In mid-November 2026, the United States is being discussed in India, Saudi Arabia and South Africa less as the familiar center of power and more as a country whose domestic political swings immediately create risks abroad. The main topics in local debate are the US war with Iran and the threat of a new escalation in the Persian Gulf, the consequences of the Democrats’ victory in the November 3 midterm elections, and the use of trade, sanctions and tariffs by the United States as instruments of pressure. The overall conclusion varies in tone but is essentially the same: Congress’s limits on Donald Trump’s power may make Washington less impulsive, but they do not automatically make it predictable or more respectful of its partners’ interests.
The sharpest reaction in Saudi Arabia concerns Iran. In Riyadh, the war is not seen as a distant American campaign against Iran’s nuclear program, but as a conflict in which Gulf countries bear all the risks — attacks on infrastructure, threats to shipping and spikes in energy prices — without having a decisive say. Saudi researcher Hassan al-Mustafa writes in a column for Arab News that the military confrontation produced no decisive result for either side, and that the current state of “neither war nor peace” will inevitably lead either to an interim agreement or to an even more destructive clash. One phrase is particularly telling: in his view, Washington “does not see an urgent need to make concessions,” while Tehran does not believe that US promises will survive the next turn in American politics. (arabnews.com)
This anxiety gives rise to an idea that is unusual for the old architecture of the US-Saudi alliance: Gulf security can no longer be delegated entirely to America. Dr. Abdel Aziz Aluwaisheg, former assistant secretary-general of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, urges Gulf states to take a more active role in shaping a diplomatic way out of the crisis in his analysis. His argument is pragmatic: the protection of sea lanes, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the Red Sea and energy supplies cannot depend solely on whether the US president is currently inclined toward strikes or negotiations. Saudi media therefore view mediation by Riyadh, Doha, Ankara and Islamabad not as a gesture of goodwill, but as an attempt to restore the region’s agency. (arabnews.com)
India’s response to the war with Iran is more geographically removed, but no less economically wary. New Delhi sees that the US decision to go to war could drive up energy prices, disrupt maritime trade and, at the same time, intensify pressure on India over its purchases of Russian oil. In a column for The Indian Express, Ram Madhav, national vice president of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party, calls the US approach a double standard: the United States demands that India restrict Russian supplies and threatens punitive tariffs, yet allows energy exemptions itself when needed to bring down domestic prices. His broader conclusion is that India must resist “the weaponization of trade, technology and sea lanes.” This reflects an important Indian perspective: the problem is not just the Trump administration, but Washington’s willingness to use interdependence as a means of coercion. (indianexpress.com)
The US midterm elections have prompted cautious hope, but not euphoria, in all three countries. For Riyadh, the Democrats’ victory in Congress means a new major war with Iran will carry a higher political cost for the White House; however, it does not remove US aircraft carriers from the region or guarantee a compromise. Saudi commentators point to precisely this contradiction: Trump has publicly said that further strikes are less likely if negotiations make progress, but he continues to use military pressure as leverage. (arabnews.com) In India, Koan Advisory director Dip Pal warns in an analysis for The Indian Express that a Democratic Congress could step up scrutiny of tariffs, sanctions and immigration restrictions, but cannot automatically overturn presidential decisions. Indians, then, view US domestic politics not as a battle between good and evil, but as a question of which institutions can curb another surge of unilateralism.
In South Africa, this distrust is expressed primarily through trade. Washington’s decision to end South Africa’s benefits under the African Growth and Opportunity Act — AGOA — as of January 1, 2027, was seen there as proof that the United States ties access to its market not only to economic rules, but also to demands for political loyalty. A Mail & Guardian report quotes Trade Minister Parks Tau as saying that the decision does not define the entire bilateral relationship, but that a way forward is possible only if both sides are willing to seek common ground. Behind this diplomatic phrasing lies a very material concern: citrus growers are particularly vulnerable, having planted orchards specifically for the US market and unable to redirect their produce to other countries overnight. (mg.co.za)
South Africa’s debate is also notably more clear-eyed about what to expect from US elections. Economist Dawie Roodt put it bluntly in Business Day: Trump’s power will be constrained, but not neutralized. For Pretoria, this means a Democratic Congress may obstruct parts of the president’s agenda, but is not obliged to change a hostile course toward South Africa, tariffs or AGOA. Here lies the difference from India: New Delhi seeks to negotiate more stable rules within its strategic partnership, while Pretoria is increasingly discussing how to reduce its dependence on a market where trade preferences can become hostage to ideological and geopolitical disagreements. (businessday.co.za)
Thus, what unites local reactions is not anti-Americanism as such. India remains interested in technology, defense cooperation and access to the US market for its professionals; Saudi Arabia is not abandoning its strategic ties with the United States; and South Africa does not see the loss of AGOA as a reason to sever relations. But a different conviction is gaining ground in all three countries: American power has become less reliable precisely because its use is so closely tied to domestic electoral calculations, the president’s personal style and a willingness to use economic ties as leverage. The most unexpected shared view is that Congress’s restraint of Trump is seen not as a restoration of American leadership, but merely as a minimal safeguard against Washington’s decisions once again forcing other countries to pay for American policies.
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