May–early June 2026 made the United States the focal point of intense debates in Asia and Latin America — but not in Washington’s usual role as the sole “center of power.” China, South Korea and Brazil are discussing America as a problematic yet still indispensable partner whose domestic politics and foreign moves directly affect their security and economies. The main catalyst was Donald Trump’s May trip to Beijing against the backdrop of the ongoing US war with Iran and a new round of trade‑technology confrontation, as well as a chain of bilateral conflicts between Washington and key partners — from Seoul to Brasília.
The first major knot of debates is Trump’s visit to China and the sense that the balance in relations is shifting from “American leadership” toward a firmer parity. Chinese and Chinese‑language outlets analyze not only the protocol side of the May 14–15 visit, but also how it fits into a long cycle of expectations and disappointments regarding the US. Commentators recall that in the late 2000s China still “looked up” to the US, but now the visit of an American president is to a country that no longer sees Washington as a development model but as a competitor and threat to be bargained with harshly. Analyses emphasize that the trip itself became possible against the backdrop of weakened American positions: part of the US military and diplomatic resources are diverted to the war against Iran and to securing shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, which paradoxically strengthens Beijing’s negotiating position. (zaochenbao.com)
This theme almost automatically moves into discussion of a new US economic and sanctions war. In the Chinese discourse there is a tone of conspicuous satisfaction: it is noted that Beijing is, for the first time, fully deploying instruments it had only talked about for years — from blocking American deals in strategic sectors to ordering Chinese companies to ignore unilateral US sanctions. One widely read piece cites Western press noting that China has directly ordered its enterprises not to comply with US sanctions on Chinese refiners — “an unprecedented act of resistance.” (guancha.cn)
Against this background, speeches by American officials are also perceived. For example, the US Treasury secretary’s late‑May remarks in California that Trump’s policies will “wake up” America and help correct “decades of mistakes” that made the US overly dependent on competitors like China are met in China with obvious skepticism: commentators point out that loud words are not followed by concrete new measures, and the risks to the global economy from the war with Iran and instability in oil supplies remain practically unmanageable. Thus, within Chinese discourse an image emerges of the US as a country loudly proclaiming “economic security as national security,” while in practice driving itself into vulnerability and pushing others to form alternative mechanisms. (guancha.cn)
The second major strand of discussions concerns how Trump’s Beijing visit and the American focus on the Middle East are felt across Asia. Official and semi‑official Chinese analysis stresses that the leaders’ meeting in May “made the entire Asia‑Pacific hold its breath”: neighboring countries simultaneously feel “relief” at the fact of dialogue and “anxiety” about how the two superpowers might bargain away their interests. One Chinese foreign‑policy commentary puts it succinctly: the path from an “America‑centered” order to a “China‑US bipolarity” forces US allies to nervously calculate the price Washington will pay for concessions to Beijing. (cn.chinadiplomacy.org.cn)
A separate line is the reaction in Asian countries outside China. Taiwanese and overseas Chinese‑language writers note that Trump’s return to Beijing has led regions from Taipei to New Delhi to wonder whether they will become “dishes on the menu” of a grand bargain, where the cost of reduced US–China tensions will be paid in their interests. In one column, Taiwan is described as a player fearful that, amid the war with Iran and constrained resources, Washington will want to “take as many crises off the table as possible,” which objectively strengthens Beijing’s negotiating position. (ipkmedia.com)
The South Korean perspective on this theme is noticeably different: for Seoul the primary question is less the “global balance” and more the reliability of American security guarantees and the cost of those guarantees for the Korean economy. In this context, the stalled talks on a bilateral security agreement and the visit to the US by South Korea’s first vice foreign minister to unblock dialogue on implementing the “joint fact‑sheet” from the previous Korea‑US summit are widely discussed. Korean commentators note that even amid the US war with Iran, when the American side cites overloaded military channels, Seoul insists that peninsula security cannot be treated as a secondary issue dependent on Washington’s Middle East campaigns. (m.go.seoul.co.kr)
The third big theme is the impact of American economic policy and global turbulence — including that caused by US actions — on export‑oriented economies. In South Korea front pages juxtapose export records and anxiety: May data showed Korean exports grew by more than 50% year‑on‑year, mainly thanks to semiconductors, and forecasts that the country could enter the top five trading nations and reach $1 trillion in exports for the first time. Yet editorial commentary highlights the “shadow” behind the record: reliance on a narrow set of industries and vulnerability to US tariffs and the fallout from the Middle East war, which pressures the auto sector and overseas construction. Thus, in Korean debate the US figures simultaneously as a key market and a source of regulatory and geopolitical shocks. (supple.kr)
In the Chinese expert field the economic theme unfolds around “mutual vulnerabilities.” Analysts recall that despite years of tariffs and high‑tech export controls, Washington still heavily depends on Chinese manufacturing chains and critical raw materials; IMF estimates are cited that a severe disruption in rare earth supplies could cost the US up to 1.5% of GDP. Against this background, Beijing’s countermeasures — from blocking tech deals to creating its own regulatory “shields” against US sanctions — are presented as a shift from defense to active use of economic weight, including in response to a new wave of Trump’s tariff policies. (epochtimes.com)
The fourth line of debate is how these countries internally evaluate the image of America and its political leader. In Chinese‑language columns aimed at a broad audience there is a tone of weary irony: authors emphasize that over two decades China has moved from admiration for American democracy and culture to a pragmatic attitude toward the US as one of the powers whose domestic polarization and external aggressiveness no longer inspire emulation. In one article, Trump’s 2026 trip to China is contrasted with the US of the late 2000s: whereas then America set the tone, today, the author argues, Trump must accept that visiting Beijing can happen only on terms that recognize the changed balance of power. (yzaobao.com)
In Korea the image of the US is split. On one hand it remains the principal military ally on which nuclear deterrence and the future of a possible Korean nuclear‑powered submarine program — currently discussed in Seoul in consultations with Washington — depend. On the other, it is a source of pressure via trade, climate and energy policies that, Korean outlets say, harm traditional export industries like autos and Middle East construction contracts. From this arises the motive that security and the economy can no longer be viewed on separate “tracks”: any US decision, whether new sanctions or military redeployments, manifests quickly and directly in Korea’s macro indicators. (supple.kr)
In Brazil the debate about America is more fragmented, but its focus is shifting as well. President Lula’s upcoming visit to Washington — described by domestic and regional media as a chance for a “reset” after a series of diplomatic scandals — comes with a complicated agenda. The arrest in the US of a former Brazilian congressman and the ensuing exchange of unfriendly gestures — mutual annulment of security staff accreditations — demonstrated that Washington’s law‑enforcement actions can instantly spill over into political conflict. (udn.com)
Brazilian commentators note Lula’s ambivalent line: on one hand he seeks to preserve strategic maneuvering among the US, China and the Global South; on the other he must reckon with Washington’s hard stance on democracy, digital regulation and the war with Iran. Public debate reveals irritation that the US easily moves from rhetoric of “partnership” to extraterritorial investigations and sanctions affecting Brazilian politicians and business. Thus the American agenda in Brazil is colored both by hope for economic rapprochement and fear of a new wave of asymmetric demands from Washington. (udn.com)
Combining these three national perspectives shows a common thread: in Beijing, Seoul and Brasília the US is no longer seen as a predictable “center of the world” whose internal logic is clear and stabilizes the global system. On the contrary, American decisions — from abrupt visits and deals to sanctions and military campaigns — are considered the main source of uncertainty, which each country tries to convert into its own gain or at least minimize the damage. China builds around this uncertainty an image of a rising power unafraid to mirror and repel American pressure. South Korea seeks to embed additional security guarantees into this turbulence while diversifying trade so as not to become hostage to tariff wars. Brazil maneuvers to use US–China competition to bolster its own agency, but fears Washington’s habit of “punishing” partners will persist.
In this sense the current cycle of international conversation about America is not just a set of reactions to another Trump visit or a new treasury secretary speech. It reflects a deeper transformation: the US remains a central player, but no longer without alternatives. And how Washington handles its still‑substantial but increasingly contested power — military, economic and normative — will determine whether the next wave of foreign debates about the US will be about restoring trust or, conversely, about finding ways to live in a world that respects America far less than America itself is used to.
