In early May 2026 the United States again finds itself at the center of a global discussion — not as a confident "world sheriff," but as a source of anxiety, irritation and at the same time an indispensable hub of the world system. From the perspectives of Riyadh, Beijing or Paris, America is no longer simply a "great power," but a nervous, internally fractured giant whose decisions are instantly reflected in oil prices, in the stability of international organizations and even in the legitimacy of its own alliances.
The sharpest themes in these three countries converge to a large extent. First, there is a new wave of unilateral American forceful intervention — above all the 2026 U.S. war against Iran and the strike on Venezuela, which in many capitals are seen as a return to the logic of the early 2000s, only in an even less predictable form.(zh.wikipedia.org) Second, Washington’s unprecedented withdrawal from dozens of international organizations — the so‑called "mass withdrawal from international institutions of 2026" — is perceived as a systemic blow to the post‑World War II multilateral order.(zh.wikipedia.org) Third, many foreign observers see signs of a structural crisis of American hegemony in current U.S. domestic politics — including the state of the Supreme Court and societal polarization — not merely another political cycle.(blog.leowang.net)
At the same time each of the three centers examined — Saudi Arabia, China and France — builds its own lens: an energy and regional‑security lens in the Saudi case, a systemic‑geopolitical and ideological lens in the Chinese, and a values‑diplomatic and "European‑strategic" lens in the French.
The most painful storyline is the U.S. war against Iran in 2026. In the Gulf Arab press, including major Saudi outlets, the strike on Iran is seen simultaneously as a strategic risk and as an opportunity to redraw the regional balance. An anonymous Saudi official told a local outlet that the U.S. operation was like "playing with fire in a powder magazine that the entire water area from the Strait of Hormuz to the Red Sea has become," noting that any prolonged U.S.–Iran clash would immediately affect the security of oil transportation and the kingdom's revenues. Saudi analysts recall that Riyadh in recent years had constructed a fragile disentanglement with Tehran mediated by China, and the new American strike is seen as an attempt to return the region to a bipolar confrontation of "pro‑ and anti‑Iranian" axes.
At the same time the official Saudi position avoids direct condemnation of Washington. In comments from experts close to the government they emphasize the United States’ right to "defend its forces and interests," but there is almost always a caveat about the "unacceptability of escalation that threatens the stability of energy markets." Such formulations simultaneously signal the limits of patience of a key oil partner to the White House and try not to destroy military‑political cooperation with the U.S., which remains critical for Riyadh.
In China the same war against Iran is viewed through a very different prism. In Chinese analysis it is "yet another example of U.S. imperialist intervention in the Middle East" and proof that "Washington continues to use force to maintain hegemony, ignoring international law and the interests of regional peoples," as one commentator in a party publication put it. Chinese authors stress that Iran and Venezuela are important partners in energy and in the Belt and Road Initiative, and therefore American strikes on them are interpreted as links in one chain: an attempt to weaken China’s neighborhood and slow down alternative economic routes.(zh.wikipedia.org)
A typical tone comes from major Chinese portals which analyze U.S. public opinion regarding the strike on Iran: they emphasize that Americans themselves are deeply divided, with a significant portion of the public opposing a new war, and skepticism even among right‑wing commentators. One Chinese analysis cites an American host criticizing the intervention as unrelated to the interests of ordinary Americans. This line is used to argue that even within the U.S. the consensus around foreign‑policy adventurism is collapsing, and thus hegemony is losing not only external but also internal legitimacy.(zh.wikipedia.org)
The French discourse on Iran and Venezuela differs again. In Paris, where memories of the split over the Iraq war are still alive, the new American operations are compared precisely to 2003 — but with the added observation that Europe is much weaker and more fragmented now, unable to act as an independent counterweight. In the French press, including major dailies, columnists write of a "return of the U.S. to the logic of preventive wars" and of yet another humiliation of European allies whom Washington presents with faits accomplis. The fact that Trump, in discussing the strike on Iran, allowed himself to compare the "suddenness of the strike" to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor is perceived in French circles as a symptom of that very "desanctification of the alliance" — Europe is openly told it won’t even be consulted.(zh.wikipedia.org)
The second major node of debates about America is the colossal "campaign of withdrawals" by the U.S. from international organizations. Chinese analytical platforms carefully but with satisfaction call this "the hegemon's self‑isolation" and the largest dismantling of America's reliance on multilateral institutions in the postwar era. In Chinese Wikipedia and several expert reviews the "mass withdrawal of the U.S. from 66 international structures, including 31 U.N. system institutions" in early 2026 is treated as a historical milestone after which "the world transitions to a post‑American model of global governance."(zh.wikipedia.org) Chinese commentators stress that such a step undermines not only the Western order but also trust in the U.S. among its own allies. At the same time, official Beijing’s tone is more restrained: it emphasizes "China’s readiness to take on greater responsibility within the U.N. and other multilateral mechanisms" — that is, it deftly uses the American demarche to promote the idea of a "responsible great power" in the person of China.
In France, by contrast, the U.S. mass withdrawal from international organizations is seen as a blow directly at the European project. French commentators note that Paris and Brussels have for decades built foreign policy through institutions — from the WTO to the WHO — and now the main "architect" of these structures is pulling out the supports. One French column highlighted the reaction of the governor of California, who condemned the U.S. withdrawal from the World Health Organization as a "reckless decision" — for the French audience this is an important detail: even within America arguments of a European spirit are raised about the value of global health and collective systems.(zh.wikipedia.org)
Saudi Arabia in this storyline is more pragmatic. Saudi commentators, especially those close to the business community, view the U.S.’s mass "disconnection" from international structures through the prism of risks to the global economy and to the sanctions regime. On one hand, Riyadh understands that the less Washington is tied to multilateral frameworks, the freer it is to use secondary sanctions and unilateral pressure measures that also harm Saudi partners. On the other hand, the weakening of American influence within institutions creates maneuvering space for Saudi Arabia, which can play off the U.S., China and other centers of power without automatically falling under the umbrella of the American normative agenda.
The third most important layer of discussions about America in these three countries is related to the internal crisis of the United States. In Chinese discourse the narrative of the "structural decline of American hegemony" is especially popular. One Chinese analytical report in 2026 states that the U.S. Supreme Court is experiencing an "unprecedented crisis of legitimacy" and that domestic political conflicts increasingly paralyze foreign‑policy planning.(blog.leowang.net) On Chinese platforms the meme "美国懦夫" — "American cowards" — is spreading; it appeared as an ironic reaction to the contrast between widespread gun ownership and the relative passivity of society in response to systemic injustices, from police violence to racial discrimination.(zh.wikipedia.org) For the Chinese public this image is convenient: it simultaneously ridicules the American gun culture and undermines the myth of civic valor and democratic courage in the U.S.
In the French sphere the emphases are different. There the writing focuses more on the "moral and institutional exhaustion" of American democracy, on constant constitutional disputes around elections, and on the radicalization of Trump’s rhetoric and his entourage. French authors are particularly alarmed by the combination of foreign‑policy adventurism with an internal institutional crisis: if a state that doubts its own democracy continues to claim the role of "judge" of other regimes, then, as one French editor writes, "the world order turns into a theater where the main director no longer controls his own actors." There is both fear of American chaos and a covert schadenfreude: France, long criticized by the United States for "half measures" and "anti‑Americanism," can now speak of responsibility and predictability in its own name.
In the Saudi context the U.S. internal crisis is viewed primarily through the prism of the long‑term reliability of American security guarantees. Saudi analysts ask whether a country whose elites are so focused on the battle over the Supreme Court, abortion and culture wars can maintain the same depth of engagement in the Middle East. On one hand, Riyadh increasingly realizes that the U.S. may be a less predictable and less stable partner in the long term. On the other hand, precisely this crisis makes Saudis value more highly what remains of the American "nuclear umbrella" and military cooperation, especially given the Iranian factor and the relative uncertainty of China’s regional strategy.
It is also interesting how all three countries react to the growing U.S.–China rivalry. In Chinese discourse 2026 is presented as a moment when the "trade war" and technological competition enter a prolonged, albeit familiar, confrontation. Chinese experts in surveys and analyses note that most expect "a deterioration or, at best, maintenance of tension" in relations with Washington.(chinapower.csis.org) They emphasize that the U.S. increasingly relies on tariffs and export controls in high technologies, while China bets on autonomy of supply chains and development of its own standards, including digital ones.
French commentators, by contrast, see the U.S.–China rivalry as a trap for Europe. For them the key question is not who will win the U.S.–China duel, but whether the European Union will be able to preserve strategic autonomy without being drawn into a logical "Cold War 2.0." French texts regularly criticize Washington for demanding full loyalty from Europeans in technological and defense dimensions while offering neither sufficient economic compensation nor real participation in decision‑making.
Saudi Arabia in this game perceives the U.S. and China as two pillars to be balanced between. For Saudi strategists, judging by local analytical columns, the important thing is not so much to choose a side as to maximize benefits from the competition for influence in the Persian Gulf. Hence their comments about the "pluralization of the world order": the U.S. remains significant but is no longer the only center of power, and thus Riyadh can simultaneously buy American weapons, sell oil in yuan and coordinate prices in dialogue with both Washington and Beijing.
Finally, special attention in discussions about America is paid to its relations with global values and religious institutions. Chinese and French authors noted a sharp diplomatic conflict between Washington and the Holy See, which flared up against the background of the Vatican’s criticism of U.S. military actions, including in Venezuela and Iran. In Chinese retellings of the story even the episode of an "antagonistic meeting" between American representatives and Vatican circles is emphasized, where the precedent of the Avignon papacy was allegedly recalled, when the French monarchy effectively subordinated the papal throne.(zh.wikipedia.org) For the Chinese reader this illustrates how America, claiming moral leadership, finds itself in conflict with the head of the world’s largest Christian church. In France the same story evokes different associations: French Catholic and secular authors fear that a rift between Washington and the Vatican will deepen internal divisions in the U.S. — especially among conservative Catholics whose votes were important for the Republican Party.
Taken together, all these storylines paint a strikingly similar picture. In Riyadh, in Beijing and in Paris, America in 2026 is no longer a monolithic superpower but a nervous center of a turbulent system: it is capable of delivering pinpoint strikes against Iran and Venezuela, dismantling international institutions, setting the tone in tariff wars and technology regulation, yet its own political and institutional base seems increasingly fragile to outside observers.
However, similarity of diagnoses does not mean similarity of remedies. China bets on accelerating the transition to a "post‑American" world and uses every U.S. move — from withdrawals from U.N. structures to military adventures — as proof of the need for alternative centers of power. France oscillates between criticizing the U.S. and fearing a world without the American umbrella, trying to build European autonomy in conditions when Europe remains economically and defensively heavily dependent on Washington. Saudi Arabia, finally, sees in the crisis of American hegemony not only risk but also a window of opportunity: the more America is torn by contradictions, the more valuable its remaining alliances become and the more freely Washington treats partners willing to assume part of the regional responsibility.
It is precisely in this diversity of reactions that the main point emerges: the world no longer simply "watches America," it learns to live with America as one of the key, but by no means the only, centers of power. Debates in Saudi, Chinese and French media — from vigorous columns about the "hegemon's self‑isolation" to biting memes about "American cowards" — show that external perceptions of the United States have entered a new phase: respect for its power is combined with doubt about its wisdom, and fear of its force with readiness to plan for a future in which Washington may finally lose the capacity to be that "indispensable" state.
