By the end of May 2026, discussion of the United States around the world almost automatically boils down to three major storylines. The first is the American–Iranian war and negotiations for a ceasefire, on which depend oil prices, currency stability and the safety of shipping from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea. The second is Washington’s role in Russia’s war against Ukraine, including the short ceasefire announced by Donald Trump and the equally loud US withdrawal from the mediator role. The third is the changing nature of American leadership: in Europe there is growing talk that the continent must "learn to defend itself with less America," while in the Persian Gulf allies welcome US initiatives but simultaneously distance themselves from its most risky plans. Russia, France and Saudi Arabia view these processes through the lens of their own interests, and their perspectives noticeably diverge from the familiar American self-perception.
The most sensitive nerve in international commentary is the US war with Iran and the crisis around the Strait of Hormuz. In France a whole wave of publications and TV debates revolves around a simple question: can Washington exit the war without collapsing the global economy and the remnant of international law? Francophone media follow the negotiations almost live. When Donald Trump said on May 24 that the blockade of Iran would remain until a "final agreement" was reached, noting that the dialogue was "orderly and constructive" but that the nuclear issue remained a red line, it was presented as a signal that Washington was not ready for rapid de‑escalation even if the markets demanded it — as the Anadolu agency wrote in a piece about his statements on Iran and the sanctionary "blockade" of the country’s economy. On francophone channels commentators emphasize that the negotiations "largely come down to a formula: oil through Hormuz in exchange for a pause in escalation" and that Europe pays for every new Trump tweet with higher energy prices.
The same story is reported from a different angle in the Arab press, primarily in Saudi publications. Here the focus is less on legal nuances and more on crisis manageability and how the US aligns its steps with the interests of Gulf allies. The newspaper al‑Watan stresses that Riyadh "highly appreciated" Trump’s decision to give the talks with Iran another chance and to postpone a military strike already prepared at the direct requests of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE, which primarily seek the restoration of security and freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and a "return to the situation before February 28, 2026," i.e., before the start of the war. The same piece recalls that the American president once postponed an attack literally at the last moment when allies warned of the risk of a regional explosion they would be forced to share with the US. For Saudi diplomacy the key question is whether Washington can think not only in terms of "punish" and "contain" Tehran, but also take into account the Gulf states’ fears of a direct ground campaign next door.
In Russia, where the Iranian conflict is seen not as a local war but as another stage in the dismantling of American hegemony, the tone of commentary is different. Russian political commentators in state and pro‑state media regularly return to the assertion that current American foreign policy remains "force‑driven by inertia," relying primarily on military superiority and neglecting the interests of other players. In this logic the blockade of Hormuz, air strikes and the "dances" around a ground operation in Iran are merely a continuation of Washington’s broader line: leaving dozens of international organizations, shrinking the role of multilateral institutions, pressuring allies in NATO. Russian speakers portray the war with Iran as evidence of US "strategic fatigue": they are still capable of destruction, but no longer able to build sustainable security architectures, including in the Middle East. Against this background Russian officials emphasize Moscow’s "constructive role" in relations with Tehran, from the passage of Russian ships through Hormuz to coordination of energy exports, contrasting this with what they call the "chaotic" actions of the US.
However, it is in Europe that criticism becomes truly systemic. Influential French outlets and experts discuss not only the war with Iran but also how it has highlighted the EU’s painful dependence on American decisions. In an analytical article for Le Parisien former NATO deputy secretary‑general Camille Grand says bluntly: "Europe will have to learn to defend itself with less America." He links this not only to Trump’s recent statements but to a clear trend of "US detachment from European affairs," which is especially noticeable against the backdrop of American demands for allies’ participation in operations in the Strait of Hormuz and in Iran. Meanwhile the Agence Europe describes how NATO allies are discussing the "Europeanization" of the Alliance after the US announced the withdrawal of several thousand troops from Germany and hinted at a possible reduction of capabilities on the European theater in favor of the Middle East, while simultaneously promising additional forces to Poland. Analysts emphasize that Washington increasingly treats Europe as a "reservoir of resources" for its extra‑European wars, rather than as an independent strategic partner.
Against this background French sociological studies record an interesting evolution of mass sentiment. According to polls cited by Euronews in a piece on European perceptions of the US, roughly one in five Europeans today sees the United States more as a threat than as a security guarantor. The article stresses that this has been driven not only by strikes on Iran and forceful pressure on allies but also by Trump’s rhetoric about "an EU created to harm America," his complaints about "free‑riders" in NATO and his apocalyptic warnings about Europe’s "civilizational suicide." At the same time, a majority of respondents in France, Spain, Italy and Poland still believe that US foreign policy will soften after Trump’s departure — i.e., they personify the problem in one president rather than in the system as a whole. But within the expert community there is increasing talk of a collapse of trust whose consequences will outlast any change in the White House.
Another major storyline, interpreted differently in Moscow, Paris and Riyadh, is the US role in Russia’s war against Ukraine. The three‑day ceasefire announced by Trump between May 9 and 11, accompanied by a prisoner exchange, is presented in the Russian media‑political field as an example that "even under hostile Western policies Moscow is ready for constructive steps," while the US — in a somewhat odd depiction — both demonstrates the power of a mediator and immediately renounces that role. Russian analytical reviews note that the American president said the US would cease participating in negotiations as the "main mediator," citing the "exhaustion of the mandate" and the "inability of Europeans to assume responsibility." In the pro‑Kremlin interpretation this looks like an admission by Washington that its previous Ukraine policy has reached a dead end, and like an opportunity for Russia to reset the diplomatic field without "obtrusive American control."
In France the same episode is viewed in the exact opposite way. Discussions across forums and in both right‑ and left‑wing commentary often argue that the US has already "achieved its key geopolitical goals" in the Ukrainian war: weakening Russia, tying Europe to its energy and military‑industrial complex, and achieving unprecedented growth in allies’ defense budgets. Therefore many see Trump’s withdrawal from the negotiating scene not as a defeat but as a cynical acknowledgement that "the mission is accomplished," even if a peace agreement and a sustainable security architecture in Eastern Europe have not materialized. Commentators stress that if the US now redirects attention and resources to Iran and the Middle East, Europe will be "left alone with a long war on its borders," which again revives the debate on the need for European strategic autonomy.
Russian experts, especially those addressing audiences in the Global South, construct a broader narrative from this: the US "sows conflicts and leaves," forcing regional powers to deal with the ruins. Examples cited include not only Ukraine but Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and now Iran. This line is widely circulated in media close to the Russian state and aims to present Moscow and Beijing as "responsible centers of power" capable, unlike Washington, of providing long‑term security guarantees and investments without political conditions. At the same time Russia’s own military actions and their consequences for Ukraine are discussed very sparingly and technocratically, while the emotional emphasis is placed on "Western hypocrisy" and "double standards" of the US.
In Saudi Arabia the US track on Ukraine is noticeably less discussed than in Europe or Russia, but it still appears in analysis of Washington’s broader "reorientation." Arab talk shows and expert programs emphasize that the simultaneous US engagement in conflicts with Russia (through support for Ukraine) and with Iran, along with attempts to pressure Arab partners on oil and normalization with Israel, create a sense of an "overheated and unbalanced" American foreign policy. Regional analysts note that under Trump Washington increasingly operates on a transactional logic — "oil and bases in exchange for security and political cover" — and is less and less seen as the pillar of a predictable order.
In this context US pressure on Riyadh over normalization with Israel is especially telling. A recent Euronews Arabic piece stresses that despite Trump and his team’s energetic efforts, Saudi Arabia is "further than ever" from signing an agreement modeled on the Abraham Accords. The article offers a telling formulation: Saudi leadership is not ready to enter a "historic agreement" with Israel while a humanitarian catastrophe continues in Gaza, the American president overtly threatens Iran, and at the same time demands active participation from Arab partners in his campaign. This is read as a signal that the "blank check" for American leadership in the region is over: Riyadh is ready to welcome an "additional chance" for talks with Tehran and to publicly thank Trump for restraint on the question of a strike on Iran, but it is not prepared to automatically endorse all of Washington’s geopolitical projects.
Finally, there is another, less visible but important layer of the discussion — the question of the future international order and the US place in it. In French and broader European expert circles the view is strengthening that Trump "is undermining the American international order" faster and more radically than any external competitor. In debates on political forums and in analytical texts cited, for example, by Reddit users in France, it is argued that by tearing down security guarantees and showing readiness to "abandon" Ukraine, pressuring NATO allies and unhesitatingly blocking key maritime arteries, Washington is simultaneously opening the way to a more chaotic, "multipolar" world in which forceful changes of borders become the norm "under a nuclear umbrella." China in these discussions appears as a quiet beneficiary: while the US expends resources and political capital on wars in Europe and the Middle East, Beijing consolidates economic positions in Eurasia and develops alternative financial and technological networks.
The Russian perspective on this matter is much more optimistic for Russia itself: official and semi‑academic texts say that the "weakening of American leadership" opens opportunities for Moscow’s "sovereign foreign policy" — from the post‑Soviet space to the Middle East and Africa. At the same time Russian analysts closely monitor US domestic political battles over the wars with Iran and Ukraine: for them these are indicators of Washington’s "limited resources" and provide opportunities to align their positions with Beijing, Tehran or Riyadh against the backdrop of what they portray as "the degradation" of American influence.
In Arab intellectual circles — including groups critical of both the US and local regimes — the new American National Security Strategy is perceived ambivalently. On the one hand, Washington’s stated desire to reduce direct dependence on Middle Eastern oil and its declared interest in multilateralism create a "window of opportunity" for regional actors who can maneuver between the US, China and Russia. On the other hand, Washington’s continued desire to control key energy routes, intervene in conflicts and impose its "red lines" on Iran, Palestine and other issues is seen as evidence that the abandonment of some forms of hegemony is compensated by the strengthening of others.
If one sums up these divergent voices, the picture looks like this. For France and a large part of Europe, the US remains an indispensable military partner but a less reliable political anchor: the war with Iran and maneuvers around Ukraine have reinforced the belief that the continent needs its own military and diplomatic muscle, not only an American umbrella. For Saudi Arabia and its neighbors the US remains a key security guarantor, but not a "dictating center": Riyadh values Washington’s ability to restrain itself at the brink of a major war with Iran, yet deliberately refrains from hasty steps on Israel and other sensitive dossiers. For Russia American activity on all fronts is simultaneously a threat and a resource: a threat because the US remains the largest military power and the primary source of sanctions pressure; a resource because every new crisis in which Washington overreaches can be presented as proof of the "decline" of American hegemony and an argument in favor of alternative centers of power.
The common denominator of these national narratives is a growing "fatigue with the US" as a state that is at once necessary and unpredictable. The war with Iran, ceasefires and failed negotiations with Russia and Ukraine, pressure on allies in Europe and the Middle East, playing on the verge of undermining international institutions — all this is pushing even Washington’s most traditional partners and adversaries to seek additional supports. In the 1990s the question was: do the US have enough strength to be the world’s policeman? Today in Paris, Moscow and Riyadh it is reformulated: can we allow the US to continue playing the role of architect of the world order if that architecture increasingly resembles temporary stage sets for a particular political cycle in Washington?
