In mid‑June 2026, discussion of the United States in international media again reminds us that Washington remains the main "distribution center" of the global agenda, but no longer an uncontested hegemon. In Moscow, Beijing and Istanbul op‑eds today talk less about abstract "America" and more about its concrete actions: the US–Israel war with Iran and the broad Middle East crisis, a new configuration of the strategic US–China–Russia triangle, Washington's role in the protracted war in Ukraine, and economic pressure and tariff policies from aluminum to high technologies. Against this background, the image of America in editorials oscillates between a tired superpower clinging to fading hegemony and an still indispensable center of power without which no major international storyline comes together.
The first and perhaps most hotly debated topic is the US–Israel war with Iran, which began on 28 February 2026 and quickly turned into a multi‑level crisis mixing strikes on Iranian infrastructure, AI‑driven disinformation campaigns, and shocks on global energy markets. Russian and Turkish outlets emphasize Washington’s role as initiator or key escalation factor. Russian analytical pieces describe the conflict as the logical outcome of a long US policy of forceful "containment" of regional powers and draw parallels with the wars in Iraq and Libya: the logic whereby any resistance to the American security architecture sooner or later meets military force is seen as an unchanging structural feature of US policy rather than the consequence of a particular administration. An important detail for Russian authors is how the US justifies strikes with rhetoric about "defending the international order" and "freedom of navigation" — presented as language that masks a struggle for control over logistics corridors in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, which directly affect energy prices and, consequently, Russia’s opportunities on the world market. That is why Russian commentaries interpret Moscow’s and Beijing’s support for Iran not only as a political gesture but also as an attempt to wrest from the US the monopoly on interpreting notions of "legality" and "security."
The Chinese press, especially official and semi‑official outlets, adopts a different tone — reproaches toward the US are accompanied by persistent calls for de‑escalation and negotiations. While condemning US‑Israeli strikes on Iran and delicately avoiding direct mention of its own regional interests, Chinese commentators stress two things. First, that political destabilization of the Middle East undermines the global economy and above all supply chains for oil and gas, on which Chinese growth depends. Second, that the war is used by Washington to cement anti‑Iran and, more broadly, anti‑China coalitions, where energy is tightly linked to technological export controls and control over payment infrastructure. A recent analysis in the Chinese English‑language press noted that "each new missile strike leads to another package of financial sanctions and secondary restrictions," and China views this as a continuation of US "economic coercion" aimed not only at Tehran but at any state trying to build alternative financial and logistical routes. Nevertheless, Beijing seeks in public rhetoric to play the role of a "responsible great power," urging Washington to negotiate while distancing itself from accusations of direct support for Iran.
Turkish media and politicians view the Iranian crisis through their own lens as a regional power squeezed between NATO, Middle Eastern wars, and the need for energy and trade autonomy. Turkey officially condemns US strikes on Iran, emphasizing the principle of territorial integrity and the danger of state collapse in another neighboring country. In Turkish commentators’ accounts, the US appears as a force that "sets its neighbor's house on fire and then sells him firefighting services" — simultaneously creating a threat and offering itself as the sole security guarantor. Particular irritation is caused by Washington’s continued use of the language of democracy and human rights — alongside its support for authoritarian regimes in the region when they fit American interests. For Turkish authors a practical aspect matters as well: a new war on the eastern flank means additional refugee flows, increased terrorist activity, and hits to trade routes through Turkey. In these conditions US policy is seen not as stabilizing but as creating new circles of chaos that neighbors will have to clear up.
The second major motif in Russia’s, China’s and Turkey’s reactions is the reformatting of the US–China–Russia strategic triangle against the backdrop of Donald Trump’s May 2026 visit to Beijing and the summit with Xi Jinping held there. American analytic centers wrote about a "window of stability amid continuing fragility" in US‑China relations, noting that the parties managed to outline the parameters of competition in technology and military security but did not reach breakthrough agreements on Taiwan, Iran, and navigation in critical straits. For Russian and Chinese authors this summit prompted a reassessment of how ready Washington is to recognize China as an "equal player" and to what extent such recognition threatens or, conversely, helps Moscow.
In Russia, part of the foreign policy expert community reacted with frank suspicion to White House attempts to speak with Beijing in the language of "parity leadership." A recent report by the Russian International Affairs Council stresses that since 2025, with Trump’s return, Washington has aimed to fragment a potential Eurasian bloc: a warming with China is seen as a tactical maneuver designed to "tear Beijing away from Moscow" and deprive Russia of its strongest partner in confronting the West. At the same time, it is noted that China itself is not interested in reducing the relationship to the American agenda alone: Moscow reads Chinese signals about multipolarity and "respect for different civilizations" as a counter to American universalism. Russian analysis leads to the view that the new US line is not a retreat from confrontation but a desire to manage it better by dividing opponents.
Chinese commentators, for their part, view the Trump–Xi summit through the prism of a long‑term "strategic competition" with the US. The Chinese press emphasizes that Washington recognizes Beijing as "equal in scale, but not in right" — i.e., it is compelled to take Chinese power into account but still tries to limit it through alliance systems in the Indo‑Pacific, technological sanctions and export controls, including on rare earths and chips. Chinese experts cautiously welcome the fact of dialogue but warn that "strategic distrust" remains and the US’s attempt to win through managed confrontation remains a basic orientation. In this context Russia figures as a key partner with whom Beijing builds a "deepened strategic dialogue" amid unpredictable American policy — which further heightens concern in Washington.
Turkey sees this great geopolitical game as an opportunity for its own maneuvering. Turkish columnists note that Washington’s "softening" of rhetoric toward China while pressuring Russia and Iran creates a kind of "window for Ankara": Turkey, a NATO member and at the same time a contentious actor with the alliance, can bargain with multiple centers of power at once. At the same time the US is regarded as a partner who will remain important but never reliable: that is why Turkish foreign policy, according to local analysts, is increasingly built on the idea of "strategic autonomy," implying a balance between Washington, Moscow and Beijing. American attempts to force Ankara into a stark choice between NATO and "authoritarian allies" are seen as a misunderstanding of Turkey’s regional perspective, where flexibility is valued above ideological loyalty.
The third recurring theme is the US role in the war in Ukraine and the wider Eastern European context. In the Russian public sphere America, as in previous years, figures primarily as Ukraine’s main sponsor and strategist, without whom the Kyiv leadership could not have continued to resist. Donald Trump’s announced three‑day ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine in May 2026 sparked lively debate: some Russian commentators see it as Washington’s attempt to demonstrate to the world its ability to control escalation, others read it as a publicity stunt ahead of elections and a way to regroup Ukrainian forces. In any case, the US is presented not as a neutral arbiter but as a full party to the conflict, shaping the course of operations through arms supplies, intelligence and diplomatic pressure.
China’s reaction to the Ukrainian conflict, viewed through the lens of its assessment of the US, remains more restrained but no less principled. Chinese authors consistently emphasize that NATO's "bloc thinking" and the alliance’s expansion to Russia’s borders underpin the current crisis, and in that logic Washington is responsible for the overall architecture of confrontation. At the same time, Beijing avoids direct military support for Moscow, cautiously positioning itself as a proponent of negotiations and a "balancing power" that is uninterested in either Russia’s total defeat or a strategic victory for the US. For Chinese experts the Ukrainian conflict is both an example of how Washington uses sanctions and the dollar system to project power and a warning about the possible cost of an open clash with the US in the future over Taiwan.
In Turkey the war in Ukraine is discussed, like the Iranian crisis, primarily in terms of risks to regional security and economic consequences. Turkish commentators recall that Ankara previously played a mediating role on the grain deal and control of the Black Sea straits and now watches Washington and Moscow compete for influence in the Black Sea region. The US is criticized for "using the conflict to strengthen NATO’s presence on Russia’s borders" while not taking sufficient responsibility for humanitarian and economic consequences in neighboring countries. However, unlike Russia, Turkey does not question Ukraine’s right to receive support; its criticism of the US centers on how and with what priorities Washington provides that support.
The fourth theme, particularly prominent in Turkish and partly in Chinese publications, is US economic protectionism and sanction activism. Turkish sources on domestic and international economics analyze how Washington’s high tariffs on aluminum imports, introduced under the pretext of protecting domestic industry, still did not save some American smelting capacities. One Turkish reviewer emphasizes that the US "still covers about 60% of its aluminum needs through imports," despite domestic price increases to historic levels — concluding that Washington’s protectionist policy harms both partners and its own consumers without solving structural competitiveness problems. For Ankara, whose economy is heavily tied to exports of metals and industrial goods to Europe and the US, such American measures are not an abstract case study but a direct hit to Turkish manufacturers’ margins and value chains.
In China the economic dimension of American policy is viewed within a broader framework of "decoupling." Chinese experts note that even amid partial rhetorical easing and talks about stabilization, the US continues to build barriers in the sectors most sensitive to the Chinese economy — from semiconductors to AI and rare earths — supplementing tariffs with export controls and sanctions against individual companies. One analytical report stresses that the American strategy is twofold: on the one hand Washington declares the goal of "managed competition," on the other it uses the full force of financial and technological levers to slow China’s technological leap and force Beijing to accept rules favorable to the US. China responds not with mirror tariffs but by actively building alternative markets and payment systems within BRICS and regional initiatives, which Russian commentaries interpret as accelerating the formation of a "post‑American" economic architecture.
Russian economic analysis, by contrast, increasingly depicts the US not as an unattainable model but as a large yet increasingly problematic market where political risks and sanction unpredictability outweigh the traditional advantages of depth and liquidity. Private investor briefs stress that the US stock market still shows high corporate profitability and remains the "locomotive of global capital," but "geopolitical tension around Venezuela, Iran, Greenland, as well as domestic problems in the US" create a higher likelihood of a serious correction. These texts convey an ambivalent attitude: on one hand America is a source of opportunities and innovation; on the other it is a source of systemic risk from which one should hedge by diversifying toward India, China and other emerging markets.
Finally, in all three countries responses to the US reveal a deeper, almost philosophical debate about the nature of American hegemony. Russian political‑economy journals describe the period from the 1980s until the recognition of China as a leading industrial power as "an era of unconditional US hegemony," but now speak of an inevitable increase in fragmentation of the world system, where American "universalism" collides with the rise of alternative centers of power and value models. In these texts the US is no longer demonized but is not idealized either: it becomes one of several major powers trying to retain maximum influence but no longer able to set the rules without accounting for others. Chinese authors, drawing on their own discourse of multipolarity and respect for "different civilizations," criticize America’s claim to universal legitimacy: for them the US still thinks of the world in blocs and hierarchies, whereas China offers a model of horizontal interdependence without a clear "center" and "periphery." Turkish commentators add their own motive: the US appears to them as a power that too often confuses its interests with the abstract "international community," devaluing the experience and sensitivities of regional powers — such as Turkey itself.
The result is an intriguing paradox. In Russia, China and Turkey the US is often criticized for directly opposite things: for excessive aggression and for weakness, for imposing values and for cynical realism, for protectionism and for neoliberal globalization. But the common thread is obvious: none of these countries any longer perceives America as the only possible center of the world. Washington is still needed by all — as a forceful arbiter, a financial anchor, a technological magnet — but no longer as the sole source of the rules. Russian experts speak of a closing era of unipolarity, the Chinese of a complex "managed competition," and the Turkish of the necessity of strategic autonomy. For a reader accustomed to the English‑language media picture in which the US often portrays itself as a tired but indispensable "world sheriff," this is a shift in perspective: outside Washington voices grow louder that do not dispute American power but increasingly deny it the right to determine the future alone.
