The main topic in recent days in Israeli, French and Russian discussions of the United States has been the war with Iran—but not in the familiar framework of “Washington versus Tehran.” Following Donald Trump’s statements on September 14 about a possible willingness to return to negotiations, it has become clear that local commentators primarily view the American strategy as a crisis of governance: the United States is trying simultaneously to maintain military pressure, secure shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, protect its allies and avoid paying for this with a political defeat on the eve of the US elections on November 3. Kommersant noted that Trump reserved the decision on whether to enter negotiations, while Tehran, through intermediaries, put forward conditions for the full reopening of the strait. (kommersant.ru)
All three countries share a common conclusion: US superiority in weapons has not translated into the ability to impose a political outcome. But the meaning of this conclusion differs. In the French interpretation, it is above all a warning to Europe about the cost of American improvisation. Experts at the French Institute of International Relations write that six months after the war began, none of Washington’s widely proclaimed goals has been achieved: Iran’s regime has survived, the nuclear issue has not disappeared, Iran’s regional allies continue to operate, and Hormuz remains a dangerous artery of global trade. The authors call this an expression of “new American impotence”: enormous military power is being displayed, but it is not creating a stable order. The IFRI analysis emphasizes a particularly French detail: Paris views the conflict not only through the prism of Israel’s security or the containment of Iran, but also through the vulnerability of the European economy—gas, oil, shipping insurance and inflation. (ifri.org)
That is why the French reaction is noticeably less triumphalist than the American rhetoric about control of the strait. Economist Patrick Artus, in a column for Le Point, explicitly includes a protracted US-Iran conflict accompanied by a prolonged disruption of shipping through Hormuz among the three main risks of accelerating inflation, alongside semiconductor shortages and climate shocks. (lepoint.fr) To a French observer, the American policy of “maximum pressure” looks less like resolve than an attempt to replace an unattainable military resolution with financial strangulation. Reporter Armin Arefi, in an analysis for Le Point, assesses this strategy as unlikely to be effective in the short term: sanctions may weaken Iran, but they guarantee neither capitulation nor the restoration of trust in negotiations. (lepoint.fr)
In Israel, the same American hesitation provokes an almost opposite emotion—not fear of inflation, but anxiety that a US deal with Iran could be concluded behind the back of a key regional ally. Israeli researchers are increasingly discussing not merely the fate of Iran’s nuclear program, but the limits of dependence on Washington. Dr. Shai Har-Zvi of Reichman University warns in his September review that disagreements between Israel and the United States are widening simultaneously at the governmental level and in American public opinion. He links this to differences over Gaza’s reconstruction, regional agreements, Washington’s relations with Turkey and US arms sales to Middle Eastern states. (runi.ac.il)
The Israeli perspective is therefore far more hostile to a possible US-Iran compromise. Local analysis raises a question that is secondary in France: what exactly is the United States prepared to regard as a sufficient victory? If the White House agrees to a partial restoration of shipping and a temporary easing of tensions, while leaving Iran with the capacity to rebuild militarily and nuclearly, Israel will view this not as de-escalation, but as postponing the threat. An INSS analysis notes that declining support for Israel in the United States now extends beyond Democrats to young Republicans as well; consequently, Jerusalem cannot indefinitely assume that American backing will be unconditional and enduring. (inss.org.il) The paradox of Israel’s reaction is that it simultaneously demands greater firmness from the United States toward Iran and increasingly doubts that American domestic politics will allow such firmness to be sustained.
The Russian debate emphasizes something else: Hormuz is interpreted as the place where the United States has encountered the limits of power based on sanctions, airstrikes and control of maritime communications. In an RBC article about Iran’s seven conditions for reopening the strait, the juxtaposition of two incompatible claims is particularly telling: Tehran says that it determines the conditions for passage, while Trump declares that the strait is controlled by the United States. (rbc.ru) For Russian authors, this gap between declared and actual power is the story itself, rather than mere diplomatic background. Military expert Yuri Knutov, in a comment to Argumenty i Fakty, argues that Washington needs not so much Iran’s conditions as regime change and control over oil flows; from this, he concludes that the White House faces an impasse between making concessions and triggering a dangerous escalation. (aif.ru)
This Russian narrative is, of course, politically motivated: it emphasizes the weakening of American hegemony and serves the broader argument that a multipolar order is taking shape. But it cannot be reduced to propaganda alone. Russian experts are identifying a real problem that French researchers also acknowledge: Washington can inflict enormous damage on its adversary, but that does not mean it can quickly reopen a trade route, create an acceptable postwar architecture and retain the loyalty of all its partners. PIR Center consultant Leonid Tsukanov, speaking on RBC, predicted as early as this summer that the conflict would be protracted and that reconciliation was not foreseeable, while Alexander Shpunt, director of the Institute for Political Analysis Tools, pointed out that Tehran is turning control over shipping risks into leverage, primarily against insurers and trading companies. (amp.rbc.ru)
The most unexpected aspect of comparing these three reactions is that no one sees Hormuz as merely a geographical point. For France, it is an indicator of the extent to which American military policy shifts costs onto European consumers. For Israel, it is a test of whether Washington will trade an ally’s long-term security for short-term de-escalation. For Russia, it is proof that control over global trade cannot be secured by declarations of superiority alone. In all three cases, Trump finds himself trapped by a double logic: he needs to demonstrate strength to voters, but every new strike raises the price of gasoline, expands the risk of a regional war and makes a diplomatic exit look like a retreat.
That is why current foreign discussions of the United States least resemble a debate over whether America is “winning.” In Israel, France and Russia, they are discussing a more fundamental question: can Washington still be a guarantor of order if its decisions increasingly look like a sequence of abrupt shifts between force, sanctions and negotiations? For now, the answer differs in its political sympathies across the three countries, but is similar in substance: American power remains enormous, yet its ability to turn military pressure into a predictable peace has been seriously called into question.
