At the beginning of 2026, the United States again found itself at the epicenter of a global discussion—not an abstract one, but a very concrete debate: about war, sanctions, unilateral actions and the transformation of the U.S. into a “revisionist autocratic power.” Saudi, Israeli and Brazilian discussions about Washington now revolve around several tightly intertwined themes: a large-scale escalation of American military presence in the Middle East and the war with Iran that began, the conversion of military force into an instrument of Donald Trump’s domestic politics, harsh economic and sanctions pressure on second-tier countries like Brazil, and an ideological dispute: are the U.S. still a liberal democracy or are they already behaving like an authoritarian hegemony. At the same time, in each country these same events are read through local fears and hopes.
The central nerve of all discussions has become the war with Iran, which began after a joint U.S.–Israeli strike on Iranian targets on 28 February 2026. In the Israeli and Middle Eastern context it is perceived not as an isolated campaign but as the culmination of years of escalating pressure, including the largest concentration of American forces in the region since 2003, starting in late January 2026.(pt.wikipedia.org) In the Saudi and broader Arab press this pivot is described primarily in the language of balance of power in the Gulf: the U.S. is returning as a heavy military pillar, at once a guarantee and a risk. For Saudi authors it is important that American dominance in the Persian Gulf is not only protection from Iran but also a factor of control over oil prices and supply corridors, and therefore over the budgets of the Gulf monarchies themselves. In a number of Arab commentaries the American strikes on Iran are presented as a continuation of the “maximum pressure” logic that began with the U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear deal and the sanctions campaign against Tehran: Washington is once again dictating, by force, not only the nuclear but also the energy agenda of the region, pushing Riyadh to make the painful choice between price coordination with Russia and China and a strategic alignment with the U.S.
The Israeli conversation about the same war is much less shy about the language of force. In the local expert discourse the war is presented as an inevitable stage of a long-term “war between wars” against Iranian infrastructure, only now scaled up with the support of American power. Israeli think tanks describe the U.S.–Israeli alliance as the main resource for deterring Iran and its allies; one recent publication in Hebrew directly states that “American dominance in the Gulf region has opened up an unprecedented strategic window for the Israeli right-wing establishment.”(maki.org.il) Here the U.S. acts not as an external force but as a continuation of Israeli strategy—from strikes on Iranian oil and military facilities to rethinking the security architecture of the region. Thus, even former Prime Minister Yair Lapid in public statements supports the destruction of critical Iranian energy infrastructure as a way to “paralyze Iran’s economy and collapse the regime,” illustrating a rare consensus in Israel on the usefulness of a hard American line.(pt.wikipedia.org)
Against this backdrop the Brazilian perspective sounds sharply dissonant. In Brazil’s public debate the war with Iran fits into a broader narrative of the U.S. as a power that wages wars “there” but forces others to pay the price “here”—through sanctions, trade wars, pressure on financial and tech chains. Since early 2025 Brazil–U.S. relations have been in a prolonged crisis phase: unilateral U.S. measures—from visa restrictions and application of the “Magnitsky Act” to Brazilian officials to 50% tariffs on certain goods—are perceived as open political and economic intervention and “interference in the country’s internal sovereignty.”(pt.wikipedia.org) In the eyes of many Brazilian commentators the current war in the Middle East is just an extension of these methods in a kinetic dimension: if the U.S. is ready to bomb Iran unilaterally, it is all the more ready to pressure Brazil through the financial system and the dollar.
That is why part of the Brazilian public conversation about America now unfolds not around the Persian Gulf, but around the U.S. domestic agenda under Trump‑2. Widely circulated analyses in Portuguese describe the transformation of the U.S. into a “revisionist autocratic hegemony,” emphasizing how the domestic drift toward authoritarianism is reflected in foreign policy: from an invasion of Venezuela and the abduction of Nicolás Maduro to renewed territorial claims, including revived talk about Greenland, and the erosion of trust in American leadership within NATO.(debugliesintel.com) For Brazilian left and centrist analysts this is not just an ideological portrait of Trump: it is a warning that a country straying from democratic norms becomes far more dangerous precisely as an economic and military partner.
From this logic also grows the nervous reaction to American economic pressure. The topic of sanctions and threats aimed at the Brazilian economy has occupied a distinct niche in local media and social networks: the U.S., with its tradition of financial sanctions and extraterritorial application of laws, is presented as a direct threat to the banking sector and innovation. Commentators on popular Brazilian platforms discuss the risk that “Trump’s United States is ready to destroy Brazil’s financial system,” including attacks on the national payment system PIX, which has become a symbol of the country’s digital sovereignty. In these discussions the U.S. appears as a power that “likes to impose sanctions that hit other countries’ economies” and uses wars and crises as pretexts to impose its own financial rules.(reddit.com)
At the same time, within Brazil’s intellectual circles there are cooler, structural assessments: here the U.S. is still seen as one of the key poles of the global technological and industrial configuration. In debates about the “semiconductor war” Brazilian authors recall that in the 1970s Brazil, Singapore and Taiwan started from comparable levels of microelectronics development, and today it is precisely the U.S. and its Asian partners (including Taiwan and South Korea) who set the rules of the game, leaving Brazil on the periphery. In this picture America is not only a power in force but also a technological hegemon, whose decisions determine Brazil’s chances of fitting into the new technological order.(reddit.com)
In Israeli discourse, by contrast, American internal transformations are discussed primarily through the prism of the fate of the American–Israeli alliance. Annual reviews of the condition of the Jewish people and the strategic environment stress that, despite turbulent American politics and waves of criticism inside the U.S., the foundation of the partnership has not only not crumbled but has strengthened in recent years—closer military coordination, joint operations against Iran, and attempts to expand the format of regional agreements with Arab states mediated by Washington. Authors of such reviews argue against obituaries for the alliance, insisting that talk of an “irreversible break” between Israel and America was exaggerated, and that events of 2024–2026 demonstrate, rather, an accelerated institutionalization of Israel’s dependence on American security assistance.(jppi.org.il)
Out of this comes an important Israeli thesis, practically absent in Brazilian or Saudi press: for Israel the problem is not that the U.S. is becoming a more aggressive power, but whether that aggressiveness can be channeled into long-term containment of Iran and its allies. The logic here is extremely instrumental: even an increase in authoritarian traits in American politics is not seen as a principal threat if it ensures greater predictability and toughness in support of Israel’s military doctrine. Against this background, American initiatives like expanding missile defense in the Western Hemisphere (“Shield of the Americas”) are interpreted in Israeli circles as an example of how Washington seeks to institutionalize its security role not only in the Middle East but also in other regions, effectively creating infrastructure of global military dependence.(pt.wikipedia.org)
For Saudi and other Gulf commentators this same vector looks ambivalent. On one hand, the bolstered American presence—the largest since Iraq in 2003—is perceived as a shield against Iranian attacks and as a signal that the U.S. is prepared to once again play the role of guarantor of the regional status quo.(pt.wikipedia.org) On the other hand, it generates anxiety: how reliable is a partner who is at the same time playing an increasingly risky game in other regions and in its domestic politics? Saudi technocratic experts emphasize the risks of excessive dependence on a single security architecture: if entanglement with American military and financial infrastructure becomes total, Riyadh’s room for maneuver between Washington, Beijing and Moscow will shrink to a minimum. This explains the Kingdom’s persistent desire to build parallel energy and investment ties with China and Russia, without breaking the traditional U.S. military-political umbrella.
It is especially telling how the triad “U.S. — democracy — power” is read differently in each country. In Israel even texts critical of American domestic segregation or polarization typically measure risks through the prism of potential weakening of support for Israel. This is a very pragmatic view: the ideological qualities of the American political system matter insofar as they affect the amount of military and diplomatic assistance. In Brazil, however, the ideological anxiety comes to the fore: if a country that claims to be a global lecturer on human rights and institutions demonstratively drifts towards autocracy, it devalues its moral claims and gives ammunition to those who propose building alternative blocs outside a dollar-centric world.(debugliesintel.com)
The Brazilian debate acquires special sharpness because of the fresh memory of the country’s own political turbulence and a disrupted “democratic continuity.” Comparisons between Trump and Bolsonaro, discussions of American hearings about the state of Brazilian free speech and actions of the Supreme Court—all this shapes an image of the U.S. not only as an external hegemon but also as a mirror in which Brazil sees its own temptations toward authoritarianism and politicization of justice. In the eyes of many public intellectuals Washington, criticizing Brazil for rights violations, looks hypocritical when it itself demonstrates tendencies toward politicization of federal security structures and interference in foreign elections.(reddit.com)
In the Middle East, including in Saudi analytical circles, the debate about the nature of American democracy is secondary. Far more important is the question: can Washington maintain predictability in providing regional security if its domestic politics are so turbulent? For many technocrats in Riyadh the lesson of the past twenty years is simple: changes of administrations in the U.S. lead to sharp turns in foreign policy—from Iraq to Iran, from Obama to Trump, from the nuclear deal to sanctions and back to war. This makes reliance on the U.S. less dependable than it seemed in the era of the “unipolar moment,” and pushes toward diversification of partners, even if military dependence on the U.S. so far remains.
The result is a strikingly contradictory picture. For Israel the United States is still the main source of security and a guarantor of existence in a hostile environment; Washington’s aggressiveness and unilateralism are generally perceived as a resource to be steered and amplified where possible. For Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchies the U.S. is a necessary but increasingly risky shield, requiring compensatory outreach in other directions. For Brazil, America today is primarily a source of economic and political pressure—from sanctions and tariffs to threats to financial sovereignty—and at the same time an example of how liberal democracy can drift toward autocracy, eroding its own moral capital.
One thing unites these three different views: in Riyadh, Jerusalem and Brasília the U.S. is no longer perceived as a neutral “world arbiter” standing above the fray. Everywhere the U.S. is seen as a state with its own hard interests, increasingly using military and financial power to advance them. The difference is whether that power is seen as protection, threat or an opportunity for maneuver. And it is precisely this differing perspective that today determines how countries of the global South and regional powers are rethinking their place in a world where America remains indispensable—and increasingly problematic—superpower.
