At the end of April 2026 the United States is again at the center of global discussions, but the focus has shifted: fewer talks about the “default hegemon” and more about a nervous, tired, but still incredibly influential player that is simultaneously at war, squabbling with allies, reacting spasmodically to domestic shocks and trying to retain control over the global economy. In Russia, Japan and Saudi Arabia much is written about the US, but key themes repeat: the war of the US and Israel with Iran and its regional consequences; a new wave of Washington isolationism and the dismantling of international institutions; American economic and energy policy affecting oil, exchange rates and markets; and domestic political and even violent episodes in the US itself, read abroad as symptoms of a weakening political system.
One of the most discussed storylines has been the US‑Israeli war with Iran, which began on February 28, 2026. In the Russian and Arab press it often appears not as a limited operation but as a new frontier of “American adventurism.” Russian commentators remind readers that the crisis was accompanied by an unprecedented disinformation campaign using deepfakes and generative AI, which itself became a subject of analysis: a Russian‑language review of the crisis emphasizes that fake clips of uprisings in Tehran and the “assassination of top leadership” were spread to intimidate Iranian society, causing brief panic in energy markets. The article “Crisis in Relations Between Iran and the US (2026)” notes that the conflict became the first major confrontation in which artificial intelligence was used so massively and deliberately as a weapon of psychological warfare — which in Russia is described with clear distrust toward the American side as the main beneficiary of such chaos. (ru.wikipedia.org)
Japanese authors view the same conflict through the lens of economics and the risk to maritime trade. Analytical notes on the international economy from April 2026 recount in detail the episode with a post by the US Secretary of Energy on X (formerly Twitter), boasting that the US Navy had “successfully secured tanker protection in the Strait of Hormuz.” After that, as the blog “週間国際経済” notes, NYMEX oil fell from $85 to the low $70s, and then, after the post was deleted, returned to the $80+ range. An economist explains to Japanese readers that one careless message from an American official in the midst of the Iran crisis added volatility to the world oil market, which hits energy importers like Japan hard. The author writes bluntly that “Washington’s policy increasingly resembles governance via social media,” and this is perceived not only as a geopolitical risk but also as a factor making business planning in Tokyo considerably more difficult. (sobon45.kim)
In Saudi Arabia the discussion about the US‑Iran conflict and, more generally, about the US role in the Middle East is much more pragmatic. In Arab columns and commentaries published in late April the conflict is often described not as a “clash of civilizations” but as another cycle in the struggle for control over oil flows and regional leadership. A note of caution is visible: official Saudi media stress the need for “de‑escalation” and the “responsible role of great powers,” but do not rush to clearly join America’s camp. In one economic‑political review discussing a possible breakdown of OPEC against the backdrop of rising pressure from Washington and growing UAE independence, it is noted that the recent decision by the emirate authorities to clearly “play on the US side” is perceived in Moscow as a signal: a protracted war and sanctions are changing the balance within the cartel and weakening OPEC+’s ability to coordinate against American influence. EADaily frames it thus: “The UAE has taken the American side: is it time for Russia to prepare for OPEC’s collapse?” — and that question echoes into the Arab press, where commentators debate whether Saudi Arabia’s strategy of balancing between Washington, Moscow and Beijing can hold. (eadaily.com)
The second major theme is the strengthening isolationism of the US and its attitude toward international organizations. In Russian encyclopedic and analytical reviews a narrative is gradually taking hold that Washington is no longer interested in “multilateral rules” if they constrain its freedom of action. Several pieces highlight a January decision by the administration to withdraw from dozens of international organizations at once, which Russian authors interpret as a “refusal of collective responsibility” and a continuation of one‑sided policies. An article on US foreign policy directly calls this trend a rise in “isolationist policy,” drawing parallels not only to the Trump era but also to the interwar period of the 20th century. For the Russian audience such a turn is depicted more as an opportunity: if the US is dismantling the post‑1945 architecture it helped create, other power centers have space to form their own blocs and institutions. (ru.wikipedia.org)
Japanese analysts, for their part, do not use the harsh term “isolationism” as readily, but economic forecasts carefully build in the risk that, before the 2026 midterm elections, the administration in Washington might sharply raise tariffs and tighten immigration policy, guided primarily by domestic electoral calculations. Researchers from the Japan Research Institute, in a review of the American economy for Japanese business, stress that such a combination of protectionism and political nervosity could accelerate inflation and trigger a spike in interest rates, which would hit the world economy, including Japan, where ultra‑low rates had been maintained for years. The line that “if the administration, in the name of expanding its electorate, goes for sharp tariff hikes and tighter immigration restrictions, it could sharply worsen growth prospects” is addressed directly to Japanese firms that depend on the American market. (jri.co.jp)
The third set of themes is American economic and energy policy, read in Moscow, Tokyo and Riyadh as a mix of strength and vulnerability. In the Russian investment community daily geopolitical and market digests recently mentioned the US trade balance and commodity price dynamics alongside Putin’s statements about the role of business and news about war and sanctions. For the Russian private investor the US is simultaneously the main external source of risks (sanctions, the dollar, oil, the Iran conflict) and a key reference for Fed rates and global liquidity. In a popular financial digest on vc.ru US trade data and signals from Wall Street are discussed in the same paragraph with oil prices and OPEC news, underlining that for Moscow the American “economic agenda” has long been not only about sanctions pressure but also about the objective dependence of the Russian market on Washington’s monetary policy decisions. (vc.ru)
In Saudi Arabia the oil component of American policy is watched even more closely. For Saudi commentators the question is whether a model can hold in which the US simultaneously pressures OPEC+ producers, demands increased output to lower domestic prices, fights a major player like Iran and at the same time proclaims a green transition. Saudi economic commentators analyzing divisions within OPEC and UAE activity constantly relate them to movements in American foreign policy: how prepared is Washington for prolonged confrontation with Tehran, what this means for the risk premium in oil prices, and how Saudi oil’s role would change if the conflict drags on and Persian Gulf infrastructure remains under threat. In these pieces the US no longer looks like an omnipotent conductor but rather a nervous major client who simultaneously demands discounts and provokes fires next door. (eadaily.com)
The Japanese perspective in economic discussions of the US is marked by pronounced sobriety. One April analytical review states that “the era of unquestioned American economic dominance is effectively coming to an end” — indicated by the rise of emerging economies and technological progress outside the US. A blogger‑economist writing for a Japanese audience notes the decline of America’s soft power and how Japan’s defense and trade policy is being forced to adapt to a world where Washington is no longer the sole pole, though it remains extremely important. Against this backdrop Tokyo’s decision to relax restrictions on arms exports is explained as a forced adaptation to a “restructuring of the world order” in which America remains a key but no longer the only pillar. (shibataku-ai.hatenablog.com)
Domestic American politics are also becoming the subject of attentive, sometimes alarmed commentary. In regional Japanese press, for example, a recent editorial in Gifu Shimbun is devoted to an armed attack targeting a representative of the US administration. The editorial in 岐阜新聞 titled “社説 米政権標的に銃撃” notes that an attack on an official is not simply a criminal episode but a symptom of a society where political violence is becoming “normalized.” For Japanese readers, deeply traumatized by the assassination attempt on former Prime Minister Abe, this is presented as a troubling parallel: the America that long taught others about democracy is itself sinking into a cycle of radicalization and violence. (gifu-np.co.jp)
Russian commentators usually view US domestic upheavals through the prism of a weakening rival. Publications about the 2026 US elections and intra‑elite conflicts often draw the line that “the US political system is losing stability,” and that elites are “torn by contradictions” against the backdrop of war with Iran and the ongoing Ukrainian conflict. Even mentions of scandals over high salaries in American agencies, such as EADaily’s note about the head of USAID, are presented as signs of “corruption and elite detachment from the people.” For the Russian audience this reinforces a convenient narrative: while Washington criticizes Moscow for democracy and corruption, it is the US whose “house is on fire.” (eadaily.com)
Saudi discussion of US domestic politics is far more restrained, but there are analytical pieces tying instability in the US to unpredictability in its foreign policy. In Arab columns aimed at a business audience it is stressed that every congressional turnover and every wave of political scandal in Washington can mean a sharp reassessment of risks: new sanctions are imposed, or there are threats to withdraw security guarantees to allies, or conversely a ramping up of presence in the region. For Riyadh the question is not whether America will “fall,” but how much longer one can build long‑term defense and energy strategies relying on an unpredictable partner.
Interestingly, in all three countries there is a fatigue with American exceptionalism, though articulated differently. In Russia this often takes the form of open irony: authors write that the US “is destroying the order it created” and “fears a multipolarity it cannot stop.” In Japan there is less irony and more cold calculation: analysts calmly explain how business must operate in a world where American elections, ministers’ tweets and tariff wars turn the global economy into a series of shocks. In Saudi Arabia the pragmatic question of price comes to the fore: what risk premium do the dollar and American security guarantees still deserve after Iran‑2026 and a possible reshuffling of regional alliances.
If one reads only the American press, one might get the impression that the US is still the center of the world — just going through another crisis. But if one looks closely at Russian, Japanese and Saudi texts, the picture is different: America remains critically important, yet is increasingly the subject of analysis rather than unconditional imitation. Russian authors see in its moves an opportunity for alternative centers of power; the Japanese see a source of risks to be carefully hedged; the Saudis see a key but no longer sole partner in a region where the balance can tip either way.
This shift in tone may be the main change of 2026: the US increasingly appears in global columns not as the “arbiter” but as one of several disputing players whose power is still enormous, yet whose ability to impose its agenda without regard for others is noticeably more limited.
