In recent days, the United States has simultaneously found itself at the center of three crises: Washington rejected Iran’s plan to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, Donald Trump held a high-profile but largely substantive-free meeting with Xi Jinping, and Seoul once again began discussing the price of American security guarantees—from investment in U.S. industry to the prospect of nuclear-powered submarines. In Israel, Turkey and South Korea, these events are not viewed as isolated news stories. The local debate boils down to one question: does America remain an ally with predictable commitments—or is it becoming a superpower that offers protection, markets and negotiations only as elements of an ever-changing deal?
The most acute issue is Iran and Hormuz. On September 26, Trump publicly rejected the “seven-day plan” conveyed by Tehran: Iran proposed reopening the strait and returning to negotiations if the United States eased its naval blockade and sanctions on oil exports and unfroze Iranian assets. In Israel’s N12, the decision is read primarily through the lens of a possible military resolution: according to reports from Washington, the U.S. president is considering resuming strikes after the November midterm elections. Israel’s concern is not that Trump is too uncompromising toward Iran, but that his intransigence may prove to be a negotiating posture followed by an incomplete agreement.
This logic is expressed particularly clearly in an analysis by Sima Shine, a former senior member of Israel’s intelligence community, for the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). She warns that Israel is now more dependent than ever on the United States in its confrontation with Iran, while having less influence over the shaping of American policy. For Israel’s expert community, this is a painful reversal of roles: Jerusalem was accustomed not only to receiving American support, but also to being a partner capable of setting red lines. The main fear now is that Washington could declare victory over an agreement that gives Tehran a respite, resources and the opportunity to rebuild its nuclear and missile infrastructure. Israel is therefore calling not for general promises, but for a verifiable timetable to reduce enriched-uranium stockpiles, restrictions on future enrichment and automatic consequences for violating the deal. (inss.org.il)
The Turkish view of the same situation is almost a mirror image. In Ankara, the American blockade and rejection of Iran’s proposal are seen not as necessary toughness for the sake of regional security, but as an attempt to turn diplomacy into an instrument of unilateral control. A June study by ANKASAM described the U.S.-Iran talks as a mechanism not for normalization, but for the controlled limitation of Iranian power—a kind of geopolitical engineering. The current dispute over Hormuz reinforces this interpretation: Turkish commentators see the United States as demanding freedom of navigation while retaining the right to determine which sanctions, routes and political concessions are acceptable.
The Turkish debate, however, is not reducible to anti-Americanism. A column on the Trump-Xi summit in Yeni Birlik emphasizes that even the absence of major agreements can be politically significant: the ceremony, personal contact and preservation of a détente atmosphere can themselves reduce the risk of uncontrolled escalation. This is a characteristically pragmatic Turkish tone. Ankara does not expect America to offer a consistent system of rules, but believes that in a world of personalized diplomacy, its own role as a mediator and regional player may grow. For Turkey, the United States is simultaneously a source of pressure, a necessary security partner and a party with which it must know how to bargain without illusions.
In South Korea, the American rejection of Iran’s proposal is viewed far less ideologically and much more materially. The Korean newspaper Hankyung assesses Trump’s decision through the prism of oil, maritime transport and the risk of another surge in energy prices. For an export economy deeply embedded in global production chains, Hormuz is not only a distant war but also a question of industrial costs, inflation and supply stability. South Korea’s reaction reveals an important feature: Seoul cannot afford the luxury of choosing between the “American camp” and neutrality. It depends on the American military umbrella, but it is equally dependent on stable access to Middle Eastern energy and the Chinese market.
That is why the meeting between Trump and Xi Jinping in Washington became a second shared point of tension for all three countries. Israeli analysts saw it as an attempt to manage the rivalry rather than eliminate it. Reserve Brigadier General Assaf Orion, who heads the INSS program on Israel’s China policy, told Globes that the summit should stabilize relations between the two powers and help them manage their competition, but not resolve it. This is an important distinction for Israel: a détente between Washington and Beijing does not mean that the United States will stop demanding that its partners exercise caution in their technological ties with China.
Turkish observers likewise saw the summit not as a resolution, but as a pause. In their assessment, Trump and Xi gained politically from demonstrating contact, extending the trade truce and keeping channels open on artificial intelligence, rare-earth metals and investment. But the sides did not remove the fundamental conflict over control of technology, supply chains and the rules governing market access. (setadc.org)
For South Korea, the most troubling aspect was not the list of agreements, but the absence of one issue. Korean commentators noted that North Korea was mentioned in the current American readout of the meeting, but the formula referring to the joint goal of denuclearizing North Korea—which had appeared after the May contacts—had disappeared. This is highlighted in an analysis by Stockhub: Pyongyang turned out to be not the center, but the periphery of the U.S.-China dialogue. For Seoul, this is a dangerous signal. When Washington and Beijing focus on trade, rare-earth metals and AI, Korean security risks becoming a secondary issue. (stockhub.kr)
Against this backdrop, the South Korean story about Lee Jae-myung’s meeting with Trump in New York is particularly revealing. The Korean press describes the talks as a package in which strategic investment, American shipbuilding, increased defense spending, the transfer of operational control and the prospect of nuclear-powered submarines are all linked. According to a JoongAng Ilbo report, Lee proposed accelerating the issue of nuclear-powered submarines in exchange for strengthening South Korea’s defense contribution, while Trump showed particular interest in cooperation to revive American shipbuilding. This is not simply a bilateral deal: it shows how an alliance with America is increasingly acquiring a commercial and industrial price tag. (joongang.co.kr)
This is where the Israeli, Turkish and Korean reactions converge. Israel fears that America will trade long-term deterrence against Iran for short-term diplomatic success. Turkey is trying to use American inconsistency to expand the space for an independent regional policy. South Korea is seeking to pay for guarantees in a way that will simultaneously provide greater autonomy in defense and industry. All three countries see the same America, but read it differently: Israel sees an increasingly uncontrollable patron, Turkey sees a power that must be balanced, and South Korea sees an ally whose protection is increasingly presented as a bill to be paid.
