In early February 2026, conversations about the United States outside America surprisingly converge around three lines: the domestic political crisis and the "Trumpization" of institutions; Washington’s forceful and sanctions-driven foreign policy — from Iran to Venezuela and Greenland; and the economic course with high Fed rates, tariffs and a rewriting of trade rules. China, Turkey and France speak about the same things, but each from its own historical and geopolitical position.
In French texts the word "tourmente" — turmoil — stands out. Thus, the French-language portal Chine Direct opens a fresh review with an image of the Capitol against the backdrop of a January shutdown and mass protests against immigration policy and border agency actions, emphasizing "deep polarization and authoritarian tendencies" in the US and simultaneously painting China as a pillar of a "stable multilateral order." In this optic Washington is the source of instability, Beijing the guarantor of predictability, and Europe is caught between the two poles and forced to navigate between values and interests. (chinedirect.net)
From the same perspective, French analysis views the new US National Security Strategy published in November 2025. In an editorial at the Franco‑Asian Foundation, Jean‑Raphaël Peytregnet emphasizes that the document sent a signal to all of Asia: Washington is ramping up its military-political presence around Taiwan, increasing arms supplies to Taipei and reshaping regional alliances, while China, in response, is enlarging exercises around the island. French readers are told that, unlike previous strategies, the current NSS marks a US shift from a "global policeman" to a more selective, transactional leadership: responsibility is shifted onto allies, primarily European ones. (fondationfranceasie.org)
From this arises the main French dilemma: how to preserve security relying on the US without becoming hostage to its internal crises and unpredictable foreign policy? This is how Spanish US expert José Antonio Gurpegui frames it in an interview widely recounted by French and Franco‑Spanish outlets: "It would be a mistake to abandon US arms to throw ourselves into China’s embrace." The piece stresses that NATO partners are shocked by Washington’s course — from the seizure and transport to the US of Venezuela’s president Nicolás Maduro to discussions of "annexing" Greenland under the pretext of national security and Chinese and Russian presence in the Arctic. Yet despite all the irritation, Europe cannot give up the American nuclear umbrella and military infrastructure, and Gurpegui believes China offers neither an institutional nor a value-based comparable alternative. (ireste.fr)
The Chinese discourse about the US is structured differently: it talks much less about the drama of American democracy and more about systemic rivalry. Beijing’s news and analytical reviews currently emphasize three narratives. First, the acceleration of American military and technological strategy. The Shanghai Center for Digital Transformation analyzes in detail the Pentagon’s new "AI acceleration strategy": it concerns building "AI‑first" armed forces, seven priority programs — from "swarm forging" to "networks of intelligent agents" — and plans to integrate the chatbot Grok into the Defense Department’s internal networks. Commentators explicitly say the US goal is to lock in long-term superiority in military AI and to rely on total digitalization of intelligence and command systems. (dt.sheitc.sh.gov.cn)
Second, China’s foreign ministry almost daily responds to American moves around China’s perimeter of interests. At a briefing on February 2, diplomat Lin Jian sharply condemned the actions of American border and immigration services which, according to the Chinese account, repeatedly and without sufficient grounds detained employees of major Chinese firms on arrival in the US, interrogated them for up to 60 hours and then deported them. China characterizes this as "harsh repressive measures" and a "gross violation of the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese citizens," stressing that Washington’s behavior contradicts the consensus of the two countries’ leaders. (fr.china-embassy.gov.cn)
Third, Beijing uses any American rhetoric about the "malign influence of China" to shift the dispute into the plane of confrontation with "US hegemonism." The French version of the Chinese MFA website extensively quotes the reaction to remarks by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and chair of the China special committee John Mulanar, who welcomed Panama’s Supreme Court decision against a concession to a Hong Kong company in Panama Canal ports. The Chinese representative states bluntly: "Whoever seeks to monopolize the canal, whoever under the guise of rule of law undermines international law — the international community sees clearly." Thus an internal legal dispute in Panama becomes a symbol of the struggle between American "monopolism" and Chinese "equal openness." (us.china-embassy.gov.cn)
Turkish analysis of the US today starts from a different premise: Ankara is not an object but a regional actor that must account for the American factor while seeking to minimize unilateral dependence. A detailed review of Donald Trump’s "foreign policy report card" for 2025 at Anadolu agency shows a dual perception. Author Hakan Çopur emphasizes that the White House has simultaneously become more involved in conflicts in Gaza and around Ukraine while radically redefining the US role in the world. The article notes that the new security strategy signed in December effectively abandons the image of the US as the "global policeman" and shifts a significant portion of the burden to allies, chiefly European ones. Foreign policy is declared "fundamentally pragmatic," built under the slogan "America First" and economic nationalism; unlike the previous administration, China is no longer called an "enemy" but described as an "international economic competitor." (aa.com.tr)
Against this background Turkish authors pay close attention to how the balance in US‑Turkish relations itself has shifted. In the same piece Çopur notes that the Erdogan‑Trump meeting at the White House on September 25 — discussing Gaza, Ukraine, Turkey’s return to the F‑35 program and boosting bilateral trade — became "the most positive diplomatic contact in recent history" of the bilateral relationship. In the Turkish view, under Trump Washington changes from a "lecturing partner" into a bargaining but more predictable counterparty: demanding, but willing to make deals if Ankara brings added geopolitical value. (aa.com.tr)
However, the same Turkey watches the expansion of the American force toolkit with concern. A separate section is devoted to Venezuela: designating the drug cartel group Tren de Aragua as a "foreign terrorist organization," strikes on "suspicious" vessels off the country’s coast, and then a total blockade of tankers and even discussion of possible strikes on Venezuelan territory raise for the Turkish reader the question: where does the fight against crime end and regime change begin? The author notes that even within the American conservative camp the question is asked: "Are we heading toward war with Venezuela?" — and concludes that American power under Trump relies even more on unilateral sanctions and demonstrative uses of force, casting a long shadow over all countries whose policies diverge from Washington’s priorities. (aa.com.tr)
The economic aspect of American policy is especially important for both Turkey and China. Turkish economists at regional centers such as BakuNetwork are already summing up the first year of Trump’s second term: the promised "unprecedented boom" in practice results in GDP growth of about 2.1% in 2025, which the author calls "a slowdown, not an explosion." A line is drawn between the rhetoric of a "great revival" and statistics that show the noticeable costs of tariff wars and high interest rates for the real sector and households. (bakunetwork.org)
In China the discussion about the Fed, rates and the dollar takes place mainly in the plane of the global financial architecture. Chinese business media debate the prospects of 2–3 Fed rate cuts in 2026, tying them not only to US domestic inflation but also to personnel changes in the Fed’s leadership and the willingness of a new, more "dovish" chair to ease despite persistent high tariffs. Such analysis is accompanied by constant comparison with China’s monetary line: Beijing presents itself as a more predictable, cautious regulator, contrasting this with Washington’s "politicized" monetary policy. (jiemian.com)
A distinct, almost symbolic layer is the US military presence and its ability to project power. French-language materials closely track the deployment of an American carrier strike group and other ships in the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea and the eastern Mediterranean amid rising tensions with Iran. Experts explain to the French audience which ships and aircraft Washington is sending and pose the question: how far is Trump prepared to go, balancing between deterring Iran and the risk of dragging Europe into a new major Middle Eastern conflict? (fr.wikipedia.org)
Against this backdrop Chinese commentators interpret the US naval buildup in the region as another example of a "counter‑offensive by a weakening hegemony," rather than as a display of strength. Turkish analysts, recalling their own operations in Syria and Iraq and difficult negotiations with Washington over zones of responsibility, stress that any major American maneuver in the region automatically forces Ankara to ask: how not to be squeezed between NATO demands and its own regional ambitions.
In all three countries there are also more subtle, "civilizational" assessments of the US. French commentary repeatedly returns to the idea that America remains indispensable for European security but is increasingly unreliable as the bearer of a liberal normative agenda: domestic protests, attempts to strengthen central control over elections, pressure on media and NGOs — all this, as one author emphasizes, "erodes American moral capital," which until recently was considered unquestioned. In the Turkish environment, especially among conservative‑Islamist circles, the US is still seen as the main architect of an unfair order in the Middle East, but Trump, unlike Biden, is viewed as a partner with whom one can bargain directly without cloaking it in human‑rights rhetoric. Chinese rhetoric puts the US outside the "modernization model" bracket altogether: Washington is described more as an example of the degradation of late liberalism, whereas Beijing offers its own "stable and inclusive" model of global governance.
Still, stripping away the ideological veneer, the common motive of Chinese, Turkish and French texts about the US is one: the world has entered an era in which American power remains colossal but is no longer perceived as the stable backbone of the system. In Paris there is worry about how not to be caught between Washington’s hammer and Beijing’s anvil; in Ankara — how to extract the maximum from a transactional Trump without becoming the target of his sanctions and operations; in Beijing — how to use the crisis of confidence in the US to advance its agenda of "equal multipolarity" while simultaneously defending against Washington’s attempts to contain China’s technological and military surge.
This combination of fear, calculation and fatigue with American exceptionalism forms today the backdrop against which the world reads news from Washington — about shutdowns, carrier groups and new tariff threats.
