At the end of February 2026, the topic of the United States again became one of the main storylines on the global agenda — but not in the abstract form of “anti‑Americanism,” rather through several very concrete crises. First, the lightning operation by the US in Venezuela to capture Nicolás Maduro and the subsequent intention to try him on American soil provoked an explosion of commentary from Latin America to Europe. Second, the US Supreme Court’s decision to declare a significant portion of the “Trump” global tariffs illegal shook trading partners and markets, while Donald Trump himself responded with a new wave of tariffs. Finally, in China and Germany, growing domestic uncertainty in the US is being viewed as a symptom of a shift: a system that set the rules for decades is increasingly displaying both strength and unpredictability.
Discussion of Washington in Beijing, Brasília and Berlin does not reduce to a single line. But in all three societies common themes are visible: irritation at the unilateralism of American actions, an attempt to understand how far the current Trump administration will go in its second term, and a pragmatic calculation of how to adapt to this “new old” US.
The central nerve of the debates became the US operation in Venezuela on January 3, 2026, which led to Maduro’s ouster and his delivery into American jurisdiction. In Brazil this event was immediately read not only as a question of democracy but also of sovereignty. In an interview with India Today, widely quoted in the Brazilian press, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva said that if the former Venezuelan leader must be tried, it should be done in Venezuela itself, not across the ocean, and called it unacceptable that one head of state is arrested by another state. The Spanish‑language version of his remarks is analyzed in detail in El País, which emphasizes that Lula sees a dangerous precedent in US actions and believes Washington is more concerned with control over oil than with real democratic choice in Caracas — he says the Americans “put under control” the transitional process and use it to redistribute influence over the country’s resources. (elpais.com)
Against this background, within Brazil itself a separate point of irritation was Washington’s dismissive attitude toward international criticism. In an interview that Secretary of State Marco Rubio gave in Slovakia, and which is analyzed in detail by Poder360, he acknowledged that “many countries did not like what we did in Venezuela,” but immediately added: “E daí?” — “So what?” Rubio emphasizes that the operation was carried out “in the interests of US national security” and that allies’ displeasure will not prevent further cooperation if it suits Washington. (poder360.com.br) For Latin American commentators this short phrase became the perfect quintessence of how they view contemporary American foreign policy: rational but cynical, ready to hear complaints without changing course by a degree.
Chinese analytical centers view the Venezuelan episode through a different lens. Beijing’s discourse, published in university and party outlets, ties it to a broader US line of forcefully cementing its status in the Western hemisphere. In the typically Chinese analytical style this is presented as an example of “instrumentalizing international law”: a formal justification via the fight against drug trafficking and corruption is combined with the de facto undermining of the principle of non‑intervention and sovereign equality. At the same time Chinese authors are cautious in tone: it is not about direct support for Maduro, but about warning that the “Caracas precedent” could be applied to any regime deemed inconvenient by Washington.
In Germany the Venezuela topic is less emotional, but fits into a broader skepticism regarding the US course. In surveys of German and Belgian newspapers, summarized for example in BRF’s press digest, it is emphasized that Washington increasingly acts “by the law of the strong,” and Europeans have to retrospectively find ways to minimize risks. In the view of many German commentators, the operation in Venezuela is a signal that under Donald Trump the US has finally stopped treating European consultations as a mandatory preliminary stage. (brf.be)
If the Venezuelan crisis became emotional, the trade crisis is truly material. The US Supreme Court’s decision last week to declare a large part of the tariffs introduced by Trump in 2025 under the National Emergencies Act of 1977 illegal caused almost physical relief in European markets. German channel n‑tv describes how after the verdict the DAX index shot up: investors took it as a signal that the “Trump tariff club” might lose its force. The judges, by majority, ruled that the cited law “does not authorize the president to impose tariffs,” thereby delineating the boundaries of executive power in the trade sphere. (n-tv.de)
But the relief was short‑lived. Just hours later, as the Belgian Gazet van Antwerpen reports and BRF cites, the “peeved Trump” responded to the defeat with a new 10‑percent tariff “against the whole world,” relying on a different provision of trade law. (brf.be) German press reads this as confirmation of a long‑held suspicion: tighter judicial control does not change Washington’s fundamental course, it merely changes the legal instruments.
In Brazil the reaction to this American “tariff pendulum” is far less academic: local outlets immediately focus on direct risks to their own economy. The center‑left portal Brasil247 notes that despite the Supreme Court’s decision, the investigation program against Brazil and China continues: the Trump administration has kept in effect the Section 301 trade investigation under the Trade Act of 1974, initiated in July 2025, and uses accusations of “unfair competition” as a pretext for pressure. (brasil247.com) For Brazilian commentators this confirms an old Latin suspicion: legal battles in Washington matter, but in the end American policy will seek loopholes to preserve levers of influence.
Against this backdrop, economic analysis of the US in the Brazilian press acquires a shade of hidden anxiety. The portal O Brasilianista, summarizing data from the US Department of Commerce, highlights that US GDP growth slowed to 2.2% in 2025 from 2.8% the year before, and that in the fourth quarter the economy grew just 1.4% at an annualized rate. The personal consumption expenditures price index and the PCE price index rose 2.6%, as in 2024 — meaning inflation seems under control but has not disappeared. (obrasilianista.com.br) In the Brazilian discourse this produces a dual feeling: on one hand the “American patient” looks resilient, on the other — the slowdown and persistent price pressure push the White House toward a more aggressive trade and industrial policy, which threatens new blows to developing countries’ exports.
In China the same figures are seen as a factor of internal US instability ahead of the 2026 midterm elections. In Chinese financial media and think‑tank analyses the primary concern is not so much the macro figures themselves but how they affect American voters’ mood. A detailed review on Sina Finance, prepared by the research team of “China Galactica Macroeconomics,” notes that according to YouGov, Americans are most worried about inflation, the economy and jobs, civil rights, healthcare and migration; inflation and the economy are named key issues by 23% and 15% of respondents respectively, and among youth under 30 these shares are even higher. (finance.sina.cn)
The Chinese conclusion here is strictly pragmatic: the stronger the cost‑of‑living pressure inside the US, the more likely the Trump administration is to continue using external trade instruments — from tariffs to sanctions — as a way to demonstrate “toughness” and redirect domestic dissatisfaction toward an external enemy. In this sense, for both Beijing and Berlin, the American domestic agenda becomes no less important than Washington’s formal declarations of commitment to free trade.
Viewed more broadly, in Germany, China and Brazil the discussion of America today passes through the prism of seeing it as a less reliable partner and a more self‑centered actor. At the Munich Security Conference 2026, according to German media assessments, it became clear: even friendly statements by the US delegation led by Marco Rubio do not hide the fact that Washington is willing to cooperate only on its own terms and with priority given to its migration and defense interests. The review of key lessons from the conference in Die Welt highlights five points: transatlantic relations are strained but not broken; Europe seeks greater autonomy; the path to that autonomy is extremely difficult; the Ukraine issue has noticeably receded; and the Trump administration is open to a “new world order,” but not based on previous rules — rather in a format of a “hierarchical” system dominated by the US. (welt.de)
That is why in German discourse the theme of European strategic autonomy increasingly appears — from ideas of a pan‑European nuclear deterrent to deepening cooperation within the FCAS air combat system. But each such project is accompanied by a long list of technical, financial and political obstacles. In comments under articles about Munich one can easily notice skepticism: many Germans understand that Europe is not yet ready to live in a world where the American “umbrella” disappears, but are increasingly unsure that the umbrella will open automatically in a crisis.
In Brazil the theme of “independence from the US” has a long‑standing anti‑colonial tone. Lula, speaking about Venezuela and plans to meet with Trump in Washington to discuss tariffs, tries to strike a delicate tone: to show respect for neighbors’ sovereignty while also maintaining a channel of dialogue with the continent’s economic giant. In an interview cited by the European press he promotes the idea of settlements in national currencies between India and Brazil and distances himself from the notion of a single BRICS currency, to emphasize that for him multipolarity is above all diversification of ties, not merely replacing one hegemon with another. (elpais.com)
Chinese commentators in turn use these debates in Brazil and Europe as confirmation of their long‑standing thesis of a “structural crisis of Western leadership.” In their view the American system remains enormously powerful — financially, militarily, technologically — but politically it increasingly emits chaotic signals: from radical shifts in course with each administration change to unilateral actions like the Venezuelan operation or global tariffs. For Beijing this is both a risk and a window of opportunity: on one hand China’s export and financial dependence on Washington’s behavior remains huge; on the other — amid third countries’ fatigue with “American swings,” Chinese diplomacy hopes to advance as a more predictable alternative.
Finally, in China special attention is paid to the political cycle inside the US itself. An article by invited expert Sun Hong, published on the Peking University platform, treats the November 3, 2026 midterm elections as a potential turning point for Trump’s second term. The author analyzes the history of American midterms from 1986 to 2022 and reminds readers that in 20 of 22 cases the incumbent president’s party lost seats in the House; in 2018 Trump already suffered such a defeat. Now, with an approval rating around 44% and an electorate highly sensitive to the economy and inflation, the election outcome could again radically change the balance of power in Congress and, therefore, the range of the White House’s foreign‑policy maneuvers. (igcu.pku.edu.cn)
For Chinese readers this is not mere academic interest. The less room for maneuver domestically, the greater the temptation to compensate with external confrontation. Hence the attention to every US move regarding Taiwan, the South China Sea or technology — and to how those moves relate to the demands of the American domestic campaign to “be tougher on China.”
Taken together, all these storylines — Venezuela, tariffs, Munich, the American economy and elections — form a multilayered but fairly coherent international portrait of the US at the start of 2026. In Brazil and more broadly in Latin America Washington is seen as an inevitable but increasingly problematic neighbor whose readiness to rewrite the rules in the region by force provokes both outrage and pragmatic calculation. In Germany and Europe it is seen as an ally with whom ties must be maintained, but who can no longer be taken as the guarantor of the accustomed order “by default.” In China it is viewed as the main external risk factor and at the same time the main reference point around which China builds its own strategy of ascent.
The common thread between all these perspectives is the understanding that the US remains the central node of the world system, but the idea of unilateral American leadership increasingly meets not only resistance but also complex, ambiguous attempts to adapt. In that sense the current wave of criticism of Washington over Venezuela, tariffs and unilateralism is not so much a rejection of America as a demand that it decide: does it want to be a predictable architect of the global order, or will it remain a power that acts according to the principle “E daí?” — “so what?” — even when whole regions’ fates are at stake?
