In early summer 2026 the United States in the foreign agenda looks simultaneously like a superpower waging a war in the Middle East, a country internally torn on the eve of new elections, and a source of a cascade of legal and political precedents shaping ideas about democracy worldwide. In Brazil, Germany and Russia they are debating not one or two episodes but an entire “package” of American narratives: the escalation of the conflict with Iran, Trump’s new line in foreign policy, the Supreme Court’s decision on voting rights, the state of the American economy and, more broadly, the resilience of American democracy with an eye to the 2028 elections. Each country sees in the US a mirror of its own fears and hopes — but interprets the reflection in its own way.
One of the central themes has been the US conflict with Iran, after the Donald Trump administration announced “large-scale combat operations” against Tehran under the pretext of eliminating “imminent threats” from the Iranian regime. The Ukrainian outlet Slovo i Delo relayed his formulation about “large-scale combat operations” and the goal of “eliminating imminent threats,” emphasizing the continuation of a logic of preventive war and Trump’s personal style, where military escalation is presented as the only way to “protect Americans.” In the Russian-language space this line is interpreted much more harshly: many Russian commentators see Washington’s actions as confirmation that the new US National Strategy, which promised a “move away from dominance,” in practice conceals forceful expansion. Americanist Valery Garbuzov directly says this in an interview with the Pskov outlet PLN, pointing out that the January invasion of Venezuela and the strikes against Iran refute any talk of a “modest” foreign policy and demonstrate, in his words, the “absurdity of US foreign policy” — a gap between declarations and real actions which in Russia is read as cynical double standards rather than an internal debate within the American establishment. In Russian official‑adjacent discourse the conflict with Iran fits a familiar narrative: the US is a force that destabilizes the Middle East to control energy resources and to pressure rivals.
But inside Russia more pragmatic assessments are also heard. Political scientist and Americanist Malek Dudakov, in a comment for NEWS.ru retold by Parliamentary Gazette, lays out possible scenarios for the conflict: from a resumption of full-scale hostilities to limited landing operations on islands in the Strait of Hormuz. He stresses that for the US “this is a path to nowhere,” and notes that Trump “is aware of the risks,” and therefore must navigate between demonstrating resolve and avoiding being drawn into a long war. Such analysis shows that even in a media environment predictably critical of Washington there is demand for rational modeling of American decisions, not only ideological rhetoric. At the same time, Russian pieces on the world’s reaction to the conflict in Iran note the international dimension: they discuss calls by part of Congress to limit presidential authority via debates over the War Powers Act, and the White House’s attempts to justify the operation as necessary to “correct decades of cowardice” toward the Iranian regime, as summarized in reviews of reactions to the conflict. All this in Russia is presented as evidence of a systemic crisis in American foreign policy: Washington, many commentators argue, is drowning in its own logic of “perpetual enemies” and cannot escape it.
In Germany the conflict with Iran also appears in analyses, but not as the central story — rather as part of a broader debate about US strategic ambitions, from the Middle East to the Arctic. A telling example was a piece in Die Zeit about how Trump again confirmed American “interest” in Greenland and linked it to NATO security questions in the Arctic. Journalists describe how discussions about increasing NATO presence should “disarm” US arguments for more direct control over the region, and German commentators ask: where does security end and geopolitical appetite begin? In their reading Washington continues to think in terms of spheres of influence and exclusive access to resources — and Greenland becomes a symbol of how Trump’s old dreams (recall his attempt to “buy” the island in his first term) are being reabsorbed in a new situation of intensified military rhetoric toward Iran and pressure on NATO allies. For German society, historically sensitive to any expansionist schemes, such a US approach provokes skepticism and anxiety, especially against the backdrop of debates on the autonomy of European defense policy.
If in foreign policy Germany and Russia view the US primarily as a source of risk, Brazil today is decisively focused on how the American domestic agenda boomerangs back to Latin America. On the Brazilian portal UOL, which often repackages material from France’s RFI, a fresh analysis is devoted to how the state of the US economy will affect Trump’s political prospects in the midterm elections. The interviewee — a researcher from Temple University — points out that the tariff wars of 2025–2026, “tarifaços impostos ao mundo inteiro,” hit the global conjuncture. If the US economy does not show clear signs of improvement, Trump could well lose his majorities in both the Senate and the House, the expert notes, stressing that Americans’ economic dissatisfaction quickly transforms into electoral protest. For the Brazilian audience this is not an abstract story: export‑oriented Brazil feels fluctuations in US demand acutely, and the history of trade conflicts with Washington is a reminder of how dangerous dependence on the American market can be.
Brazilian commentators use the upcoming 250th anniversary celebrations of the US Declaration of Independence as an occasion to reflect on the “vanguarda americana na criação e instituição dos pilares da democracia,” as one author writes in UOL, and at the same time on how closely modern America aligns with those ideals. A researcher preparing a book for the anniversary speaks of a peculiar “pacifism” in today’s US political culture regarding the celebration of the state’s founding: many prefer to abstract the anniversary from sharp issues like racial inequality, political polarization and economic pressure, seeing it as a ritual rather than a moment for critical self‑examination. For part of the Brazilian elite this sounds like a warning: a country that once served as a model of constitutional democracy today hesitates to honestly discuss the mismatch between its declarations and reality. Against this background Brazilian authors cautiously draw parallels with their own political system, which experienced the shock of the Brasília storming in 2023 inspired by America’s January 6, and ask how resilient a democracy is when political myths replace institutional guarantees.
A separate large block in foreign discussions of the US has been the recent high‑profile electoral law reform through a Supreme Court decision. The Spanish‑language but widely read European outlet El País writes about how, in late April 2026, the Supreme Court by a 6–3 majority limited the application of the Voting Rights Act, effectively changing rules that had been in place for around sixty years and declaring Louisiana’s district map with an expanded Black district unconstitutional. The piece emphasizes that the court’s conservative majority sided with plaintiffs demanding the elimination of the second Black‑majority district, and that this decision could affect the November 2026 elections, calling into question the effectiveness of the second half of Trump’s presidential term and even increasing the risk of a third impeachment attempt. The authors recall the role of the Voting Rights Act advanced by legendary Senator and civil rights leader John Lewis, calling it one of the key steps toward “reconciling the country with its painful slaveholding past.” Thus, the European liberal press sees the court decision not as a mere legal technicality but as a blow to the symbolic foundation of a multiracial democracy.
Brazil’s Folha de S. Paulo, commenting on the same ruling, writes that the Supreme Court “limitа o uso de lei histórica que protege eleitores negros” and explains to readers the concept of gerrymandering — manipulating district boundaries to create artificial political advantages. The journalist cites human‑rights assessments that argue the result “reverte décadas de progresso rumo a uma democracia multirracial em nome da política partidária,” that is, it reverses decades of progress toward a multiracial democracy in the name of partisan politics. For Brazilian readers, familiar with their own issues of representation and territorial distortions, the American case becomes a mirror: if in the “oldest democracy” the court can so sharply curtail protection for minorities, what does that mean for countries with more fragile institutions? In the German press the same story fits into a broader skepticism toward the American model: observers note that a politicized Supreme Court, entrenching the power of one camp by changing the rules of the game, brings the US closer to the practices Washington traditionally criticizes in other countries.
Against the backdrop of legal battles over voting rights, foreign observers are also watching the political dynamics ahead of the next presidential elections. In an interview with El País, former Barack Obama adviser Ben Rhodes predicts that “Estados Unidos de 2028 serán aún más extremos y más polarizados,” pointing to the Democrats’ failure in 2024 as the inability to build their own narrative. He notes that without a clear story about the future the party allowed Trump to turn himself into the “party of the system,” while Trump himself, despite lack of restraints, managed to offer an effective message that mobilizes his base. For a European audience this reads as a warning: if influential figures within the Democratic Party speak of rising extremism and polarization, allies should prepare for an even more unpredictable America in 2028 — regardless of who ends up in the White House. This strengthens discussions in Berlin about the EU’s strategic autonomy: Washington ceases to look like a “stability anchor” and increasingly resembles an internally conflicted power projecting its culture wars onto its foreign policy.
In Brazil more attention is paid less to ideological splits than to how Trump’s economic and social decisions resonate globally and whether they can weaken his domestic support. The UOL piece cites an AP‑NORC poll showing on which issues Trump is losing support even among Republicans and where, conversely, he retains a loyal core. Particular concern for Americans is rising gasoline prices amid the war with Iran and general dissatisfaction with the administrations’ foreign policy, as the Los Angeles Times (Spanish version) emphasizes: a majority of respondents disapprove of Trump’s approach to Iran and to international affairs overall. Brazilian commentators draw a simple conclusion: if foreign adventurism and tariff wars undermine the economic wellbeing of the average American, this opens a window for a change of course, but at the same time increases the risk that Washington will more aggressively shift costs onto external partners, including the Global South.
Russian voices, by contrast, are inclined to interpret any American weakness as a source of additional aggression abroad. In an analytical note on EADaily commenting on Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s remarks about a possible extension of waivers from sanctions on Russia’s oil sector, the author of the popular Telegram channel “ZeRada” claims that “the US needs Europe to slowly get worse.” By his logic, Washington intentionally doles out sanction pressure so as not to allow a complete collapse of the European economy, but also not to let it recover, keeping allies in a state of managed dependence. This interpretation is telling: where the German discourse speaks of growing distrust of American motives and the EU’s desire to rely more on itself, Russian pro‑government commentary turns European‑American contradictions into proof of US “malice” toward both Europe and Russia. In that worldview the US is not merely a selfish partner but almost a puppet master interested in weakening any competitors, including allies.
Finally, everywhere — from São Paulo to Berlin and Moscow — the question of the future of democracy as such is being discussed through the prism of the United States. In Brazil the paradox attracts attention: a country that first created a stable system of constitutional democracy now displays a much tougher Supreme Court that rolls back the gains of the civil‑rights era; a political culture that separates the independence anniversary from real conflicts over racism and inequality; and an electoral system where district manipulations are legitimized by the highest judicial instance. German analysts see this as a warning that even mature democracies are vulnerable to a slow “creeping” shift in institutions: by formally observing procedures, one can radically change the distribution of power. Russian commentators, on the other hand, use US crises as an argument that the liberal model has exhausted itself and as justification for their own authoritarian practices: if even America effectively strips minorities of a voice and interferes in other countries’ affairs, then criticisms of Moscow supposedly lose legitimacy.
Comparing these three perspectives shows how differently the same phenomenon — the United States in 2026 — can be read. For Brazil it is above all a lesson learned from others’ mistakes and an understanding of how Washington’s economic and institutional choices reverberate in the Global South. For Germany it is a prompt to accelerate discussion of European autonomy and to look critically at an ally whose internal polarization and external ambitions create increasing risks. For Russia it is convenient material to strengthen an anti‑Western narrative and to confirm the thesis of the “absurdity” and hypocrisy of American policy. But in all three cases a common thread runs through: the fate of American democracy and foreign policy is no longer seen as exclusively an internal US affair. The world watches Washington not only because it remains a superpower, but because each new turn in American history restarts the debate about what democracy and the international order should look like in the 21st century — and whether one can rely on a country that itself is uncertain about its own principles.
