The most noticeable discussions about the United States in Saudi Arabia, Russia and China today are not focused on an abstract “American policy,” but on three very specific focal points: American pressure through tariffs and sanctions; the role of Washington in Middle East security after the Iran war; and whether the United States remains a reliable partner in a world that is increasingly perceived as fragmented and conflict-prone. This is evident both in official statements and in analytical columns and editorial assessments by local media: in China, the tone is set by themes of “unilateral measures” and the trade war; in Russia, it is sanctions pressure and the strategic Moscow–Beijing pairing against U.S. containment policy; and in Saudi Arabia, it is both pragmatic partnership with the United States and a cautious calculation regarding the U.S.-Iran settlement and nuclear cooperation with Washington. (globaltimes.cn)
If we look at the Chinese debate, the main irritant is not so much Donald Trump himself as the logic of American economic and technological policy itself. Official Beijing and Chinese state media describe U.S. tariffs again and again as “unilateral” and contrary to international rules, while new levies are framed as a source of chaos and unpredictability for global trade. At the end of February, China’s trade reaction directly linked American decisions to rule-breaking and harm to all sides, and in April and July, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Chinese experts again emphasized that sanctions against buyers of Iranian oil—along with secondary sanctions targeting Chinese companies—constitute unlawful extraterritorial pressure that Beijing does not recognize. (globaltimes.cn)
It is especially telling that in the Chinese press the United States is often discussed not as the “center of the world system,” but as a source of instability, forcing the PRC to strengthen its own autonomy and deepen external ties outside the American orbit. In Global Times, Chinese experts wrote that the U.S. tariff policy is failing even by Washington’s own standards, because the U.S. trade deficit is expanding rather than shrinking; another article stressed that Washington’s moves are pushing China toward tougher protection against secondary sanctions and toward activating retaliatory measures. At the same time, within China’s editorial logic, Russian-Chinese rapprochement is presented as a “signal of stability” in a turbulent world—meaning that America indirectly serves as a backdrop for demonstrating a more reliable alternative. (globaltimes.cn)
In Russian discussions, the tone is similar but the emphasis is different: the American “problem” is read there primarily as a problem of pressure and coercion. In the past weeks, Kommersant and TASS have shown that Moscow and Russian analysts view the United States as a country that does not so much “negotiate” as combine sanctions, tariff threats and political pressure—including against those states that continue to buy Russian oil and gas. Russian texts about new bills in Washington describe them as a mechanism aimed not only at Russia, but also at China and India; alongside this, Russian business and foreign-policy outlets are noting that American business does not see any real easing of sanctions pressure, despite rhetoric about normalization of relations. (kommersant.ru)
At the same time, Russia’s response to the United States is not limited to defense. Increasingly, it is built around the idea that it is precisely American harshness that accelerates the formation of tighter Russian-Chinese coordination. Kommersant writes directly that the U.S. and China remain locked in a conflictual bundle over tariffs, sanctions, Taiwan, Iran and Ukraine, while Russia in this new triangle turns out to be a “third party.” In TASS there is also a harsher formulation: Russian and Chinese analysts describe the Moscow–Beijing axis as an element of a new global balance capable of creating a multipolar order alternative to American hegemony. In other words, in the Russian context, the United States is discussed not only as a rival, but also as an unwitting architect of closer ties between Russia and China. (kommersant.ru)
Saudi Arabia looks at America quite differently. Here, the United States is still viewed as a key partner in security and diplomacy, but the attitude is not romantic—it is strictly transactional. After contacts between Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Donald Trump, Saudi media highlighted that Riyadh and Washington are discussing not only bilateral ties, but also regional stability, navigation, and U.S. contacts with Iran. In June and July, Saudi official and semi-official sources emphasized that the kingdom welcomes diplomatic settlement between the U.S. and Iran because, for it, the freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and reducing the risk of a new war are critical. (arabnews.com)
But it is precisely in Saudi discourse that a paradox is especially visible: America is needed both as a guarantor and as an object of caution. The most important topic in recent weeks is an agreement on the peaceful use of nuclear energy between Saudi Arabia and the United States. Arab News and Al Riyadh describe it as a major strategic breakthrough, emphasizing that it strengthens economic resilience, local production and the goals of Vision 2030, and also builds trust between the two countries. Even in positive materials, however, “difficult questions” are raised—ranging from political conditions to possible risks and the role of U.S. domestic politics. In other words, in Saudi reactions to the United States, it is not just an ally, but a provider of strategic technology with which Riyadh is trying to strike a deal on terms that are as beneficial and safe for itself as possible. (alriyadh.com)
The common denominator across these three countries is still there: American policy is now, almost everywhere, read through the lens of predictability. In China, the United States looks like a source of tariff and technological coercion; in Russia, it looks like the center of a sanctions system and military pressure; in Saudi Arabia, it looks like a necessary but demanding partner that must be kept within an agreement—not trusted unconditionally. Interestingly, even where the tone is more positive—such as in Saudi texts about the nuclear agreement—positivity is not built on ideological sympathy for America, but on calculation: does Washington bring stability, investment, access to technology, and a lower risk of war? This is a very modern, almost cold way of looking at the United States—not as a symbol, but as a factor of risk or benefit. (arabnews.com)
The most interesting hidden line—easy to miss if you read only American press—is that the United States today is unwittingly bringing together very different foreign-policy cultures through their reaction to itself. Chinese editors talk about protection from unilateralism; Russians talk about resisting sanctions coercion and strengthening an alternative center of power; Saudi commentators talk about insuring their own security and modernizing through selective cooperation. As a result, America remains the main topic on the international agenda not because everyone is admiring it, but because almost all major players are forced to rebuild their strategies around American unpredictability. (globaltimes.cn)
