What a week ago still looked like a "regional flare‑up" is now being perceived in Ukraine, Israel and Saudi Arabia as a new stage in the global power configuration centered on the United States. A joint Washington–Tel Aviv operation against Iran, the killing of Ali Khamenei, massive strikes on Iranian infrastructure and Tehran’s retaliatory barrages against US bases and allies have reshaped the day's agenda: in Kyiv they are discussing how this will affect the war with Russia and US‑led negotiations; in Israel — how far the White House is prepared to go in a "war to victory"; in the Persian Gulf — how not to become expendable in an American‑Iranian confrontation.
The first major throughline heard in Kyiv, Jerusalem and the Arab press alike is the fear of a protracted US–Israel war with Iran that would turn the Middle East into a theater of attritional conflict in which Washington would be simultaneously the director, a participant and the one who could at any moment switch off the lights and leave. The Chinese agency Xinhua’s Arabic edition reports that officers and analysts in the region are already talking not about a "retribution campaign" but about the risk of a "long war of attrition" that will affect energy markets, maritime security and the internal stability of Gulf states tied to the US for security and economy. The piece emphasizes that it was the US‑Israeli strikes that set the tone, while Iran is only responding and widening the arc of the conflict across the Levant to the Strait of Hormuz and further into the Gulf — which produces a "growing fear that neither Washington nor Tehran controls the escalation ladder." Commentators in Cairo and Tehran warn that the US, accustomed to seeing the region as a "managed pressure space," faces the opposite situation — a front that drags it into the logic of endless counterattacks.
The second major motif in the Ukrainian debate centers on what the American strike on Iran means for Russia’s war against Ukraine and for the negotiation track Washington is trying to bring to a symbolic date, July 4, 2026. One of the most illustrative pieces is a column by a Kyiv analyst in Ukrainska Pravda with the telling headline "US Strike on Iran. What Are the Possible Consequences for Ukraine." The author, lawyer and reserve officer of the Israel Defense Forces Ihor Yoffe, writes bluntly that Washington’s decision "to use force against Tehran" reshuffles US priorities, resources and diplomatic attention and will inevitably be reflected in Moscow’s, Beijing’s and Kyiv’s allies’ lines of behavior. In his assessment, if the military phase on the Iranian front ends quickly and leads to a deal acceptable to Washington and Tel Aviv, it will remove acute competition for resources and allow the US to return to the role of moderator on Ukraine from a stronger position. Conversely, if the conflict drags on, Ukraine risks becoming "war number two" on the American agenda — with reduced military aid and, no less importantly, diminished interest in pressuring Russia. Yoffe notes that Russia is already attempting to exploit the new situation, presenting itself as a necessary US partner for Middle East stabilization and hoping to extract concessions on the Ukrainian dossier in exchange for "responsible behavior" in Iran.
Against this backdrop, Ukrainian media are vigorously debating an overall shift in American strategy under a second Trump term. Political scientists Minna Alander and Andreas Umland, in a column for Ukrainska Pravda, describe three strategic dilemmas for Europe in new US‑Russia‑Ukraine negotiations and stress that: cuts in military assistance, a conspicuous rapprochement with Moscow and now a large‑scale operation against Iran mean that Washington "has significantly reduced its influence on the Russia‑Ukraine war by cutting aid and refusing to exert effective pressure on Russia." The authors argue that the unprecedented concentration of US resources on the Middle Eastern theater leaves the EU with greater responsibility and, paradoxically, greater leverage over the final configuration of any deal on Ukraine — but for Kyiv this means increased dependence on an erratic transatlantic linkage where the keys to a ceasefire lie simultaneously in Washington, Moscow and now in regional capitals that see the Ukrainian track as a bargaining chip. In this context they warn: the example of Trump’s attempt to "buy" Greenland shows that Washington can offer Europe cynical packages like "territorial concessions in exchange for preserving a military umbrella for Ukraine" — and precisely now, amid the Middle Eastern war, pressure on Europeans could intensify.
Interestingly, the Russian press, read and cited in Ukraine as the "opposite perspective," also interprets the American war with Iran through a Ukrainian prism. Gazeta.Ru, in a piece on the impact of the US operation in Iran on Ukraine negotiations, quotes Kremlin press secretary Dmitry Peskov as emphasizing that it is advantageous for Moscow to continue talks with Washington on a settlement "despite American and Israeli strikes on Iran," because Russia "has its own interests," and US efforts are appreciated, but "you can only trust yourself first and foremost." For a Ukrainian audience this reads as: Russia is ready to bargain over Ukraine while watching Washington get bogged down in another war, and it hopes that the skewing of American resources toward the Middle Eastern front will give it additional room on the battlefield and at the negotiating table.
A second recurring thread is how Israelis and their regional partners perceive the US role in this war. Israeli commentary, which appears in both Ukrainian and Russian‑language media, conveys simultaneous gratitude for unprecedented levels of coordination and anxiety that Operation "Epic Fury" contains more than just "strikes on missile bases." Israeli officer‑lawyer Yoffe, analyzing the situation for a Ukrainian audience, emphasizes that Washington chose a forceful scenario not only because of Iran’s nuclear program but also as a demonstration of Trump’s willingness to use coalition operations to achieve quickly marketable domestic victories. For Israeli analysts this is a double signal: on one hand, a rare case in which the US not only declares "commitments to an ally" but converts them into large‑scale action; on the other, that very "demonstrativeness" makes Israel a target for a wider circle of adversaries and renders the war harder to manage.
A separate layer is the reaction in Arab media, primarily Saudi and pan‑Arab outlets. Saudi newspaper Okaz on its front page after the strike on Riyadh emphasizes that "Saudi authorities characterize Iran’s attacks on Riyadh and the Eastern Province as 'brazen and cowardly,'" while a headline about a "mythic fury" that "ignited the region" simultaneously references the official name of the American operation and the kingdom’s perception of this war as externally imposed and fraught with the destruction of the regional status quo. Authorities are conspicuously expressing solidarity with neighbors — the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan — which also came under Iranian strikes, yet they are not in a hurry to speak of full entry into the war on the US side, limiting themselves to rhetoric about "defending sovereignty" and the "right to respond." The tone between the lines is this: Saudi Arabia is not prepared for its territory and infrastructure to become a battlefield again, as happened in 2019, and it expects Washington to shoulder the main burden of escalation with Iran.
Many Arab commentaries also reflect another important regional view of the US: Washington is still seen as a security provider whose military presence is both insurance and a source of threat. In an analytical piece, Al Jazeera examines the "secret US weapon that disabled Iranian air defenses," dissecting the cyber and electronic warfare components of the operation and quoting specialists who call this war "the deadliest, most complex and most precise in history." But the piece also stresses that the US and Israel’s technological superiority means they are setting a new norm — where a crippling strike on a sovereign state can be delivered "without declaration and without mandate." For Arab readers this is not theoretical: in a neighboring article about Iranian strikes on the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait, the UAE Ministry of Defense reports civilian deaths and injuries among migrants, and Qatari authorities term attacks on civilian infrastructure "such that they cannot remain unanswered." The mirror logic is simple: if today the US creates a precedent for a "preemptive" coalition war against Iran, tomorrow that logic could be applied to a Gulf country whose policies no longer satisfy Washington.
A third common motif is the fear that the current war accelerates the erosion of international law and turns the UN Security Council into a stage for US power politics. At an emergency Security Council meeting, UN Secretary‑General António Guterres bluntly stated that both the US‑Israeli strikes on Iran and Tehran’s retaliatory attacks violate international law and raise the risk of a far wider conflict, calling for an immediate return to diplomacy. The American and Israeli delegations, by contrast, insisted on the "legality of preventive actions" to avert an Iranian nuclear threat, while the Iranian representative spoke of "war crimes" and "mass civilian casualties." In Arab and Ukrainian commentary that meeting is described as another example of how the US uses the UN platform to legitimize facts already committed: strikes that resulted in the death of the supreme leader of another state and the destruction of hundreds of sites across the country. For Kyiv this recalls how the US and its allies previously tried to push through Security Council decisions on Iraq and Libya, and for Arab readers — how the same "responsibility to protect" logic turned into regime change and chaos.
In Ukrainian discourse, notably, the reaction to the Middle Eastern war is accompanied by reflection on how Ukraine itself interacts with the American agenda. Commenting on Washington’s recent demarche after Ukrainian strikes on Novorossiysk and targets of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, one Kyiv commentator noted that Trump’s harsh reaction was essentially "emotional" and linked not so much to international law as to the interests of particular American companies. This fits the same pattern as the current Middle Eastern campaign: in the eyes of the Ukrainian elite the US increasingly looks less like an "abstract bearer of democratic values" and more like a large, sometimes impulsive player for whom deals, business and quick political results matter more than a long‑term security architecture.
A revealing counterpoint to this is the Saudi experience of recent years. For Riyadh the US–Israel war with Iran is a new test of how independent Saudi foreign policy can be when the American security umbrella both saves and drags the kingdom into conflict. Just yesterday the crown prince tried to balance Washington, Beijing and Moscow — signing energy and investment deals and restoring relations with Iran through Chinese mediation. Today, against the backdrop of drone strikes on the US embassy in Riyadh and growing nervousness in oil markets, Saudi press conspicuously emphasizes "solidarity with allies" and "determination to protect the kingdom’s territory," yet it does not articulate a clear answer to whether Saudi Arabia is ready to join the escalation if Washington demands more than diplomatic notes and interception of hostile missiles.
This difference in emphasis is well illustrated by comparison with the Ukrainian agenda. For Kyiv the present war is above all a chance and a risk in negotiations with the US and Russia: a chance if Washington wants to demonstrate its ability to "close conflicts" and by July 4, 2026, be willing to squeeze Moscow; a risk if Trump decides that a picture‑perfect victory is easier to achieve in Tehran than in Donetsk. For Israel this is an existential war and a struggle to ensure that the US does not stop halfway but remains ready to go the distance despite regional and global costs. For Saudi Arabia and its neighbors this is an exam in surviving between hammer and anvil without allowing Washington or Tehran to turn them into expendable resources.
That is why the current configuration of the American campaign against Iran, as seen in Kyiv, Jerusalem and Riyadh, reveals three different but interconnected images of the US. For Ukraine America is increasingly an unpredictable but indispensable mediator controlling the main levers — military‑technical aid and the sanctions regime. For Israel it is the decisive but impulsive senior partner, willing to use military force for domestic political effect, but not always fully calculating the regional consequences. For Saudi Arabia it is both guarantor and source of threat, whose decisions open its skies to rockets and drones and subject its markets to price shocks. Altogether this creates a picture in which US influence remains colossal, but confidence in its strategic judgment is increasingly fragile. And that may be the main conclusion of the first week of a war already called in the Middle East "the deadliest and most complex in history": it has not only changed the balance of power between Washington, Tehran and Tel Aviv, but has also forced their partners — from Kyiv to Riyadh — to reconsider what it means to be an American ally when America itself is fighting multiple wars and increasingly acts from its own, not collective, security logic.
