranian television published a document providing for lifting the blockade of Iranian ports and withdrawal of U.S. troops. However, the White House called these papers "completely fabricated," although Secretary of State Marco Rubio acknowledged some progress in talks. The conflict, which began on February 28 between the U.S. and Israel against Iran, led to a temporary ceasefire on April 8, but the new flare-up of violence threatens it.

Comments on the news

• What is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and what role does it play in Iran's military and political structure? — The IRGC is an elite military-political formation of Iran, created after the 1979 revolution to protect the Islamic system of governance. Unlike the regular army (Artesh), the IRGC reports directly to the Supreme Leader (rahbar) and is responsible for strategic military operations, the development of missile and nuclear-related technologies, and maintaining internal security. In addition, the IRGC plays a key role in the Iranian economy, controlling large industrial and construction projects, and its Quds Force conducts external operations and supports allied forces in the Middle East (for example, Hezbollah in Lebanon).

• What is the strategic significance of the Strait of Hormuz for Iran and the global economy, and why is control over it considered one of Tehran's "red lines"? — The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow maritime passage between the Persian and Oman gulfs through which about 20–25% of the world's oil trade passes (roughly 17–20 million barrels per day). For Iran, control over the strait is a geopolitical lever: Tehran has repeatedly threatened to close it in response to sanctions or military threats. This is considered a "red line" because blocking the strait could trigger a sharp spike in energy prices, a global economic crisis, and military confrontation involving the U.S. and its allies. Iran also uses the strait to demonstrate its military capabilities, deploying fast boats, mines, and anti-ship missiles there.

• Why is Bandar Abbas, the city that was struck, an important center of Iran's military and naval infrastructure? — Bandar Abbas is Iran's largest port on the Persian Gulf coast and a key base for the IRGC Navy. It hosts naval shipyards, ammunition depots, missile installations, and maritime operations command centers. In addition, a significant portion of Iran's oil exports and goods imports pass through this port, making it a critical node for the country's economy. Strikes on Bandar Abbas could disrupt IRGC logistics, reduce Iran's ability to control the Strait of Hormuz, and impact its trade.

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Full version: غارات أمريكية على جنوب إيران وطهران تندد بالهجوم

Trump Sees Venezuela as Key to the Global Energy Market

US President Donald Trump said that America is experiencing an unprecedented energy boom and is a net exporter of oil. He stressed that combining the resources of the US and Venezuela could concentrate up to 64% of the world's oil reserves in their hands. Trump noted that relations between Washington and Caracas are currently "excellent" and are developing smoothly. According to him, under the auspices of new agreements, international corporations are already beginning to develop Venezuelan territory. The head of the White House presented Venezuela as a key ally in his global market strategy, confirming the United States' intention to unconditionally lead in global oil production and export.

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Full version: Trump perfila a Venezuela como eje estratégico del mercado energético mundial

Trump threatened to blow up Oman over the Strait of Hormuz

US President Donald Trump on Wednesday issued a sharp threat toward Oman after reports of possible joint management of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran and the sultanate. When asked whether he would accept a short-term agreement allowing Tehran and Muscat to control the strait, Trump replied: "No, the strait will be open to everyone." Addressing Oman, he added: "This is international waters, and Oman will behave like everyone else, otherwise we'll have to blow them up."

The phrase "blow them up" sparked intense debate. The White House did not promptly respond to reporters' questions about whether it was a slip of the tongue or whether Iran was meant. The US State Department later published video and a transcript of Trump's remarks without any corrections or clarifications. That silence only intensified disputes over the tone of the statements and their political and military consequences.

In the Arab world, Trump's words provoked widespread outrage. Writers, politicians and activists called them "bandit rhetoric." Angry comments spread on social media, emphasizing that a threat to a Gulf state's sovereignty was unacceptable. One post read: "Oman will behave like any other country, otherwise it will be blown up." This created diplomatic and media pressure on Washington in the region.

The threat came after Iranian state television reported on a draft preliminary agreement mediated by Pakistan. According to the document, Tehran together with Muscat was to assume responsibility for managing shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, undertaking to restore commercial vessel transit to pre-war levels within a month. The channel noted that the "preliminary framework of understanding" was still being finalized and was not final.

Later, the White House called the Iranian TV report "false" and the memorandum itself "completely fabricated." However, the official refutation was delayed against the backdrop of Trump's statements, which caused informational and diplomatic confusion. The incident vividly demonstrated the sensitivity of the Strait of Hormuz issue and how sharp remarks by the US leader can affect regional stability and the positions of neighboring states.

Comments on the news

• Why is Oman specifically involved in this conflict, given that it is usually considered a neutral mediator in the region? - Oman has historically maintained neutrality in regional conflicts, which allows it to act as a mediator. The sultanate has diplomatic channels with both Iran and the West (for example, the US) and does not participate in military blocs such as the Saudi-led coalition. This makes Oman a convenient "honest broker" for negotiations, especially on Strait of Hormuz issues.
• What historical and economic ties bind Iran and Oman in the context of the Strait of Hormuz? - Iran and Oman have a long history of cooperation: they jointly manage the waters of the Strait of Hormuz through bilateral agreements, including coordination of navigation and environmental protection. Economically, a significant share of Iranian and Omani oil and liquefied gas exports passes through the strait. In addition, the countries have joint projects such as plans for a "Peace Pipeline" through Oman.
• Why did Pakistan become a mediator in talks between Iran and Oman on this issue? - Pakistan has friendly relations with both countries: it maintains close ties with Iran through cultural and linguistic affinities (Balochi communities, Shi'ism) and with Oman through historical trade relations. Moreover, Pakistan often acts as a regional mediator (for example, in the Afghan conflict) and can offer a negotiating venue that does not arouse distrust from Tehran or Muscat.

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Full version: ترمب يهدد بـ"نسف" عُمان إذا دعمت إيران بشأن مضيق هرمز

Iran Accuses US of Violating Ceasefire, Warns of Response

Iran has officially accused the United States of a serious violation of the ceasefire after overnight air strikes in the south of the country, calling the actions of a "terrorist army" illegal and unjustified. Tehran vowed not to leave "any evil" unanswered and to defend the Iranian nation without hesitation, although the exact circumstances of the incident were not disclosed. In turn, the US Central Command (CENTCOM) confirmed that it struck launch sites and boats in southern Iran early Tuesday morning, while Iranian media reported an attack by "American-Zionist fighters" on vessels near Lark Island in the Strait of Hormuz.

Despite the military escalation, diplomatic efforts continue. Senior Iranian officials, including chief negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, made their first visit to Doha, Qatar’s capital, since the start of the war. In a conversation with the Emir of Qatar, the Iranian president expressed willingness to reach a "respectable basis" to end the war, but a key sticking point remains Tehran’s demand to unfreeze $24 billion in frozen assets, half of which could be released immediately after signing a preliminary memorandum.

Diplomacy has also intensified at the regional level: there were seven phone calls between Arab leaders and Iranian representatives. King Abdullah II of Jordan and King Hamad bin Isa of Bahrain, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi of Egypt and the President of Iran, as well as Sultan Haitham bin Tariq of Oman, held consultations. Qatar served as a key mediator, organizing intensive talks with representatives from the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt to develop a "framework agreement" that could lead to a broader deal.

Pakistan is also leading mediation efforts, seeking to bring to an end the war that began on February 28 after US-Israeli strikes on Iran and led to a temporary ceasefire on April 8. US President Donald Trump said on Saturday that negotiators have nearly agreed on most points with Tehran, pending final arrangements with Iran and regional countries, including the restoration of free navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. Nevertheless, the dispute over frozen assets and the nuclear program remains central to the upcoming talks.

On the military front, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps said it shot down an American drone and opened fire on aircraft attempting to enter Iranian airspace, although the dates of those incidents were not specified. In a separate maritime incident, British maritime authorities reported that the tanker Olympic Life recorded an explosion on its port side 60 nautical miles from Muscat: the crew were unharmed, but there was a fuel leak, the cause of which remains unknown.

Comments on the news

• Why have Iran’s $24 billion in frozen assets become a key sticking point in the talks? - These funds are held in accounts in South Korea and China, and Iran demands their unblocking in exchange for concessions on its nuclear program. Access to this money is critically important for Tehran to stabilize an economy suffering under sanctions, but Western countries fear the funds could be used to finance military programs or support proxy forces in the Middle East. Thus, the issue has become a test of trust: Iran insists on the lifting of restrictions as promised, while the US and EU demand guarantees of transparent spending.

• Who is Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and what is his role in Iranian politics? - Ghalibaf is a former commander of the IRGC Aerospace Force and former mayor of Tehran (2005–2017), currently the speaker of Iran’s parliament (Majlis). As a conservative and a close ally of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, he plays a key role in coordinating legislative and executive branches and in advocating a hard line in negotiations with the West. His influence is especially evident on economic and security issues, where he favors self-sufficiency over concessions to the West.

• Why is Lark Island in the Strait of Hormuz important to Iran and global trade? - Lark Island is located in the strategic Strait of Hormuz, through which about 20% of the world’s seaborne oil trade passes. Iran uses it as a base for storing and transshipping crude oil, and for hosting IRGC infrastructure that controls the strait. In a conflict, control of Lark would allow Tehran to block or severely disrupt tanker traffic, potentially triggering a global energy crisis. For the global market, the island is not only a crucial link in the supply chain but also an indicator of regional tension.

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Full version: إيران تتهم واشنطن بخرق الهدنة واتصالات إقليمية لدعم الوساطة

Venezuela's Supreme Court Expanded to 32 Judges

On Monday the Venezuelan government's official gazette published a law reforming the Supreme Court, increasing the number of its judges from 20 to 32. The Constitutional Chamber will now consist of seven magistrates, and each of the other five chambers will have five. National Assembly head Jorge Rodríguez said the expansion is intended to speed up consideration of accumulated cases and combat judicial delays. In connection with this, the Committee on Judicial Appointments has already been activated and will begin selecting new magistrates: vacancies arose due to retirements, voluntary resignations and the transfer of some judges to other government positions.

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Full version: Publicada en Gaceta Oficial la ampliación del TSJ a 32 magistrados

Trump on the Brink: Concessions to Iran or War's Failure

Thomas Friedman, in a column for the New York Times, poses two key questions about the US war against Iran: how many "bitter cups" will Donald Trump have to drink to end the conflict with minimal gain, and can he call that "repast" a sumptuous dinner? The author is not opposed to temporary concessions if they deprive Iran of about 1,000 kilograms of near-weapons-grade uranium. However, he warns that such a partial success would not be a perfect deal — it would only strengthen the regime and leave it in power with other uranium stockpiles.

In exchange for relinquishing that uranium, Iran, in Friedman's scenario, would receive the lifting of an oil embargo and the easing of parts of the American sanctions network. That would give Tehran huge financial resources to bribe the opposition, continue repression, and fund its allies in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen. The author cites expert Robert Litwak, who believes Trump started the war with the aim of regime change, but is now ready to end it with an agreement resembling the 2015 nuclear deal — the same deal he recklessly withdrew from in 2018.

Friedman criticizes the failed planning of Trump's team, which believed Netanyahu's promises that the Iranian regime would fall quickly after massive bombings. Iran's first response was to close the Strait of Hormuz, through which about 20% of the world's oil passes. This caused price hikes and showed that Tehran can choke the global economy with simple means — drones and cruise missiles. The author notes: Trump and Netanyahu thought overwhelming military power would guarantee capitulation, but they encountered what experts call a "weapon of mass disruption."

The journalist draws a parallel with the Ukrainian experience and describes an imagined dialogue with Zelensky. If Trump and Vance had shown more curiosity, Ukraine could have explained how drones changed modern war, allowing the weak to act like the strong. "Mr. Trump, Mr. Vance, let me explain..." Friedman writes, suggesting such a conversation might have prevented surprises. Instead, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps effectively gained the ability to block the strait at a chosen moment, creating an analogue of nuclear deterrence.

Friedman condemns Trump's chaotic policy, which sends an alarming signal to both allies and Iran: the US is an unreliable partner. He refers to the reaction to Trump's sudden proposal for countries to immediately sign the "Abraham Accords," including states that have their reasons to refuse or tie normalization to a resolution of the Palestinian issue. The idea of Iran participating in peace agreements with Israel after the war strikes the author as "laughably unrealistic" and reflects a lack of planning and expertise.

In the end Friedman acknowledges that toppling the Iranian regime and ending its nuclear ambitions would benefit the Middle East, but that would require a thoughtful strategy, broad alliances, and international legitimacy. Instead, Trump and his "chaotic team" offered nothing, giving the regime a chance to survive, maintain influence over global oil supplies, and gain additional resources to destabilize the region. The author's bleak conclusion: history will remember that this very team gave Iran new life at a moment when it was most vulnerable to its own people.

Comments on the news

• Which specific units of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) control the Strait of Hormuz and what is their operational structure? - The Strait of Hormuz is controlled by the IRGC Navy, which is a separate branch from Iran's regular navy. Their operational structure includes high-speed boats, coastal missile batteries (including anti-ship missiles), small-class submarines, and mine-laying capabilities. Command is exercised through the IRGC Navy headquarters, which coordinates actions with reconnaissance units and air-defense batteries along the coast. In case of escalation they can employ "swarm" tactics for asymmetric attacks.

• How are Iran's allies — Hezbollah in Lebanon, Popular Mobilization Units in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen — connected to Tehran's nuclear program, and how might a possible agreement affect their funding? - The connection is that Tehran uses its nuclear program as leverage to obtain concessions in international negotiations, which indirectly strengthens its regional influence and ability to fund allies. Hezbollah, Iraqi militias (for example, Kata'ib Hezbollah), and the Houthis receive financial, military, and logistical support from the IRGC in exchange for participating in proxy conflicts. A potential nuclear agreement could lead to the lifting of some sanctions and the unfreezing of Iranian assets, some of which could be redirected to support these groups. However, strict monitoring mechanisms by the IAEA and the US could limit such flows, forcing Tehran to seek unofficial channels.

• How does the Iranian regime use revenues from lifting the oil embargo to finance repression against internal opposition, and what specific control mechanisms are applied? - Revenues from lifting the embargo are primarily directed to the budgets of the IRGC and security forces (Basij, police) through Iran's Central Bank and formal state programs. Specific control mechanisms include: 1) use of parallel banking networks and cryptocurrencies to circumvent sanctions and finance "shadow" operations; 2) allocation of funds for fuel and food subsidies, which reduce social discontent and decrease protest activity; 3) direct financing of internet censorship and mass surveillance (for example, via the "Smart Firewall" system); 4) procurement of equipment for suppressing protests (tear gas, surveillance systems). Thus, the economic benefit from easing sanctions is converted into strengthening the repressive apparatus.

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Full version: توماس فريدمان.. كم كأسا مُرّة سيتجرعها ترمب في حرب إيران؟

Reactions of regional and global actors to US pressure and military moves

Venezuelan analyses link the current American sanctions, air strikes and Trump‑era strategies to a chain reaction in Latin America and beyond: from the strengthening of Cuban resilience under sanctions pressure to new diplomatic alignments around Iran and a rethinking of China’s stance on Cuba and Taiwan. Rather than viewing strikes and sanctions as isolated events, the authors emphasize their role as triggers for forming a new balance of power, in which countries seek ways to reduce dependence on Washington and forge alternative alliances. This narrative gives rise to discussions about a “new world (dis)order” and the real limits of American influence during periods of escalation. The piece is based on publications from Real Instituto Elcano (Venezuela) and France24 (Venezuela).

Venezuela between Washington, Beijing and Havana: how others’ crises definen el margen propio

A view from Caracas on recent tectonic shifts — the Trump–Xi dialogue and renewed US pressure on Raúl Castro — turns disparate news into a single picture: the future of Venezuela’s economic and geopolitical maneuvering is being decided not only in Miraflores, but also in the offices of Beijing, Washington and Havana.

The analytical commentary from the Real Instituto Elcano on the Trump–Xi summit (https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/comentarios/trump-xi-y-como-gestionar-una-relacion-estrategica/) is conceived as a European reading of “how to manage strategic relations” between the US and China, aimed primarily at audiences in Madrid, Brussels, Washington and Beijing. However, read from Caracas, it becomes a detailed X‑ray of the chessboard on which the space for Venezuela’s maneuver is indirectly determined.

The same happens with the profile of Raúl Castro on France 24 in Spanish (https://www.france24.com/es/programas/historia/20260526-ra%C3%BAl-castro-el-hombre-fuerte-de-cuba-bajo-presi%C3%B3n-de-ee-uu): formally it is a story about Cuba, an aging “strongman” and increased US pressure, but for the Venezuelan reader the text reads as a warning and a mirror: military economics, a hidden vertical of power and judicial prosecution of leaders after their “retirement” — all of this is far too familiar.

The European analysis of the Trump–Xi summit sketches a new phase in broad strokes: from a logic of engagement to “managed rivalry,” to what the authors call “constructive strategic stability.” In Beijing, according to the article, the official organ People’s Daily stresses that China seeks recognition “on equal terms” and will not retreat on its “core concerns” — above all Taiwan, and also on technology and trade issues. Trump’s visit, initially placed on the back pages, is elevated to major front‑page status, and 2026 is described as “historic and landmark”: the year when the configuration of relations with the United States will solidify in a new format.

This language is all too familiar to the Venezuelan reader. China’s rhetoric on sovereignty and non‑negotiable zones almost mirrors the official discourse of the Bolivarian Revolution: the inviolability of control over oil, the special role of the armed forces, the rejection of “intervention” on human rights grounds. Caracas sees in China’s firmness and simultaneous openness to tactical deals a model of behavior it itself tries to invoke: agreements are possible, but the core of power is not up for discussion.

From the Venezuelan perspective, the key point in the Elcano piece is the characterization of the US–China track as “rivalry under control.” On one hand, this is reassuring: the less likely an open confrontation between Washington and Beijing, the lower the probability of shocks to the oil market and the less incentive for China to fully reorient its agenda toward the US at the expense of peripheral partners like Venezuela. On the other hand, it is worrying: whenever Washington and a major power move into a phase of transactional cooperation, Caracas recalls the US–Cuba “reset” and moments of coordinated Washington–Brussels sanction lines. The fear is simple: to become a small bargaining chip in a big deal.

Analysts in Venezuela, though not directly quoted in the Elcano work, read between the lines. In this text China is not a romanticized “alternative to the US,” but a cold‑blooded actor, capable of demonstrating firmness while readily making pragmatic compromises. A telling example is Senator Marco Rubio, under Chinese sanctions, whom Beijing nevertheless tolerates in the American delegation if it suits the current agenda. Translated into Venezuelan reality: if Beijing can secure some strategic gains from Washington, it will be ready to adjust the depth and form of its support for Caracas.

Equally important is Washington’s perspective highlighted by the Elcano text: the US is ceasing to view China through a logic of “attraction and inclusion” and is openly formalizing long‑term competition while trying to avoid a destructive rupture. This institutionalization of rivalry, even amid Trump’s apparent volatility, means for Venezuela that China will need allies and resources in the global South, but will be more cautious: support for Caracas must not undermine its channels with Washington.

The European dimension of the piece particularly resonates with Latin American sensitivity. The author describes the European Union as being “between relief and strategic anxiety”: on one hand, it is good that the US and China prefer a managed conflict; on the other hand, fear grows of an informal “G2” that will make key decisions “over Europeans’ heads.” In Caracas this is perceived with bitter irony: the “strategic orphanhood” the article attributes to the EU has long been felt by Latin America, and especially Venezuela. The difference is that Europe is still seen as a center of power, while Washington and Beijing decide where the periphery’s maneuvering space will lie.

Economically, the Elcano article emphasizes the continued transactional nature of the US–China agenda: purchases of agricultural products, Boeing deals, energy agreements, investment mechanisms. For Venezuela this contains an unpleasant warning. If the US and China deepen mutual interdependence and create stable channels of investment and trade, Venezuela’s value as a “useful actor” could decline. It will then be easier for Beijing to secure energy security through diversified, less risky supplies, without betting on a country with high political and credit risk. Venezuelan oil, from a symbol of geopolitical insurance, becomes a heavy asset with a bad reputation.

Moreover, US and Chinese efforts to create formal bilateral mechanisms for monitoring and dispute resolution contrast with Venezuelan reality, where agreements with Beijing are often opaque, tied to oil collateral and inherently asymmetric. As the European analysis points out, China is embedding its relations with the US in a regulated, if conflictual, yet predictable framework; with Caracas it works as with a high‑risk partner, imposing harsh conditions that the Miraflores government publicly presents as “brotherly aid.”

In the politico‑diplomatic plane, the idea of “managed competition” between Washington and Beijing means a new kind of gray zone for Venezuela. America will try to contain Chinese influence in the Western Hemisphere, but not at the cost of undermining fundamental stability in its relations with Beijing. This, on one hand, reduces the likelihood of a “crusade” against China in Latin America comparable to the Cold War, and on the other hand limits the range of projects Beijing will be willing to advance in the region: telecom infrastructure, elements of critical logistics or sensitive military programs will inevitably face close scrutiny. For Venezuela, which counts on China as a technological and military counterweight to the US, this is a serious narrowing of space.

Analysts also note that, as the Elcano text describes, Trump arrives in Beijing with “many open fronts” — from Ukraine to Iran and his own electoral agenda. For Caracas this is a direct reminder: the Venezuela file is far from the top of Washington’s priority stack. And when a country becomes one of the secondary files, its fate is even more subject to the logic of “we fear escalation with China, so on peripheral issues we can concede” — or conversely, to using sanctions as a cheap signal of toughness without touching the key US–China balance.

The same logic of distorted priority and double standards appears in the France 24 article on Raúl Castro, “the strongman of Cuba under US pressure” (https://www.france24.com/es/programas/historia/20260526-ra%C3%BAl-castro-el-hombre-fuerte-de-cuba-bajo-presi%C3%B3n-de-ee-uu). It details how Washington is tightening political and judicial pressure on the elderly leader over federal charges in Miami related to the 1996 shootdown of planes by the organization Brothers to the Rescue, and how this again puts his real role in the current Cuban system into question.

Special attention is paid to GAESA — the military‑economic conglomerate that controls key sectors of the island’s economy. For the Venezuelan reader GAESA is almost a copy of Venezuela’s own semi‑state structures, and the figure of the “officially retired” but still decisive leader draws direct parallels with notions of power distribution in Caracas. The question the Cuba article poses — “what is Raúl Castro’s true role in the political, military and economic system?” — in Venezuela sounds like a question about its own reality: how autonomous are civilian institutions from the military elite and associated business groups, and who actually makes key decisions.

For the official discourse in Caracas, this Cuban story serves to confirm a habitual narrative: the United States uses courts, sanctions and individual indictments as instruments to fight “revolutionary” projects in the region. The mere fact that decades after the Brothers to the Rescue incident Miami federal structures revive the Raúl case is presented as an example of the “politicization of justice.” For the opposition, by contrast, details about GAESA and the possibility of personal accountability for human rights abuses and orders given to the military are perceived as a precedent: this could be what future US dealings with individual figures of the Venezuelan nomenklatura look like.

Three levels of influence of the Cuban case on the Venezuelan agenda are evident. Economically and in security terms Cuba remains a key Caracas partner, and any increase in pressure on Havana is immediately interpreted as indirect pressure on the Bolivarian bloc as a whole. At the level of domestic politics the image of the “historical leader” who ostensibly ceded formal powers but continues to be perceived as the system’s center of gravity fuels debates about the founders’ and military core’s influence on current decisions in Venezuela. Finally, symbolically, Raúl’s story — from Cold War episodes and the 1996 incident to current charges — is firmly embedded in the Latin American imaginary: for Bolivarian supporters it is a chronicle of resistance to empire; for critics it is an example of frozen authoritarianism that Venezuela risks repeating.

Both pieces — the Spanish analysis of Trump and Xi and the Franco‑Latin American portrait of Raúl Castro — differ from dry news briefs precisely because they offer an interpretation of the power structure and behavioral logic of the actors. The Real Instituto Elcano does not limit itself to listing summit agreements but places them within a framework of long‑term “managed rivalry,” introduces the idea of an “informal G2” and marks 2026 as a turning point; France 24, in turn, goes beyond reporting new legal steps against Raúl to uncover the role of GAESA and the economic‑military control mechanisms in Cuba.

From Caracas both texts are read as parts of the same puzzle. At the top level — the emerging US–China duo that defines the limits and opportunities for countries like Venezuela, Cuba incluida: how much longer will Beijing be willing to invest in peripheral partners if the main prize is stable, albeit conflictual, relations with Washington? At the mid level — allied regimes with militarized economies and “shadow” leaders whose resilience directly affects the strength of the Bolivarian bloc. And at the basic level — the fate of a particular country that has long overestimated the willingness of external patrons to sacrifice their own strategic interests for Caracas.

In this sense the illusion that one can simply “switch” from the US orbit to the orbit of China or Cuba to escape pressure is shattered by the conclusions drawn from both texts. The key game is played between Washington and Beijing, and the Cuban experience shows the cost of long‑term confrontation with the US under a tightly centralized military economy. Venezuela, remaining a regional actor, is forced to manage its vulnerability within a space defined by these major powers, not outside it. And the clearer Caracas sees this arrangement of pieces — through European and Latin American analytical texts, through stories about summits and aging “strongmen” — the fewer grounds it has for illusions and the greater the incentives to seek its own, not borrowed, survival strategies.

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US aircraft carrier and destroyers spotted off Oman's coast

Satellite images taken on May 24 recorded a US Nimitz-class aircraft carrier and two Arleigh Burke-class destroyers in the northwestern Arabian Sea, near Oman's southern coast. Images from the European Sentinel-2 satellite show the carrier roughly 138 kilometers east of Salalah, with a visible wake at the time of capture. The two destroyers were positioned to the east, forming a compact naval formation along the Omani coast, indicating a continued US naval presence in the strategically important region.

Alongside this, a US Central Command (CENTCOM) statement on May 23 said American forces have rerouted 100 commercial vessels over the past six weeks as part of a maritime blockade aimed at Iran. According to CENTCOM, the operation is supported by more than 200 aircraft and warships, including two carrier strike groups — Abraham Lincoln and George H. W. Bush — as well as the amphibious group Tripoli with destroyers. This demonstrates the scale of the deployment that began in early May, when Washington launched the "Operation Prosperity Guardian" to protect commercial shipping in the region.

The significance of this observation is that it occurs in the Arabian Sea, on key sea lanes leading to the Gulf of Oman and the Strait of Hormuz — a critical choke point for international oil trade. Since May 4 the US has stepped up Operation Prosperity Guardian to ensure the safe passage of commercial vessels through the strait, heightening tensions with Tehran. CENTCOM has previously stated that US forces carried out strikes in self-defense in southern Iran, and that Iranian attempts to attack did not result in US military casualties, underscoring the fragile balance in the region.

The deployment of the carrier along with destroyers and support ships underscores the continuation of the US campaign to deter Iran and protect shipping. While the blockade and military maneuvers intensify, the situation remains tense but without direct clashes. These satellite images are another reminder that the Arabian Sea and the Strait of Hormuz remain arenas of strategic confrontation, where every movement is monitored and analyzed by the international community.

Comments on the news

• Why is the Strait of Hormuz considered strategically important for Iran and the global economy, and what role does Iran play in its control? - The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow sea passage about 39 km wide, through which roughly 20% of the world's oil trade passes (including liquefied natural gas). For Iran it is critical because the country exports a large portion of its oil and gas via this route, which provides up to 40% of the state budget. Iran controls the northern coast of the strait, including strategic islands (Abu Musa, Greater and Lesser Tunb). This allows Tehran to block or restrict shipping using anti-ship missiles, minefields and fast attack boats. In the event of a conflict Iran could close the strait, causing a sharp rise in global energy prices and a worldwide economic crisis.

• How does the geography of Iran's southern coast, including islands in the Persian Gulf, affect naval strategy in the region? - Iran's southern coast along the Persian Gulf has several features: a narrow coastal strip, shallow waters and mountainous terrain in Khuzestan province, which complicate large-scale amphibious operations. The islands — Abu Musa, Greater and Lesser Tunb — serve as forward bases from which Iran controls the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz. They host missile systems, air defense systems and reconnaissance assets. This geography allows Iran to employ an asymmetric strategy: instead of traditional large warships, it can use thousands of small vessels (dhows, missile boats) for swarm attacks. In addition, coastal missile complexes (for example, Khalij Fars) and mobile launchers along the coast make the strait a zone of high threat for any adversary's naval fleets.

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Full version: حاملة ومدمرتان.. الأقمار الصناعية ترصد تحركات أمريكية في بحر العرب

Venezuela strengthens guarantees of citizens' rights through coordination of authorities

Acting President of Venezuela Delcy Rodríguez held a working meeting with Ombudswoman Égle González, focusing on the development and review of institutional plans to improve the quality of protection of citizens' rights. During the discussion, described as a "valuable exchange," social response mechanisms were clarified, with Rodríguez confirming that all state actions are based on human rights principles. The new strategies are aimed at renewing the operational capacity of the ombudsman's office to strengthen the system of direct protection and assistance to the population, and also align with the reforms and social welfare policies being implemented by the president's administration to consolidate the country's growth and stability.

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Full version: Presidenta (E) y Defensoría del Pueblo coordinan planes para fortalecer garantías de DDHH

Uncertainty Surrounding US–Iran Interim Agreement

The timeline for announcing a temporary agreement between Washington and Tehran remains unclear, despite optimistic statements about an imminent accord. The presumed 60-day truce would include reopening the Strait of Hormuz, allowing Iran to export oil, and opening a negotiation track on the nuclear program. However, US President Donald Trump emphasized on his social network Truth Social that the blockade of Iranian ports and ships in the strait remains fully in place until the agreement is officially signed. Analysts note that inflated expectations on both sides complicate finalizing the deal’s details.

Experts name long-standing mutual distrust and disagreements over what the agreement should include as the main obstacles. Contentious issues concern Iran’s sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz: Tehran insists on the right to regulate passage without charging fees, which Washington rejects. In addition, the US ties sanction relief and the unfreezing of Iranian assets to progress in nuclear talks. The volume of frozen funds and the mechanism for their return also remain serious procedural hurdles.

The nuclear dossier provokes the sharpest disagreements. Iran might agree to transfer enriched uranium to a third party with the condition of its return if the deal collapses, whereas the US demands a direct handover and possibly the destruction of stocks, especially uranium enriched to 60%. It is also unresolved which sanctions would be lifted — only those related to the nuclear program or also restrictions tied to human rights and terrorism. Tehran insists on legal guarantees protecting against a future US administration withdrawing from the deal, as happened in 2018.

Israel exerts significant influence, viewing any nuclear concessions as an existential threat. Through lobbying groups, Israel pressures the US Congress and administration to scuttle or toughen the terms of the deal. Criticism also comes from within the Republican Party: some believe Washington has made concessions and given a “gift” to Tehran. This forced Trump to link approval of the agreement to expanded normalization with Israel, although Saudi Arabia denied the possibility of normalization without real progress on the Palestinian issue.

Analysts propose several compromise solutions. For example, transferring enriched uranium to storage by a third party (as in 2015 with Russia) with the right to return it if the deal fails. A step-by-step approach instead of an all-encompassing package is also being discussed. A compromise on enrichment could include a moratorium of 15–20 years. Regional issues are proposed to be separated from nuclear ones through initial technical agreements. It is also important to lower inflated expectations and show more goodwill to conclude the negotiations.

The announcement timing remains uncertain: it could be “in the coming days” or by the end of the week, but the situation is complicated by regional events, including Israeli escalation in Lebanon. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said the agreement could be reached “within days,” while Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Bakaei noted that “they have reached an agreement, but it would be wrong to claim that signing will occur at the appointed time.”

According to leaks, preliminary points include: keeping the strait open without charging fees, easing restrictions for Iranian ports, exemptions for oil exports, Iran’s obligation not to develop nuclear weapons, and the start of talks to suspend uranium enrichment. However, details of implementation and guarantees remain subjects of bargaining, which is delaying the official announcement.

Comments on the News

• Why is enriching uranium to 60% a critical threshold for international negotiations, and what technical capabilities does it give Iran? - Enrichment to 60% is considered critical because it significantly shortens the time required to reach weapons-grade (90%). For international negotiations, it signals that Iran is approaching the threshold for producing a nuclear weapon, prompting harsh sanctions and pressure. Technically, this level allows Iran to produce medical isotopes and fuel for research reactors, but it also gives the capability to transition quickly to military-grade enrichment if a political decision is made.

• How exactly did Russia participate in the transfer of Iranian uranium under the 2015 agreement, and why is that model seen as a possible compromise? - Under the JCPOA (2015), Russia participated in removing enriched uranium from Iran in exchange for deliveries of natural uranium and fuel for the Bushehr reactor. This model is seen as a compromise because it reduced Iran’s stock of low-enriched uranium while preserving its rights to a civilian nuclear program. Russia acted as a neutral intermediary, which makes it possible to propose a similar scheme again to de-escalate tensions and return to diplomacy.

• Why does Saudi Arabia link normalization with Israel to progress on the Palestinian issue, and how does this affect the US negotiating position? - Saudi Arabia ties these issues to preserve legitimacy in the eyes of the Arab and Islamic world, where the Palestinian question remains central. This creates pressure on the US to secure concessions from Israel on the Palestinians (for example, on a two-state solution). The effect on the US negotiating position is that Washington must balance obligations to Israel with the need to meet Saudi demands for a broader regional agreement.

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Full version: لماذا تأخر الإعلان عن الوصول لاتفاق بين واشنطن وطهران؟.. خبراء يجيبون

U.S. and Iran Talks: 60-Day Truce on the Horizon

American sources report that talks between Washington and Tehran are approaching a final draft of a memorandum of understanding that would provide for a 60-day cessation of hostilities to create conditions for substantive negotiations. However, an official announcement and the details of the agreement have not yet been released. U.S. President Donald Trump, on his Truth Social platform, emphasized that the naval blockade of Iranian ports and ships in the Strait of Hormuz will remain fully in effect until the agreement is formally signed. He urged both sides "not to rush and to do it right."

According to Reuters, a senior U.S. official said that Iran has agreed "in principle" to the resumption of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. In return, the U.S. promises to lift the naval blockade and ensure the disposal of highly enriched uranium. Sources say that Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei approved the overall framework of the agreement. However, there has been no official confirmation from Tehran, and the phrase "in principle" leaves room for maneuver. The main dispute now concerns not the refusal to dispose of the uranium but the mechanism for its destruction.

The Trump team, according to The Washington Post, is emphasizing economic incentives: large post-war investments and phased sanctions relief provided Iran complies with nuclear constraints. The proposal calls for the immediate and free reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and for Iran to renounce developing nuclear weapons. In return, the U.S. is prepared to halt hostilities, unfreeze Iranian assets, and gradually lift sanctions. A "reward-for-compliance" principle has been introduced, where each concession by Tehran would be immediately rewarded.

Iranian media, including Tasnim and Fars, show that Tehran is extremely concerned about the issue of unfreezing frozen assets. Sources say that Iran insists on partial release of funds already at the first stage, and without this the agreement is impossible. The U.S., according to Tasnim, continues to block some items, especially those related to finance. A possible compromise includes the temporary lifting of sanctions on oil, gas and petrochemical exports for the duration of the talks.

In Washington they expect that final Iranian consent may take a few days. Secretary of State Marco Rubio noted that the nuclear agreement will require time to resolve technical issues but could become the beginning of the process Trump seeks. However, critics including Mike Pompeo and some Democrats warn that the new deal is little different from the 2015 nuclear agreement from which Trump withdrew. The New York Times adds that the fate of Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium is unresolved and will be deferred to the next round.

Iran has more than 440 kg of uranium enriched to 60%, which brings it nearly to weapons-grade (90%), according to the IAEA. Iranian sources allow for the possibility of future reductions in enrichment under agency supervision. On the diplomatic front, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif fueled speculation by saying he hopes to host the next round of talks "very soon." An official announcement and specific mechanisms on assets and nuclear commitments remain the decisive factors for the fate of this potential agreement.

Comments on the news

• How strategically important is the Strait of Hormuz for Iran’s economy and why is its blockade such a powerful tool of pressure? - The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow maritime passage through which about 20–25% of the world’s oil shipments pass. For Iran it is the "oil throat": all Iranian oil exports, as well as a significant share of liquefied natural gas, transit through it. Blocking the strait (or threatening to) allows Iran to instantly trigger a spike in global energy prices, damage the economies of importing countries (China, India, Japan, South Korea, EU countries) and gain leverage in negotiations. In addition, control over the strait enhances Iran’s regional influence, since any escalation in this corridor affects the interests of the U.S., Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

• What role does Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei play in decisions about the nuclear program and why is his approval so important for the deal? - According to Iran’s Constitution, the Supreme Leader is the commander-in-chief and the highest arbiter of all state affairs, including the nuclear program. Ali Khamenei controls the Expediency Discernment Council and the Supreme National Security Council, which approve the parameters of negotiations. Without his direct "red line" (for example, requirements on uranium enrichment or sanctions relief) no deal can be signed or ratified. In 2015 it was his tacit approval that made the JCPOA possible, and after the U.S. withdrawal his veto blocks any concessions. Therefore any agreement that does not meet his criteria will be immediately rejected by the Iranian establishment.

• What are the Iranian media outlets Tasnim and Fars? What is their political weight and how much do they reflect the official position of authorities? - Tasnim and Fars are semi-official news agencies close to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and conservative circles. They are not government media (unlike state television IRIB), but their editorial policy is closely coordinated with senior state bodies, especially on security, foreign policy and the nuclear program. Both agencies often publish statements that later become the official line — for example, threats toward Israel or comments on talks with the IAEA. Their political weight is high: they shape the narrative inside Iran (particularly among hardline supporters) and serve as a channel for signals to the international community. However, they should not be considered fully independent — they consistently support the Supreme Leader’s and IRGC’s course, which makes them reliable indicators of the official position but not alternative sources.

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Full version: حتى اللحظات الأخيرة.. غموض يلفّ تفاصيل اتفاق واشنطن وطهران

WSJ: Trump backs Delcy Rodríguez without demanding elections in Venezuela

An investigation by The Wall Street Journal revealed that Venezuela's acting president Delcy Rodríguez has become a key Washington ally under Donald Trump. According to the paper, she regularly meets with U.S. investors interested in the country's oil sector and receives direct praise from the U.S. president. This alliance provides Rodríguez with the necessary resources, institutional legitimacy, and political time to consolidate power while preserving many elements of the system built under Nicolás Maduro. As a result, the prospect of free elections in Venezuela is being postponed indefinitely.

The Trump administration is not interested in disrupting its current relationship with Rodríguez: she is described as accommodating and willing to engage in dialogue. Senior White House sources emphasize that the president does not consider Venezuelan elections a priority—U.S. energy interests take precedence. Because of the conflict with Iran, Venezuelan oil is viewed as a strategic reserve in case of global instability. Rodríguez herself, avoiding public comments, agrees in private negotiations to elections “later,” but sets a condition: first lift the sanctions to restore the country's revenues and infrastructure.

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Full version: The Wall Street Journal revela que Trump mantendrá su relación con Delcy Rodríguez y descarta elecciones en Venezuela como prioridad inmediata

U.S. Secretary of State says agreement with Iran possible

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said that an agreement with Iran to end the conflict could be reached as early as today, while emphasizing Israel’s right to self-defense. Leaving New Delhi, Rubio noted that news on the matter was expected last night and expressed hope that it would appear today. He confirmed that the U.S. is giving diplomacy every chance to succeed before considering alternative options. According to him, Washington will either reach a good agreement with Tehran or act "in another way."

Rubio indicated that on the negotiating table is a "very strong proposal" that includes Iran reopening the strait and holding temporary talks on its nuclear program. He expressed hope for success and noted that the deal enjoys broad support from the Gulf countries. According to the secretary of state, all the states with whom the issue was discussed consider the agreement not only sensible but also "the right step for the whole world." Work on the framework conditions continues; details and wording are still being discussed.

U.S. media reported that the White House believes Tehran has in principle agreed to the framework of the deal, and that 95% of the work is already done. President Donald Trump is inclined to give Iran a few days to conclude the deal. Trump himself said that talks with Tehran are not yet finished but are proceeding in an organized and constructive manner. Sources in the U.S. confirmed that final wording is now being discussed. Washington is prioritizing diplomacy but is leaving other options open if negotiations fail.

Touching on the Israel issue, Rubio stressed that Israel always has the right to defend itself: if Hezbollah launches rockets toward it, Israel has the full right to respond. It is reported that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu received assurances from Trump of Israel’s right to self-defense on all fronts, including Lebanon. This statement underscores the balance of American policy: pursuing a diplomatic solution with Iran while maintaining security support for regional allies.

The U.S. State Department expressed disappointment that the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons failed to adopt a final document at the 2026 NPT review conference. Washington called the failure disappointing, especially against the backdrop of "Iran’s continued noncompliance with safeguards under the treaty." The U.S. intends to raise the issue of some states’ inability to take seriously the threat Iran poses to the global non-proliferation regime. These events occur amid Israeli concerns that a memorandum of understanding between Tehran and Washington could limit Netanyahu’s influence on Trump’s decisions, even as the U.S. administration increasingly leans toward a diplomatic path. Both the U.S. and Israel affirm the need to preserve freedom of military action and to focus on sensitive security issues at later stages if necessary. In the coming days it will become clear whether the agreement will indeed be concluded and what its consequences will be for regional stability and the non-proliferation regime.

Comments on the news

• Why is control of the Strait of Hormuz a key lever for Iran in negotiations, and what consequences for the world economy could its closure have? — The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow sea passage through which about 20–25% of global oil trade passes (roughly 17–20 million barrels per day). Iran, controlling the strait’s coast and possessing powerful naval and missile forces, can threaten to block this route. In negotiations this gives Tehran leverage: in the event of severe sanctions or a military threat it could trigger a sharp spike in energy prices. Closure of the strait would lead to an immediate oil shortage, pushing prices to $150–200 per barrel, which would cause a global recession, especially in importing countries (EU, China, Japan, India).

• What role does Lebanon’s Hezbollah play in Iran’s strategy to deter Israel, and why are its rocket attacks viewed as a threat to regional security? — Hezbollah is a key Iranian proxy on Israel’s southern flank. Tehran uses it to create “multi-layered deterrence”: a huge rocket arsenal (estimated at over 150,000, including precision-guided missiles) can strike key targets across Israel. Rocket attacks from Lebanese territory are seen as a threat because Hezbollah controls the area along the border and can inflict a massive strike that would overload Israel’s air defenses. Additionally, this deters Tel Aviv from open confrontation with Iran, since any response could be large-scale and involve Hezbollah.

• Which countries are included among the "Gulf countries" mentioned in the article, and how does their position on Iran’s nuclear program differ from that of the U.S. and Israel? — The Gulf countries include Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman and Bahrain (and sometimes Iraq, though it is often treated separately). Their position is more cautious: like the U.S. and Israel, they fear a nuclear Iran, but they prefer diplomatic channels and economic engagement rather than military escalation. Unlike Washington and Tel Aviv, which lean toward maximum pressure or preemptive strikes, the Gulf states seek an agreement that would guarantee their own security and not disrupt energy transit. Oman and Qatar often act as mediators, while Saudi Arabia and the UAE diversify their ties (including rapprochement with China) to reduce dependence on the U.S.

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Full version: روبيو: اتفاق إيران قد يُبرم اليوم ولإسرائيل الحق في "الدفاع عن نفسها"

Iran Deal: A Pause Before the Storm, Not a Resolution

Presented as a step toward de‑escalation, the latest U.S.-Iran agreement resembles a postponement more than a genuine settlement. It extends the ceasefire for 60 days, reopens the Strait of Hormuz to shipping, allows Tehran to export oil, and launches a negotiation process on the nuclear program. Yet the key question remains unanswered: have the underlying causes of the tension changed, or have the parties merely delayed an inevitable explosion?

At its core, the agreement does not reflect a strategic shift in the parties’ positions; it rather indicates their mutual conviction that the cost of escalation has become prohibitively high. Washington has not abandoned its concerns about Iran’s nuclear program, ballistic missiles, and regional influence. Likewise, Tehran has not altered its view of national security and has not relinquished the instruments of its regional presence. Therefore the deal looks more like a respite than an attempt to build a long-term peace.

This temporary alignment of interests is driven purely by pragmatic considerations: Washington seeks to secure shipping and stabilize energy markets, while Iran is under severe economic and political pressure that makes confrontation too costly. However, a temporary need for calm does not equate to a genuine consensus about the region’s future. Such a situation usually leads to an incomplete agreement that meets immediate needs but does not lay the foundations for lasting stability. The fragility of the deal is built into its structure: it provides an easy ceasefire that can be broken, not a durable peace capable of withstanding the test of time.

Despite the Trump administration’s 2018 withdrawal from the deal, which demanded a “more comprehensive and tougher” agreement on uranium enrichment, regional influence, and missiles, Washington has returned to the logic of step‑by‑step arrangements. What we see today is a temporary lowering of U.S. demands under the pressure of current realities, not an admission that partial measures are the optimal path. Iran views the pause as an opportunity to strengthen its position domestically and regionally, not as capitulation, using it to ease sanctions pressure and restore its networks of influence.

This agreement cannot be considered apart from Israel’s position, which regards any non-radical de‑escalation as “precious time” gifted to Tehran. For Israel, it is a strategic mistake or an unjustified concession by the United States. According to Israeli media reports, military sources note that Iran is intentionally prolonging negotiations to secure the withdrawal of U.S. aircraft carriers, while the army prepares for a possible collapse of talks and the resumption of direct confrontation. This divergence in assessments only increases the risk that a deal—interpreted by each side as either an opportunity for maneuver or as weakness and deception—could become the spark for future conflict. In the end, the agreement stops the shooting but does not put out the fire; it is a maneuver to reduce costs and buy time, not a historic solution. It lowers the likelihood of immediate confrontation but does not remove the roots of the conflict, meaning the temporary success may hide a deeper failure to address the fundamental causes of tension.

Comments on the news

• Why is the Strait of Hormuz considered one of the most strategically important places in the world, and how can Iran block shipping there? - The strait, only 33 km wide, is the sole maritime route from the Persian Gulf to the open ocean — about 20% of the world’s oil flows through it (17–20 million barrels per day). Iran controls its northern shore (Hormozgan province) and can block shipping in several ways: laying mines, using fast attack craft of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), launching anti-ship missiles (including Chinese Silkworms and Iranian “Noor”), and deploying Ghadir-class submarines. Even a partial blockade could trigger a 30–50% spike in global energy prices.

• What is meant by “Iran’s regional influence”? Through which armed groups and countries (for example, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen) does Tehran advance its interests in the Middle East? - “Regional influence” means Iran’s ability to project military, political, and ideological power beyond its borders through a network of non-state allies (often called “proxy forces”). Key nodes: 1) Hezbollah (Lebanon) — the most powerful, possessing its own rocket arsenal of up to 150,000 units; 2) Houthis (Yemen) — receive Iranian drones and missile technology for attacks on Saudi Arabia and ships in the Red Sea; 3) Syria — through IRGC presence and support for the Assad government; 4) Iraq — Shiite militias (e.g., Kata'ib Hezbollah); 5) Gaza Strip — funding for Hamas and Islamic Jihad. These groups give Iran “strategic depth” and the ability to wage indirect war without entering into direct conflict with Israel or the U.S.

• Why does Israel view Iran’s nuclear program as an existential threat, and what role did the Israeli side play in undermining the 2015 nuclear deal? - Israel sees Iran’s nuclear program as a threat to its very existence, since Iranian leaders (including Supreme Leader Khamenei) have repeatedly called for “wiping Israel off the map.” Tel Aviv believes that a nuclear weapon in Tehran’s hands would break the strategic balance and deprive Israel of the ability to retaliate given its small territory. Regarding the 2015 deal (JCPOA), Benjamin Netanyahu’s government lobbied intensively against it in the U.S. Congress, calling it a “historic mistake.” Israeli media also report that Israel took part in clandestine operations — including the theft of Iran’s nuclear archive in 2018 and the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists (for example, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh in 2020) — which undermined trust in the diplomatic process. In 2018, Israeli pressure played a key role in the decision by President Trump to withdraw from the deal.

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Full version: أمريكا وإيران اتفاق أقرب إلى الانفجار لا إنهاء الحرب

Venezuela Strengthens Epidemiological Surveillance over Ebola Outbreak in Africa

Venezuela immediately activated public health safety mechanisms after the World Health Organization declared the outbreak of the Bundibugyo variant in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda a Public Health Emergency of International Concern. Although the virus is not circulating on the American continent, the country has stepped up epidemiological surveillance at major ports and airports, and technical teams are updating protocols and the National Preparedness and Response Plan. Citizens planning trips to affected areas of Africa are advised to avoid contact with people showing symptoms, maintain hygiene, and seek medical attention immediately if fever or malaise develop after returning.

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Full version: Venezuela fortalece vigilancia epidemiológica preventiva ante alerta internacional de Ébola

US and Iran Close to a Deal; Pakistan Acts as Mediator

Talks between Washington and Tehran are showing "tangible progress," according to recent statements by senior officials. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, speaking in New Delhi, expressed hope that "the world will hear good news in the coming hours, especially regarding the Strait of Hormuz." He stressed that over the past 48 hours progress has been made in discussing a common framework that could resolve the crisis around this strategic waterway.

Pakistan played a key mediating role, organizing several rounds of consultations and expressing optimism about "significant progress." Pakistan's Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar said that the results achieved "give grounds for hope for a positive and long-term solution." He also praised the leadership of US President Donald Trump and his commitment to dialogue, and Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif expressed hope that the next round of talks would be held in Pakistan.

The main sticking point remained the order in which key issues would be discussed. Iran sought to postpone the nuclear issue until after signing an agreement to open the Strait of Hormuz and end the war, while the US insisted on addressing all issues simultaneously. According to The Washington Post, the command of the Pakistani army made efforts to bring the parties' positions closer together, helping to find a compromise between these two approaches.

US President Donald Trump confirmed that a "substantial part" of a memorandum of understanding has already been agreed and that final details are now being discussed. On his social network Truth Social he wrote that the agreement will be announced soon. Without disclosing details, Trump reinforced the impression that the parties have reached a common framework that only needs to be finalized. This signal was accompanied by intensive consultations both at the mediator level and at official levels.

Iranian media, including the Fars and Tasnim agencies, published the alleged points of a preliminary agreement. According to them, the parties undertake not to attack one another or their allies, and to end military actions on all fronts. It is planned that measures to restore shipping in the Strait of Hormuz will be taken within 30 days after signing, and then negotiations on the nuclear program will take place within 60 days. The document also provides for a partial lifting of sanctions on Iranian oil and gas, a return of ship traffic to pre-war levels, and the unblocking of part of frozen assets.

Israel reacted to the course of the talks with alarm. According to Channel 12, a senior Israeli official said that "the agreement that is now taking shape is bad because it sends the Iranians a signal that the Strait of Hormuz is as powerful a weapon as the nuclear [program]." The official noted that Trump views the deal as "economic," and the nuclear issue may be postponed, but "it is unclear what will happen after the first phase." According to Channel 14, Prime Minister Netanyahu even forbade ministers from commenting on the forthcoming agreement, indicating the subject's extreme sensitivity within the Israeli government.

Comments on the news

• What strategic significance does the Strait of Hormuz have for global energy supplies, and why could its blockade trigger a global crisis? - About 20–25% of all global oil shipments and a significant share of liquefied natural gas pass through the Strait of Hormuz. This chokepoint between the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean is the only maritime route for energy exports from Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE and Qatar. A blockade of the strait, even partial, would lead to a sharp spike in oil and gas prices (IEA estimates — up to $150–200 per barrel), paralysis of energy supplies in importing countries (China, Japan, South Korea, India, the EU) and would deal a blow to the global economy comparable to the 1973 crisis or an actual recession.

• What are the Fars and Tasnim news agencies known for, and how can their political orientation affect coverage of the talks? - Fars (founded in 2003) and Tasnim (founded in 2012) are influential semi-official agencies in Iran. Fars is closely linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), while Tasnim is associated with the conservative wing that supports Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Being loyal to the regime, both agencies typically portray negotiations (for example, on the nuclear deal) as "concessions under pressure" or "a defensive necessity," less often giving a positive assessment to diplomacy with the US and the West. The difference in emphasis: Fars more often stresses military strength and threats, Tasnim — ideological integrity and resistance. As a result, their coverage can shift public perception of the talks toward skepticism and aggressive rhetoric, complicating public acceptance of any potential compromises.

• What key events (for example, the US withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018) preceded the current conflict over Iran's nuclear program? - The escalation includes several stages: 1) 2015 — signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between Iran and the "P5+1" (US, UK, France, Germany, Russia, China + EU); 2) 2018 — unilateral US withdrawal under President Trump and the reinstatement of tough sanctions ("maximum pressure" policy); 3) 2019–2020 — Iran gradually abandons JCPOA commitments (raising uranium enrichment levels from 3.67% to 60%, accumulation of centrifuges and isotopes); 4) 2020 — the US killing of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani; 5) 2021–2022 — failed negotiations in Vienna on returning to the JCPOA; 6) 2023–2025 — further enrichment of Iranian uranium (up to 84% purity, close to weapons-grade), diplomatic deadlock and an increase in mutual threats (including Israel's position on preemptive strikes). These events created a "powder keg" in which the technical capability for nuclear weapons has almost been mastered, but political agreement is lacking.

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Full version: بوساطة باكستانية.. واشنطن وطهران تقتربان من اتفاق وإسرائيل تحذر

Satellites detect 240 ships gathered near Strait of Hormuz

Satellite images taken in mid-May showed an unusual concentration of about 240 vessels in the waters of the Persian Gulf at the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz. The ships gathered near a line that Iran recently declared its new zone of control. Analysts note that such ship density in this strategically important maritime corridor has not been seen before, raising concerns for the safety of global shipping.

Iran officially announced the creation of a new maritime zone controlled by the so-called "Organization of the Persian Gulf." Its boundaries run from Iran’s Mount Mubarak to the Emirati Fujairah at the eastern entrance to the strait and from the island of Qeshm to Umm al-Quwain on the west. The area of the zone is about 26,900 square kilometers. Tehran calls these measures "navigation regulation," but international experts see them as an attempt to strengthen control over a key sea route.

Analysis of images from May 17 and 20 shows 240 vessels concentrated over an area of roughly 1,400 square kilometers. Near this concentration, 36 kilometers southwest of the UAE coast, a US Arleigh Burke-class destroyer was observed. Such a concentration of military and civilian ships creates a tense environment and increases the risk of incidents in a region already considered one of the most unstable in the world.

The images also recorded only one vessel transiting the Strait of Hormuz — an oil tanker heading from the Omani port of Shinas into the waters of the gulf. The limited movement through the strait indicates serious disruptions to shipping. Experts speak of a "navigation paralysis" after Iran published a new map of maritime control requiring prior coordination and permission to pass through the strait.

While Iran’s Foreign Ministry officially states that "the Strait of Hormuz is not closed" and that traffic continues, in practice ship passages are now subject to additional restrictions. Tehran asserts that "vessels not related to hostile parties" can safely transit the strait if coordinated with Iranian authorities. The creation of the "Organization of the Persian Gulf" has effectively handed control over the strait to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which heightens risks for international shipping amid current tensions in the Middle East.

Commentary on the news

• What is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and why does handing it control of the Strait of Hormuz increase risks for international shipping? — The IRGC is an elite military-political formation of Iran, directly subordinate to the Supreme Leader and possessing its own ground, naval and air forces separate from the regular army. Giving it control over the Strait of Hormuz raises risks because the IRGC is known for more aggressive tactics (for example, seizing tankers, threats to block the strait in response to sanctions), which increases the likelihood of incidents involving civilian vessels and warships from other countries.

• What significance do Mount Mubarak, Qeshm Island and Umm al-Quwain have in the context of Iranian territorial claims in the Persian Gulf? — Mount Mubarak and Qeshm Island (the largest island in the Persian Gulf, controlled by Iran) are strategic points for controlling shipping and resources. Umm al-Quwain (one of the UAE emirates) is mentioned in the context of historical disputes: Iran contests the ownership of several islands (for example, Abu Musa, Greater and Lesser Tunbs), which are under UAE control but which Iran considers its territory, creating tension.

• How do Iranian authorities justify the creation of the "Organization of the Persian Gulf" and what legal or historical arguments do they use to establish control over this zone? — Iran argues that the "Organization of the Persian Gulf" is necessary to coordinate security and protect Iran’s "historical rights" in the region, citing long-standing cultural and economic ties to the Persian Gulf. Legal arguments include references to international maritime law (for example, rights to an exclusive economic zone), and historical arguments point to periods when the region was under Persian influence. However, these claims are disputed by Arab states, which insist on respecting existing borders and UN decisions.

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Full version: قرب خط إيران.. صور فضائية لاحتشاد 240 سفينة قبالة هرمز

Venezuela: number of released will exceed 500 people

Acting President of Venezuela Delcy Rodríguez announced that within the next few hours the number of people released under the Amnesty Law for Democratic Coexistence will exceed 500. This process began back in January, before the law came into force, and has already led to the release of 885 people. The law is aimed at strengthening national reconciliation and social peace, as well as providing the opportunity for political participation and reintegration into society for people prosecuted for political reasons. Rodríguez confirmed the authorities' commitment to restoring the social fabric and the political stability necessary to overcome the challenges facing the country.

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Full version: Presidenta encargada sobre excarcelaciones: Sé que vamos a superar las 500 liberaciones en las próximas horas

US Intelligence Chief Resigns: Family Reasons or Political Split?

Tulsi Gabbard, Director of National Intelligence, announced her resignation, which will officially take effect on June 30. In a letter to President Donald Trump she explained her decision by saying she needs to care for her husband, who has been diagnosed with a rare form of bone cancer. While her statement expresses gratitude for the trust placed in her, many observers link her departure to growing disagreements with the president on key foreign-policy issues.

The main stumbling block was the stance on Iran. At congressional hearings, Gabbard said that Tehran’s nuclear program had been completely destroyed following U.S. strikes in 2025, and that the infrastructure was damaged to such an extent that recovery was out of the question. Trump, by contrast, called Iran an “imminent threat” and criticized Gabbard for being “soft” in her assessment of Iranian ambitions. That contradiction was one of the reasons the president, according to sources, began considering her resignation as early as March.

The problem, however, ran deeper: Gabbard consistently opposed military interventions not only in Iran but also in Venezuela, and took a pro-Russian stance on the conflict in Ukraine. This line led to her gradual isolation within the administration. For example, the military operation in Venezuela was carried out without her, and the decision to start a war with Iran was made without her participation, which directly indicates a loss of trust from the president.

Gabbard’s departure is seen as a landmark event for the MAGA movement: it marks the weakening of the anti-war wing, which previously had some influence. The Economist called the intelligence chief’s resignation evidence that the “hawks” — such as Secretary of State Marco Rubio and CIA Director John Ratcliffe — increasingly define Trump’s foreign policy, while skeptical voices are fading.

This personnel shift is only part of a broader trend. According to the Brookings Institution, turnover among Trump’s key advisers reached 34%: 23 of 68 senior officials have left their posts. Notably, Gabbard became the fourth woman to leave the administration in the past three months, after the Attorney General, the head of the World Bank, and the labor adviser.

In any case, regardless of the official explanation that she’s leaving for family reasons, Tulsi Gabbard’s resignation exposes a deep rift within the president’s team. It weakens the position of those who oppose military conflicts and shows that in the near term the U.S. course on the international stage may become even tougher and more confrontational.

News commentary

• How extensive and what was the nature of Iran’s nuclear program before the 2025 strikes? (for example, uranium enrichment levels, presence of international inspections, underground facilities) — Before the 2025 strikes, Iran’s nuclear program had reached enrichment levels up to 60% (close to the weapons-grade 90%) at underground facilities in Fordow and Natanz. International IAEA inspections were limited due to Iranian restrictions, but continued in part. The program included an advanced centrifuge infrastructure (including modern IR-6 and IR-9 machines) and underground storage facilities protected from bombing, for example in the mountain beneath Fordow.

• Which specific elements of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure (for example, Natanz, Fordow, Arak) were hit, and why is their restoration considered impossible? — Major sites were struck: Natanz (centrifuge manufacturing and storage), Fordow (underground enrichment plant) and Arak (heavy-water reactor). Their restoration is considered practically impossible due to targeted strikes on key structures (for example, destruction of foundations and cooling systems), and strategic damage to critical equipment that requires imported components and many years to reproduce. In addition, the strikes may have been aimed at power and ventilation sources, making repairs impractical.

• How was Iran’s nuclear program linked to its regional influence through support for groups like Hezbollah or the Houthis, and did this change after the strikes? — The nuclear program served as a “security umbrella” for Iran’s proxy forces, such as Hezbollah (Lebanon) and the Houthis (Yemen), allowing them to act more aggressively under the protection of a potential nuclear response. After the destruction of the nuclear infrastructure in 2025, Iran’s regional influence weakened because the threat of a nuclear strike could no longer shield these allies. As a result, proxy activity declined, and some of these groups (like Hezbollah) faced reduced funding and military-technical support.

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Full version: استقالة غابارد.. هل انتهى نفوذ التيار المناهض للحرب في إدارة ترمب؟

Iran and the US continue exchanging messages via Pakistan

Tehran and Washington continue to exchange signals through the mediation of Pakistan, seeking to produce a framework agreement. According to ISNA, consultations are in full swing, but several remaining disagreements have not yet been resolved. Pakistani Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi remains in Tehran to continue meetings. According to the Iranian outlet Noor News, the correspondence is based on an Iranian proposal consisting of 14 points.

During his visit, Naqvi met with senior Iranian officials, including Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. Official sources in Tehran note that differences are narrowing, although a final agreement has not yet been reached. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baqaei emphasized that the talks are focused on ending the war on all fronts, including in Lebanon, but did not go into details about the disputed points.

In Washington, the US president rejected the possibility that Iran would charge fees for passage through the Strait of Hormuz, calling it an "international waterway." He also reiterated that the US will not allow Iran to have nuclear weapons, and said bluntly: "We will take the highly enriched uranium. We don't need it, maybe we'll destroy it, but we will not let it remain with them." Earlier, Western media reported that Iran's Supreme Leader had ordered that uranium stocks not be moved abroad, but Tehran officially denied that information.

Against the backdrop of ongoing talks, the sensitive key issues remain Iran's uranium enrichment program and Tehran's control over the Strait of Hormuz. Pakistani mediation is expected to intensify, with a possible visit to Tehran by Pakistan Army Chief of Staff Asim Munir. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio noted "some positive signals" in the talks but warned against excessive optimism: "I don't want to sound too optimistic — let's wait and see what happens in the coming days."

The domestic political situation in the US is also having an impact: House Republicans canceled a vote on a resolution that would limit Trump's war powers against Iran due to a lack of votes. This reflects a split in the party over constraining the president. Meanwhile, the Navy command of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps said that in 24 hours 31 commercial vessels, including oil tankers, passed through the Strait of Hormuz under Iranian coordination and protection, while the US has been blocking Iranian ports since April 13.

Comments on the news

• Why is Pakistan acting as intermediary in talks between Iran and the US, rather than traditional countries like Oman or Qatar? – Pakistan has long-standing diplomatic and economic ties with Iran and is also a nuclear state, which gives it weight. In addition, Pakistan maintains certain channels of communication with the US (for example, in the context of Afghanistan) and can act as a neutral party less entangled in Middle Eastern regional conflicts. Oman and Qatar remain active mediators, but in some cases Iran and the US may choose different players to reduce pressure or test new dialogue formats.
• Who is Abbas Araghchi and why is his participation in the talks important for understanding Iran's diplomacy on the nuclear program? – Abbas Araghchi is an experienced Iranian diplomat who served as deputy foreign minister and the leading negotiator on the nuclear deal (JCPOA) in 2013–2015. His involvement signals Tehran's seriousness: Araghchi knows the technical details of the nuclear program, the structure of sanctions, and Western positions. He is also considered a pragmatic figure in the Iranian establishment, making him someone capable of seeking compromises.
• What is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and what role does it play in controlling the Strait of Hormuz and protecting commercial vessels? – The IRGC (Sepâh-e Pâsdârân-e Enghelâb-e Eslâmi) is an elite military formation of Iran, created after the 1979 revolution to defend the Islamic regime. It has its own land, air, and naval forces, including the IRGC Navy, which is responsible for operations in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. About 20% of the world's oil passes through this strait, and the IRGC controls strategic points to protect Iranian interests as well as to potentially close the strait in case of conflict. In recent years the IRGC has also escorted Iranian and allied commercial vessels to prevent their interception or inspection by Western navies.

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Full version: واشنطن وطهران تواصلان تبادل الرسائل وروبيو يتحدث عن "مؤشرات جيدة"

For Venezuelans, the Economy Matters More Than Elections

According to the latest study by Hinterlaces, 63% of Venezuelans believe that economic stability and the country's recovery should take priority over holding elections. Citizens think that it is first necessary to achieve sustained growth, improved well-being, and a reduction in political tensions, and only then create the conditions for fair and universally recognized electoral processes. In addition, external factors, such as unilateral coercive measures, in the majority view distort the political and economic situation, so socio-economic stability is seen as a key condition for legitimate and peaceful elections in the future.

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Full version: Economía antes que política: El sentir del 63% de los venezolanos en el más reciente estudio de Hinterlaces

Republicans Cancel Vote on War with Iran Due to Lack of Quorum

Republican leaders in the U.S. House of Representatives unexpectedly cancelled a vote on a resolution requiring President Donald Trump to obtain congressional approval before starting a war with Iran. According to Fox News, the cancellation was related to quorum issues: the scheduled vote did not take place before members of the House left for official recess. Democrat Gregory Meeks said, "We definitely had the votes, and they knew it," hinting that Republicans feared defeat.

This move reflects a growing split within the Republican Party. Earlier, the House of Representatives blocked similar resolutions three times with near-unanimous Republican support. However, after the outbreak of hostilities between the U.S., Israel, and Iran on February 28, support began to weaken. After one vote ended in a tie and disagreements emerged within the party, leadership lost control of the situation and postponed the vote until early June.

At the center of the dispute is the constitutional question of the right to declare war. Democrats and some Republicans insist that only Congress has that authority and demand that Trump obtain formal authorization. In response, the White House and the majority of Republicans argue that the president, as commander-in-chief, has the right to conduct limited military operations to protect national interests from "imminent threats." This legal conflict underlies the ongoing debates.

Last week the U.S. Senate unexpectedly passed a similar resolution limiting Trump’s war powers, with a vote of 50 to 47. It was a rare rebuke of the president, as four Republicans joined Democrats to support the measure. Vice President J.D. Vance defended Trump’s policy, saying, "This is not a long war — we will complete the mission and come home." But the margin was slim, underscoring the fragility of support.

The economic consequences of the war have heightened concern among Republicans. Since February 28, disruption of global oil trade has led to a 50% increase in gasoline prices in the U.S. This, along with falling approval ratings for Trump in polls, creates a risk for the party ahead of the midterm elections in November. Despite a ceasefire announced in May, the U.S. continues to blockade Iranian ports, while Iran is blocking the Strait of Hormuz. Congress remains at the center of the political struggle over control of military actions and their consequences.

Commentary on the news

• What is the importance of the Strait of Hormuz to the global economy and why does Iran’s blockade have worldwide consequences? - The Strait of Hormuz is a strategic maritime corridor connecting the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean. About 20% of global oil shipments (roughly 17–20 million barrels per day) and a significant volume of liquefied natural gas pass through it. Any Iranian blockade of the strait immediately causes a sharp spike in oil and energy prices, destabilizes global markets, disrupts supply chains, and increases inflationary pressure, affecting the economies of almost all countries.

• Which Iranian ports are the United States blocking and what is their significance to Iran’s economy? - The U.S. has imposed sanctions that effectively block access to key Iranian ports, such as Bandar Abbas (the main commercial port and naval base through which much of Iran’s imports and exports pass), Kharg Island (the largest oil terminal, handling about 90% of Iran’s crude oil exports), and Chabahar port (a strategic hub for bypassing sanctions and transiting goods, particularly to Afghanistan and Pakistan). The blockade of these ports deals a severe blow to Iran’s economy, depriving it of oil export revenues, limiting foreign trade and access to imported goods, and worsening the country’s economic crisis.

• What was the official reason for the start of hostilities between the U.S., Israel, and Iran on February 28, since the article does not mention it? - There were no official hostilities between the U.S., Israel, and Iran on February 28, and there is no confirmed data on such a conflict. The question is likely based on a hypothetical scenario or speculation. In reality, relations among these countries are characterized by tensions over Iran’s nuclear program, Iran’s support for regional groups (for example, Hezbollah), and cyberattacks, but there has not been a large-scale direct military confrontation.

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Full version: الجمهوريون بمجلس النواب الأمريكي يلغون تصويتا على صلاحيات حرب إيران

Oil prices rebound amid uncertainty over US–Iran talks

Oil prices rose on Thursday after two days of sharp declines, supported by lingering uncertainty over a possible agreement between the United States and Iran. Brent futures gained $1.05 (1%) to $106.53 a barrel, while WTI rose $0.79 (0.80%) to $99.79. The gains followed losses of more than 5.6% on Wednesday after remarks by Donald Trump about progress in the talks, although he also threatened new strikes if Tehran does not agree to a deal.

Trump’s comments that the talks had entered a “final phase” sparked hopes of a possible breakthrough, but Iran warned of any attacks and announced measures to increase control over the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran said it intends to create an authority to manage waterways and to introduce a “controlled maritime zone” in the strait, through which before the war passed about 20% of global oil and liquefied natural gas consumption. The de facto closure of the strait occurred in response to US and Israeli strikes that sparked the war on February 28, and despite a ceasefire in April, shipping restrictions remain.

Analyst Yan An of Haotong Futures noted that the sharp price drop reflected the market’s expectation of a possible diplomatic breakthrough. However, he added that “if Trump insists on Iran making no concessions, reaching an agreement seems unlikely, and the outcome of the talks could change dramatically.” This political uncertainty remains the main market driver: any escalation or diplomatic progress can quickly shift the balance.

Reduced supplies from the Middle East have accelerated withdrawals from commercial and strategic reserves of consumer countries, raising concerns about depletion of global stocks. The US Energy Information Administration reported a record withdrawal of about 10 million barrels from the strategic reserve last week, while commercial crude inventories fell by 7.9 million barrels to 445 million. Gasoline stocks dropped by 1.5 million barrels, while distillate stocks rose by 372,000 barrels.

Experts warn that continued blockade or restrictions in the Strait of Hormuz would sharply reduce global oil and petroleum product stocks. Minyu Gao, senior researcher at China Futures, said: “Lower inventories will make it difficult to keep prices low. With the strait closed, onshore global stocks of oil products and crude could fall below five-year lows for this time of year.”

Thus, the market is oscillating between two opposing factors: a possible diplomatic breakthrough that could lower prices, and real concerns about stock depletion and shipping restrictions that support rises. Further price movements will depend on the progress of US–Iran talks, the pace of reserve withdrawals, and the extent of Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz. Uncertainty remains high, risking sharp price swings with any new diplomatic or military developments.

Commentary on the news

• Why has control of the Strait of Hormuz become Iran’s key lever in talks with the US? — The Strait of Hormuz is a strategic corridor through which about 20% of the world’s oil passes. By threatening to close the strait, Iran can sharply raise global energy prices, forcing the US and its allies to make concessions in nuclear and regional negotiations. However, a full blockade is unlikely because it would provoke a military response, so Iran uses a “managed chaos” tactic — detaining tankers, inspections, and demonstrations of military power.

• Which specific US and Israeli strikes led to the war on February 28, and how does this affect current talks? — The reference to a “war on February 28” is not confirmed by authoritative international sources — it is likely a distorted mention of clashes in February 2024 (US strikes on pro-Iranian groups in Iraq/Syria in response to attacks on coalition bases) or February airstrikes by Israel on IRGC targets in Syria. Such incidents increase mutual distrust in the talks: Tehran insists on pre-emptive sanctions relief, while Washington demands non-proliferation guarantees.

• What is the “authority to manage waterways” that Iran is creating, and how might a “controlled maritime zone” differ from a full blockade of the strait? — Iran plans to create a state body similar to a “Suez Canal of Iran” that would coordinate ship transit through the Strait of Hormuz, formally citing international law (for example, mandatory pilotage or environmental controls). A “controlled maritime zone” would mean introducing paid services, mandatory inspections, or delays for hostile vessels, but without a full closure — this allows Iran to exert pressure without crossing the “red line” (a full blockade) that would trigger US military intervention.

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Full version: النفط يرتفع مع تعثر مفاوضات إيران وتراجع المخزونات الأمريكية

Diosdado Cabello: María Corina Machado's opposition sows hatred

The secretary-general of the ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), Diosdado Cabello, said that the political actions of opposition leader María Corina Machado are aimed at spreading hatred. According to him, the opposition is trying to copy the format of the government's regional visits to create a false impression of mass support. Cabello emphasized that their rhetoric is based on confrontation and political hostility, while their real intentions are hidden behind a propaganda façade.

The statement came amid a "national pilgrimage" — a series of trips by government representatives across the country's federal districts. Cabello promised that the PSUV will continue to monitor the opposition's public appearances and inform citizens about the political situation in order to counter disinformation and manipulation by opposition forces.

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Full version: Diosdado Cabello asegura que actividades políticas de María Corina Machado buscan propagar el odio

New Era for the Fed: Warsh Sworn In Amid Oil Shock

Kevin Warsh was sworn in as chairman of the United States Federal Reserve System by Donald Trump after the Senate confirmed his nomination by a narrow majority. The vote starkly reflected the deep partisan divide in the country. Jerome Powell’s term officially expired, but he remained in office as acting chair until the handover, saying he intends to exercise his legal right to remain a member of the Board of Governors until the end of his term in January 2028. Powell said his decision was aimed at protecting the bank’s independence and completing criminal investigations against him, although analysts believe the move could delay the appointment of a Trump‑friendly successor.

Warsh takes office amid a complex economic and geopolitical trial, as his previous promises clash with an escalation of military conflict with Iran and its impact on global markets and the policies of Gulf countries. Before his nomination, Warsh was known for supporting rate cuts, based on the theory that a productivity boom tied to artificial intelligence could naturally restrain inflation, allowing aggressive rate cuts without inflationary risks. However, the start of U.S.-Israeli attacks on Iran pushed oil prices above $110, disrupted shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, and affected production in some exporting countries, completely changing the economic picture.

Oil shocks and tariffs introduced by Trump have again pushed U.S. inflation to around 3.8%, nearly double the Fed’s 2% target. As a result, Warsh was forced to adjust his rhetoric despite his prior inclination toward rate cuts. Wall Street analysts’ forecasts point to interest rates remaining at 3.50%–3.75% throughout 2026, with possible hikes later if inflation continues to rise. This reversal puts pressure on the policies of central banks in countries whose currencies are pegged to the dollar, forcing them to synchronize their rates to prevent capital outflows and to combat local inflationary waves.

Sustained high rates mean continued expensive borrowing for companies and households in several countries in the region and the Gulf, which could slow growth in non‑oil sectors such as construction, development and finance. At the same time, Gulf budgets are receiving significant surpluses thanks to high oil prices caused by the war and supply disruptions. However, high interest rates pull liquidity away from local stock markets into safe bonds and high‑yield deposits, limiting the growth of Arab exchanges despite huge oil revenues, creating an economic paradox in the region.

Regional instability has increased trade costs and the risks of maritime transport, forcing some economic powers to seek dollar swap lines from the Fed to secure foreign liquidity amid military uncertainty. The most vulnerable are Arab countries that are not oil exporters: higher U.S. rates make it harder to return “hot money,” complicate external debt financing, and raise the cost of energy imports. Thus, the foreign currency shortages in these states are directly exacerbated by rising oil prices and geopolitical turbulence.

Ultimately, the change of the “master of the dollar” plunges the region into a phase of waiting and domestic monetary discipline: peg‑to‑dollar regimes force central banks to follow Fed decisions even when they are undesirable, guided by the principle “if you live with wolves, howl like a wolf.” Arab borrowers and investors will have to postpone major plans for financial expansion until the geopolitical picture becomes clearer. The wise course now is to rationalize spending and reserve liquidity, because “a penny saves a ruble” in an era of news about oil tankers and tweets from the White House inhabitant.

Comments on the news

• What strategic significance does the Strait of Hormuz have for the global economy and why does its disruption affect oil prices? — About 20–25% of the world’s seaborne oil and liquefied gas trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz. This narrow waterway is the main transporter of energy from the Persian Gulf countries (Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, the UAE, Qatar and Iran itself). Any disruption — military action, blockade or even the threat of closure — sharply reduces oil supply on the global market, which immediately pushes prices up. Attacks on tankers in the region in 2019–2020 already caused price spikes despite temporary fluctuations.

• Why are Gulf countries forced to follow the decisions of the United States Federal Reserve even if it is disadvantageous? — Most Gulf countries (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman) have pegged their national currencies to the U.S. dollar at a fixed exchange rate. This is done for the stability of oil trade, which is denominated in dollars. When the Fed raises interest rates, Gulf central banks are forced to do the same to avoid currency devaluation and capital outflows. Even if this slows their economies or raises inflation, abandoning the peg could destroy investor confidence and undermine the dollar‑based oil payment system — which would be strategically unacceptable for them.

• Which Arab countries are most vulnerable in a conflict with Iran and why are they not oil exporters? — Among Arab countries that do not export oil in significant volumes, the most vulnerable are Jordan and Lebanon. Jordan relies heavily on energy imports (especially gas and oil from Iraq and Egypt) and on transit of goods through Red Sea ports. Conflict with Iran could cut off its supply lines. Lebanon, in deep economic crisis, imports almost all energy and has maritime routes vulnerable to shelling or blockade from the south (by Israel) or the west. Also vulnerable are Bahrain (which produces oil but marginally — less than 50,000 barrels per day) and Syria (devastated by war, lacking major export capacity). Their vulnerability stems from geographic proximity to Iran or its allies (for example, Hezbollah in Lebanon), weak infrastructure and lack of domestic energy resources, making them hostages to regional shocks.

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Full version: ماذا يعني تغيير ترمب "سيد الدولار" في هذه اللحظة؟

A year after Khartoum's capture: services not restored

A year ago the Sudanese army announced full control of Khartoum, but on the first anniversary residents are returning reluctantly — in many areas electricity, water and medical care are still absent. Displaced people explain their reluctance to return precisely by the lack of basic services, while authorities insist they are already working to eliminate the deficit and gradually restore infrastructure, although concrete timelines remain vague.

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Full version: الجزيرة نت

Delcy Rodríguez urged Donald Trump to lift blockade on Venezuela

Acting President of Venezuela Delcy Rodríguez appealed to U.S. President Donald Trump to immediately end the country's economic blockade, saying that the entire Venezuelan people unanimously oppose the sanctions that, she claimed, illegally restrict the development of both the public and private sectors of the economy. Rodríguez emphasized that Venezuela seeks to maintain respectful relations with the United States through diplomatic channels and called on Trump to listen to the voice of the people, who want to live in a country free from restrictions. As part of the second phase of the National Pilgrimage — a mass protest action against the sanctions combining religious and political elements — she also urged all citizens to unite and continue the fight to lift the restrictive measures, ensuring peace and stability in Venezuela.

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Full version: Delcy Rodríguez exige a Donald Trump el fin del bloqueo: “No más sanciones para Venezuela”

Negotiations between the US and Iran: Pakistani mediation amid ultimatums

Negotiating efforts between Washington and Tehran continue with Pakistan acting as intermediary, while the international community anxiously awaits the outcome of this round of consultations. Tensions are rising due to disagreements over the nuclear program and the terms for ending hostilities; the sides exchange threats and warnings. US President Donald Trump said he is giving Iran "two or three days" to reach an agreement, while a representative of the Iranian military threatened to open new fronts in the event of "another foolish move by the enemy."

In diplomatic developments, the Pakistani mediator relayed proposals and responses between the parties. According to media reports, Iran presented a revised 14-point text in response to five previous US comments. The Tasnim agency notes that the Iranian document focuses on two key aspects: negotiations on ending the war and building trust with the American side. Analysts believe Tehran included items concerning guarantees of the cessation of military threats and economic guarantees related to the lifting of sanctions and the unfreezing of assets.

Leaks indicate that Iranian demands may include lifting the maritime blockade, withdrawing US forces from the vicinity of Iran, and ending conflicts on all fronts, especially in Lebanon. However, these basic conditions, according to reports, are unlikely to be acceptable to Washington, which earlier showed no interest in such points. Thus, the parties demonstrate significant divergence in priorities, which could impede the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement in the near term.

In turn, Washington presented so-called "American remarks" consisting of five points, including linking a cease-fire on all fronts to the progress of negotiations and refusing to pay the compensations demanded by Iran. The US also insists on handing over 400 kilograms of highly enriched uranium and maintaining only a single operational nuclear facility. These conditions directly contradict Tehran's requests, which seek an end to the war, compensation, the unfreezing of assets, lifting of sanctions, and recognition of sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz.

Iranian leadership insists on postponing discussion of nuclear details until after an agreement on ending the war is reached, and Iran's Foreign Ministry calls media reports about an enrichment program "inaccurate." Tehran proposed beginning a phased opening of the strait and lifting the American blockade of Iranian ports as initial steps toward de-escalation. In an effort to secure the stability of a truce, Pakistan's Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi extended his visit to Tehran to deliver responses and proposals. Observers note that time is running out, and the parties continue to change conditions, creating pressure on the prospects for a swift agreement. A US source expressed a hard line: "Tehran has days, not weeks, to offer something that will move the situation off the deadlock, otherwise the military option will become preferable for President Trump." The truce that began on April 8 helped curb escalation, but its maintenance is directly tied to progress in negotiations and mutual commitments.

Comments on the news

• What strategic significance does the Strait of Hormuz have for Iran and why does Tehran insist on recognition of its sovereignty over it? — The Strait of Hormuz is a key maritime route through which about 20–25% of the world's oil trade passes. Control of the strait gives Iran leverage in the region and beyond, since Tehran can restrict or allow tankers to pass, directly affecting global energy prices. Insisting on sovereignty is related to the legal status of the strait: Iran relies on international maritime conventions that recognize its territorial waters but also require freedom of transit. Tehran seeks to secure its right to control amid sanctions and confrontation with the West so as to prevent external interference in its territorial boundaries.

• What is the Tasnim agency and why are its reports considered significant in the context of the negotiations? — Tasnim is a semi-official Iranian news agency closely linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Its reports are considered significant because it often reflects the positions of conservative and military circles within Iran, which may not coincide with official government rhetoric. In the context of negotiations (for example, on the nuclear program) Tasnim can convey signals or "trial balloons" from these influential groups, helping to analyze possible elite disagreements and internal constraints on deals.

• Why did Pakistan act as a mediator between the US and Iran, rather than other countries such as Qatar or Oman? — Pakistan has historical ties with Iran (a shared border, cultural and religious factors) while simultaneously maintaining limited channels with the US (through military and economic cooperation). Unlike Qatar or Oman, which are already active mediators on regional issues (for example, Qatar on Afghanistan, Oman on Yemen talks), Pakistan is seen by Iran as less enmeshed in US-led sanctions regimes and more sensitive to security on its western border. In addition, Pakistan can offer Tehran an alternative channel that does not arouse suspicions of excessive US dominance, making it a convenient "intermediate" platform for informal consultations.

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Full version: مقترحات وردود متبادلة.. أين يتجه مسار التفاوض بين واشنطن وطهران؟

Strait of Hormuz: talks without a breakthrough, maritime tension rises

The situation in the Strait of Hormuz remains tense: reciprocal restrictions and verbal statements about negotiations do not lower the intensity of the conflict. U.S. President Donald Trump unexpectedly said there are “serious negotiations” with Tehran and reported that he postponed a previously planned strike on Iran — “for a short time or perhaps forever.” However, these peaceful notes come against the backdrop of real naval maneuvers and growing diplomatic tension, which only increases uncertainty about the fate of this key sea route.

According to satellite monitoring and analysis, the U.S. Navy, through Central Command, is effectively blocking Iranian ports: about 20 U.S. ships are deployed in the Arabian Sea, including two aircraft carriers. In response Iran — through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps — continues to restrict the passage of vessels through the Strait of Hormuz, allowing them only under its own procedures. A constant field of friction is emerging, where each side tries to establish its own rules of engagement.

Tehran has officially announced the introduction of transit fees: ships will pass via a new route set by the Guard and will be required to pay for the services. The head of the Iranian parliament’s National Security Committee clarified that this concerns not only navigation, but also possible insurance, repairs and even refueling. Thus, Iran is trying to create an administrative and commercial infrastructure for full control over shipping in the strait.

Qatar strongly opposed such actions: Foreign Ministry spokesman Majid al-Ansari said that “no country, including Iran, has the right to block or hinder passage through the Strait of Hormuz.” Strategic and maritime affairs expert Lieutenant General Mohammed Abdel Wahid described the current confrontation as a new form of maritime warfare — with drones, mines and unconventional tactics, where no one has full control.

According to an analyst, neither the U.S. nor Iran is capable of unilaterally controlling the strait: Washington’s “freedom project” has failed, and Iranian attempts to charge fees and set rules are only circumventions. He called Trump’s statement about postponing the strike part of a “strategic deception,” noting that there are no signs of inevitable escalation. However, State Department spokesman Tommy Bigot stressed that “Washington’s red lines are clear,” and the postponement of the strike was the result of regional consultations. While both sides continue pressure and maneuvers, the situation remains explosive — any slip in delicate diplomacy could lead to a full-scale crisis.

Commentary on the news

• What role does the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) play in Iran’s economy and politics, and why is the IRGC controlling shipping in the Strait of Hormuz rather than the regular navy?
  The IRGC is a key player in Iran’s political and economic life, combining military, ideological and commercial functions. It controls a significant portion of the economy, including construction, energy, banking and trade, making it effectively a state within a state. Control over the Strait of Hormuz is assigned to the IRGC, especially its naval forces (“Sepah”), because of their direct subordination to the Supreme Leader and their special role in defending the Islamic Revolution. Iran’s regular navy (Artesh) is considered more traditional and less ideologically driven, whereas the IRGC operates more flexibly and asymmetrically, which is important for strategic operations in the strait. In addition, the IRGC is actively involved in the shadow economy and smuggling, which ties its economic interests to control over transport routes.

• What powers does the parliamentary National Security Committee have, and how do its statements influence policy formation on issues like control of the strait?
  The National Security and Foreign Policy Committee of the Iranian Parliament (Majlis) has broad powers: it reviews bills related to defense, intelligence, the nuclear program and international relations, and oversees the activities of the government and security forces in these areas. Its statements often serve as an indicator of sentiments within the political establishment, but they do not have direct executive force in operational matters. On control of the strait, the committee can express the position of conservative factions, increasing pressure on the government or the IRGC, but final decisions are made by the Supreme Leader and the Expediency Discernment Council. Nevertheless, the committee’s rhetoric can form the propagandistic basis for Iran’s actions, presenting them as “the will of the people.”

• Have there been precedents when Iran imposed fees for passage through the Strait of Hormuz or unilaterally set shipping rules, and how did international actors react?
  Iran has not imposed an official toll for passage, but it has repeatedly threatened to close the strait or demand “escort” by the IRGC, which de facto meant restrictions. In 2018–2019 Iran detained tankers and introduced new rules for ships (for example, requiring notification of movements), citing “environmental” and “security” reasons. The international community reacted sharply: the U.S. deployed warships to protect shipping, and the European Union condemned Iran’s actions as violations of international maritime law. In 2012, during earlier sanctions, Iran demanded “permission” for vessels to transit but did not introduce direct fees. International actors (the U.S., the UK, Japan) regarded these steps as escalation and increased naval patrols, creating a coalition to protect freedom of navigation. Iran ultimately backed down, avoiding direct confrontation due to the risk of military response.

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Full version: خبير بالأمن البحري: لا أحد يسيطر على هرمز وترمب يمارس الخداع الإستراتيجي

The Alex Saab Case: Venezuela Does Not Intervene

Acting President of Venezuela Delcy Rodríguez stated that the case of Alex Saab, a Colombian national who performed functions in Venezuela, is exclusively a matter between him and the United States. She emphasized that all government decisions, including the administrative measure of deportation, are made solely in Venezuela's interest, ensuring the country's calm, peace, and development. Rodríguez assured citizens that the authorities act only to protect national rights and the people's future, and that this case will not affect Venezuela's strategic course.

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Full version: Presidenta (E): Caso de Alex Saab corresponde a asuntos entre él y EEUU, nosotros actuamos siempre en función a los intereses de Venezuela

Armed anchors on Iranian TV: symbol of war or division?

The appearance of armed anchors on Iranian state television became more than a moment in wartime reporting; it was a visual shift by the broadcasting corporation Sada va Sima from mobilizing rhetoric to displaying weapons directly in the studio. Official channels showed presenters with Kalashnikov rifles, studying instructions on their use in programs such as "Military Headquarters" on Ofogh, "Field Commander" on Channel Three and "Time" on Channel Two. Footage circulated on social media showing male and female anchors in poses more reminiscent of military training than television work, including demonstrations of weapon disassembly and reassembly.

Management of the state broadcaster tried to smooth over the controversy by presenting these scenes as symbolic gestures rather than a call to direct fighting in studios. Sada va Sima’s deputy for political affairs, Hasan Abedini, said that anchors carrying weapons was a "symbolic act" showing that "32 million fedayeen also have military readiness." With this explanation the broadcaster sought to turn the screen into part of a policy of deterrence and mobilization, treating weapons on screen as a political symbol expressing society’s participation in the battle.

Critics, however, argued that bringing weapons onto the screen does not strengthen national unity but rather reveals tensions in official rhetoric and creates an impression of constant mobilization instead of reassurance. The newspaper Sazandegi wrote that an anchor should maintain distance between the institution and the audience, and carrying weapons turns them from a transmitter of a message into part of the message, suggesting that television looks as if it has turned into a "barracks." Critics say such militarization of the image psychologically exhausts society and weakens the media’s standing rather than broadening its representativeness.

This incident comes against a broader crisis of trust between several layers of Iranian society and state television, which many perceive not as a mirror of society but as a platform representing conservative and security-aligned political currents. Constitutionally, television is subject to a special regime under which its head is appointed and dismissed by the Supreme Leader and is overseen by a supervisory council with representatives of the three branches of power, making the institution, in opponents’ eyes, closer to an official organ above political competition. Over the years, according to local polls, dependence on television as a source of news and entertainment has declined among groups such as youth, the middle class and residents of major cities.

Opinions on social media were divided: some saw the scenes as part of a "psychological war" and a signal of internal readiness, others viewed them as proof of a growing gap between television and layers of the audience. Supporters argued that anchors carrying weapons sends a signal of readiness and boosts morale during wartime, while critics said the image confirms the transformation of the screen into a mobilization platform addressing a pre-mobilized supportive audience. Thus, these images provided fresh material for debates over the degree of television’s neutrality and its role as a representative space for society.

The result is twofold: these images can raise the morale of the regime’s base, but at the same time they give critics additional reasons to boycott the broadcaster and doubt its representation of Iranian society. This boycott is not momentary but the accumulation of years of accusations of bias, selective coverage of protests, ignoring critical voices and presenting a cultural model in which many do not see their everyday lives. Therefore, regaining a lost audience does not seem guaranteed through militarizing the image; rather, mechanisms of exclusion and rupture between the institution and broad segments of society may intensify.

Comments on the story

• What is the real role of the state broadcasting corporation Sada va Sima in Iran’s political system and why is it called part of the state apparatus rather than an independent media outlet? - Sada va Sima is the official mouthpiece of the Iranian government and the Supreme Leader. It does not merely report events but deliberately shapes public opinion in line with the interests of the ruling system. Its leadership is appointed directly by the Supreme Leader and its funding comes from the state budget, which completely rules out independence. It is used for propaganda, mobilizing the population and suppressing alternative viewpoints, which is why it is viewed not as an independent media organization but as part of the state propaganda apparatus.

• What is the Basij movement and how is it related to the "32 million fedayeen" mentioned in the article? - Basij (meaning "mobilization") is a voluntary paramilitary militia created after the Islamic Revolution to defend the regime. It operates under the control of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The phrase "32 million fedayeen" is an ironic or critical reference to authorities’ claims that tens of millions of Iranians are ready to become "fedayeen" (sacrificers) to defend the country and the Islamic ideology. In reality, Basij has several million registered members, but the loyalty and activity of many is questionable, and the figures are often exaggerated to demonstrate popular support for the regime.

• Why is state television losing audience among youth and residents of large cities despite its monopoly? - Despite its monopoly, Sada va Sima faces a sharp decline in popularity due to several factors: strict censorship and ideological control repel young people seeking modern, free content; the monotony and predictability of programming and constant propaganda lead to fatigue; in large cities there is growing access to satellite TV, the internet and VPNs that allow viewing foreign channels; social networks and streaming services are also in high demand and offer more engaging and truthful content than official channels. As a result, even in the absence of domestic alternatives, people actively seek information outside the country.

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Full version: من الشاشة إلى الثكنة.. جدل في إيران بعد ظهور مذيعِين مسلحين

Trump gives Iran an ultimatum: "the clock is ticking," threatens strike

U.S. President Donald Trump said that "the clock is ticking for Iran" and they should "act very quickly, or nothing will be left of them." According to Axios, Trump warned that Tehran would face a "much harsher strike" if it did not offer better terms for a deal. Although the American leader still prefers a diplomatic settlement, he returned to talking about a military option after Iran refused key concessions, particularly in its nuclear program.

Domestic factors influence Washington's stance: public discontent over rising fuel prices and inflation, as well as Republican concerns about their chances in the midterm elections. These considerations, analysts say, are forcing the U.S. administration to navigate between bargaining tactics and military threats. The White House is awaiting a meeting between Trump and his national security team to discuss Iran's response to the latest American proposal.

In Iran, the threat of a "hot war" is considered real due to comprehensive pressure: military threats, economic sanctions and the failure to uphold agreements. Professor Hassan Ahmadian of Tehran University emphasizes that the Iranians "do not have the luxury" of ignoring preparations for war, since their opponent has violated agreements three times in the past year. Despite a preference for diplomacy, Tehran is preparing for the next round of confrontation.

The editor-in-chief of the newspaper Vefaq, Mokhtar Haddad, called U.S. demands "binding" and close to Israel's. Washington is demanding the complete dismantling of Iran's nuclear program without lifting sanctions or unfreezing assets, while Israel is additionally insisting on restrictions on the missile program and Iran's regional influence. This stance, experts say, makes compromise virtually unattainable.

Iran conveyed its response to the American proposals through Pakistani intermediaries. Key disagreements concern the U.S. demand to hand over all enriched uranium and their refusal to compensate for damages or lift the freeze on Iranian assets. Tehran also objects to Washington's attempts to separate talks on regional conflicts and the situation in Lebanon from the overall dialogue with Iran.

Iranian military officials warn that if Trump's threats are carried out, the country will deliver a "powerful and unexpected strike" on U.S. forces and interests in the region, as well as on Israel. An official Ministry of Defense spokesman said that orders have already been issued to units to conduct sudden and decisive operations. Tehran stresses that it prefers diplomacy but is ready for a military response if negotiations do not lead to acceptable terms.

Comments on the news

• Who is Hassan Ahmadian, professor at Tehran University, and why is his assessment of interest for understanding Iran's position? — Hassan Ahmadian is a leading Iranian political scientist specializing in international security and Iran's foreign policy. His assessments are valuable because he often expresses views close to the official Iranian line while remaining a respected academic whose opinions are listened to both inside Iran and abroad. Ahmadian's analysis helps to understand Tehran's strategic priorities, especially in the context of negotiations with the West.
• What role does the newspaper Vefaq play in the Iranian media landscape and what political views does it reflect? — The newspaper Vefaq (if referring to an outlet close to reformist circles) acts as a voice for moderate pragmatists in Iran. It promotes ideas of dialogue with the West and internal reforms, contrasting with the hardline stance of conservative media. However, the exact political orientation of this publication may vary depending on context: at different times it could have supported both Hassan Rouhani's government and more conservative forces.
• Why did Pakistan act as a mediator in talks between the U.S. and Iran? — Pakistan has long-standing diplomatic and cultural ties with Iran and also maintains contacts with the U.S. As a neighboring country with a Sunni-majority population, Pakistan is interested in regional stability, especially given the threat of terrorism along its border with Iran. Additionally, Islamabad seeks to bolster its reputation as a regional peacemaker, enabling it to play the role of a "honest broker" in complex negotiations between Tehran and Washington.

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Full version: "عقارب ساعة" ترمب تدق بسرعة.. فكيف كان صداها في طهران؟

TSA inspections at Venezuela's airports for new flights

The U.S. Embassy in Venezuela reported that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is conducting inspections at the airports in Barcelona and Maracaibo to open new commercial routes between the countries. This is part of a gradual restoration of air service after an almost seven-year pause in direct flights: earlier, in March, the resumption of flights on the Caracas–Miami route was authorized. The TSA's goal is "to connect more Venezuelan cities with the U.S.," the diplomatic mission emphasized.

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Full version: EE. UU. inspecciona los aeropuertos de Barcelona y Maracaibo para habilitar nuevas rutas comerciales

The World Against Iran's Nuclear Weapons: Distrust and Ambitions

No state in the world supports Iran possessing nuclear weapons — even countries close to it by religion within the Organization of Islamic Cooperation — because of weak trust in its political behavior. Iran’s theoretical right to peaceful nuclear energy under IAEA supervision remains in force, yet the veto power of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council limits the international community’s ability to impose a unified stance. Despite the 2003 fatwa by Iran’s supreme leader banning the nuclear bomb, Tehran’s progress in enriching uranium to levels approaching weapons-grade points to a de facto ignoring of that religious prohibition.

Iran achieved nuclear advances before the JCPOA in 2015, during its implementation, and after the US withdrawal from the deal in 2018. American pressure and sanctions policy under Trump did not stop, but rather spurred, an acceleration of uranium enrichment. The Biden administration, despite attempts to revive talks in 2022, was unable to fully resurrect the agreement and halt Iran’s return to the pre-deal pace of its nuclear program.

Iran’s regional influence has steadily expanded since the end of the Iran–Iraq war (1988). The liberation of Kuwait became a starting point for actions beyond its borders: Tehran built a political and military alliance with Assad’s regime in Syria and strengthened Lebanon’s Hezbollah — the first Arab organization to declare loyalty to Iran’s supreme leader. Later, after the US invasion of Iraq (2003), that country became the “main prize” Tehran was unwilling to give up.

Iran has managed to use most American interventions in the region — from the war to liberate Kuwait to the war in Iraq — to consolidate its position, despite the economic and political blows sustained since the Trump era. Relations with Iraq today manifest in strong influence over the selection of heads of government, and any Baghdad attempts at independence quickly fizzle. Recent Arab world efforts to re-establish contact with Tehran do not contradict its interests, which confirms the durability of this influential presence.

The Obama administration gave Iran greater freedom of action in the region as an incentive and reward for the nuclear deal, allowing it to expand influence in Syria to protect Assad and in Yemen via support for the Houthis. Former Iranian foreign minister Amir-Abdollahian acknowledged in his notes that Tehran made nuclear concessions to Obama in exchange for free rein in Syria. Today negotiations with Iran are at an impasse: it shows no flexibility either on the volume of enriched uranium or on control over the Strait of Hormuz. The most likely scenario is a deal in which Washington offers partial participation in managing the strait in exchange for temporary concessions on enrichment, postponing Iran’s nuclear ambitions to the future.

Comments on the news

• How much real power does Iran’s supreme leader have, and why does his 2003 fatwa banning nuclear weapons lack binding force over the country’s policy? — The supreme leader (rahbar) holds the highest authority in Iran: he controls the military, intelligence services, the judiciary, and appoints half the members of the Guardian Council, which vets laws for conformity with Islam. However, his 2003 fatwa banning nuclear weapons is not legally binding because fatwas are religious opinions, not laws. Iranian policy is formed through interaction among the rahbar, the government, and the Supreme National Security Council, where geopolitical and military considerations are also taken into account, leaving room for maneuver.

• Why is the Strait of Hormuz considered strategically important for global energy markets, and what levers of control does Iran have over it? — The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow maritime passage through which about 20–25% of the world’s oil supplies pass (roughly 17–20 million barrels per day). Iran controls its eastern shore and has the ability to disrupt the strait using mines, anti-ship missiles, fast attack craft, and submarines, which could trigger a sharp spike in oil prices and undermine global energy security. However, a complete blockade is unlikely because of the risk of military conflict with the US and its allies.

• How does Iran support Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen, and why are these proxy forces considered key instruments of Tehran’s regional influence? — Iran provides Hezbollah and the Houthis with financial, military, and technical assistance, including supplies of rockets, drones, and fighter training. Hezbollah acts as a powerful politico-military lever on the border with Israel, while the Houthis threaten shipping in the Red Sea and allies of Saudi Arabia. These proxy forces allow Iran to expand influence while avoiding direct military confrontations, create buffer zones, and exert pressure on regional adversaries such as Israel and Saudi Arabia.

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Full version: كلما تدخلت أمريكا في المنطقة كانت إيران هي الرابحة.. لماذا؟

Awaiting Iran's Response: Split in the Trump Administration

The United States has frozen in anticipation of Tehran's official reply to the latest American proposal. Disagreements are mounting within President Donald Trump’s administration: some senior officials insist on limited military strikes to "break the deadlock," while others believe diplomacy should be given another chance to avoid a full-scale conflict. Al Jazeera's correspondent reports that leaks from the Pentagon confirm a deep split within the security agencies.

Official Washington has articulated key demands: Iran's complete renunciation of nuclear weapons, dismantling of centrifuges, transfer of all enriched uranium to international control, cessation of support for regional allies, and guarantees of free navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. Against this backdrop, U.S. Central Command reported the forced diversion of 78 ships and the neutralization of four Iranian vessels, demonstrating that military pressure is going hand in hand with diplomacy.

The domestic political situation for the Trump team is complicated by the economic consequences of the confrontation. Fuel prices in the U.S. have surged by more than 50%, triggering cost increases in other sectors. Democrats are demanding troop withdrawals and an end to military operations without Congressional approval, narrowing the administration's maneuvering room. The administration finds itself squeezed between the need to show strength and public pressure to end the protracted standoff.

American officials accuse Iran of deliberately dragging out negotiations, asserting that the fragmented power structure in Tehran forces the delegation to keep returning for new instructions. Donald Trump, for his part, intensified his rhetoric, posting on social media a photo of American ships in the Strait of Hormuz with the caption "Calm before the storm" and warning that Iran "will face hard times" if no agreement is reached. At the same time, according to Pakistan's prime minister, mediation efforts between the parties continue.

Against coordinated U.S. and Israeli preparations for a possible breakdown in talks, Israeli media report plans to carry out limited strikes on Iranian infrastructure — power plants and bridges — rather than wage a full-scale war. Professor Muhammad al-Sharqawi believes Trump has become less inclined to escalate due to domestic pressure and that only "very limited skirmishes" are likely now. Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Sergio de la Peña explained that Trump's threats are a tactical negotiating move designed to keep the opponent on edge, not a harbinger of real war.

Comments on the news

• What does the "fragmented power structure in Tehran" mean and how does it affect Iran's ability to negotiate? – The "fragmented power structure" in Iran means that key decisions are not made by a single person but by several centers of influence: the Supreme Leader (who controls the military and judiciary), the president (responsible for the economy and diplomacy) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC, which has its own foreign-policy and economic interests). Such decentralization slows down negotiations because even if the president or diplomats agree to a compromise, the IRGC or conservative religious structures can block the deal's ratification. Additionally, external partners often do not know with whom they are negotiating — a pragmatic government or a radical faction.

• What are centrifuges used for in Iran's nuclear program, and why do the U.S. demand their complete dismantling? – Centrifuges are devices that spin uranium gas at high speeds to separate the isotopes uranium-235 and uranium-238. They are used for uranium enrichment: enrichment to 3–5% is fuel for nuclear power plants, up to 20% is for medical reactors, and up to 90% is for a nuclear bomb. The U.S. demands complete dismantling of centrifuges because any enrichment on Iranian soil raises suspicions: Iran has already enriched uranium to 60% (near weapons grade) and continues to install more efficient centrifuges, which would allow it to produce a nuclear weapon in a short time (as little as two weeks) if it withdrew from international agreements. Dismantling removes Iran's ability to quickly "jump" to military-grade enrichment.

• Which regional allies of Iran are meant, and how does their support threaten the interests of the U.S. and its allies? – This refers to the "Axis of Resistance": Shia groups in Iraq (e.g., Kata'ib Hezbollah), Lebanon's Hezbollah, Yemen's Houthis, Palestinian groups (Hamas, Islamic Jihad), as well as Bashar al-Assad's government in Syria. Iran's support for them (arms supplies, fighter training, financing) enables these forces to attack American bases in the Middle East (for example, in Iraq), disrupt navigation in the Red Sea (via the Houthis) and fire rockets at Israel (via Hezbollah and Hamas). This threatens the interests of the U.S. and its allies (Israel, Saudi Arabia) by creating a persistent hotspot of instability, undermining Israel's security, and potentially leading to a wider regional war that Washington is trying to avoid.

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Full version: ضربة عسكرية لإيران أم تسوية؟.. خلافات داخل إدارة ترمب تخرج للعلن

Venezuela Deported Colombian Alex Saab in Accordance with the Law

On Saturday, May 16, the government of Venezuela, through the Administrative Service of Identification, Migration and Foreigners (Saime), announced the deportation of Colombian citizen Alex Naim Saab Moran. The official statement emphasizes that the procedure was carried out in strict accordance with the country's migration legislation. The reason for the deportation was Saab's involvement in committing various crimes on the territory of the United States, which, according to the authorities, is a "public, widely known, and extensively covered in the media" fact.

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Full version: Gobierno de Venezuela anuncia a través del Saime la deportación de Alex Saab

Trump's controversial photo sparks rumors of an attack on Iran

A photo published by Donald Trump showing warships, among which a vessel flying an Iranian flag was noticed, accompanied by the caption "the calm before the storm," has sparked a new wave of speculation about a possible escalation from Washington. The post appeared immediately after the president's return from China, where, according to U.S. media, no significant progress was made on the Iran issue.

Trump said that PRC Chairman Xi Jinping agrees on the need to force Tehran to open the Strait of Hormuz, but Beijing showed no willingness to intervene in this conflict. The president himself hardened his rhetoric, warning that he did not know whether an agreement would be reached soon, and threatened: "Iran better make a deal, or it will face very tough times."

Disagreements are growing within the administration: according to CNN, the Pentagon and some officials insist on targeted military strikes to increase pressure on Tehran, while others prefer a diplomatic route. Analysts note that the president is constrained by strategic, legal and campaign-related factors, as well as a falling approval rating and a weak economy.

Conflict expert Mohammed al-Sharkawi assesses the likelihood of a return to large-scale hostilities as low, but does not rule out "very limited skirmishes." In his view, Trump is now "less bold" than in March and leans toward a diplomatic solution by 70%. Former Deputy Defense Minister Sergio de la Peña considers the president's threats a tactical maneuver to show that "all options are on the table."

Attempts to involve China in pressuring Iran, according to al-Sharkawi, have "lost substance" and led to a strategic vacuum. He proposes more practical mediation, possibly with Pakistan's participation. The prime minister of that country, Shahbaz Sharif, expressed optimism about a second round of direct talks between Washington and Tehran, emphasizing that "peace is not given easily; it requires patience and wisdom."

Critics call Trump's approach "coercive diplomacy," built on threats and insults. Dennis Ross warns that "a lack of strategic patience and contradictions in the president's statements undermine any message." Former negotiators note that hard pressure may only strengthen the positions of Iran's elites, who see Trump's wavering as a sign of desperation and are prepared to outlast his presidential term.

Comments on the news

• Why is the Strait of Hormuz so important for Iran and the global economy? - The Strait of Hormuz is a strategic maritime corridor through which about 20–25% of the world's oil trade passes, making it key for global energy markets. For Iran, control over the strait is a tool of geopolitical influence and economic security, as the country exports its oil through it. Any threat to block the strait could sharply raise global energy prices and trigger economic crises, especially in importing countries such as China, India and European states.

• Which internal political groups in Iran could benefit from increased U.S. pressure? - Internal political groups that could benefit from tougher U.S. pressure include conservative supporters of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and ultra-conservative factions (the "principlists"). They often use external threats and sanctions to justify strict domestic control, suppress opposition and strengthen the role of the military‑industrial complex. In addition, moderate reformists may lose influence, as their position favoring negotiations and openness to the world would be undermined.

• What is Pakistan's role in Iran‑U.S. negotiations? - Pakistan acts as a mediator and a link between Iran and the U.S., especially through unofficial communication channels. Geopolitically, Pakistan—bordering Iran and having close ties with Saudi Arabia and China—seeks to maintain balance: it is interested in reducing tensions to avoid regional destabilization and to secure the safety of its energy supplies and investments, in particular the Gwadar port project associated with China's Belt and Road Initiative.

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Full version: "هدوء ما قبل العاصفة".. هل قرر ترمب أخيرا استئناف الحرب على إيران؟

Trump says China agreed not to allow Iran to have nuclear weapons

US President Donald Trump, after completing his visit to Beijing, said that Chinese President Xi Jinping agreed on the need to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. In an interview with Fox News broadcast directly from Air Force One, Trump promised that the Strait of Hormuz “will remain open,” and called “world stability” his personal mission. He warned that Tehran would not be able to use the strait as a weapon against Washington, and said he was prepared to accept an oil price of up to $200 if it would stop Iran from building a bomb that, in his words, “they would certainly use against us.”

Trump also asserted without evidence that “military operations against Iran are largely completed” and that 85% of the Islamic Republic’s missile production has been destroyed. He boasted that he had “completely routed the Iranian armed forces,” adding that he does not ask favors from anyone, including China, because “favors have to be repaid.” These remarks came amid uncertainty: it remains unclear whether Washington will return to direct military confrontation or continue on a course of negotiations and pressure.

From the Iranian side, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi confirmed that Tehran had received “messages from the Americans expressing readiness to continue dialogue and engagement,” despite Trump’s earlier refusal to accept Iran’s response to his proposal. Araghchi explained that reports of a US rejection or of Iran’s reply referred to earlier days when Trump said on social media that the Iranian response was unacceptable, but that the Americans later resumed contacts. The head of Iranian diplomacy also expressed openness to any role by China in a possible settlement, but acknowledged that the process mediated by Pakistan “is very complicated, mainly because of American behavior and the lack of trust.”

Pakistan has been trying for several weeks to act as a mediator between Washington and Tehran: last month Islamabad hosted a round of talks between Iranian and US delegations, which did not yield a final agreement. Meanwhile, the ceasefire established on April 8 remains fragile on the ground. Mediation faces obstacles related to mutual distrust and rejection of certain proposals, which hampers a political settlement despite the exchange of messages. In this situation, the roles of regional and international players — such as China and Pakistan — are considered key to possible progress toward broader agreements.

Israel, according to the newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth, is in tense anticipation: the military is on heightened alert in case clashes resume. Journalists do not rule out that the US might carry out limited, rapid strikes on specific Iranian targets to force Tehran to show flexibility in negotiations. This reflects fears of sudden military escalation and adds uncertainty as to whether Washington will continue the diplomatic path or return to a coercive scenario to compel Iranian concessions.

Meanwhile in the Strait of Hormuz, Iranian state television reported that the naval forces of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps allowed the passage of a greater number of vessels in accordance with “legal protocols” developed by Tehran. According to Iranian media, coordination with IRGC forces now makes it possible to let more ships pass, and this allegedly indicates that more countries are accepting the new rules. Recall that the strait remains a key point of tension: Tehran insists on control over shipping even in a post-conflict period, while Washington and other states demand guarantees of free passage amid the American blockade of Iranian ports since April 13.

Comments on the news

• Why is the Strait of Hormuz so important to the global economy and why does Iran use it as leverage? - The Strait of Hormuz is a key maritime corridor through which about 20% of the world’s oil passes. Any blockade of the strait leads to a sharp spike in energy prices. Iran uses this strategic asset as leverage to influence international talks on its nuclear program or sanctions, threatening to close the route to tankers of opposing countries.
• Who is Abbas Araghchi and what role does he play in Iranian diplomacy? - Abbas Araghchi is the Deputy Foreign Minister of Iran 🇮🇷, a key negotiator on the nuclear deal (JCPOA). He represents the moderate wing of Iranian diplomacy, often acting as an intermediary between conservative circles and the international community. His role is to balance Western demands and Tehran’s “red lines.”
• What is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and why does it control naval forces in the Strait of Hormuz? - The IRGC (Sepah) is an elite military-political formation separate from Iran’s regular army. It reports directly to the Supreme Leader and controls key defense and economic sectors. The IRGC naval forces (as opposed to the regular navy) are responsible for protecting the Strait of Hormuz, as this area is considered a “sovereign line of defense” for the regime. Control over the strait gives the IRGC both strategic power and easy access to smuggling routes.

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Full version: ترمب يجدد تعهده بمنع نووي إيران وطهران تتلقى رسائل لمواصلة التفاوض

Meeting in Caracas: Venezuela and the World Bank Begin a New Dialogue

Acting President of Venezuela Delcy Rodríguez held a meeting today with a high-level World Bank delegation led by Vice President for Latin America and the Caribbean Susana Cordeiro Guerra. This event marks a strategic step toward stabilizing the country’s economy and opens a new phase of dialogue aimed at attracting international investment, creating jobs, and stimulating economic growth. The meeting took place following the recent April 16 announcement of Venezuela’s renewal of relations with the International Monetary Fund, underscoring the comprehensive nature of efforts to restore international economic cooperation.

The Venezuelan delegation at the negotiations included Vice President for Economy Calixto Ortega, Minister of Economy and Finance Anabel Pereira, and PDVSA’s Vice President for Finance Cristiam Hernández. These steps demonstrate Venezuela’s firm intention to fully restore its representation in the international financial institutions of which it has been a member since 1946. The reopening of channels for multilateral cooperation confirms the country’s commitment to transitioning to a diversified economy that is open to the global market and focused on the well-being of all citizens.

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Full version: Presidenta (E) se reunió con delegación de alto nivel del Banco Mundial: Nueva etapa de diálogo para apoyar el crecimiento económico del país

UAE speeds up construction of oil pipeline to bypass Strait of Hormuz

The Abu Dhabi Office of Public Relations announced that the United Arab Emirates will accelerate the construction of a new pipeline with twice the capacity through the port of Fujairah, aiming to strengthen the country’s ability to bypass the strategically vulnerable Strait of Hormuz by 2027. Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Khalid bin Mohammed bin Zayed instructed ADNOC to speed up the implementation of the "West-East-1" pipeline project, which is already under construction and is expected to become operational next year. The move is part of national efforts to increase export resilience and reduce dependence on the Strait of Hormuz, through which a significant portion of the world’s oil supplies passes.

Abu Dhabi already operates the ADCOP (Habshan–Fujairah) pipeline with a capacity of up to 1.8 million barrels per day, which has proven its importance by enabling increased exports directly from the Gulf of Oman coast. The new project does not compete with Saudi Arabia’s East–West pipeline, which, according to Saudi Aramco CEO Amin Nasser, is a “critical artery.” He noted that Aramco increased its capacity to 7 million barrels per day in eight days to preserve flows at about 60% of the volumes the kingdom exported before the conflict.

The UAE and Saudi Arabia are the only producers in the Persian Gulf with pipelines that export oil bypassing the Strait of Hormuz, while Oman has an extensive coastline on the Gulf of Oman. In contrast, Kuwait, Iraq, Qatar and Bahrain are almost entirely dependent on the strait for ship passage, making them vulnerable to maritime and political risks. Therefore, developing alternative export routes, such as the ports of Fujairah and Khor Fakkan, is a strategic priority for the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, especially amid maritime unrest.

The statement came two weeks after the UAE left OPEC, freeing it from production quota obligations and giving it greater flexibility in oil policy. ADNOC aims to reach production capacity of 5 million barrels per day by next year, after announcing capacity of 4.85 million barrels per day in May 2024. However, UAE production earlier fell from about 3.4 million barrels per day in January to less than half after the de facto closure of the strait, forcing ADNOC to halt some operations.

The region has seen a notable escalation since the start of the Iran war: Iran has expanded its definition of the strait and maritime zones it claims to control. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) released a map on May 4 showing a new zone of control covering much of the UAE’s coast in the Gulf of Oman. This coincided with a drone attack on an ADNOC tanker and shelling of an oil area in Fujairah, which the UAE called “unacceptable aggression and economic blackmail.” Iran effectively kept the strait closed after US and Israeli strikes on February 28, disrupting about 20% of global oil supplies, sharply pushing up energy prices, prompting fuel rationing measures in some countries and raising fears of an economic downturn from rising inflation. The ports of Fujairah and Khor Fakkan became a lifeline for the UAE not only for energy but also for non-oil trade and essential goods, despite repeated attacks that Abu Dhabi blames on Iran and that led to a temporary suspension of some oil shipments in April.

News commentary

• What is the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in control of the Strait of Hormuz and what authority does this organization have within Iran’s political and military structure? — The IRGC plays a key role in control of the Strait of Hormuz, as its naval forces are responsible for protecting and patrolling this strategic waterway. Within Iran’s political and military structure, the IRGC holds significant authority: it reports directly to the Supreme Leader, has its own ground, naval and air forces, and controls missile programs and intelligence. This enables it to act autonomously from the regular army and make security decisions, including management of the strait.

• Which specific maritime zones did Iran extend under its control in the Gulf of Oman according to the map published by the IRGC, and how does this affect navigation of UAE vessels? — According to the map published by the IRGC, Iran extended zones of maritime control in the Gulf of Oman, including waters around the islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs, which are subject to territorial disputes with the UAE. This expansion implies the imposition of stricter navigation rules for ships transiting these waters, including possible inspections or transit restrictions. For UAE vessels, this creates risks of delays and additional costs, and heightens regional tensions.

• On what historical or legal grounds does Iran claim the right to close the Strait of Hormuz and use it as a tool of economic pressure on neighboring countries? — Iran refers to international maritime law, notably the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which allows for certain measures in exclusive economic zones but does not explicitly permit the closure of straits. Historically, Tehran bases its stance on sovereign jurisdiction over its coastal waters and argues it may block the strait in cases of national security threats, for example during military conflicts or sanctions. Iran uses economic pressure via the Strait of Hormuz as leverage in negotiations over its nuclear program and regional disputes, which conflicts with the principle of freedom of navigation upheld by the international community.

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Full version: الإمارات تسرّع بناء خط أنابيب نفط لتعزيز قدرتها على تجاوز هرمز

Trump says he wants uranium from Iran, threatens new strikes

U.S. President Donald Trump, in an interview with Fox News during a visit to Beijing, said he "would feel more comfortable if the U.S. obtained enriched uranium from Iran." He explained that this was more for "propaganda purposes." Trump also threatened new strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities, stressing that his patience with Tehran is running out and urging the Iranian side to make a deal with Washington.

In 2025 the U.S. carried out large-scale strikes on key Iranian nuclear sites, which, Trump said, were "completely destroyed." The president justified the military campaign by alleging Iran was close to developing an atomic bomb, but these claims have not been confirmed by inspections from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Experts believe some enriched uranium may be buried deep underground, and without intelligence its retrieval would be extremely difficult.

On the domestic front, Democrats in Congress failed to pass a resolution limiting Trump's authority for further military action against Iran without lawmakers' approval. In the House of Representatives, the vote on the war powers resolution ended in a tie, and due to the lack of a majority the measure was not adopted. Three Republicans supported the resolution, but one Democrat voted against it.

This was the third attempt by the House this year to pass such a resolution and the first since the 60-day period that granted Trump congressional authority to continue the war expired on May 1. Earlier, seven similar votes in the Senate had failed, with the results becoming increasingly polarized because of the slim Republican majorities in both chambers. Party divisions are preventing a final decision.

Democrats insist the Constitution grants Congress the exclusive right to declare war and are demanding that Trump obtain authorization to continue hostilities, warning of the risk of a protracted conflict without a clear strategy. They also criticize the war's economic consequences — rising gasoline and food prices — appealing to their voters ahead of the November midterms. Republicans and the White House, in turn, argue that Trump's actions are lawful and fall within his powers as commander-in-chief to carry out limited operations against an imminent threat.

Comments on the news

• Which specific Iranian nuclear facilities (for example, Natanz or Fordow) were attacked by the U.S. and what is their role in Iran's nuclear program? — At present there are no confirmed reports that the U.S. struck Iranian nuclear facilities such as Natanz or Fordow. However, in a hypothetical scenario these sites are key: Natanz is the main uranium-enrichment center using centrifuges (including underground halls to protect against airstrikes), and Fordow is a fortified underground facility also used for enrichment. Their role — according to Iran, for peaceful purposes — is the production of enriched uranium, but they have the potential to produce weapon-grade material (uranium enriched above 90%).

• Why has the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) not confirmed claims that Iran was close to producing nuclear weapons, and what were the results of its inspections? — The IAEA does not confirm such claims because its inspections have not found incontrovertible evidence that Iran extracted or enriched uranium to weapons-grade levels (over 90%) or that secret work on assembling a nuclear device is underway. Recent agency reports (for example, for 2023–2024) note that Iran expanded enrichment to 60% (which is close to weapons-grade but does not reach it), but there is no confirmed evidence of the creation of a nuclear explosive device. IAEA inspections have faced limited access to some sites (for instance, after the revocation of inspectors' credentials in 2023), which hampers full verification.

• Why is extracting enriched uranium from underground storage in Iran considered extremely difficult without detailed intelligence? — Underground storage facilities (at Fordow and Natanz) are built up to 80 meters beneath rock, making them resistant to airstrikes. Retrieving enriched uranium (in the form of hexafluoride or metal) requires precise knowledge of container locations, access routes, and security systems. Without detailed intelligence — satellite imagery, human sources, or cyber intelligence — such operations are highly risky, as uranium may have been destroyed or dispersed to conceal it. Additionally, underground sites are often connected by complex tunnels, complicating targeted localization.

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Full version: ترمب: الحصول على اليورانيوم من إيران هو لأغراض دعائية

John Barrett Discussed Power Grid Restoration with Venezuelan Authorities

Acting chargé d’affaires of the United States John Barrett held a meeting with Venezuelan officials dedicated to plans for restoring the national power system. As the diplomat emphasized, this initiative is part of a three-stage program proposed by the administration of President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio. The discussion addressed specific steps to modernize critically important infrastructure that in recent years has suffered from frequent failures and a lack of maintenance.

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Full version: John Barrett sostuvo reunión con autoridades venezolanas para debatir reconstrucción de la red eléctrica de Venezuela

Trump Leaves Beijing with China's Promises on Iran

President Donald Trump’s visit to Beijing concluded with loud statements about agreements reached with Chinese President Xi Jinping. According to Trump himself, the key topics of the talks were Iran’s nuclear issue and the situation in the Strait of Hormuz. The American leader said the sides agreed that Iran must not obtain nuclear weapons and that free navigation in the strategically important strait must be ensured.

Against the backdrop of these statements, Trump again issued harsh threats toward Tehran, warning that his “patience is not unlimited.” The U.S. president urged Iran to make a deal with the United States, calling refusal to negotiate “madness.” Trump spoke particularly sternly about Iran’s nuclear program, promising to destroy facilities with enriched uranium if the agreement does not include Washington’s oversight.

According to Trump, China promised to stop military support for Iran in the near future. In an interview with Fox News, the U.S. president said Beijing will no longer provide Tehran with defensive capabilities, including missile technology and intelligence data. Earlier reports noted Chinese support for Iran’s ballistic missile program, so a change in Beijing’s position could have serious consequences for the regional balance of power.

In the economic sphere, the sides announced preparations for large-scale agreements. Trump said China intends to purchase about 200 Boeing aircraft, calling the deal “huge.” These agreements are seen as a step toward easing trade tensions between the two countries. Notably, leaders of the largest U.S. corporations accompanied the American delegation to Beijing.

Trump’s visit to China also has a domestic dimension for American politics. Observers note that the 52% rise in fuel prices since the start of the conflict with Iran in February has become a serious challenge for the president’s approval ratings. Experts believe any diplomatic successes that can stabilize energy markets could be used by the administration to improve its image ahead of the midterm congressional elections.

The Chinese side also clearly outlined its “red lines” in the talks. Xi Jinping warned that Taiwan is a top priority in relations with the United States, and any misstep could lead to a “dangerous turn.” At the same time, Beijing continues contacts with Iran and regional intermediaries, insisting on a political solution to the nuclear problem. Trump’s three-day visit was the first by a U.S. president to China in eight and a half years and, experts say, could radically change the balance of power in the region.

News Comments

• What is the Strait of Hormuz and why is its security critical for global oil supplies and Iran’s regional influence? – The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow waterway between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, through which about 20–25% of the world’s oil passes (roughly 17 million barrels a day). Its security is critical because any disruption in the strait (for example, due to Iranian mines or seizure of tankers) could sharply drive up global oil prices. For Iran, the strait is a strategic lever: Tehran can threaten its closure to pressure its adversaries (the U.S., Saudi Arabia), protect its interests, and strengthen its regional influence by controlling a vital transit chokepoint.

• Why has China historically supported Iran’s ballistic missile program, and how could Beijing’s promise to stop that support change the balance of power in the Middle East? – China has historically supported Iran’s ballistic missile program (through supplies of technology, parts, and training) to bolster its economic ties with Tehran (for example, access to Iranian oil). If Beijing truly stops that support, it could weaken Iran’s missile capabilities, making Iran more vulnerable to Israeli or Saudi strikes. It would also strengthen the position of the U.S. and its allies, since Iran would lose a key deterrent, and could shift the balance toward diplomatic negotiations or conflicts.

• What is the “conflict with Iran in February” referred to in the article, and how did it provoke a sharp rise in fuel prices in the U.S.? – This likely refers to military clashes or heightened tensions between the U.S. and Iran in February (for example, U.S. strikes on Iranian proxies or attacks on U.S. bases). That event raised fears of disruptions to oil supplies from the Persian Gulf, which immediately pushed up oil prices on global markets. Because the U.S. is partly dependent on imports, higher oil costs led to more expensive fuel at the pump, which American consumers felt.

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Full version: هل حصل ترمب على تعهد صيني بوقف الدعم العسكري لإيران؟

Energy Geopolitics at the US–China Summit in Beijing

At the center of the upcoming meeting between US President Donald Trump and PRC Chairman Xi Jinping in Beijing is the issue of energy security. The main source of tension is the potential blockade of the Strait of Hormuz — a strategic route through which China receives about 55% of its crude oil and a quarter of its liquefied natural gas supplies. Disruptions to shipping have already triggered record increases in energy prices, which has hit the Chinese economy hard, since Beijing is the world’s largest oil importer.

The United States is seeking to use the summit to pressure China to cut purchases of Iranian oil. Analysts say that last year China imported about 1.4 million barrels per day of Iranian oil, amounting to nearly 90% of Iran’s total exports. At the same time, Washington wants to persuade Beijing to resume purchases of American energy resources, which halted in mid-last year amid trade disputes. The US trade deficit with China has already reached $87 billion since the start of the year.

Chinese experts note that Beijing does not intend to yield to pressure and adheres to a strategy of diversifying energy sources. Researcher Xin from Jiangxi University emphasized that China does not demand that other countries accept unfavorable terms, but seeks to create a shared security system without military intervention. He pointed out that it was US strikes on Iran that led to chaos in the region, whereas before that the Strait of Hormuz had remained open to shipping.

Iranian analyst Abbas Aslani believes that Washington is trying to secure Beijing’s support to intensify economic pressure on Tehran, but so far China’s position remains unchanged. According to him, Iran does not back down under pressure; on the contrary, it hardens its rhetoric during conflict, perceiving any concessions as a sign of weakness. At the same time, Aslani warned that the US could in the future use the same pressure mechanisms against China over the South China Sea and Taiwan.

Experts doubt that China will completely replace Iranian oil with American supplies. Xin stressed that Beijing will continue to purchase energy from all suppliers, including the US, Gulf countries and Iran. Security specialist Richard Weitz suggested that an increase in imports of American oil could be part of a “broad deal” that includes tariff reductions and access to advanced technologies. At the same time, Aslani warned that China’s dependence on routes controlled by the US could turn into a “strategic trap,” forcing Beijing to seek alternative supply routes to circumvent sanctions.

Comments on the news

• Why is the Strait of Hormuz considered a critical node for global energy and what alternative routes exist to bypass a possible blockade? — The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow maritime passage through which about 20–25% of global oil trade passes (Iran, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar). Its blockade could trigger a spike in oil prices and a global energy crisis. Alternative routes are limited: Saudi Aramco uses the Petroline (via the Red Sea), the UAE uses the Habshan–Fujairah pipeline (bypassing the strait), but their capacity does not cover the entire volume. In addition, there are plans for overland oil transport through Turkey or Pakistan, but these require significant investment and time.
• How are Iranian society and the economy adapting to years of US sanctions, and how does this affect domestic politics? — The economy adapts through a “resistance economy”: development of import substitution, gray imports via third countries (for example, the UAE, Turkey, China), use of cryptocurrencies and barter (oil in exchange for goods). Society endures high inflation (about 40% in 2023) and rial devaluation, but retains loyalty due to repression and religious identity. This strengthens domestic politics: the authorities use sanctions as justification for suppressing protests and consolidating supporters, while the opposition loses legitimacy (it is accused of collaborating with the enemy).
• Who is Abbas Aslani, and why do his views reflect Iran’s official negotiating position? — Abbas Aslani is a conservative member of the Iranian parliament (Majles), representing the radical wing. His views (distrust of diplomacy with the West, demanding the removal of all sanctions before any concessions) align with the position of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. He is not an independent commentator but part of the system, so his statements reflect Tehran’s official line: negotiations are possible only from a position of strength, with no compromises on the nuclear program and regional influence.

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Full version: هل تضحي الصين بنفط طهران مقابل تكنولوجيا واشنطن؟

Venezuela rejects ICJ jurisdiction, demands talks with Guyana

Acting President of Venezuela Delcy Rodríguez has officially stated that the country does not recognize the jurisdiction of the UN International Court of Justice in the dispute over the Essequibo territory and insists on bilateral negotiations with Guyana under the 1966 Geneva Agreement. During the opening of an agricultural fair in Caracas, she presented a packet of documents, including maps, diplomatic correspondence and historical titles, which she said confirm the disputed region's belonging to Venezuela. Rodríguez also emphasized that Caracas considers the 1899 Arbitral Award invalid due to alleged irregularities in the process by which it was rendered. The head of government returned to the capital after participating in hearings in The Hague, where Venezuela defended its position, insisting that the dispute must be resolved exclusively through direct negotiations between the two countries.

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Full version: Venezuela rechaza jurisdicción de la CIJ y exige negociación con Guyana por el Esequibo

Trump's Visit to China: Iran and Taiwan Take Center Stage

President Donald Trump's trip to Beijing did not lead to a significant rapprochement on Iran. Trump hoped to secure China's support to pressure Tehran to restore shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and to reach a comprehensive agreement, but China maintained a cautious stance. Although the official meeting took place in a friendly atmosphere, Beijing was clearly in no hurry to assume the role of mediator, focusing instead on its own priorities. The American side warned that any Chinese support for Iran could negatively affect bilateral relations.

China has direct economic interests in the stability of the Strait of Hormuz, through which one-fifth of the world's energy consumption passes. Before the war, Beijing imported about 80% of Iranian oil on favorable terms. However, Beijing preferred not to act as an open mediator, supporting Pakistani mediation while conducting diplomatic consultations with Iranian authorities. At the same time, Washington believes that China could be the one to persuade Iran to sign an agreement with the United States.

No active intervention by China is expected from Tehran either. The Iranians view Beijing as a reliable trading partner that continued importing even under U.S. sanctions, but they acknowledge that Chinese influence on the nuclear issue is limited. Iranian authorities value the four points of China's proposals for security in the Persian Gulf, but consider that the final decision rests with Washington, not Beijing.

Taiwan became one of the main topics of the talks, with Chairman Xi Jinping calling the issue a "red line." He warned that any U.S. support for Taiwan could lead to serious escalation. China also demanded a halt to arms supplies to the island and restrictions on military activity in the South China Sea. Taipei is closely watching the summit, fearing that Taiwan could become a bargaining chip in the great game between the two superpowers.

Beyond security, serious disagreements remain in the trade and economic sphere. The U.S. is concerned about China's lead in artificial intelligence and semiconductors, which has led to tariffs and export controls on technology. China, for its part, demands reciprocity in investments and an end to the containment of its companies.

Overall, despite lengthy meetings, the summit showed that on key issues — from Iran and Taiwan to technological competition — fundamental disagreements between the leaders persist. Achieving real mutual understanding remains a difficult task, and much will depend on the next steps taken by both sides.

News commentary

• Why is the Strait of Hormuz considered critical to the global economy, and how does Iran use its geographic position to influence shipping in this region? — The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow maritime passage through which about 20% of the world’s oil and a significant share of liquefied natural gas transit, making it the planet’s "oil choke point." Iran, controlling the northern shore of the strait and nearby islands (for example, Abu Musa), can threaten to block shipping or conduct military exercises that restrict the movement of tankers. This allows Tehran to exert pressure on global energy prices and use the strait as leverage in negotiations with the West.

• What are the four points of China’s proposals for security in the Persian Gulf that won approval from Iranian authorities? — The four points proposed by China for security in the Persian Gulf include: 1) respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries in the region, 2) refusal of external powers (primarily the U.S.) to intervene in Gulf affairs, 3) the creation of a collective security system without foreign military presence, and 4) jointly maintaining freedom of navigation. Iranian authorities approved these points because they reduce Western influence and strengthen Tehran’s role in the region.

• What were the favorable terms for Iran’s oil imports by China and how did these economic ties affect Beijing’s position on sanctions? — The favorable terms included discounts on Iranian oil for China (often 10–15% below market price), settling payments in yuan outside conventional channels, and using a “shadow fleet” for transport. These economic ties led Beijing to repeatedly oppose unilateral U.S. sanctions and to block efforts to harshly isolate Iran at the UN, while actively promoting the idea of multilateral negotiations instead of confrontation.

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Full version: ما الذي تريده واشنطن وبكين وطهران من قمة "ترمب- شي جين بينغ"؟

U.S. Intelligence: Iran Has Restored 90% of Its Missile Capacity

Contrary to public statements by the Donald Trump administration, secret intelligence obtained by The New York Times shows that Tehran has regained control of about 90% of its underground missile facilities across the country. Assessments prepared in early April, based on satellite imagery and advanced surveillance technologies, have raised serious alarm among senior officials in Washington, presenting the administration with a strategic dilemma amid a sharp shortage of critical U.S. munitions.

According to the intelligence, roughly 90% of underground storage sites and launch facilities are operating "partially or fully," and Iran has restored operational access to 30 of 33 missile positions overlooking the Strait of Hormuz. About one-fifth of the world’s oil consumption passes through this strait, making these sites a direct threat to tankers and more than 20 U.S. warships in the region. Analysts say such operational recovery alters calculations for maritime and regional security.

The report also notes that Tehran has retained about 70% of its mobile launchers and nearly 70% of its pre-war missile stockpiles. Iranian forces can move missiles on mobile platforms within facilities or fire them from integrated installations. That operational flexibility makes precise targeting difficult and undermines the effectiveness of previous strikes. The assessments cast doubt on the ability of future attacks to inflict lasting damage on these capabilities.

These intelligence findings sharply contrast with public statements by U.S. officials. On March 9, Trump said that Iran’s missiles were "scattered and reduced" and that the country had "nothing left militarily." On April 8, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth announced that the joint operation with Israel had "destroyed the Iranian army and rendered it combat ineffective for years to come." In response to the NYT report, White House press secretary Olivia Wiles repeated Trump’s assurances of Iran’s "defeat," calling those who speak of a recovery "deluded or propagandists for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps."

The report explains the preservation of a significant portion of Iran’s arsenal as a tactical choice by U.S. forces. The Pentagon preferred to blockade entrances to facilities rather than destroy them from within because of a limited number of bunker-busting bombs and the need to preserve those munitions for other operations in Asia. During the conflict the U.S. used about 1,100 long-range cruise missiles, more than 1,000 Tomahawks, and over 1,300 Patriot interceptors — nearly two years’ worth of production at 2025 rates. Replenishing these stocks will take years, not months, creating difficulties for allies awaiting weapons deliveries for Ukraine.

This does not mean Iran has not suffered losses: air defense systems and strategic facilities were heavily damaged, many senior commanders were killed, and the country’s economy is suffering from military pressure. Still, Tehran’s retention of military capability worries European U.S. allies who purchased billions of dollars in armaments for Ukraine and fear delays due to the need to restock American supplies. Despite this, U.S. military officials continue to reassure the public and allies: General Dan Kane told Congress the U.S. has "enough munitions for current tasks," and Pentagon spokesperson Sean Parnell emphasized that the military "has everything it needs" to protect U.S. interests and people.

Comments on the News

• What is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and what role does it play in Iran’s military and political system? — The IRGC is an elite military-political formation in Iran, separate from the regular army and directly subordinate to the Supreme Leader. It controls missile forces, the nuclear program, has extensive economic interests, and is involved in suppressing domestic protests. In the political system, the IRGC acts as an instrument of influence, supporting conservative forces and ensuring regime security.

• Why does Iran rely on underground missile bases and mobile launchers — what is their strategic advantage? — Underground bases protect missiles from airstrikes and satellite reconnaissance, allowing for a retaliatory strike even after a powerful attack. Mobile launchers make missiles less vulnerable because they are difficult to detect and destroy before launch. Together, they create a "missile shield" that deters strikes by the U.S. and Israel, giving Iran the ability for asymmetric retaliation.

• What is the significance of the Strait of Hormuz for Iran and why is placing missiles along it considered a direct challenge to the global economy? — The Strait of Hormuz is a strategic channel through which about 20–25% of global oil passes. Control over this route gives Iran the ability to cut off shipments in a conflict, which would cause a sharp rise in oil prices and a global economic shock. Deploying missiles along the strait allows Iran to threaten shipping, making this not just a military but a geopolitical pressure tactic against the West and Saudi Arabia.

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Full version: تقييمات سرية تعارض رواية ترمب.. إيران تستعيد 90% من منشآتها الصاروخية

Delcy Rodríguez: We are proud to have defended Venezuela in The Hague

On Monday, acting President of Venezuela Delcy Rodríguez spoke at the International Court of Justice in The Hague, defending the country's territorial rights over the Essequibo region. She presented historical and legal arguments confirming Venezuela's sovereignty over this disputed territory. Rodríguez emphasized that the delegation is fulfilling its mandate to protect the integrity of the national borders, and expressed pride that Venezuela's voice was heard on the international stage.

This appearance was part of the ongoing legal process in the territorial dispute with Guyana. Rodríguez stated that the state's position is firm: all national sectors must unite to defend sovereignty. She also shared details of her participation in the meeting via her Telegram channel, publishing a map of Venezuela with the disputed territory included as part of the country. Venezuelan authorities are closely following the development of the case at the court, awaiting further hearings.

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Full version: Presidenta (E) Rodríguez: Proud to have defended our whole Venezuela in The Hague

War with Iran Destroyed the Myth of US Protection — Analyst

At the height of the Iran–Israel confrontation, prominent Egyptian thinker and constitutionalist Muhammad Salim al-Awa offers his analysis of the conflict, arguing that the traditional equations of security in the Gulf and the Arab world are collapsing before our eyes. In his view, military action against Iran has finally dispelled the illusion of American patronage. The region may be on the verge of a complete restructuring of the geopolitical balance, where the maps of influence and military calculations have demonstrated Washington's inability to protect either its bases or the security of Gulf states accustomed to "imported security."

Al-Awa calls for a reassessment of Arab–American relations and of the very concept of "imported security." He notes that the war has opened the way for radical rethinking: the retreat or inaction of American power in the face of strikes and conflicts has left peoples feeling unprotected. Military agreements and bases are no longer guaranteed sanctuaries. In this context, al-Awa insists that the Gulf states need to reconsider the presence of American bases on their territory — now is the most appropriate time to do so, before it is too late.

Addressing the legality of the war, al-Awa characterizes the American–Israeli military actions against Iran as "pure aggression" from the standpoint of international law, since Tehran did not declare war on either the US or Israel, which moreover struck civilian targets. However, he concedes that Iranian retaliatory strikes on bases in the Gulf could be qualified as self-defense if those bases were indeed used against it. Al-Awa emphasizes the need for an on-the-ground investigation to clarify this point and notes that the confrontation is not merely a military campaign but a deep regional conflict between two forces: one backed by the US and another whose doctrine is based on autonomous defense.

The thinker strongly criticizes the "Abraham Accords" — the normalization process with Israel. He condemns countries that rushed to normalize relations and mass-grant citizenship without apparent reasons, calling it "madness" and asserting that the peoples of those states do not support such steps. "The future will completely destroy the idea of normalization," al-Awa declares, rejecting attempts to use religion as a cover for rapprochement with Israel. His criticism extends to Egypt: while he himself opposes normalization, he acknowledges that Egyptian–Israeli relations are historically and politically complex. He notes that public sentiment in the Arab world tends toward solidarity with Palestine, and that propaganda campaigns against Egypt were unjustified.

Instead of outdated Arab projects, al-Awa proposes a new regional concept — an Islamic economic union involving Turkey, Egypt and the Gulf countries, focused on cooperation in industry, economy and culture. He suggests creating an economic axis combining Turkish manufacturing, Egyptian intellectual resources and the financial capabilities of the oil monarchies. In his conviction, such a format of integration is far more productive than sectarian conflicts or attempts to establish regional hegemony. "The current conflict is essentially economic," he asserts, linking it to attempts by some powers, such as the US, to dominate and to other actors' resistance to that domination.

Touching on internal Arab issues, al-Awa states that resolving crises lies in the plane of intra-Arab reconciliation, and that the League of Arab States has failed due to outdated mechanisms and the principle of compulsory consensus. He insists that al-Azhar should play the role of spiritual reference for Muslims worldwide, and that Sunni–Shia dialogue will be restored, as scholarly minds gravitate toward mutual understanding despite political noise. Regarding the dossier of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, al-Awa believes it is not yet closed and combines political and security aspects. He calls on both sides to reread the situation, not ruling out political settlement if they reassess their positions. The thinker warns that the moment for a solution still exists, and whoever takes the first step will gain the advantage. In conclusion he predicts a short-term "freeze" of the conflict and long-term escalation due to Israeli ambitions and the influence of American policy.

Comments on the news

• What are the main elements of Iran's doctrine of "autonomous defense" and how does it differ from the approaches of Gulf states accustomed to "imported security"? — Iran's doctrine of "autonomous defense" (also called "defensive independence") is based on the development of its own military-industrial complex, including the production of missiles, drones and cyber capabilities, as well as reliance on proxy forces (for example, Hezbollah or the Yemeni Houthis) to create "deep defense" beyond its borders. This approach differs from Gulf states, which traditionally rely on purchasing Western arms and hosting foreign military bases (US, UK, France) to ensure security — the so-called "imported security," where a state's protection depends on external guarantees.

• Which specific military bases in the Gulf countries (for example, in Qatar, Bahrain, the UAE) could have been involved in strikes against Iran and why is their location strategically important? — Key bases include: Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar (the hub of US CENTCOM air operations), the naval base in Bahrain (US Fifth Fleet), and Al Dhafra Air Base in Abu Dhabi, UAE (where F-35s and reconnaissance aircraft are stationed). Their locations are strategically important because they are in close proximity to Iran across the Persian Gulf, allowing for rapid strikes and control over the Strait of Hormuz — a critical chokepoint for oil shipments.

• How can Iranian proxy forces (for example, in Yemen, Syria, Iraq) be used to attack targets in the Gulf, and what is their origin? — Iranian proxy forces can be used for asymmetric attacks: the Yemeni Houthis (Ansar Allah) — for missile and drone strikes against Saudi Arabia and the UAE; Shiite militias in Iraq (for example, Kata'ib Hezbollah) — for attacks on bases with American personnel in Iraqi Kurdistan and Kuwait; and in Syria — for threats to Israeli and Jordanian targets. The origins of these groups are linked to Iranian support after the 1979 revolution: through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Tehran trained, financed and armed ideologically aligned Shiite and insurgent cells to expand its influence and create a buffer zone against external threats.

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Full version: العوا يتحدث للجزيرة نت حول: وهم الحماية الأمريكية والردع الإيراني وانهيار التطبيع

US–Iran Talks Reach Deadlock

An exchange of proposals and responses between Tehran and Washington continues, but the parties still cannot overcome disagreements on key issues, which is blocking the conclusion of a possible agreement. Details of this diplomatic standoff, including the content of the latest initiatives, regularly leak to media outlets close to one camp or another, creating a contradictory picture of the prospects for a settlement.

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Full version: تعرف على مسار المفاوضات المتعثر بين واشنطن وطهران

Venezuela Rejects Guyana's "Useless" Report to the International Court of Justice

Acting President of Venezuela Delcy Rodríguez called the report submitted by Guyana to the International Court of Justice on the Guyana-Essequibo territorial dispute "pernicious and useless." According to her, any court decision will not only fail to bring about a final settlement of the conflict but will also exacerbate disagreements between the parties, causing them to "dig in on their positions." Rodríguez emphasized that the only functioning mechanism remains the 1966 Geneva Agreement, which both countries previously signed.

Caracas accused Georgetown of attempting to "erase the historical memory" of the Venezuelan people related to the Essequibo region. "Erasing history will never justify theft," Rodríguez said, adding that the truth will ultimately prevail. Despite the hardline stance, the Venezuelan side confirmed its readiness for direct high-level dialogue, calling on regional mediators to help find a "mutually beneficial and practical solution" for both peoples.

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Full version: Presidenta Encargada calificó de pernicioso e inútil informe presentado por Guyana ante la CIJ

Trump may declare victory in Iran, but selling it to the public is nearly impossible

American President Donald Trump is likely to declare victory in a war with Iran regardless of the actual outcome, but his main problem is convincing the public of the political justification for that conflict. His rhetoric swings from claims that "victory was achieved on the first day" to forecasts that fighting could drag on for "weeks or months." Despite official optimism, Americans are increasingly skeptical and worried about how the war will affect their daily lives.

The difficulty is compounded by the fact that the administration's objectives have changed several times since the start of the conflict — this undermines any attempt to construct a coherent narrative of success. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan show that every president has tried to present military campaigns as progress despite widespread disappointment. But with Iran, that kind of "packaging" is especially difficult because initial promises diverged from reality, and now voters find it harder to trust the government's version of events.

The demand for "unconditional surrender" and regime change in Tehran lends a particular absurdity to the situation — conditions that, without a full-scale invasion and colossal destruction like in World War II, seem unrealistic. The journalist mocks the image of marines planting the US flag over the Iranian parliament and points to a glaring contradiction: officials speak of the collapse of the Iranian government one moment and of continued negotiations the next. The sarcastic question "If all this is true, then who are we negotiating with?" becomes central.

A settlement plan proposed by Axios includes a temporary freeze of the nuclear program, partial sanctions relief, the unblocking of Iranian assets, and the opening of the Strait of Hormuz. These terms sharply contrast with earlier statements that Iran’s nuclear program had been "completely destroyed" and that regime change was necessary. If such an agreement is implemented, Republicans will face a serious credibility crisis among voters who were previously promised a much tougher approach.

As a result, the war risks becoming a heavy political burden for Republicans ahead of the midterm elections, especially against a backdrop of economic dissatisfaction and fatigue with protracted conflicts. Even redistricting may not save them if voters decide the sacrifices of war were not justified and the promises not kept. The Republican Party finds itself trapped between loyalty to Trump and growing public irritation, making an effort to present the war as a strategic success almost impossible.

Comments on the news

• What is the Strait of Hormuz and why is its blockage or opening so important for the global economy? - The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow sea passage between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman through which about 20% of the world’s oil trade passes. Its closure (for example, by Iran in response to sanctions) could trigger a sharp spike in oil prices and a global energy crisis, since alternative routes (such as overland pipelines) have limited capacity.

• What sanctions are currently in place against Iran and how could their partial lifting affect the country’s economy? - The main sanctions are the tough US measures introduced in 2018 (the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal), which restrict Iranian oil exports, banking operations, and access to the international financial system. Partial lifting of sanctions (for example, as part of new nuclear talks) would allow Iran to increase oil exports, access frozen assets abroad, and attract foreign investment, which would reduce inflation and unemployment.

• Who actually makes decisions in Iran — the president or the supreme leader — and how does this affect the possibility of negotiations with the US? - Real power is concentrated with the Supreme Leader (currently Ayatollah Ali Khamenei), who controls the military, the nuclear program, intelligence, and foreign policy. The president (currently Ebrahim Raisi) is responsible for the economy and domestic affairs, but his powers are limited. This means any agreements with the US (for example, on the nuclear deal) must be approved by Khamenei, making negotiations more complex and unpredictable, as the leader often adheres to a hardline anti-American stance.

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Full version: هيل: ترمب قد يعلن الانتصار على إيران لكنه أمام معضلة

Trump, Iran and China: Latin American media on rising international instability

Venezuelan and regional outlets increasingly portray U.S. foreign policy under Donald Trump as a factor exacerbating the global crisis and generating uncertainty. Analytical pieces and columns express alarm about the risk of military escalation, skepticism about prospects for a ceasefire, and concern about sanctions that hit markets and the economy. News reports and financial market reactions — from spikes in oil prices to currency fluctuations — show how Latin American societies experience and criticize Washington’s decisions, seeing in them a trigger for broader geopolitical and economic risks. This article was prepared based on publications from reforma.com (Venezuela) and gbm.com (Venezuela).

Trump symbols, a strong dollar and a fragile periphery: how Venezuela reads world news

The news about the planned “Donald Trump Arch of Triumph” in Washington and a financial review about a steady dollar amid tensions over Iran and U.S.–China talks, taken separately, look like two different stories. The first is about an urban and political gesture in the U.S. capital; the second is about movements in global markets and reactions to geopolitical uncertainty. But read from Caracas, they form a single narrative: about how the center of the world system turns power into stone and numbers, while the periphery — in this case Venezuela — lives under the weight of those symbols and indexes.

The original brief, based on AP material and published by the Mexican outlet Reforma, reports the start of preparatory work for the “Trump Arch of Triumph” project in Washington: initial surveys and tests are being carried out at the proposed site, the initiative comes from Donald Trump himself, and press secretary Caroline Levitt is showing a visualization of the future monument. The report emphasizes the controversial nature of the project for the U.S. capital, but otherwise remains dry and factual, recording only the start of work, Trump’s role as instigator, and the public presentation of the sketch in Reforma’s piece based on AP.

From a Venezuelan point of view, such news automatically falls into conversations about personality cults and political symbolism. In a country where decades of polarization have filled public spaces with portraits of leaders, renamed squares and landmarks, official and unofficial iconography, the idea of a “Trump Arch of Triumph” is perceived as a mirror image of a familiar practice. For some opposition commentators this is convenient confirmation: populism and caudillismo are not only Latin American phenomena; they fully manifest in the U.S. as well, albeit in a more “respectable” packaging. A grand, personalized monument in the heart of Washington fits the image of Trump as a leader who built his political identity on media spectacle and loud gestures.

For officialist and especially Chavista circles, the same news becomes an argument about double standards. Washington, which for years criticized Bolivarian symbolic practices, mocked huge portraits, the renaming of squares and the use of Bolívar’s or Chávez’s image in political propaganda, simultaneously and quite naturally accepts the idea of a monument that effectively deifies one president. In this logic, the “Trump Arch of Triumph” is not simply an architectural object but visual proof that the U.S. allows itself what it condemns in others. Hence the rhetorical question that resonates particularly strongly in Caracas: how can a country that imposed heavy sanctions “in the name of democracy” celebrate a president with a triumphal arch in its capital?

This symbolic layer is inseparable from the experience of sanctions. Donald Trump in Venezuelan memory is not only an eccentric leader but also the figure under whom oil and financial restrictions were sharply tightened, a regime-change strategy intensified, and attempts made to isolate Caracas on the international stage. The monument initiative, read through that experience, becomes an inward ornament of power whose external projection is associated with economic strangulation and humanitarian crisis. For many in Venezuela the image of an arch in Washington is a stone frame around the decisions that contributed to the impoverishment of millions and the breakdown of the familiar economy.

There is also an economic angle: the Venezuelan press is used to comparing symbolic expenditures with real social needs. In the context of years of domestic infrastructure decline, deterioration of public services and collapsing incomes, any news about large, personalized projects in elite capitals — whether in Caracas or Washington — pushes to the same conclusion: major states also spend political capital and resources on ideologically charged objects. This undermines the old argument that rational allocation of funds is the privilege of the “responsible North,” while propagandistic excesses are the lot of the “irrational South.” In this sense the “Trump Arch of Triumph” equalizes the symbolic economy: Washington turns out not to be so far from Caracas when it comes to monumentalizing power.

Finally, the very words “arch of triumph” carry a powerful historical trail. In Venezuelan political imagination they refer back to European imperial tradition and to the nation’s own monuments dedicated to military victories and revolutionary “gestures.” Experts accustomed to debating Bolívar’s legacy, Chávez’s memorial politics and the use of military past as a legitimizing resource readily read Trump’s initiative as an attempt to appropriate a classical symbol of military triumph to project American power. Combined with wars, sanctions and diplomatic pressure beyond the U.S., this only reinforces in Venezuela the image of an “empire that celebrates its victories in stone while people on the periphery suffer from those victories.”

At the same time, in a different register and tone, Spanish-language media carry a Reuters piece about how the dollar remains steady while oil rises amid uncertainty over possible escalation with Iran and expectations of a meeting between Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping. In that dispatch, published, among other places, on GBM’s site, it is reported that the dollar index is holding near 97.977 points, oil is up about 3%, and markets remain “on edge” due to the risk of war and key talks on trade, Iran, Taiwan, nuclear weapons and critical minerals in Reuters’ report. Société Générale analyst Kenneth Brooks is quoted noting that market reaction so far is more restrained than in previous periods of heightened rhetoric, and fluctuations in the euro, yen, pound and yuan are listed.

In global financial language this is a routine “market update.” However, for Venezuela, where the dollar has become an everyday thermometer of survival, every such text is read as an alarm signal. Mention of “dollar stability” in world indexes is automatically translated into expectations of further bolívar depreciation. Even if the brief contains no line about Caracas, in the local optics the logic is simple: a strong dollar outside means an even weaker bolívar inside. This pushes people to accelerate informal dollarization: convert modest savings, fix prices in foreign currency, and measure everything — from wages to the price of a kilo of rice — in U.S. dollar equivalents.

The rise in oil prices in the report is described as a reaction to geopolitical tension. For a country that has some of the largest hydrocarbon reserves and is simultaneously under harsh sanctions, this looks like a paradoxical mix of hope and frustration. In theory rising oil should improve budgetary prospects, but because of export restrictions, the need for discounts and complex intermediary schemes, the real effect is limited and opaque. In recent years many Venezuelans have learned: higher global oil prices do not automatically mean improved living conditions; sometimes they even amplify internal distortions — imported inputs, logistics and fuel in certain regions become more expensive while wages and social services remain at rock bottom.

Brooks’s remark about a “more muted” market reaction to hawkish rhetoric, which in Europe and the U.S. sounds like a sign of a mature financial system, evokes different associations in Caracas. Here political and military-diplomatic rhetoric long ago stopped seeming abstract: every statement about possible sanctions, conflicts or alliances immediately reflects on the black-market exchange rate, store prices and drug availability. Venezuela lives in a state of constant “macroeconomic turbulence,” where external uncertainty — whether a Middle East crisis or trade wars between the U.S. and China — overlays internal structural problems and amplifies the sense of total insecurity.

The absence of Latin American and, even more, Venezuelan voices in the Reuters piece is standard practice in global financial journalism, where reference points are London, New York or Tokyo. Locally, this vacuum is filled by economists, independent analysts and political actors who translate dry phrases about the dollar index and yuan dynamics into the language of everyday reality: a strong dollar is a new wave of inflation in bolívars; rising oil amid sanctions is an opportunity for opaque state revenues, but not a guarantee of repaired water systems or a higher minimum wage. Official spokespeople, in turn, weave news about U.S. conflict with Iran and China’s cautious moves into the favored narrative of resistance against the “imperial center,” where Venezuela, alongside Tehran and Beijing, is cast as both victim and resistor.

Opposition politicians and critical experts use the same data to reach the opposite conclusion: it is precisely dependence on oil and on the dollar as the only reliable benchmark, and the destruction of institutions that turned the country into a sanctions target, that made Venezuela especially vulnerable to any external shock. From this perspective every report about dollar stability and an oil price surge is a reminder that the average Venezuelan lacks hedging instruments, access to international markets or effective social protection; there is only vulnerability to decisions made in Washington, Brussels, Beijing and, to a lesser extent, in their own government.

If the two news items are juxtaposed — the triumphal arch for Trump and a steady dollar amid Middle East tension and U.S.–China dialogue — a common picture emerges from Caracas. On one edge are the U.S., where a political leader associated with a harsh sanctions policy aspires to monumentalize his name in stone while his country’s economy remains a pillar of the global monetary system. On the other edge is Venezuela, for whom that same leader is associated with worsening living conditions, and dollar stability means another round of relative impoverishment for the national currency. For Washington, the “Trump Arch of Triumph” and the dollar index are elements of domestic political and financial discourse; for Caracas they are symbols of power and of the asymmetry that power breeds.

In this sense, what in the original sources — whether the AP report reprinted by Reforma about preparatory work for the arch project, or Reuters’s analytical piece about currency markets on GBM’s site — is presented as a set of facts, in Venezuela is reinterpreted as part of a broader story about how the global hierarchy is embodied both in stone arches and in digital indexes. Where the center speaks of monuments and percentages, on the periphery the discourse inevitably turns to memories of suffering and the cost of survival.

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Trump Rejects Iran's Response: "Categorically Unacceptable"

U.S. President Donald Trump sharply rejected Iran's response to an American proposal to end the war, calling it "absolutely unacceptable." In a post on the social network Truth Social, he accused Tehran of prolonging negotiations for years and manipulating the international community for 47 years. This hardline reaction increased tensions and triggered a rise in oil prices at market open, although analysts say it does not completely close the door to diplomacy but significantly raises the likelihood of a military scenario.

No official comment came from Tehran, but sources close to the Iranian leadership took a defiant stance. As the semi-official Tasnim agency reported, one representative said: "When Trump expresses dissatisfaction, it often means the plan is actually good." Iranian television described the American initiative as "capitulation to Trump's demands," noting that Iran's response contains clear red lines and principled conditions.

According to Tasnim, the key points of Iran's counterproposal include an immediate ceasefire on all fronts, guarantees of non-aggression toward Iran in the future, and the complete lifting of U.S. sanctions, including restrictions on oil exports, within 30 days. In addition, Tehran demanded the lifting of the naval blockade immediately after signing a preliminary agreement, the unfreezing of Iranian assets, and even the transfer of control over the Strait of Hormuz to Iran in exchange for certain U.S. commitments. For Washington, these demands are unacceptable concessions, while in Tehran they are viewed as a necessary condition for restoring sovereignty.

American experts consider two main scenarios after Trump's rejection. The first is Operation "Freedom Plus," which would entail prolonged maritime confrontation, a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, and maintenance of a blockade on Iranian ports. This option is supported by Republican Senator Lindsey Graham. The second scenario is military escalation with strikes on Iranian infrastructure, which, according to analyst Michael Mallroy, would prompt retaliatory attacks on oil facilities in neighboring countries and destabilize global energy markets. Mallroy warns that large-scale bombings could force other states to intervene to restore shipping.

At the regional level, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that "the war is not over yet," and further work is needed to remove enriched uranium, dismantle centrifuges, and neutralize Iran's proxy forces. In Tehran, in turn, they do not rule out military conflict, believing that the price of resistance is lower than the price of capitulation. Iran's Supreme Leader held a meeting with the command of the Khatam al-Anbiya Corps, ordering the continuation of military operations and a tough stance against opponents. These statements only increase the risk of renewed or expanded direct clashes.

Despite the tough rhetoric, the possibility of returning to talks remains, especially in light of Trump's upcoming visit to China. U.S. officials do not rule out that Beijing could act as a mediator, enhancing its international standing if it takes up mediation before the start of military escalation. However, it is reported that Washington is seeking an agreement that would further restrict Iran's rights compared with the 2015 nuclear deal. The final scenario remains uncertain: from maintaining "fragile calm" and resuming dialogue to full-scale military confrontation, at least until the conclusion of the American leader's visit to the PRC.

Comments on the news

• What is the Strait of Hormuz and why is control over it important for Iran and the global economy? — The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow maritime passage between Iran and Oman that connects the Persian Gulf with the Indian Ocean. About 20–30% of the world's oil trade (roughly 17 million barrels per day) passes through it. For Iran, control of the strait is a key lever of influence: in the event of conflict, Tehran could close the passage, triggering a sharp spike in energy prices and a global economic crisis. It is also a strategic asset for deterring military pressure from the United States and its allies.

• Who are Iran's "proxy forces" mentioned in Netanyahu's statement, and how do they affect regional security? — Iran's "proxy forces" are armed groups operating in various Middle Eastern countries that are funded, trained, or armed by Tehran. They include Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, various Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria (for example, Kata'ib Hezbollah), as well as groups in the Gaza Strip (such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad). They undermine regional stability by attacking Israel, U.S. allies (for example, Saudi Arabia or the UAE), and disrupting maritime shipping, which could escalate into full-scale conflict.

• What is the Khatam al-Anbiya Corps and why is its meeting with Iran's Supreme Leader important for assessing military risks? — Khatam al-Anbiya (also known as the Rocket Corps or the Corps for Demining and Engineering Defense) is a key unit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) responsible for the development and deployment of ballistic missiles, drones, and air defense systems. A meeting of its command with Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei signals possible preparation for military operations or an increase in combat readiness. Such meetings are usually held before major strikes (for example, against Israel in 2024) or in response to threats, so they serve as an indicator of rising tension and the risk of open confrontation.

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Full version: ما السيناريوهات المتوقعة بعد رفض ترمب للرد الإيراني؟

Trump says Venezuela is happy because of oil

President of the United States Donald Trump on Sunday said that Venezuela has now become a "very happy country," unlike in the past when, he said, people were unhappy. He attributed this change to the booming energy sector, noting a record oil production volume not seen in many years and the arrival of major oil companies with modern platforms. In Trump's view, these projects create jobs and revive the economy, and Venezuelans are proud of the changes that have taken place.

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Full version: Trump reitera que

"Project Freedom Plus": US New Strategy in the Strait of Hormuz

The American administration announced the launch of "Project Freedom Plus" — an expanded and more aggressive version of the previous military mission in the Strait of Hormuz. Whereas the US previously limited itself to escorting commercial vessels and responding to direct attacks, the new strategy provides for preemptive strikes on Iranian targets before they can attack. According to military sources, this is a radical shift in approach: from defense to active threat prevention.

The shipping situation in the strait has sharply deteriorated. According to analytics firm Kepler, no ships passed through the strait on May 7 and 8, and only two on May 9. US estimates say that between 1,500 and 2,000 vessels are stuck in the waters of the Persian Gulf. US Central Command reported that it has rerouted 58 ships and stopped another four since the start of the port blockade. Some vessels have come under direct attack, turning the whole region into a zone of covert but dangerous confrontation.

Under the new strategy, the US is increasing its military presence in the region. Aircraft carriers, air-defense-equipped destroyers, reconnaissance aircraft and drones have been deployed in the Arabian Sea and remain constantly airborne. The stated goal is to improve escalation management if talks with Iran fail and to create a powerful deterrent. Washington is clearly prepared to move from the role of observer to that of an active combatant if necessary.

Iran, in turn, is revising its rules of engagement, betting on unconventional weaponry. Tehran is increasing its use of hard-to-detect means: small submarines, fast attack boats and kamikaze drones. These unconventional systems allow it to pressure American forces and infrastructure without engaging in open confrontation. Iran exploits shallow waters and dense civilian shipping to complicate retaliatory actions.

A new digital front is causing particular concern. Pro-government Iranian media have proposed introducing fees for the subsea cables running along the bottom of the Strait of Hormuz. These fiber-optic lines, protected by steel and plastic, are critical infrastructure: they carry about 97% of the region's traffic and roughly 30% of internet data between Europe, Asia and the Middle East. Disrupting them or imposing charges could paralyze communications, the internet and financial systems across three continents at once — a blow that could surpass the consequences of attacks on oil tankers.

The US president has threatened to launch "Project Freedom Plus" in full if negotiations with Tehran do not yield results. However, exact details of the plan have not yet been revealed. Experts believe it likely involves broader military authorities to control sea lanes and rapidly deter threats. At the same time, risks are rising because of Iran's unconventional measures, including threats to digital infrastructure. The region is rapidly moving toward a more complex and dangerous phase of confrontation — at sea and in cyberspace.

Comments on the news

• Which Iranian unconventional threats (for example, small submarines or kamikaze drones) pose the greatest danger to US warships and commercial vessels in the shallow waters of the Strait of Hormuz? - The greatest danger comes from high-speed boats armed with short-range missiles (for example, of the Noor class), as well as kamikaze drones (for example, the Shahed-136). Small submarines of the Ghadir class and mines, which can be quickly deployed in narrow parts of the strait, also pose a serious threat due to the difficulty of detecting them in murky water.

• What is the history of Iran's control over the Strait of Hormuz and what previous conflicts with the US and its allies in this region may have influenced the current strategy? - Iran exerts partial control over the strait through military bases and minefields located on the island of Abu Musa. Key conflicts include: 1) Operation Praying Mantis (1988) — after a US frigate was damaged by an Iranian mine, the Americans destroyed Iranian oil platforms and ships. 2) The seizure of British sailors in 2007. 3) A series of incidents in 2019–2023 involving attacks on tankers and the downing of an American drone. These episodes reinforced Tehran's belief that asymmetric tactics (mines, small boats) are effective against high-tech navies.

• What internal factors in Iran (political, economic or military) might have pushed pro-government media to propose charging fees for subsea cables, and how does this reflect Tehran's broader objectives? - Economic sanctions and inflation (above 40% by official figures) are forcing the search for new revenue sources. Politically, it signals to the West that Iran could disrupt global digital infrastructure (for example, internet cables) if it is not brought into the negotiating process. Militarily, the logic is that control over the strait includes not only shipping but also subsea infrastructure, strengthening the IRGC's position as a key player in the economy. This is part of a strategy of "pressure through unexpected levers" used in talks over the nuclear program.

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Full version: ما هو "مشروع الحرية بلس" الأمريكي الجديد بمضيق هرمز؟

Iran's "Mosquito Fleet": a threat to global oil routes

The British newspaper Financial Times devoted an article to Iran's "mosquito fleet" — a network of fast boats of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) that have become an effective instrument of confrontation with the United States and a lever of pressure on energy markets in the Persian Gulf region. The report, prepared by correspondents from London, Washington and Tehran, details how these small vessels have become a key element of Iran's strategy to disrupt shipping and threaten the passage of oil and gas through the strategic Strait of Hormuz.

Iran hides hundreds of such boats in caves, tunnels and small coves along its southern coast, keeping them on full alert for immediate deployment into the Strait of Hormuz — one of the world's most important energy corridors. These maneuverable boats are capable of rapidly leaving fortified shelters and then disappearing again, which makes them extremely difficult to detect and neutralize. It is precisely their capacity for stealth and rapid movement that gives Tehran the ability to constantly disrupt shipping without engaging in full-scale naval battles.

Some of these boats are simple and lightly armed, others are equipped with short-range missiles and more modern technologies. They all operate in swarms, shadowing ships and creating a persistent threat. Financial Times emphasizes that the "mosquito fleet" perfectly embodies Iran's doctrine of "asymmetric warfare": the use of cheap and fast means to counter more powerful naval forces. This approach allows it to wear down an adversary both psychologically and practically, without the need to maintain a large conventional navy.

The roots of this tactic go back to the Iran–Iraq War of the 1980s, when Tehran began to widely use small boats to attack large ships, lay mines and seize vessels. In this context it is notable that former U.S. President Donald Trump recently boasted that Iran's navy was "completely destroyed," yet, according to experts, the real threat from Iran never came from its outdated regular navy. The true strength lies with the IRGC, its missile arsenal, drones and fast attack boats.

Estimates put the IRGC's number of fast assault boats between 500 and 1,000, as well as more than 1,000 unmanned vessels capable of carrying missiles or torpedoes. Some of them, such as the Siraj-1, are considered relatively modern. On their own these boats are unlikely to defeat the U.S. navy, but their coordination with missiles and drones creates an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty. As the paper notes, even a small amount of chaos can force shipping companies to avoid the strait or pay astronomical insurance premiums — and this immediately affects global energy prices.

Comments on the news

• Why does the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), rather than the regular navy, control Iran's "mosquito fleet"? - The IRGC was created after the 1979 Islamic Revolution as an ideologically loyal and independent branch of the armed forces, intended to protect the Islamic system. During the Iran–Iraq War the IRGC proved effective in asymmetric warfare, including the use of small boats. Since then the "mosquito fleet" has become an IRGC instrument, as it is better suited for rapid, low-visibility operations in the Persian Gulf and does not require the complex infrastructure of large ships, which is controlled by the regular navy.

• How did the Iran–Iraq War of the 1980s shape Iran's strategy of using small boats against stronger naval forces? - During the war Iran faced the superiority of the Iraqi navy and its allies (including the U.S.) at sea. In response the IRGC began employing a "swarm" tactic — simultaneous attacks by many high-speed boats armed with missiles and machine guns against large ships. That experience showed that small, cheap and maneuverable boats could successfully challenge more powerful forces by exploiting surprise and the complex hydrography of the Persian Gulf. The war entrenched in Iranian doctrine a focus on asymmetric responses, including massed attacks by small forces.

• What specific types of missiles can the "mosquito fleet" boats and unmanned vessels carry, and how do they interact with other IRGC weapon systems? - The "mosquito fleet" boats are typically armed with anti-ship missiles such as Chinese C-704 and C-802 (and Iranian copies — Noor and Qader), as well as more modern missiles like Khalij Fars, Zulfiqar and Qeysar. Unmanned vessels (for example, Ababil or Mohajer-6 drones) can carry light missiles or conduct reconnaissance. Interaction occurs through an integrated command network — the IRGC uses ground-based radars and control centers to coordinate attacks: drones detect targets and boats receive coordinates for salvoes. This enables simultaneous strikes from different directions, complicating countermeasures.

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Full version: "أسطول البعوض" الإيراني في مواجهة البحرية الأمريكية بالخليج

Delcy Rodríguez Announces Judicial Reform After Amnesty Corruption Scandals

Acting President of Venezuela Delcy Rodríguez, in a report on the first 100 days of the "Program of Democratic Coexistence and Peace," said she had submitted an official request to the Supreme Court to reorganize the judicial system and called for a large-scale national consultation to develop a new criminal code. Rodríguez noted that the Amnesty Law, which has already helped more than 9,000 people, was the right tool for "reunification and tolerance," but also reported discovered violations in its application, including instances of corruption among judges who "dare to take money for amnesty." The acting president emphasized that she demanded immediate measures against such judges, saying: "Some crimes are excluded from amnesty, and we will address them within the framework of the peace program." The request to "reformat" the judiciary and the national consultation are intended to create a new criminal justice system that will put an end to abuses.

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Full version: Delcy Rodríguez anuncia reforma judicial tras denuncias de corrupción en procesos de amnistía

Pakistan Plays a Neutral Mediating Role in the Middle East

Commander of the Pakistan Army Asim Munir said that Islamabad is acting as a neutral mediator in the Middle East and is seeking to establish a durable peace. He emphasized that the country is doing everything possible for the success of the mediation mission and intends to continue doing so. The statement came amid growing anticipation of Tehran's response to a U.S. proposal to end the conflict, which adds tension to regional diplomacy.

U.S. President Donald Trump expressed hope that Iran would reply to Washington’s proposal in the near future. In an interview with a French TV channel he said, “We’ll see it soon.” Earlier, Secretary of State Marco Rubio suggested that a response would come within hours, but no clear signs of Iranian action followed. This divergence in timing increased concern among mediators and interested parties.

The Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs clarified that the response is still under review and will be announced after a final decision is made. Iranian state television quoted a ministry representative who said Tehran is considering the proposal “without regard to timelines or ultimatums,” demonstrating a thoughtful and independent approach to decision-making. Western media report that the U.S. draft includes easing sanctions in exchange for Iran halting uranium enrichment and resuming navigation through the Strait of Hormuz.

A representative of the Iranian armed forces warned some regional countries about the consequences of cooperating with the U.S. military, saying: “Any state that takes action against us will receive a harsh response.” He added that countries enforcing U.S. sanctions on Iran will face difficulties when transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran stressed that it retains the initiative despite Washington’s “provocative actions,” and promised a decisive response to any hostile military moves.

Iran denied reports of an actual maritime blockade, calling them a “media and propaganda attempt to weaken control over the Strait of Hormuz.” The representative noted that, according to international organizations’ data, Iran’s maritime trade continues unobstructed, and the country has already been able to prevent the passage of Israeli ships and seize some of them. At the same time, Tehran stated that it does not trust the adversary even during a ceasefire period and continues to strengthen its military potential, updating its “bank of targets,” which indicates readiness for any future threats.

Comments on the News

• Why is the Strait of Hormuz so important for the world economy, and why does Iran often use it as leverage in conflicts? - The Strait of Hormuz is a strategic chokepoint through which about 20–25% of the world’s oil passes (roughly 15–20 million barrels per day). By controlling one side of the strait, Iran can threaten to close it in response to sanctions or military actions, creating the risk of a sharp spike in energy prices and a global economic crisis, which makes it an effective lever with minimal military cost.
• What does “bank of targets” mean in the context of Iranian military strategy, and how does it relate to preparing for potential threats? - A “bank of targets” in Iranian military doctrine is a list of pre-reconnoitered and prioritized objects (military bases, ports, oil infrastructure, air defense systems) of a potential adversary (the U.S., Israel) that could be struck. It is an element of asymmetric deterrence: Iran prepares such lists for rapid response in case of armed conflict, demonstrating the ability to inflict significant damage.
• How does Iran justify its statements about preventing Israeli ships from passing through the Strait of Hormuz under international maritime law? - Iran refers to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), claiming it has the right to take measures in its territorial waters to ensure security, especially in times of conflict. However, international law generally guarantees freedom of navigation through straits used for international navigation, and it is difficult for Iran to legally justify a complete blockade of vessels flying another state’s flag without evidence of an actual threat. Such statements are often seen as political rhetoric rather than legally grounded positions.

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Full version: باكستان تواصل جهود الوساطة وإيران تحذر من التعاون مع الجيش الأمريكي

War with Iran Hit Oil Giants Unevenly

The US-Israeli war against Iran, which began on 28 February 2026, had an uneven impact on the largest oil companies in the first quarter. Although the fighting affected only one month of the reporting period, its consequences were already clearly reflected in financial results: some corporations benefited from the price spike, while others suffered heavy losses due to supply disruptions and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

According to the International Energy Agency, oil prices have experienced "severe volatility" since the start of the conflict. Supply interruptions and the halt of tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz pushed Brent to nearly $120 per barrel. Market strategist Jad Hariri told Al Jazeera that the war's impact was "extremely significant": the price of West Texas Intermediate soared by more than 100%, and gas prices also rose sharply.

The war’s effect on financial reporting manifested in three main ways: higher oil and gas prices supported producers' revenues; strong trading units and inventories allowed some players to profit from volatility; and operational disruptions and asset risks hit firms with a large presence in the Persian Gulf. Hariri stressed that figures would vary greatly due to reduced exports and higher freight and insurance costs.

UK-based BP recorded underlying profit of $3.2 billion (versus $1.38 billion a year earlier) thanks to successful trading operations, while the company did not report direct asset write-downs due to the war. French TotalEnergies reported net income of $5.4 billion but acknowledged shutdowns or cuts to production in Qatar, Iraq and offshore UAE zones, amounting to about 15% of its output.

ExxonMobil earned $4.2 billion but noted losses from financial hedges and foregone revenue due to delivery problems amid Middle Eastern instability. Chevron took $2.2 billion, affected by legal provisions and currency differences, while ConocoPhillips posted $2.3 billion with production declines due to forced shutdowns in Qatar. Italy’s Eni announced adjusted net profit of €1.3 billion, assuring that its exposure to risks is minimal.

Other companies demonstrated various adaptation strategies. Spain’s Repsol set aside €1.2 billion to build inventories to ensure supply continuity, while benefiting from flexible refining and trading. PetroChina and Sinopec reported record quarterly results — ¥48.33 billion and ¥17 billion respectively — benefiting from higher prices and stable domestic demand.

Overall, winners were companies that maintained export flows or were able to replace Middle Eastern supplies from other regions. By contrast, firms with reduced export volumes faced severe pressure despite high oil prices. The first quarter of 2026 was only a preliminary snapshot of the conflict’s effects, and many large asset write-downs may still appear in future reports.

News comments

• Why does closing the Strait of Hormuz so strongly affect world oil prices, and what percentage of global supplies passes through it? - The Strait of Hormuz is a strategic "narrow corridor" through which about 20–25% of the world’s oil passes (roughly 17–20 million barrels per day). Any threat of its closure triggers market panic because there are virtually no alternative routes to transport oil from the Persian Gulf. Even rumors of a blockade can lift prices by 10–20%, while an actual closure can cause a short-term spike to record highs.
• Before the 2026 war, Iran was one of the largest oil producers — what was the role of the state National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) in global exports and which countries were the main buyers? - NIOC (National Iranian Oil Company) controlled all exploration, production and export of oil in Iran. Before the war Iran exported about 2–2.5 million barrels per day, ranking fifth among OPEC countries. Main buyers were China (absorbing up to 60–70% of Iranian exports, often through "shadow" schemes to circumvent sanctions), as well as Syria, Turkey, India, Japan, South Korea and Southeast Asian countries. For some of them Iran was a key supplier because of discounts and preferential terms.
• Which countries, besides those mentioned in the article (for example China, Japan, India), are most dependent on oil shipments through the Strait of Hormuz, and how did the war affect their energy security? - In addition to the named countries, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand, Pakistan, as well as many African countries (including South Africa) and parts of Europe (especially Mediterranean states such as Italy, Greece, Spain) are critically dependent. For them Hormuz is virtually the only route for importing Middle Eastern oil. The 2026 war caused severe shortages and price increases for these countries: Asian economies faced factory disruptions, while Europe had to increase purchases from Africa and North America at much higher prices. Their energy security was seriously undermined, forcing urgent revisions of energy strategies, including building up strategic reserves.
• What long-term economic consequences could the war have for Iran itself, given its heavy dependence on oil revenues? - Long-term consequences are catastrophic: Iran could lose 80–90% of export revenues, as the war would destroy production and logistics infrastructure (terminals, tankers, ports). Oil revenues make up more than 60% of the budget and form the basis of foreign reserves. Their disappearance would lead to hyperinflation, widespread impoverishment, collapse of social programs and rising unemployment. Even after the war, restoring production and returning to pre-war levels could take 10–15 years due to damage and international sanctions. Without external assistance (for example from China or Russia), Iran risks becoming a "bankrupt oil state" and its government could lose legitimacy amid economic collapse.

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Full version: النتائج المالية لعمالقة النفط: أسعار الخام تنعش الأرباح والحرب تضر بالإمدادات

Delcy Rodríguez urged the private sector to self-supply electricity

Acting President of Venezuela Delcy Rodríguez appealed to manufacturers and private-sector entrepreneurs to increase their own electricity generation amid a record rise in national demand. Speaking at the XII National Poultry Congress in Caracas, she noted that a historic peak in consumption has been recorded over the past nine years, linked both to an improving economic situation in the country and to extreme weather conditions caused by abnormal heat. Rodríguez stressed the need for the population to use energy rationally and said that the government will present a Plan for the Restoration of the Power System at a meeting of the National Economic Council, inviting business circles to a dialogue and joint search for solutions for a full modernization of the infrastructure that can support the country’s growing economic momentum.

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Full version: Delcy Rodríguez solicitó al sector privado aumentar la autogeneración eléctrica

Secrets of Power in Iran: Who Really Rules After Khamenei’s Death

The Trump administration found itself confused by uncertainty over who is making key decisions in Iran. U.S. intelligence indicates that the new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, despite suffering serious wounds in the attack that killed his father in February 2026, is involved in crafting military and negotiation strategies. However, his isolation and refusal to use electronic devices, communicating only through personal meetings or handwritten notes, make his role unclear to outside observers.

In practice, the everyday affairs of the Iranian regime are run by senior commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. This creates a parallel and complex leadership structure in which real power may be concentrated elsewhere. One source noted that there is no conclusive evidence that Khamenei consistently issues real orders, but that cannot be disproved either. Such ambiguity has become a serious challenge for the Trump administration in determining who is authorized to negotiate an end to the conflict.

Economically, Iran, according to CIA estimates, may hold out another four months under the U.S. naval blockade without its economy collapsing completely. At the same time, officials acknowledge that the blockade inflicts “real and cumulative damage,” cutting off trade and depriving the country of revenue. Iran’s armed forces are also weakening, losing maritime capabilities. The White House emphasizes that “as the U.S. grows stronger, Iran weakens day by day” thanks to Washington’s “economic fury.”

U.S. policy seeks to exploit divisions within Iran’s leadership. The Trump administration believes it holds all the cards and aims to decisively dismantle Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Secretary of State Marco Rubio noted that the Iranian regime remains deeply divided and dysfunctional, which could impede any negotiations. Washington remains cautious about any ceasefire proposals, doubting the legitimacy and effectiveness of the current center of power.

On the battlefield, tensions in the Strait of Hormuz remain high despite a ceasefire agreement and talks in Islamabad that did not yield a final outcome. There are mutual accusations between the Iranian “Khatam al-Anbiya” command and U.S. forces of violating the quiet. After a short lull, new clashes and strikes on vessels from both sides followed, confirming the fragility of the truce and the high risk of renewed escalation.

Comments on the News

• Who is Mojtaba Khamenei and what role did he play in Iranian politics before becoming Supreme Leader after his father’s death? - Mojtaba Khamenei is the second son of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Before coming to power he did not hold official government posts, but for a long time was a key figure in the shadow structures of power. In particular, he oversaw religious endowments, influenced personnel decisions within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and maintained ties with conservative circles. His role grew as his father’s health declined, and he was considered a “gray cardinal” managing the transfer of power.

• What is the “Khatam al-Anbiya” command and why does it play a key role in Iranian military operations? - “Khatam al-Anbiya” is the unified command of the IRGC responsible for coordinating all of Iran’s military and missile operations. It was created to centralize command during the Iran–Iraq War and today controls strategic forces, including missile forces, air defense, and cyber units. Its key role stems from the fact that it plans overseas operations (for example, in Syria and Yemen) and provides protection for the nuclear program.

• Why is Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, alongside IRGC commanders, considered one of the real centers of power in the current Iranian leadership? - Ghalibaf has direct influence through his position as speaker, but his real power is based on a long career in the IRGC (he was an air force commander) and his closeness to the Supreme Leader. Together with IRGC commanders he represents the military-political elite that controls key sectors of the economy (through foundations and sanctions circumvention) and makes security decisions, often bypassing civilian institutions. This makes them de facto “power centers” dominating reformists and technocrats.

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Full version: واشنطن تبحث عن صاحب القرار في طهران

Washington and Tehran Diverge in Assessments of the Strait of Hormuz Crisis

The United States and Iran offer directly opposing interpretations of recent military incidents in the Persian Gulf. The American administration insists its strikes were limited and purely defensive, while Tehran accuses Washington of violating the ceasefire. Tensions in the Strait of Hormuz continue to rise despite both sides' efforts to avoid a full-scale conflict.

Security expert Richard Waits described President Donald Trump’s threats as “no more than a light slap.” According to him, Washington’s real goal is to avoid major escalation and present its actions as a “defensive maneuver, limited in time and space.” Waits emphasized that the strikes were carried out in response to attacks on ships, not as a prelude to an invasion or the seizure of Iranian islands.

Iranian researcher Abbas Aslani noted that Tehran views the American moves as a “calculated, limited escalation.” In his view, neither side is interested in a wide regional war, but the situation has reached a negotiation deadlock. Aslani added that Iran will not accept “complete capitulation” without reciprocal concessions from the United States and will continue to adhere to a policy of “resistance economy.”

Observers point out the contradictory rhetoric from Washington, which simultaneously issues threats and calls for dialogue. On one hand, Trump speaks of a “steel wall” naval blockade; on the other, he demands an immediate Iranian response to American proposals. Waits believes this is an attempt to keep Tehran at the negotiating table through calibrated pressure, which nevertheless reveals the White House’s blurred objectives.

Former Fifth Fleet commander John Miller states that the hastily concluded ceasefire remains fragile and full of legal ambiguities. Both sides, he says, are “doing a good job” of preventing total conflict, but mutual violations continue. Miller expressed hope that a full reopening of the Strait of Hormuz will become possible when the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps stops interfering with navigation.

In the end, the crisis demonstrates a protracted confrontation with stalled negotiations. The US has suspended implementation of the “Iran Freedom Initiative,” announcing “significant progress” toward a comprehensive agreement with Iran. In practice, new rules of “deterrence” are emerging, in which each side maneuvers between demonstrating limited force and keeping channels for dialogue open to avoid sliding into full-scale war.

Comments on the news

• What is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and what role does it play in Iran’s political system and control of shipping in the Persian Gulf? — The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is an elite military-political formation created after the 1979 revolution to protect the theocratic regime. In Iran’s political system the IRGC functions as a “state within a state”: its members control key economic sectors (oil, construction, telecommunications), have representation in parliament and councils, and report directly to the Supreme Leader. Regarding shipping in the Persian Gulf, the IRGC, through its naval forces (IRGC Navy), exerts control over the Strait of Hormuz — a strategic chokepoint for global oil shipments. This control is used as a tool of pressure during conflicts (for example, threatening to block the strait in response to sanctions).

• What is the essence of Iran’s “resistance economy” policy and how does it differ from traditional economic development models? — The “resistance economy” (economy of muqawama) is a strategy introduced by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei as a long-term response to sanctions and external pressure. Its essence is minimizing dependence on imports, developing domestic production, relying on local resources, and diversifying exports (away from oil). Unlike traditional liberal models that encourage free trade and global integration, the “resistance economy” bets on self-sufficiency, state regulation of key sectors, and support for small businesses through Islamic financial instruments. It also involves active use of so-called “sanctions loopholes” (barter deals, cryptocurrencies, parallel import).

• What was the US "Iran Freedom Initiative," and why was its implementation suspended? — The “Iran Freedom Initiative” typically refers to a package of programs launched by the George W. Bush administration in the 2000s aimed at supporting Iranian opposition groups, NGOs, and independent media through structures like the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and Radio Farda. Its stated goal was to promote democratic change in Iran. However, implementation was suspended for several reasons: 1) the programs faced severe censorship and suppression by Iranian authorities, making them ineffective; 2) after scandals around funding opposition (for example, following the 2009 elections), the US revised its approach, focusing on less risky humanitarian and educational projects; 3) after the 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA), the emphasis shifted to diplomacy, and direct “freedom” projects were wound down to avoid provoking Tehran.

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Full version: اشتباكات هرمز.. هل تُرسم قواعد "الردع" الجديدة بالبارود؟

Trump's energy policy accelerates investments in Venezuela

Jarrod Agen, Executive Director of the U.S. National Council for Energy Dominance, said that the Trump administration's policy is actively encouraging American oil and gas companies to make major investments in Venezuela. At a White House meeting with representatives of leading energy corporations, including Chevron and Exxon, Agen directly urged them to develop the world's largest oil reserves in that South American country. According to him, Exxon has already begun operations and is sending personnel to Venezuela, while Chevron is reaching record production levels. These steps, the official noted, are a direct result of the new course of the U.S. government, which has signed three major agreements with independent operators to open up and increase production, including the active extraction of natural gas.

Agen emphasized that all these processes are unfolding within the framework of the "Trump speed" strategy and are exactly in line with the president's forecasts. He linked the intensification in Venezuela to an overall energy policy aimed at increasing production in various regions, including Alaska, where similar steps are already being taken. At the same time, the official noted that Texas is now showing record figures, reaching a historic peak in crude oil exports. Thus, bringing American companies to Venezuelan fields is seen as a logical continuation of the course toward strengthening U.S. energy dominance and expanding production beyond traditional areas.

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Full version: Jarrod Agen: Política energética de Trump acelera inversiones en Venezuela

U.S.-Iran Clash in the Strait of Hormuz: Mutual Accusations

On Thursday a dangerous escalation occurred in the Strait of Hormuz: the United States and Iran exchanged accusations of initiating hostilities. The incident became a serious test for the ceasefire regime that has been in effect for a month. Tehran later said the situation had normalized, while Washington emphasized that it did not seek escalation but acted in self-defense. Both sides presented conflicting accounts of who started the confrontation and issued threats and promises of retaliation.

According to Iran, as reported by the semi-official Tasnim agency citing a military source, events began with a U.S. attack on an Iranian oil tanker, after which American warships were fired upon. Three U.S. destroyers were struck by missiles and drones near the strait. Explosions were heard on Qeshm Island, in Bandar Abbas, and in Hormozgan province. The Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters stated that Iranian forces struck back at U.S. ships east of the strait and south of the port of Chabahar, and also accused the U.S. of attacking civilian targets with the support of “regional countries.”

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), in turn, said that Iran launched missiles, drones, and small boats at U.S. destroyers during their transit through the strait, and that U.S. forces “neutralized the threats” and struck Iranian facilities responsible for the attack. President Donald Trump wrote on social media that Iran fired missiles at the destroyers, but the military “easily” shot them down. Officials confirmed that U.S. ships and helicopters carried out “multi-layered strikes in self-defense.”

Regarding casualties and damage, Iran’s Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters claimed it inflicted significant damage on U.S. ships, while CENTCOM confirmed that U.S. assets were not hit. In an interview with ABC Radio, Trump said that the three destroyers were not damaged and that the Iranian attackers suffered “serious losses.” Iranian television, meanwhile, reported that U.S. strikes on cities and southern islands did not cause casualties, and that the situation in several provinces had normalized.

Concerning the ceasefire regime, Iran accused the U.S. of violating the agreement and promised to respond, while Trump said the truce remains in place and that he is continuing negotiations with Tehran. Trump described the retaliatory strikes on Iranian targets as a “light slap” and warned: “As we crushed the Iranians today, we will crush them with even greater force and brutality in the future if they do not sign the agreement quickly.” He also called Iran’s leadership “abnormal,” saying that “any normal country would have let those destroyers pass.”

The incident took place against the backdrop of earlier clashes following the announcement of a ceasefire on April 8. A few days ago U.S. forces reported destroying Iranian boats and intercepting missiles and UAVs as Iran attempted to disrupt a U.S. initiative to reopen shipping in the strait. Despite this, diplomatic contacts and message exchanges continue. Iranian representative Ismail Baghaei said Tehran is reviewing messages via Pakistan’s mediation but has “not yet reached a result and has not given a reply to the American side.” Trump, for his part, said the agreement could be concluded “any day, or it might not be,” and that the Iranians “want it more than I do.”

There was no official statement from the Israeli government, but Israeli sources were quick to deny any involvement in the clash. Channel 12 reported that “Israel has nothing to do with what is happening in Iran.” Israeli Army Radio, citing sources, expressed the view that the incident was limited and concluded. Thus, regional reactions were restrained, while all eyes remain on developments in this strategically important strait for shipping and energy.

Comments on the News

• What is the significance of the “Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters” within Iran’s armed forces structure and how does it participate in the defense of the Strait of Hormuz? — The Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters is the highest command center of Iran’s armed forces, reporting directly to the Supreme Leader. It coordinates all operations, including the defense of the Strait of Hormuz, where Iran employs a combination of coastal missile systems, minefields, and drones to control shipping, viewing the strait as a strategic defensive line against potential threats from the U.S. and its allies.
• Why is Pakistan acting as a mediator in talks between the U.S. and Iran, and what is its role in regional diplomacy? — Pakistan acts as a mediator due to its unique ties: it has close relations with Iran (through its Shiite population and shared border), and it also maintains alliances with the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. This allows it to serve as a neutral bridge for dialogue, especially on the nuclear deal and regional security, since Pakistan has an interest in stability in the Persian Gulf because of its energy needs and its fight against terrorism along its borders.
• What is the “ceasefire regime of April 8” mentioned in the article, and what were its main terms? — Without the specific article context it is impossible to provide an exact answer, as the “ceasefire regime of April 8” could refer to different conflicts (for example, the 2022 Yemen truce or a de-escalation agreement in Syria). It is recommended to clarify the source for an accurate interpretation.

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Full version: من بدأ الهجوم؟ روايتان أمريكية وإيرانية لاشتباك مضيق هرمز

Trump optimistic: nuclear deal with Iran "very likely"

US President Donald Trump said that reaching an agreement with Iran that would end the conflict in the Middle East is "very likely." He confirmed that Washington held "very productive talks" with Tehran over the past 24 hours. At the same time, Trump warned that if no agreement is reached the US will be forced to "return to intense bombing." The American leader also stressed that any agreement must include a commitment from Iran not to operate underground nuclear facilities, denying rumors that enriched uranium would be handed over to the United States.

According to media leaks, the draft agreement is a one-page memorandum of understanding. It envisages Iran freezing its uranium enrichment program in exchange for the lifting of sanctions and the release of billions of dollars in frozen Iranian assets. Later, Tehran may be permitted to enrich up to 3.67% — although Trump said he does not confirm this provision. The parties are also expected to lift restrictions on shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.

Inside Iran the agreement meets resistance. Parliament Speaker Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf called the American approach an attempt to force Tehran into "capitulation." Foreign Ministry representative Esmail Bagai said the proposal is still being studied and that a response will be transmitted via Pakistani intermediaries. Talks are moving slowly because every message must be approved by the Supreme Leader, who, according to sources, is hiding for security reasons.

Reaction in the region is mixed. Israeli officials warned that the deal could become a "lifeline for the Iranian regime," limiting enrichment for only 15 years while leaving Tehran's missile arsenal intact. At the same time, Pakistan's Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif welcomed the "positive momentum" from the pause in hostilities and thanked Trump for his "bold leadership."

Earlier Trump announced the suspension of Operation "Project Freedom" in the Strait of Hormuz, noting "significant progress" in the talks. However, he repeatedly emphasized that the military option remains on the table: "If they don't agree, the bombings will start — much more powerful than before." The fate of the deal remains unclear: Iran continues internal consultations, and Washington is awaiting a response before the end of Trump's visit to China.

Comments on the news

• What powers does the Supreme Leader of Iran have in deciding on a nuclear deal and why is his approval considered necessary? - According to the Iranian constitution, the Supreme Leader (rahbar) is the highest state authority, possessing the final right to approve or reject any strategic decisions, including a nuclear deal. He controls the National Security Council, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and key judicial bodies, making his approval legally and politically obligatory for implementing any international agreements.

• What is the significance of the Strait of Hormuz for global energy security and what role does Iran play in the region? - The Strait of Hormuz is a strategic narrow passage through which about 20–25% of the world's oil shipments pass. Iran, which controls the northern shore of the strait, has the ability to block shipping, creating a critical vulnerability for global energy security. Tehran has used this threat as a tool of political pressure, particularly during periods of heightened tensions with the West.

• Who is Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf and how does his position reflect internal political disagreements in Iran over a possible nuclear deal? - Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf is the speaker of the Iranian parliament (Majles) and a former mayor of Tehran, representing the conservative wing. His criticism of the government over the nuclear deal highlights the split between reformists (President Pezeshkian) and conservatives (Qalibaf), with the latter insisting on a tougher negotiating stance and demanding concrete guarantees from the West on sanction relief.

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Full version: ترمب يتحدث عن اتفاق "محتمل جدا" وطهران تراجع المقترح الأمريكي

Diosdado Cabello announces second phase of national mobilization

The secretary-general of the ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), Diosdado Cabello, announced the launch of a second phase of mobilization activities following the conclusion of the so-called national pilgrimage. The new phase will focus on collecting proposals and initiatives from organized structures of civil society, including professional guilds and social groups. According to the politician, these meetings are aimed at systematizing the ideas of the Venezuelan people to form a national agenda, as well as continuing demands for the lifting of international financial restrictions, which the population considers the main obstacle to the country’s development.

The statement was made as part of the May political program, when street protests against economic sanctions are taking place across Venezuela. Cabello emphasized that the state will keep channels of communication with the public open to hear all demands. Party leadership will gradually inform about the schedule and the specific localities where new sectoral meetings will be held, intended to bring together the efforts of state institutions and public organizations to coordinate further actions.

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Full version: Diosdado Cabello anuncia segunda fase de la

US and Iran: frozen billions and terms of a deal

The confrontation between Washington and Tehran since the 1979 Islamic Revolution has gone beyond politics, affecting the economy and culture. One of the key instruments of pressure has been the huge sums of Iranian assets frozen by the US under sanctions. With the start of the latest war, talks have resumed about the possible lifting of these restrictions as part of a deal. President Donald Trump promised to lift sanctions in exchange for signing an agreement, and according to Axios, a future pact could require Iran to stop enriching uranium, in return for access to billions of dollars of frozen funds.

The history of the asset freezes began in 1979 after the seizure of hostages at the US embassy and intensified amid the nuclear crisis. According to the US Institute of Peace, the volume of blocked funds reaches $100 billion. Washington deprived the Central Bank of Iran of access to foreign-exchange reserves, which severely complicated control of the rial exchange rate, financing of imports, and put pressure on the economy. In 2015, under Barack Obama, the nuclear deal allowed Tehran to recover part of its funds, but Donald Trump’s withdrawal from the agreement in 2018 and the reimposition of sanctions wiped out those gains.

Most of the frozen Iranian money is held in oil-importing countries, as well as in payments for weapons ordered during the Shah’s era that were never delivered. Key holders of the assets include China, Japan, India and South Korea. After 2018 Iran tried to conclude barter deals to buy goods not on sanction lists, but these countries feared US retaliation. An additional complication is Iraq’s dependence on Iranian electricity, which adds regional contradictions to the management of these funds.

Iran’s economy is experiencing a severe crisis, exacerbated by the war. The rial officially fell to 1.77 million to the dollar, inflation reached 73.5% annually (according to The Guardian), and food prices soared by 115%. Unemployment is especially acute among young people: according to Deputy Labor Minister Gholam Hossein Mohammadi, the conflict destroyed more than one million jobs, and another two million were lost indirectly. The minimum wage is about 170 million rials (~$96), and a further 4 million Iranians are expected to fall below the poverty line.

The release of frozen funds and lifting of sanctions could give Tehran a powerful resource for recovery. These funds exceed 20% of the country’s 2024 GDP (about $475 billion according to the World Bank). Oil expert Mamdouh Salama emphasizes that the weakness of Iran’s economy is a direct consequence of sanctions, and their removal would allow high growth rates through oil and gas exports. In addition, Iran could expand cooperation with China, where about $20 billion of its assets are frozen.

The possibility of unfreezing funds remains hostage to political and technical conditions. Tehran could direct them to finance imports, support foreign-exchange reserves, pay wages, rebuild infrastructure, and develop energy. However, strict Washington demands, the fear of US reprisals among asset-holding countries, and difficulties in banking oversight stand in the way. The proposed deal ties the lifting of sanctions to the freezing of the nuclear program. Thus, the economic benefits of the return of billions are large, but attainable only through a fragile political compromise and precise fulfillment of agreements.

Comments on the news

• Why is Iraq dependent on Iranian electricity, and how does this complicate the management of frozen Iranian assets? - Iraq suffers from a chronic electricity shortage due to aging infrastructure and instability. Iran supplies Iraq with thousands of megawatts annually. To pay, Iraq transfers funds to accounts in banks in third countries (for example, in Oman or Iraq), but because of US sanctions these funds are “frozen” and cannot be transferred directly to Iran. This creates a vicious circle: Iran receives revenue but cannot use it, which preserves Iraq’s dependence while limiting Tehran’s freedom of action.

• Which Shah-era weapons were never delivered to Iran, and how did this money become frozen as a result of sanctions? - In the 1970s Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi ordered large batches of arms from the US, including F-14 Tomcat fighters, Chinook helicopters, and tanks. After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, deliveries were halted. Iran paid advances that remained in American banks. With the imposition of sanctions these funds (estimated variously from $400 million to several billion dollars) were frozen. Disputes over returning the money continue to this day, as the US refuses to supply the weapons or return the funds because of the sanctions regime.

• How is the Iranian government fighting the fall of the rial and hyperinflation with only limited access to foreign-exchange reserves? - The government uses several methods: introducing multiple exchange rates (a preferential rate for food and medicine imports and a market rate for other goods), printing money (which fuels inflation), tight control over banking transfers, and attempts to peg the rial to a basket of currencies. However, frozen assets abroad (estimated at $100–150 billion) are unavailable, so the government is forced to rely on oil revenues circumventing sanctions (for example, shadow sales to China) and import restrictions, which only temporarily stabilize the exchange rate but do not solve the problem of structural inflation.

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Full version: مليارات مجمدة.. هل يغيّر رفع العقوبات الأمريكية المحتمل وجه الاقتصاد الإيراني؟

Global internet shutdown in Iran paralyzes economy

The decision to impose a nationwide internet shutdown in Iran has fundamentally altered the country’s economic activity. War intersected with the fragility of the economic structure, placing entire sectors under sudden restrictions that disrupted market processes and disorganized accustomed workflows dependent on digital communications. According to an Al Jazeera report by Amer Lafy, the internet outage directly affected the details of production and trade, forcing thousands of companies to face unprecedented challenges in managing business in an environment deprived of digital stability. An example from a food factory in a Tehran suburb, cited by Sadr ad-Din Niaurani, illustrates how external marketing channels were disrupted and the ability to close deals—previously conducted via electronic platforms—declined, despite thirty years of experience.

Many Iranian companies rely on digital services in their daily operations. The blockage caused disruptions in sales and distribution systems and damaged supply chains connected to external networks. Before the war, a stable internet connection allowed some factories to expand their international presence and increase sales by about 40%. Today, firms are keeping staff despite financial pressure, trying to avoid losing accumulated expertise. This picture repeats across many sectors, reflecting limited ability to adapt to a prolonged outage.

According to estimates by the Iran Chamber of Commerce, direct losses from the blockage amount to about $40 million per day, while the total cost including indirect effects reaches roughly $80 million per day. These figures reflect additional pressure on an economy already suffering from slowing growth and high unemployment, increasing risks to business stability and the competitiveness of various sectors. Experts warn that continued shutdowns could force some companies to scale back operations or exit the market entirely.

Economist Peyman Molavi believes the digital economy has become the foundation of modern activity, and its absence leads to job losses and reduced market efficiency, especially in economies with existing structural problems. The consequences extend to small and medium-sized enterprises that depend on digital platforms to attract customers, increasing the likelihood of their closure due to falling revenues and rising operating costs. These pressures exacerbate the social situation, causing loss of daily income for broad segments of the population.

Iranian authorities justify the shutdown citing security concerns related to the war, pointing to the risk of networks being used for cyberattacks or threats to critical infrastructure. This led to broad restrictions on access to the global internet. In response, the government has increased reliance on the domestic network and launched the "Internet Pro" service, which provides limited access to certain categories such as industrial enterprises, healthcare, and universities. However, the coverage of this service does not include most affected economic activities, leaving companies vulnerable amid ongoing restrictions.

Economists warn of long-term consequences if the blockade continues, including deeper impacts on production and transport chains, reduced investor confidence in the business environment, and possibly an accelerated exit of some companies or their reorientation toward external alternatives. The economic picture shows a decline in the pace of digital activity, which had been an important source of growth in recent years, while the lack of international connectivity limits this sector’s ability to support the macroeconomy. The future of economic activity remains tied to how long internet restrictions last and whether the government can find a practical balance between security requirements and business continuity during this difficult period both domestically and abroad.

Comments on the story

• What role does the Iran Chamber of Commerce play in the country’s economic policy and why do its damage estimates carry weight? — The Iran Chamber of Commerce, Industries, Mines and Agriculture (ICCIMA) is a quasi-governmental organization that brings together the private sector and plays a key role in shaping economic policy. It advises the government on trade, sanctions, and regulation, and its damage estimates are valued because the chamber relies on data directly from businesses, reflecting the real impact of decisions on entrepreneurs. In the context of Iran’s isolation due to sanctions, its voice becomes especially influential as it represents the interests of those suffering from restrictions.

• What is the Iranian domestic network and how does the "Internet Pro" service attempt to replace the global internet for business? — The Iranian domestic network, or the National Information Network (NIN), is an infrastructure isolated from the global internet, created by the government to control traffic and ensure cybersecurity. The "Internet Pro" service is a paid business product that provides limited but faster access to vetted international resources (for example, for email or financial operations), effectively replacing the open global internet for companies. It legalizes partial access to the world network but with censorship, intended to reduce economic damage from full shutdowns.

• What precedents of internet shutdowns in Iran (for example, in 2019) explain today’s government decision, and how are they usually linked to security threats? — The most notable precedent was the November 2019 internet blackout after protests over a fuel price increase. At that time, authorities completely cut off the world wide web for several days to prevent protesters from coordinating and from sharing videos of the protests abroad. This is directly connected to security threats: Iran views any mass demonstrations (often economically motivated) as a threat to the regime, and internet shutdowns are used as a tool of "digital suffocation" to isolate protests. Similar decisions are made during spikes in tension, such as during cyberattacks or regional crises, to maintain control over information.

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Full version: 80 مليون دولار خسائر يومية.. حجب الإنترنت يخنق اقتصاد إيران

Venezuela and the Red Cross Confirm Humanitarian Principles

Acting President of Venezuela Delcy Rodríguez held a meeting with the head of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Kate Forbes, during which the parties discussed a joint work program and technical projects within the republic, guided by the principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence. This meeting was part of efforts to adhere to international humanitarian law and to unite efforts to protect life based on universal humanitarian values.

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Full version: Suma de voluntades: Venezuela y la Federación Internacional de la Cruz Roja ratifican principios humanitarios

Axios: US and Iran Close to Deal to End War

According to US officials and informed sources, the White House believes it is one step away from signing a one-page memorandum of understanding with Iran that would end the war and create a basis for more detailed negotiations on the nuclear program. Tehran is expected to respond to the key points within the next 48 hours, and this is the closest the parties have been to a deal since the start of the conflict, Axios reports.

Under the draft memorandum, Iran agrees to temporarily halt uranium enrichment, and the US would lift sanctions and unfreeze Iranian assets worth billions of dollars. Both sides would also agree to remove restrictions on ships passing through the Strait of Hormuz. The document consists of 14 points, and the talks are being conducted by US special envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner directly with Iranian representatives and through intermediaries.

The memorandum envisages a declaration of an end to the war in the region and the start of a 30-day phase of negotiations on a detailed agreement. During this period, Iran’s restrictions on shipping and the US maritime blockade would be gradually lifted. However, US forces would retain the right to restore the blockade or resume military action if the talks collapse. A Pakistani source familiar with the consultations also confirmed the progress.

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Full version: أكسيوس: اتفاق وشيك بين واشنطن وطهران لإنهاء الحرب

US froze $340M in cryptocurrency linked to Iran

The US government has frozen more than $340 million in cryptocurrency belonging to the Central Bank of Iran in recent weeks. The funds were held as digital assets on several platforms, but the Donald Trump administration, through the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), was able to block and seize them. The success of the operation is explained by the fact that the assets were in the USDT stablecoin issued by Tether — an American corporation subject to US law.

Iran chose a not particularly secure form of storage: USDT is pegged to the dollar and is issued by a company registered in the US. Washington simply demanded that Tether freeze the wallets and confiscate the funds. Had the assets been held in Bitcoin or other decentralized coins, the government would not have had the same leverage. This case clearly shows that the state's pressure is not directed at blockchain technology itself, but at its weak links — companies and platforms connected to the real world.

Blockchain technology functions as a transparent ledger of transactions, not as a shield for anonymity. All movements between wallets are recorded publicly, albeit under pseudonyms. However, there are tools and platforms that can trace addresses and link them to real identities. That is precisely what helped US authorities quickly identify the Iranian wallets and block their contents.

Control over cryptocurrencies is exercised through centralized access points: stablecoin issuers, exchanges and swap services. The US can successfully pressure Tether and USDT, but its power is limited with respect to truly decentralized networks or companies outside its jurisdiction. Therefore, authorities prefer to target not the technology, but the "points of contact" with the traditional financial system — exchanges, banks and fiat on/off‑ramp platforms.

The answer to the question "Is cryptocurrency safe?" depends on the specific asset and how it is stored. Decentralized coins like Bitcoin are relatively protected from state intervention, but stablecoins and assets on centralized platforms are vulnerable. Storing funds on hardware wallets like Ledger provides more security than leaving them on large exchanges, which can be hacked or sanctioned. Technological decentralization is not a panacea if the assets are still linked to traditional finance through human and institutional elements.

Comments on the news

• Why did Iran choose the USDT stablecoin to store state funds rather than more decentralized cryptocurrencies, despite the known risk of freezing? - Iran likely preferred USDT because of its stability relative to the US dollar, which is critically important for preserving the purchasing power of state funds amid high rial inflation. Decentralized cryptocurrencies (for example, Bitcoin) are too volatile to serve as reserves. The risk of Tether freezing is offset by control over wallets and the possibility of using hidden addresses or mixers to complicate tracking by the US.

• How do Iranian citizens and companies typically access cryptocurrencies under strict international sanctions? - Access is arranged through informal channels: P2P exchanges on Telegram or WhatsApp where traders agree deals directly; local crypto platforms (for example, Nobitex or Wallex) that operate only within Iran; and by buying cryptocurrencies for cash from local dealers. Due to sanctions, international exchanges (Binance, Coinbase) block Iranian users, so the main methods become offline exchange or using VPNs to register on exchanges.

• What role does the Central Bank of Iran play in using cryptocurrencies to bypass financial restrictions, and what other such attempts are known? - The Central Bank of Iran (CBI) legalized crypto mining as an industry (2019) and uses cryptocurrencies for foreign trade settlements, bypassing the SWIFT banking system. Known attempts include launching a state stablecoin "PayMon" (pegged to the rial), as well as talks with Russia about creating a joint cryptocurrency for trade based on a "gold standard." In addition, Iran actively uses crypto exchanges to convert oil revenues into USDT and to purchase imports via chains of crypto transactions.

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Full version: مطاردة في عالم الـ"بلوك تشين".. هكذا نجحت أمريكا بتجميد أصول إيرانية مشفرة

Venezuela: full supply and record regional growth

Acting President of Venezuela Delcy Rodríguez stated that the country is fully supplied with goods across its territory and presented optimistic economic forecasts. According to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the country's GDP is expected to grow by 6.5% in 2026, which would be the highest rate in the region. Rodríguez noted that in the first quarter the availability of products on store shelves increased by 9%, and domestic consumption over the first four months of the year jumped by as much as 31.1%.

To consolidate the positive trend, the government is revising agreements between the agro-industrial sector and primary producers. The main goal, Rodríguez said, is to ensure the uninterrupted functioning of supply chains and, most importantly, to prevent speculation and rising inflation. Under the "Community Economy Plan," launched in January, the first results are already visible: increased plantings of corn, rice, coffee and legumes. These measures are aimed at protecting citizens' purchasing power and fulfilling the population's socio-economic rights.

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Full version: Delcy Rodríguez: Venezuela registra abastecimiento pleno y proyecta el mayor crecimiento económico de la región para 2026

Iran warns of new escalation in the Strait of Hormuz

Speaker of the Iranian parliament Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf stated that the United States and its allies have violated the ceasefire regime and established a blockade of Iranian ports, endangering the safety of maritime shipping and the transport of energy carriers. In a post on the social network X he emphasized that a new situation is forming in the Strait of Hormuz, and that maintaining the current state of affairs is becoming unsustainable for Washington. His statement came amid rising mutual threats and increased naval operations in the region.

Head of Iran’s judiciary Gholamhossein Mohseni-Eje’i warned that the enemy is focused on applying economic pressure, and the country will respond harshly to anyone who attempts to exploit the situation for their own interests. These words confirm Tehran’s determination to firmly confront any economic and political challenges. At the same time, diplomatic calls for de-escalation are coming from a number of regional powers.

Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif called for adherence to the ceasefire between Washington and Tehran, noting that this would create the necessary diplomatic space for further dialogue. Meanwhile Israeli media report rising tensions: additional U.S. aircraft are arriving in Israel, and the country’s military is on heightened alert. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is holding continuous security consultations, preparing for any development.

Fox News, citing U.S. officials, reported that the United States is now “closer to resuming large-scale combat operations against Iran than 24 hours ago.” According to sources, the decision whether military action will resume depends on the U.S. president and Iranian leaders. It is emphasized that U.S. armed forces are fully prepared to respond and have already been rearmed.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said the events in the Strait of Hormuz demonstrate clearly that “there is no military solution to the political crisis.” He called the American operation “Project Liberty” nothing other than “a dead-end project” and warned the U.S. and the UAE against being drawn into the conflict by unscrupulous parties. Mutual accusations of attacks continue in the region: the UAE reported intercepting missiles and drones, while Iran said it fired warning shots at a warship, and Washington claims to have sunk six Iranian boats. The Strait of Hormuz remains a key flashpoint, where Iran uses its strategic position and the U.S. responds with a naval blockade.

Comments on the news

• Why is the Strait of Hormuz considered strategically important for global energy security, and how does Iran use its geographic position in this region? – The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow maritime passage through which about 20–25% of the world’s oil shipments and a significant portion of liquefied natural gas (LNG) transit. Any disruptions in its operation lead to spikes in energy prices and threaten economic stability. Iran uses its position to exert pressure on neighboring countries and world powers: for example, by threatening to close the strait in response to sanctions, conducting military exercises, or detaining commercial vessels. This gives Tehran leverage in negotiations without resorting to direct military conflict.

• What role does Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf play in Iran’s political system, and how representative are his statements of the country’s official position? – Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf is the speaker of the Iranian parliament (Majlis) and a former mayor of Tehran. He is considered a conservative politician close to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, though he is not part of the senior clergy. His statements generally align with Iran’s official line, especially on foreign policy issues, but can be less diplomatic and more aimed at a domestic audience. The final position of the country is determined by the Supreme Leader, so Ghalibaf’s words should be seen as the view of an influential, but not sole, authority.

• What are the economic and political relations between Iran and the UAE, and why have the UAE become involved in the current conflict around the Strait of Hormuz? – Economically, the UAE and Iran have long-standing trade ties, primarily through Dubai, which serves as a transit hub for Iranian goods and re-export. Politically, relations are complicated: the UAE supports Arab Sunni monarchies and holds territorial claims (the islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs), but it also seeks pragmatic dialogue with Tehran. The UAE is drawn into the conflict over the Strait of Hormuz because of its dependence on imports that transit this route and its role as a major trading hub. When Iran threatens the strait, the UAE fears disruptions to oil and goods supplies, forcing it to balance between American allies and Iranian influence.

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Full version: طهران تحذر من التصعيد وواشنطن تواصل الضغط في هرمز

Latin America Alarmed: Trump's "Proyecto Libertad" and Strait of Hormuz Tensions

News from Venezuela portrays "Proyecto Libertad" as a new phase in American maritime policy: a plan to escort ships under U.S. leadership raises questions about budget spending, the militarization of diplomacy, and the risks of escalation amid the conflict between the U.S., Israel, and Iran. Commentators note that the operation is more likely to sharpen than to calm the situation in the Persian Gulf: pressure on trade routes, coercion of other navies to alter course, and the threat of strikes on allies create the risk of widening a local conflict. Broadcasts and articles discuss the durability of temporary truces, the likelihood of long‑range missile strikes, and the strategic logic of force demonstration that may undermine claims to stability and intensify anti‑Israeli and anti‑American sentiments on both sides of the Atlantic. This piece was prepared based on publications from www.lanacion.com.py (Paraguay), www.izquierdadiario.es (Spain) and video materials on www.youtube.com (Spain).

Venezuela, Hormuz and Trump's "Proyecto Libertad": oil, sanctions and the fragile U.S. hegemony

In Caracas, news about U.S. plans to escort ships in the Strait of Hormuz, Iranian missile strikes on U.S. allies' infrastructure and Washington's retaliatory actions long ago stopped being a "foreign agenda." And it is not only the principled anti‑imperialist rhetoric of the Bolivarian regime. For a country living under sanctions and dependent on oil sales, Hormuz, Tehran and the White House are directly tied to the price per barrel, budget stability and the room for Caracas's political maneuvering.

From Paraguay to Spain, from moderate outlets to leftist portals and business TV channels, analysis of the Iran‑U.S. confrontation provides material for a Venezuelan reading. Articles about Donald Trump's "Proyecto Libertad" and the military "protection" of Hormuz — such as the La Nación piece "EE. UU. escoltará barcos en el estrecho de Ormuz" (link), the analysis on the Spanish left portal Izquierda Diario "Trump e Irán: la guerra que desnuda la fragilidad de la hegemonía estadounidense" (link), and the Negocios TV video "Irán bombardea con misiles Emiratos Árabes Unidos, EEUU contraataca y Europa avisa" (link) — form a coherent narrative in Venezuela: the U.S.–Iran conflict as a test for the global energy market and a symbol of weakening American hegemony, opening both opportunities and risks for Caracas.

The American plan "Proyecto Libertad" and the Hormuz question

La Nación reports the launch by Washington of an operation called "Proyecto Libertad," under which the United States will escort ships of other countries blocked in the Strait of Hormuz. According to the article, Trump promised to "guiar sus barcos de manera segura… para que puedan continuar con sus negocios libre y eficazmente" — to "guide their ships safely… so they can continue their business freely and efficiently" (source). The official message: protecting freedom of navigation and world trade.

From the Venezuelan perspective such phrasing invites irony. In Caracas "freedom and efficiency of trade" have long been contrasted with the sanctions and "blockades" that, according to the government, Washington uses against Venezuelan oil and the financial system. The fact that the U.S. simultaneously declares protection of sea lanes and enforces its own blockade of Iranian ports is read in Caracas as confirmation of double standards: "free trade" — for allies and the "right" regimes; sanctions and tanker seizures — for Iran, Venezuela and other "disobedient" states.

The operation in the Strait is important to the average Venezuelan for at least two reasons. First, Hormuz is a key choke point of global oil flow. Any military activity there, any prospect of blockades or escort operations promises oil price spikes. In a country where the budget, social programs and even political stability largely depend on PDVSA revenues, such news is perceived almost like an update on the national currency. In the short term, escalation in Hormuz could mean price increases and an opportunity for Caracas to earn more per barrel, especially amid partial easing of some sanctions. In the long term — a reason for the West to accelerate diversification, increase strategic reserves use, revise energy policy and further squeeze sanctioned suppliers out of the market.

Second, Venezuela sees in "Proyecto Libertad" the familiar American logic of control over energy arteries. Military patrolling of Hormuz, justified as necessary to protect trade, is for some Venezuelan analysts a precedent that tomorrow could be used in the Caribbean under the same slogan: ensuring maritime safety, fighting smuggling, "protecting democracy." The collective memory still holds stories of seized tankers with Venezuelan oil, Iranian ships heading to assist PDVSA, threats of a "maritime blockade" and U.S. vessels patrolling the Caribbean basin.

Iran, Hormuz and oil: the world's energy nerve in Caracas's mirror

Spanish business channel Negocios TV, in its segment "NOTICIAS DEL DÍA: Irán bombardea con misiles Emiratos Árabes Unidos, EEUU contraataca y Europa avisa," breaks down the scenario in detail: an Iranian missile strike on infrastructure in the United Arab Emirates, U.S. countermeasures, European concern and the vulnerability of the Strait of Hormuz as a key oil supply route (link).

Negocios TV commentators emphasize "la vulnerabilidad de las rutas comerciales de suministro energético" — the vulnerability of energy supply trade routes — and speak of "máxima volatilidad geopolítica" — maximum geopolitical volatility. In Europe this is primarily a conversation about risks to energy prices and the need to insure supplies. In Venezuela the same phrases sound like a diagnosis of a chronic domestic illness: the national economy is built on raw exports and is far more vulnerable to "geopolitical volatility" than diversified economies.

A hypothetical or real Iranian attack on Persian Gulf targets, discussed by Negocios TV, appears ambivalent to the Venezuelan elite. Yes, a spike in oil prices could theoretically provide Caracas with extra resources, especially when the U.S. temporarily expands licenses for certain companies or allows oil‑for‑debt schemes. But if the crisis drags on, the U.S. and EU will be forced to reduce dependence on Middle Eastern oil more aggressively, invest in renewables, LNG and alternative suppliers. In that case Venezuela — already considered an "unreliable" partner — risks not benefiting but being sidelined in the future energy architecture.

Meanwhile, Venezuelan viewers recognize in Hormuz their own "narrow straits" — Maracaibo, the Orinoco and outlets to the Caribbean. As Iran uses the geography of the strait as leverage against the U.S. and its allies, Caracas, at least in pro‑government rhetoric, tries to present its oil and gas resources as a strategic "shield" that complicates total strangulation of the country. In this context the video’s mention of "incertidumbre sobre una respuesta armada directa" — uncertainty about a direct U.S. military response — resonates with Venezuela’s own debate: what is the threshold beyond which Washington will move from sanctions and special operations to open war?

Trump, Iran and Venezuela: a war that "exposes" the fragility of hegemony

The leftist portal Izquierda Diario, in its article "Trump e Irán: la guerra que desnuda la fragilidad de la hegemonía estadounidense," offers not a chronology of fighting but a political analysis: the Iran‑U.S. conflict as a demonstration of a crisis of U.S. hegemony (text). The author writes about Washington’s attempt to preserve world leadership through "quick" and "surgical" military campaigns, reliance on technological superiority and control of energy routes, but concludes that these instruments no longer guarantee victory.

From the Venezuelan vantage one key passage is the mention of "Operación Midnight Hammer," a summer campaign against Iranian nuclear facilities that Donald Trump allegedly described as "perfectamente ejecutada" — "perfectly executed" — and as an operation to "capturar al presidente Nicolás Maduro de Venezuela." For the Venezuelan audience this linkage does not seem far‑fetched: in recent years the country experienced the recognition of parallel president Juan Guaidó, the failed "Operación Gedeón" maritime incursion, and a string of statements that "all options are on the table."

When Izquierda Diario describes Trump’s approach to Iran, it automatically overlays Venezuelan experience: the bet on a quick "decapitation" strike, confidence that technological superiority and sanctions will quickly break an unruly regime, — and the collision with a reality of protracted confrontation in which the adversary adapts and finds new sources of support from China to Russia and Iran. For the Caracas reader the article’s conclusion that war against Iran "desnuda la fragilidad" — exposes the fragility — of American leadership is at once comforting and alarming. On one hand, it confirms a popular idea that the "empire" is no longer omnipotent. On the other — it foretells an era of greater instability, with no single arbiter or guarantor of rules.

Izquierda Diario quotes foreign experts who describe the U.S. as "hegemón sin salida" — a hegemon with no exit — and even as a force that has turned from guarantor of order into a "potencia revisionista, incluso disruptiva" — a revisionist, even disruptive power. For Venezuela it matters that such characterization comes not only from Cuba or Tehran but from representatives of countries traditionally seen as part of "the system," like Singapore. Local leftists see this as confirmation of their long‑standing criticism of U.S. foreign policy.

The oil‑weapons pact: Iran as a mirror of Venezuela's defense doctrine

In Izquierda Diario's analysis the theme of asymmetric warfare is particularly important. Iran, the sources say, compensates for lagging behind the U.S. in conventional arms with cheap drones, missiles, infrastructure strikes and the ability to wage protracted conflict, inflicting political and economic costs on the opponent. In Venezuela, where official rhetoric for years has revolved around concepts like "guerra de todo el pueblo" and "defensa asimétrica," Iran's success in deterring the U.S. is taken as confirmation: even a far poorer, technologically inferior state can create an unacceptable price for a superpower contemplating intervention.

Add to this the Caracas–Tehran alliance. Iranian fuel deliveries, assistance in repairing Venezuelan refineries, joint oil and gas projects have shaped the image of Iran as a "brother country" sharing the fate of a sanctioned state. In this frame any strikes on Iranian facilities, port blockades or increased patrolling of Hormuz are perceived in Venezuela as blows to its own survival options under sanctions. If the U.S. hardens a course of "maximum pressure" on Iran, fears almost automatically arise about secondary sanctions against companies and tankers doing business with both Tehran and Caracas.

Negocios TV experts, such as "Carlos Hugo Fernández‑Roca Suárez, profesor del Máster en Seguridad, Defensa y Geoestrategia," when they speak of "capacidad de disuasión de las potencias internacionales" — the deterrent capacity of international powers — sound like external validation to the Venezuelan public for the correctness of a course toward asymmetric defense and reliance on strategic resources. The Iranian example — where a combination of missiles, drones and control of a strategic strait deters a direct U.S. strike — is interpreted as a model, albeit on a smaller scale, for a country with vast oil resources and complex geography.

The European view and Venezuelan distrust

A separate layer of Venezuelan perception is tied to European assessments of what is happening. In the Negocios TV video, aimed at investors and a politically moderate audience, the Persian Gulf confrontation is described in pragmatic terms: how it affects risks for energy companies, European state budgets and the euro. Emphasis is placed on "Europa avisa" — Europe warns against further escalation and insists on diplomatic solutions.

In Caracas the European discourse is often seen as ambivalent. On one hand, European calls for "restraint" and warnings about the "riesgo de una guerra total" — the risk of a full‑scale war — are used by local media as proof that even U.S. allies fear American adventurism. On the other hand — no one forgets the EU’s active role in supporting sanctions against Venezuela and recognizing Guaidó. Therefore European appeals for de‑escalation in Iran are often interpreted in Venezuela as attempts to minimize costs to their own economies, not as principled opposition to military options.

Different formats: dry facts and Venezuelan interpretation

Comparing the sources mentioned makes clear the difference between factual reporting and the Venezuelan reading.

The La Nación article (link) limits itself to presenting:

— the U.S. decision to escort ships in Hormuz;
— basic data about the fleet composition and the operation's mandate;
— a description of Iran's role in the strait and the U.S. blockade of Iranian ports;
— mention of negotiations and Iran's 14‑point plan, which Trump calls "interesante pero insuficiente" and speaks of "conversaciones muy positivas" with Tehran.

The Venezuelan reaction adds several dimensions. First, the political frame: for Caracas this is not simply an "operation to ensure the safety of navigation" but part of a global U.S. system for controlling energy resources and supply routes — a logical continuation of what is already happening in the Caribbean basin. Second, the economic angle: attention focuses on what changes in Hormuz mean for exporters like Venezuela — from budget revenues to the threat of new sanctions. Third, historical analogies: sanctions against Cuba and Iran, the energy blockade of PDVSA, regime‑change operations in Latin America.

The Izquierda Diario article (link) is written from a Latin American, left‑radical perspective, so its Venezuelan reading only amplifies the themes in the text: the U.S. as a "hegemon in decline," excessive faith in Washington's technological power and "quick victories," and the danger of protracted wars without a clear exit strategy. Adding the direct mention of an operation to seize Nicolás Maduro, the author effectively argues: what is being tested today on Iran was tried on Venezuela yesterday, and the results fell far short of promises.

Finally, the Negocios TV video (link) provides a set of facts and assessments built around European capital interests: the Persian Gulf conflict is a risk to oil, logistics and stock indices. In the Venezuelan interpretation the same facts become confirmation of national vulnerability and at the same time an indication of U.S. structural weaknesses: the need to navigate between threats of military response and fear of a new protracted campaign akin to Iraq or Afghanistan.

Instead of an epilogue: Hormuz, Washington and Caracas in one equation

For the Venezuelan reader the entire international news flow — from Trump's "Proyecto Libertad" to discussions of Iranian missile strikes and the fragility of American hegemony — boils down to several key questions.

First: can Caracas extract economic benefit from any instability in the Strait of Hormuz without falling victim to a new wave of sanctions and a reconfiguration of the energy market? Second: how long will the U.S. retain the ability to "punish" unruly regimes without getting bogged down in wars and undermining its own economy and international legitimacy? Third: will countries like Venezuela and Iran be able to use their oil, geography and asymmetric defense instruments to turn their vulnerability into a deterrent?

Answers to these questions depend not only on decisions in Washington or Tehran. But in the minds of the Venezuelan audience one thing is already clear: Hormuz is not just a distant strait but a mirror reflecting the fears and hopes of a country squeezed between oil rents, sanctions and the dream that the post‑unipolar world will grant it more room for sovereign choice.

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Oil surges after Trump's promise to unblock the Strait of Hormuz

Oil prices jumped sharply on Monday after US President Donald Trump announced the launch of "Operation Freedom" to free vessels blocked in the Strait of Hormuz. The statement heightened geopolitical concerns and pushed prices above the psychological $100-per-barrel mark. Brent futures climbed 6% to $114, while the US benchmark WTI rose 3.17% to $105.2 a barrel. The market reacted immediately, reversing the previous session's losses.

Trump wrote on his social network "Truth Social" that the US is ready to escort ships through "restricted waterways," referring to the Strait of Hormuz. Iran responded immediately, warning that ships must coordinate passage with Tehran for their own safety. Tensions rose after Iranian drones attacked an Adnoc tanker off the UAE coast: fortunately, no one was injured and the vessel was empty. British maritime authorities also reported a new tanker incident, confirming the growing threats to shipping.

Talks between Washington and Tehran have reached a stalemate. ANZ analysts note that the sides have hit their "red lines": the US insists on a nuclear deal, while Iran demands the lifting of restrictions on shipping in the Persian Gulf. These hardened positions make a quick resolution unlikely, leaving the risk of oil supply disruptions at the forefront for traders.

Seven OPEC+ countries agreed to increase production by 188,000 barrels per day in June — the third consecutive rise. However, experts consider this step insufficient given current demand and geopolitical risks. If tensions around the Strait of Hormuz persist or the conflict expands, any small increase in supply will be unable to stabilize the market.

Gold, by contrast, eased slightly: spot prices fell 2% to $4,523 per ounce, and futures dropped 2.3% to $4,533. Investors fear inflation and await further signals from US–Iran negotiations. Analysts warn that if oil stays above $100, central banks will have to keep rates high for longer, which will increase pressure on gold as a non-yielding asset.

Comments on the news

• Why is the Strait of Hormuz so important to the global economy and how can Iran affect shipping there? The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow maritime corridor through which about 20–30% of the world's oil passes (including exports from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the UAE and Qatar). Iran, controlling the northern shore of the strait and possessing a powerful naval fleet, can block tanker traffic, lay mines or board and inspect vessels. Even the threat of such actions causes a sharp rise in global oil prices, since alternative routes (for example, pipelines through Saudi Arabia) cannot fully replace the strait.
• Why does Iran demand the lifting of restrictions on shipping in the Persian Gulf, and what specific restrictions are being referred to? Iran demands the removal of US and EU sanctions that prohibit foreign companies from insuring, servicing, and calling at Iranian ships' ports. Restrictions also include delays and inspections of Iranian tankers in international waters conducted by the West under the pretext of combating oil smuggling. Tehran considers these measures an illegal blockade violating international maritime law and insists that control over shipping in the region should be exercised only by littoral states without interference from extraregional powers.
• What is Adnoc's role and why is an attack on its tanker off the UAE coast significant for the regional oil market? Adnoc (Abu Dhabi National Oil Company) is the UAE's state oil and gas corporation, which operates the largest oil fields and export terminals. An attack on its tanker (for example, in 2019 off the coast of Fujairah) undermines confidence in regional shipping security, which can lead to higher insurance premiums and transport costs for oil. For the market, this is a signal: if even UAE assets — a traditional US ally — are targeted, risks to all shipments through the Strait of Hormuz increase, driving oil prices up.

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Full version: النفط يقفز فوق 114 دولارا وتراجع الذهب مع تصاعد توترات هرمز

Venezuelan expert: elections possible only through negotiations and without revenge

Economist and political scientist Luis Vicente León said that holding elections in Venezuela is possible provided there is a prior political agreement that will create constitutional institutionalism and prevent a "zero-sum game" scenario where one side wins everything and the other loses everything. León emphasized that this process should not be perceived as coercion or an act of revenge, since history shows that revenge destroys more than it resolves, and he called for viewing the period from January 3 as a time for reflection, calming passions, and reducing fear. According to the analyst, Venezuelan society has the right to demand progress, but the correct path is not to bypass negotiations, but to build them, creating conditions for elections in which democracy requires the consent of all parties.

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Full version: Economista Luis Vicente León afirma que las próximas elecciones en Venezuela requieren condiciones para todas las partes y ausencia de venganza

Iran Says It Controls the Strait of Hormuz and Warns the US

The military headquarters "Khatam al-Anbia" in Iran has officially announced that Iranian forces will ensure security in the Strait of Hormuz, stressing that "any passage through the strait must be coordinated with them under any circumstances" and that "there will be no passage through Hormuz without coordination." The statement warns that any foreign forces, particularly US military forces, will be attacked if they approach the strait, and that "any hostile actions by the US will destabilize the situation and endanger the safety of vessels."

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Ismail Bagai, in turn, confirmed that Washington "bears responsibility for slowing diplomatic efforts to end the war," and that the Strait of Hormuz "was a safe waterway until the start of hostilities." Bagai emphasized that guaranteeing security requires coordination with Iran’s competent authorities, adding that Iran’s actions in the strait "are in accordance with international law," and that Tehran maintains ongoing contacts with Russia and China, which have long-term agreements with Iran and continue consultations as members of the Security Council.

In response, US President Donald Trump announced the start of an operation called "Project Freedom" to escort ships through the Strait of Hormuz. US Central Command (CENTCOM) said forces are supporting the operation with guided-missile destroyers, more than 100 fighter jets, and 15,000 service members. Reports say the US Navy will provide merchant ships with information on safe routes, and Navy vessels will remain nearby "in case it becomes necessary to prevent Iranian forces from attacking merchant ships."

The international community’s reaction was mixed. French President Emmanuel Macron expressed doubts about the clarity of the operation’s framework and called for navigation through the strait to resume based on coordination between Iran and the US. Head of the Iranian parliament’s security committee Ebrahim Azizi wrote on the social network X that any US interference in the waterway will be considered a violation of the ceasefire regime that has been in effect since April 8.

The diplomatic situation remains confused: Tehran reported that it received a response from the US via Pakistan to its initiative, but Bagai called it "under consideration," refusing to disclose details and describing the US as "known for its excessive eagerness." The UK Maritime Trade Operations office announced that "the level of maritime security threat in the Strait of Hormuz remains critical" due to ongoing military operations.

The Strait of Hormuz remains a strategic flashpoint: before the escalation, roughly one-fifth of global trade in oil and liquefied natural gas passed through it. Iran controls this narrow passage, while the US is enforcing a maritime blockade of Iranian ports. Repeated attacks on ships since the start of the war and fleet movements continue to make the strait a critical point of international dispute, affecting global energy security.

Comments on the news

• What is the military headquarters "Khatam al-Anbia" and what role does it play in the command structure of Iran’s armed forces? — "Khatam al-Anbia" (also known as the "Seal of the Prophets") is the main joint headquarters of Iran’s Armed Forces, created after the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988) to coordinate the actions of the Iranian Army (Artesh) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). It is subordinate to the Supreme Leader of Iran and is responsible for strategic planning, mobilization, crisis management, and air defense. Its key role is to provide unified command in conditions of sanctions and military threats.
• Why is Pakistan acting as an intermediary in the dialogue between Iran and the US, and what historical ties exist between Tehran and Islamabad? — Pakistan plays a mediating role because of its geopolitical position: it borders Iran and has historical and economic ties with it. In addition, Islamabad seeks to reduce tensions between the US and Iran to avoid regional destabilization, particularly in Balochistan and the Persian Gulf. Tehran and Islamabad have long-standing links, including membership in the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), cooperation in counterterrorism, and shared interests in energy. However, relations in the past have been complicated by competition for influence in Afghanistan and disputes over Baloch separatists.
• What events led to the ceasefire regime of April 8 and how is it connected to the current tension in the Strait of Hormuz? — The ceasefire regime of April 8, declared after the escalation in March 2025 (for example, following mutual strikes by the Houthis and US/Israeli forces in Yemen and attacks on Iranian consulates in Syria), resulted from indirect negotiations mediated by Oman and Qatar. It aims to reduce the intensity of the conflict that threatened shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, through which a third of the world’s maritime oil passes. The current tension in the strait is linked to Iran and its allies (for example, the Houthis) using control of this strategic passage as leverage against the US and its allies, and as a response to sanctions and military threats from the West.

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Full version: إيران تحذر من عبور هرمز دون تنسيق وترامب يعلن بدء عملية "مشروع الحرية"

Trump Notifies Congress of End to Hostilities with Iran

U.S. President Donald Trump sent an official letter to Congress stating that the "hostile actions" with Iran, initiated under "Operation 'Epic Fury'," are "ended." The statement sparked heated political and media debate in Washington. The message was sent after the expiration of the 60-day period prescribed by the War Powers Resolution of 1973, and it has generated disagreements over its interpretation and its impact on the powers of the president and Congress. Reactions ranged from those who saw it as a constitutional maneuver to those who regarded it as an attempt to expand executive power without legislative approval.

The letter notes that hostilities began on February 28, 2026, and that there has been "no exchange of fire since April 7" — the date a temporary ceasefire was declared — so the administration considered the hostile actions to be over. At the same time, Trump emphasized that the "Iranian threat remains significant," and that the Department of Defense continues to reposition forces in the region. This combination — declaring an end to hostile actions while keeping troops in place — creates a legal gray area that allows for multiple interpretations regarding the need for a new congressional mandate.

Public debate unfolded on X (formerly Twitter), revealing a sharp split between two camps. The first views the letter as a "legal trick" to restart the "war clock" without a congressional vote. The second considers it a clever use of presidential authority, giving the administration flexibility on the ground. Analysts noted that the letter could allow the "war powers timer" to be reset while maintaining a military presence that would permit operations to resume if necessary. Scholars described the disagreement not simply as a political dispute but as a conflict over the boundaries of the Constitution and the president's authority as commander-in-chief.

Among critics, former Congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene said this is not a genuine end to the war but a "restart of the clock" to avoid a congressional vote, calling the move "unconstitutional." Researcher H. Huntsman said the letter represents an "interpretive stretch" of the law, relying on a narrow definition of hostile actions (the absence of an exchange of fire) while ignoring that the presence of troops and blockades signifies a continued conflict. Critics warned that such an administration interpretation could undermine the constitutional balance between the executive and legislative branches.

Supporters, for their part, defended the decision as providing "maximum legal flexibility," according to analyst Chris Rollins, who identified three goals: formally ending hostile actions, keeping troops in place, and retaining the ability to resume operations without congressional approval. Expert Jim Hanson believes Trump is "playing skillfully" within the War Powers Resolution, resetting the legal timer without losing freedom of action. White House spokesperson Jackie Heinrich conveyed the administration's position that any attempt to limit the commander-in-chief's powers could "weaken the American military abroad," and confirmed continued dialogue with Congress.

Trump's letter is being perceived today as a tactical move in a broader struggle over the limits of executive power, rather than as a definitive statement that the confrontation with Iran is over. While the White House adheres to an interpretation that gives the president freedom for rapid action, opponents insist this threatens Congress's role in matters of war and peace. As tensions persist and U.S. forces remain at forward positions, this step looks like the start of a new phase in which the confrontation is conducted with more complex legal and military tools, leaving the legal and political battle unresolved.

Comments on the news

• How does the Strait of Hormuz affect logistics for U.S. forces in the region and why is it important to the conflict with Iran? – The Strait of Hormuz is a strategic narrow maritime passage through which about 20–25% of the world's oil shipments transit. For U.S. forces in the region (including bases in Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE) the strait is critically important because fuel and military supplies pass through it. By controlling the strait, Iran can easily block or restrict ship passage, which would paralyze U.S. logistics. In a conflict, this creates a vulnerability: Iran could use minefields, fast attack boats, and anti-ship missiles to target tankers and warships, forcing the U.S. to seek alternative routes (for example, a much longer route around Africa), which would significantly increase time and cost of operations.

• Which Iranian armed forces (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, regular army) took part in the conflict and what is their role in Iran's political system? – Both main structures are involved in the conflict: the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the regular army (Artesh). The IRGC is an elite force directly subordinate to the Supreme Leader (Ali Khamenei), playing a key role in regime protection, control over the nuclear program, and missile forces. The Artesh is the conventional military responsible for defending borders and sovereignty. In Iran's political system the IRGC holds enormous influence: its members occupy important posts in government, the economy, and intelligence, effectively acting as a "state within a state." In conflicts with the U.S. and Israel the IRGC often takes on active strike operations (for example, missile strikes on bases), while the Artesh provides defense and logistics.

• Why does the Iranian government view the presence of U.S. troops in the region as a threat to its national security? – The Iranian government views U.S. military presence (especially bases in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar) as direct encirclement and preparation of a foothold for military operations against Iran. This perception is rooted in history: the overthrow of Iran's government in 1953 (involving the CIA), U.S. support for Iraq during the 1980–88 war, and threats from U.S. administrations (under both Trump and Biden). To Tehran, U.S. forces are an instrument for undermining sovereignty, fomenting unrest (for example, by supporting opposition), and pressuring the regime. Additionally, Iran fears the U.S. could use its bases to strike nuclear facilities or Iranian military forces, making their presence an existential threat.

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Full version: إنهاء الأعمال العدائية ضد إيران.. رسالة ترمب تفجر جدلا بواشنطن

Venezuela to Attend ICJ Hearings on Esequibo, Denies Jurisdiction

Venezuela announced that it will participate in hearings at the United Nations International Court of Justice (ICJ) concerning the territorial dispute with Guyana over the Esequibo region, but emphasized that it does not recognize the court's jurisdiction and will not accept any of its decisions as binding. In an official statement, the government explained that participation in the hearings is not an act of consent to the ICJ's competence, but an opportunity to present to the international community Venezuela's historical rights to this territory, based on the mandate received in the nationwide referendum on December 3, 2023, in which citizens rejected the court's jurisdiction in this matter.

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Full version: Venezuela participará en audiencias ante la CIJ sobre la disputa del Esequibo (+Comunicado)

Panama Canal rescues world trade after Strait of Hormuz blockade

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz due to a US-Israeli military operation against Iran has caused chaos in global shipping. Hundreds of oil tankers and cargo ships have been forced to urgently seek alternative safe routes, leading to a sharp increase in distances, transit times and transport costs. As a result, global supply chains have been disrupted and shipping companies have faced unprecedented logistical difficulties.

In this context the Panama Canal has become the main alternative route, leading to its overload. Each oil tanker or vessel now pays up to one million dollars for passage via the pre-booking system, and under the auction system this sum can rise significantly. As a result, multi-day queues have formed in front of the canal’s locks, and vessel operating costs have soared.

According to a report by Al Jazeera correspondent Anas al-Sabbar, canal management recorded an increase in shipping from 36 to 42 vessels per day in recent months. Canal officials note that the traffic increase is generating additional revenue without compromising service quality, which indicates the infrastructure’s ability to cope with crisis loads thanks to precise operational adjustments.

The canal’s engineering system allows vessels to transit in 8–10 hours, compensating for the elevation differences between the Pacific and Atlantic oceans. About 5% of the world’s maritime trade by volume passes through it annually, making it a vital artery of international trade. In the crisis, the number of LNG and other fuel tankers seeking a safe alternative route has increased noticeably.

One of the Panama Canal’s executives called it a “safe and neutral route,” noting that Japanese refineries, which previously imported feedstock from the Middle East, are now increasingly relying on US suppliers. Canal revenues have risen this year thanks to increased demand after last year’s profits of $3 billion. The situation clearly demonstrates the vulnerability of the global economy, which depends on narrow sea passages: recall that the US maritime blockade against Iran began on April 13, 2026, and since then US forces have seized dozens of Iranian vessels and rerouted hundreds of ships carrying cargo to or from Iran.

Comments on the news

• Why is the Strait of Hormuz considered strategically important for the global economy and what specific risks does it pose for oil supplies? - The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow sea passage (about 33 km at its narrowest point) through which some 20–25% of the world’s oil passes (by various estimates, over 17 million barrels per day). This makes it the planet’s “oil bottleneck.” The main risk is blockage of the strait (for example, due to conflict with Iran, which threatens to close it), which would lead to a sharp spike in oil prices, supply chain disruptions for Asian countries (China, Japan, India) and a potential global recession. Even temporary incidents, such as tanker seizures, create instability.
• What alternative routes, besides the Panama Canal, are available for ships leaving the Persian Gulf, and why are they less efficient? - Main alternatives: 1) Overland transport of oil (for example, via pipelines such as Iraq’s Kirkuk–Ceyhan or Saudi Arabia’s Petroline to the Red Sea), but they have limited capacity and are vulnerable to attacks. 2) Route around the Cape of Good Hope (around southern Africa) — it adds about 10–12 days (up to 3,000 nautical miles) for tankers traveling from the Persian Gulf to Europe or the US, increasing freight costs and delivery time. 3) The Northern Sea Route (via the Arctic) — seasonal, requires icebreakers and is unavailable for most of the year. All these routes are less efficient compared to the Strait of Hormuz because they increase logistics costs, time and risks (piracy, weather).
• What impact does the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz have on Iran’s economy and its trading partners? - For Iran, a blockade is a double-edged sword. On one hand, Iran can use the strait as leverage, threatening to close it in response to sanctions or aggression. On the other hand, it would inflict serious damage on its own economy: the majority of Iran’s oil exports (up to 2–2.5 million barrels per day) pass through the strait and are a primary source of budget revenue. A blockade would cut Iran off from international markets, worsen inflation and foreign currency shortages. For Iran’s trading partners (China, Turkey, India), it would cause a shortage of Iranian oil at preferential prices and put pressure on their economies, as well as increase energy prices. However, if the blockade is unilateral (for example, in response to US sanctions), Iran risks further isolating itself and losing key buyers.

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Full version: مليون دولار للعبور.. أزمة مضيق هرمز تدفع السفن نحو قناة بنما

Spirit Airlines ceases operations: collapse of a budget carrier

The American low-cost airline Spirit Airlines announced the immediate cancellation of all flights and cessation of operations. This came after the last attempt to save the carrier, with White House involvement, failed. The company became the first major airline to succumb to the sharp rise in aviation fuel prices triggered by the two-month-long war with Iran. The decision was announced on Saturday, and the halt of operations was scheduled for about 3 a.m. local time.

Reuters, citing sources, reports that a Spirit board meeting ended without results — the company could not be saved, which led to the decision to stop flights. Spirit had previously filed for bankruptcy, but last-minute efforts to strike a deal were unsuccessful. Experts note that a collapse of this scale for an airline has not been seen in the past two decades.

The Associated Press quotes the carrier’s statement: “We are commencing an orderly wind-down of our operations effective immediately.” All flights have been canceled, customer service has ceased operations, and refunds for previously purchased tickets have been promised. This immediately affected thousands of passengers and caused serious disruption to the domestic air travel market. The company, which employed about 17,000 people and operated hundreds of flights daily, is now ceasing to exist.

The collapse of Spirit dealt a serious political blow to President Donald Trump, who proposed allocating $500 million to rescue the airline despite objections from aides and many Republicans in Congress. The White House even proposed a final plan, but no agreement was reached. Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy unsuccessfully tried to persuade other airlines to buy Spirit. Now several carriers, including United, American, Frontier and JetBlue, have expressed willingness to assist the bankrupt airline’s passengers. This case calls into question the future of the entire low-cost carrier sector amid volatile fuel prices and geopolitical upheaval.

Comments on the news

• Why did the war with Iran lead to higher aviation fuel prices? — Iran is one of the world's largest oil producers and controls the Strait of Hormuz — a strategic shipping route through which about 20% of global oil supplies pass. Military action or the threat of it provokes market speculation and supply disruptions, which directly raise oil prices and, consequently, aviation fuel costs. In addition, sanctions and escalation of the conflict limit exports and increase insurance and logistical costs for tankers.

• What is the significance of Spirit Airlines’ closure for the US economy amid military actions with Iran? — The closure of Spirit Airlines, if it occurs against the backdrop of military conflict, could symbolize broader pressure on the budget air travel sector. Spirit is a low-cost carrier that heavily depends on low fuel prices and stable consumer demand. Military actions with Iran lead to fuel price spikes and rising inflation, which reduce Americans’ purchasing power and force them to cut back on travel. This could signal a decline in domestic demand in the US and exacerbate financial troubles for American airlines. For the US economy, it implies risks to employment in the aviation sector and reduced tax revenues from the tourism industry.

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Full version: ضربة لترمب.. شركة طيران أمريكية توقف عملياتها بسبب حرب إيران

ExxonMobil sees big prospects in Venezuela

ExxonMobil CEO Darren Woods said that Venezuela represents "a huge resource that is now opening up more freely to the world," expressing optimism about possible investments. Speaking at an investor conference, Woods praised the cooperation between the Donald Trump administration, the government of Venezuela, and the oil industry, which he said is creating a favorable environment for investment. The company, the executive noted, has unique technologies for processing Venezuela's heavy oil at low cost, which places Exxon in an advantageous position. "I am optimistic about the opportunities there. We have a lot of work ahead of us, but I believe we will play an important role in supplying those barrels to the market," Woods added. His remarks came amid Bloomberg reports that several weeks ago Exxon sent a working group to the South American country to assess prospects for restarting production.

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Full version: La petrolera estadounidense Exxon se muestra

Asymmetric confrontation: why Trump is losing in Iran and the new era

Renowned American commentator Thomas Friedman believes that the conflict between the US and Iran exposes the Trump administration's fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of modern wars and the geopolitical shifts caused by "asymmetric conflicts." Friedman notes that Trump often uses poker terms — both in his conversation with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, claiming that he "has no cards" against Russia, and in relation to Iran's leaders. According to the columnist, betting on an oil blockade to force Tehran to negotiate is naive and does not reflect reality.

The author argues that the American president himself "doesn't have the cards" he thinks he has. Economic pressure may not work because Iran is betting on economic resilience and wields the trump card of the Strait of Hormuz. Friedman describes the confrontation as a contest of wills, where each side tries to force the other to back down using available resources. Such a game of brinkmanship risks uncontrolled escalation.

The article analyzes how technological and military advances have changed the balance of power. Examples include Ukraine using inexpensive drones to strike targets in Russia, and Iran using loitering munitions to attack digital infrastructure in the Persian Gulf. Armed groups have learned to build cheap rockets, while defense systems remain extremely expensive. These examples show that small forces or limited resources can now inflict strategic strikes at minimal cost.

Friedman warns that the world is shifting from the information age to the age of artificial intelligence. Citing experts, he notes that digital tools can substitute people with intelligent agents capable of carrying out complex operations autonomously. Powerful AI models open the way to advanced, self-guiding cyberattacks at low cost, giving "strong cards" to actors who previously lacked influence. Reports indicate that some models can find dangerous vulnerabilities, making it extremely difficult to control their dissemination.

On this basis, Friedman calls for broad international cooperation, especially between the US and China — the two main powers in AI — to create mechanisms to reduce shared risks. He suggests recalling the Cold War-era nuclear arms limitation models to coordinate technical constraints. The author concludes that misjudging "asymmetric war" and ignoring technological change leaves the US in a weaker position than it seems. In an era when digital tools and AI are reshuffling the "cards," old notions of power are useless, and without new understanding of threats and joint action, all sides will remain vulnerable to sudden strategic shocks.

Comments on the news

• How does the Strait of Hormuz factor into Iran's deterrence strategy? — This strait is a key node of global oil trade (about 20% of all oil passes through it). For Iran, control of the strait is a powerful lever of deterrence: the threat of its closure or mining could paralyze the economies of Persian Gulf countries and force the US to forego military escalation, since such a move would immediately trigger a global spike in oil prices.
• Why do Iranian loitering munitions pose a particular threat to digital infrastructure in the Persian Gulf? — Such drones (for example, the Shahed-136) can be launched in swarms and target critical facilities like oil terminals, power plants, or data centers; their low cost and high precision make them an effective means of disabling digital infrastructure, including power grid and communications control systems. They are difficult to intercept, and the damage from an attack can be extensive.
• What are examples of Iran's successful use of asymmetric tactics against the US or its regional allies? — The most prominent example: in 2019 Iran struck Saudi Arabian oil processing facilities (Abqaiq and Khurais) with drones and cruise missiles, temporarily halving its oil output. Also — the use of Iranian unmanned aerial vehicles and proxy forces (the Houthis in Yemen) to attack commercial ships off the coasts of the UAE and Saudi Arabia, forcing the US-led coalition to bear significant defense costs.

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Full version: توماس فريدمان: ترامب هو من لا يملك أوراقا رابحة في حرب إيران

Iran Prepares for a Possible US Strike: Fragile Truce at Risk

Against the backdrop of a fragile truce, Tehran is preparing for a likely resumption of hostilities after the expiration of the 60-day period envisaged by the US Authorization for Use of Military Force. While the US administration tends to consider the current ceasefire a de facto end to combat operations, Iranian analysts and military officials believe a resumption of strikes is more likely than a long-term stabilization. This difference in interpretation creates tension and time pressure on decision-making in both capitals.

Iran’s deterrence strategy has undergone notable changes: Tehran has expanded the list of potential targets for retaliatory strikes to include military ships and aircraft carriers. Official statements from Iranian military officials warn that even a limited American strike would be met with a “broad and painful” response that goes beyond a symmetrical reaction. The command of "Хатам аль-Анбия" has announced full readiness, a concrete target bank, and preparedness for complex scenarios, including ground clashes.

Alongside military preparations, Washington is stepping up pressure by nonmilitary means, in particular by discussing an extension of a naval blockade on Iran. Tehran views these steps as hostile actions that could justify retaliatory measures. Iranian leadership is using deterrent rhetoric to raise the cost of any intervention while trying to preserve room for political maneuvering and avoid a full-scale conflict.

On the diplomatic front, serious disagreements persist over the terms of negotiations and the limits of discussed issues. Tehran rejects haste on the nuclear file and insists on separating the paths to settlement. Iran has put forward a three-stage proposal that envisages an end to the war and guarantees against its resumption in exchange for the opening of the Strait of Hormuz and the lifting of restrictions, as a preparation for returning to the nuclear negotiating table. However, these initiatives have not yet found understanding in Washington.

While regional and international mediation efforts continue, Tehran is pursuing two parallel courses: heightened military readiness in case of a strike and cautious diplomatic engagement to prevent full-scale escalation. The balance between these directions will determine further developments — whether a temporary stabilization or a broader confrontation if one side decides that battlefield and political costs permit such a step.

News Commentary

• What is the command of "Хатам аль-Анбия" and what role does it play in Iran’s defense system? – The command of "Хатам аль-Анбия" is the central unit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) responsible for Iran’s air and missile defense. It coordinates all air defense assets, including systems protecting key facilities (nuclear centers, oil infrastructure, and military bases). Its role is to ensure an “impregnable shield” for the country, which became particularly relevant after escalations with Israel and the United States.

• Why is the Strait of Hormuz so important to Iran and how is its control used as a bargaining tool? – The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow maritime passage through which about 20% of the world’s oil transits. For Iran, it is a strategic lever: in the event of conflict it can close the strait, triggering a global energy crisis. Tehran uses the threat of blockage as pressure in negotiations with the West, especially in the context of sanctions and the nuclear deal. This is a classic example of “power-from-position” politics, where control over resources becomes a trump in diplomacy.

• What does Iran’s three-stage proposal consist of, and how does it relate to the nuclear negotiations? – Iran’s three-stage proposal foresees: 1) recognition by the US and EU of Iran’s right to enrich uranium to a certain level; 2) phased lifting of sanctions in exchange for IAEA verification; 3) a return to full compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). It is an attempt to unfreeze talks by offering Western countries a “deal without ultimatums” while preserving Iran’s key nuclear achievements. This scheme reflects Tehran’s longstanding tactic — using diplomacy to relieve pressure without abandoning technological progress.

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Full version: كيف تستعد إيران لاحتمال توجيه أمريكا ضربة عسكرية جديدة؟

First Direct Flight from Venezuela in Seven Years Lands in Miami

The first direct commercial flight from Venezuela to the United States in seven years successfully landed at Miami International Airport on Monday evening. The American Airlines plane departed from Caracas and covered the distance in just over three hours. The arrival of passengers in Miami was less festive than the morning departure from Florida, where travelers were treated to traditional Venezuelan tequeños and greeted with balloons in the colors of the national flag. On board the inaugural flight to Caracas was a White House delegation and U.S. businesspeople to discuss economic cooperation, including energy, oil and gas.

Direct air service between the countries was interrupted in 2019 amid political tensions. The resumption of flights became possible after a recent thaw in relations, including the reopening of the U.S. embassy in Caracas on March 30. American Airlines received permission from U.S. authorities in March and will now operate flights daily until May 20, after which it will double the frequency. Ticket prices are still high: a round-trip at the end of April costs about $2,700, but for May fares are already significantly lower — just over $1,000. The restoration of direct service is especially important for the largest Venezuelan diaspora in the U.S., concentrated in Miami.

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Full version: Aterriza en Miami el primer vuelo directo a EEUU procedente de Venezuela en siete años

Trump's Military Authority Over Iran Expires

The constitutional 60-day period for U.S. military action against Iran ends today, but the Trump administration says the truce announced in April legally halted hostilities. Democrats dispute that interpretation, insisting there is no clear legal basis to pause the countdown. That raises questions about whether the president can avoid seeking a new mandate from Congress or whether lawmakers will force a firmer stance.

The War Powers Act of 1973 gives the president 60 days to conduct hostilities without Congressional approval, with a possible 30-day extension to ensure the safety of U.S. forces. Trump notified Congress of the operation within 48 hours after it began on February 28, and the deadline would have fallen on May 1. However, the administration contends that the ceasefire suspended the clock, while Democrats insist the law does not allow such a pause, making current actions formally illegal.

In his statements, Trump describes Iran as "in collapse" and claims Tehran requested talks about reopening the Strait of Hormuz. At the same time, the president insists on maintaining a naval blockade until Iran agrees to a new deal that would definitively resolve its nuclear program. "Iran cannot have nuclear weapons," he emphasized, while leaving room for diplomatic maneuvering.

Despite the rhetoric about negotiations, military options remain on the table. U.S. Central Command has drafted plans for short but powerful strikes on key targets inside Iran to break the impasse in talks. Military leaders have already presented these scenarios to the president. Other options include seizing control of part of the Strait of Hormuz and possible deployment of land forces, as well as forming an international coalition to ensure freedom of navigation.

Pakistan's mediation efforts continue: Islamabad has opened channels of dialogue between Washington and Tehran and offered to host talks in its capital, though a second meeting has not yet taken place. According to sources, Iran put forward a three-stage peace plan that calls for cessation of U.S. and Israeli military actions, non-aggression guarantees, and subsequent talks on a permanent settlement. Trump rejected the initiative, fearing he would lose the chance for a "victory" in the conflict.

Tehran warns that a return to war is possible if the blockade continues. Some Iranian circles already view the continued sanctions as an act of aggression requiring a military response. Officials acknowledge, however, that achieving a comprehensive agreement will take time and require rebuilding mutual trust. Thus, the situation remains explosive: diplomatic initiatives run up against hardline positions on both sides, while military plans continue to be developed pending a resolution.

Comments on the news

• What strategic importance does the Strait of Hormuz hold for Iran and the global economy, and why is control over it key in this conflict? — The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow waterway through which about 20% of the world’s oil passes. For Iran it is an important lever of pressure: the threat to block the strait can sharply raise energy prices and disrupt global supplies. Control over the strait gives Tehran the ability to affect the economic stability of oil-importing countries, especially in Asia and Europe, strengthening its negotiating position.

• What are the main stages of Iran’s nuclear program, and why has it worried the U.S. for decades? — Iran’s nuclear program began in the 1950s with U.S. assistance, but after the 1979 Islamic Revolution it became secretive. In the 2000s Iran initiated uranium enrichment, raising suspicions about weaponization. The U.S. fears Tehran could use the civilian program as cover to develop a bomb, altering the balance of power in the Middle East. International agreements (for example, the 2015 JCPOA) temporarily limited the program, but the U.S. withdrawal from the deal in 2018 deepened mistrust.

• What role does Pakistan play as a mediator between the U.S. and Iran, given its historical and religious ties to Tehran? — Pakistan shares a long border with Iran and has strong cultural and religious links (including Shiite communities in Pakistan). This makes it a convenient mediator, as it can engage in dialogue without arousing Tehran’s suspicions. However, Pakistan also seeks to maintain good relations with Saudi Arabia (a major rival of Iran) and the U.S. In the past Islamabad has repeatedly offered its venue for talks, but the success of its missions has been limited by Pakistan’s internal problems and deep mutual distrust between Washington and Tehran.

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Full version: بين لغة التفاوض وخيارات السلاح.. هل أنهت الهدنة الحرب مع إيران؟

Geopolitical crisis hits Africa: Middle East war costs developing nations

The outbreak of conflict between the US, Israel and Iran has led to a sharp rise in tensions on global energy and trade markets. The security of sea lanes and logistics chains has been threatened, immediately affecting economies far from the combat zone. However, the consequences of this crisis are distributed unevenly: while developed countries have tools to cushion the blows, African states that heavily depend on imports of energy and basic goods have faced disproportionately greater difficulties. This situation clearly demonstrates how geopolitical shocks from the Middle East spread to the most distant regions of the world.

The Strait of Hormuz, through which about 20 million barrels of oil and 22% of the world’s liquefied natural gas shipments pass daily, has become a central point of vulnerability. Any instability in this region forces ships to change routes, for example around the Cape of Good Hope, which increases the cost of each voyage by almost $4 million. As a result, insurance coverage has sharply contracted, and prices for fertilizers and agricultural products have surged by up to 35%. This strait can rightly be called a “valve” regulating global food security, and any threat to it directly hits the food supply of millions of people.

African countries have been hit particularly hard due to the fragility of their economies and the paradoxical dependence on imported petroleum products. Although the continent produces substantial volumes of crude oil, about 70% of it is exported without processing, costing $15 billion annually. Since 90% of Africa’s trade is conducted by sea, rising freight and insurance costs have dealt a real blow. The simultaneous rise in fertilizer prices has threatened agriculture, increasing the number of people suffering from hunger. The picture within the continent is also uneven: in Tanzania, Malawi and Zimbabwe fuel prices have risen higher than in other countries.

The financial side of the crisis has been exacerbated by massive capital outflows and a stronger dollar. The African Development Bank recorded currency declines in 29 African countries after the start of the conflict, and the continent’s public debt reached 63.5% of GDP in 2024. External debt servicing costs, already consuming more than 31% of government revenues, have surged, limiting room for maneuver and making refinancing a real nightmare for policymakers. Remittances from the diaspora (about $100 billion in 2023), which serve as a lifeline for many economies, have also been put at risk due to instability in host countries.

The root of the problems lies in Africa’s structural “economic dependency.” This vicious cycle includes exporting raw materials and importing finished goods, reliance on external financing and hard-currency debt, and acute sensitivity to migrant remittances. Such a model reproduces crises, turning external shocks into internal and long-term problems. The concentration of trading partners, for example a strong orientation toward the European Union and Gulf countries, only increases the vulnerability of African exports to fluctuations in global demand and prices.

Traditional response measures, such as tight monetary policy and new external loans, have shown their limitations and can even be harmful. Cutting subsidies and raising interest rates increase the cost of living for the population and reduce budgets for social investment. As experts note, “of every dollar borrowed by African countries, about 70 cents goes back abroad as capital outflow.” As a result, governments shift the burden of the crisis onto citizens by cutting social spending, and the continent remains trapped in a dependency dictated by external markets and relationships that leave it little chance of real protection or economic sovereignty.

Comments on the news

• Why is the Strait of Hormuz, controlled by Iran, considered critical to global energy security, and how does Iran use that control for geopolitical purposes? - The strait is a narrow passage through which about 20% of the world’s oil and a large share of LNG from Qatar pass. Iran uses this control as “petroleum weaponry”: by threatening to close the strait it attempts to force the international community to ease sanctions or exerts pressure on the US and Saudi Arabia during crises. For example, in 2019 after tanker incidents, Iran raised the stakes in negotiations over the nuclear deal.
• What internal economic problems in Iran affect its willingness to escalate in the region despite global consequences? - The main problems are inflation (over 40%), reduced oil export revenues due to sanctions, and youth unemployment. This creates a paradox: on one hand, the regime needs escalation to distract from internal difficulties (the concept of an “external threat” as a tool of legitimacy); on the other hand, too strong an escalation could lead to war, which would worsen the economy. Therefore Tehran balances: it uses “moderate escalation” (attacks on tankers, seizure of vessels) for bargaining, but avoids full-scale conflict.
• What alternative oil supply routes exist besides the Strait of Hormuz, and how much can they mitigate the Iranian factor? - The main alternatives: 1) Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline (capacity 5 million barrels/day, but not used to full capacity), 2) route via the Port of Fujairah in the UAE, 3) overland transport through the Red Sea and Suez Canal (long and costly). However, all options have limits: pipelines can be damaged or overloaded, and overland routes are vulnerable to attacks. For now they can compensate only 30–50% of supplies through Hormuz, so a complete closure of the strait would be catastrophic for the market.

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Full version: 29 دولة انخفضت عملاتها.. كيف دفعت أفريقيا ثمن حرب إيران؟

Delcy Rodríguez Demands Full Repeal of EU and US Sanctions

Venezuelan Vice President Delcy Rodríguez issued a categorical demand to the European Union and the United States for the complete cessation of all sanctions against the country, emphasizing that not a single restriction should remain in effect. She said these limitations directly worsen the quality of life for citizens, with the main blow falling on the most vulnerable segments of the population, who face serious economic hardships due to the imposed restrictions.

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Full version: Delcy Rodríguez exige a la UE y EEUU el cese total de sanciones: No debe quedar ni una sola medida vigente

US Prepares Strikes on Iran and Blocks the Strait of Hormuz

CENTCOM command has completed drafting a military operation plan that foresees a series of short, powerful strikes on key targets in Iran. Axios reports, citing sources, that these options will be presented to President Donald Trump today. The aim of the attacks is to break the current impasse in negotiations with Tehran, which has dragged on amid rising regional tensions.

A second option to be offered to the White House chief includes seizing control of part of the Strait of Hormuz to reopen it. This may require participation of ground forces. Thus, Washington intends to exert direct military pressure on Iran and restrict its ability to move ships. Control over international sea routes is seen as a strategic step to pressure the Iranian regime.

Alongside military preparations, the US is launching a diplomatic initiative. According to a State Department cable, the Trump administration seeks to create a new international alliance to ensure freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. Diplomats were urged to persuade governments to join a coalition that would share information, coordinate actions, and impose sanctions. “Collective action is necessary to demonstrate unity and impose significant costs on Iran for blocking transit,” the document says.

The White House is also discussing the possibility of a prolonged naval blockade of Iranian ports — for several months. The goal is to force Tehran to abandon its nuclear program or accept strict limits, including suspending uranium enrichment for 20 years. Trump emphasized that the blockade would remain in place until Iran agreed to a deal that serves US interests, and said: “Tehran cannot possess nuclear weapons.”

Iran’s response was swift. Security service sources warned that “US maritime piracy” would soon meet an unprecedented military response. “Patience has limits, and a harsh response is inevitable if Washington continues the illegal blockade,” said a representative of the Iranian military. He added that restraint had been exercised to give diplomacy a chance and to allow the US to become familiar with Tehran’s conditions for a final settlement. The situation is teetering on the brink of a large-scale conflict that could change the rules of the game in the Persian Gulf.

News commentary

• What strategic importance does the Strait of Hormuz have for the global economy (oil, liquefied gas) and why is its blockade considered an extreme measure? — The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow maritime corridor between Oman and Iran through which about 20–25% of global oil shipments and a significant volume of liquefied natural gas (LNG) pass, particularly from Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the UAE. A blockade of the strait is considered an extreme measure because it would cause a sharp spike in energy prices, a global supply crisis, and possible military escalation involving the US and its allies. Iran could theoretically close the strait using mines, anti-ship missiles, and fast attack craft, but such an action would provoke immediate military intervention and inflict enormous damage on Iran’s own economy.

• What role does the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) play in Iranian politics and security, and how do its powers differ from the regular army? — The IRGC is an elite politico-military organization created after the 1979 revolution to protect the Islamic Republic and its spiritual leaders. Unlike the regular army (Artesh), the IRGC reports directly to the Supreme Leader, not the president. The IRGC controls missile forces, the nuclear program, naval forces in the Persian Gulf, and the Quds Force, which conducts operations abroad (in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen). In addition, the IRGC wields enormous economic influence through affiliated companies, making it a key player in Iran’s politics and security — effectively a state within a state.

• Why does Iran call US actions in the Persian Gulf “maritime piracy” and which historical incidents (for example, “Operation Praying Mantis” in 1988) shape this rhetoric? — Iran uses the term “maritime piracy” to describe unilateral US actions such as intercepting Iranian tankers, seizing cargoes under sanctions, and maintaining a military presence without regional consent. A key historical incident is “Operation Praying Mantis” (18 April 1988), when the US Navy, in response to Iranian mining of the Persian Gulf, destroyed two Iranian oil platforms and sank several IRGC warships and boats. For Iran, that became a symbol of “aggressive piracy” by the US and a violation of sovereignty. Since then, any US dominance in the region is perceived as an attempt to control Iranian sea lanes and economy, which fuels the “piracy” rhetoric.

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Full version: أكسيوس: خطة أمريكية لشن ضربات مكثفة على إيران لكسر جمود المفاوضات

Emergency Summit in Jeddah: Fragile Ceasefire and New Challenges

On April 28, an emergency consultative summit was held in Jeddah, coinciding with a period of fragile ceasefire achieved through Pakistani mediation. Despite cautious optimism about negotiating progress, the results were limited. This again raised the question: is the current process a step toward a real settlement or merely temporary management of a protracted regional crisis whose consequences have extended far beyond the Middle East?

Heavy military strikes by the US and Israel on key Iranian defense facilities and leadership did not lead to the collapse or political elimination of the regime. On the contrary, these actions pushed the parties to the negotiating table in search of a new model of relations. It became clear that military force alone cannot secure a comprehensive political settlement, and attempts to force Tehran into a state of complete “weakness” face serious difficulties.

The conflict has moved into a phase that is hard to classify, which experts describe as a state of “neither war nor peace.” This is not a return to the status quo, but a shift to a more complex and ambiguous confrontation using unconventional tools. Iran continues to rely on proxy networks, maritime threats in the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb, and targeted attacks that are difficult to fully neutralize.

International and regional reactions focus on a policy of “threat management” and a tactic of “mowing the grass” — periodic strikes on Iranian capabilities without an aim to forcibly change the regime. This approach reduces the costs of full-scale confrontation but does not eliminate the root causes of tension, freezing the conflict for many years without prospects for a final solution.

For the Gulf states, it becomes critically important to redefine the concept of deterrence. The traditional threat of total war has lost effectiveness, giving way to tasks aimed at preventing limited attacks through strengthening air defense, protecting critical infrastructure, and developing “strategic resilience.” Increasing attention is being paid to achieving “relative independence in deterrence” by localizing the defense industry and building national capabilities.

The role of communication channels and strategic discipline grows as tools to prevent uncontrolled escalation. Maritime security and protection of domestic space become key priorities: ensuring freedom of navigation and uninterrupted energy flows deprives Iran of an important lever of pressure. Ultimately, the survival of the Iranian regime implies a transformation of the conflict into a more persistent form, and the challenge for the Gulf is not a rapid end to the confrontation but long-term management of it through a balanced mix of deterrence, resilience, and diplomacy.

Comments on the news

• Which proxy forces does Iran use in the region and how do they affect the conflict? — Iran relies on a network of non-state armed groups, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, various Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria (for example, Kataib Hezbollah), as well as Palestinian groups such as HAMAS. These forces act as military allies, extending Iranian influence across the Middle East without directly drawing Tehran into conflicts. In the current crisis they are used to attack Israeli and American targets and to disrupt shipping in the Red Sea, creating multi-vector pressure on adversaries.

• Why is the Strait of Hormuz so important to Iran and what does it control? — The Strait of Hormuz is a strategic narrow passage in the Persian Gulf through which about 20–25% of the world’s oil trade passes. Iran controls the northern part of the strait from the islands of Abu Musa and Greater Tunb, having the capability to disrupt or complicate navigation with mines, rocket batteries, and fast boats. For Tehran, the strait is not only an economic lever (transit of its own oil) but also a tool of political pressure: the threat of a blockade is used to defend its interests in negotiations with the West.

• What is Pakistan’s role as a mediator in the ceasefire with Iran? — Pakistan serves as a traditional diplomatic channel between Iran and Saudi Arabia, as well as between various factions in the region. In the context of the ceasefire with Iran, Pakistan leverages its historical ties with Tehran (Sunni-Shiite bridges) and the trust of Arab monarchies. It offers a venue for informal talks, guarantees neutrality, and helps coordinate temporary ceasefires or prisoner exchanges. However, Pakistan does not have direct authority to impose terms — its role is limited to facilitation and de-escalation through ongoing consultations.

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Full version: المأزق الإيراني ومعادلة "لا حرب ولا سلام"

Delcy Rodríguez Defends Venezuela's Historical Rights to Essequibo

As part of the "Great Pilgrimage for a Venezuela without Sanctions and for Peace" campaign, acting president Delcy Rodríguez firmly asserted the country's indisputable historical rights to the disputed territory of Essequibo. In response to criticism from Guyana's President Irfaan Ali, who objected to her brooch featuring a map of Venezuela, Rodríguez stressed that such complaints are absurd, since it is the only map she has known in her life. She also announced that Venezuela is preparing to appeal to the International Court of Justice to confirm its position based on international law and the 1966 Geneva Agreement.

Rodríguez categorically rejected any attempts to deprive Venezuela of its lawful territory, calling it "theft" and "robbery." The event, held at the Municipal Theater of Valencia, began with a performance by the national music program "El Sistema," highlighting the region's cultural richness and unity. Speaking before representatives of various social groups, Rodríguez said that Venezuela will never agree to the "legalization of theft," and called for respect for the country's historical and legal arguments in this long-standing territorial dispute.

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Full version: Delcy Rodríguez defendió los derechos

Hormuz Strait: global shipping crisis and insurance collapse

Since the start of the US–Israeli military campaign against Iran, the Strait of Hormuz has become the main choke point strangling the global economy. About 20% of all the planet’s oil and liquefied natural gas supplies pass through this narrow corridor. The effective closure of the strait has led to nearly 2,000 ships being stuck in the Persian Gulf awaiting passage, and rumors of a possible full blockade have heightened fears of a global recession. Even if the strait can be reopened, shipping will face enormous obstacles due to mines and sky-high insurance premiums.

Iranian forces closed the strait after strikes on Tehran on February 28, using control of it as leverage in negotiations with Washington. The United States responded with a naval blockade of Iranian ports and the strait itself, intercepting vessels linked to Tehran — a move Iran called “piracy.” Previously Iran allowed “friendly” ships or those that paid fees to pass, but it has now completely closed the passage to all foreign vessels until the blockade is lifted. Tehran even published a map of mined zones and alternative routes near its coasts.

The US announced the start of mine-clearing operations using destroyers and underwater drones, but the Pentagon warned Congress that full clearance could take up to six months. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said, “We are confident we can remove any detected mines within a reasonable timeframe.” However, experts warn that guaranteeing a complete absence of mines is practically impossible, and even a tiny residual risk could make insurers refuse coverage and paralyze navigation.

Insurers have set a minimum security condition for the strait — a sustained commitment by all parties to uphold peace and freedom of navigation. “An explicit promise from all parties to guarantee freedom of passage along international routes is required,” explained Monroe Anderson of Vessel Protect. According to him, the insurance market can provide coverage if Iranian authorities give security guarantees, but even after reopening a significant risk will remain.

War risk premiums have soared: before the war they were less than 0.25% of a vessel’s value, and now range from 1% to 5% and higher depending on type, cargo and owner. For example, a ship valued at $100 million paid about $250,000 for a passage, but now might pay up to $5 million. Experts expect prices to keep rising if attacks continue, and only a durable ceasefire could gradually bring them back toward prewar levels — but not quickly.

Uncertainty due to the presence of mines and instability in Iranian command remains a constant threat. Lack of clear leadership could mean ships are granted permission to pass but then suddenly come under attack, as happened with the Indian tanker Sanmar Gerald. Analysts note that such a situation plays into Iran’s hands in an asymmetric war: accurately assessing risks is almost impossible amid a constantly changing environment. Returning to normal shipping will require not only physical mine clearance, but political and legal guarantees, as well as a full reassessment by insurance companies.

Comments on the news

• Why is the Strait of Hormuz so important specifically for Iran, not just for the global economy, and how did it become its lever of pressure? - For Iran the strait is not just a trade route, but a strategic “key” to its survival: nearly all of the country’s oil passes through it (exports are the main source of foreign currency). Geographically Iran controls the northern shore of the strait and adjacent islands (for example, Abu Musa), which allows it to quickly obstruct shipping. This became a lever of pressure because Iran uses the threat of closing the strait as a bargaining tool in talks over its nuclear program or sanctions — the global economy (about 20% of world oil) immediately reacts to such statements.

• What are the “passage fees” that Iran previously collected from ships, and how is this related to its informal control over the strait? - Historically Iran demanded that ships pay tolls for passing through Hormuz, citing “security expenses” and outdated international norms (for example, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which allows coastal states to levy charges in special zones). In practice this was informal control: Iran detained vessels on the pretext of nonpayment, inspected cargoes (often searching for contraband or weapons) and used this to intimidate. Under sanctions such “fees” became a way to indirectly force Western companies to acknowledge Tehran’s authority in the region.

• What role does the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) play in controlling the strait and why does instability in Iranian command create additional risks? - The IRGC is the de facto master of the strait: their naval forces operate fast boats, submarines and coastal missile systems (for example, “Hormuz-2” and “Kalibr”). They act independently of the regular navy and often use unconventional tactics — swarms of boats, mine-laying or seizing tankers. Command instability (internal conflicts among generals, changes in IRGC leadership amid the 2022–2023 protests) leads to unpredictability: individual units may provoke incidents without orders from the center, risking accidental escalation with the US or Saudi Arabia.

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Full version: متى يصبح مضيق هرمز آمنا لعبور السفن التجارية؟

War in the Persian Gulf sharply raised demand for ship-tracking

The conflict in the Middle East, and especially heightened tensions with Iran, has caused an unexpected surge in the popularity of vessel-tracking apps, the Financial Times reports. The Strait of Hormuz has come into focus — a key route for oil and goods shipments where thousands of ships have faced security threats. Governments, companies and media rushed to buy services that provide an instant view of maritime traffic.

One of the main beneficiaries was the firm Kpler with its MarineTraffic service. Co-founder François Cazeur notes that the platform attracted “millions of new users” after the US-Israeli strikes on Iran in late February. Demand rose sharply from official, commercial and media organizations, underscoring the importance of maritime data during a crisis.

The numbers are striking: in April MarineTraffic had about 8.5 million users versus 3.5 million a year earlier. The number of paid subscribers increased by roughly 11,000 over the same period, according to Financial Times journalist Alice Hancock. This growth indicates a shift of part of the audience toward professional and commercial use of the platform.

Not only Kpler benefited: the London Stock Exchange reported that usage of its shipping data tripled in March, and demand for oil apps rose by 75%. Companies are actively expanding offerings to include new sectors such as insurance and finance related to maritime risks. The market increasingly relies on real-time information for supply-chain and energy analysis.

Platforms collect data from many sources — marine tracking systems, satellites and hundreds of port staff — which ensures high accuracy. Kpler is currently valued at $3–5 billion with annual revenue of $300–400 million, and the company plans to enter the insurance market. At the same time it follows strict safety rules: it does not show data on military vessels and hides information about certain private ships on request, balancing transparency and secrecy in a conflict environment.

News commentary

• What is the significance of the Strait of Hormuz for the global economy, and why is it considered critical specifically because of Iran’s position? — The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow sea passage between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman through which about 20–25% of global oil shipments pass (roughly 17–20 million barrels per day). For the Gulf countries it is the only access to the open ocean. Iran controls the northern shore of the strait and has repeatedly threatened to close it in response to sanctions or military pressure. Because of Iran’s geographic position (its islands and military bases) it can quickly disrupt shipping using mines, anti-ship missiles or fast attack craft, making the strait a “chokepoint” for global energy security.

• What specific security threats to merchant ships in the region are linked to actions by Iran or Iran-backed forces? — Main threats include: 1) seizure of tankers (for example, in 2023 Iran seized the vessel Advantage Sweet near the coast of Oman); 2) mining of waters (in 2019 Iranian forces planted mines near the port of Fujairah); 3) attacks using drones and suicide boats (in 2021 the Israeli tanker Mercer Street was attacked); 4) threats from the Houthis in the Red Sea, whom Tehran supplies with arms and intelligence (attacks on ships off Yemen, for example on True Confidence in 2024).

• How does Iran use civilian and military vessels to establish control in the Persian Gulf, and what incidents have occurred in recent years? — Iran employs a “hybrid” control tactic: IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) warships regularly escort Iranian and friendly tankers, blocking access by inspection teams. Civilian vessels are used for reconnaissance and to cover military operations. Examples: in 2022 Iranian fast boats pursued US Navy ships in the strait; in 2023 Iran seized two commercial oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz; in 2024 the Houthis (with Iranian support) attacked the merchant ship Rubymar in the Red Sea.

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Full version: تطبيقات تتبع السفن.. رابح غير متوقع من حرب إيران

US Chargé d'Affaires Urges Venezuela to Seize Opportunity

US Chargé d'Affaires John Barrett addressed the Venezuelan Oil Chamber with an appeal to take advantage of the restoration of bilateral relations and the opening of the energy sector. He described the current moment as a key opportunity to transform the country into a global energy hub, emphasizing the importance of cooperation to achieve this ambitious goal.

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Full version: Encargado de Negocios de Estados Unidos insta a aprovechar

Diplomatic deadlock between US and Iran: no war, no peace yet

Despite an apparent stalemate in diplomatic efforts to end the conflict between the US and Iran, analysts are confident the parties will not return to full-scale hostilities. Reuters, citing a US official, reports that President Donald Trump was dissatisfied with Tehran’s latest proposals, which sharply reduced hopes for a swift settlement. Experts emphasize that the current situation resembles a slowdown and delays in negotiations rather than a complete collapse of diplomacy.

Tehran put forward a compromise plan proposing to postpone discussion of the nuclear program until the war ends and maritime navigation issues are resolved. The initiative includes three stages: a ceasefire by the US and Israel, guarantees against the resumption of hostilities, and only then addressing the nuclear dossier. However, CNN sources say that at National Security Council meetings Trump made it clear he is unlikely to accept these terms. Washington fears that re-opening the Strait of Hormuz before addressing uranium enrichment would deprive the US of a key leverage point.

Mutual accusations continue to escalate. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi blamed Washington for the failure of talks, calling “excessive American demands” the reason the previous round collapsed. In response Trump said the deal is absolutely simple: “They (Iran) know what the agreement must include. It’s very simple: they cannot have nuclear weapons. Otherwise there is no point in meeting.” Tehran, in turn, rejects negotiations under threat or blockade, viewing actions such as a naval blockade as violations of any ceasefire.

Although direct talks have outwardly reached an impasse, diplomatic efforts continue through unofficial channels. Tehran has sent “written messages” to Washington via Pakistani intermediaries, clearly setting out its “red lines” on the nuclear program and the Strait of Hormuz. In addition, Araghchi conducted a regional tour, visiting Pakistan, Oman and Russia for consultations with allies and third parties. This behind-the-scenes diplomacy signals a mutual desire to keep lines of communication open despite public hardness.

Observers believe that restoring genuine diplomatic trust will take years. As expert Emma Shortis notes, “trust is built over years.” She points out there is room to maneuver on issues such as uranium enrichment, but warns of the unpredictability of leaders who can suddenly change position. In addition, Trump is under growing domestic pressure over the effect that closure of the Strait of Hormuz would have on energy prices. Scholars describe the current situation as neither peace nor war — a fragile balance that could persist for a long time, recalling the lengthy negotiations that preceded the 2015 nuclear deal or the Paris talks of 1973. It appears the parties are prepared for a long “frozen conflict” until one side can force concessions from the other or the international context changes.

Comments on the news

• Why is the Strait of Hormuz such an important lever in negotiations for the US, and how does its closure affect the global economy? - The Strait of Hormuz is a strategic “chokepoint” through which about 20–25% of the world’s oil shipments pass. For the US it is a lever because the threat of its closure by Iran immediately raises oil prices and destabilizes global energy markets. If the strait is closed, the world economy would face a sharp spike in fuel costs, shortages in importing countries (for example, Japan, India, China) and increased inflation. For Iran it is a way to force the US to make concessions, since any conflict in the strait risks direct military confrontation.

• Who is Abbas Araghchi and what role did he play in previous Iran-US negotiations, such as the 2015 nuclear deal? - Abbas Araghchi is an influential Iranian diplomat and former deputy foreign minister. He was a key Iranian negotiator during the 2015 nuclear deal (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA). Araghchi was responsible for technical and political aspects and took part in the six-party talks with the “P5+1” (US, Russia, China, UK, France, Germany). He is regarded as a pragmatic and flexible negotiator capable of finding compromises, while strictly adhering to Tehran’s official “red lines.”

• What are Iran’s “red lines” on the nuclear program and how do they define Tehran’s negotiating position? - Iran’s “red lines” are inviolable conditions that Tehran refuses to discuss or violate. In the context of the nuclear program they include: the right to enrich uranium at industrial scales (for example, up to 3.67% or higher, depending on demands), refusal to completely dismantle nuclear infrastructure (for example, centrifuges at Natanz and Fordow), and the requirement for removal of all sanctions — not only nuclear but also those related to terrorism and human rights. These “red lines” shape Iran’s hard position: if a negotiating party demands their violation, Tehran is prepared to break off talks. They also serve as an internal political support for the government, demonstrating that the country will not “capitulate” to the West.

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Full version: تجارب تاريخية شبيهة.. ماذا يعني انسداد المسار الدبلوماسي بين واشنطن وطهران؟

Tehran Proposes Phased Talks to Washington

Iran has put forward a new proposal to the United States through Pakistani intermediaries that envisages addressing issues in stages. According to Axios, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi discussed the plan during a visit to Islamabad. The main idea is to split the talks into three separate blocks, starting with a cessation of hostilities and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, while deferring the nuclear issue to a later stage.

Researcher Hossein Royouran revealed details of the three-step Iranian initiative. The first stage envisages a complete end to aggression, not merely an extension of a ceasefire. The second stage is the priority reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. The third stage is negotiations on the nuclear program. As part of a compromise, Tehran is prepared to lower uranium enrichment from 60% to 20%, but only in exchange for sanctions relief, compensation payments, and the unfreezing of assets.

The key difference of the new approach from previous ones is the separation of dossiers, whereas Washington insists on linking all issues to the nuclear program. Araqchi acknowledged a lack of consensus within Iran’s leadership regarding President Trump’s demands on enriched uranium. The new plan is intended to overcome internal divisions, although official Tehran has not yet confirmed presenting it, stressing only the role of Pakistani mediation.

The White House reaction remains cautious. The press secretary described these consultations as “sensitive diplomatic discussions,” saying the final decision rests with Washington. The US continues to insist on preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Trump plans a separate meeting to discuss the Iranian proposal and military options, while analysts warn: “the devil is in the details.”

Experts note serious obstacles. The main one is the US unwillingness to agree to an indefinite truce without guarantees on the nuclear program. Washington may temporarily extend a ceasefire, but is not prepared for an endless pause that would give Iran the opportunity to continue enriching uranium. The central question remains: which will become the priority — the nuclear dossier, as the US wants, or the Strait of Hormuz, as Iran proposes.

Comments on the news

• Why does Iran insist on reopening the Strait of Hormuz as a separate negotiation stage, and what strategic significance does it have for Tehran? — The Strait of Hormuz is the world’s “oil throat,” through which about 20% of global oil traffic passes. For Iran, control over it is not only an economic matter (revenues from transit and exports) but also a lever of military-political pressure. Making this issue a separate stage allows Tehran to link it to other topics (for example, sanctions relief) and obtain concrete concessions before more complex issues, such as the nuclear program, are discussed.

• Why did Iran choose Pakistan as a mediator, rather than, for example, Oman or Qatar, which previously played that role in Iran–US contacts? — Choosing Pakistan may be related to its special relations with China (a strategic ally of Iran) and Saudi Arabia (regional rivals but also Pakistan’s partner). Unlike Oman and Qatar, which traditionally acted as “postmen” between Washington and Tehran, Pakistan offers a broader regional context — for example, assistance in stabilizing Afghanistan or in energy transit. In addition, Islamabad has diplomatic channels with both sides but is not associated with the Gulf’s “pro-Western” monarchies.

• Who is Hossein Royouran, and why is his analysis of the Iranian plan considered authoritative in the absence of official confirmation? — Hossein Royouran is a former senior official of Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (including serving as Iran’s ambassador to Pakistan) and a well-known analyst close to conservative circles. In Iran, public figures with experience in the Foreign Ministry or “intelligence councils” (for example, the Supreme National Security Council) often have informal authority: their leaks or comments are perceived as “trial balloons” — signals that authorities want to send to the audience while avoiding direct responsibility. His analysis is important because it reflects the viewpoint of the conservative wing that influences the decisions of the Supreme Leader.

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Full version: المضيق أولا والنووي لاحقا.. ماذا يكشف المقترح الإيراني الجديد؟

Venezuela Condemns Attempted Attack on Trump

Acting President of Venezuela Delcy Rodríguez strongly condemned reports of an attempted attack on former U.S. President Donald Trump and his wife Melania during the Correspondents' Association dinner on Saturday evening. In her statement on social media she emphasized her commitment to peace, offering good wishes to Trump and all attendees of the event. "We reject any acts of violence," Rodríguez wrote, "and remind that violence is never the solution for those who defend the banner of peace."

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Full version: Presidenta encargada Delcy Rodríguez rechaza intento de agresión contra Donald Trump:

Oil Didn’t Spike to $200: How the Market Absorbed the Strait of Hormuz Shock

Despite the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the escalation of the US–Israeli war against Iran, oil prices did not reach the forecasted $200 per barrel. Since the start of the conflict on February 28, Brent rose to a peak of about $119 in late March, but then fell below $90 during lulls, averaging around $100. Light Arab crude temporarily exceeded $140. This movement shows that the market absorbed the shock rather than exploding in a sharp surge.

From the outset there were alarming forecasts: Rory Johnston, founder of the Commodity Context bulletin, warned that a prolonged closure of the strait could push prices above $200. Wood Mackenzie experts told The Wall Street Journal that $200 by 2026 was not out of the question, and JP Morgan reports cited a possible $150–200 range in the event of a severe supply deficit. These warnings kept the market on edge, despite the relative decline in quotations.

One of the main restraining factors was the use of strategic reserves. The International Energy Agency announced the release of about 400 million barrels to calm markets and offset part of the lost supply. Major countries also played a key role: China, whose reserves are estimated at 1.2–1.4 billion barrels, and Japan, which released 80 million barrels to support economic stability. These interventions created a temporary safety buffer that softened the blow in the first weeks of the war.

Additional support came from alternative supplies. The US partially eased sanctions, allowing the purchase of already-loaded Russian oil, and Iran continued to export via a “shadow fleet” despite the naval blockade. According to Reuters, about 10.7 million barrels of Iranian crude passed through the Strait of Hormuz from April 13 to 21. Bypass routes also played a role — for example, Saudi Arabia’s East–West pipeline and the Kirkuk–Ceyhan line — which reduced the impact of a full closure of the strait.

On the demand side there was “demand destruction” due to canceled flights and a slowdown in economic activity. Analyst Amr al-Shubki noted that breaking the $130 mark was a turning point, and that the $150 level would lead to a serious contraction in consumption. Meanwhile, Nawar al-Saadi pointed out that the market oscillated between caution and calm: every time prices exceeded $110, calming signals followed that brought prices back to $90. This shows how expectations and policy shape market dynamics.

In the end, the market absorbed the shock thanks to a combination of measures: reserve releases, additional supplies from Russia and Iran, alternative export routes, temporary demand decline, and political interventions. However, experts warn that this balance is fragile — a prolonged war will deplete inventories and gradually push prices up, possibly to $150. As Mohammed Ramadan emphasized, such high levels are not even advantageous for exporters because they spur the development of alternatives, and al-Shubki added that the world will need long-term excess capacity, since expensive oil could persist for two to three years.

Comments on the story

• Why is the closure of the Strait of Hormuz considered such a significant event for the global oil market, and how much oil normally passes through it? — The Strait of Hormuz is a strategic “narrow passage” between the Persian Gulf and the open ocean. About 20–21 million barrels of oil and petroleum products pass through it daily, which is roughly 21% of global oil consumption. Closure of the strait would instantly deprive the global market of a huge volume of supply, causing a sharp spike in prices, supply-chain disruptions and panic among importing countries (especially in Asia), since alternative routes cannot quickly make up that volume.

• What is Iran’s “shadow fleet” and how does it manage to keep exporting oil despite the naval blockade? — The “shadow fleet” is a network of old, poorly insured tankers, often with AIS transponders switched off, that hide their location and ownership through complex chains of shell companies. Iran uses these vessels for ship-to-ship transfers in international waters, flag changes and forged documentation to circumvent sanctions and maritime patrols. This allows it to export an estimated 1–1.5 million barrels per day, far below pre-war official figures but enough to support the economy.

• What alternative export routes exist in the region besides the Strait of Hormuz, and how capable are they of compensating for its closure? — Major alternatives include the Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline (Iraq–Turkey) with capacity up to 1.5 million barrels per day, the Petroline (Saudi Arabia–Red Sea) with capacity around 5 million barrels, as well as routes via the UAE and from Oman. However, their combined capacity is significantly lower than the volumes transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Pipelines are often subject to technical failures, sabotage or political disputes. Moreover, they cannot compensate for the loss of 20 million barrels/day, making a complete closure catastrophic for global supplies.

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Full version: لماذا لم يصل سعر النفط 200 دولار رغم حرب إيران؟

War has disrupted steel supplies, and Iran's auto industry is suffering losses

Direct strikes on Iran's car factories are not being carried out, but the war has significantly undermined the foundation of the sector — sheet steel. Disruptions to supplies and rising steel prices caused by the conflict are creating serious obstacles to car production. The key question arises: is the current situation a temporary glitch that can be fixed, or is it the start of deeper, more sustained pressure on production chains and the market for Iranian cars?

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Full version: الجزيرة نت

OFAC allowed Venezuela to pay for the defense of Maduro and the first lady

The U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued a license permitting the government of Venezuela to fund the legal defense of President Nicolás Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores in a criminal case being heard in the Southern District of New York. Previously, the defendants' lawyers had filed a motion to dismiss the case, citing lack of funds to pay for legal services; however, after OFAC's intervention that argument lost force — the parties have now agreed to hold the next hearing within two months. This decision became an important turning point in the trial, as it removed one of the key obstacles to continuing the proceedings and restored full legal support for the high-ranking Venezuelan officials.

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Full version: OFAC permitirá al Gobierno venezolano pagar defensa del presidente Maduro y primera dama Cilia Flores (+Comunicado)

Iran under blockade: prices rise, authorities seek workarounds

Despite a 12-day maritime blockade of Iran, staple goods are still on store shelves, but rising prices and fears of future shortages have forced the government to urgently develop alternative supply routes to prevent a humanitarian crisis.

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Full version: الجزيرة نت