In early February 2026 the United States simultaneously found itself at the center of several dramas: a military intervention in Venezuela, an attempt to reboot a Middle East settlement through a Gaza peace plan, mounting tensions around Iran, and continued repackaging of the Syrian dossier. These storylines give Washington, in the eyes of the outside world, an almost caricatural image of a superpower that alternately claims the role of peacemaker and returns to forceful interventions. In Turkey, Germany and Saudi Arabia these events are actively discussed, but in completely different ways: through the prism of each country’s own security, historical traumas and political calculations.
One of the main topics in recent weeks has been the American intervention in Venezuela and the ousting of Nicolás Maduro. In Germany this provoked a sharp political split. German media report in detail how foreign-policy spokespeople of leading parties interpret Washington’s actions: conservatives from the CDU/CSU bloc see the “end of Maduro’s rule” as an “encouraging signal for Venezuela,” while the Social Democrats call the operation a “serious violation of international law.” The Left speaks of “state terrorism” on the part of the U.S. president, and the Greens demand that the German government explicitly classify the strike as illegal. These assessments, published, among other places, on Deutschlandfunk, reveal not only attitudes toward the United States but also an internal debate about how willing Germany is to tolerate the logic of unilateral uses of force even when a dictatorial regime in Caracas is unpopular. (en.wikipedia.org)
Interestingly, the Turkish and Saudi reactions to the Venezuelan operation are much more restrained in the public sphere. Ankara traditionally reacts sharply to Western interventions in the Muslim world, but Latin America is perceived as a distant theater. Turkish commentators, when discussing Venezuela, are more likely to use Washington as an illustration of double standards: when it comes to the Kurdish issue and northern Syria, Ankara constantly emphasizes that the West criticizes Turkish operations, yet far from Europe it readily changes regimes if it fits the agenda of fighting for democracy or resources. This line is clearly heard in Turkish political talk shows and columns, where the American intervention in Venezuela is mentioned alongside Iraq and Libya — as part of a general pattern of intervention.
In Saudi Arabia many commentators view the Venezuelan episode through the prism of energy. For Riyadh the most important consideration is the effect such moves have on global oil markets and on OPEC+’s role. However, they are not quick to publicly condemn Washington: the strategic partnership with the U.S. after the resumption of direct dialogue on Russia, Ukraine and Iran already rests on a delicate balance. On Saudi analytical platforms and in English-language commentary, writers often note that Washington still demonstrates a readiness for forcible intervention beyond its “traditional” theater, and this must be taken into account when planning one’s own foreign policy; but criticism is more muted and academic rather than a frontal political accusation.
An almost mirror-like story can be observed around the Gaza peace plan, which took the form of an agreement on a ceasefire, the exchange of hostages and the launch of a Gaza reconstruction process with active roles by the U.S., Qatar, Egypt and Turkey. The international reaction to this plan reveals a paradox: many world leaders not only welcomed the ceasefire but also began nominating U.S. President Donald Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize. Argentine President Javier Milei publicly said that Trump deserves the award, and the collective leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina officially decided to nominate him for his “contribution to establishing a lasting peace in Gaza.” (en.wikipedia.org)
For a Middle Eastern audience, especially the Saudi one, the Gaza plan is not just a diplomatic gesture. It fits into a broader line of the new U.S. administration: an attempt to simultaneously reduce violence in the region and strengthen its position as an indispensable mediator between Israel, Arab states and uncontrolled armed groups. Saudi commentators in leading outlets emphasize that Washington has returned to the role of architect of regional deals on which maritime security, investment inflows and prospects for normalization with Israel depend. At the same time, Saudi expert discourse shows noticeable distrust: commentators recall past failed initiatives and note that every American “peace” construct has historically been accompanied by armed pressure on one side. An important detail for a Saudi audience is Turkey’s and Qatar’s participation in the negotiations: this reduces the fear of a unilateral American‑Israeli security architecture and makes the deal politically more acceptable.
In Turkey the Gaza plan was also met with cautious approval, but with a clear emphasis on Ankara’s role. The Turkish press stresses that without Turkey’s participation — Turkey having earlier led strong rhetoric against Israeli operations in Gaza and having links with both Qatari and Egyptian mediators — Washington would hardly have been able to shape the deal in its current form. Columnists oriented toward the ruling party interpret this as confirmation that the U.S. is forced to recognize Ankara as one of the key regional centers of power, not merely a “problematic NATO ally.” Opposition commentators, meanwhile, remind readers that American policy on the Palestinian track is cyclical: one administration signs agreements, the next revises or forgets them, so relying on the durability of the current peace without deep structural changes in the Israeli‑Palestinian conflict is dangerous.
The German view of the Gaza plan is far more skeptical, although at the official level Berlin welcomes the ceasefire and the release of hostages. For the German expert community the key question is institutional guarantees: how likely is a solution tied to a specific U.S. administration to become a sustainable security format? Analytical pieces in political journals and research institute sites often argue that under Trump the U.S. acts improvisationally, relying on personal deals and situational alliances, which makes any success fragile. The German public, having undergone years of debate about Europe’s dependence on the American security umbrella and the future of the transatlantic alliance, views American “peacekeeping” activity primarily through the question: can one rely on Washington strategically if its long‑term commitments depend on the outcome of the next elections.
A fresh surge of tension in U.S.–Iran relations, accompanied by threats of strikes and an increased American military presence in the region, has pushed Saudi Arabia and Turkey into an unusual joint role — parties publicly urging both Washington and Tehran to show restraint. Associated Press reporting emphasizes that Arab U.S. allies, including Saudi Arabia and Turkey, in private and public contacts warn that any escalation threatens to destabilize the entire region and bring strikes on their territory or on American facilities on their soil. (apnews.com)
For Saudi elites this is not just a security question: the experience of attacks on oil infrastructure and tankers makes a possible U.S.–Iran war a direct threat to the kingdom’s economic model. In Saudi columns and expert notes the U.S. is criticized for “playing with fire,” yet efforts are made not to undermine the image of Washington as a necessary counterweight to Iran. In public statements Saudi officials emphasize that in this conflict Riyadh is not a junior partner but an independent mediator capable of speaking with both Tehran and Washington.
The Turkish discourse on the Iranian issue is more multilayered. On one hand, Turkish authorities traditionally oppose any scenario of a major American military operation near Turkey’s borders, pointing to refugee flows and the strengthening of radical groups as happened in Iraq and Syria. On the other hand, the Iranian factor is tightly linked to the Kurdish question and the Syrian dossier. Against the backdrop of the continuing crisis in northeastern Syria, where after a shift in U.S. policy and de facto recognition of Syria as a Turkish sphere of influence Ankara gained more freedom to act against Kurdish forces, any radical weakening of Iran could redivide the map of influence. Turkish analytical texts stress that the Trump administration, on one hand, encourages protest movements in Iran and promises to intervene if repression intensifies; on the other hand, it demonstratively rolls back some previous commitments in Syria, where Ankara has been given a carte blanche to manage the Kurdish autonomy issue. The perception of the U.S. here is ambivalent: Washington is dangerous because it is unpredictable, but it can also be useful if its moves weaken Turkey’s competitors.
Germany watches the U.S.–Iran confrontation through the prism of European security and its own energy vulnerability. German analysts often express fatigue: after the Ukrainian crisis and the prolonged confrontation with Russia, the prospect of a new large conflict that would inevitably draw in NATO is seen as a catastrophic scenario. Trump‑style rhetoric toward Iran, including threats of regime change and demonstratively tough warnings, produces a déjà vu effect for German audiences reminiscent of 2003, when Berlin clashed with Washington over the Iraq invasion. But whereas then the federal government took an openly oppositional stance, today Germany is much more tied to American guarantees and cannot afford a severe rupture. Therefore criticism is more often voiced through parliamentary opposition and the expert community, while official Berlin sticks to a vague formula about the inadmissibility of escalation.
A separate but closely related storyline is the continuing reconfiguration of the Syrian question. After the Trump administration de facto recognized Syria as a Turkish sphere of influence and abandoned the previous format of support for Kurdish forces, the Turkish press has been actively discussing a “new era” in relations with the U.S. According to reviews of events in Syria, Washington not only lifted some sanctions but also signaled that it is withdrawing its troops, opening space for Ankara to operate against Syrian Kurds. (en.wikipedia.org)
In Turkey this is presented as a diplomatic victory: finally the U.S. has begun to consider Turkey’s “legitimate security interests” and stopped ignoring Ankara’s claims to control its northern border. However, Kurdish and opposition Turkish commentators view this as a cynical deal: Washington, which once relied on Kurdish forces in the fight against ISIS, now easily changes course when an agreement with Turkey and a desire to extract itself from the Syrian quagmire demand it. In the German and European discourse the Syrian redivision is discussed from another angle: as an example of the U.S. increasingly making decisions without aligning them with Europe’s interests — whether migration risks, new waves of radicalization, or the fate of allies left unsupported on the ground. For Saudi Arabia the Syrian knot with American involvement matters insofar as it affects the balance with Iran and Turkey: in Saudi analytical materials Washington appears as an architect who now listens more to Ankara than to traditional Arab partners.
Finally, U.S. relations with Germany and Saudi Arabia today are greatly affected by Washington’s attempt to restart dialogue with Russia through venues like the Riyadh meeting in February 2025. Then U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, with Saudi mediation, discussed ways to end the war in Ukraine, while in Paris European leaders had expressed concern that the American line was shifting too quickly. (en.wikipedia.org)
For Saudi commentators that meeting confirmed the kingdom’s new status: Riyadh is perceived as a venue where issues between the U.S. and Russia are decided, and thus where the fate of European security is also determined. In the Saudi press this was interpreted as a step toward multipolarity, where the U.S. is an important but not the sole center of power. In Germany the same series of events provoked alarm: Washington, ready to hold bilateral talks with Moscow in a format that leaves Europeans the role of extras, reminds German analysts of historical Yalta‑type scenarios and more recent examples of “deals over the heads of allies.” Therefore any American statement about a quick peace in Ukraine and large geopolitical bargains raises in Berlin not so much hope as questions about the price of these compromises for the European security architecture.
The result is a complex mosaic in which the U.S. is simultaneously criticized, feared, used and suspected. For Turkey Washington is a source of risk and opportunity: American policy in Syria, toward Iran and on the Kurdish issue can either cement Turkish influence or blow up the region on Turkey’s doorstep. Germany sees the U.S. as a key security guarantor but increasingly doubts the predictability of that guarantor, especially when forceful operations — like the intervention in Venezuela — are carried out outside the norms that underpin German political consensus. Saudi Arabia assesses Washington pragmatically: as an indispensable partner for security and energy, but also as a player whose propensity for escalation with Iran and unilateral interventions can jeopardize the very model of Saudi stability.
What remains largely invisible inside the American media sphere is the sense in the outside world that the U.S. increasingly acts according to a logic of “deals of the moment”: today a peacemaker in Gaza, tomorrow an initiator of regime change in distant Venezuela, the day after a participant in a risky bargaining with Iran. Turkish, German and Saudi voices together paint the picture of a state that still possesses immense influence but is increasingly seen not as a pillar of predictable order, but as the main factor of global uncertainty to which each must adapt at their own peril.
