In recent days the United States has again become the center of global discussions — but this time not because of elections or domestic polarization, rather because of a sharp turn toward a power-based foreign policy. Military intervention in Venezuela, joint U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran, the assassination of Iran’s supreme leader and subsequent Iranian strikes on bases with American presence in the Persian Gulf, as well as the sinking of an Iranian frigate by an American submarine in the Indian Ocean — all of this is perceived in Australia, Japan and Brazil not as isolated episodes but as the outlines of a new era of American “hard-power leadership.” (en.wikipedia.org)
Against this backdrop, in Brazil the conversation about Washington’s pressure on the upcoming elections and economic policy is intensifying; in Japan, concern focuses on whether the U.S. military venture will draw the country even more deeply into the orbit of American strategy; and in Australia, discussion centers on risks to regional security and the global economy. A common undertone everywhere is anxiety: how controllable is America, whose decisions still determine the price of oil, exchange rates, the security of sea lanes and the resilience of alliances.
The central theme of all these discussions is the war with Iran. For Brazil this is primarily a question of oil, inflation and political pressure. One economic assessment for the Brazilian press explicitly states: the market is closely watching the consequences of the U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran, which are already raising fears about disruptions to oil and gas supplies and, consequently, a spike in inflation. (forbes.com.br) Forecasts of slower growth for Brazil’s economy in 2026 are now linked not only to domestic elections and a high policy rate but also to the “American” factor — war, sanctions and commodity price volatility.
At the same time, the reaction of Brazil’s political scene to the U.S. strikes on Iran is uneven. In the Senate, Senator Marcos Rogério Bittar recently publicly welcomed Washington’s actions, saying that “the free world today celebrates the United States’ attacks on Iran,” and he lambasted the Brazilian left for “inconsistency”: domestically it speaks of human rights but turns a blind eye to repression in states like Iran. This was reported by the official Senate agency. (www12.senado.leg.br) Meanwhile, left-wing and progressive outlets portray events as a new phase of American imperialism, emphasizing the danger of conflict escalation and the threat to Global South countries.
The government line, voiced in a notably cited analytical piece, is to condemn the strikes and call for de-escalation. Brazil officially condemned the U.S. attacks on Iran and demanded a reduction in tensions, while Brazilian media noted that most Americans themselves — according to a CNN poll — do not support the operation: 59% of U.S. citizens expressed disapproval of military action against Iran. (poder360.com.br) For a Brazilian audience this is an important argument: criticism of American policy is emphasized not simply as “anti-imperialist” rhetoric but by reference to American democracy itself, which many in Brazil believe increasingly diverges from the decisions of the Trump administration.
The second strand of Brazil’s discussion is structural: it’s not only about Iran but also about how the U.S. treats its partners. The 2025 diplomatic crisis is recalled, when the Trump administration imposed 50-percent tariffs on all Brazilian goods, citing a “witch hunt” against Jair Bolsonaro and an allegedly unfavorable trade balance — despite the fact that in reality the U.S. ran a trade surplus with Brazil. (pt.wikipedia.org) Recent news fits this narrative: the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision to declare the broad Trump tariff regime under the IEEPA law unconstitutional is read in Brazilian business media as a signal: on one hand, U.S. institutions still function; on the other, the president immediately promised a new global 10% tariff on all imports. (inda.org.br)
In left-leaning Brazilian outlets such as Brasil de Fato there is a warning: the country “bets on caution,” but U.S. pressure ahead of the elections will only increase. Political scientist Karen Lapa, in her column for Brasil de Fato, speaks of a combination of direct and indirect intervention: from the agenda of Lula’s visit to the White House to information campaigns and the positions of American funds in the Brazilian market. In her view, “no country in the world will irresponsibly risk standing on the front line against the United States,” but it is this asymmetry of power that creates a double trap for Brazil — economic and political. (brasildefato.com.br)
In more radical publications of popular movements, like the January issue of Jornal do MAB, the current U.S. war in the Middle East is framed within a broader picture of “imperialist aggression,” where Iran, Palestine, Cuba, Venezuela and the BRICS countries are elements of the same field of struggle. The authors emphasize that 2026 will be a year of a “great struggle for hegemony,” in which the U.S. and some European states try to hold onto dwindling control over resources and the rules of the game. (mab.org.br) This rhetoric does not directly set the course of official foreign policy, but it shows how a significant portion of Brazilian civil society perceives Washington’s actions: not as a fight for security but as a reaction to the rise of China and the BRICS.
If in Brazil the “American issue” is closely intertwined with oil, inflation and electoral pressure, in Japan the current escalation with Iran and the war in Venezuela are perceived primarily through the prism of regional security and Tokyo’s role in the U.S.-led alliance architecture. Analytical blogs and expert columns, for example on the Canon Institute for Global Studies site, note that the joint U.S.-Israeli operation against Iran, launched shortly after Trump’s message to Congress, became, in one author’s phrase, a “weekend breaker” of the previous agenda: Washington’s attention switched instantly from domestic economic issues and competition with China to a war that could alter the balance of power in the Middle East. (cigs.canon)
For Japanese analysts the key question is not only the war itself but how it will shift U.S. strategic priorities in the Indo-Pacific region. Commentators working at the intersection of economics and security emphasize that the new course of the administration, set out in the national security strategy, implies focusing forces on containing China and maintaining “Western” control over the Western Hemisphere, as already demonstrated by the American intervention in Venezuela. (jiia.or.jp) In a widely cited column journalist Yoshiko Sakurai explains that the strikes on Caracas became a visible implementation of the new doctrine: the U.S. intends to “hold” both Americas under its umbrella, even if that requires military intervention and ignoring the reactions of Global South countries.
At the same time Japanese financial commentators are tracking another aspect of American policy — attitudes toward the dollar and intervention in currency markets. Articles for J‑Money and analytical notes from Nomura Research recall how the U.S. Treasury once listed Japan as a watchlist country for currency policy, and they discuss the risk that a second Trump administration could shift the emphasis from tariffs to encouraging a weaker dollar, which would put Japan between the hammer of U.S. demands and the anvil of its own struggle against excessive yen depreciation. (nri.com) In this narrative the wars with Iran and Venezuela are not background noise but factors accelerating financial shocks and forcing Tokyo to coordinate its moves with Washington even more closely.
Japanese public opinion, however, is not unanimous. On the left there is sharp criticism framing the current U.S. course of building military power and expanding operational zones as an “imperialist global war strategy.” In a recent article in the weekly Zenshin, U.S. strikes on Iran and the planned hardening of policy toward China are described as part of a “global war strategy,” and the authors call for mass protests against both Washington’s policy and the Japanese government’s path of militarization and closer alignment with the U.S. (zenshin.org) Notably, these protest voices not only denounce specific strikes but also question the very idea that an alliance with the U.S. guarantees Japan’s security. In their view, following Washington drags the country into potential conflict with China and Iran, making Japanese bases and ports targets for missiles and drones.
In more moderate academic debates, for example on the platform of the Japan Association of International Relations, the focus shifts to how to maintain “strategic maneuverability” in relations with the U.S.: how to remain a key ally without becoming an automatic accomplice to all American interventions. University-run seminars on the U.S. role in the Israel–Palestine conflict and the war in Gaza underscore that Japan cannot afford to ignore the moral and legal aspects of allied policy. (jair.or.jp)
Australia occupies a special position in this trio: traditionally close to the U.S. and sharing its strategic concerns about China, it is simultaneously heavily dependent on stable global commodity markets and maritime trade. In Australian business and political commentary the two current American narratives — Trump’s trade policy and the war in Iran — overlap. The Supreme Court decision on tariffs, followed by the president’s promise to introduce a 10-percent global import tariff, is seen as proof that Washington is ready to take unilateral steps even toward allies, including Australia. (finance.yahoo.com) For Canberra this is a signal: American protectionism is becoming a permanent backdrop, not a temporary tool of pressure on specific competitors.
At the same time Australian analysts view the war with Iran and strikes on maritime infrastructure through the lens of vulnerability of their own export routes. Admiralty and academic commentators in Canberra warn that a large redeployment of U.S. forces to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, observed already in the buildup phase before the war, pushes the region toward greater militarization and raises the risk of attacks on tankers and undersea infrastructure vital to Australia. (en.wikipedia.org) Unlike the left scenes in Brazil and Japan, mainstream Australian media more often emphasize the need to “contain” authoritarian regimes and the danger of a nuclear Iran, while also expressing concern about the scope and consequences of the military campaign.
At the intersection of all these themes another common motif emerges: perceptions of the American domestic discourse itself. In Brazil, Japan and Australia careful citation is given to U.S. polls showing that a majority of Americans disapprove of the war with Iran, and to reports of large protests in U.S. cities against escalation. (poder360.com.br) For external observers this confirms that the current Washington course is not the result of a “national consensus” but of a political choice by a specific administration, and that the gap between society and elites in the U.S. is widening. In Brazil this is cited to show that criticism of the war is not anti-Americanism but solidarity with Americans themselves; in Japan to emphasize that betting long-term on a “Trump-style” approach may prove mistaken; and in Australia to reassure audiences that the United States still retains democratic mechanisms capable of correcting the current course.
Finally, country-specific emphases give international reactions local color. In Brazil discussion of American wars is closely tied to the struggle against “fascism” and the internal comeback of Bolsonarism: the left sees Washington as a source of external pressure capable of tilting the electoral field, while the right sees it as a model of tough anti-communist and anti-Islamist policy. (brasildefato.com.br) In Japan the debate revolves around balancing alliance and autonomy: conservatives call for strengthening military capability and embedding Japan in the U.S. global strategy, while the opposition warns against turning the country into a staging ground for others’ wars and highlights the risk of being simultaneously drawn into crises with Iran and China. (jiia.or.jp) In Australia the question is put more plainly and bluntly: how to remain a reliable U.S. ally without becoming hostage to its trade and military decisions that are dangerous for an export-oriented economy and regional stability. (finance.yahoo.com)
In all three countries the American agenda has ceased to be abstract geopolitics. U.S. strikes on Iran and Venezuela are reflected in the price of gasoline in Brazil, in the exchange rates of the yen and the Australian dollar, and in the planning of Japanese and Australian defense policy. Local experts and politicians increasingly speak not about whether the U.S. is “right” or “wrong” in a specific conflict, but about how to build their own strategy in a world where Washington once again bets on unilateral force. And although the tone of these discussions varies — from sharp anti-imperialist rhetoric in Brazilian and Japanese left-wing outlets to more restrained pragmatism in centrist Australian newspapers — the same feeling is present everywhere: the era when America could afford “distant wars” without a serious response from its allies is passing. Now each new Washington move — whether a missile strike on Iran, the torpedoing of a frigate, or a 10-percent global tariff — immediately becomes a domestic political issue in Brazil, Japan and Australia. And it is precisely this, not only the combat operations themselves, that is shaping the international view of the United States today.
