World about US

23-08-2026

Pushback Against U.S. Economic and Political Pressure

Today’s edition looks at reactions from various countries to pressure from Washington. Canada is seeking ways to reduce its economic dependence after the introduction of U.S. tariffs, Iran is condemning the resumption of U.S. economic pressure, and Mexico is discussing the domestic implications of Washington’s accusations against a governor involving drug trafficking. Venezuelan reports focus on Donald Trump’s declining popularity and the political consequences of U.S. policy and leadership. This edition was prepared based on materials from RFI (China) and YouTube (Venezuela).

U.S. Tariff Dispute Accelerates Canada’s Search for New Markets

The threat of new U.S. tariffs has once again exposed the main weakness of the Canadian economy—its long-standing dependence on the U.S. market. As noted by the Chinese edition of RFI, Washington plans to invoke Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930 and impose 50% tariffs on Canadian goods worth approximately $20 billion in total.

Negotiations between the countries have effectively reached an impasse, with both sides blaming each other. U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer claims that Ottawa put forward additional demands at the last minute. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney takes the opposite view: according to him, the U.S. administration changed the initial terms and offered Ottawa an economically unfair deal.

Carney has promised to respond to the pressure on a “dollar-for-dollar” basis. “Canada has resources the world needs, and we will not allow any one country to determine our future,” he said. This formula reflects not only Canada’s position in the specific tariff dispute but also a broader shift in Canadian policy: Ottawa is increasingly looking for ways to reduce its vulnerability to decisions made by its main trading partner.

The scale of this dependence is particularly significant. Around 70% of Canada’s exports traditionally go to the United States, while the European Union accounts for approximately 4%. Consequently, even tariffs limited to particular groups of goods are seen by Canada not as an ordinary commercial dispute, but as a threat to the entire model of its foreign trade.

Richard Ouellet, a professor of international economic law at Université Laval, called the situation “unprecedented.” In his assessment, Canada is experiencing “fear” because the Canada–United States–Mexico Agreement had previously served as a kind of “shield” for the country. Now, the scholar argues, the United States itself is “opening a breach” in that protection, calling into question the reliability of agreements with its closest ally.

In response, Ottawa is accelerating the diversification of its trade and investment ties. Carney is stepping up contacts with India, China, and Saudi Arabia. According to the report, the Donald Trump administration was particularly angered by a preliminary agreement with the PRC concerning the admission of Chinese electric vehicles to the Canadian market. For Canada, this could become one element of a new strategy in which China is viewed not only as a competitor and a difficult political partner, but also as an important market, source of investment, and supplier of industrial products.

At the same time, the country is seeking more direct access to Asian markets. Key areas include expanding port capacity in Montreal and Vancouver, developing new deposits, and constructing a pipeline that would connect Alberta’s oil sands with the Pacific coast. Such infrastructure would make it possible to redirect part of Canada’s energy exports to Asia, reducing producers’ dependence on American buyers and transportation routes.

The first signs of this reorientation are already visible. In 2025, Canadian exports to countries outside the United States increased by 11.1% and approached one-third of total overseas shipments. According to Canada’s foreign-affairs department, this was the highest figure in 40 years.

In the Chinese interpretation, the dispute goes far beyond a bilateral conflict. U.S. tariffs and political pressure are presented as an example of how Washington’s protectionist and unilateral measures affect even its closest allies. From this perspective, Canada’s search for alternative markets confirms the need to diversify international ties, strengthen the domestic economy, and prevent national development from becoming dependent on the decisions of a single foreign power.

For Beijing, a possible weakening of Canada’s economic ties with the United States creates new opportunities—from trade in raw materials and energy cooperation to investment, electric-vehicle supplies, and expanded access to the Canadian market. For Ottawa itself, however, closer ties with Asian partners are becoming less an ideological choice than a pragmatic response to the growing unpredictability of U.S. trade policy.

Venezuela Watches Trump’s Waning Influence in the United States

Donald Trump’s declining popularity and the defeats of candidates he backed in Republican primaries are viewed in Venezuela’s information space as signs of deeper problems within the U.S. political system. The focus is not so much on the outcome of individual intraparty campaigns as on the president’s ability to retain influence within the Republican Party ahead of the midterm elections for Congress.

As noted in a CNN report, a number of candidates endorsed by Trump lost Republican primaries. Expert Octavio Pescador linked the results to the decline in the president’s approval rating and questioned the durability of his control over his own party.

For Venezuela, these developments are of more than merely observational interest. Washington remains one of the main external factors shaping sanctions policy, restrictions in the oil sector, and diplomatic pressure on Caracas. Therefore, a possible weakening of the U.S. president is viewed as a factor capable of influencing the future direction of U.S. policy toward Latin American countries.

If Trump loses support among Republicans, his administration may find it more difficult to pursue a consistent policy through Congress. This concerns not only the domestic agenda, but also decisions on sanctions, migration, oil restrictions, and relations with Venezuela. Growing intraparty resistance in the United States could potentially limit the White House’s room for maneuver and make foreign-policy decisions less predictable.

In the Venezuelan context, the defeats of Trump’s allies are interpreted as an indicator of a crisis of his leadership, rather than as a series of isolated electoral episodes. For a country that has been under U.S. sanctions and pressure for an extended period, Washington’s political vulnerability may be perceived as a possible opening for negotiations, the easing of restrictive measures, or a reduction in the scale of external interference.

Although the report contains no direct comments from Venezuelan politicians or local experts, the very interest in the topic shows how closely internal conflicts in the United States are linked in Caracas to the prospects for bilateral relations. Viewed this way, U.S. primaries become not merely domestic political news, but a factor that could affect sanctions, diplomacy, and the future dialogue between Washington and Caracas.