In the first days of September 2026, the image of the United States in Saudi Arabia, Ukraine and Brazil is taking shape not around a single news story but around a shared perception: Washington still has the power to change the rules of the game, but is increasingly doing so through the language of urgent deals, tariffs and personal arrangements rather than durable commitments. In Kyiv, this is discussed through the lens of future negotiations with Russia, security guarantees and access to American weapons. In Riyadh, it is viewed through the consequences of the US–Iran war for the security of the Persian Gulf and shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. In Brasília, the focus is tariff pressure, the dispute over the national payment system Pix, and suspicions that Washington’s trade arguments are intertwined with domestic Brazilian politics.
The most prominent common theme is the transformation of American foreign policy into an exchange of specific assets and concessions. Ukrainian analyst Oleksandr Kraiev, head of the North American program at the Ukrainian Prism, describes this new logic in especially stark terms in a column for Ukrainska Pravda: Moscow can offer Washington energy resources and geopolitical benefits, while Kyiv can offer war-tested technologies and production expertise in the drone sector. In his assessment, this creates practical interdependence but does not signify strategic closeness: Ukraine is becoming more useful to the Trump administration, but that does not automatically make it more secure. (pravda.com.ua)
This point is particularly important against the backdrop of reports on September 3 about planned visits by Donald Trump’s representatives Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner to Moscow and Kyiv. Volodymyr Zelensky emphasized that US involvement in the negotiating process is “very important” and that Kyiv expects a substantive meeting in the coming days. Ukrainska Pravda’s report reflects Ukraine’s ambivalent mood: America remains an indispensable participant in the process, but the very form of its mediation is causing concern, as Ukraine fears that Washington may value the speed of reaching a deal more than its durability. (pravda.com.ua)
In Brazil, the same transactional style is perceived not as diplomatic uncertainty but as direct pressure on sovereignty. US tariffs on Brazilian goods reach 37.5% in some cases; Washington links the measures to complaints regarding Pix, ethanol and efforts to combat imports of products made using forced labor. During a phone call on August 21, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva called the grounds for the tariffs “unfounded,” although the two sides formally agreed to continue negotiations. Folha de S.Paulo reports on this in detail. (www1.folha.uol.com.br)
But Brazil’s reaction goes far beyond a dispute over tariff rates. For the country, Pix is not merely an instant-transfer service but a symbol of the state’s ability to create mass digital infrastructure independent of American card networks. As a result, the USTR investigation is viewed in the local debate as an attempt to portray a successful public technology as a trade violation. Brazilians see here the same formula that Ukrainians observe in discussions of drones, minerals and air defense: the United States wants the value offered by a partner country to be incorporated into American interests on American terms. At the same time, Lula is not choosing a path of rupture: on August 25, the countries scheduled a new meeting on tariffs, while Brazilian officials and industrialists considered even the resumption of dialogue useful, albeit without high expectations of immediate results. (www1.folha.uol.com.br)
The Saudi perspective adds the question of physical security to this economic and military-technical bargaining. In the local Arabic-language press, the United States is discussed primarily through the war with Iran, attacks on regional infrastructure and the fate of the Strait of Hormuz. In a commentary by the Saudi newspaper Okaz, published on August 26, the main focus is not on who will gain a diplomatic advantage but on the inadmissibility of turning an international strait into an instrument of blackmail. The author insists that Iran cannot claim exclusive control over Hormuz, since freedom of passage there is guaranteed by international law and is critical to the global economy. (okaz.com.sa)
For Riyadh, this is not an abstract legal dispute. Saudi Arabia’s official response to the June US–Iran agreement welcomed the cessation of hostilities but simultaneously called for the restoration of maritime security and for the security interests of the region’s states to be taken into account. In an Okaz publication, this position is framed as a desire for lasting peace rather than a short pause between escalations. (okaz.com.sa) The Saudi view is notable because it amounts neither to support for nor condemnation of the United States: Washington is needed as a military power and negotiator, but an American operation could itself make the kingdom a target for retaliatory strikes. Hence Riyadh’s desire to be not a staging ground for someone else’s war but an independent mediator and guarantor of regional de-escalation.
This brings Saudi Arabia closer to Ukraine than might initially appear. Kyiv fears a peace imposed for the sake of a political result in Washington; Riyadh fears a military campaign whose consequences will remain on its territory, even if the decision to launch it was made overseas. The difference lies only in the scale of the threat: for Ukraine, the price of a mistake is territorial integrity and the survival of the state; for Saudi Arabia, it is the security of its oil infrastructure, maritime trade and entire economic transformation model. In both cases, local commentators are demanding not a dramatic gesture from the United States but predictability.
In Brazil, distrust of Washington’s predictability is further colored by historical memories of US interference in Latin American affairs. Researcher Lucas de Souza Martins says in an interview with Folha that the Trump administration views Brazil through an “ideological, partisan-political lens” rather than through the prism of the long-term national interest of the United States. He warns that such a policy creates the impression that America is an unreliable partner, and that the natural response will be to seek support in Europe and Asia. (www1.folha.uol.com.br)
The most unexpected common feature of these three reactions is that none of the countries is building its strategy around the simple formula of being “for America” or “against America.” Ukraine is trying to turn its own technologies and military experience into an argument that Washington cannot ignore. Saudi Arabia seeks to keep the United States within the regional security architecture while preventing the American confrontation with Iran from dictating its own choices. Brazil is resisting tariffs and the politicization of trade but continues negotiations because the American market remains too important. In all three capitals, the United States is seen not as a departing superpower but as a power with which it is becoming increasingly difficult to deal according to the old rules: it remains necessary, but requires ever more careful safeguards against its own unpredictability.
