At the end of February 2026, the image of the United States in the world again came under close scrutiny, but the angle of that scrutiny in Riyadh, Delhi and Ankara differs noticeably from what a reader of American media might expect. For some, America remains the chief architect of global security and the economy; for others, it is a source of pressure and double standards; for still others, it is a necessary but increasingly less dominant partner in a multipolar world. Three themes, in various forms, surface in almost all local discussions: security and the U.S. role in the Middle East, the economic and digital rules of the game, and the struggle over narratives and the influence of American “analytic factories” and media.
On regional security, Saudi Arabia and Turkey are increasingly discussing the United States not as the sole guarantor of order but as one influential yet in many respects problematic actor. Arab outlets discuss a series of publications by a Washington think tank that in recent days has been conducting a targeted campaign directed at the Gulf countries and Yemen, where Saudi Arabia and Oman figure among the key addressees. The Yemeni portal "الموقع بوست" emphasizes that the Foundation for Defense of Democracies in Washington, whose experts regularly testify before the U.S. Congress, effectively crafts a hard line toward the policies of Riyadh and Muscat, and its publications are perceived in the region as a continuation of pressure that aligns with the interests of competing powers in the Gulf. The piece notes that this campaign is presented in the U.S. as analysis on sanctions and foreign policy, but locally it is seen as direct interference in internal balances of power and an attempt to redefine Saudi Arabia’s role in the Yemeni dossier through expert discourse that can easily become an argument for new steps by Washington. (yemennownews.com)
Against the backdrop of such stories, the Saudi debate about the United States is increasingly intertwined with the theme of strategic maneuvering between Washington and Beijing. While the official press covered in detail the deepening of a “comprehensive strategic partnership” between Riyadh and Beijing and the alignment of the “Vision 2030” plan with China’s “Belt and Road” initiative, the emphasis has shifted to the view that China, not the U.S., is becoming, in the eyes of part of the Saudi establishment, the key long-term economic partner. The Saudi news agency stresses that cooperation with China is being built “outside any geopolitical tug-of-war” and is based on mutual respect and predictability, whereas the American line in the region in Arab columns is more often described as a mix of declarations about democracy combined with sanctions and targeted pressure. (spa.gov.sa) Against this backdrop many local commentators no longer speak of a break with the U.S. but of a gradual “normalization” of America — it is losing its exceptional status and becoming one of several centers of power with which Saudi Arabia is willing to engage on its own terms.
In Turkey, the U.S. issue fits into a broader context of Turkish perceptions of global instability and regional risks. The recent “Turkish Digital Media Report” for 2025, prepared by the B2Press platform, says that the national agenda online was driven by natural disasters, domestic politics and terrorism, while global wars and external actors, including the U.S., although constantly present, no longer dominate discussions. (dha.com.tr) This is an important shift: the American factor still appears in the context of NATO, Syria, the Kurdish issue and sanctions, but Turkish media increasingly place Washington among external sources of risk alongside other powers, rather than as the sole decision-making center. Commentators emphasize that Ankara, faced with a series of internal crises and terrorist attacks, is less ready to accept American rhetoric about fighting terrorism as neutral, because it sees double standards regarding Kurdish armed formations in Syria and Iraq.
In India in recent days another aspect of American influence has been widely debated — the economic and digital rules of the game that Washington is shaping through bilateral agreements. Against this backdrop, criticism of a new U.S.-Asian trade agreement by the Committee for the Responsibility of Digital Platforms to Support Quality Journalism (KTP2JB) became especially resonant. In a newly published piece by VOI agency, the committee sharply opposed a provision of the agreement that effectively exempts American platforms from the obligation to financially support national media. KTP2JB representatives warn that such an approach “undermines the press ecosystem” and in the long run harms not only the media industry but also citizens “who have a right to quality information.” (voi.id) Sasmito, a committee member, announced preparation of a letter to the president and parliament demanding a review of the article concerning digital platforms and its removal from the agreement. Essentially, Indian media and media organizations fear a repeat of the Western scenario in which global American platforms gain economic advantages while local news outlets lose revenue and influence.
This dispute over digital giants reveals another common motif in discussions about the U.S. in India, Turkey and the Arab world: America is no longer only a military and political superpower but also a legislator of global digital norms that directly affect the sovereignty of media and the information security of other states. Indian commentary on the U.S.-Asian deals increasingly asserts that Washington seeks to cement a privileged position for its IT corporations, shifting risks onto national regulators and newsrooms. Turkish experts, analyzing their own experience of regulating social networks and disputes with major platforms over data storage, note in turn that under the rhetoric of free speech the U.S. promotes a model in which national governments are left to react to decisions made in Silicon Valley rather than to shape their own digital architectures. For Saudi and broader Arab analysts, this ties into an older line of criticism of American surveillance technologies and cybersecurity, where Washington simultaneously acts as both guarantor and threat.
The third connecting thread is the struggle over interpreting reality, where American think tanks and media act not merely as information sources but as full-fledged geopolitical actors. Arab analysis examines in detail the phenomenon of Washington-based foundations like the Foundation for Defense of Democracies mentioned above, which, under the cover of expert language, effectively project a hard line toward certain Arab capitals and in many ways substitute themselves for classic diplomacy, creating intellectual justification for sanctions and political pressure. (yemennownews.com) Regional discussions increasingly recall the asymmetry of the media space: leading American newspapers and TV channels, despite being openly liberal, are criticized for systematically skewing emphasis in key foreign policy conflicts — from the Middle East to Ukraine. Arab media readily cite research from Western universities showing that outlets like The New York Times have historically covered the Palestinian-Israeli conflict with a clear tilt toward the Israeli side, which for regional readers becomes another argument for the thesis of structural bias in the American press. (institute.aljazeera.net)
That is why the debate over digital platforms in India turns out to be much broader than the argument over a specific clause of the agreement. For Indian journalists’ associations, it is not only a matter of money but of who will set the framework for every subsequent political and socio-cultural debate — local newsrooms accountable to their audiences, or global American newsfeed algorithms whose logic is subordinated to a different set of priorities. Critics of the agreement warn that if American platforms are legally freed from obligations to support local journalism, in the long term this will lead to even greater dominance of English-language, primarily American, content in India’s information space, making it harder to form a genuinely independent Indian voice in global debates.
In Turkey the theme of American media hegemony overlays an already lively and polarized media sphere. The review of nearly 61 million news items for 2025 shows how much domestic stories — from forest fires to political crises — push foreign policy issues, including the U.S., out of top news rankings. (dha.com.tr) But this does not mean interest in America has disappeared — rather, the attitude has become more instrumental: Washington is perceived as an external variable, important but not determinative of the domestic course. Against this backdrop debates about the American role in NATO and regional conflicts gain particular sharpness: when the U.S. appeals to principles of democracy and human rights, some Turkish commentators reply by pointing to American support for allies’ military operations, criticizing selective sanctions, and asking why human rights violations outside Washington’s interests rarely provoke equally harsh reactions.
In Saudi Arabia and more broadly in the Arab world the theme of double standards is intensified by memories of the Iraq campaign, the Syrian war and pressure on human rights grounds. In discussions about the current campaign by Washington think tanks regarding Riyadh, the question arises: how legitimate is it that institutions closely connected to Congressional committees call into question the course of a state that remains at the same time a key U.S. partner in energy and security? Authors stress that such campaigns in the American media-expert field are often synchronized with domestic political cycles in Washington and used to pressure the administration, which then transfers this discourse into negotiations with Middle Eastern allies.
Against this background a broader trend is particularly noticeable: Saudi Arabia, India and Turkey are increasingly speaking of the United States less in terms of “for” or “against” and more in terms of balancing interests and sovereign choice. In Riyadh it is emphasized that developing partnerships with China and other Asian countries is not directed against the U.S. but simply records a shift toward multipolarity. (spa.gov.sa) In Delhi the dispute over trade agreements with Washington turns into a discussion about how to reconcile a strategically one-directional partnership with the U.S. with the need to protect India’s media ecosystem and digital sovereignty. In Ankara, relying on a dense domestic agenda, people increasingly say openly that NATO alliance membership does not mean automatic agreement with every American foreign-policy course.
As a result, a new picture emerges: the U.S. remains the largest military, economic and technological center, but its ability to prescribe a single interpretation of what is happening in the world is rapidly shrinking. Saudi analysts, Indian press defenders and Turkish media researchers, each discussing their own topics — the Yemeni dossier, the rights of local journalists, internal security — together form an alternative narrative about America. This is no longer a story about the “leader of the free world,” but a conversation about a complex, contradictory and increasingly contested partner with whom tough negotiations must be conducted under rules that are no longer written solely in Washington.
