At the beginning of 2026, the United States once again finds itself at the center of global disputes — but in a different configuration than the familiar “Cold War” or “war on terror.” A sharp increase in American military presence in the Middle East, joint strikes by the US and Israel against Iran, an intervention in Venezuela followed by a political‑economic crisis spiral in Cuba, and Washington’s internal drift toward a tougher, revisionist foreign policy — all of this is being discussed simultaneously in Brazil, Israel and India. Tone, emphases and emotions differ, but the through‑line is the same: the world is rethinking America as a power that no longer pretends to be a “global arbiter” but acts as a hegemon ready to change the rules of the game.
One of the key lines of discussion is the large‑scale buildup of US military presence in the Persian Gulf and the Eastern Mediterranean. In the Brazilian press this is first of all associated with an escalation against Iran. On the Portuguese‑language page “US Attack on Iran” it is noted that since late January Washington has deployed the largest concentration of forces in the region since 2003, and in February–March 2026 carried out a series of strikes on Iranian strategic targets in cooperation with Israel. It is emphasized that even within the American establishment veterans of the foreign‑policy bloc warned the White House about weak political support for potential personnel losses and the questionable sustainability of such a course in the long run, a point referenced by a review of these actions in Politico cited in the Brazilian overview. (pt.wikipedia.org)
Brazilian commentators see this not only as another turn in Middle Eastern drama, but as a signal to the global South. In analytical texts published in left‑leaning regional outlets, US military moves in Iran are put on the same level as pressure on Latin American governments. Thus, in the bilingual India‑and‑Anglo‑oriented but also read in Brazil publication Border News Mirror, where “imperialist” US strategies are discussed, it is argued that such a policy “lays the groundwork for a third world war,” and American interventions are interpreted as a consistent attempt to cement a unipolar world order even at the cost of destroying regional economies. (bordernewsmirror.com)
In Israel the US troop buildup is viewed far more pragmatically — as a rare alignment of interests that gives Jerusalem strategic “umbrella” protection. Analysts at Israeli research centers emphasize that the US and Israel are essentially conducting a “joint war” against Iran’s military and nuclear infrastructure. In the annual assessment of the Jewish people’s situation by the Jewish People Policy Institute (JPPI), it is noted that a significant portion of the Israeli elite perceives the current American military line as a “historic window of opportunity” to neutralize the Iranian threat and solidify the armed alliance, while within American society fatigue is growing over the role of “defending Israel at any cost.” (jppi.org.il)
From the Israeli perspective, American strikes on Iran and the increased presence in the region are a continuation of a long‑standing strategic dialogue, but at a higher level of risk. In Israeli debates, including on popular discussion platforms, participants acknowledge that Washington could have pursued a more “distanced” approach limited to sanctions and cyber operations; however, the current Trump policy, which, according to one military commentator, “broke the psychological barrier to a direct strike on Tehran,” is seen as decisive, though dangerous. On informal platforms, such as discussions in Israeli online communities, critics of the government’s line ask whether “Israel was drawn into” the US‑Iran conflict, or conversely — whether Jerusalem for years pushed Washington toward the current scenario and now cannot stop itself. (reddit.com)
The Indian view complements this picture from another angle. In the Indian press, especially in English‑language outlets aimed at Hindi readers, the emphasis is on how US policy toward Iran and the Middle East complicates Delhi’s room for maneuver. On one hand, India has traditionally built close ties with Washington along security lines in the Indo‑Pacific; on the other, it remains a major buyer of Iranian oil and cannot ignore potential energy shocks. In several Hindi‑language analytical pieces, the American line is described using the rhetoric of “samrajyavadi neetiyan” — imperialist policies that subordinate the interests of third countries, including India, to Washington’s strategic game. (bordernewsmirror.com)
The second major theme uniting discussions in Brazil, Israel and India is US interventions in Latin America, primarily in Venezuela, and the subsequent crisis spiral in Cuba. Portuguese‑language overviews relied upon by Brazilian columnists recount the chronology in detail: on January 3, 2026, after US military intervention President Nicolás Maduro was deposed, shipments of Venezuelan oil to Cuba were blocked, and the US administration openly declared its intention to achieve regime change on the island by the end of the year. (pt.wikipedia.org)
In Brazil this evokes painful historical associations. Columnists in leading newspapers and portals recall the long history of Washington’s interventions in the region — from support for coups during the “Cold War” to pressure on the governments of Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia and Brazil itself in the 2000s. In these texts the intervention in Venezuela is seen as the culmination of a “Monroe Doctrine 2.0,” in which Latin America once again becomes the US “backyard.” In center‑left outlets analysts write that the current White House course undermines Brazil’s efforts to build its own mechanisms of regional integration and mediation; moreover, it provokes a new wave of polarization within Brazil itself: right‑wing forces tend to welcome Maduro’s fall as the “end of the narco‑regime,” while the left sees it as a step toward the militarization of the entire region. (shakuf.co.il)
From the Israeli viewpoint the Venezuela‑Cuba episode is interesting in a different way: it fits into a broader picture of a “revisionist” America. In one recent analytic report in Hebrew, the US is described as a “revisionist autocratic hegemon,” whose internal drift toward autocracy finds a “mirror image” in its foreign policy. The report’s authors particularly note that the operation to capture Maduro is seen as part of a broader pattern: from hard pressure on NATO allies to a demonstrative willingness by Washington to revise previous agreements if they do not fit the administration’s current interests. (debugliesintel.com)
Indian commentators, especially in left‑leaning and national‑patriotic circles, react to events in Venezuela and Cuba with caution but without Brazil’s emotional involvement. In Indian analyses this is primarily an example of “extraterritorial use of force” that, they argue, could one day be turned against any country that violates Washington’s unwritten “red lines.” Pragmatically minded commentators emphasize that India, facing its own challenges with neighbors China and Pakistan, has an objective interest in keeping the US strong and active enough to contain Beijing, and therefore cannot afford to openly oppose Washington’s course in Latin America.
The third through‑line is the perception of the United States’ internal transformation and Donald Trump’s return to power in the context of foreign policy. In Israel this topic is covered in both scholarly and popular texts. In one recent Hebrew collection, the American system is described as “liberal only in form”: researchers, citing American comparative‑political works, argue that by the 2020s the US had effectively approached the type of “illiberal democracy” with weakened checks and balances, and after Trump’s return the course toward concentration of power and attacks on independent institutions only intensified. A report published in early 2026 in Hebrew notes that the US transition to a more autocratic model of governance is accompanied by an aggressive foreign policy in which strikes on Venezuela, pressure on Cuba and threats against Iran become a single, consistent project. (shakuf.co.il)
In Brazil this same turn in the US reminds many of Jair Bolsonaro’s rule — with its clashes with the Supreme Court, attacks on the media and radicalization of the electorate. Brazilian analytical pieces increasingly draw parallels between the MAGA movement in the US and Bolsonarism. Brazilian commentators write that Trump‑2026’s rise is closer in spirit not to classic Republicans or neoconservatives but to right‑wing populist leaders of the Global South who combine nationalism, religious conservatism and economic protectionism. In this vein, Washington’s foreign policy — strikes, sanctions, threats — is seen as a continuation of the internal logic of “us versus them” exported to the global level.
In the Indian discussion the theme of America’s internal transformation is colored more pragmatically. For some Indian commentators the US example is a warning: even a mature democracy can quickly slide into institutional erosion if the combination of a charismatic leader, a polarized media space and social networks overlays real economic and cultural fears. But for another segment of the elite something else matters more: even an “illiberal” America remains India’s most important external partner. Hence the dual rhetoric: criticizing Washington’s “imperialism” and “double standards” in semi‑official texts, New Delhi at the same time expands military and technological cooperation with the US, seeing it as a counterweight to China.
A special dimension of debates about the US is the reaction to American involvement in the war against Iran and its regional consequences. In Israel military cooperation with the US in strikes on Iranian targets is described as a historic achievement. In public speeches and leaks from the military command it is stressed that joint operations “neutralized and destroyed over sixty percent of ballistic missile launchers,” presented as “a significant achievement that saved many lives on the home front.” Against this rhetoric, Israeli expert circles discuss a longer‑term question: is Israel becoming a “frontline state” of American strategy, whose maneuverability increasingly depends on the political weather in Washington. (reddit.com)
In Brazil the same war looks entirely different. Leftist and pacifist circles perceive US and Israeli strikes on Iran as another “unsanctioned” act of force leading to destabilization of the global economy and rising oil prices, which directly hits Brazilian consumers. At the same time Brazil watches diaspora reactions closely: Portuguese‑language articles recount how the Iranian diaspora in various countries responds to US and Israeli strikes — sometimes with protests, elsewhere with rallies of approval and hopes for the regime’s fall. These stories become part of a broader Brazilian debate about the right of external powers to intervene in the internal affairs of authoritarian states under the banner of defending human rights or fighting terrorism. (pt.wikipedia.org)
Indian authors, especially in strategic and defense outlets, view the war on Iran through the prism of the balance of power in Eurasia. For them the US and Israeli strikes are not only an episode in confronting a particular regime but part of a larger puzzle: how will the balance between the US, Russia, China and regional powers change, and what will that mean for India’s interests. Articles contain a creeping anxiety: each new escalation caused by the US reorients Washington’s attention and resources from the Indo‑Pacific to the Middle East, making American involvement in containing China less predictable.
Finally, another important motif is perceiving the US as a source not only of power but of instability in the world system. In the aforementioned Israeli report on the “transformation of the United States into a revisionist autocratic hegemon” it is argued that trust in American leadership has noticeably declined among NATO allies and partners in other regions: polls in NATO countries record a sharp drop in support for the US role as a global leader. This thesis is picked up in Latin America and in Asia, where the idea increasingly sounds: when the hegemon itself becomes a source of uncertainty, middle powers are forced to diversify their foreign‑policy anchors. (debugliesintel.com)
Brazilian authors therefore increasingly write about the need to strengthen regional cooperation institutions — from a renewed UNASUR to an alliance with Mexico and Argentina — as “insurance” against Washington’s caprices. Israeli analysts, by contrast, discuss how to embed themselves in the new, tougher American strategy in ways that minimize dependency on US domestic politics while simultaneously building ties with Europe and rising Asian powers. Indian commentators talk about “multilateral multivectorism”: New Delhi seeks to play on several boards at once — cooperate with the US, not alienate Russia, contain China and at the same time maintain its image as a leader of the global South.
Viewed from Washington, it may seem that the world merely reacts to American impulses. But texts from Brazil, Israel and India show a different angle: each of these countries uses America’s turn to force as a mirror for their own debates about democracy, sovereignty and the role of force in foreign policy. In Brazil US interventions provoke fierce disputes about where Brazilian democracy should move after Bolsonaro and whether Latin America can ever truly free itself from the American shadow. In Israel internal polarization and the war with Iran are closely intertwined with the question of how far the country is willing to go with the “new America” and whether it will retain room for independent decisions. In India the discussion about the US is essentially a debate about what India’s role in the world should be when the great hegemon increasingly resembles not a “bulwark of liberal order” but a lone player pursuing its objectives without much regard for consequences.
Thus, at the start of 2026 the United States appears in the international mirror both as an engine and as a symptom of global instability. And it is in texts written not in Washington or London but in São Paulo, Tel Aviv and Delhi that one can best see how profoundly not only American policy but the perception of America itself has changed — from an idealized “city on a hill” to a complex, contradictory, often frightening, yet still indispensable actor on the world stage.
