World about US

A dense information cloud is gathering again around the United States, and this time its outlines are especially clear from Kyiv, Jerusalem and Beijing. In each of these capitals, America is perceived not as an abstract "superpower" but as a very concrete factor: a negotiator in war, the principal military partner, or a strategic rival with whom agreements will still have to be reached. In recent weeks, media and expert circles in Ukraine, Israel and China have been discussing not an isolated Washington move but an overall vector: what the U.S. course in the war with Iran means, where the limits of support for Ukraine lie, and how Donald Trump's visit to Beijing changes the architecture of the confrontation between the two powers.

The main common theme is "military America," and it is no longer only about Ukraine, as has been familiar in recent years. The launch of a large-scale U.S. and Israeli operation against Iran at the end of February, during which heavy strikes began on targets in Iran and Hezbollah positions in Lebanon, effectively cemented Washington's role as the chief conductor of two wars at once: the Iranian one and the Russia–Ukraine one.(ru.wikipedia.org) Against this background, the three countries are debating, in different ways but with shared nervousness, the question: what are the real limits of American power and willingness to bear the burden of global leadership.

The Ukrainian discussion about the U.S. today revolves around two words — "assistance" and "pressure." On the one hand, Kyiv still vitally needs American military support, and every piece of news from Washington is filtered through: will this speed up arms deliveries? A characteristic example is the reaction of the Ukrainian outlet Rubryka to the story about a delay in the Pentagon's decision to transfer a shipment of arms worth $400 million to Ukraine. Ukrainian journalists emphasize that the Pentagon itself faced criticism in the U.S. Congress, and Democratic Senator Chris Coons called the delay "an absolutely wrong signal to Putin" at a moment when "the fight for freedom" in Ukraine has its limits.(rubryka.com) In the Ukrainian perspective this matters not only as a signal to Moscow but also as a test of the resilience of the American course: will "Washington fatigue" begin in the shadow of a war in the Middle East that is sharper for the U.S.?

On the other hand, the theme of distrust toward American mediation is growing louder. Independent Ukrainian media and experts discuss reports that the U.S., while building a negotiation track with Russia, often acts "over Kyiv's head." An English-language analysis widely cited in Ukraine said that the U.S. lead negotiator on the Russia–Ukraine file, Steve Witkoff, traveled to Moscow repeatedly but for a long time avoided a visit to Kyiv, creating a sense of an "asymmetric" approach.(brookings.edu) In the Ukrainian information field this overlays long-standing fears of a "bad deal" in which, as one Kyiv commentator put it, "Russia would get a lot, and Ukraine — nothing."(kyivindependent.com)

Against this background, the position of Volodymyr Zelensky himself is interesting: just days ago he stressed that Ukraine "practically daily" maintains diplomatic contacts with the U.S., and his Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council, Umerov, briefs him on negotiations with American representatives. Chinese media reported, in particular, on a trip by a Ukrainian delegation to Miami for a series of meetings with the American side.(news.china.com.cn) For Beijing this is additional confirmation: even when Washington's attention is consumed by Iran and the Middle East, Ukraine remains a priority — and this intensifies Chinese interest in the Ukrainian issue as a "second front" of American foreign policy.

In Israel, the U.S. is discussed with a very different emotional intensity and in another key — an "existential" one. For the Israeli establishment, the war with Iran is literally a question of life and death, and the key fear is not that America will leave but that it will seek peace too soon. Israeli media consistently convey the concerns of the military and politicians that Donald Trump might make a "bad deal" with Tehran that leaves Iran's main threat potential unchanged. A CNN piece widely republished in Israel highlights that Jerusalem fears a deal that would not secure the full removal of enriched uranium, the dismantling of enrichment capabilities, tough control over the missile program, or the dismantling of the network of proxy formations.(kesq.com)

Former and current Israeli officials in this context repeatedly return to the famous five conditions articulated by Israel before the war began: remove all enriched uranium, eliminate enrichment capabilities, limit ballistic missiles, dismantle the regional proxy system, and introduce truly strict inspections.(kesq.com) Now the question is: is Washington willing to go all the way for these goals, or will it revert to a logic of "managed containment" of Iran for the sake of de‑escalation and reallocating resources to other directions, including Russia and China. In Israeli analytical columns the U.S. is depicted both as an indispensable ally — without American military power the campaign against Iran could not have reached its current scale — and as a potential source of disappointment that might stop one step short of the final undermining of the Iranian regime.

Behind the major war with Iran, in Israel another, less visible but no less important storyline for the local audience continues: the U.S. role in trying to restrain Hezbollah and stabilize the northern border. Reports of joint U.S. and Israeli strikes on Hezbollah targets and parallel diplomatic contacts with Lebanon, carried out under an American umbrella, create the impression that Washington remains the only force capable of simultaneously fighting, mediating and keeping the region from sliding into a full-scale war.(ru.wikipedia.org) However, Israeli commentators increasingly compare this to the Ukrainian experience, warning that a "protracted conflict under U.S. management" could become a gray zone where objectives are not achieved and losses accumulate.

China's picture of America today is built not around a front but around a visit — although the warlike background does not disappear. Chinese media and analytical portals are actively discussing Donald Trump's visit to Beijing on May 13, his meeting with Xi Jinping, and an agenda that simultaneously included trade, the war with Iran, the conflict in Ukraine and the Taiwan issue.(zh.wikipedia.org) Chinese commentators emphasize that the U.S. has already reallocated some resources from East Asia to the Middle East, and the ongoing war with Iran, in the context of a potential Taiwan crisis, is seen as a factor that objectively strengthens Beijing's negotiating position: the more America gets bogged down in the Middle East, the harder it will be for it to consolidate military and political power in the western Pacific. One widely cited Chinese analytical review explicitly concludes that the Iranian front "gives China additional bargaining chips" at the negotiating table with Trump.(zh.wikipedia.org)

At the same time, official outlets such as People's Daily deliver a more measured but essentially similar message: China "welcomes" visits by American congressmen and politicians, but expects the U.S. to "observe the One China principle and be cautious on the Taiwan question." In a May issue the paper described in detail a meeting between Chinese leadership and a delegation of U.S. senators, emphasizing that dialogue is useful only if Chinese sovereignty is respected and new lines of confrontation are not created.(paper.people.com.cn) For the domestic audience this is presented as an illustration: Washington, despite tough rhetoric, is forced to reckon with China's economic and political reality and to seek comparative stability in relations while U.S. resources are dispersed between Europe and the Middle East.

It is interesting that in China U.S. foreign policy is increasingly viewed through the lens of the economy and energy markets. A recent analytical report by a Chinese brokerage firm directly states that a scenario of major escalation between the U.S. and Iran would push global oil prices up, which on the one hand creates risks for global growth and on the other pushes China to accelerate diversification of supply sources and strategic reserves.(pdf.dfcfw.com) Thus, for the Chinese audience, the U.S. is not only a military player but also a principal "generator of shocks" to the world economy that requires advance adaptation.

Viewed from above, several cross-cutting themes can be identified that are refracted differently in Kyiv, Jerusalem and Beijing.

First — doubts about the long-term American strategic focus. In Ukraine this manifests as a fear that the war with Iran will push Kyiv to the periphery of attention and lead to delays in arms deliveries, as in the case of the mentioned $400 million from the Pentagon.(rubryka.com) In Israel — fear that the White House, pursuing de‑escalation with Tehran, will stop halfway and abandon an ally with an "unfinished war."(kesq.com) In China — the calculation that the dispersion of American resources increases Beijing's opportunities in key areas, from Taiwan to trade negotiations.(zh.wikipedia.org)

Second — growing distrust of the American idea of a "managed order." Ukraine bitterly discusses scenarios in which the U.S. would push through a compromise with Russia allowing the effective loss of territory, under the rhetoric of a "realistic peace."(kyivindependent.com) Israel fears a similar "realism" toward Iran, in which Washington will deem half measures sufficient to ease tensions in the Persian Gulf.(kesq.com) China sees in the American version of world order an attempt to freeze a status quo favorable to Washington and seeks, using the moment, to cement a right to an "alternative architecture" in which the American role will no longer be dominant but one among others.(imf.org)

Third common thread — the pragmatization of perceptions of the U.S. In Ukrainian discourse there are fewer illusions and more talk about the need for multiple supports — from the EU to the Gulf states — yet America remains the main, sometimes the only, critically important partner for arms and finance.(rubryka.com) In Israel, nobody needs convincing that without the U.S. there would be neither military aircraft nor critical political backing at the UN, but precisely for that reason any divergence with Washington over the ultimate goals of the war with Iran is felt so acutely.(kesq.com) In China, despite ideological criticism of American policy, the official discourse still underscores the need for "stable and predictable" relations — Beijing has no interest in a chaotic weakening of the U.S. that would wreck the global economy, but seeks a balance more favorable to itself.(paper.people.com.cn)

It is especially telling that China and Ukraine actively quote each other: Chinese papers report on Kyiv's almost daily contacts with Washington, while Ukrainian Telegram channels retell Chinese notes about how the war in Iran "draws away" American resources.(news.china.com.cn) Israeli commentators often look at the Ukrainian experience as a "warning": one must not allow the war to become a managed but endless conflict on the periphery of the American agenda.

In the end, the common nerve of the discussion about the U.S. in the three countries can be formulated like this: the world has entered a phase in which American power remains indispensable, but its strategic attention has become a scarce resource. Each actor — Kyiv, Jerusalem, Beijing — is trying in its own way to secure as much of that attention as possible, while simultaneously protecting against possible American policy zigzags. For Ukraine it is a question of the state's survival, for Israel — the physical safety of its citizens, for China — a long-term place in the hierarchy of world powers. And that is why today, perhaps, nowhere are Washington's every word and gesture reread as closely as in these three capitals — even if they look at the same America from completely different worlds.

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