Chinese and Turkish publications view Washington’s policy toward Iran and the Middle East as strategically unsuccessful and increasingly costly. The focus is on missed opportunities to contain the crisis surrounding Iran, disagreements within the Pentagon over military operations, threats to oil supplies and shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, and growing pressure to withdraw U.S. troops. Commentators note that the consequences of the escalation are narrowing Donald Trump’s room for maneuver, while China may gain additional strategic advantages. The material is based on publications by Guancha (China).
Chinese Press on Protests Against U.S. Data Centers
America’s race to build artificial intelligence infrastructure is increasingly encountering resistance from local communities. Residents fear higher electricity bills, overloaded power grids, environmental consequences, and the influence of major technology corporations on regional life. Yet in U.S. political rhetoric, these domestic conflicts are increasingly being linked to China, writes the Chinese outlet Guancha.cn.
The publication was prompted by remarks from Donald Trump, who urged American communities not to obstruct the construction of data centers. In his view, opponents of such facilities are choosing “backwardness and poverty,” whereas the development of AI infrastructure could create new jobs, increase prosperity, and reduce taxes. Trump also claimed that China was supposedly “incredibly happy” about the anti-AI movement in the United States.
Guancha.cn ironically observes that China has once again been drawn into an American domestic political debate without convincing evidence of its involvement. In the Chinese interpretation, this fits Washington’s familiar pattern: problems caused by its own political decisions, energy constraints, and conflicts of interest between corporations and the public are explained as the result of an external threat and “Chinese interference.”
At the same time, the publication notes, the causes of the protests are quite concrete and domestic. According to an Annenberg Foundation poll, 61% of Americans oppose the construction of new data centers in their communities. Among Republicans, the figure is 54%. People fear that energy-intensive data-processing facilities will increase demand for electricity, drive up rates, and place additional strain on public utilities.
Vice President J.D. Vance effectively acknowledged the connection between public dissatisfaction and household expenses. In his words, “99%” of the strong opposition to data centers is probably explained by rising energy costs in areas located near such facilities. This admission is particularly notable against the backdrop of attempts to portray the protest movement as the result of foreign influence.
Another problem is the split within the Republican Party. Republican governors, lawmakers, and candidates who had previously supported expanding AI infrastructure are being forced to take voters’ attitudes into account. In Texas, where the authorities had sought to attract technology investment, hundreds of projects have been halted. Governor Greg Abbott and other Republican politicians have found themselves in a situation where supporting data centers has become a politically risky position.
The Chinese publication sees this as a contradiction between U.S. national ambitions in AI and the interests of local communities. The effort to overtake China in the technology race requires the rapid construction of computing capacity, but at the local level it encounters rising costs, environmental concerns, distrust of Big Tech, and demands for public oversight. According to Guancha.cn, these factors—not actions by Beijing—determine the scale of the resistance.
Nevertheless, some members of the American political establishment have attempted to link the protests to the PRC. Republicans in the House of Representatives called for an investigation into alleged Chinese “incitement,” while OpenAI, without providing evidence, claimed that China might have conducted an online campaign against the construction of data centers. Even American analysts have challenged this logic. Ryan Fedasiuk, an expert at the American Enterprise Institute, emphasized: “We have to acknowledge that China is not the reason AI construction is unpopular in the United States.”
For China, the story is important in the broader context of technological competition and the development of its own computing capacity, energy base, and AI industry. However, Guancha.cn’s publication focuses less on rivalry than on the vulnerabilities of the American model. The United States is trying to rapidly build critical digital infrastructure, but it cannot reconcile the interests of technology companies, the energy sector, local authorities, residents, and party elites.
In this interpretation, references to China become a convenient political device that allows officials to avoid discussing the real costs of AI expansion: expensive energy, pressure on the grid, potential environmental damage, and a lack of dialogue with the public. The Chinese press presents protests against data centers not as the result of an external campaign, but as a consequence of the United States’ internal problems—problems that American politicians seek to explain through the presence of a symbolic foreign adversary.
