In early April 2026, foreign media discussion of the United States revolves around three major storylines that intertwine politics, economics and even sport. There is the new war of the US and Israel with Iran and the threat of escalation across the Middle East; the return of Donald Trump and his domestic agenda, perceived abroad as a global risk; and a softer but telling theme — perceptions of American society, its well‑being and values seen through happiness rankings and international sporting events. Russia, Saudi Arabia and South Korea look at the same events from different angles, but similar motifs often emerge in their assessments: fatigue with America’s “global mission,” fear of Washington’s unpredictability, and pragmatic calculations about how to use the current crisis to their advantage.
The central nerve of all discussions is the US and Israel war with Iran, which began on 28 February 2026 with Operation “Epic Fury” and the killing of Iran’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei. (ru.wikipedia.org) For Russian commentators this is a long‑awaited confirmation of their long‑held thesis that Washington inevitably resorts to forceful solutions. In analytical pieces in major Russian outlets the war is described as a logical continuation of the “history of American interventions,” and the strike on Iran is portrayed as an attempt to regain control of the energy market and to preserve the petrodollar as central banks increasingly shift into gold, the euro and the yuan. (gold.1prime.ru) At the same time, Moscow revives the old theme of “double standards”: Tehran’s suppression of protests is condemned almost everywhere, but Russian experts emphasize that the US is using this only as a convenient pretext while ignoring similar practices by its regional allies.
Saudi media view the same conflict much more pragmatically. The main question in local economic and political columns is not moral judgment of Washington but the price per barrel and logistics resilience. Business pieces analyze oil and gold price spikes in response to news of US–Iran talks and the risk of direct strikes on Iranian infrastructure: bank and trading house analysts explain to readers how a “geopolitical premium” of a few dollars per barrel is linked to the likelihood of an American attack and Iran’s possible retaliatory strikes on Persian Gulf infrastructure. (alriyadh.com) On the one hand, higher oil prices are temporarily beneficial to the kingdom’s budget; on the other, any serious disruption of shipments through Hormuz threatens global market destabilization and pushes consumers toward diversification — so Saudi commentary expresses cautious criticism of escalation from all sides, but without direct confrontation with Washington.
South Korean analysts view the US–Iran war primarily as a factor in global macroeconomics and defense markets. In recent briefs from Korean investment houses the conflict is described as a “localized war / war of attrition” after Khamenei’s death, which increases oil price volatility, affects the Fed’s rate decisions and, at the same time, boosts demand for air defense systems and precision weaponry. (file.alphasquare.co.kr) One market report on commodities and defense assets states outright: Operation “Epic Fury” and the subsequent IRGC strikes on US bases in Qatar, Kuwait, the UAE and Bahrain create a “window of opportunity” for Korean manufacturers of air‑defense missiles, as regional supplies of interceptors are rapidly depleting. (samsungpop.com)
At the same time, Korean commentators do not share illusions about the manageability of the conflict. Parallels with 2022 and the war in Ukraine appear in the context of inflation: authors remind readers that even before the current war with Iran the American economy was living with post‑COVID inflation, and now an oil shock again ties US military adventurism to the wallet of the Korean consumer. (file.alphasquare.co.kr) Here American policy appears not as a distant story “about democracy in the Middle East,” but as a direct driver of gasoline prices, loan rates and volatility on the Seoul exchange.
The second major thread is Donald Trump’s return and his domestic initiatives, which outside the US are perceived not as a purely domestic matter but as a radical change of the rules. In the Arab press, including in Gulf states, economic commentators continue to dissect his tax plan, which threatens to inflate the budget deficit, raise borrowing costs and thereby alter global capital flows. In a Kuwaiti outlet this bill is described as a “threat to the American economy,” not only due to rising debt but also because of the risk of new currency and debt crises that traditionally “spill over” into emerging markets. (aljarida.com)
In Saudi public discourse Trump more often appears in the light of his controversial immigration and citizenship initiatives. Reports from the US in the local press note Supreme Court hearings on the possibility of ending birthright citizenship by presidential decree. Journalists carefully explain American constitutional logic to readers — the Fourteenth Amendment, the “citizenship clause” — and emphasize that lower courts have already found Trump’s initiative unconstitutional. (alriyadh.com) But the underlying question for Saudi audiences is different: if such a fundamental norm can be politically re‑examined in the US, how secure are the guarantees for foreign students, investors and workers on which the kingdom relies in its own transformation strategy?
Russian commentators perceive Trump’s return more cynically and instrumentally. In analysis and columns he is often presented as a “symptom of crisis in American democracy” and simultaneously as a figure whose unpredictability could weaken Western coordination on sanctions and military matters. Reviews of the political situation in the US stress that Trump’s projects, from tax reform to a hardline immigration agenda, divide American society and create an opening for other centers of power, including Russia and China. Paradoxically, Moscow commentators sometimes speak of Trump with a certain sympathy, stressing that his criticism of the “deep state” and international alliances reflects the fatigue of part of American society with the country’s globalist role — which aligns his rhetoric with the traditional Russian narrative of “sovereignty” and “multipolarity.”
South Korea views Trump through a security prism. Articles on nuclear deterrence and strategic stability raise the question: how reliable is the US “nuclear umbrella” if Washington is again led by a leader who openly questions the value of alliances and is willing to negotiate the terms of military presence? International reviews remind readers that discussions about Seoul acquiring its own nuclear weapons, as with Germany or Poland, are largely fueled by doubts that the US would truly risk its own cities for an ally in a critical moment. (afsa.org) For the Korean public this is not an abstract theory: it immediately raises the question of whether Trump, absorbed by confrontation with Iran and domestic battles, will keep sufficient attention on North Korea and East Asia.
The third, seemingly less dramatic but revealing thread concerns how American society and soft power are judged abroad — from happiness rankings to the World Cup. In Saudi Arabia the new World Happiness Report has been widely discussed in recent days: the kingdom rose to 22nd place, overtaking the United States, which ranked 23rd. (alriyadh.com) For Saudi writers this is not mere statistics; commentary draws a direct line: not long ago America personified the “American dream” and the highest standard of well‑being, but now a reforming kingdom demonstrates a higher level of subjective life satisfaction than many traditional Western powers. This is a subtle form of symbolic revanche: while still acknowledging America’s technological and cultural influence, Saudi media increasingly claim that the West no longer monopolizes the model of a “successful society.”
Interestingly, the same motif appears in the sporting context. The 2026 FIFA World Cup, to be hosted in part by the US, is discussed in the Arab press not only as a sporting celebration but as a potential source of political friction. One Saudi piece quotes FIFA president Gianni Infantino saying that Iran, despite the war, will participate in the tournament and will play its matches where the draw assigns — including on American stadiums, although Tehran tried to move its games to Mexico and Donald Trump said Iranian players “would not be safe” in the US. (alriyadh.com) For a Middle Eastern audience this is a vivid example of how US geopolitical conflicts spill into the football arena, and simultaneously a test of whether an international organization like FIFA can withstand pressure from superpowers.
In Russia, sports and “ranking” themes around the US emerge less often and more often in an ironic tone, but the common subtext is similar: America no longer looks like an unquestioned benchmark. Some pieces link this to internal polarization and social problems, others to foreign policy adventures that are exhausting the country. Against this backdrop Russian commentators emphasize that many developing economies — from Saudi Arabia to China — no longer feel like “second‑class” compared to the US in their assessments of well‑being and economic resilience, especially amid dollar devaluation in reserves and central banks’ turn to gold and alternative currencies. (gold.1prime.ru)
South Korean media in their daily agendas focus much less on the “American dream” as such, but American society constantly appears in the background through discussions about the labor market, Fed rates, technological competition and regulation of big platforms. When discussing, for example, the US crackdown on Chinese tech companies and laws to force the sale or ban of TikTok, Saudi and Korean authors see not only a US national security issue but a symptom of a broader crisis of the liberal digital order that Americans themselves built. In one Saudi article the lawsuit by TikTok and ByteDance against an “unconstitutional” law banning the platform is presented as a historical precedent: for the first time the US Congress is imposing an indefinite ban on a specific platform of expression, restricting Americans’ access to the global online community. (alriyadh.com) For writers in countries where freedom of speech has traditionally been more constrained, the paradox is striking: America, which for decades criticized censorship abroad, now resorts to tools strikingly similar to those it once condemned.
At the intersection of all these threads a general feeling emerges: in Russia, Saudi Arabia and South Korea the United States is no longer perceived as a predictable “anchor” of the world system. For Russian commentators this is an occasion to speak about the collapse of the old unipolar order and an opportunity for Moscow to exploit Washington’s contradictions with Iran, China and its own allies. For Saudi commentators it is a signal to be maximally pragmatic: relying on American security guarantees, the kingdom is simultaneously working to diversify its economy, reserves and foreign ties so as not to be dependent on moods in the White House. For South Korean analysts America remains an indispensable ally, but increasingly a source of turbulence that requires preparation by strengthening domestic defense, technological capabilities and financial resilience.
These reactions show little naive anti‑Americanism and much cold calculation. Russia uses any Washington misstep to reinforce its narrative of “Western hypocrisy”; Saudi Arabia counts dollars, barrels and happiness rankings; South Korea measures everything through the prism of risks to exports, energy prices and reliability of the nuclear umbrella. But all three share one thing: in 2026 America is less an abstract symbol of freedom or imperialism than a large, noisy and increasingly unmanageable factor whose influence must be accounted for in daily politics, economics and even in determining where and against whom Iran’s national team will play at the World Cup.
