Reactions to Washington’s decisions in foreign publications remain limited and fragmented. German reports criticize the American foreign-policy establishment for attempting to evade responsibility for wars, while also following the U.S. primaries and import flows. A South Korean analysis examines a decision associated with Donald Trump that affects Chinese drones. Overall, most of the available references are general or irrelevant and do not reflect a full-fledged international reaction. This material is based on publications by Merkur.de (Germany) and YouTube (South Korea).
American Wars and the Cost of Strategic Miscalculations
The German portal Merkur published a translation of a column by Harvard University professor Stephen M. Walt, originally published in Foreign Policy. It is not the German outlet’s editorial position or a news report, but an author’s assessment of American foreign policy. Nevertheless, its publication on a major German platform makes the arguments presented relevant to a German audience, which has traditionally viewed military interventions and regime change with caution.
Walt’s central argument is that the United States fails in wars not because it lacks resources, weapons, or the courage of its service members. In his view, the problem lies in the choice of conflicts and the setting of excessive political goals. Washington often enters “wars of choice,” attempting to reshape other societies according to its own ideas, while U.S. opponents fight for independence, survival, or control over their own country. Given this disparity in motivation, the weaker side can prevail if it manages to outlast the more powerful adversary.
The author cites the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and the many-year war in Afghanistan as examples of such strategic miscalculations. Iraq occupies a particularly important place in his argument: Walt believes that overthrowing Saddam Hussein was not connected to vital U.S. interests, while the occupation of the country generated resistance, intensified instability, and created regional consequences that had to be dealt with for many years.
The 1991 Gulf War serves as a contrast. The administration of George H. W. Bush set a limited and clear objective: liberating Kuwait after Iraq’s invasion. The U.S. authorities then rejected the capture of Baghdad and regime change, avoiding turning the operation into an attempt to remake Iraq. In Walt’s view, it was precisely this proportionality between military objectives and political capabilities that enabled the campaign to avoid many of the mistakes that followed.
For Germany, this debate is particularly sensitive. Berlin remains a key U.S. ally within NATO and relies on American security guarantees. At the same time, German political culture, shaped after World War II, calls for heightened caution regarding overseas military operations, especially when they involve regime change, prolonged occupation, or the absence of a clear international legal mandate.
The 2003 Iraq crisis occupies a prominent place in this collective memory. Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s government opposed the U.S. invasion, and in Germany the episode is often viewed as an example of justified skepticism toward Washington’s use of force. The publication in Merkur indirectly returns to the question of how an ally’s reliability should be measured—not only by the scale of its military power, but also by its ability to formulate limited, realistic, and achievable goals.
The sharpest section of the column concerns the responsibility of the American foreign-policy elite. Walt quotes neoconservative intellectual Robert Kagan, one of the prominent supporters of the Iraq War. Asked whether the war had been a mistake, Kagan replied: “I’m not sure what good it does to admit that it was a mistake. It won’t bring anybody back to life.” For Walt, this position demonstrates the unwillingness of influential circles in the United States to acknowledge the consequences of their own decisions and learn from them.
In the author’s assessment, the absence of political and intellectual accountability creates a risk that past failures will be repeated. In particular, he links this problem to the current Donald Trump administration’s policy toward Iran. At the same time, assessments of a possible conflict with Iran and criticism of Trump’s policy represent the columnist’s own position, rather than facts established by Merkur’s editors.
For Europe and Germany, Walt’s arguments raise the practical question of the degree of strategic autonomy they should pursue. If the United States spends resources on wars with unclear or excessively ambitious objectives, this may weaken its ability to focus on NATO responsibilities, European security, and long-term competition with China. Consequently, as the article’s logic suggests, allied solidarity should not rule out an independent assessment of risks and national interests by European states.
The column does not claim to offer a neutral presentation of all views on American wars. It is a reasoned critique of a foreign-policy approach in which military superiority is taken to mean an ability to achieve any political outcome. Walt’s main conclusion is that power without limited objectives, an adequate strategy, and a willingness to accept responsibility for mistakes ultimately leads not to stronger influence, but to costly defeats.
U.S. Imposes Drone Tariffs While Preserving Benefits for Allies
U.S. President Donald Trump signed a proclamation imposing tariffs of up to 100% on imported drones and their components. The measure is due to take effect in 21 days and is intended to reduce the United States’ dependence on Chinese production chains, develop domestic drone manufacturing, and strengthen the American position in this technological sector.
As noted by South Korean public broadcaster KBS, South Korea has been included in a separate group of partners alongside Japan and the countries of the European Union. They will face a lower, though still significant, maximum tariff of up to 15%. Washington is therefore recognizing Seoul as a reliable ally and potential participant in “friend-shored” defense-technology supply chains, but is not exempting South Korean companies from protectionist restrictions.
For Chinese manufacturers, the new rates could effectively prove prohibitive. This gives South Korean companies an opportunity to capture part of the U.S. market previously occupied by Chinese suppliers of drones, electronics, batteries, cameras, sensors, and other critical components. At the same time, the 15% tariff raises the cost of Korean products in the United States and could reduce their competitiveness compared with American-made goods.
The Korean view of Trump’s decision highlights the country’s ambiguous position. On the one hand, inclusion in the preferential tariff category confirms Seoul’s political and technological closeness to Washington. South Korea has an opportunity to deepen cooperation with the United States in defense manufacturing and unmanned systems, particularly against the backdrop of the American administration’s drive to push China out of strategic supply chains.
On the other hand, the new rules demonstrate the limits of the advantages enjoyed by allies. Even the United States’ closest partners receive no complete immunity from trade barriers if Washington believes it is necessary to relocate critical production to American territory. For South Korea’s export-oriented economy, this means dependence not only on demand and product quality, but also on the political decisions of the largest markets.
In this situation, Seoul will need to use its “friendly country” status to expand joint projects, localize some production processes in the United States, and secure a position in Western supply chains. However, it will also be important for South Korean authorities and businesses to ensure that preferential rates do not become a permanent obstacle to exports. The new tariff policy demonstrates the hierarchy of allies in America’s strategy: South Korea is far removed from China in terms of the level of trade restrictions, but it is still forced to pay a price for the U.S. drive toward technological autonomy.
