In India, Japan and Brazil, discussion of America in mid-August 2026 revolves around two interconnected issues: the US war with Iran and a new wave of trade pressure from Washington. But local commentary no longer sees these as a collection of separate foreign-policy episodes. A broader conclusion is taking shape: the United States remains an indispensable power—military, financial and technological—yet its decisions increasingly appear to partners not as a guarantee of order, but as an independent source of strategic, economic and political risk.
The sharpest common concern is the impact of the US-Iranian confrontation on the Strait of Hormuz. For Indian commentators, this is above all not a story about a distant Middle East, but about the vulnerability of their own economy. An Indian Express analysis emphasizes that Washington’s attempt to undermine Tehran’s ability to control the strait produced the opposite result: Iran turned the very threat to shipping into its main bargaining tool. For New Delhi, this means threats to energy supplies, rising insurance and freight costs, inflation and pressure on the rupee. The Indian government publicly expressed “deep concern” over the attack on commercial shipping and the new escalation, calling on the parties to exercise restraint. The wording is telling: India is not severing its strategic ties with the US, but it refuses to be politically bound to the American military logic. (indianexpress.com)
Indian criticism is considerably more substantive than simple anti-Americanism. Shashi Tharoor, a member of Parliament and former UN under-secretary-general, called the outcome of the American campaign a deal worse than the previous one in a column for Indian Express: Washington used force but achieved neither the destruction of Iran’s missile capabilities nor a lasting political settlement. In this interpretation, the main problem with the US is not a lack of power, but the mismatch between maximalist goals, changing negotiating conditions and the actual result. Indian expert Sanjay Kumar Verma makes a similar point in an ORF study in Hindi: the war demonstrated the limits of American power and showed that alliances are sustained not by weapons, but by trust, dialogue and clarity of purpose. In the view of many Indian observers, trust is precisely what is now lacking.
In Japan, the same war is viewed far less ideologically and far more anxiously—through the price of oil, the yen’s exchange rate and household sentiment. Nobuhide Kiuchi, executive economist at the Nomura Research Institute, warns in his analysis that a new blockade of the Strait of Hormuz threatens Japan with shortages of crude oil and naphtha, accelerating price growth and worsening expectations among businesses and consumers. His important observation is that the danger to Japan lies not only in an actual interruption of supplies. Even the expectation of another round of strikes between the US and Iran sets off a chain reaction: oil prices rise, the yen weakens, and imported inflation hits real incomes.
This explains the distinctive Japanese perspective. Tokyo does not dispute that the security of shipping is a legitimate international concern. But it is increasingly asking whether American policy is capable of providing that security. After a temporary US-Iranian agreement was signed in June, only for hostilities and blockade threats to return in July, the very meaning of “guarantees” was called into question. Japanese analysts see a paradox: the US is far less dependent on Middle Eastern oil than Japan, yet American decisions determine whether the Japanese economy will pay for a new wave of instability. (nri.com)
Brazil’s reaction is more politicized. In an editorial by Folha de S.Paulo, Donald Trump’s actions in Iran are described as a return to “endless war”—that is, precisely the type of foreign intervention he once promised to abandon. For the Brazilian press, what matters is not only the humanitarian or military aspect, but also the fact that Iran managed to turn attacks on tankers and the risk to the Strait of Hormuz into a tool for influencing the global energy market. This is seen as further proof that coercive force without a durable diplomatic framework does not restore control; instead, it raises the cost of chaos for the entire Global South.
US trade policy causes no less irritation, although the nature of the complaints differs in the three countries. In Brazil, it has effectively become part of domestic electoral politics and the debate over sovereignty. New American tariffs have compounded earlier accusations of “unfair” practices, in which Washington has mixed trade issues with Brazil’s regulation of digital platforms, its Pix instant-payment system, environmental matters and forced-labor issues. Analyst Lourival Sant’Anna stated directly in a CNN Brasil article that the justifications for the American tariffs had changed in search of a legally acceptable framework, not because the substance of the complaints had changed. He called Brazil’s position the “worst case” because of the cumulative application of tariffs and the lack of transparency surrounding the criteria. (cnnbrasil.com.br)
What is particularly painful in Brazil’s perception is the selective nature of American pressure. The issue is not simply the access of goods to the US market: many commentators see an attempt to punish Brazil for pursuing an independent digital and industrial policy, as well as for refusing to shape its domestic democratic agenda according to American political templates. Brasília’s response therefore combines caution with demonstrative firmness: the government does not want a trade war, but neither does it want to create the impression that pressure from Washington can determine the rules governing Pix, digital platforms or Brazilian institutions.
In Japan, the tone is more restrained, but the concern is no less serious. Here, American tariffs are interpreted as a systemic problem of predictability. The Japanese government and businesses are trying to operate within the framework of agreements and exemptions, but the US approach—first issuing a threat, then negotiating individual concessions, and subsequently introducing new sector-specific measures—undermines the familiar logic of long-term planning. In July, Washington introduced a new country-based tariff regime affecting Japanese exports, while in recent days measures concerning drones and components have also come to the fore. For Tokyo, this is an unpleasant signal: even an allied status and investment in the American economy do not protect Japan from trade policy being used as an instrument of immediate political bargaining. (pwc.com)
India draws perhaps the most strategic conclusion on this issue. In an ORF commentary in Hindi, American policy is described as reflecting an inability to fully accept India as an equal partner rather than a junior ally. Following tariff threats, restrictions surrounding H-1B visas, American contacts with Pakistan and attempts to pressure India through its ties with Russia, Indian debate is increasingly less focused on the question of “how to return to the former closeness with the US.” Instead, it is discussing balance: expanding ties with America where it is advantageous—in technology, defense and the Indo-Pacific—but simultaneously strengthening relations with Europe, the Gulf states and Russia, and even stabilizing relations with China.
This is the shared, though differently expressed, conclusion reached by India, Japan and Brazil. None of the three countries is currently seeking a break with the US. Japan objectively cannot replace the American security umbrella; India values access to technology and cooperation against Chinese pressure; and Brazil remains interested in the world’s largest consumer market. However, each is learning to reduce its dependence on American will. For India, this means strategic autonomy; for Japan, economic insurance against shocks; and for Brazil, protection of its political and technological sovereignty.
The most unexpected common feature of these reactions is not fear of American weakness, but anxiety about American impulsiveness. Washington remains capable of launching strikes, imposing tariffs and changing global markets with a single decision. But this very capability, when exercised without a consistent diplomatic strategy, is forcing partners to prepare not for peace under American leadership, but for a world in which they need their own insurance against American leadership.
