In the world's most strategically important oil corridor — the Strait of Hormuz — the problem is not only the intensity of shipping but also the legal nature of the vessels themselves. In conditions of heavy traffic, ships sailing under "flags of convenience," registered in open registries, are actively used here. This practice, common in global shipping, allows operators to effectively evade tracking and sanctions, turning attribution of responsibility for any incident into a complex geopolitical maze.
Legal aspects are increasingly intertwined with geopolitical calculations, turning flags of convenience from a commercial tool for reducing costs into a strategic weapon for masking and bypassing international restrictions. According to a report by Al Jazeera correspondent Manal Boali, a significant portion of this activity is attributable to Iran's so-called "shadow fleet" — tankers operating under fabricated identities. This disguise complicates international response and makes operations to detain or target them practically impossible for both the US and Iran.
"Flags of convenience" means registering vessels under the flags of countries different from the state of the actual owner. This frees them from oversight by the owner's national sovereignty, which makes establishing their true national affiliation extremely difficult. Such a legal fog not only confuses tracking systems but also paralyzes enforcement of international law and security measures during periods of tension. Moreover, registration in countries with low oversight standards undermines enforcement of safety requirements and opens loopholes for evading international sanctions.
The practice of flags of convenience serves several purposes: from evading sanctions and misleading international monitoring systems to lowering operating costs and taxes. This explains its wide adoption among many commercial fleets. However, the practice simultaneously weakens safety standards and legal compliance, increasing the risk of accidents and endangering crew lives.
Data from various institutions confirm the scale of this phenomenon in the Strait of Hormuz during periods of escalation. According to the International Transport Workers' Federation, in 2025 five countries led in the number of vessels under flags of convenience: Panama, the Marshall Islands, Liberia, Malta, and Antigua and Barbuda. Lloyd's data indicate that nearly half of the 279 ships that transited the strait during the period of tension used convenient flags or concealed identities, with about 60% of cargoes directly or indirectly linked to Iran. Bloomberg reports that 34 tankers connected to Iran were able to transit, and Vortexa estimated the volume of Iranian oil crossing the strait from April 13 to 21 at roughly 11 million barrels. In these conditions the essence of the conflict in the Strait of Hormuz changes: the battle is no longer for physical control of the route but for the ability to hide a vessel's identity. The flag turns from a symbol of sovereignty into an instrument of confrontation, allowing avoidance of responsibility and exploitation of shadow fleets that ignore international norms. This challenge raises critical questions about who is responsible in the event of an attack on a ship or an accident and requires a reevaluation of tracking mechanisms and international law enforcement.
Comments on the news
Which transit schemes (for example, ship-to-ship transfers or the use of ports in Oman and the UAE) does Iran use to bypass sanctions through its "shadow fleet" in the Strait of Hormuz? - Iran uses several key schemes: ship-to-ship transfers at sea, especially in neutral waters of the Gulf of Oman; use of ports in Oman and the UAE, where Iranian oil can be blended with legitimate cargoes or re-exported under the guise of third-country products; and turning off AIS transponders or falsifying them so ships are not identified as Iranian.
Why are international monitoring technologies, such as the Automatic Identification System (AIS), ineffective for tracking Iranian tankers operating under fake identities? - AIS becomes ineffective because operators of Iran's "shadow fleet" deliberately manipulate the data: they switch off signals, use false identifiers (ship names, flags, IMO numbers), or transmit fictitious routes. In addition, the system itself relies on voluntary data transmission in international waters, and many Iranian tankers sail under flags of convenience of countries that do not require strict oversight, making AIS tracking practically useless without satellite intelligence.
What measures is the international community (for example, the International Maritime Organization) taking to combat flags of convenience in the Strait of Hormuz, and why do they often fail? - The International Maritime Organization (IMO) tries to strengthen oversight of flags of convenience through port state control systems and recommendations for identifying violating vessels (for example, through Memoranda of Understanding on port state control). However, these measures often fail because many registering states (such as Panama, Liberia) have weak oversight mechanisms, and inspections in ports of Oman and the UAE are not always conducted thoroughly enough. Moreover, the legal status of the "shadow fleet" in international waters makes them invulnerable to direct actions without risking escalation with Iran.
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