The main American story being discussed in Germany, Ukraine and South Korea in recent days has not been so much the midterm elections on November 3, in which Democrats won back control of both chambers of Congress, as the practical limits of Donald Trump’s power. The response has been mixed almost everywhere: the Republican defeat is seen as a constraint, but not as an automatic reversal of US policy. Berlin, Kyiv and Seoul have reached a similar conclusion: the United States is becoming a less predictable ally because the president retains broad powers to act through the executive branch—in diplomacy, tariffs and security policy. (tagesschau.de)
Germany greeted the election results with cautious relief. Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul spoke of a possible “change,” but stressed that Berlin intended to work not only with the administration, but with Congress as well. That formulation matters: Germany’s response is not simply an expression of sympathy for the Democrats; it reflects an effort to establish more points of support in Washington than just the White House. In a taz commentary, the Democrats’ victory is explicitly described as no reason to relax: in the author’s view, Trumpism will live on in trade policy, and Germany and the EU must speed up their strategic emancipation from excessive dependence on both the United States and China. In Germany, the US election has thus become not a return to the old transatlantic norm, but another argument for European agency. A taz commentary puts it plainly: Europe should prepare for the possibility that even a weakened Trump can impose his trade policy on partners. (taz.de)
The same logic is evident in South Korea’s debate, but there it takes on a much more tangible character. Seoul views the US domestic political crisis through the cost of factories, investment commitments, export shipments and defense programs. South Korean analysts do not expect a Democratic Congress to quickly dismantle tariffs already in force: doing so would require overcoming a presidential veto, and many restrictions were introduced under existing executive powers. The Korea Customs and Trade Development Institute, summarizing KOTRA’s assessments, warns that Democrats may tighten oversight of tariff decisions, but duties under Sections 232 and 301 are likely to remain. Cho Seong-dae, head of the research department at the Korea International Trade Association, notes that trade policy itself “will not change substantially” in the association’s review. (kctdi.or.kr)
Hence the distinctive South Korean concern: US political polarization does not reduce uncertainty, but distributes it among different centers of power—the White House, Congress and state governments. Seoul Shinmun describes the situation facing Korean companies as a risk posed by “two men”: Trump, who remains inclined to use tariff pressure, and the new Congress, which could change tax, environmental and permitting conditions for investors. Shin Won-gyu, an expert at the Federation of Korean Industries, urges the government and businesses to pursue “multi-level” engagement not only with the administration, but with Congress and the states as well. This is markedly different from Germany’s call for autonomy: Seoul is not talking about distancing itself from the United States, but about finding ways to become more deeply embedded in the US political system so as not to depend on a single political cycle. The Seoul Shinmun article links this task to investments in Texas data centers, nuclear power and manufacturing projects. (m.seoul.co.kr)
US volatility is felt most acutely in Ukraine—above all against the backdrop of US, Russian and Ukrainian negotiations in Abu Dhabi. The focus of discussion there has been the idea of a “broader European security architecture” being advanced by US negotiators. Kyiv and its European allies are wary of it not because the need for a postwar security system is in doubt, but because the formula could bring Russia’s demand for recognition of its special “security interests” in Europe back to the center of negotiations. Ukraine is especially concerned that discussions of a security architecture could begin before the war ends and without a clear mechanism to compel Russia to honor its commitments.
This position is well captured by EU Commissioner for Defence Andrius Kubilius: Europe, he says, should first strengthen its own defenses against an aggressive Russia, rather than negotiate a new security architecture with it. In an interview with Radio Liberty’s Ukrainian Service, he effectively expresses a view that resonates with Ukrainian public opinion: security cannot be built on the assumption that the Kremlin will once again become a reliable partner. (radiosvoboda.org)
On this issue, Germany and Ukraine are closer than they might appear. The German government has officially stated that the war must end first, after which it will be possible to discuss Europe’s security order; moreover, talks about peace and European security without Europe itself taking part will not be productive. At a government briefing on November 6, Berlin thus rejected the logic of a possible deal in which the United States and Russia set the rules for the continent while Ukraine and the Europeans are handed a fait accompli. (bundesregierung.de)
Ukrainian commentators, however, are even more distrustful than their German partners of Washington’s political guarantees themselves. The Democrats’ victory in Congress is seen as a chance to curb pressure from the White House on Kyiv, restore oversight of aid and make unilateral concessions to Moscow more difficult. But it is not seen as guaranteeing a change in policy. At an expert discussion hosted by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation, former Ukrainian ambassador Valeriy Chaly called the current elections historically significant precisely because of Trump; participants noted that Europe would have to adapt its strategy to a “new America,” where public opinion is increasingly pushing Europeans toward an independent role. The foundation’s report treats the US elections not as a rescue, but as an opening for a more difficult struggle over the terms of peace. (dif.org.ua)
This leads to a conclusion shared by all three countries. Germany sees the US election as a chance to strengthen Europe as an independent political center. Ukraine sees an opportunity to prevent peace from becoming a deal convenient above all to Moscow and the White House. South Korea sees a reason to diversify its political ties within the United States in order to protect exports, investment and the alliance from another policy reversal. In all three cases, America remains indispensable, but is no longer seen as a constant. This shift—from trust to continuous risk management—is now the main factor shaping the international response to Washington.
