In South Korea, China and Turkey, the United States has been discussed in recent days less as a distant superpower than as a source of immediate costs and risks. Three interconnected issues have dominated the discussion: the protracted US-Iran war and the fate of the Strait of Hormuz, the US midterm elections approaching on November 3, 2026, and Washington’s attempt to shift some of its domestic political problems onto its partners through tariffs, investment demands and security deals. Local commentators’ overall conclusion is rather harsh: Trump’s foreign policy is increasingly subordinated to the logic of the American electoral campaign, but the consequences are being paid for far beyond the United States.
The most prominent common theme is Iran. Chinese, Turkish and South Korean publications agree on one point: Donald Trump’s October 8 statement that the United States would not attack Iran before the midterm elections looks less like a diplomatic breakthrough than an acknowledgment of the political cost of war. In a report by The Paper, Trump’s comments about “productive negotiations” with Tehran and his refusal to launch a strike before November 3 are presented as a direct link between a military decision and the voting calendar. The Chinese perspective is particularly skeptical: Diao Daming, a professor at Renmin University of China, explained the contradictory signals from the White House and the Pentagon by saying that the administration was seeking both to pressure Iran and to prevent the war from damaging its position in the elections. (news.cri.cn)
In Turkey, this connection has been formulated even more explicitly. In an analysis for Anadolu Ajansı, political analyst Bekir İlhan writes that US voters will most likely assess not the war’s geopolitics as such, but its everyday consequences—gasoline, food and housing prices. This is an important Turkish perspective: the war is essentially viewed not as a dispute over Iran’s nuclear program, but as a mechanism that turns into American inflation and then into political vulnerability for the White House. The same idea is being voiced in Seoul. South Korea’s Maeil Business Newspaper has highlighted on its front page a shortage of tankers and rising freight rates resulting from the prolonged Middle Eastern conflict: shipping costs are increasing, while industry is preparing for more expensive raw materials and renewed inflationary pressure. (aa.com.tr)
Interpretations of the war’s future, however, differ. Chinese official and semi-official platforms insist that the problem lies not merely in escalation, but in the very American model of coercive pressure. An editorial in Global Times says that the United States should abandon its “hegemonic mindset,” stop the strikes and acknowledge Iran’s legitimate security concerns. Beijing is also presenting itself as a mediator: Foreign Minister Wang Yi has called on Washington and Tehran to restore the negotiating mechanism, while Chinese experts emphasize the need to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and secure energy routes as soon as possible. (globaltimes.cn)
For Turkey, the same war is above all a matter of regional proximity and diplomatic standing. Ankara wants neither an American victory at any cost nor an Iranian collapse that would hit trade, the border and the migration situation. Serhan Afacan, head of the Center for Iranian Studies, argued in an Anadolu Ajansı article that blocked diplomatic channels could be reopened with Turkey’s participation. This differs from China’s position: Beijing is proposing a new regional security architecture, while Turkey is seeking to demonstrate its practical usefulness as a country capable of talking simultaneously with Iran, the United States, Arab capitals and NATO. (mobile.aa.com.tr)
The South Korean reaction is less ideological and far more bottom-line focused. Seoul is not concerned with who is morally right in the conflict, but with how American election tactics will translate into new demands on allies. A Maeil Business report describes how Trump, under pressure ahead of the elections, is raising the stakes: foreign companies, including South Korean firms, face tariffs of up to 300% if they do not build facilities in the United States. Korean commentators are calling this not merely protectionism, but a policy of coercing investment. The issue of Alaska and LNG is particularly sensitive: the local press notes that the White House is trying to present Korean investment as a domestic political success, even though Seoul prefers to speak of commercial viability rather than an unconditional commitment. (mk.co.kr)
This is where the second common theme emerges: America is perceived as a country where allied relations are becoming increasingly inseparable from domestic politics and elections. In Turkey, this can be seen in the F-35 case. In the summer, Trump promised to lift the sanctions restrictions and consider selling aircraft to Ankara, but Turkish analysts emphasize that a personal promise from the president is not enough: Congress, the issue of Russia’s S-400s, Israeli opposition and divisions within the US state apparatus remain obstacles. An analysis by Tercüman states plainly that the decision depends not only on relations between Trump and Erdoğan, but also on Washington’s ability to turn a strategic priority into coordinated state policy. (tercuman.com)
For China, American inconsistency serves as an argument for multipolarity and for reducing dependence on the United States. Chinese authors link the war around Iran to the broader rivalry between Beijing and Washington: as a Turkish analysis by Anadolu Ajansı argues, the United States is testing the limits of China’s interests without entering into a direct confrontation with the PRC. Oil, sea routes and the cost of instability for Chinese supply chains are especially important. The Chinese debate therefore is not limited to sympathy for Iran: it is built around the idea that American military activity destabilizes global trade, while China can offer predictability, mediation and protection of the principle of sovereignty. (aa.com.tr)
The third theme is Trump’s weakening as an international negotiator. In Seoul, the midterm elections are being followed not out of curiosity about American politics, but because a possible Republican defeat could make pressure from the White House even more severe. A Maeil Business analysis allows for a paradoxical scenario: if the Democrats take the House of Representatives, Trump may seek room for maneuver not domestically but in foreign policy, intensifying pressure on allies over defense spending and trade. (mkbn.mk.co.kr)
Turkish authors likewise see the elections not as the end of Trumpism, but as a test of its ability to outlive Trump. İlhan points out that the war with Iran, tariffs and the rising cost of living could weaken the Republicans, while also determining who will inherit the MAGA movement in 2028—above all, J.D. Vance or the more traditional Republicans around Marco Rubio. In this reading, America is not abandoning external pressure; it is merely debating which faction will have the right to wield it. (aa.com.tr)
The most unexpected common conclusion from Seoul, Beijing and Ankara is that all three countries are already expecting less strategic consistency from the United States. South Korea is trying to formalize agreements in documents and protect its companies from tariff blackmail. China is turning America’s military and trade nervousness into evidence of the need for an alternative international order. Turkey is creating room for mediation and bargaining, but does not believe that personal closeness with Trump will automatically solve its institutional problems with Washington. American policy continues to shape the global agenda, but in these three capitals it is increasingly understood as a policy in which global decisions are made with an eye to the price of gasoline in the United States, fluctuations in the president’s approval rating and the map of the midterm elections.
