Three articles focus on different events: investigations into the actions of Israeli forces in Gaza, a trade conflict between the United States and Canada, and the Donald Trump administration’s attempt to increase economic pressure on Iran. Yet they share a common theme: states use coercion as their main policy instrument but must contend with legal constraints, economic consequences, and the other side’s ability to withstand pressure. In all three cases, pressure may produce a short-term effect—triggering negotiations, halting escalation, or demonstrating resolve—but it does not guarantee a lasting result.
The ABC News article discusses the decision by the Israel Defense Forces to launch criminal investigations into two incidents from the war in Gaza. One involved the deaths of five-year-old Hind Rajab and members of her family in 2024; the other concerned the deaths of 15 Palestinian medics in 2025. The Israeli side says that reviewing “exceptional incidents that occurred during combat” is part of its obligations under international and domestic law.
The story of Hind Rajab attracted international attention after a phone call between the girl and a dispatcher from the Palestine Red Crescent Society. When her family tried to leave Gaza City, their vehicle came under fire. “They’re dead,” Hind told the dispatcher. While rescuers tried to send an ambulance to her, the girl recited the Quran and played with the operator to distract herself from what was happening. However, the ambulance never arrived, and Hind and everyone else with her were later found dead.
The significance of this investigation extends beyond one specific incident. During wartime, armies inevitably cite difficult combat conditions, intelligence failures, and the need to make decisions within seconds. But international humanitarian law requires distinguishing lawful military operations from attacks on civilians, disproportionate use of force, and failures to take precautionary measures. That is why a domestic investigation matters—not only as a review of individual soldiers, but also as a test of the entire decision-making system.
At the same time, announcing an investigation does not mean that guilt has been established. It merely initiates a legal process. According to IDF data, since the war began in October 2023, a special fact-finding and assessment mechanism has examined around 150 incidents and referred material to the military prosecution service. Decisions have been reached in only five cases. This statistic may indicate both the difficulty of reviewing wartime incidents and the slowness and limited scope of the accountability mechanism. For the affected families, what matters is not only the announcement of an investigation, but also its independence, transparency, and the existence of consequences if violations are confirmed.
In the trade dispute between the United States and Canada, pressure took a different form. Donald Trump suspended, at the last moment, the introduction of 50 percent tariffs on Canadian goods that were due to take effect overnight. He wrote that the tariffs had been postponed for three days because, in his words, the sides had reached an agreement. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney confirmed that negotiations had made progress but stressed that “important work remains.”
The tariffs would have affected approximately $20 billion worth of U.S. imports from Canada, ranging from hockey sticks and construction materials to alcohol and certain types of clothing. This was therefore more than a diplomatic signal. Higher tariffs could have raised consumer prices, complicated manufacturers’ operations, and disrupted North American supply chains. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce warned that the measures could harm both economies and put at risk 13 million jobs linked to the North American trade agreement.
Here, pressure became part of a negotiating strategy. The threat of tariffs created an incentive for Canada to seek a compromise quickly, while the three-day pause allowed Washington to retain leverage without immediately moving to a full-scale trade escalation. But this approach also increases uncertainty for businesses. Companies do not know whether the tariffs have been permanently canceled, temporarily postponed, or could be reintroduced after the next political dispute.
The legal basis also remains contested. The tariff threat relied on Section 338 of the U.S. Tariff Act of 1930, which allows the president to impose tariffs of up to 50 percent on a trading partner if, in Washington’s view, that partner discriminates against American trade. The Canadian government had previously called such measures a direct violation of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement—the treaty Trump himself promoted during his first presidential term.
Tariffs on automobiles became another contentious issue. According to information cited by NBC News, U.S. officials were apparently unwilling to reduce the existing 25 percent rate below 15 percent. This shows that a temporary pause is not the same as a resolution of the conflict. The sides may have agreed to a political delay, but key disagreements over industrial goods, automobiles, and Canada’s retaliatory measures remained.
The Politico article shifts the same question to the level of the strategic confrontation between the United States and Iran. The Trump administration is trying to economically exhaust Tehran, hoping that sanctions, a blockade, and other forms of pressure will force Iran’s leadership to change course. But the authors emphasize a fundamental asymmetry: for Washington, the conflict creates serious political and economic costs, while Iranian authorities view it as existential—that is, as connected to the regime’s very survival.
This creates a central problem: a side that believes it is fighting for its own existence may have no obvious “breaking point.” That is what is conveyed by the phrase “there is no breaking point”—there is no point at which pressure will force them to retreat. Iran’s leadership may prefer to endure extremely severe economic consequences if concessions are perceived as a threat to the political regime or national security.
Pressure also carries a cost for the United States. According to Politico, the six-month war contributed to oil prices rising to approximately $90 per barrel and increased the cost of long-term borrowing. The yield on 30-year U.S. government bonds rose to its highest level in nearly two decades. Bond yields indicate how much it costs the government to raise money on the market: the higher the yield, the more expensive it becomes to finance the budget deficit and new programs.
Economist Julia Coronado describes the situation this way: “We’re spending more and more to finance more and more.” The war is making the world “riskier, with additional frictions and supply shocks.” A “supply shock” is a sharp reduction in the availability of a product or resource, such as fuel, which leads to higher prices and inflation. Thus, sanctions and military measures against Iran may weaken Tehran while simultaneously worsening conditions in the United States through expensive energy, inflation, and rising government debt costs.
This is where the difference between the trade conflict with Canada and the confrontation with Iran becomes especially important. Canada is an economic partner closely tied to the United States, so the threat of tariffs quickly creates mutual losses and encourages both sides to negotiate. Iran, by contrast, may view economic losses as an acceptable price for preserving the regime and confronting Washington. What works in relations with a partner interested in maintaining trade interdependence may not work against a state for which making concessions appears more dangerous than economic isolation.
These articles also demonstrate the difference between the short-term and long-term effects of pressure. In Canada, pressure led to a pause and a promise of a deal, but not yet to a final agreement. In the case of the Gaza investigations, the legal mechanism may restore some trust, but only if it produces credible results and real accountability. With regard to Iran, economic pressure may worsen its financial position without necessarily changing the leadership’s strategic calculations.
The main conclusion is that pressure does not work by itself. It works only when there is a specific mechanism linking costs to political concessions. If the opponent sees a way to reach an agreement without threatening its existence, as in the U.S.-Canada trade dispute, pressure may lead to compromise. If concessions are perceived as defeat or as a threat to the survival of those in power, economic sanctions may strengthen the willingness to resist. Finally, in wartime, pressure must be accompanied by accountability: without a transparent investigation, even an appeal to international law remains merely declarative.
The common trend across all three stories is a shift from unlimited coercion toward a more complex policy of managing consequences. Washington is confronting the fact that tariffs harm American consumers and producers, while its strategy toward Iran increases energy and financial risks. The Israeli military is compelled to demonstrate its ability to investigate the actions of its personnel, because military effectiveness without legal accountability undermines international legitimacy. In each case, authorities seek to show that they control the situation, but the logic of pressure itself creates new constraints.
A lasting result therefore depends not on the strength of the threat, but on how realistic the goals are, how clear the conditions for ending the pressure are, and how the costs are distributed. A temporary pause, a criminal investigation, or a new package of sanctions may be important steps, but none resolves a conflict on its own. Without a diplomatic exit, an independent examination of the facts, and consideration of economic consequences, pressure risks turning from a policy instrument into a source of further instability.