World about US

In recent days, discussions about America in South Korea, Germany and Russia have focused less on any single White House initiative than on a new style of American power: Washington is simultaneously demanding solidarity, changing the terms of cooperation and using military guarantees as a bargaining tool. The immediate triggers were Donald Trump’s “unprecedented economic” pressure on Iran, announced on August 20, and the scaling back of U.S.–South Korean exercises that began on August 17. In local debates, these developments are linked by a single idea: the United States is increasingly transferring the logic of the deal—“you are either with us or against us”—from trade into the sphere of security. (amp.rbc.ru)

The sharpest common issue is the American campaign against Iran. In Germany, it is seen primarily as a symptom of Washington’s strategic confusion rather than as a carefully conceived path toward an agreement. In an article for Tagesschau, political scientist Sascha Loman describes Trump’s approach as lacking a strategy: threats, the withdrawal of threats and statements about diplomatic progress follow one another, while no military or negotiating breakthrough is in sight. German commentators are particularly sensitive to this not because of abstract pacifism: Europe has already felt how the conflict around Iran turns the security of shipping routes and energy prices into an immediate domestic problem. (tagesschau.de)

South Korea’s reaction to the same campaign is considerably more pragmatic and anxious. Seoul views the Iranian crisis through two vulnerabilities: dependence on maritime trade and the risk that alliance commitments will be expanded without clear limits. The newspaper Kyunghyang Shinmun notes that the 60-day negotiating period between the United States and Iran expired without results, while experts doubt that sanctions pressure will change Tehran’s position. For Korean readers, this is not simply a Middle Eastern story: economic warfare around the Strait of Hormuz threatens energy supplies, while the American demand that partners support the campaign raises the question of what price Seoul should pay to preserve its special relationship with the United States. (khan.co.kr)

Russia’s discussion of Iran approaches the issue differently—not as an ally’s dilemma, but as evidence of the limits of American coercion. RBC reported in detail on Trump’s formula concerning the consequences for any country that helps Iran. But Russian analysis places greater emphasis on the way secondary sanctions turn America’s conflict with Tehran into a problem for third countries. In an earlier column in Kommersant that remains influential in this discourse, Elena Chernenko argued that the United States had failed to achieve its declared military objectives in Iran. Russia therefore reads today’s threat of an “economic D-Day” as an attempt to replace failure on the battlefield with global economic intimidation. (amp.rbc.ru)

The clearest illustration of this new logic is Trump’s decision to significantly scale back joint exercises with South Korea. Formally, he explained the move by citing his good relationship with Kim Jong Un, the high cost of the maneuvers and his displeasure that Seoul had refused to join the American line on Iran. For South Korea, this was a painful reminder: deterrence against North Korea, regarded for decades as a stable foundation of the alliance, can be altered by a decision of the U.S. president literally on the eve of the exercises. (apnews.com)

Two interpretations are therefore competing in Seoul. The first sees the reduction in exercises as an invitation to Pyongyang to pursue new diplomacy. A Seoul Shinmun article called the move a signal almost on the level of a personal message to Kim Jong Un; Victor Cha of CSIS considers it a demonstration of Trump’s seriousness about resuming contact. The second, more cautious interpretation holds that North Korea is merely a convenient pretext: the White House is simultaneously punishing Seoul for refusing to support U.S. policy on Iran and pushing it toward larger investment and military concessions. This duality is captured by Money Today, citing an assessment by Adam Farrar, a former U.S. National Security Council official. (seoul.co.kr)

The distinctive feature of the Korean perspective is that no one there can simply choose between “dialogue” and “deterrence.” North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, as well as Pyongyang’s growing military ties with Moscow, make the reduction of exercises not a symbolic gesture but a question of military readiness. The South Korean Parliament Library’s National Strategic Portal explicitly notes that American experts both allow for a diplomatic rationale behind the decision and warn of possible damage to joint defense readiness. Seoul’s government is trying to speak with extreme caution: preserving the possibility of dialogue while emphasizing coordination with the United States to maintain common defense. (nsp.nanet.go.kr)

In Germany, the Korean episode was perceived as a distant but highly understandable warning to Europe. In a Die Zeit podcast, the question is posed directly: are the United States turning away from their allies? A recent essay, “Should Germany Still Rely on the United States?”, reaches an even harsher conclusion: Germany depends on America not only militarily, but also for technology, cloud infrastructure, payment systems and strategic capabilities ranging from missile defense to satellite intelligence. German anxiety, therefore, is not reducible to an aversion to Trump. It is fear that Europe still lacks a full substitute for American guarantees even as those guarantees become increasingly conditional. (zeit.de)

Russia’s interpretation of the reduction in exercises is almost a mirror image of South Korea’s. In an RBC analysis, the decision is presented as Trump’s return to personal diplomacy with Kim Jong Un and to his long-standing view of military exercises as costly and provocative rituals. But the more important point is this: Russian observers see it as confirmation that American alliances increasingly resemble flexible deals rather than automatic commitments. For Moscow, this is a useful argument in the debate over the United States’ “unreliability”; for Seoul, a reason to demand predictability from Washington; and for Berlin, another argument in favor of European strategic autonomy. (amp.rbc.ru)

The third common thread is fatigue with American sanctions diplomacy. In Russia, discussion of new restrictions against Moscow centers on how real they are and who their true targets will be. Kommersant notes that the new American package could give the president the authority to impose tariffs on major buyers of Russian energy, including China, India and certain European countries. From the Russian perspective, this is not only pressure on the Kremlin but also an expansion of America’s power to punish external economic partners. This is why Russia’s reactions to sanctions against Iran and to possible new measures against Russia converge: according to this interpretation, Washington is trying to address several conflicts at once through extraterritorial levers. (kommersant.ru)

The most unexpected conclusion from these three national debates is that the United States today inspires not merely the familiar responses of approval or anti-Americanism. In South Korea, America remains an indispensable protector, but its decisions are increasingly perceived as a source of uncertainty. In Germany, it remains the foundation of security, but at the same time the reason for an accelerated search for European autonomy. In Russia, America appears as a power whose capabilities are considerable, but whose reliance on pressure and personal deals reveals strategic overextension. Iran, Korea and sanctions may seem like separate stories, yet local reactions are united by one troubling thought: the international system is increasingly dependent not on stable rules and institutions, but on what deal the White House wants to make today.

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