In early February 2026, conversations about America in the foreign press turned tense and contradictory again. In New Delhi they are debating how far they can go in strategic rapprochement with Washington without losing autonomy and their relations with Moscow. In Israel, society scrutinizes every gesture from the White House, trying to determine whether the US is truly prepared to push Benjamin Netanyahu’s government on the Gaza war. In Turkey, the United States remains both an indispensable security partner and a source of irritation, especially regarding Washington’s Middle East policy and the Palestinian issue. One theme runs through all of this: the world perceives the US less and less as a “neutral arbiter” and more and more as a player whose decisions directly interfere in domestic and regional agendas.
The loudest news of the past week was the US‑India agreements on trade and oil. Back in 2025, the 25 percent additional tariffs on Indian imports introduced by the Donald Trump administration were portrayed in India as punishment for purchases of cheap Russian oil and were directly linked in US documents to the task of “countering threats” from Moscow and its partners. Indian experts at the time warned that such steps “would push India to reconsider its strategic orientation, deepening ties with Russia and China,” as Ajay Shrivastava, former trade representative of the Global Trade Research Initiative, recounted for The New York Times.(ria.ru) A common theme in the Indian press in 2025 was that Washington was applying sanctions pressure without fully understanding that New Delhi’s strategic autonomy had not been built yesterday and could not be torn down by a single trade war.
February 2026 shows a different picture. After a tense bargaining phase, the White House announced the removal of those 25 percent tariffs effective February 7, directly linking this to “New Delhi’s cessation of purchases of Russian oil,” according to the presidential decree.(ria.ru) Russian agencies, relaying the decision, emphasize this aspect — the story is presented as an example of successful US pressure that forced an important partner of Moscow to “choose a side.” But the Indian reaction is more nuanced. In New Delhi officials emphasize something else entirely: Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, summing up his visit to the US, speaks of “positive dynamics” and the expansion of a framework agreement on trade and technology, trying not to highlight concessions on oil but rather to showcase gains in market access and technology.(ria.ru)
Notably, the joint US‑India statement did not contain an explicit clause committing to cease purchases of Russian oil. Russian media focus precisely on that: “the statement does not mention a renunciation of Russian oil,” emphasizing that New Delhi avoids formal obligations even if it practically redirects part of its imports.(ria.ru) For the Indian audience that is an important detail: the government shows voters that it defends the principle of strategic autonomy — yes, we gain from the deal with Washington, but we do not sign on to strict political conditions.
Indian commentators in the English‑language and Hindi press describe this as an example of a “transactional partnership.” New Delhi demonstrates readiness to accommodate the US where it aligns with national interest: expanded export quotas, access to American technologies, cooperation in AI and defense. At the same time, there is active domestic debate about how to avoid becoming a “junior ally.” A telling column in the business press emphasized: “America is a key technological partner for India, but not its only strategic anchor.” Against the background of data showing that the US and India already generate nearly a quarter of global ChatGPT traffic, with Indian office workers using AI even more actively than Americans,(thinktanks.pro) the discussion of the US as a technological hegemon acquires a social dimension for India: from education systems to the labor market.
For Turkey, the same America is not a top trading partner but primarily an indispensable factor of regional security and simultaneously the main external irritant amid the protracted Gaza war. Since autumn 2025 Turkish media and expert circles have been dissecting President Donald Trump’s initiatives to halt hostilities. When the American leader said that Israel had allegedly agreed to a 60‑day ceasefire in Gaza, Anadolu and several analysts in Turkish publications described it as an attempt to pressure both sides rather than the result of a full-fledged agreement. In its piece Anadolu stressed that the Israeli press sees Trump’s words as “an attempt to force Tel Aviv and Hamas to agree to an American post‑war plan for the Gaza Strip.”(aa.com.tr)
To the Turkish public in this story, the US is not a peacemaker but the initiator of its own political project in post‑war Gaza intended to cement American influence in the region. Turkish commentators, especially those close to the ruling Justice and Development Party, draw parallels with previous American initiatives in Iraq and Syria, warning that “whenever Washington talks about stability, it means reformatting the region to suit its own interests.” In liberal and opposition media the tone is different: they criticize the Israeli government and call for using “even halfhearted US pressure” to accelerate an end to the war. But here too there are few illusions about Washington’s altruism: America is viewed as a “necessary but unreliable partner” capable of changing course at any moment for domestic political gain.
The Israeli discourse on America is even more ambivalent. On the one hand, Israel objectively depends on the US militarily, diplomatically and financially. On the other — questions about the limits of that dependence are increasingly loud in Israeli media and expert circles. When Israeli media reported in 2025 that the Trump administration had delivered a clear signal to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu about the desirability of ending the Gaza war and presented a detailed 21‑point plan to do so, it was framed explicitly as pressure from an ally rather than gentle advice.(aa.com.tr) Israeli channel KAN reported on meetings between Trump’s special envoy Steve Whitkoff and his son‑in‑law Jared Kushner with Netanyahu in New York, emphasizing that Washington was not merely mediating but offering its own political “roadmap” for the post‑war order.
In Israeli commentary in Haaretz and other outlets this elicits mixed reactions. Liberal columnists welcome greater US activism, seeing it as a chance to stop the protracted war and prevent Israel’s international isolation. Conservative and religious circles, conversely, speak of the inadmissibility of “external diktat,” even when it comes from the principal ally. One political scientist on Israeli television phrased it this way: “American support is our strategic air. But if that air turns into a hurricane that sweeps the government away during a military crisis, we have to ask who really runs the country.” For some voters, in this logic, the US becomes a sort of “senior partner” demanding not only tactical concessions but a reorganization of Israel’s internal political field.
In Turkey there is parallel close attention to the same dynamics but from a completely different angle. Turkish commentators write that intensified American pressure on Israel over Gaza may open maneuvering space for Ankara: Erdoğan is trying to balance criticizing Israel’s military campaign with maintaining dialogue with Washington and NATO. In this sense, American Gaza initiatives are perceived in the Turkish agenda as a factor indirectly affecting Turkey’s regional standing, its claims to be a protector of the Palestinians and a mediator between the Islamic world and the West.
Another line of debate about America is attempts to reinterpret the very nature of its global leadership. In several Eurasian analytical pieces the US is described not so much as a nation‑state as a center of a global governance system — “the United States of the World.” In one recent text on the analytic site EADaily it is argued that, amid an impending global financial crisis, Washington and allied London are transforming their role, seeking to control not only military‑political alliances but also the architecture of future digital currencies, energy flows and AI platforms. The authors warn that Asian countries should not rely excessively on the American “umbrella” and must develop regional mechanisms of mutual support.(eadaily.com)
This view, though tinged with anti‑Western rhetoric, unexpectedly resonates with far more pragmatic discussions in India. There, behind dry formulations about “deepening cooperation with the US” lies growing concern: does dependence on American technologies — from cloud computing to AI services — risk becoming a new form of inequality, where the rules of the game are dictated from Silicon Valley and Washington? Some Indian experts see a close technological alliance with the US as a chance for a leap forward and to secure the country’s status as a global digital power. Others warn: if the architecture of these platforms is not sufficiently “Indian” — accounting for languages, cultural specifics and local business interests — New Delhi risks becoming a large but dependent consumer of foreign infrastructure.
In the Turkish and Israeli contexts similar worries emerge in a different domain — defense and intelligence cooperation. Turkish commentators have debated for years how deeply Ankara should integrate into American missile defense systems, intelligence networks and arms programs after the crisis over the purchase of Russian S‑400s. Israeli analysts ask whether their country is too tightly woven into the American military and technological ecosystem, when any change in Washington’s political climate could directly undermine its ability to conduct operations in the region.
A unifying motif across articles, columns and expert debates from Delhi to Tel Aviv and Ankara is not a rejection of America or simple anti‑Americanism, but the search for a new formula balancing dependence and autonomy. India uses American pressure as an occasion to publicly reaffirm its multi‑vector course, negotiating for a better deal while avoiding formal political concessions, as with the wording on Russian oil. Israel, paradoxically, more often speaks of the need for “sovereignty even in the face of an ally” when it comes to scenarios for ending the war and the post‑war arrangement of Gaza. Turkey seeks to turn any American initiatives in the region into a resource to strengthen its own role — from Afghanistan to the Eastern Mediterranean — while emphasizing historical wounds tied to Western intervention.
Within the American media environment these debates often remain almost invisible: Washington still tends to think in terms of “leadership” and “responsibility,” while foreign partners and opponents increasingly speak of the “costs of dependence” and the “risks of a unipolar infrastructure.” A careful reading of Indian, Israeli and Turkish texts shows that the main change of recent years is not the number of contradictions with the US but the tone: even when countries agree with Washington, they strive to state conditions and red lines out loud. And in this new, much more talkative world, America remains a superpower — but no longer one whose decisions are automatically applauded; rather one that is constantly argued with, bargained with, and being learned to be seen not as destiny but as a complicated, if indispensable, partner.
