In Russian, Japanese, and Israeli discussions about the United States during the first days of October 2026, one common mood stands out: America is no longer viewed as a power whose actions are determined solely by alliance commitments or immutable principles. The focus is on the Donald Trump administration’s ability to negotiate with China, pressure Iran, promise talks with Moscow, and reconcile all of this with its own domestic political calendar ahead of the November 3 congressional elections. Yet the conclusions drawn in the three countries are almost diametrically opposed. Russia sees this volatility as an opening for a pragmatic deal; Japan sees the risk of being sacrificed in a major U.S.-China détente; and Israel fears that Washington will settle for a compromise before the threat from Iran has been eliminated.
The most widely discussed topic in Japan was Xi Jinping’s September visit to Washington and his meeting with Trump on September 24. For Japanese commentators, the concern is not so much the fact of contact between the two superpowers as its symbolism and lack of clarity. An analysis by the Itochu Research Institute emphasizes that the Chinese leader received a state reception, while no breakthrough was achieved on key issues ranging from Taiwan and artificial intelligence to trade. Tokyo reads this in two ways: the absence of an agreement does not mean that Japan’s interests are securely protected by the United States; rather, it may mean that they can be included in the next deal.
Japan is particularly troubled by the fact that the final language of the meeting left Taiwan on the periphery, while the historical formula describing the United States and China as allies during World War II was used without regard to its political effect in Japan. The Japanese Strategic and Defense Research Center drew attention specifically to this asymmetry: Taiwan was not mentioned in the document, while a reference to the U.S.-China wartime alliance was included. For Tokyo, this is not a matter of philological nitpicking. In Japanese strategic thinking, Taiwan is not an abstract issue but a potential flashpoint through which a U.S.-China conflict could directly affect the Japanese islands, maritime communications, and American bases in the country.
This gives rise to a characteristic Japanese anxiety: the strength of the American alliance is no longer considered a sufficient guarantee against decisions being made “over an ally’s head.” JB Press puts it bluntly: military strength alone is not enough to prevent Japan from being left on the sidelines when artificial intelligence, semiconductors, critical minerals, and trade concessions become bargaining chips. This is an important local argument that is rarely heard in American debates. Japanese authors are not calling for a break with Washington; on the contrary, they are effectively demanding that the military alliance be supplemented by technological, industrial, and diplomatic autonomy. In their view, American unpredictability is not a reason for anti-Americanism but an argument for ceasing to be merely a “reliable ally” and becoming an indispensable participant in negotiations.
In Russia, the same American transactionalism is viewed with less anxiety and more expectation. The main issue there is linking possible economic recovery to a settlement of the war in Ukraine. On October 1, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said that the United States was ready to discuss joint projects only after a political settlement; Moscow, he said, was proposing to work “in its own interest right now.” This is how his words were conveyed by Kommersant. This is not simply a diplomatic disagreement over the sequence of steps. The Russian interpretation is based on the idea that business and economic interests should become instruments for reducing confrontation, whereas Washington continues to use them as a reward for political concessions.
However, Russia’s reaction is far from being limited to optimism about a possible “grand bargain” with Trump. In an RBC report, Peskov describes bilateral relations as “not in the best shape,” while Russian official assessments increasingly combine hopes for working-level contacts with distrust of American inconsistency. Moscow’s discussion is based on the assumption that the United States can send signals favoring negotiations while continuing to support Kyiv, speak about the economy while intensifying pressure, and promise political contact while postponing it because of the Ukraine issue.
In this sense, Russian commentators see American domestic politics not as a secondary backdrop but as an independent source of instability. In a Vedomosti analysis, Vladimir Vasiliev, chief research fellow at the Institute for the U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, links the administration’s actions concerning the security of the November elections to the risk of a severe domestic political crisis. His formulation—“the American political system is on the threshold of its most serious test”—reflects a widespread Russian view: Trump’s foreign policy will increasingly be subordinated not to a stable strategy but to his personal struggle for control over Congress and the Republican coalition. For Moscow, this means that dialogue is useful, but any promises from Washington should be considered reversible.
The Israeli view of American policy is the sharpest because here the cost of American inconsistency is measured not in trade terms or diplomatic status but in the threat of a new war with Iran. In Israeli analysis, the main issue remains Washington’s shift from extensive military pressure to a long-term strategy of economically isolating Tehran. In a September analysis by the Institute for National Security Studies, INSS authors Yoel Guzansky, Eldad Shavit, and Ari Heistein describe the new American phase as an attempt to shift the center of gravity “from military force to economic isolation.” In their assessment, the problem is that six months into the confrontation, shipping through the Strait of Hormuz has not returned to normal, and the nuclear issue remains unresolved.
For Jerusalem, this does not look like an unequivocal success. Israeli experts fear that Trump wants to turn a limited military result into a politically convenient image of victory without taking on the costs of a prolonged campaign. An INSS assessment dated September 10 highlights the American dilemma: the closer the elections approach and the higher the energy and domestic political costs become, the harder it is for Washington to impose terms for ending the crisis on Iran. It also warns that a new surge in Iranian nuclear activity or an escalation in the Strait of Hormuz could not bring a deal closer but instead derail Trump’s effort to achieve a controlled de-escalation.
This produces a rare combination of dependence and distrust in Israel. The Israeli public still views the United States as an indispensable ally, but is increasingly uncertain that the American president is prepared to place Israeli interests above his own desire to bring the conflict to a swift close. According to an INSS poll conducted in June, 66% of respondents considered U.S.-Iranian agreements bad for Israel, while only 12% believed that Trump was “very committed” to protecting Israeli interests. At the same time, 58% of those surveyed acknowledged that, in the event of disagreement with Washington, Israel could act independently only to a limited extent or not at all. This is perhaps the most important Israeli conclusion: distrust of the American approach does not translate into confidence in Israel’s own freedom of action.
The Russian, Japanese, and Israeli reactions converge in viewing the United States as a country that prefers to negotiate from a position of strength but increasingly uses force to secure a better deal rather than to resolve a problem once and for all. The difference is that Moscow hopes to use this logic to thaw relations, Tokyo is trying not to become a bargaining chip in a U.S.-China trade-off, and Jerusalem fears that a deal with Iran could come too early and be too lenient.
The most unexpected common feature of these three debates is that they are not about whether America is powerful. No one seriously doubts its military, financial, or technological strength. The dispute concerns something else: whether the U.S. administration can turn that power into a predictable order. In Moscow, the answer is: there is no predictability, but one can patiently wait for an opportunity. In Tokyo: there is no predictability, so Japan must urgently increase its own weight. In Jerusalem: there is no predictability, and therefore even the closest alliance does not eliminate the need to prepare for the moment when Washington decides that the war has already become too costly.
