At the end of February 2026, foreign press coverage of the United States again revolves around a familiar set of names and topics: Donald Trump, new tariffs, the Supreme Court, the threat of a strike on Iran, transatlantic frictions. But the tone of these discussions is noticeably different from his first term: less shock, more cold calculation and tired skepticism. Germany, Australia and China view Washington from different distances and with different interests, but a common motif emerges in their columns and commentaries: the world has grown used to living with an unstable America and now evaluates the U.S. primarily through the prism of its own interests, rather than eternal declarations of “leadership of the free world.”
One of the main triggers was the U.S. Supreme Court’s verdict on February 20: the court ruled that Trump’s so‑called “reciprocal” tariffs, introduced under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), were unlawful. Chinese business media analyze in detail that the court pointed to the absence of any mention of tariffs in the IEEPA and cited the “clear statement” principle and the “major questions doctrine”: the president cannot single‑handedly reshape the global trade architecture without express authorization from Congress. An analytical review on the financial portal JRJ emphasizes that the so‑called “fentanyl tariffs,” where a 20% rate had been set for China, as well as the global “reciprocal” tariffs that brought an estimated over $130 billion in revenue to the U.S. budget, were also affected. The key question — the return of already paid duties — the Supreme Court effectively left to the lower courts, which, in Chinese assessments, makes “an automatic full refund unlikely.” Importers, including Chinese ones, are advised to prepare for lengthy legal procedures to recover at least part of the money. It is here that pragmatism shows most clearly in the Chinese discourse: not so much a celebration of “defeating Trump,” but a detailed analysis of how to extract the maximum benefit from the current legal situation and which industries (from chemicals to electronics) might gain from a partial easing of tariff pressure. (stock.jrj.com.cn)
In Germany, the tariff issue and the Supreme Court ruling fit into a broader conversation about fragile economic recovery. Business press analysis treats the February rise in the Ifo index — to 88.6 points — as a “signal of a possible turnaround” after several years of stagnation; but alongside it there is a reminder: “if not for Trump.” As Welt writes, for example, German industry — foremost mechanical engineering — has already felt the costs of American tariffs, even though the electronics industry showed record exports in 2025. The new wave of tariff uncertainty, including Trump’s announced “replacement” 10% global tariffs under a different legal basis, is seen by Germans not as temporary noise but as a structural risk factor. Economists commenting on the Ifo data emphasize that without “deep domestic reform” in Germany any external shock originating in Washington can pull the economy back into stagnation. Unlike the trade war period of 2018–2019, the tone of German commentators is much less moral‑ideological and far more technical now: the question is not whether “Trump is right” regarding China, but how a European exporter can survive between American protectionism and Asian competition. (welt.de)
The Australian perspective on tariffs is quieter but similar in logic. Local analyses of global markets describe the U.S. Supreme Court decision as a blow not so much to China as to the predictability of American economic policy. Australian commentators, writing for retail investors, view the situation primarily through the lens of global capital flows: if the White House can one day lose the authority behind one set of tariffs and immediately try to impose another — under a different trade statute — that signals that markets are regulated less by law than by Washington’s domestic political cycle. In financial firms’ reviews, Trump appears as a figure whose tariff moves, and the threat of “new 10% national‑security tariffs,” are both part of electioneering and a tool of pressure in other directions — from China to alliance partners. (acy.com)
The second major theme, shared across several countries, is the sharp escalation around Iran. Regional and Chinese reviews quote concern: American sources report that the Trump administration is considering a “limited strike” on Iran if a deal on the nuclear program is not reached in the coming weeks, while Iran threatens to retaliate against U.S. bases in the region. China’s Foreign Ministry, responding to an Arab TV channel question at a recent briefing, reacted as expected but notably: spokesperson Mao Ning again stressed that Beijing opposes any actions leading to escalation and calls for respect for “the legitimate concerns of all parties” and a return to dialogue. In the statement published on the website of the Chinese embassy in the U.S., the American line is not named directly, but the context is clear: Beijing positions itself as a supporter of stability and multilateral arrangements against an image of Washington as a power ready to use force to press its negotiating position. (us.china-embassy.gov.cn)
European reaction to the risk of a strike on Iran is shaped largely by the recent Munich Security Conference, where the American delegation tried to reassure allies that the “transatlantic era is not over.” Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s speech in Munich, in which he stressed that the U.S. does not seek a rupture with Europe but wants “a renewed alliance with a strong Europe,” is read by European commentators as an attempt to prove the stability of a partner whose actions — from tariffs to Iran — are interpreted as provoking instability. German analysts note that the “renewed alliance” rhetoric sits uneasily with a unilateral approach to sanctions and military threats, as well as with the practical neglect of European interests in the Iran nuclear deal. For Berlin and Paris, which until recently tried to salvage the JCPOA against Washington, the current American line looks like a continuation of an old story: the U.S. makes decisions whose consequences fall first on the shoulders of Europe’s neighbors in the region, from migration waves to energy turbulence. (zh.wikipedia.org)
A third overlapping theme is the domestic state of the United States itself and the question of trust in its political system. Here the perspectives of all three countries are interesting. Australian market analysts link the split within the Federal Reserve about timing and scale of potential rate cuts to political uncertainty: inflation data might leave room for easing, but Fed meetings are accompanied by conspicuously measured rhetoric amid threats of new budget crises and sudden tariff policy shifts from the White House. Chinese reviews of the U.S. economy point out that even after the recent federal government shutdown was resolved — with Congress able to pass a stopgap budget only in early February — confidence in Washington’s ability to manage the economy without recurring shutdowns and extreme political maneuvers remains low. (acy.com)
In Germany, internal U.S. stories are read through the prism of the transatlantic partnership. The German press reports new U.S. opinion polls in detail, where Trump’s approval rating, according to CNN/SSRS, falls to 36%, and only a third of respondents say he focuses on the right priorities, above all the economy and cost of living. For the German reader this signal is ambivalent. On one hand, declining support for a president whose policies are seen in Berlin as sources of external shocks seems potentially positive. On the other hand, columns increasingly argue that even a change of administration does not guarantee a return to the “old normal”: the Republican‑Democrat split, recurring budget crises, courts constraining the White House — all make American politics unpredictable in the medium term. (theamericanroulette.com)
The Chinese public sphere, by contrast, emphasizes the institutional side of recent events: the Supreme Court decision on the IEEPA is presented as an example that even a “strong president” in the U.S. is ultimately constrained by the system of checks and balances. In Chinese commentary this is often contrasted with China’s own political system — not necessarily in a self‑critical way, but rather to illustrate that systemic predictability can be achieved by different means. Authors of economic reviews on Chinese sites carefully use the American example to stress that relying solely on “administrative” levers in foreign trade makes a country vulnerable to judicial decisions and political pendulum swings. For the Chinese audience this is both an argument for strengthening their own legal and institutional framework and a reminder of the risks of excessive dependence on the U.S. market. (stock.jrj.com.cn)
Finally, beneath the loud headlines about tariffs and Iran there is a quiet but important divergence in the cultural‑political agenda. Chinese diplomacy is actively promoting an image of its soft power amid the global hubbub around Chinese New Year celebrations: Foreign Ministry commentaries emphasize that dozens of countries celebrate the holiday, tourist flows to China during the long holidays surged many times over, and foreign guests “encounter Chinese culture through the spring festivals.” In this discourse the United States appears almost only as context: the statement was published on the embassy’s Washington site, but the focus is on China as a magnet for tourists and a provider of a global cultural agenda. The result is an intriguing contrast: America is discussed as a source of risks, while China talks about itself as a source of celebration and stability. For Beijing this is an opportunity to underscore: while the U.S. issues tariffs and weighs strikes on Iran, China offers the world “a shared celebration” and economic cooperation. (us.china-embassy.gov.cn)
If one attempts to bring these disparate voices into a single outline, the picture looks like this. Germany worries about its industry and security, assessing Washington in terms of “demand shocks” and “security shocks”; Australia views the U.S. as a central but increasingly unreliable anchor of the global financial system; China acts simultaneously as a pragmatic calculator of the gains and risks of American decisions and promotes its own image as a more predictable partner and cultural superpower. The common denominator is a decline in the idealization of the U.S. Leading countries speak of America as an important but problematic element of the world system, whose actions must be watched closely, hedged against, and, where possible, used to exploit emerging legal and economic “windows of opportunity.” This is what a world looks like that no longer debates values with the U.S. but “negotiates” about risks and benefits.
