In July–August 2026, in French, German and Ukrainian media, the United States is being discussed not as an abstract ally, but as a source of strategic uncertainty: the spotlight is on both the war and the negotiations over Iran, threats of new tariffs, doubts about NATO’s reliability, and the broader question of whether Washington can still be considered a predictable guarantor of European security. In France, this is described as historically low trust in the United States—and even as fear of a military threat from America; in Germany, as the painful realization that Berlin has no quick replacement for the American “umbrella”; in Ukraine, as direct anxiety about its own security and the future of NATO membership. (lemonde.fr)
The most visible shared theme is Iran and the style of American power. French analysts write that Paris fears a drawn-out crisis while being forced to take into account the fact that Washington is again playing at the edge of pressure and bargaining; in Le Monde, a French diplomatic source openly admits that “more than a bilateral conversation between Iran and the United States will be needed” to restore the system of control over the nuclear program. In Germany, the reaction is even sharper in tone: tagesschau quotes SWP political scientist Sascha Lomon, who sees Trump’s Iran policy as an expression of “strategic ambiguity,” while another commentary flatly claims that Trump “failed” to achieve his goals in Iran. The German debate is not only about the Middle East, however: it also emphasizes that American actions create legal and moral questions for Berlin—especially if US operations affect the Ramstein base. (lemonde.fr)
The second cross-cutting line is NATO and trust in American guarantees. Here the Ukrainian reaction is the most tense and the most practical. Ukrainian outlets regularly remind readers of Trump’s skepticism toward the alliance: Ukrainska Pravda and Ukrinform report his remarks that allies are “disloyal,” that the United States supposedly does not receive help from NATO, and that the question of Ukraine’s membership in the alliance remains blocked by a number of countries. In an interview with Ukrainska Pravda, former US Chargé d’Affaires George Kent says that the West and NATO must accelerate “deep discussions” not about Ukraine’s survival, but about how to help it win—an emphasis that reflects the Ukrainian demand for specifics rather than rhetoric. German media reads this through its own security concerns: in tagesschau, commentators note that Germany “has no alternative” to the United States as a guarantor, even if relations with Washington under Trump remain strained and even accompanied by talk of withdrawing American troops. French authors, by contrast, increasingly frame it as a Europe sovereignty problem: one of the texts in Le Monde notes that French public opinion already considers the United States a possible “military threat” in the future, and an ECFR poll shows that Europeans’ trust in the US has fallen to a historic low. (pravda.com.ua)
The third theme is broader disenchantment with the political and institutional face of the United States. In France, this comes across especially strongly: Le Monde writes that Trump “saturates the political and media landscape,” and in France, by making internal issues suddenly seem secondary; they also point out that French politics—including debates ahead of the 2027 elections—has to respond to the American agenda. In Germany, the debate about the US increasingly concerns not only foreign policy, but also the internal condition of American democracy—from redrawing electoral districts to pressure on voters’ rights—which tagesschau describes as an attack on Martin Luther King’s legacy. In Ukraine, this motif is picked up particularly sharply: after polls and comments in local media, the idea takes hold that most Ukrainians view Trump’s presidency negatively, and that Washington behaves as if help for Ukraine were an instrument of bargaining rather than an obligation of an ally. Even when Americans promise production licenses for missiles or discuss new support packages, the tone of Ukrainian commentary remains wary: what matters is not the gesture, but how durable it proves to be. (lemonde.fr)
There are also differences that clearly show the local optics. France more often talks about the US as a challenge to European autonomy and as the possibility of a strategic “divorce,” even if no one is suggesting a complete break; Germany sees it as an inevitable but uncomfortable partner, without which it is impossible to ensure defense; Ukraine sees it as a country whose unpredictability directly affects survival. That is why today’s common European thinking does not sound like anti-Americanism, but like a tense recalibration of expectations: the US remains the center of global power, but in Paris, Berlin and Kyiv people increasingly discuss what the United States does when it acts as an ally—and what the rest should do if that ally starts behaving like a factor of risk. (lemonde.fr)
