In recent weeks the United States has again found itself at the center of other countries’ domestic agendas — not so much because of Washington itself as because of how its decisions are used and interpreted abroad. In Russia there is debate about “frozen” relations with the US amid the war and attempts by Donald Trump to present himself as a peacemaker. In South Africa there is controversy over whether the new American migration policy is racially motivated. In Brazil the Americans have suddenly become a factor in the 2026 presidential campaign — at once partner and meddling arbiter. These stories show that the image of the US as a global center of power remains, but attitudes toward it are becoming increasingly pragmatic and suspicious.
One of the loudest disputes around America has erupted in South Africa, where the administration of Donald Trump announced a decision to admit an additional 10,000 white South Africans as refugees, effectively raising the quota exclusively for Afrikaners while the program remains nearly closed to other countries. Associated Press reported that the White House justified the move as an “unforeseen refugee emergency” and pointed to a “growth of racially motivated violence” against white farmers in South Africa. The administration says Afrikaners are being persecuted, but the government in Pretoria firmly denies this.(apnews.com)
Here the gap between American discourse and local perception is visible. The South African cabinet and Afrikaner organizations themselves issued a joint rejection, effectively dismissing the American narrative of a “humanitarian emergency for whites.” The AP report from Johannesburg emphasizes that both authorities and advocacy groups representing the white minority said they saw no basis for the special threat Washington describes and did not want to be used as a tool for an ideological agenda in the US.(apnews.com)
To South African audiences this looks like a transfer of American “culture wars” onto African soil: the White House appeals to the theme of “aggrieved whites,” while the local discourse is accustomed to discussing the complex but far more multidimensional issues of crime, land reform and historical inequality. Pretoria’s official reaction, judging by the coverage, is built around not allowing the US to dictate the interpretation of South African reality. In South Africa this is perceived not as a gesture of solidarity but as a unilateral political decision that ignores local statistics and gives racial questions an explosive cross‑border hue.
Seen in a different key but with a similar motif of “Washington as an interfering player” are perceptions of the US in Brazil. There the focus is on the American decision to designate the largest Brazilian criminal groups PCC and Comando Vermelho as terrorist organizations. On the UOL News analytical program, former Brazilian ambassador to Washington Rubens Barbosa described this as “the first manifestation of interference” by the American government in the 2026 presidential campaign. In the conversation recounted by UOL, he stressed that the designation itself was expected, but its timing and symbolism are being viewed through the lens of the elections.(noticias.uol.com.br)
This is a typically Brazilian reading: the US is described not only as a security partner but as a player capable of sending a signal to particular electoral groups within the country. For some of the conservative and “law-and-order” electorate, such a hardline American gesture may bolster trust in candidates promising close cooperation with Washington in combating crime. For leftist and sovereigntist circles it is grounds to speak of unacceptable external “certification” of internal problems and of a threat to the sovereignty of justice.
At the same time, Brazilian media continue to analyze President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s visit to the White House and his meeting with Donald Trump. In the influential weekly Veja, in a piece titled “Encontro entre Lula e Trump: o impacto no bolsonarismo…,” it is noted that a meeting conceived as ceremonial turned into a political victory for Lula: the American president publicly praised him, and the White House moved to ease tariffs. The authors emphasize that this changed the rhetoric of the right, which now finds it harder to accuse Lula of “subservience” to the US, since their own “ideological referent” in Washington is conspicuously friendly with him.(veja.abril.com.br)
Thus, in Brazil the US is a field of symbolic struggle: Lula uses Washington to strengthen his international and economic positions, while opponents use it to criticize or rethink their anti‑ or pro‑American theses. In another Veja piece about the CNI business forum in New York it is emphasized that, despite tensions over tariffs, Brazilian industry continues to view the US as a strategic economic partner and is actively seeking new forms of cooperation.(veja.abril.com.br) Beneath that pragmatism lies an important nuance: unlike the South African discussion about refugees, where Washington is seen as upsetting the balance, in Brazil the issue is a complex game in which the American factor both irritates and attracts.
The Russian conversation about the US today is colder and more cynical. At the official level Moscow signals that it does not believe in the possibility of real détente even under Donald Trump. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, in comments carried by Reuters and quoted, among others, by the German portal onvista, said that “nothing is happening” in relations with the US, stressing that ties remain at a minimal level and that a change of administration in Washington by itself changes little.(thestar.com.my)
Overlaying this is a specific view among Russian and foreign experts of Washington’s role in the war in Ukraine. In Russian‑ and English‑language analytical reviews — from “Russia Matters” to pieces about Moscow’s Victory Day Parade — the US appears both as the main sponsor of Ukraine and as the background against which Moscow builds “alternative” ties with Beijing and the Global South. In one recent Russia Matters review it is emphasized that Russia is increasingly drawn into dependence on China, trading raw materials for machinery and technology, while the US remains a much more important economic rival and market for Beijing.(russiamatters.org) In Russian domestic optics this is presented as a turn toward “multipolarity” and liberation from American hegemony, but Western analysts read these trends more as strategic vulnerability.
At the same time, the “peacemaker” role of Washington is actively discussed in the Russian‑language space. Chronological summaries of the war note the three‑day ceasefire announced by Trump between Russia and Ukraine in early May, which is presented in the Russian public discourse as proof that only the US can exert a real lever on the tempo of hostilities. However, in expert columns the emphasis is different: analysts remind readers that even such pauses do not change the structural character of the conflict and do not negate the long‑term US course of supporting Kyiv.(russiamatters.org)
Comparing these three perspectives reveals several common threads. First, the US is everywhere perceived not as an abstract superpower but as a concrete, highly pragmatic actor whose decisions interfere with the balance of forces inside other countries. Declaring Afrikaners refugees, manipulating the status of Brazilian criminal organizations, targeted initiatives for ceasefires in Ukraine — abroad these actions are read not as a universal “fight for values” but as carefully calculated moves in Washington’s own interest and, often, in the interest of the sitting administration.
Second, in each country there is a growing demand to interpret their own reality sovereignly. South Africa does not want someone from outside to declare what in its racial politics constitutes an “emergency,” and stresses that even organizations of the white minority do not share the dramatic tone of American formulations. Brazil seeks to preserve the right to decide for itself where security cooperation ends and political interference begins. Russia, even while in deep confrontation with the US, constructs rhetoric around the notion that Washington is no longer the sole decision‑making center in the world — pointing to China and other players.
Finally, each country has its own unexpected inflections. In Brazil the right’s reaction to the “friendship” between Trump and Lula shows how flexible anti‑American rhetoric can be: yesterday the US was a symbol of “globalism” against national sovereignty, today it is valuable capital for one’s own president if he can convert personal ties with the White House occupant into tariff relief. In South Africa, by contrast, some conservative circles traditionally skeptical of the post‑apartheid state find themselves on the same side as the government when it comes to defending the national interpretation of events against an American “rescue” narrative. In Russia the paradox is that the more official rhetoric distances itself from the US, the more the military‑political and economic reality remains tied to American decisions — from sanctions to the scale of military aid to Ukraine.
The picture of international reactions to the US today is far from black and white. America remains the main screen onto which the hopes, fears and strategies of other countries are projected, but fewer and fewer are willing to accept a script written in Washington unquestioningly. Russia, South Africa and Brazil, in different ways but with equal insistence, are trying to rewrite the roles: not to be merely objects of American policy, but to make the US one factor among many in their own, much more complex game.
