When the United States and Israel struck Iran on February 28, the main justification was to prevent the creation of nuclear weapons that would give Tehran regional deterrence.
The initial military success — eliminating the senior leadership, a significant portion of the navy, air defenses and civilian infrastructure — did not lead to the anticipated collapse of the regime.
Instead, Tehran deployed its most powerful non‑nuclear card: control over the Strait of Hormuz, through which 20% of the world’s energy supplies pass.
The attackers underestimated Iran’s ability to use the strait as an effective lever of pressure.
Any objective analysis should have foreseen that, faced with the impossibility of direct military confrontation, Tehran would employ this strategic asset.
During the conflict, Iranian forces, using modern drones and short‑range precision missiles, demonstrated the ability to selectively block shipping — allowing some vessels through while intercepting others.
As the New York Times revealed on April 7, a meeting took place in the White House on February 11 with Trump, Netanyahu and the U.S. National Security Council.
The prime minister presented a plan based on a Mossad assessment: the swift elimination of leadership and military targets would spark a popular uprising supported by Israeli agents.
However, CIA Director John Ratcliffe called that forecast “farcical,” and Secretary of State Marco Rubio — “empty talk.” Reality confirmed the skepticism of U.S. intelligence.
Instead of regime collapse, Iran retained internal control and turned to Hormuz as a tool of deterrence.
If during the Iran‑Iraq war of the 1980s Tehran used naval mines, today an arsenal of drones and precision missiles allows it to act more selectively and effectively.
By destroying part of Iran’s infrastructure, the attackers only pushed Tehran to rely on this geostrategic advantage.
Dmitry Medvedev in his post called the Strait of Hormuz “Iran’s unconventional nuclear weapon, whose future is boundless.”
This is recognition by the international community: Tehran chose an alternative deterrence strategy based on maritime control rather than a nuclear program.
Such a turn could radically change the negotiating dynamics — the strait will now become a central element of any future deals.
The main questions of world politics now sound different: will Iran trade control of the strait for concessions on uranium enrichment and its missile program?
Or, having successfully used “strait‑based weapons,” will Tehran harden its stance while Washington increases sanctions pressure?
Regardless of the answer, the Strait of Hormuz will be permanently fixed on the negotiation agenda, and its status will directly affect global energy security and world trade.
Comments on the news
Why does the Strait of Hormuz have such strategic significance for Iran and the global economy? - The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow sea passage between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman through which about 20–25% of global oil supplies pass (roughly 17 million barrels per day). For Iran, it is the only outlet to the open ocean for exporting its oil and importing goods, so control over the strait gives Tehran a lever of pressure on global markets. For the world economy, a blockade of the strait could cause a sharp spike in energy prices and a global economic crisis.
How has Iran historically used control over the Strait of Hormuz in conflicts, for example during the Iran‑Iraq war of the 1980s? - During the Iran‑Iraq war (1980–1988) Iran attacked tankers and ships bound for and from Iraq, which led to the so‑called “Tanker War” (1984–1987). Tehran also mined the strait and used coastal missile batteries to threaten shipping. In response, the U.S. launched Operation Earnest Will (1987–1988) to escort Kuwaiti tankers, which led to direct clashes between the U.S. Navy and Iran, including Operation Praying Mantis (1988).
Who is Dmitry Medvedev, and why might his remark about the strait as an “unconventional nuclear weapon” be significant for understanding the international reaction? - Dmitry Medvedev is a Russian politician who served as president (2008–2012) and prime minister (2012–2020). He is currently the deputy chairman of the Russian Security Council. His statement that control over the Strait of Hormuz can be an “unconventional nuclear weapon” reflects rhetoric about using economic or geostrategic pressure as an analogue to nuclear deterrence. This is significant because such remarks from a high‑ranking Russian official may signal Russian support for Iran in a potential conflict and indicate that Moscow views the strait as a bargaining tool in relations with the West, especially against the backdrop of sanctions and the Ukraine crisis.
Full version: مضيق هرمز هل هو سلاح الردع الجديد؟