In March 2026, conversation about the United States in leading countries around the world again concentrates simultaneously on American power and its vulnerabilities. Washington is conducting a large-scale war against Iran, continues to define the contours of the conflict over Ukraine, launches new security initiatives in its hemisphere and, at the same time, destabilizes the global economy with unpredictable tariff policy. Against this backdrop, Russia, Germany and China view the United States as a source of threats, opportunities and systemic risk to the global order — but each in its own way and tied to its own fears and interests.
The most discussed topics today are the American military campaign against Iran and the expansion of U.S. presence in the Middle East; Washington’s role in the war in Ukraine; the new “shield” initiative in the Western Hemisphere, symbolizing a reformatting of American influence in the Americas; and U.S. domestic economic and tariff policy, which, Chinese and European authors emphasize, is increasingly becoming an instrument of political pressure. Each country overlays this common set of narratives with its own historical traumas and expectations of “America.”
The central nerve of the discussion is the U.S. war against Iran. Russian political and military commentators describe the deployment of American forces and the ensuing war as a predictable but nevertheless dangerous escalation scenario. Russian reviews point not only to U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran, but also to Iranian drone retaliatory attacks on American facilities, including a strike on a U.S. site in Kuwait with noticeable U.S. military casualties. This is presented as confirmation of the thesis that the American strategy of “controlled escalation” in the Middle East has long ceased to be controlled and drags allies and neighboring states into the orbit of war. One Russian commentator in Izvestia emphasizes that even within the U.S. the number of complaints from military personnel about commanders’ religious‑ideological rhetoric — justifying participation in the war by appealing to a “crusade” — is growing; Russian press interprets this as a sign of radicalization of American political culture and elites’ detachment from society. (zh.wikipedia.org)
Chinese analysts approach the same conflict through the prism of resilience: how long the American economy and political system will hold up during a protracted campaign, and how long Iran can withstand strikes. For example, one prominent section of a South China newspaper is built around two questions: “How long will American energy resources last?” and “How long can Iran endure?” The authors cautiously but consistently stress that ongoing U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran create risks for the energy security of the entire East and, in particular, for countries dependent on Middle Eastern oil, including Japan and China. At Foreign Ministry briefings, the PRC’s official spokesperson, in response to questions about the bombings of Iran and strikes on American and Israeli targets, repeats the mantra of the need for “restraint” and “dialogue,” but in Chinese publications this is read as criticism that Washington first destroys the balance of power and then calls for “responsible behavior.” (ep.ycwb.com)
The German optics on the war with Iran are less emotional and more “managerial.” In the German press the main concern is how a protracted conflict will affect energy markets and already strained European defense planning. Analytical notes emphasize that any major American campaign outside Europe automatically increases pressure on NATO allies to assume greater obligations for Ukraine and the eastern flank. German commentators, relying on sociology, remind readers: society is not prepared for further increases in military spending and certainly not for Bundeswehr participation in potential “peacekeeping missions” in hot zones if simultaneously the U.S. launches a new war in the Middle East. (reddit.com)
The second major block is the U.S. role in continuing the war in Ukraine. For Russia this is, of course, the main context of all Washington policy. Russian media meticulously track the chronology of hostilities and constantly link successes and failures of the Ukrainian army to shipments of American weaponry, Congressional decisions on aid packages and “NATO warehouses” on the territory of European countries. In recent issues of major Russian newspapers, analysts argue that ammunition depots and logistics hubs in Germany and other EU countries effectively turn them into participants in the conflict, even if formally “NATO troops” do not fight. Parallels are drawn with the U.S. campaign against Iran: in both cases, Russian authors assert, Washington seeks to wage war “with other people’s hands,” minimizing its own losses while maximizing strategic pressure on adversaries. (ru.wikipedia.org)
In Germany the discussion about the American role in Ukraine runs through the prism of an internal debate over Germans’ willingness to pay the price for “Western solidarity.” Against the backdrop of a protracted conflict and growing demands from NATO allies, contradictory voices are heard domestically. On the one hand, the annual Berlin Pulse survey has previously shown that the majority of Germans in principle support the idea of a more active German role in ensuring European security, theoretically including peacekeeping missions. On the other hand, protest sentiments are visible in the information space against the return of conscription and plans to send questionnaires to all 18‑year‑olds, which in online discussions crystallizes into slogans about unwillingness to “die for geopolitics” and reinforces skepticism toward American initiatives perceived as sources of new obligations for Europe. Against this background, Washington often appears in German texts not as “leader of the free world” but as a partner whose decisions automatically expand Berlin’s responsibilities, not always taking into account the internal legitimacy of such steps within Germany itself. (reddit.com)
In China the Ukrainian theme is linked to the U.S. primarily as an example of “bloc thinking” and a “Cold War mentality.” In Chinese analytical materials over recent months a pattern emerges: Washington wages a proxy war in Europe, intervenes directly in the Middle East and at the same time launches a new wave of economic pressure in Asia and Latin America. This is presented as evidence of the U.S.’s inability to perceive the world as multipolar: any autonomous policy of other centers of power is perceived by the American establishment as a challenge that must be suppressed through sanctions, military alliances or information campaigns.
The third major theme is the reformatting of American influence in the Western Hemisphere through new security initiatives. Chinese and Latin American materials actively dissect Washington’s announced initiative called the “shield” or “Shield of the Americas,” aimed at combating transnational crime and drug cartels and simultaneously consolidating allies in the Western Hemisphere under American leadership. Chinese analysts primarily see this as an instrument for cementing American dominance in its “own backyard” and for containing alternative partnerships in the region — from Chinese infrastructure projects to energy and military‑technical cooperation with other external actors. Official publications note that under the slogans of the fight against drug trafficking, the U.S. gains legitimation to expand military and intelligence presence in Central and South America. (zh.wikipedia.org)
The Russian perspective here is somewhat different: in Moscow the initiative is seen as part of a broader U.S. pivot to so‑called “Western Hemisphere realism” of the Trump era, within which resources and attention increasingly concentrate on the American continent and competition with China, while Europe and even the Middle East are supposed to gradually transition to a mode of “managed spheres of influence” with a division of labor between Washington and regional allies. For Russian analysts, the important point is that such a pivot reduces Russia’s room for maneuver in Latin America and complicates attempts to exploit anti‑American sentiment there.
Against this backdrop, special attention in discussions is given to U.S. domestic economic and tariff policy. Chinese business and general‑political publications almost daily analyze the consequences of what Beijing calls the White House’s “tariff pendulum”: abrupt, sometimes contradictory decisions on duties on imports from Mexico, Canada, China and the EU affect global supply chains and undermine predictability in world trade. One Chinese legal‑economic newspaper provided a detailed analysis of the president’s latest steps in imposing and readjusting 25 percent tariffs on goods from neighboring countries, and forecast a rise in the U.S. budget deficit to more than 6% of GDP by 2026. Authors cite assessments by Western economists that the combination of a high deficit and tariff aggression undermines confidence in American fiscal policy and accelerates the search for alternatives to the dollar in regional settlements. (epaper.legaldaily.com.cn)
In Germany this topic is presented less as an existential threat and more as an irritant. German commentary on tariff wars reminds readers that business needs predictability: every “twist‑decision” from Washington calls U.S. investment into question and forces German companies to hedge by redirecting flows to Asia and within the EU. However, unlike China, European authors more often speak not of a “systemic competition with the U.S.” but of the need to “educate” Washington, persuading it to abandon unilateral measures and return to multilateral WTO rules — even if these calls largely remain rhetorical.
An interesting layer of discussion about the U.S. appears in less official but revealing debates. On Russian‑language forums and social networks the question “what do you think about the U.S.?” regularly appears. In these discussions Russia often describes the current world as “Pax Americana,” a world under American leadership that, however, is already “on the horizon” being succeeded by “Pax China” — an era when China’s economic and technological weight will surpass America’s. Some participants emphasize that U.S. power is still based on the attractiveness of its culture, market scale and innovation, while others point to internal polarization, a crisis of freedom of speech and the growing influence of radical movements, seeing these as sources of future weakening of American influence. In these debates the U.S. is simultaneously an object of envy, a symbol of hypocrisy, and still the main benchmark against which the “success” or “backwardness” of one’s own countries is measured. (reddit.com)
Chinese online discussions are usually less emotional, but they increasingly express the idea that the U.S. is an “inevitable opponent, yet still a necessary market.” On the one hand, young commentators sarcastically discuss American social problems, from mass shootings to racial conflict, arguing that Washington has “lost the moral right” to teach others about democracy. On the other hand, entrepreneurs and economists remind readers that American demand remains a key driver for whole sectors of the Chinese economy, and any sharp deterioration with the U.S. will immediately hit jobs inside China itself. In this duality there is respect for American technological might and at the same time criticism of its political shell.
In the German public sphere the discussion about America is increasingly generationally split. The older generation still sees the U.S. as a guarantor of security and the most important political ally without whom one cannot build a European architecture to deter Russia. Young Germans participating in protests against militarization and the return of conscription more often perceive Washington as a symbol of “militarized capitalism,” which exports not only culture and technology but also wars. Some placards and slogans at student protests explicitly or implicitly contrast the need to solve Germany’s internal social problems with the pressure from NATO allies led by the U.S. to “do more” militarily.
In the end, if one attempts to synthesize these divergent views, a paradoxical image of the U.S. at the start of 2026 emerges. For Russia it remains the main military and ideological adversary, whose actions in Ukraine and the Middle East define the fundamental parameters of Russian security. For Germany it is a complicated but indispensable partner, whose decisions influence energy prices, the contours of European defense, and the limits of acceptable economic losses for allied solidarity. For China it is a strategic competitor and at the same time a central economic counterparty, whose tariff experiments and military adventures accelerate the search for alternatives but do not yet negate objective interdependence.
What all three countries share is that the U.S. is increasingly no longer perceived as a “normal” participant in the international system. For Russia it has long been a symbol of the “hostile West.” For Germany it is a partner that needs to be constantly “compensated” for through European policy. For China it is a hegemon that must be managed, constrained and at the same time used. And the longer the war with Iran and the conflict in Ukraine remain fixtures on the American military and political calendar, the more this ambivalence will harden into a persistent distrust of Washington’s ability to be not only strong but also a responsible center of power.
