At the end of January 2026, there is a lot of nervous talk about America in Japan, Israel and Turkey — but the focus differs in each place. In Tokyo the United States is seen primarily through the prism of the Fed and Taiwan; in Ankara — through Washington’s decisions on interest rates and Donald Trump’s political pressure on Jerome Powell; and in Israel — through the hardline American stance on Iran, postwar settlement in Gaza and a new security architecture with the White House. At the same time, several storylines unexpectedly converge in all three countries: concern about the politicization of U.S. economic policy, growing dependence on Washington’s security decisions, and a sense that Trump’s second term is increasing global instability rather than calming it.
The most immediate theme, visible in all three countries, is the January Federal Reserve meeting, which left the policy rate at 3.50–3.75% and recorded the first “pause” after a series of cuts at the end of 2025. In Japan this is discussed as a factor for the yen’s exchange rate and a bubble in the U.S. stock market: OANDA Japan analysts describe the rate hold and the S&P 500 rising above 7,000 points as “a situation where talk of AI and easing policy pushes investors toward risk” and warn of heightened vulnerability if the Fed suddenly adopts a tougher tone. In the review “ニュースTop10と今日の整理” a private analyst writing under the pseudonym Zack points out that Powell is publicly urging the future head of the Fed to “stay away from electoral politics” and is conspicuously stressing the central bank’s independence from the White House — a signal that in Japanese circles is interpreted as a veiled response to Trump’s pressure and a sign that the topic of Fed politicization has become a global market risk.
In Turkey the same Fed pause is presented very differently. Economic portals such as Milliyet Uzmanpara and Endeks24 foreground that rate decisions are made “in the shadow of political challenges” — an open call by President Trump for further rate cuts and a criminal investigation initiated by the administration into Jerome Powell. Uzmanpara’s piece states plainly that the committee “will decide the rate trajectory under pressure from the president’s calls for cheaper money and the legal troubles surrounding the Fed chair,” and in an analysis on Hisse.net the author calls the scenario of further cuts “hanging in the air” precisely because of the clash between the Fed’s economic logic and the White House’s political demands. For Turkish commentators this invites a painful parallel: a country that itself long suffered from a central bank subordinated to political will now shows readers how similar risks are being “imported” into Washington. On the portal Aydinpost the decision to hold the rate is called a “first stop” after a series of easings, and they emphasize that it was not unanimous: the dissent of two FOMC members who voted for another cut is interpreted as a sign of intra-political division within the American economic elite.
Israeli media, overall, are less caught up in the fine points of U.S. monetary policy and much more focused on how American strategy in the region affects the country’s survival. In the daily pre-election “diary” on the Zman Israel portal the Fed decree hardly figures; instead the threat from Trump to Tehran is front and center: “sign the nuclear deal, otherwise the next strike will be far worse.” The same page quotes a reply from an advisor to Iran’s supreme leader: “any military action by the U.S. will lead to strikes on the U.S., Israel and all who support them.” The diary’s author explains to readers that American rhetoric effectively makes Israel a secondary but inevitable target in any escalation, and that this increases Jerusalem’s dependence on the American nuclear and diplomatic “umbrella,” which in the hands of an unpredictable Trump becomes both a shield and a source of risk.
The second major storyline connecting Japan and the Middle East is the reconfiguration of the American security alliance system. In Tokyo the subject of the biggest recent debate is Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s statement that if Japan does not support American forces in the event of a conflict over Taiwan, “the Japan-U.S. alliance could collapse.” Foreign press, citing Japanese sources, also covers this: Takaichi had to explain that she was not talking about going to war with China but about “rescuing Japanese and American citizens in Taiwan,” yet public debate in Japan has gone far beyond purely legal nuances. Liberal commentators in the Japanese press see in her words a dangerous willingness to “adjust” the interpretation of the pacifist constitution to Washington’s interests — in order to preserve the alliance under a Trump administration that systematically weakens multilateral institutions. Conservative outlets, by contrast, stress that given China’s growing military pressure in the region, “without the resolve to help the U.S., Japan risks being left alone at the most dangerous moment.”
At the other end of Eurasia Israel is discussing a similar-in-substance but different-in-form process: a Reuters report, republished by Newsweek Japan, about the preparation of a new ten-year security deal between Jerusalem and the Trump administration. Gil Pinchas, former chief financial adviser to the Israel Defense Forces, quoted in the Financial Times, says upcoming negotiations will be not only about money but about the “partner nature of the relationship,” and warns that the volume of annual U.S. aid (currently about $3.3 billion for arms purchases and another $5 billion for missile defense under the existing memorandum) could be reduced. For Israeli commentators this signals a dual dependency: on one hand, Israel counts on continued access to American technology and joint missile defense projects; on the other, it understands that any tightening of America’s fiscal austerity or isolationist agenda will first hit military aid to allies. Paradoxically, Israeli press rarely frames this vulnerability as an argument for diversifying alliances; on the contrary, many commentators stress the need to integrate even more tightly into the American defense ecosystem to minimize the risk of cuts.
Japanese public opinion about U.S. foreign policy in the region is currently more preoccupied not with the Middle East per se but with the protracted Gaza conflict and the future of the “American peace plan.” In a major analytical piece in Toyo Keizai on prospects for 2026 the author recalls that the Trump administration was the main broker of the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas in autumn 2025 and later secured U.N. approval for a plan to deploy international stabilization forces in Gaza. The Japanese author describes the U.S. peace initiative as “vague in substance and extremely politically unstable”: for Tokyo it is important how ready Washington is not only to push the settlement formula but to provide financial and logistical support for a peacekeeping presence — against the backdrop of growing dissatisfaction with Trump within the U.S. and the approach of the 2026 midterm elections. The Japanese perspective here is strikingly pragmatic: American diplomacy is seen primarily as a factor of predictability for the global economy, not as moral leadership.
Israeli sources, meanwhile, focus on a different aspect of the American role in Gaza. In a JETRO piece on bilateral relations it is emphasized that the recent ceasefire and Trump’s subsequent stabilization plan were viewed positively by about 68% of respondents — a rare example of broad support for American diplomacy in Israeli society. But a parallel stream of news — about possible cuts to U.S. military aid, hardline ultimatums to Iran and rumors of a reassessment of agreements with regional players like Turkey and Saudi Arabia — sets an anxious tone: Israel is receiving powerful but highly personalized support from the White House, which can change sharply with the slightest domestic political shift in the U.S.
The Turkish view of U.S. Middle East policy now sounds especially cautious. In a Japanese reprint of JETRO’s report on a Trump-Netanyahu meeting at Mar-a-Lago it is noted that Iran and Turkey were on the agenda: Ankara, as a NATO member and simultaneously a regional competitor of Israel, is carefully watching whether the new closeness between Washington and Jerusalem is being used as a lever of pressure on itself. The Turkish commentary sphere, when talking about American policy in the region, is today less about debating the Israeli-Palestinian track as such and much more about the general trend: the U.S. is strengthening bilateral military formats with “selected” partners, creating a network of dependencies rather than durable multilateral institutions. Against this backdrop even purely economic Fed decisions on rates are interpreted in Turkey through a geopolitical lens: a stable dollar and high yields on American assets are not only a question of returns but also a way for Washington to keep developing economies within its financial orbit.
Finally, another nerve shared by Japan, Israel and Turkey is the political trajectory of the United States itself and the upcoming 2026 elections. Japanese state and quasi-state institutions, such as JETRO and the association of former diplomats “Kasumigasekikai,” portray the Trump administration in their analyses as a source of “structural uncertainty.” Reports on preparations for the midterms emphasize that the president is betting on confrontation and increasing internal polarization, relying on emergency powers and aggressive use of executive orders. In an interview for Kasumigasekikai, well-known U.S. expert Glenn Fukushima notes that the Trump team prepared for a second term in advance, including through ideological projects like the famous “Project 2025” at the Heritage Foundation, and that this makes the internal transformation of the American state much deeper than in the first term. For a Japanese audience the key conclusion is simple: the more unpredictable and concentrated power becomes in Washington, the more important it is for Tokyo to have its own scenarios in case of a sharp turn in American foreign and economic policy.
The Israeli pre-election chronicle published on Zman Israel views the same processes from a different angle. There the emphasis is less on institutional risk and more on Trump’s personal style: his remarks in Davos, where he simultaneously threatens Iran and hints at the possibility of sweeping deals, are described as “playing on the edge,” which the Israeli elite must publicly support even though in private many politicians and military figures admit that such heavy dependence on the will of one American leader creates for Israel “a point of vulnerability, not just strength.” Nevertheless, given the continuing threats from Iran and the instability of neighboring regimes, Israeli commentators so far see no realistic alternative to a close alliance with the U.S.
In Turkey the upcoming U.S. elections are seen as a factor that could sharply change Washington’s approach to Ankara — from sanctions pressure to cooperation on Syria and the Caucasus. However, the Turkish press is far less detailed in assessing American domestic politics: instead of parsing the nuances between Democrats and Republicans, a binary logic predominates — “an administration prone to sanctions and intervention” versus “an administration prone to deals and pragmatism.” By this logic the current Trump is of the latter type: he can press the Fed or allies hard, but he is also ready for bilateral deals if he sees economic benefit. Therefore, for some Turkish economic and political commentators the main question is whether this “pragmatic” unpredictability will be replaced after the 2026 elections by a more ideological and harsher course.
If one tries to assemble these disparate voices into a single picture, a fairly clear international portrait of today’s United States emerges. For Japan it remains an indispensable economic and military-political anchor, but increasingly risky due to the politicization of institutions from the Fed to foreign policy. For Israel it is a vital patron and security partner whose ultimatum-style tough measures toward Iran and involvement in the Gaza settlement yield short-term dividends but at the same time tie the country’s future to domestic American political storms. For Turkey it is an ambivalent center of global financial and military power, whose ability to wield rates and the dollar shapes Ankara’s economy, while also opening the potential for targeted deals with Trump as a deal-making politician.
The common denominator of all these discussions is a shift in the perception of the U.S. from a predictable “leader of the free world” to a large, conflictual and increasingly institutionally unbound power whose decisions must not only be supported or criticized but constantly hedged. That is exactly what Tokyo, Jerusalem and Ankara see in Washington today — and what rarely makes it into the view of those who read only American media.
